INTRODUCTION

The past several decades have witnessed a major shift in terminology concerning the events of November 9 and 10, 1938 in Nazi Germany and Austria, namely from “Kristallnacht” to “Pogrom.” Given that the attacks against the Jewish population represented a major stepping stone from discrimination and exclusion of German and Austrian Jews to persecution and violence, it seems remarkable that this shift in terminology—its context and motivations—has not been investigated by historians more carefully. This chapter questions and challenges in particular the motives for the ubiquitous use of the term “pogrom,” both in academic and non-academic parlance, for this terror attack on the Jewish population under Nazi control in November 1938. “Pogrom” seems to reflect an urge for an expression commensurate to the horror with which we view such a case of organized violence upon a defenseless minority. It furthermore avoids the risk in using a euphemism, such as “Kristallnacht,” a term which was apparently coined shortly after the events. For these good reasons, the term “Kristallnacht” has somewhat faded to the background.

This chapter posits that the term “pogrom” is equally misleading, if only for a different set of reasons. As we will demonstrate, it refers in its original eastern European setting to interethnic violence in consequence of a breakdown
in the complex social and cultural interaction between majority and minority groups. The inaction or ambivalence in the attitude of state actors is of crucial relevance in these occurrences, very much in contrast to the events in 1938, when the Nazi regime unleashed its destructive potential on the already diminished Jewish community under its control. Not in the least because of the centrality of the events in November 1938, it is more than appropriate to use more adequate terminology, as will be suggested in the conclusion of this chapter.

In the immediate context of the events, a variety of terms were used. The perpetrators—various agencies of the Nazi regime—called the attack on German and Austrian Jewries an “Aktion,” the “Judenaktion,” “Vergeltungsaktion” (revenge action) or “Rath-Aktion,” after Ernst vom Rath, the murdered German diplomat. At that time, the oddly sarcastic and inappropriate term “Reichskristallnacht” emerged. It is first recorded in June 1939, in a speech by the NSDAP speaker Wilhelm Börger (1896–1962), at a party convention in Lüneburg about the policies of the regime towards the Jews. In it, he referred to the term “Reichskristallnacht” as having “elevated [the attack on the Jews] through humour”.:2

After the Reichskristallnacht last year, November 11, for instance—look, this matter enters history as Reichskristallnacht [applause, laughter]. You see, this has thus been elevated by humour, well. One might have asked, is this economically viable? One has to import the window panes from Belgium, for foreign currency. One can have different views on this. One thing however is for sure: they [the Jews] now know perfectly well: when one pushes the button, the bell rings, everywhere [laughter].

The most likely origin of the term “Reichskristallnacht” is Berlin popular parlance mocking the pomposity of Nazi vocabulary adding “Reich” to whichever project the regime undertook. Both the reaction of the audience—made up of Nazi functionaries—as well as the flattered appropriation by Börger illustrates the ambiguities of the term. The speech also reflects with great clarity the further reaching objectives in the Nazi hierarchy: “There has not been enough kicking [during Kristallnacht], they should have beaten the heads much more [laughter], and we would have been done by now [applause].” These quotes demonstrate that the term “Reichskristallnacht” resonated in ambiguous ways, on the one hand as expression of a distant attitude towards dictatorship (ironic enough not to be persecuted by the Gestapo), and on the other hand taken up and willingly misinterpreted, by a high-ranking Nazi.
This article first reflects on the term *pogrom* as it emerged in the eastern European context and how it has been discussed in recent scholarship. Additionally, we would like to shed light on the trajectory of the terminology used in the German and English languages. To that end, this article discusses how after the war, both Reichskristallnacht and Kristallnacht, the short version of the term, gained common currency in public as well as academic discourse, in both East and West Germany, Austria, and beyond German speaking countries. Over time, however, it has been supplanted by the term “pogrom,” which has become almost ubiquitous in a range of variations, both in common parlance as well as in academic language. The use of terms like *Pogromnacht* (pogrom night), *Reichspogromnacht*, *Novemberpogrom* or *Novemberpogrome*, was motivated by the hope, especially from the 1970s onwards, that such a terminology allowed one to avoid seemingly euphemistic terminology such as Kristallnacht, which was perceived as highly inadequate. The final part of the chapter will focus on the emphatic use of the term pogrom outside of Germany, and mostly by Jewish authors after 1938.

“WHAT IS A POGROM?” THE TERMINOLOGY ON ANTI-JEewish VIOLENCE IN EASTERN EUROPE

Over the past generation, historians have broadened our understanding of anti-Jewish violence in eastern Europe and the history of the term “pogrom.” The Russian term originally referred to widespread devastation, particularly in the context of wars. It was first used to identify anti-Jewish violence after the attack on the Jewish community in Odessa in 1871. The mass occurrence of anti-Jewish violence in 1881–82 led to a narrowing of its meaning in the Russian language to mark interethnic violence against Jews. In his recent analysis of the pogrom in Kishinev in 1903, Steven Zipperstein presents convincing evidence that the term pogrom did not gain common currency beyond Russia before the early years of the twentieth century.

Interethnic violence, including anti-Jewish violence, was a recurrent phenomenon across Europe since time immemorial. Both Jewish and non-Jewish contemporaries, however, considered the more than four hundred anti-Jewish riots in 1881–82 in Eastern Europe as a new phenomenon, for which the relatively recent term “pogrom” seemed appropriate. John D. Klier (1944–2007) argued that these incidents represented a major shift in anti-Jewish
violence. Their novel character resided in the fact that they would take place in urban settings and that they were triggered by more recent developments of infrastructure like railways and telegraphs, and the wider dissemination of the press, which established the idea of the anti-Jewish pogrom in the popular mind, as Klier wrote.

In their studies, Hans Rogger (1923–2002), I. Michael Aronson, and John D. Klier have rejected the hypothesis that the pogroms of 1881–82 had been ordered, inspired or triggered by the Tsar or higher echelons of the Russian imperial administration. They have emphasized the contrast between the very high number of incidents (four hundred between April 1881 and May 1882, in three major waves of violence) and the relatively low intensity of the violence itself: among the nearly forty fatalities, half were pogromists. Klier has also emphasized the virtual absence of religious framing in this instance, citing the example of Orekhov, Tauride province, where the synagogue was the only Jewish building that was not touched during the pogrom.

The violence occurred in the southern provinces, which did not have a long history of Jewish residence and experienced considerable in-migration occasioned by rapid economic change. It was also in these southern provinces of the Empire that in 1903 the pogrom of Kishinev would mark the transition to a much more lethal pattern of pogrom violence: with forty-five Jewish victims, twice as many people were murdered in the three-day Kishinev pogrom of 1903 than during the hundreds of incidents of 1881–82. The pogroms of 1898 in Galicia, recently analyzed in depth by Tim Buchen, featured patterns very similar to those in Russia 1881–82: local residents turning against their Jewish neighbors after a period of intense political mobilization and the targeted spreading of rumors. A similar picture emerges from Darius Staliunas’ investigation of the infrequent cases of anti-Jewish violence in Lithuanian provinces around the turn of the twentieth century. He follows the definition of pogrom violence of German sociologist Werner Bergmann, who describes a pogrom as “a one-sided, non-governmental form of social control.” Pogrom violence can be mobilized in situations when one group feels legitimated to get down to “self-help” against another group because it does not expect any support by the state. This definition reflects the significant impact of the competitive ethnicity model proposed by Roberta Senechal de la Roche. Among the ingredients for the triggering of interethic violence, Senechal de la Roche identified the perception among a majority or hegemonic community of a perceived upward shift in the position of a minority or marginal community, combined with a perception of state authorities to be weak and/or not taking action against this
upward shift. Prejudice and stereotypes about the minority or marginalized community are a further prerequisite in the transition to physical violence, as it contributes to polarization and thus lowers the threshold of using force against a group of people one has cohabited with for extended periods of time.

The relative deprivation theory at the basis of this model describes the violence as “culturally constructed, discursively mediated, symbolically saturated, and ritually regulated.” As Buchen and Staliunas emphasize, anti-Jewish violence in Eastern Europe of this period was considered to “redress” or “rectify” the injustice of Jews occupying space and status they did not, in the eyes of the pogromists, deserve. One key feature of this attitude was the expectation that Jews were “enemies for one day,” though part of the social fabric after being “put in their place” by the attacks.

A perspective which both the competitive ethnicity model as well as the analysis of the “deadly ethnic riot” by Donald Horowitz share is that each outbreak of violence lessens social constraints and taboos against this form of violence in the future. This undoubtedly applies to mass violence against the Jews in eastern Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with specific places and towns being again the site of such attacks in 1905.

While scholarship has by now established that the authorities did not order or authorize the anti-Jewish riots of this period, they were by no means neutral. The empathy expressed by officers, ministers, or monarchs after violence had occurred, encouraged a significant shift in perception of anti-Jewish violence around 1900. Initially, in 1881, pogroms were seen as misguided and undesirable, but nonetheless understandable acts directed against Jewish exploitation. In the early twentieth century, as Jews were collectively viewed as an unreliable political element, pogroms came to be viewed as action in support of the government. Thus, Nicholas II, in grateful disbelief, interpreted the pogroms embedded in the revolutionary disorders of 1905 as a form of political mobilization in support of the autocracy. The instances of eastern European anti-Jewish riots that gave a certain type of interethnic violence their name—pogrom—were neither ordered nor authorized by the government or the authorities. Leading officials, members of governments or heads of state would come to condone such riots, but their fear of loss of control would prevent them from making the incitement to mass violence, or its implementation, a tool of governance. Instead, these riots were the result of strong intercommunal tensions, anti-Jewish resentment, and targeted incitement by anti-Semitic authors, agitators, and movements. In his recent book on pogroms in the Russian Empire, Stefan Wiese has argued that to comprehend the violence we
need to study the opportunity structures of the riots (including even weather conditions) and the leeway for negotiations between potential victims and attackers.21

The difference between these pogroms and the Nazi terror on the Jews of Germany and Austria in November 1938 is that the former was locally instigated, often slowly developing, while the latter was orchestrated by the state and carried out area-wide within a few days. As historians have now documented, the attacks in November 1938 originated in an order by Hitler to Goebbels. Formulated in indirect terms by Hitler, the decision to embark on violence all over the country was conveyed by phone from the Old City Hall in Munich to the Nazi leadership on the level of the provinces (or Gaue) and further down the chain of command to district and local branches of the party. Uniformed members of the SA and SS, gathered for the celebrations commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the Hitlerputsch in 1923, started the attack while it was still night. In the course of a few hours, Jewish individuals, shops and dwellings, as well as places of worship, were attacked and often destroyed. The attacks encompassed the entirety of the Jewish communities in Nazi Germany and Austria, from Ostfriesland to the Burgenland, from Baden to Eastern Prussia, and mark a major transition from discrimination, expropriation, harassment

Hof (Saale), November 10, 1938, destruction of the synagogue by the I. Sturmbann of the 41st SS Brigade. The photos were taken by the firm Foto Eckart and were presumably placed in the town archive before 1945. The series is part of the exhibition “Kristallnacht”—Anti-Jewish Terror in 1938, History and Remembrance,” curated by Foundations Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe and Topography of Terror; Stadearchiv Hof.
and persecution to mass arrests and targeted violence against broad segments of the remaining Jewish leadership, and to the physical destruction of property and buildings. After this terror attack, Jews in the reach of the Nazi regime ceased to be (second class) citizens worthy of political or moral consideration, but had become mere objects of police and Gestapo measures.\textsuperscript{22}

**POSTWAR GERMANY, DEUTSCHER HERBST AND THE “POGROM TURN” IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY**

In the postwar period, commemorations of the November events were, it seems, limited to Germany, and revolved around the round or “half round” anniversaries.\textsuperscript{23} In 1948, commemorative events referred to the November 1938 attacks exclusively as “Kristallnacht.” They were organized by the VVN (Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes, an association of those persecuted by the Nazi regime), with the most prominent ceremony taking place in the Deutsches Theater in Soviet occupied zone of Berlin.\textsuperscript{24}

In hindsight, the 1953 commemorations on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the events seem a turning point leading to what Schmid identifies as a process of “pluralization” and “growing routine” (Habitualisierung) of historical memory at least in the Federal Republic of Germany. At this point in time, the German Democratic Republic followed the template of Stalin's Soviet Union and adopted anti-Semitic policies. The regime accused Jewish citizens of being “Zionists.” In consequence, one third of East Germany’s Jews fled to West Berlin in February 1953. Prominent displays commemorating Jewish victims of National Socialism were held in the GDR until 1963. They started again on a modest level, as a nervous, Cold War reaction of the East German leadership to the increasingly flourishing “culture of commemoration” in western Germany. Indeed, in the Federal Republic a broad range of institutions, parties, movements, and religious communities made the November events an often-marked reference for the memory of the Nazi terror.\textsuperscript{25} Commemoration ceremonies often took place at the sites of former synagogues, and commemorative plaques and monuments often framed the persecution in 1938 as an attack on German and Austrian Jews exclusively in religious terms. In this period (1950s to 1970s), these increased activities for commemoration in western Germany were accompanied only by limited public interest in getting to know details about how the crime took place locally.
This would change during the next decades. Early on, there had been a growing discomfort with the designation of the events. The late 1970s and 1980s saw a tendency in the Federal Republic of Germany to avoid the term of “(Reichs-) Kristallnacht” in public and academic discourse when speaking of the events of November 9–10, 1938. “Reichskristallnacht” became a synonym for a trivialization of the crimes in 1938. It euphemized smashed glass as “crystal” and it left aside any reference to the perpetrators—it neither spoke of the state’s or the Nazi party’s role, nor about local perpetrators. Hence using the term was seen as a cynical obfuscation of what happened. Over the years, this led to a complete avoidance of the word in public discourse.

We find a paradigmatic expression of the motives for this shift in an article by one of the pioneers of western German Holocaust research, Wolfgang Scheffler (1929–2008). It was published in 1978 in “aus politik und zeitgeschichte,” a high-impact supplement to the weekly Das Parlament with wide distribution to schools, the media, and the political world and worth quoting at length:

Pogrom—this Russian term means ‘annihilation, destruction, riot,’ and, as the Brockhaus explains, “a persecution specifically of the Jews, combined with plunder and violence.” History offers many examples of this. The events beginning in the night from 9–10 November, commonly known as “Reichskristallnacht,” was an exemplary case of a pogrom. One should therefore identify these events as such, and restrict the generally used “Kristallnacht,” which expresses only one aspect, namely the smashing of windows, only in passing/as a footnote.

This quote demonstrates the attempt to distance scholarship from the use of the term “Reichskristallnacht.” As historiography would turn to the question of how to define anti-Jewish violence in Russia and eastern Europe only in the following ten years, it is no surprise that Scheffler had to refer to a general encyclopedia in order to define a pogrom, and not expert scholarship.

Scheffler’s article was part of a massive expansion and broadening of commemoration referring to November 1938 in West Germany. “It is like the floodgates have opened,” wrote the New York magazine Aufbau in December 1978 in an article on the Federal Republic’s commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of the wave of terror in November 1938. There were at least 380 events, held in 101 towns. For the first time, a German Chancellor delivered a speech on this anniversary and it was the first time that the Federal President attended such an event. The ceremony in Cologne Roonstraße Synagogue was broadcast live on television.
The shift in terminology—from “Reichkristallnacht” to “Pogrom,” “Novemberpogrom” or “Reichspogromnacht”—was part of the increased interest in the events of 1938. It reflects both a renewed interest in history in general and more specifically, in the history of National Socialism. The reasons are manifold. Western German society experienced an increased interest in history, triggered in part by doubts about the sustainability of economic development and a growing general apprehension about future environmental issues. Consequently, history became more politicized, partially as a consequence of the youth and student movements of 1968 and the increased emphasis on understanding the history of everyday life and ordinary people.30 This new sense of urgency in engaging with local and regional history would lead to the founding of initiatives like the Geschichtswerkstätten (historical workshops), a development influenced not in the least by the turn to social history in English language historiography: “Grabe wo du stehst” (“Dig where you are”) became the leitmotiv of this new historical sensitivity.

Furthermore, the so-called Hitler craze (“Hitler-Welle”) after 1973, with glorifying references to National Socialism and attempts to commercialize this interest by marketing memoirs, illustrated volumes and records, demonstrated that Germany had not fully turned its back on the Nazi past.31 Jewish communities were alarmed. The Central Council of Jews in Germany hosted a “2nd Youth- and Culture Conference” in Dortmund on November 10, 1978, dedicated to investigate “Nationalsozialismus und die jüdische Gegenwart” (National Socialism and the Jewish Present). Among younger politicians in attendance was the head of the Jusos, the youth organisation of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the later chancellor Gerhard Schröder. They faced critical questions from young members of the Jewish community (including Micha Brumlik and Henryk M. Broder, who would later become well known public intellectuals) concerning impending time limitations for accusations for murder, including crimes committed during Nazi rule and World War Two. Such restrictions would have significantly curtailed any persecution of Nazi crimes.32 This statute of limitations was permanently lifted by the German parliament only in 1979.

The reluctance to use the term “Reichkristallnacht” occurred simultaneously with the introduction of the term “Reichspogromnacht.” Its first use dates back to November 9, 1977, when two social-democratic members of parliament, Klaus Thüsing (b. 1940) and Karl-Heinz Hansen (1927–2014) fitted a commemorative plaque onto the walls of an ancient fortress, Wewelsburg, which had served as an SS-“Ordensburg,” located close to the former Niederhagen
concentration camp (not far from the district town of Paderborn). These left-wing members of the SPD wanted to ensure that the lessons of the catastrophe of National Socialism were not forgotten. It is by no means accidental that the term “Reichspogromnacht” emerged in this context. The term was used for the first time in one of the speeches during the fitting of the plaque. In his autobiography, Karl-Heinz Hansen described the general ambiance of the moment as follows:

The year is 1977. Deutscher Herbst [German autumn], 9. November, 39th anniversary of the pogrom. (. . .) . The papers in Düsseldorf write about expressions of sympathy for the SS murderers accused in the Majdanek trial, and about insults against concentration camp witnesses (. . .). The head of the Christian Democrats in Bremen asks for the burning of Erich Fried poetry.

Hansen thus clearly situates the commemorative plaque in the context of debates and events of 1977. Looking back in his memoirs and probably overstating the ferocity of the political confrontations at the time, he blends different aspects: the climate of political panic in the context of far-left terrorism (“German Autumn”), and the perception of persisting right-wing attitudes.

The western German Left undoubtedly was on the defensive. The legislation restricting professional activities of those suspected of having a critical view of the constitution, the “Radikalenerlass,” led to 3.5 million checks of political reliability, mostly targeting individuals on the left. Terrorist attacks of the RAF (Rote Armee Fraktion) and the abduction and murder of Hans-Martin Schleyer, president of the employers’ federation, were branded as a left-wing continuation of national-socialist crimes by conservative media. In this difficult context, one exit strategy for the left was empathy with the victims of National Socialism and an identification with them—not in the least in contrast to the students’ movement of the 1960s, which was still largely indifferent to their fate.

This identification—for which the term “Reichspogromnacht” stands as a code—allowed them to bridge this gap. The term pogrom offered a stronger sense of immediacy of the danger emanating from the political right, and thus compared the situation of the political left to the one of Jews during the terror attacks of November 1938. Thus the advent of the term “Reichspogromnacht” cannot be explained by referring to a single development (like the “Hitler craze”), but is a reaction to complex changes within left and liberal segments of the western German public.
A number of scholars and activists criticized this change in terms. In the words of the well-known author, Barbara Noack:36

Does Reichspogromnacht offer a more adequate description of these horrors? Pogroms are unfortunately frequent phenomena. Do we [the Germans] want to hide by blending into the mass of rioters? and pretend we’re actually the same? By the same token, we will help let fade into the background the uniqueness of the Nazi crimes, the dimensions and the unheard-of systematic character of how we Germans proceeded gets lost.37

This was the year when both terms, “Reichskristallnacht” and “Reichspogromnacht,” were listed by the Society for German Language as candidate terms for the “Word of the Year.”38 Thus, political context and motivations need to be taken into consideration when attempting to historicize the history of the term. However, to identify one’s own embattled situation with the one of the persecuted Jews in Germany and Austria, as significant segments of the liberal and left-wing public in the Federal Republic of Germany did, represented a historical short-cut of considerable dimensions. The ambiguous term “Kristallnacht” or “Reichskristallnacht” was replaced by the equally problematic neologism “Pogromnacht.”

“POGROM” AS AN EMPHATIC TERM USED BY JEWISH AUTHORS
In his recent assessment of the 1903 pogrom in Kishinev—which marked the transition from incidents of anti-Jewish riots in east central and eastern Europe with a comparatively low degree of physical violence to massacres with high numbers of Jewish fatalities—Zipperstein observes that the term “pogrom” is “sturdily portable” and “was believed to capture accurately centuries of Jewish vulnerability, the deep well of Jewish misery.” Zipperstein sees a complete contrast to the Holocaust, since “pogroms would never—despite their Russian origins—be tethered to a particular time, place, or dictator.”39

It thus does not come as a surprise that immediate reactions by Jewish observers outside Nazi Germany would frame the events as a pogrom.40 Press outlets frequently used this term in headlines while stressing in the actual analysis that the events had been carefully masterminded and orchestrated by the Nazi regime. Thus, the headline of the November 11, 1938 issue of Nasz Przegląd, the
flagship paper of the Polish-Jewish intelligentsia, “Terrible Pogrom of the Jews in Germany,” emphasized that despite the fact that Goebbels referred to the violence as an outbreak of popular wrath, “thousands of proofs demonstrate that the entire anti-Jewish campaign (in the Polish original: akcja) was ‘inspired by Nazi forces.’” One of the earliest treatises assessing the catastrophic impact of the attack on Jews in Germany and Austria was published under the title Die Novemberpogrome in Deutschland by the “Centre de Documentation” in Strasbourg still in 1938. Rejecting the collective responsibility forced upon the victims of the attack, it described the propaganda strategy of the Nazi regime:

In Germany, however, the press undertook it to bring the public mood to boiling point in order to have a “psychological” explanation at hand for the terrible outbreaks of hate which erupted between 9 to 11 November and which were carefully prepared and reminded everyone of the Russian pogroms of the Tsarist period, and to pretend, that they were the result of an all-too-well understandable anger (Erregung) of the entire German population, that they were, as Mr Göbbels [sic] formulated, a “reaction of healthy instinct” of the German people.

There are indications that the publishers of this treatise belonged to the circles of exiled Social Democrats and Communists in Strasbourg, probably around Ernst Roth (1901–51, SPD, later member of the German Bundestag) and Robert Klausmann (1896–1972, KPD). The Germany Reports (Deutschlandberichte) of the Social Democrat Party leadership in exile stressed the same points as the Strasbourg publishers: the violence had been executed by the Nazi party suborganizations; it was part of a general and persistent “terror against the Jews” which had already developed into a “permanent pogrom” (in the original: Dauerpogrom). Publications within the proletarian resistance movement in Nazi Germany used the term “pogrom” as well. One can surmise that this emphatic term was used in these contexts in order to stress the violence of the attacks and to frame them as reminiscent of anti-Jewish violence in the Middle Ages or in nineteenth-century Russia.

American correspondents in Nazi Germany witnessing the events of November 9–12 often used the term “terror” to describe the events, and emphasized the coordinated character of the attack and its obvious function in stepping up the oppression of the Jewish population. As of November 15, 1938 (“A New Phase in Germany”) New York Times op-ed noted:
It is evident now that last week’s day of terror in Germany signified something more than the unleashing of Nazi ferocity. It marked an important stage in the development of the National Socialist revolution. For it is now clear that the outbreak of violence was a prologue to a performance previously prepared and rehearsed. The punitive decrees which have followed in quick succession are too drastic and comprehensive to be improvised on the spur of the moment.

An undated British typescript drafted undoubtedly very close to the events and preserved in the Wiener Library equally referred to the attack as “German pogroms.”\(^4\) This item, which probably has been redacted in Alfred Wiener’s office or in Amsterdam or in London explains that November 10, 1938 meant the eruption of “popular fury.” It was, like everything in the Third Reich, by order—no further proof being required since the facts in themselves are plain enough evidence.

The explicit reference to “German” pogroms in the title of this collection of short reports obviously invites the association of the term “pogrom” with the more familiar “Russian pogroms,” thus integrating the atrocities of Nazi Germany into the grand narrative of anti-Jewish violence, or the “deep well of Jewish misery,” as Zipperstein put it. It seems, however, noteworthy that by referring to the violence as “pogrom,” these authors reiterated Goebbels’ deceitful reference to the events as the result of “popular wrath” or “vengeance” and not as coordinated state-sanctioned violence.

In the postwar period, the religious framing of the attack appeared in texts dedicated to the November events outside Germany, and resonated with the development of the early commemorative culture in western Germany.

Lionel Kochan (1922–2005) wrote in 1957 that the term “pogrom” integrated the events into the long history of Christian anti-Judaism and that for religious reasons, “Jew and European stand at opposing poles.”\(^4\) In a 1959 publication commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the event, Eva Reichmann (1897–1998), a central figure in the Jewish support and rescue organization within Nazi Germany until 1938, pleaded to avoid the term “Kristallnacht” as it evoked ideas of youthful tricks or at the most of laddish pranks, thus trivializing the horrors of the events: “What happened in reality was the crime of sacrilege,” referring to the events later in the lecture as “Pogromnacht.”\(^4\) Like Reichmann, other Jewish authors qualified the enormity of the devastation of the November attacks by using the term “pogrom” and integrating it into a history of religious prejudice. By so doing, the core
dynamic of the terror as an instance of state-directed violence exacted on the Jews of Germany and Austria got lost.

**CONCLUSION: 1938—A POGROM?**

In the night from November 9–10 and on November 10, 1938, Jewish places of worship in Nazi Germany were destroyed, Jewish property vandalized or robbed, thousands of Jews were arrested or hurt, and hundreds killed. While the details of the terror attack only became apparent over days and weeks after the events, their enormity was perceived immediately. This is reflected in both the neologism of Kristallnacht or Reichskristallnacht, which sought to encapsulate the unheard-of character of what had happened, as well as in the term “pogrom,” integrating devastation, persecution, and murder, into a terminological framework shaped by the Jewish historical experience in eastern Europe.

It is also a reflection of the inability of “polite society”—of Jews and non-Jews—to comprehend that the institutions at the very foundations of civil society—the police, uniformed people, political representatives—would be at the very core of this violence inflicted on the Jews of Germany and Austria, or contribute, as, for instance, fire departments, to its devastating effect.

In contrast to the anti-Jewish riots as they unfolded in eastern Europe in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the violence directed against Jews, Jewish property, and Jewish places of worship on the night of November 9–10, 1938 appears of a very different character: coordinated, centrally organized, and executed by armed and uniformed units directly depending on the central agencies of the Nazi regime. It was a systematic, comprehensive and coordinated terror attack, as the simple exercise of overlaying the maps of Jewish communities in 1933 and of the location of the attacks in November 1938 demonstrates: with the exception of those territories appropriated by Nazi Germany since 1933, these maps are congruent.

Indeed, spontaneous and popular violence occurred in the context of this state-sponsored terror attack. But it was clearly a phenomenon that accompanied the centrally organized attacks. Those responsible for spontaneous acts of violence have not yet been the objects of sufficient systematic research, although the brutality of their actions did equal the one of the terror attacks involving the SA, the SS and members of other branches of the NS hierarchy.
So far, we only have preliminary research by Edith Raim, who surveyed post-war trials in the French, British and American zones of occupation (as well as a smaller number of trials that took place in the Federal Republic of Germany). Further research could be based on a comparative analysis of reports and testimonies of these 2,468 investigations and 1,174 trials. Among these 17,700 individuals were members of both groups: perpetrators involved in the terror attack orchestrated by the Nazi hierarchy, as well as those involved in spontaneous attacks, which in part undoubtedly qualify as pogroms.

To use the identical term for these two sides of the November events is historically misleading. It would be problematic not in the least because it would fail to call out Goebbels’ deceit of the “spontaneous people’s wrath.” To avoid the term pogrom does not exclude the events of November 9–12, 1938 from the long history of anti-Jewish violence. The advantage of an increased terminological precision would, however, help distinguish the dynamic which unfolded in the case of the unique dynamic towards the catastrophe of the genocide and make it much more tangible. These events were planned, organized, centrally triggered and executed, to the most devastating of effects. A variety of designations would reflect this dimension of a state-sponsored terror attack on a minority population, such as “November terror,” “anti-Jewish terror” or “state terror,” which would all identify the events of November 1938 more adequately as a coordinated and systematic attack of a depraved regime on a defenseless minority.
Notes


2. Wilhelm Börger gave his speech on June 24, 1939. Börger had been a member of parliament for the NSDAP since 1930 and since 1938 a high level official in the Reich Department for Labor (*Reichsarbeitsministerium*). In the original: “Nach der Reichskristallnacht voriges Jahr, am 11. November, sehen Sie, also die Sache geht als Reichskristallnacht in die Geschichte ein (Beifall, Gelächter). Sie sehn, das ist humoristisch erhoben, nicht wahr, schön. Man hätte sagen können, ist das wirtschaftlich richtig? Die Scheiben müssen wir aus Belgien holen, das kostet Devisen. Kann man zweierlei Meinung darüber sein. Eins aber steht fest, die wissen jetzt ganz genau, wird auf’n Knopf gedrückt, hat es jeklingelt, überall (Gelächter).”

3. In the original: “Es ist zuwenig getreten worden, die hätten noch mehr auf die Birne hauen müssen (Gelächter), dann wären wir fertig damit (Beifall).”


7. [The press] provided the newspapers, official broadsides, and printed decrees that expedited the spread of the misinformation and rumor that played such an important role in sparking pogroms. Most importantly, these factors established the idea of the anti-Jewish pogrom in the popular mind, creating a precedent, and a model, for future riots. Klier, *Jews, Russians, and the Pogroms*, 59.


11. Tim Buchen, *Antisemitismus in Galizien. Agitation, Gewalt und Politik gegen Juden in der Habsburgermonarchie um 1900* (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2012). Buchen does not undertake a systematic group analysis of the “pogrom specialists” in Galicia, although his thick description would have allowed for that. In contrast, see the


13. “I define pogroms as a one-sided and non-governmental form of social control, as ‘self-help by a group’ that occurs when no remedy from the state against the threat which another ethnic group poses can be expected. The pogrom is different from other forms of control, such as lynching, terrorism, and vigilantism, in that the participants in such a pogrom hold the entire out-group responsible and therefore act against the group as a whole, and also in that it usually displays a low degree of organization,” in Werner Bergmann, “Ethnic Riots in Situations of Loss of Control: Revolution, Civil War, and Regime Change as Opportunity Structures for Anti-Jewish Violence in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Europe,” in *Control of Violence: Historical and International Perspectives on Violence in Modern Societies*, ed. Wilhelm Heitmeyer, Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, Stefan Malthaner, and Andrea Kirschner (New York: Springer, 2011), 488.


16. David Horowitz, *The Deadly Ethnic Riot* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). Horowitz identifies the following core elements of the deadly ethnic riot: (1) a growing focus on the hated group, to the neglect of others; (2) a belief that the hated group possesses fixed characteristics and dispositions to action; (3) a compression of intragroup differences attributed to members of the hated group; and (4) a sense of repulsion toward the group and its members” (543).

17. *Die Judenpogrome in Russland. Herausgegeben im Auftrag des Zionistischen Hilfsfonds in London von der zur Erforschung der Pogrome eingesetzten Kommission(Allgemeiner Teil)* (Frankfurt am Main: Jüdischer Verlag, 1910), 1:189–91. This was the case among others for Balta, Elisavetgrad, Kiev, Kishinev, Konotop, Odessa, Pereiaslav, and Smela.

18. Nicholas II reportedly stated that “a whole mass of loyal people suddenly made their power felt. Because nine-tenths of the troublemakers are Jews, the People's whole anger turned against them. That's how the pogroms happened,” cited in Klier, *Russians, Jews, and the Pogroms*, 88.

19. The impact of strong policing in Prussia 1882–84 and in Galicia 1898, and its absence/impossibility in underpoliced Russia, seems one of the most relevant differences in coping with xenophobic incitement—a difference which seems to have lost nothing of its pertinence in twenty-first century Central Europe.


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34. Karl-Heinz Hansen, “Es ist nicht alles schlecht, was scheitert”: Ein politischer Lebenslauf (Hamburg: KVV Konkret Verlag, 2014), 92.

35. Erich Fried (1921–88), born to a Viennese-Jewish family, was a poet and politically involved author of considerable popularity especially in the 1970s and 1980s. After his father had been killed by the Gestapo, he had fled Nazi Germany in 1938. Fried was identified with the Left and more specifically with the disarmament and peace movement. The mentioned politician was Bernd Neumann (CDU), later Federal Government Commissioner for Culture and the Media in the cabinet of Chancellor Angela Merkel. He indeed expressed the wish of burning a poem of Erich Fried during a heated debate with the deputy Henning Scherf (chairman of the Bremen branch of SPD). Neumann later met Fried.


38. Erika Ising, “Kristallnacht—Pogromnacht: Schlusspunkt oder neue Fragezeichen?” Der Sprachdienst 33, no. 6 (1989): 171; Detlev Claussen and Harald Martenstein, Vor aller Augen. Verfolgung, Vertreibung und Vernichtung der Juden in Deutschland (Berlin: Pressestiftung des Tagesspiegels, 1988). Other terms listed were Robbensterben (the mass phenomenon of seals perishing in the North Sea), Kälbermastskandal (a scandal involving the cramming of veals) and Europäischer
Binnenmarkt (the European single market, introduced then). The term selected by a search committee was “Gesundheitsreform” (the reform of the German health care provision system).


42. Die Novemberpogrome in Deutschland, ed. the Centre de documentation, Strasbourg, 1938, Wiener Library microfilm 88038/K211. In the original: “In Deutschland aber versuchte man, durch die Presse die Volkserregung bis zur Siedehitze aufzupitztschen, um für die sorgsam vorbereiteten an die russischen Pogrome zur Zeit der Zarenregierungen erinnernden entsetzlichen Hassausbrüche, wie sie sich zwischen dem 9. und 11. November ereigneten, eine 'psychologische' Erklärung bei der Hand zu haben, um vorzutäuschen, dass sie 'spontan' aus der 'allzubegreiflichen tiefen Erregung des gesamten deutschen Volkes' herzuleiten seien, dass sie, wie sich Herr Göbbels ausdrückte, noch 'eine Reaktion des gesunden Instinkts' des deutschen Volkes' gewesen wären” [no page numbers, emphasis in original].

43. The unkown publishers of the pamphlet refer to information given by a “Service d’information in Strassburg.” A report written by the Gestapo (Staatspolizeistelle Neustadt an der Weinstraße) from September 1939 does link Roth and Klausmann to a Service d’information, see a report to the Gestapo/Berlin, from the Staatspolizeistelle Neustadt a. d. Weinstraße (September 28, 1939), Landesarchiv Speyer, Inventory: Geheime Staatspolizei Neustadt/Ermittlungsakten (H 91), Nr. 566. The authors express their indebtedness to Jens Späth (Universität des Saarlands) for sharing these details.

44. Deutschland-Berichte, 1181.

45. Schmid, Erinnern, 82; Detlev Peukert, Der deutsche Arbeiterwiderstand gegen das Dritte Reich (Berlin: Gedenkstätte Deutscher Widerstand, 1990), 32.

46. We are grateful to Norman Domeier for sharing his insights into the history of American reporting about Kristallnacht, focusing specifically on the reporting of Otto Tolischus and Ralph Barnes. The latter defined the attack as “Police-controlled reign of terror planned by Nazis” already in his first despatch of November 9, 1938 (New York Herald Tribune, November 10, 1938). For further details see Norman


48. Lionel Kochan, Pogrom: 10 November 1938 (London: Andre Deutsch, 1957), 13. He continues: “There was nothing spontaneous about the pogrom. But nor was it wholly contrived and organized. Of necessity, a great deal had to be left to local initiative. The result was a horrible combination of anti-Semitic passion set in motion, and sometimes reinforced, by every kind of technical resource. The lower links in the chain of command were still animated by the same crude mentality as had been their precursors in, for example, Eastern Europe. But technical advance made it possible to replay them on an unprecedented scale.”


50. See the observations by Mary Fulbrook, “Social Relations and Bystander Responses to Violence: Kristallnacht November 1938,” in this volume, on the considerable role of young people already socialised in Nazi Germany.


52. It is not the task of this contribution to propose yet another term for the events. Describing it as an act of state terror would, however, undoubtedly add to a more adequate contextualization.
Bibliography


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