Natural Resource-Based Development in Africa

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Introduction

There is a spectre haunting Africa in the twenty-first century – the spectre of resource nationalism (Economist 2012). Nowhere is it more apparent than in Zambia, an African economy heavily dependent on the extraction of copper (and, to a lesser extent, cobalt, nickel, manganese, and emeralds), with recent efforts to strengthen the mineral taxation regime, improve the regulation of the mines, and encourage economic linkages to the mining sector. However, this is not the first time Zambia has experienced resource nationalism. Indeed, as the title of this chapter suggests, Zambia has wrestled with the task of how best to manage its sizeable copper deposits for its entire postcolonial history. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Zambian state nationalized the ownership and management of the copper mines in an effort to secure greater control over its largest export and source of foreign exchange. However, low copper prices, depleted foreign exchange reserves, and sovereign indebtedness (made worse by escalating interest rates in the late 1970s), led to a lack of reinvestment in the mines and lower production levels, the imposition of neo-liberal structural adjustment, and the eventual privatization of the mines in the late 1990s. The overly concessionary – and, in some instances, dubious – manner in which Zambia’s mining assets were privatized, coupled with the changing operational imperatives of the foreign investors who purchased them, spurred popular disaffection with the country’s liberalized mineral governance regime in the 2000s. This sentiment translated into increased popularity for the populist Patriotic Front (PF) – leading to their eventual victory in the 2011 elections – and the resurgence of resource nationalism over the last decade.

This resurgent resource nationalism, though similar in sentiment, differs from the earlier efforts of the late 1960s and early 1970s. This chapter compares these two episodes of resource nationalism by examining the different national and international contexts, associated policies and regulatory institutions, and
the sociopolitical coalitions driving them. In doing so, it seeks to historicize the phenomenon of resource nationalism and understand its varying motivations, limitations, and outcomes. It argues that while the motivations and political dynamics propelling these two episodes of resource nationalism are similar, during the more recent episode, the policies advocated are relatively restrained and the state regulatory capacity is comparatively weaker. Neo-liberal structural adjustment is largely responsible for these differences and continues to shape and influence future regulatory initiatives. Hence, the second wave of resource nationalism is less an effort to secure greater control over foreign mining capital than it is an effort to redress the shortcomings of Zambia’s liberalized mining regime partially and unevenly.

This chapter also strives to contribute to a burgeoning discussion on resource nationalism in the Global South, and sub-Saharan Africa in particular. Most analyses of resource nationalism offer a spatial comparison between different geographical cases, classifying and juxtaposing different ideal types with one another (Bremmer and Johnston 2009; Andreasson 2015; Wilson 2015), but this paper seeks to offer a temporal comparison of two periods from a single geographical case. This will serve to demonstrate the constraints and limitations that economic liberalization has placed on current efforts to regulate and govern mineral extraction. And aside from outlining the international opportunities and constraints to resource nationalism (i.e., commodity prices, competing sources of foreign investment, external debt levels, etc.) and the dynamics of state-firm relations, this chapter maintains that domestic pressures also serve as important catalysts for resource nationalism, principally heightened political contestation, labour militancy, and domestic capital formation in the Zambian case.

Resource Nationalism: Motivations, Opportunities, and Constraints

Following Jeffrey Wilson, resource nationalism can be understood as “a strategy where governments use economic nationalist policies to improve local returns from resource industries.… It involves governments exercising control over resource industries through selective and discretionary resource policies, which are designed to achieve some set of political and/or economic benefits that would otherwise not obtain” (Wilson 2015, 400). In practice, resource nationalism has typically involved three distinct but overlapping kinds of policies: the maximization of public revenue from resource extraction, the regulation and ownership of extractive industries by the state, and the enhancement of developmental spillovers from resource extraction (Haslam and Heidrich 2016, 224–7). But while there is a scholarly consensus on the definition of resource nationalism, the motivations for resource nationalism are contested.
Taken at face value, resource nationalism generally appears to be motivated by the desire of states to assert their national sovereignty over natural resources being extracted in the confines of their territorial boundaries. In developing economies, this has typically involved drawing concessions from foreign investors. While this assertion no doubt serves as a partial explanation for the emergence of resource nationalism, the phenomenon is arguably more complex. Some business journalists have suggested that the rise and decline of resource nationalism is attributable to market cycles; when primary commodity prices are high, states possess greater leverage and are more inclined to secure concessions from extractive firms, but when primary commodity prices are low, those firms possess greater leverage and are able to push states to adopt more liberal extractive regimes. Resource nationalism is understood as a cyclical phenomenon, determined by the boom-and-bust cycle of primary commodity prices (Gravelle 2012). Some scholars, following Vernon (1971) and Moran (1974), have employed the obsolescing bargaining model. This paradigm, Wilson explains (2015, 402), “argues that when resource projects are first developed, firms have the upper hand in bargaining – as uncertainty and capital mobility mean states must offer attractive conditions to attract investment.” However, once these projects have become “sunk assets” and are unable to relocate, these initially concessionary bargains obsolesce, enabling states to impose less favourable regulatory measures. Hence, this model maintains that resource nationalism is dependent on the maturity of the extractive industries. The problem with the previous two explanations is that they are overly economistic, focusing on primary commodity prices and extractive industry maturity, neglecting political contexts (Wilson 2015), and narrowly conceiving resource nationalism as a bargaining process between states and firms, ignoring other constituencies and social forces.

Contemporary resource nationalism emerged in sub-Saharan Africa early in the twenty-first century, driven by distinct economic and political dynamics. Prior to its emergence, African states were encouraged to liberalize their mining regimes by international financial institutions and the donor community in the 1990s (World Bank 1992). The liberalization of African mining regimes involved the development of investor-friendly mining codes that sought to offer various regulatory and taxation incentives to foreign mining capital and to restrain and weaken the state's control over natural resources (Campbell 2010). The negative consequences of liberalized extractive regimes on mining communities and supply chains, surging primary commodity prices, and low fiscal receipts from mineral taxation (contrasted with exorbitant corporate profits) were economic justifications for resurgent resource nationalism. But there were also several political motivations: the rise of popular grievances over perceived lack of benefits or spillovers from resource extraction, the corruption and predation of domestic elites, and heightened democratic contestation catalysed
debates around the regulation of natural resources. Hence, African govern-
ments were both incentivized and exhorted (from aggrieved constituencies) to
draw concessions from mining firms.

Equally as important as the economic and political motivations that animate
resource nationalism, are its opportunities and constraints. Many scholars, fol-
lowing the collapse of the first wave of resource nationalism, suggested that
developing economies that were heavily dependent on the extraction of natu-
ral resources suffered from the “resource curse” (Auty 1993). Scholars main-
tained that resource extraction’s high capital intensity, low value addition, and
vulnerability to elite rent-seeking and predation, coupled with volatile fiscal
flows (notably due to price fluctuations), made it difficult to harness natural
resources for development. As a result, those developing countries were said
to suffer from slow economic growth, authoritarianism, deindustrialization,
high levels of inequality, and armed conflict. However, the more recent wave of
resource nationalism raised new questions around key tenets of the “resource
curse” (see also Chapter 3 in this volume). Several scholars began to argue that
natural resources could be harnessed to spur industrialization – through the
implementation of local content programmes and the cultivation of backward
linkages – and to fund transformative social policies (Hujo 2012; Morris et al.
2012; Ovadia 2016b). Many Latin American “New Left” governments pursued
greater control over the extraction of petroleum and natural gas, with the aim
of deploying the proceeds to finance redistributive reforms (Rosales 2013).
African legislators also shifted their focus in the wake of the rising primary
commodity prices and increasing mining investment, advocating for policies
that bolstered state regulatory capacity, increased taxation revenues, nurtured
backward and forward linkages to extractive industries, expanded national/
indigenous ownership, and empowered surrounding communities (Africa
Mining Vision 2009). Hence, the second wave of resource nationalism has
aroused the possibility for the (re)construction of developmental states in Latin
America and sub-Saharan Africa (UNECA 2011; Burchardt and Dietz 2014,
470–1; Routley 2014; Haslam and Heidrich 2016, 5; Ovadia 2016b; Nwapi and

Yet, enthusiasm for building developmental states and escaping the resource
curse should be weighed against the many limitations and obstacles confront-
ing the second wave of resource nationalism. In Southern Africa, Saunders and
Caramento (2018) maintain that weakened state regulatory capacity (following
neo-liberal structural adjustment), its inability to effectively discipline mining
capital, rising public indebtedness, and elite predation have stifled the possi-
bility of an “extractive developmental state” in the near future. In their edited
volume on contemporary resource nationalism in Latin America, Haslam and
Heidrich (2016, 227–33) determined that there are a number of international,
national, and industry-related factors that can represent either opportunities
or constraints. These factors include primary commodity prices, the availability of alternative sources of investment, the existence of sizeable mineral and hydrocarbon reserves, political culture, and state capacity. They could equally be applied to the African continent. Kaup and Gellert (2017), utilizing a world-systems approach, argue that resource nationalism in peripheral economies (Bolivia and Indonesia) emerges during periods of global capitalist expansion and hegemonic rivalry. During the most recent episode of expansion and rivalry, they contend that the Chinese (and, to a lesser extent, other hegemonic aspirants, like Brazil and India) are offering new markets and alternative sources of investment to peripheral economies, thus providing them with the opportunity to pursue resource nationalist policies.

Kaup and Gellert’s (2017) argument compliments those made by other scholars who suggest that increased Chinese investment on the African continent is developmental, rather than exploitative (Brautigam 2009), and that China’s rise would provide the economic foundations for a “new Bandung spirit” of South–South cooperation and mutual prosperity (Arrighi 2009, 384–5). Arguably, the Chinese have, to some extent, enabled African resource nationalism. The primary commodities’ super cycle can be largely attributed to increased Chinese demand (Humphreys 2019) and unlike the “traditional” donors, the Chinese are offering non-concessional loans to African states with minimal conditions attached (Brautigam 2011). But Chinese mining investment is not exceptional nor fundamentally different from other investors. Lee (2014, 2017) maintains that the Chinese state-owned copper mines in Zambia operate according to a different “logic of accumulation” and “regime of production” from other investors, by not retrenching their employees, relying less on contract labour, and facilitating developmental spillovers (e.g., Chambishi Multi-Facility Economic Zone). However, the production levels and number of employees maintained by the Chinese mines in Zambia are minimal in comparison to non-Chinese investors (see Table 8.1), making such differences largely trivial. Moreover, the supposed economic spillovers from Chinese-owned mines are negligible (Accountant, NFCA Chambishi Pay and Accounts Office, 2018). Several local mine suppliers and contractors interviewed by the author complained that Chinese-owned mines generally tended to procure fewer goods and services than non-Chinese mines. And there are numerous warning signs that Chinese non-concession loans, whose terms and conditions have not been publicly disclosed, will have adverse effects on Zambia’s future economic prospects (Simumba 2018; Smith 2020).

A range of motivations, opportunities, and constraints to resource nationalism has meant that a diverse set of policies has been enacted by various African governments. Resource nationalism has varied greatly across the African continent. Andreasson (2015), applying Bremmer and Johnston’s (2009) typology of resource nationalism to sub-Saharan Africa, sees a range of models on the
### Table 8.1. Zambia’s Copper Mines: Ownership, Production (2018), and Employment (2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Ownership</th>
<th>Production (Tonnes), 2018</th>
<th>Employment, 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Direct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mopani</td>
<td>Glencore 73.1%, First Quantum 16.9%, ZCCM-IH 10%</td>
<td>62,191.24</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konkola</td>
<td>Vedanta 79.4%, ZCCM-IH 20.6%</td>
<td>93,165.01</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumwana</td>
<td>Barrick Gold 100%</td>
<td>101,890.03</td>
<td>1,882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansanshi</td>
<td>First Quantum 80%, ZCCM-IH 20%</td>
<td>249,532.07</td>
<td>4,781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalumbila</td>
<td>First Quantum 100%</td>
<td>223,655.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubambe</td>
<td>EMR Capital 80%, ZCCM-IH 20%</td>
<td>22,074.50</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chibuluma*</td>
<td>Jinchuan Group 90%, ZCCM-IH 10%</td>
<td>11,258.53</td>
<td>602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chambishi Metals</td>
<td>ENRC 90%, ZCCM-IH 10%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chambishi Copper Smelter*</td>
<td>CNMC 60%, Yunnan Group 40%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFCA Chambishi*</td>
<td>CNMC 85%, ZCCM-IH 15%</td>
<td>27,644.02</td>
<td>1,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sino-Metals*</td>
<td>CNMC 100%</td>
<td>9,312.90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNMC Luanshya*</td>
<td>CNMC 80%, ZCCM-IH 20%</td>
<td>50,363.32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Small-scale producers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>861,946.21</strong></td>
<td><strong>28,870</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Zambia Chamber of Mines (2019); Sikamo (2014)

* Chinese-Owned Assets
An Examination of Zambian Resource Nationalism

continent fitting within a continuum extending from “revolutionary” to “soft” approaches; the former denoting cases of nationalization and asset seizure, and the latter implying greater reliance on the use of taxation and market regulation. However, a typology developed from the perspective of investors misses key aspects of policy processes and impinges our understanding of the complexity of political and economic dynamics underlying the resource nationalist moment.

A more useful typology is offered by Jeffrey Wilson (2015), who differentiates between three forms of resource nationalism: rentier models, whereby resource rents “allow regimes to fashion loyal societal coalitions, finance repressive apparatuses and engage in neopatrimonialism”; developmental approaches, which entail the use of interventionist strategies to harness resource extraction for industrial transformation; and market-based initiatives, which involve low-intervention strategies, like taxation to capture resource rents. Wilson’s typology usefully focuses on developmental outcomes, placing greater importance on political institutions and thereby moving beyond economistic models rooted in bargaining processes around commodity prices and sunk assets. Yet, an institutional typology does not fully capture the dynamics (i.e., state–society relations) of resource nationalism. Moreover, scholarship on the governance of natural resources needs to move beyond simplistic state–market dichotomies in understanding real historical cases. The complexity of resource nationalist politics and outcomes on the ground requires a subtler appreciation of the dynamics among interests, institutions, and surrounding economic structures, opportunities, and constraints. The notion, for example, that resource nationalist projects always entail greater state involvement in extraction, strong challenges to foreign investors, and confrontations with neo-liberal economic strategies, is misconceived. Rather, as Childs (2016) and Nem Singh (2010) respectively maintain, the governance of resource extraction is characterized by “hybridity” or “continuity with change,” a combination of both interventionist and market-based reforms. This observation is particularly relevant in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, where resource nationalism has emerged in the wake of neo-liberal adjustment.

Arguably, the best way to understand and appreciate such “continuity with change” is by examining a particular case over time. Most of the above-mentioned literature has sought to develop typologies for contemporary resource nationalism, but few have attempted to examine how resource nationalism has transformed. The existent literature has also largely ignored the influence of social forces and political contestation on resource nationalism, under the false assumption that they are too contextually specific. However, overlooking these factors obstructs our complete understanding of the resource nationalist phenomenon and prevents the discovery of variables that could advance future comparative research. The following case study will examine the two waves of
Zambian resource nationalism, comparing and contrasting their multiple and multifaceted motivations, opportunities, and constraints.

Zambian Resource Nationalism in the Late 1960s and Early 1970s

On the eve of independence in 1964, Zambia inherited an economy dependent on the extraction of copper from mines that were under the foreign ownership of Roan Selection Trust (RST) and the Anglo-American Corporation (AAC) and tied to the economies of its hostile neighbours – white settler–controlled Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa. Foreign, private control over Zambia’s most important economic assets and main source of foreign exchange were perceived to be antithetical to national development (Martin 1972). African mineworkers were also paid considerably less and held fewer skilled positions in comparison to their white counterparts. To surmount these impediments, the Zambian state advanced the Zambianization of managerial and technical positions and nationalized the mines (Burawoy 1972; Martin 1972; Daniel 1979). The Matero reforms of 1969 enabled the state to acquire a majority 51 per cent controlling stake in Zambia’s two privately owned copper mining firms, by transferring controlling shares to the state-owned conglomerate Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO). The old shareholders would receive ZIMCO bonds in exchange, to be repaid in twelve years from 1970 for AAC and eight years for RST with an interest rate of 6 per cent. The management of the mines and copper sales would remain under the control of the minority shareholders, AAC and RST (Whitworth 2015).

Three motivations for these reforms can be discerned. Firstly, the price of copper in the late 1960s was particularly high, incentivizing nationalization (see Figure 8.2). Second, Kenneth Kaunda’s United National Independence Party (UNIP) government nationalized the mines to increase the government’s share of the mining profits, curb excessive dividend payments to foreign shareholders, and expand and diversify mining operations (Libby and Woakes 1980). Nationalization, in other words, was intended to spur national development, not fund foreign, private enrichment. Thirdly, the emergence of a political divide within UNIP (i.e., heightened political contestation) and the imperative to discipline mining labour also contributed to the decision to nationalize the mines. In the late 1960s, Simon Kapwepwe harnessed the discontent amongst Bemba speakers in the Copperbelt and Northern Provinces to attain the vice-presidency and challenge Kaunda’s dominance (Larmer 2011). In an effort to defuse the radicalism of Kapwepwe, who had demonstrated sympathies for Nyerere’s Arusha Declaration in neighbouring Tanzania (BNA FCO 29/58), Kaunda implemented the Mulungushi and Matero reforms (Martin 1972, 111–12; Hall 1973, 221; Larmer 2010a, 115–17). Soon after the reforms, Kapwepwe left government and formed the United Progressive Party (UPP) in 1971, prompting
UNIP to form a one-party state in 1973. Mineworkers also posed a threat to UNIP’s control over the Copperbelt. Their control over the extraction and production of Zambia’s largest export and source of foreign exchange made them particularly formidable. The rank-and-file members of the Mineworkers Union of Zambia (MUZ) continued to strike for better pay and working conditions following independence, defying efforts by the ruling party to co-opt them. Some members even joined Kapwepwe’s UPP (Larmer 2007, 59–96). Hence, “the nationalizations are best understood as an attempt by an effective coalition of state and international capital to increase their control over … the organized working class, by enabling the state to restrict worker demands in the interests of national development” (Larmer 2002, 105–6).

In a miscalculated effort to secure further control, the Zambian government redeemed the ZIMCO bonds early in 1973, paying out US$231 million, after borrowing US$150 million externally to do so (Whitworth 2015). Unfortunately, this decision depleted Zambia’s foreign exchange reserves, just before copper prices began to tumble. By redeeming the ZIMCO bonds, the Zambian government’s stated aims were to cancel the costly managing and service contracts it signed with RST and AAC in 1969, accelerate Zambianization, and secure greater control over marketing, purchasing, and investment (BNA FCO 45/1366). But newspaper articles and records found in the Mining Industry Archives from the early 1970s also point to pressures from Zambian contractors for contracts from the mines as another possible motivation for the early redemption of the ZIMCO bonds (Times of Zambia 18 September 1973; 4 October 1973; 19 November 1973; MIA 15/3/4A). In both the media and correspondence found in the archives, there are numerous complaints that Zambian contractors were being discriminated against in the award of contracts by the newly nationalized mines. Conflicts emerged between expatriate managers and Zambian officials on the awarding of contracts, with the former concerned solely with price and duration, and the latter concerned with empowering local contractors. In an effort to ensure Zambian contractors were being chosen, politicians and civil servants placed numerous information requests to the Division Managers of the mines to provide information on the value of contracts and the nationality of contractors. There was also the establishment of protocols for the disbursement of contracts under 100,000 kwacha, with priority being given to local Zambians (MIA 15/3/4A). Arguably, with the cancellation of the managing contracts, government-appointed managers would select Zambian contractors. The redemption of the ZIMCO bonds were accompanied by the formation of the state-owned Metals Marketing Corporation of Zambia (MEMACO) in 1973. By managing the sale of Zambia’s copper, MEMACO replaced the marketing teams of the private minority shareholders, countering the latter’s tendency to under-report sales. MEMACO provided the Zambian state with greater oversight and control of mining revenue but also led to a
lack of reinvestment into mining productivity as payments were diverted to the Bank of Zambia (NRGI 2015). The mines were subsequently consolidated to form Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) in 1982.

While the national ownership of the mines encouraged the training of Zambian managers and technicians, improved regulatory capacity, and ensured contracts were awarded to local Zambian contractors, it was also plagued by numerous inefficiencies and declining productivity (NRGI 2015). These inefficiencies were made worse by the steady decline in the price of copper starting in the mid-1970s (see Figure 8.2), decreased foreign exchange earnings, and the increased transportation costs incurred by cutting links with white-settler-ruled Rhodesia. And as the majority shareholder, the Zambian state was compelled to use precious foreign exchange earnings to finance the mines, providing them with enough funds to cover operational costs but insufficient capital to make new investments or replace aging equipment (NRGI 2015). The Zambian government looked to foreign lenders to cover the shortfall and, worsened by the spike in US interbank interest rates in the early 1980s, the country’s external debt rose from US$ 627 million in 1970 to US$7.2 billion in 1990 (Rakner 2003, 44). Indebtedness ultimately led to the imposition of neo-liberal structural adjustment policies in the 1980s, catalysing opposition against the UNIP one-party state and leading to its collapse following the 1991 elections.

**Neo-liberal Structural Adjustment and the Privatization of the Mines**

Pressed by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to privatize ZCCM, with copper prices at an all-time low, the succeeding Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) government offered lucrative incentives to potential foreign investors. The Mines and Minerals Act of 1995 permitted the government to enter into generous development agreements with foreign investors during privatization negotiations. Some of the conditions stipulated in these agreements included the following: reducing corporate taxation from 35 per cent to 25 per cent; sizeable tax deductions, including a 100 per cent tax deduction allowance on capital expenditures; exempting mining companies from paying customs, excise duties, or any other duty or import tax levied on machinery and equipment; extending loss–carry forward provisions for up to fifteen to twenty years; setting mineral royalties at a paltry 0.6 per cent of the gross revenue of minerals produced; relieving some private investors from assuming financial liabilities and environmental legacies originally incurred by ZCCM; and protection for these development agreements by a stability period wherein these agreements could not be amended for fifteen to twenty years (Lungu 2008). Clearly, the provisions of the development agreements were exceedingly favourable to the interests of the foreign mining firms.
Table 8.2. The Number of Permanent Employees and Contract Employees at Mopani Copper Mines (Glencore)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2014</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contractors</td>
<td>1,920</td>
<td>9,513</td>
<td>11,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent</td>
<td>8,624</td>
<td>9,783</td>
<td>9,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>10,544</td>
<td>19,296</td>
<td>20,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kumwenda (2016)

While privatization brought desperately needed investment to the copper mines, significantly bolstering production levels (see Figure 8.2), some of ZCCM’s assets were privatized under dubious circumstances (Kaunda 2002; Fraser and Lungu 2006; Gewald and Soeters 2010), and the subsequent copper price rebound called into the question the overly concessionary terms afforded to foreign investors. To make matters worse, the new investors hired workers on fixed-term contracts to avoid paying benefits and pensions (see Table 8.2), flouted labour safety regulations, and eliminated previously funded health care and public health services (Fraser and Lungu 2006). Many of the privately owned engineering firms and parastatals that formed part of ZCCM’s mining supply chain were either sold to foreign investors or were shuttered due to the negative effects of trade liberalization, severely weakening Zambia’s manufacturing base. By the mid-2000s, higher copper prices, perceived profiteering by foreign companies, and continuing popular dissatisfaction with the consequences of adjustment intersected with increasing democratic contestation and a resurgent civil society to catalyse a new wave of resource nationalism.

Zambian Resource Nationalism in the Twenty-First Century

During the 2006 elections, the opposition Patriotic Front’s (PF) populist election campaign manipulated anti-Chinese sentiment (HRW 2011) and promised to change the mining tax regime, increase regulation of the mines, raise wages, improve basic services, and lower personal taxes (Larmer and Fraser 2007). The PF’s resource nationalist platform threatened the MMD’s hold over Zambian national politics, prompting the MMD government to reform the mining taxation regime in 2008 (Former Cabinet Minister 2015). The MMD government was unable to renegotiate the eleven development agreements due to the intransigence of foreign mining firms. The government legislatively cancelled the agreements and developed a new mining taxation regime in 2008. Most controversially, this new regime included a graduated windfall royalty
tax levied on gross proceeds at a rate of 25 per cent when the price of copper exceeded US$2.50 per pound, at a rate of 50 per cent when the price of copper exceeded US$3.00 per pound, and at a rate of 75 per cent when the price of copper exceeded US$3.50 per pound (Lungu 2008). The sharp decline in copper prices in late 2008, caused by the global financial crisis, led to a withdrawal of the controversial graduated windfall tax in 2009. With the support of miners-workers on the Copperbelt, the residents of Lusaka’s kombonis (“compounds” or informal urban settlements), and Bemba speakers in Luapula and the Northern Provinces, the PF’s leader, Michael Sata, won the presidential elections of 2011 (Resnick 2013; Larmer and Cheeseman 2015).

Following the PF’s electoral victory, the second wave of resource nationalism has sought to adjust the mineral taxation regime to increase revenue, bolster state regulatory capacity, and advocate on behalf of mine suppliers and contractors. The ruling PF have adjusted mineral royalties six times in the last nine years (see Table 8.3). In 2012, the mineral royalty was increased from 3 per cent to 6 per cent. Again, in late 2014, it was announced that, as part of the 2015 budget, mineral royalties were set to increase to 8 per cent for underground mines and 20 per cent for open-pit mines. However, this increase in the mineral royalty tax was aggressively opposed by the Chamber of Mines. Barrick Lumwana went as far as to threaten to put their operations under care and maintenance in December 2014 if the mineral royalty tax was not altered. It was subsequently reduced to 6 per cent for underground mines and 9 per cent for open-cast mines in 2015. The mining taxation regime was altered again in 2016, with the removal of the variable profit tax and the introduction of “price-based royalty” that varies between 4 per cent and 6 per cent (see Table 8.3); “[a] 4 percent rate applies on the whole tax base when the price is below USD 4,500 per tonne, 5 percent when prices are between USD 4,500 and USD 6,000, and 6 percent when the copper price is above USD 6,000 per tonne” (Manley 2017, 6–7). In 2019, this price-based mining royalty was increased by 1.5 per cent for each of the respective price ranges, with the addition of a 10 per cent royalty when the price of copper exceeds US$7,500 per tonne. While this most recent mineral royalty increase appears to signal the waning influence of foreign mining investors, the recent reversal of the planned replacement of the value-added tax (VAT) with a sales tax at their behest suggests otherwise (Reuters 27 September 2019).

The PF government also sought to counter tax evasion after an audit of Mopani Copper Mines, conducted by Grant Thornton in 2010 on behalf of the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA), was leaked, alleging the company had engaged in transfer pricing (War on Want 2015). In response, statutory instrument (SI) 55 was enacted and VAT rule 18 was amended in 2013. SI 55 empowered the Bank of Zambia to monitor international money transfers, and the changes to VAT rule 18 required exporters (mines included) to obtain import
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mineral Royalty</strong></td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8% Underground</td>
<td>6% Underground</td>
<td>4–6%</td>
<td>5.5–10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Corporate Income Tax</strong></td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>0% on concentrate</td>
<td>30% on concentrate</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Windfall Tax</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variable Profit Tax</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capital Allowance</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Export Duty on Copper Concentrate</strong></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Manley (2017)
documentation and proof of payment from the country of ultimate destination. However, both measures were either revoked or diluted within two years of their implementation, attributable in large part to pressures emanating from the mines and the depreciation of the kwacha in 2014.

In addition to increasing mineral royalties and trying to curb tax evasion, the second wave of Zambian resource nationalism has also entailed efforts to improve state regulatory capacity. State technical capacities for regulating and monitoring the mining companies were severely weakened by fiscal austerity, the dismantling of ZCCM, and the overly concessionary developmental agreements made with foreign investors in the 1990s. MEMACO was dismantled, and the privately owned copper mines were responsible for the marketing and sales of the copper they produced, with the newly formed ZRA responsible for collecting revenue from them. However, the ZRA proved incapable of effectively monitoring the mines and recognizing tax evasion. In response to this lack of regulatory capacity, the ZRA sought assistance from the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), the Norwegian Tax Authority (NTA), and the Norwegian Embassy in Lusaka to improve its auditing and enforcement capabilities to increase fiscal receipts from the mines through the training of mine auditors and the implementation of the multi-agency Mineral Value Chain Monitoring Project (Kalyandu 2015). While these improvements to the Zambian state’s taxation efforts represent positive developments, they also underline its technical dependence on the donor community.

The second wave for resource nationalism was firmly rooted in the aspirations and frustrations of the Copperbelt, with mine suppliers and contractors as a key constituency of the PF (Kabimba 2015; Mufonka 2015; Scott 2015). Moreover, demands for local procurement and backward linkages complimented the PF’s agenda for employment promotion. A recent study commissioned by the African Development Bank (Lombe 2019, vii–viii) maintained that: “84% of [mining] input goods and services are procured locally, [yet] this masks their value creation in the economy. Less than about 13% of local purchases are goods manufactured in Zambia or services provided by resident or Zambian-owned firms. These reflect ‘true local procurement.’ Thus 87% of goods and services are provided by locally domiciled foreign first tier companies with little value added. Of the true local procurement, only about 2.5% of goods and services are supplied by Zambian-owned firms.”

These disappointing statistics can be largely attributed to the negative consequences of trade liberalization, with cheaper imports outcompeting Zambian-produced manufactures, and to the privatization of the mines, with private mining companies moving away from local procurement (Fesshaie 2012; Caramento 2020). Both the Mines and Mineral Development Bills of 2008 and 2015 included provisions giving preference to “materials and products made in Zambia” and “contractors, suppliers and service agencies located in Zambia
and owned by citizens or citizen-owned companies.” However, these provisions were vague, not actively enforced, and carried no penalties for non-compliance. In 2012, then Vice President Guy Scott, in cooperation with the Chamber of Mines and the Zambian Association of Manufacturers (with funding from the World Bank and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development), initiated the Zambian Mining Local Content Initiative (ZMLCI), which was meant to act as a successor to the International Finance Corporation’s Copperbelt SME Supplier Development Programme. ZMCLI proposed a series of recommendations to facilitate local supplier development, “including the establishment of a credit guarantee facility, financial education for micro- and small enterprises, establishment of a central collateral registry, and development of a national MSMEs financing policy” (Kragelund 2017, 63). Unfortunately, the initiative appears to have dissipated following President Sata’s death in late 2014 and the subsequent departure of Scott from office (Mwape 2015). Instead of implementing a strong local content policy (Ovadia 2016a), PF ministers tended to make non-binding pronouncements encouraging mining companies to procure from and hire Zambian suppliers and contractors (Mufonka 2015).

The Beginning of the End?

The recent expropriation of Konkola Copper Mines (KCM) from Vedanta Resources in mid-2019 may, if taken at face value, suggest Zambian resource nationalism is ascendant. However, the action remains an isolated incident, with the former Presidential Spokesman Amos Chanda assuring other foreign investors that “[t]here will be no takeover (and) no seizure of private assets” (Reuters 29 May 2019). Moreover, the Zambian state does not intend to nationalize KCM but, rather, find a more suitable investor (Bloomberg 29 May 2019). Some journalists have even speculated that the Chinese are seeking control of KCM as collateral for possible debt restructuring (Smith 2020).

Three factors appear to signal the beginning of the end of Zambia’s second wave of resource nationalism. Firstly, a combination of volatile copper prices, currency depreciation, decreased public revenues, and electricity supply shortages beginning in 2015 have created an economic crisis. Secondly, this economic crisis has morphed into a political crisis. The ruling PF became increasingly authoritarian in the face of mounting opposition and splintering. The lead up to, and aftermath of, the August 2016 elections saw increased violence, electoral fraud, and the contravention of civil and political rights. Two prominent examples were the closure of the Post – Zambia’s largest independent newspaper – in 2016, and the arrest and temporary detention of then opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema on trumped up charges in 2017. Since Michael Sata’s passing in late 2014, the PF splintered, with former party grandees leaving to join the opposition or create their own political parties.
In the Copperbelt Province, traditionally an important support base for the PF, erstwhile supporters became increasingly disillusioned with the ruling party. Popular disillusionment with the ruling party, coupled with an ever deteriorating economic situation, culminated in the electoral defeat of the PF in the recent 2021 elections. The commitment to resource nationalist policies by the victors of the election, Hakainde Hichilema and his United Party for National Development (UPND), appears tenuous. Thirdly, and perhaps most crucially, Zambia’s external debt stock has increased substantially under the governance of the PF.

In an effort to fund the PF’s expansive infrastructure project, Zambia entered the sovereign bond market with an issuance of a ten-year US$750 million Eurobond at a coupon rate of 5.375 per cent in 2012. The Zambian government issued two additional ten-year Eurobonds for US$1 billion in 2014 and US$1.25 billion in 2015, with coupon rates of 8.5 per cent and 8.97 per cent, respectively (Nalishebo and Halwampa 2015). As Figure 8.1 demonstrates, these issuances have increased Zambia’s external debt stock significantly over the past decade, from US$4.25 billion in 2010 to US$27.34 billion in 2019. The COVID-19 pandemic further worsened Zambia’s debt crisis, as the Zambian state defaulted on its first repayment to Eurobond holders in late 2020 (Financial Times 19 November 2020). Hence, the recent spike in the price of copper price caused by the pandemic – reaching higher than US$3.50/pound in late 2020, the highest it has been in over five years – will not likely embolden Zambian policymakers to pursue resource nationalist measures, as many might expect.

In 2005, Zambia reached the HIPC Completion Point whereby its debt stock was reduced from US$7.1 billion to US$4.5 billion. In 2006, under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative, the IFIs provided those countries that had already reached HIPC Completion Point an additional debt write-off, reducing Zambia’s
The reduction in Zambia’s debt load and sustained economic growth prompted positive sovereign credit ratings (B+) in 2011. This permitted the government to tap into international bond markets to finance infrastructure investments. However, the yield rates on these Eurobonds have more than tripled in the last three years, as economic conditions in Zambia have deteriorated (Bloomberg 30 May 2019). Policymakers have eroded any room to manoeuvre Zambia had been afforded post-2006, inevitably returning the country to a situation reminiscent of neo-liberal structural adjustment in the 1980s and 1990s. Zambian policymakers will either have to pursue bailout negotiations with the International Monetary Fund or restructure the country’s sovereign debt with its main bilateral creditor, the Chinese. Both options would likely dampen contemporary Zambian resource nationalism.

Comparative Assessment

A number of similarities and differences between the two episodes of resource nationalism can be discerned. Perhaps most evidently, resource nationalism emerges in both instances when copper prices are high (Figure 8.2). Undoubtedly, the perceived profitability of the copper mines prompted calls for resource nationalist policies by Zambian legislators, civil society, and the general public. But both episodes of resource nationalism also emerged after a preceding period when foreign entities benefitted disproportionately in relation to indigenous Zambians. The two mining houses (RST and AAC) and the white-settler population had thrived under late colonial rule, in stark contrast to most of the subjugated African populace. The subsequent nationalization of large enterprises and the mines following independence was, in part, an effort to redress colonial legacies (Martin 1972). In the late 1990s, the postcolonial Zambian state was compelled by the IFIs and the Paris Club to privatize the copper mines at a time when the price of copper was low. The resulting fire sale benefitted foreign investors, who purchased mines at discounted prices under overly concessionary terms. Moreover, the communities of the Copperbelt, as mentioned earlier, suffered retrenchment, deterioration in the conditions of employment, and a loss of public services following privatization. The subsequent emergence of resource nationalism in the late 2000s was, in part, an effort to rectify this imbalance.

Pressures asserted by Zambian mine contractors and suppliers on the state to facilitate indigenous capital formation occurred during both waves. At the height of the first wave of resource nationalism, pressures from Zambian contractors to secure contracts from the recently nationalized mines coincided with the decision to cancel the management contracts and redeem the ZIMCO bonds in the early 1970s. During the second wave of resource nationalism,
the PF cultivated ties with Zambian contractors and suppliers on the Copperbelt and purported to advocate on their behalf. Unfortunately, a durable local procurement initiative has remained elusive (see also Chapters 7 and 9 in this volume).9

Both waves of resource nationalism either restrained or harnessed the militancy of mineworkers on the Copperbelt (Larmer 2007; Uzar 2017). The first wave involved the state’s assertion of control over intransigent mineworkers, while the second wave involved the mobilization of mineworkers by the opposition and efforts to appease them once in power (see note 7). Lastly, political contestation also influenced both resource nationalist waves. The threat posed to Kaunda by former Vice President Simon Kapwepwe and the intransigent mineworkers of the Copperbelt no doubt spurred the Mulungushi and Matero reforms in 1968–9. Similarly, electoral rivalries between PF and MMD, and later the PF and the UPND after the splintering of the MMD in 2011, pushed Zambian governments to improve the mineral taxation regime and bolster state regulatory capacity. The threat posed by political opposition and labour militancy in both instances fuelled “elite insecurity” (Hinfelaar and Achberger 2017, 19), driving ruling politicians to implement resource nationalist policies to hold on to power.

A significant constraint that both waves of resource nationalism shared was indebtedness. Mounting external debt from the late 1970s onward, culminated in neo-liberal structural adjustment and the privatization of the mines in the 1990s. It was only after reaching the HIPC Completion Point and receiving...
multilateral debt relief in 2005–6, that the Zambian legislators could contemplate the implementation of resource nationalist policies. However, as discussed above (see Figure 8.1), the recent return to indebtedness appears to have stunted the second wave of resource nationalism.

Despite similar motivations and constraints, there were noticeable differences between the two waves of resource nationalism. Most evidently, the types of policies and reforms implemented under each of the respective waves differed. The first wave of resource nationalism concentrated on the ownership and management of the mines and indigenization of the workforce. The second wave of resource nationalism has been more concerned with taxation, the cultivation of regulatory capacity, and, to a lesser degree, the cultivation of productive linkages to the mines. The former wave sought to control and expand copper mining, while the latter sought to remedy the liberalized mineral governance regime of the 1990s. Evidently, the scope and weight of the proposed policies and reforms were comparatively moderate in the second wave. This moderation is largely due to the Zambian state’s inability to effectively discipline foreign mining capital. There are three reasons for this dilemma. First, the ownership structure of the Zambian copper mines is much more dispersed in the twenty-first century, making it appreciably more difficult to regulate. Second, the mines possess more structural power in relation to the state and thus can more forcefully oppose measures that run counter to their interests. Due to the PF’s support base on the Copperbelt and dependency of the Zambian economy on copper exports, the current government is averse to mine closures. Hence, by threatening to place mines under care and maintenance or withholding planned capital investments, foreign mining capital has successfully vetoed taxation increases or alterations to the mining taxation regime. Third, as discussed previously, state regulatory capacity has not kept pace with increasingly sophisticated accounting and logistical practices employed by multinational enterprises. The lack of coordination between various state agencies and ministries that regulate the large-scale mining sector and the failure to adequately counter tax evasion, until recently, has meant the Zambian state is in the process of playing catchup. And there exists little doubt that this catchup effort, though notable, will likely be hampered by the debt crisis. As a result, the second wave of resource nationalism has experienced numerous setbacks and reversals.

Economic liberalization has also narrowed the policy options available to peripheral economies. Zambia’s backward linkages to mining acts as a case in point. During the first wave of resource nationalism, procurement from domestic suppliers was mandated by the mine’s majority shareholder, the Zambian state. Moreover, those domestic suppliers were also afforded protections from foreign competitors. Following trade liberalization and the privatization of the mines in the 1990s, procurement from privately owned domestic
suppliers was encouraged but not legislatively enforced, and these suppliers were often priced out by “briefcase businessmen” and foreign competitors (Fesehaie 2012). Without a robust industrial strategy, a viable local content initiative, and selective trade barriers, the Zambian supply chain is unlikely to be resuscitated (Caramento 2020). But, aside from contending against likely resistance from the privately owned mining companies to such measures, some scholars have suggested that they contravene the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) and multilateral trade agreements (the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa and the Southern African Development Community’s Free Trade Area in the case of Zambia), effectively “kicking away the ladder” (Chang 2002).

Another challenge faced by many local mine suppliers and contractors is securing access to finance. Commercial lending rates for long-term capital finance are prohibitively high in Zambia, making it difficult for domestic manufacturers and service providers to modernize or expand their operational capacities. The Zambian government was prodded to enact financial liberalization in the 1990s under structural adjustment, which entailed, among other measures, the removal of controls on commercial lending rates (Brownridge 1996). Subsequent efforts to cap lending rates for SMEs by the Sata administration were scrapped due to aggressive inflation targeting (Caramento 2020).

Conclusion

The preceding examination has produced a number of notable observations. Despite the varying political and economic dynamics of both episodes of resource nationalism, some motivations and opportunities for the phenomenon remain constant. These include the price of copper, resistance to foreign exploitation, pressures to facilitate indigenous/domestic capital accumulation, political contestation, and labour militancy. The first two factors are consistent with the findings of the existent literature on the topic, but the last three factors are not. Whether or not these motivations are exclusive to the Zambian case or applicable to other cases, requires further comparative research. These three additional motivations demonstrate the need to expand the study of resource nationalism beyond conflicts between host governments and foreign investors. A constraint that both episodes of resource nationalism shared was the debilitating impact of indebtedness.

Yet there was one major difference between these two episodes of resource nationalism – the latter was preceded by neo-liberal structural adjustment. Arguably, this served to moderate and limit the policies and reforms associated with the second wave of resource nationalism. Instead of advocating for greater ownership and control over mining assets, the most recent wave of resource nationalism in Zambia (and throughout the African continent more broadly) has sought to cultivate fiscal and productive linkages to natural resource
extraction. Hence, the second wave does not represent a complete repudiation of the liberalized extractive regime forged in the 1990s but, rather, “continuity with change” (Nem Singh 2010).

At the dawn of the 2020s, similar competing pressures continue to influence the governance of Zambia’s mining sector. Glencore attempted to place Mopani Copper Mines (MCM) under care and maintenance in April 2020, allegedly in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Such an action would have resulted in thousands of job losses. In an effort to appease frustrated mineworkers and Copperbelt residents, the government threatened to withdraw MCM’s mining licence. Glencore subsequently retracted their decision, and instead proceeded to offload its stake in MCM to the state-owned mining investment firm ZCCM-IH under very favorable terms. In the recent 2021 elections, Hakainde Hichilema and his UPND defeated the incumbent Edgar Lungu and his PF. While it’s too early to determine definitively if resource nationalist policies will wane under Hichilema’s tenure, early indications appear to point in that direction.

The formation of a “post-neo-liberal” developmental state that many hoped would accompany contemporary resource nationalism is debatably complicated by the enduring legacy of neo-liberal economic policies in the Global South. Zambia is not “cursed” by its copper deposits but, rather, a combination of exogenous economic conditions and institutional and legislative shortfalls.

NOTES

1 The maximization of public revenue from resource extraction includes measures such as increased royalties, taxes, and duties on mining operations and the removal or limitation of tax exemptions and deductions. Regulation and ownership of extractive industries includes measures such as the creation or renovation of state regulatory bodies and the outright or partial nationalization of privately owned assets. Finally, the enhancement of developmental spillovers from mining operations typically involves the cultivation of backward and forward linkages, such as the formation of local content or supplier development programmes in the case of the former or the construction of mineral processing and metal fabrication facilities in the case of the latter (Haslam and Heidrich 2016).

2 Some scholars and civil society activists have argued that the Chinese-owned copper mines are plagued by poor working conditions, worse than those of other large copper mines (Fraser and Lungu 2006; HRW 2011). For a comprehensive discussion of the issue and a carefully researched rebuttal, see Hairong and Sautman (2013).

3 The nationalization of mines was complimented by the establishment of CIPEC (Conseil Intergouvernemental des Pays Exportateurs de Cuivre) in 1967, a copper producers’ cartel that sought to “increase member earnings; increase real prices; coordinate production, pricing, and capacity additions; and provide production and marketing information” (Shafer 1994, 57). Unfortunately, CIPEC ultimately
failed, largely due to its limited control over global copper production, with member states accounting for less than 60 per cent of the world copper trade, and its inability to concertedly stockpile copper reserves (Larmer 2010b).

4 Former Managing Director of the Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO) and Zambian civil servant Andrew Sardanis (2003, 266–78) argued that the early redemption of the ZIMCO bonds was, in actuality, a profit-making scheme hatched by infamous Lonrho Chief Executive Tiny Rowland who, with the cooperation of Zambian officials, had allegedly purchased the bonds earlier at a reduced rate.

5 Stipulations encouraging the newly privatized mines to procure services and goods from Zambian contractors and suppliers and to establish local business development programmes were included in the development agreements, but these stipulations were largely ignored.

6 The author was contracted as a consultant, from 1 July to 14 August 2020, by Prospero Zambia (funded by UKAID) to assist the Zambian Ministry of Mines and Minerals Development with the drafting of a statutory instrument (SI) to enforce Section 20 of the Mines and Minerals Development Act no. 11 of 2015. Section 20 regulates the procurement of local goods and services and the employment and training of Zambian citizens. As of writing, the draft SI had not yet been enacted.

7 Guy Scott, Mulenga Sata, Robert Sichinga, and Geoffrey Bwalya Mwamba (or “GBM” as he is more commonly known) joined the main opposition party, the United Party for National Development (UPND). And Wynter Kabimba, Miles Sampa, and Chishimba Kambwili formed their own political parties. Chishimba Kambwili Miles Sampa, GBM, and Mulenga Sata subsequently rejoined the PF.

8 A UNDP discussion paper (Simpasa et al. 2013) estimated that if a 6 per cent royalty and 30 per cent corporate tax rate had been applied in the DAs during the 1997–2012 period, the government would have earned an additional US$1.6 billion, or the equivalent of 3.7 per cent of annual GDP for the period. Greater resource mobilization through taxation, the paper concluded, would have enabled the government to avoid the costly sovereign bond market.

9 Though this situation may soon improve. The Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry released the National Local Content Strategy, 2018–2022 in 2018, wherein a future multisectoral local content policy was outlined (MCTI 2018). And the author recently participated in the drafting of a mining local content statutory instrument for Ministry of Mines and Minerals Development (see note 6). Hence, a renewed effort towards realizing increased local content in the copper mining supply chain is conceivably on the horizon.

REFERENCES


Fraser, Alastair, and John Lungu. 2006. *For Whom the Windfalls? Winners and Losers in the Privatisation of Zambia’s Copper Mines*. Lusaka: CSTNZ & CCJDP.


An Examination of Zambian Resource Nationalism


**Interviews**


Former Minister in Mwanawasa’s Cabinet. 2015. Conducted on 17 June in Lusaka.

Kabimba, Wynter. 2015. Former Secretary General of the PF and Minister of Justice under the Sata Administration. Conducted on 1 July in Lusaka.


Mwape, Roseta. 2015. Managing Director of ZAMEFA and Former CEO of Zambian Association of Manufacturers. Conducted on 11 August in Lusaka.

Scott, Guy. 2015. Former Vice-President under the Sata Administration. Conducted on 2 June in Lusaka.

**Archival Material**


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