the present of . . . economics and politics . . . suggest that political reform will not be successful (no matter how coherently designed, no matter how accommodating the political strategies of certain elected officials) if political power continues to be the most sure source of economic gain.”84 We challenge you, in the name of future and present generations everywhere.

Further Thoughts

Global Governance

Walt Anderson

For many people the dream of world government has always seemed the key to the future, the only pathway to a world of peace, stability, equity, and fairness. This was the dream expressed by Alfred Lord Tennyson in his poem “Locksley Hall,” invoking a future time when “the war-drums throbbed no longer and the battle flags were furled/In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world.”

Today World Federalists carry forth the idea of a global government complete with constitution, capital, and powers to levy taxes and enforce world law. Outside their ranks, many people who are not prepared to go all the way with a complete global state nevertheless advocate a greatly strengthened United Nations or perhaps an elected global parliament.

In striking contrast to this is the worldview of the political theorists and government officials who call themselves “realists” and who see nation-states as the once and future keepers of legitimate power to govern and the realities of world events driven by national interest. From the realist point of view, such a global government is neither practical nor desirable.

A third point of view holds that we already have a system of global governance (not a government, but rather an ever-changing arrangement of governments, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational corporations, regimes, and practices) and that the hope of the future lies in its evolution, variously described as an “ambiguous world order,” a “nobody-in-general-charge system,” or an “ecology of governance.”

Notes

1. Ted C. Lewellen, Political Anthropology: An Introduction (Westport, Conn.: Bergin & Garvey, 1992), chaps. 1, 2.


17. H.R. 3070, “A bill to provide for the continuous assessment of critical trends and


24. Ibid., 804.


26. Ibid., xi.

27. Ibid., x.


31. Ibid.

32. Ibid., 384.


34. Ibid., 16ff

35. Ibid., 22ff.

36. Ibid., 33ff; and Benjamin Barber, A Place for Us: How to Make Society Civil and Democracy Strong (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998). See also his “Clansmen, Consumers and Citizens: Three Takes on Civil Society,” in Civil Society, Democracy, and Civic Renewal, ed. Fullinwider, 9–29. Barber’s use of the label “clansmen” also critiques the “neutrality” that some uses of “civil society” imply—hate groups like the Ku Klux Klan and/or groups that are internally organized as patriarchal dictatorships, for example, can be understood to be good examples of “civil society” unless a specific value orientation is added.

37. Ibid., 75.

38. Available at http://aei.org/events/eventID.329,filter./event_detail.asp.


40. Martin Kohler, “From the National to the Cosmopolitan Public Sphere,” in Re-
41. Ibid., 233.
42. Ibid., 247.
45. Ibid, 22.
46. Ibid., 21–24 passim.
51. Ibid., 6.
52. Ibid., 7.
53. Ibid., 8.
54. Ibid., 9.


64. Wheeler, “Constitutionalism,” in *Governmental Institutions and Processes*, 5:esp. 6 and 76f.

65. For more discussion on the questionable assumptions of rationality underlying law and electoral decision making, see Dator, “Quantum Theory and Political Design.”


69. Ibid., 172.

70. Ibid.


72. For more on this, see Jim Dator, “When Courts are Overgrown with Grass: Futures of Courts and Law,” *Futures* 32.1 (February 2000): 183–197.


74. Ibid., 1f.

75. Ibid., 2.

76. Ibid., 3.


80. Ibid.


84. Ibid., 291.