Notes

Preface

5 Prud’homme, *L’Économie* …, p. 11.
7 *Bulletin Bi-Hebdomadaire, Chambre Mixte de Commerce et d’Agriculture du Cambodge*. Copies held in the State Archives of Cambodia (ANC), Boxes 144–73.

Introduction

3 Ibid., p. 357.
4 These figures applied in 2000, before the national commune elections of 2002.
6 Article 1, Chapter 1, *The Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia* (as amended on 4 March 1999).
7 Ibid., p. 10.

ADB, “Indigenous Peoples, Ethnic Minorities and Poverty Reduction,” Manila, June 2002, pp. 5–6. The figures are supported by a table entitled “Indigenous Peoples Identified by Language Spoken” sourced from the National Population Census of 1998 and based on 17 language groups. The data in the table include indigenous groups in the five northeastern provinces only.


NIS, Report on the Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey 1999, Ministry of Planning, Phnom Penh. The “poverty line” refers to the commonly used World Bank income/consumption measure that defines as extremely poor those adults who cannot afford to consume the benchmark per capita calorie requirement of 2,100 calories per day plus a small measure for essentials such as shelter and clothing. Commonly, this is understood to refer to those who survive on less than US$1 per day. In Cambodia’s case, however, the benchmark is set at around 50 U.S. cents. Separate calculations for Phnom Penh, Other Urban Areas and Rural Areas of Cambodia give benchmark figures of 1,629 riels, 1,214 riels and 1,036 riels respectively. These calculations were made in 1998 when the official exchange rate was 3,807.8 riels per U.S. dollar.


Ibid., p. viii.


As a sharp reminder of the vagaries of the Cambodian climate, extremely favourable conditions allowed the agricultural sector to recover markedly in 2003 with 8.2 per cent growth; paddy production alone increased by 26.9 per cent. Oum Sothea and Sok Hach, *Cambodia Economic Watch*, EIC, pp. 6–7.


In 1995, the four nations of the Lower Mekong Basin: Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam signed the landmark “Agreement on Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin” that has the status of an international treaty. The signatories agreed to cooperate in development and management of the river basin and its resources, including navigation, flood control, fisheries, agriculture, power production, and environmental protection. See Joern Kristensen, “Cooperation Key to Fair Mekong Development,” *The Cambodia Daily*, 11 July 2001.


Sok Hach et al., “Prospects …,” p. 8.


Ibid., p. 26. The Mekong River Commission study of 1995–96 showed 24 per cent, both NIS and CASD/WFP studies of 1997 reported 10 per cent, and the 1998 WFP target survey calculated 17 per cent. Studies in 1999 by WFP and FAO reported a landlessness rate in rural Cambodia of over 20 per cent. Chan Sophal et al. (CDRI Working Paper 19) warn there is a huge inconsistency in the parameters generated from the different data sets on variables relating to land.

In September 1999, the Prime Minister issued an eleven-point order to halt “anarchical” land grabbing. Civil society groups that provide legal aid reported that half of all their civil cases involved land disputes. See Toshiyasu Kato et al., Cambodia: Enhancing Governance …, fn. 12.


Ibid., p. 21.


Sok Hach et al., “Prospects …,” p. 4.


Oum Sothea and Sok Hach, Cambodia Economic Watch, EIC, p. 36.


Oum Sothea and Sok Hach, Cambodia Economic Watch, EIC, p. 36.


Ibid., p. 12.


Sok Hach et al., “Prospects …,” p. 9.


Sok Hach et al., “Prospects …,” p. 10.


David Kihara, “Bank Official: Cambodian Microfinancing Rates Too High,” The Cambodia Daily, 18 July 2001. This account explains that the ADB offers the loan to the Ministry of Finance at one per cent per annum (1.5 per cent after eight years) which lends the money to the Rural Development Bank at approximately seven per cent. The RDB distributes it among microfinancing
institutions at 11 per cent and they disburse to farmers at rates between 24–60 per cent per annum.

Oum Sothea and Sok Hach, *Cambodia Economic Watch, EIC*, p. 29.

**Chapter 1**


3. Ibid., p. 21.

4. Ibid., p. 43.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., p. 45.


8. Ibid., p. 8.

9. Ibid., p. 6.


11. In his doctoral dissertation, David Chandler suggests that Thailand already exercised *de facto* jurisdiction over these *srok* “simply because they were able to do so, once the Cambodian administration had become so far off, so fragmented and so weak.” See “Cambodia Before the French: politics in a tributary kingdom 1794–1848,” Doctoral Thesis, University of Michigan, 1973, p. 79.

12. Ibid., p. 132.

13. Ibid., p. 144.


15. Ibid., p. 103, fn. 10.

16. Ibid., p. 33.


18. Ibid., p. 226.

19. Ibid., p. 236.

20. Ibid., p. 275.


22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., p. 83.


25. Ibid., p. 38.

26. Ibid., p. 47.

27. Ibid., p. 99.

28. *The French in Indo-China* …
29 Ibid., p. 124.
31 Ibid., p. 204.
37 Ibid.
39 For a discussion of these changes, see Osborne, *The French Presence…*, chapter 9.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., p. 250.
51 Ibid., Confidential letter from Résident Supérieur Cambodge to Gouverneur- Général, Saigon, No. 771/EX., 30 September 1931.


Figures in this paragraph are taken from Robequain, *The Economic Development of French Indo-China*, chapter 1.


Collard, *Cambodge et Cambodgiens*, p. 62.

Ibid., p. 249.

Ibid., p. 195.

Ibid., p. 47.

Ibid., p. 193.


Collard, *Cambodge et Cambodgiens*, p. 77.


Ibid., p. 77.

Ibid., p. 261.

Ibid., p. 243.


ANC RSC File 13948, ORs et arrêtés de la RSC.


Ibid., Preparation of *Livre Vert*, Section II, “Concessions Domaniales.”


Ibid., p. 36.

Ibid., p. 37.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

ANC RSC File 15688, Protectorate of Cambodia, “Regulations relative to the distribution of incentives and bonuses for agriculture and raising domestic animals and horses,” 26 September 1905.

Collard, *Cambodge et Cambodgiens*, p. 262.

Prud’homme, *L’Économie du Cambodge*, p. 254. These are tentative figures, based on a 1930 figure given by Yves Henry and for the years before that given by Morizon.


Collard, *Cambodge et Cambodgiens*, p. 262.


Thompson, *French Indo-China*, p. 203.

Ibid., p. 176.


Ibid.


Collard, *Cambodge et Cambodgiens*, p. 144.

Ibid., p. 102.

Ibid., p. 266.


Ibid.

Chapter 2


3 Michael E. Latham, *Modernisation as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North


Ibid.


Ibid.

There was also a two-year plan for November 1956 to June 1958, but Prud’homme says that it was mainly a catalogue of public expenses, “a sort of biennial budget.” See Prud’homme, p. 170.

Ibid., *L’Économie …*, p. 169.

Ibid., pp. 170–1.


Ibid., p. 201.


Ibid.

Bib., p. 159.


Ibid., p. 21.

Ibid., p. 31.


Ibid., *L’Économie …*, p. 38.

Ibid., p. 46.
Notes to pp. 88–99

30 Ibid., pp. 46, 48.
32 Delvert, Le Paysan . . ., p. 524.
33 BCMCAC, 7–17 July 1970.
34 Prud’homme, L’Économie . . ., p. 107.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., p. 108.
40 Prud’homme, L’Économie . . ., p. 31.
41 Ibid., p. 33.
42 Osborne, Prince of Light . . ., p. 268. The table has been created from figures provided by Osborne.
43 Ibid.
44 Prud’homme, L’Économie . . ., p. 55.
47 Prud’homme, L’Économie . . ., p. 70.
48 Delvert, Le Paysan . . ., p. 490.
49 The Cadastral Service made a distinction between “owners” and “occupiers.” Strictly speaking, only those households whose names appeared on the register were officially owners, and many communes still had not been surveyed and registered. Delvert considered this legal point had no practical importance since “occupiers” had the same rights and responsibilities as “owners.” Possession was obtained by purchase, inheritance or by the traditional method of occupation and development over five years on land belonging originally to the Domain (State Domain or Local Domain) and on which the peasant had obtained a “permit to cultivate.” The old Khmer principle of “acquisition by the plough” was still important in under-populated regions but was approved by the state, Delvert noted.
50 Delvert, Le Paysan . . ., pp. 496, 500.
52 Prud’homme, L’Économie . . ., p. 72.
53 Ibid., p. 73.
54 Delvert, Le Paysan . . ., p. 358.
55 Ibid., p. 322 for paddy, p. 372 for sesame and groundnuts.
59 Ibid., p. 354.

61. ANC Box 469, “Rapport Annuel …”


63. Ibid.


65. Ibid., 3 July 1964.


68. Details about the rubber industry are provided in *Photos-Souvenirs … Agriculture*, pp. 89–107.

69. BCMAC, 27 October 1964.


74. Ibid., p. 12.


76. Ibid., p. 45.


79. Ibid., p. 116.

80. BCMAC, 18 December 1962.


Prud’homo, L’Économie …, p. 90.

Ibid. See also following note.

BCMCAC, 26 February 1954, quoting Bulletin Économique et Statistique du Cambodge, April, May and June 1954.

Ibid., 11 April 1958.

AN Box 331, “Basic Information …”

Quoted by Khieu Samphan in his dissertation, using figures from the Retrospective Statistical Yearbook for Cambodia, June 1958.

BCMCAC, 8 September 1959, “The Spirit of Economic Aid,” speech to the Rotary Club of Phnom Penh by Charles A. Mann, director of the American Economic Aid Mission to Cambodia.

Ibid., 15 March 1957.

Rémy Prud’homme considered that an average rate for the whole period up to 1963 was 82 riels to the dollar, compared with the official rate of a little over 35 riels. In December 1957 and again exactly one year later, the French franc was devalued against the U.S. dollar and against gold. Cambodia refused to change the rate of the riel against the franc or the dollar, but there were disparities in the money markets of Phnom Penh where the official rate was maintained at 10 riels to the franc and 35 to the dollar.


BCMCAC, 15 November 1963.


Ibid.

Less than a fortnight before the nationalisation law was passed, the Diem regime in South Vietnam was overthrown in a bloody coup. American complicity was clearly understood by the prince and he no doubt interpreted the event as a warning.

BCMCAC, 20 December 1963.


Prud’homo, L’Économie …, p. 170.

In 1958, for example, U.S. economic aid was worth 373 million riels compared with France’s contribution of 132 million riels. That year, an agreement on economic and technical cooperation worth 150 million riels was signed with Japan. Refer to BCMCAC, 6 November 1959, quoting AKP, 31 October 1959.
Notes to pp. 114–31  311

104 BCMCAC, 8 September 1959, “The Spirit of Economic Aid.”
105 Ibid., 16 May 1967, “Report on the meeting to discuss economic problems at the Chamber of Commerce,” presided over by Chau Seng, Minister of State for National Economy.
106 Ibid., 11 August 1967.
107 Refer to BCMCAC, 1 March 1957, 27 September 1957, and 29 August 1958.
108 Osborne, Power and Politics, p. 103.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid., p. 63.
112 Ibid., p. 62.
113 BCMCAC, 13 September 1954.
115 Prud’homme, L’Économie …, p. 221.
116 Ibid., p. 223.
117 Delvert, Le Paysan …, pp. 514, 518.
118 Ibid., p. 523.
120 Prud’homme, L’Économie …, p. 188.
121 Ibid.
122 Photos-Souvenirs … Agriculture, p. 245.
125 Delvert, Le Paysan …, p. 519.
128 BCMCAC, 9 December 1969.
129 A friend of the author and her husband were volunteers on a cooperative in Pursat province in the 1960s. They confirmed the low interest rate which they put at 0.7 per cent per month, which was very low compared with unorganised credit. They said that the credit system at their cooperative did not work because the farmers refused to repay loans.
131 Ibid., p. 2.
132 Ibid., p. 16.

Chapter 3

Le Cambodge Economique (formerly the BCMCAC), 16 October 1970. The twice-weekly bulletin of the Chamber of Commerce and Agriculture was renamed Le Cambodge Economique (LCE) with its first issue on 8 May 1970. On 29 January 1971, it was renamed Revue Economique (RE). The Revue Economique continued publishing until 29 March 1974. Copies referred to below are held at the State Archives of Cambodia (ANC), starting with Box 165.
According to these laws, the public sector would retain monopoly of the production and distribution of electricity (of more than 500KVA), the production of arms and munitions, rail transport, and the post and telecommunications services. Other areas of economic activity were open to competition from the private sector. In commerce and trade, the state retained monopoly of exports of rice and derivatives, maize, rubber, and precious or semi-precious stones. Some listed imports also remained under state monopoly. Otherwise, the law stated, “All the other operations of export and import can be exercised as well by the private sector as by the public sector and without privilege of any sort for the latter.” See BCMCAC, 17 February 1970.


Han Suyin, who had close personal contact with the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party wrote, “[T]hrough the port of Sihanoukville in Cambodia, war matériel was being transported to the thirteen [North Vietnamese] bases [on Cambodian territory] and on to the Liberation Front of South Vietnam. This matériel was not only Russian but also Chinese. It was the Chinese who paid for the conveying of goods, and the man who was being paid was … Lon Nol, through his wife’s transport company. In 1969, during an official visit to Beijing as Premier of Cambodia, Lon Nol had asked for more money. ‘He made quite irrational demands,’ Zhang Wenjing told me. Then why the coup? Perhaps Lon Nol would get more money from the Americans …”. See Han

15 LCE, 12 May 1970.


17 Ibid., p. 31.

18 RE, 7 September 1971.


21 Ibid.

22 Ibid., p. 108.

23 Ibid., p. 109.

24 Ibid., p. 107.

25 Ibid., p. 91.


28 Hildebrand and Porter, *Cambodia* . . . , p. 42.


30 Desbarats, *Prolific Survivors* . . . , p. 130.


32 RE, 4 August 1972.

33 Hildebrand and Porter, *Cambodia* . . . , p. 21.

34 RE, 29 August 1972.

35 Hildebrand and Porter, *Cambodia* . . . , p. 23.

36 RE, 20 October 1971.

37 Hildebrand and Porter, *Cambodia* . . . , p. 21.

38 RE, 4 January 1974.

39 Ibid., 15 August 1972.

40 Ibid., 18 August 1972.

41 Elizabeth Becker, *When the War was Over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution* (New York: Public Affairs, 1986), p. 152.


43 Ibid., p. 162.

44 Hildebrand and Porter, *Cambodia* . . . , p. 29.

45 ANC Box 357, Maréchal Lon Nol, “Neo-Khmerisme,” Phnom Penh, undated.


47 Ibid., p. 80.


LCE, 26 May 1970.

51 Ibid., 30 June and 3 July 1970.

52 RE, 16 March 1971.

53 Ibid., 12 February 1971.

54 Ibid., 16 March 1971.

55 Hildebrand and Porter, *Cambodia …*, p. 20.


58 LCE, 22 January 1971.


60 Ibid., 28 October 1972.


63 LCE, 26 May 1970.


65 BCMCAC, 17 February 1970.


68 Hildebrand and Porter, *Cambodia …*, p. 19.


70 Hildebrand and Porter, *Cambodia …*, p. 36.

71 Ibid., p. 34.

72 Table compiled from figures in RE, 29 March 1974.

73 Hildebrand and Porter, *Cambodia …*, p. 33.


75 LCE, 26 May 1970.


79 Ibid., 16 November 1971.

80 Ibid., 9 November 1971.

81 Ibid.

Chapter 4

1 Khieu Samphan, *Cambodia’s Economy and Industrial Development*.
3 “Cambodia” and “Kampuchea” are used interchangeably in this chapter. In Western literature and reporting, the latter usually denotes the revolutionary society, but both names have a long history of use.
4 Hildebrand and Porter quote Deputy Premier Ieng Sary who said in September 1975 that further increases in the city’s population were expected as productive facilities were restored and expanded. See *Cambodia: Starvation and Revolution*, p. 46.
5 Many reasons have been cited for the decision to evacuate the city. They vary from practical problems of food stocks, transportation and security to ideological ones. Khieu Samphan argues that there would have been “confusion” among the revolutionary troops if the city had not been evacuated. The battle-hardened fighters, he said, were “very brave in front of bullets but not prepared to confront the kroab skâr (sweets or candy).” See In Sopheap, *Khieu Samphan: Aggrandi et Réel* (unpublished), p. 82. Others suggest that the movement had long lost touch with its urban cells, so setting up an administration to run a city the size of Phnom Penh was beyond the capacity of the victors. See Peter Sainsbury and Chea Sotheacheath, “Good intentions paved road to mass murder,” an interview with a Phnom Penh-based founder of the CPK and former student colleague in Paris of Pol Pot, Ieng Sary and other leaders, in *Phnom Penh Post*, 14–27 April 2000.
6 Michael Vickery explained, “[Battambang] with the greatest potential social contradictions had, in 1975, the largest number of republican supporters outside Phnom Penh, and also the weakest local Communist organisation.” For details of his interviews conducted with refugees in 1980, see *Cambodia 1975–1982* (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1999).

The *Gouvernement Royal d’Union Nationale du Kampuchéa* (GRUNK) was created by Prince Sihanouk to administer the *Front National Uni du Kampuchéa* (FUNK) after the coup in March 1970.

In Sopheap, *Khieu Samphan* … Khieu Samphan named Doeun as head of Office 870 and claimed that the political matters Doeun dealt with were carried out in complete secrecy.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


David Chandler et al., *Pol Pot Plans the Future*, p. 44.


ANC PRK, “Decision of the centre concerning the setting out of duties and the system of organisation of the work of the party centre, the government and the front,” for Central Committee, First Secretary, 1979 (unsigned, undated).


The most commonly quoted figure in newspapers and journals is 1.7 million “deaths.” Vickery notes that given the normal pre-war mortality rate of 18 per thousand, there would have been at least 511,200 normal deaths in the same period. See Cambodia 1975–1982, p. 198.


Desbarats, Prolific Survivors …, p. 87.

Ibid., p. 88.

Michael Vickery’s Cambodia 1975–1982 refutes the journalistic “standard total view” that developed from early reports about the DK regime. From interviews with refugees in Thai camps, he presented the case that conditions in Pursat and other parts of the northwest were generally the worst for most of the regime, and while there were few refugees to represent Kratie, he believed that conditions there had been relatively benign. The present author agrees with this argument on the basis of hundreds of informal conversations with Cambodians who experienced the regime as “new people” in all regions of the country as well as figures from the 1998 census.

Desbarats, Prolific Survivors …, p. 93.


Jerrold W. Huguet, The Population of Cambodia, 1980–1996, and Projected to 2020, National Institute of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Phnom Penh, May 1997, p. 28. Huguet explained his method as follows: “To project back to 1980, the 1985 population, including the camp population, was used. The estimated 200,000 return migrants were subtracted, the population was reverse survived to 1980, the 140,000 persons in camps in Thailand were subtracted, and the 72,000 persons who emigrated after 1980 were added to obtain the estimated population as of mid-1980, or 6,549,687 persons.”

Ibid., p. vii.

Desbarats, Prolific Survivors …, p. 107.

These figures are quoted by Jacqueline Desbarats, Prolific Survivors …, pp. 92–4.

Ibid., p. 88.


Ibid., using various sources, p. 113.

The table has been compiled from information provided in Appendix A, ‘International Migration Assumptions’ by Banister and Johnson, “After the Nightmare,” pp. 121–4.

UNDP KNAS, p. 184.

Ibid., p. 19. The Finnish Inquiry Commission reported in 1982, “Today national minorities account for approximately three per cent of the population, the largest being the Chinese minority which formerly made up five to six per
cent of the population. Since 1981 some ethnic Vietnamese have returned, p. 34.

Ibid.

Banister and Johnson, “After the Nightmare …,” p. 97.


Ibid., p. 141.


Desbarats, Prolific Survivors …, p. 131.


Ibid., p. 150.

Desbarats, Prolific Survivors …, p. 162.

Slocomb, “Chikreng Rebellion,” p. 66.


Desbarats, Prolific Survivors …, p. 163.

Ibid.


Hildebrand and Porter, Cambodia …, p. 54.

Vickery, Cambodia 1975–82, p. 102.

In Sopheap, Khieu Samphan …, p. 109. The anti-malarial campaigns did take place. Karl D. Jackson notes, “In November 1976, in one of its first international trading transactions, the Kampuchean government was forced by dire circumstances to purchase $450,000 worth of DDT for its anti-malarial campaign,” Cambodia 1975–1978: Rendezvous with Death, p. 48.

Desbarats, Prolific Survivors …, p. 151.

Ibid., p. 96.

In Sopheap, Khieu Samphan … David Ayres identifies these remarks from a document circulated by the Centre in September 1975. See Anatomy of a Crisis …, p. 105.
69 Ibid., p. 113.
71 ANC PRK, “Report summing up the results of the campaign against illiteracy and for complementary education,” National Committee for the Campaign, unsigned and undated.
73 Ibid.
75 Ibid., p. 10.
76 Ibid., p. 14.
77 Hildebrand and Porter, *Cambodia*, p. 88.
80 Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–82*, p. 117.
81 Hildebrand and Porter, *Cambodia*, p. 92.
82 Ibid. The authors do not say, but this decision to nationalise the plantations was presumably taken by the government of the United Front (GRUNK), not the government of the Khmer Republic.
84 The five per cent figure was quoted by Nayan Chanda, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 17 August 1979, p. 16. The specific area in hectares is from “Announcement of the People’s Revolutionary Committee and the Central Committee of the FUNSK concerning the state of affairs for the first six months of 1979 and duties for the future,” President Heng Samrin, Phnom Penh, July 1979 (ANC PRK files).
88 UNDP KNAS, p. 42. This survey report blamed the drop in production on an acute lack of fishing nets, harm caused by pesticides for the rice crop or perhaps a fish disease.
90 ANC PRK, “Report concerning the results of implementing the state budget for nine months of 1987, the plan for the fourth quarter and estimates for implementation throughout 1987,” No. 08RBK, for Council of Ministers, Chairman, Hun Sen, Phnom Penh, 27 October 1987.
91 UNDP KNAS, p. 42.
92 Ibid., p. 44.
96 UNDP KNAS, p. 47.
98 UNDP KNAS, p. 47.
100 In Sopheap, Khieu Samphan …
101 Vickery, Cambodia 1975–82, p. 86.
103 The UNDP KNAS reported that the industrial workforce was three times the 110,000 figure it had been in 1967, p. 57.
105 UNDP KNAS, p. 73.
107 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
111 Desbarats, Prolific Survivors …, p. 60.
112 Ibid., p. 197.
113 Ibid., p. 199.
115 Ibid. Hildebrand and Porter note the West African interest in importing rice from Democratic Kampuchea, p. 89.
116 Ben Kiernan says contact was made with UNICEF and then with US firms about aid and purchases of drugs and anti-malarial equipment. See “Conflict in the Kampuchean Communist Movement,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 10, 1–2 (1980): 56.
118 Twining is quoting Elizabeth Becker. Ben Kiernan mentions this point also but he says it went to Singapore in late 1976 during the brief period of less
than a month when Pol Pot had been deposed and there was a fair degree of trade liberalisation.

120 UNDP KNAS, p. 8.
121 Stephen Heder estimates that the number of Chinese advisers in Cambodia was “a few thousand at any one time.” See Phelim Kyne, “The Chinese-KR connection,” Phnom Penh Post, 14–27 April 2000, p. 6.
125 ANC PRK, “Agreement between the government of the USSR and the government of the PRK concerning the provision of economic and technical assistance to the PRK in order to redevelop the basis of the national economy and to practise other works,” 1982.
127 UNDP KNAS, p. 10.
128 Ibid.
130 UNDP KNAS, p. 11.
131 In Sopheap, Khieu Samphan …., p. 83.
135 ANC PRK, “Concerning the state budget,” unsigned, undated.
137 ANC PRK, “Memo to Council of State concerning request to change the tax policy for industry and commerce,” Council of Ministers, Chairman, Hun Sen, Phnom Penh, 1 February 1986. The official exchange rate was then 30 riel to the U.S. dollar, but on the black market, the dollar could buy 130 riel.

Chapter 5

1 This was the fourth document of the Paris Peace Agreements signed in October 1991.

2 Prince Sihanouk returned to Phnom Penh in November 1991 and assumed the presidency of the SNC when it was formed. Apart from the prince, there were 12 members, 6 appointed by the SoC and 6 representing the other 3 factions in the conflict. The SNC was not the Cambodian government, as the SoC continued to administer the country. The SNC’s role was to represent the sovereignty of Cambodia during this transitional period, including its representation at the UN.


4 Grant Curtis, *Cambodia Reborn?*, p. 61.


7 This clause in Article 100 of the 1993 constitution resulted in a political deadlock following the 2003 general elections. Fearing that he would not receive the vote of confidence from the Assembly, Hun Sen, who led the CPP to victory at those elections, delayed the assembly for almost a full year. During that crisis, the pre-poll government was extended and functioned with a budget that was released in monthly increments.

8 The Constitutional Council Law requires that the eldest or second eldest member convene or preside over a meeting of at least seven of the nine members. The king’s appointees were Son Sann, aged 86, Chau Sen Cocsal Chhum, 92, and Pung Peng Cheng, 81. Chau Sen Cocsal Chhum left the country rather than submit to pressure to convene the meeting, Son Sann refused to attend it and Peng Cheng declined attempts by the other six members to preside over it. See Samreth Sopha and Eric Pape, “Council in jeopardy after elders boycott meeting,” *Phnom Penh Post*, 5–18 June 1998.


The population size of communes ranged from 305 to 44,513 individuals and the average size was around 7,000, according to the draft speech “The New Decentralised Government Structure and the Role of the Commune Councils in Local Development,” for Prum Sokha, Secretary of State, Ministry of the Interior, 31 August 2000.


Ibid.


Curtis, *Cambodia Reborn?*, p. 32.


This figure was an improvement on the estimate of 39 per cent given by the 1993–94 SESC. Nick Lenaghan, “Cambodia, 1997: AIDS and poverty,” Phnom Penh Post, 24 October–6 November 1997, p. 3.


Quoting from an EIC report, Kay Kimsong and Daniel Ten Kate, “Gov’t reaffirms commitment to agriculture,” The Cambodia Daily, 31 October 2003.

NIS, Cambodia Statistical Yearbook 2000, p. 63.


Unifem et al., A Fair Share for Women, p. 89.


Unifem et al., A Fair Share for Women, p. 89.


Ibid., p. ix.

Ayres, Anatomy of a Crisis, p. 182.

Ibid., p. 171.


Ibid., p. 7.


Sik Boreak, *Land Ownership* ...


Ibid., p. 28.


Chan Sophal et al., *Land Tenure*, using data from the *CSES 1999*.

ADB, *Cambodia: Education Sector Strategy Study*, p. 23. Presumably these figures are in ten million dollars, not simply US$.


NIS, *Cambodia Statistical Yearbook 2000*, p. 79.

Ibid., p. 80.


Stephen O’Connell and Bou Saroeun, “Finger points …”


Shawcross, *Cambodia’s New Deal*, p. 17.


Ibid., p. 791.

Ibid., p. 797.


Ibid., p. 23.


NIS, *Statistical Year Book 2003*, p. 294, with data provided by the Ministry of Tourism.

NIS, *National Accounts of Cambodia*, p. 27.


Molly Ball, “Cambodia braces itself …”


Grant Curtis, *Cambodia Reborn?*, p. 74.

Ibid., p. 79.


The U.S. did not resume direct bilateral assistance to Cambodia until 2007, ten years after the freeze on aid commenced.


Ibid.

Martin Godfrey, “How important is external assistance to Cambodia?” *Phnom Penh Post*, 31 March–13 April 2000, p. 10.


NIS, *Statistical Year Book 2003*, p. 306. The most controversial failed investment was the Ariston project. In 1995, the Malaysian firm committed itself to a US$1.8 billion investment in infrastructure and tourism projects, mostly in Sihanoukville. Finally, in 2005, the RGC and Ariston agreed to abandon the contract and all state land and properties, with the exception of the casino in Phnom Penh, reverted to the government.

The six-month clause was later changed to one year. See Kay Kim Song, “Investment in Cambodia up from last year,” *The Cambodia Daily*, 2 December 2003, p. 14.


Erik Wasson, “Chinese Chamber leader says investment is just profit-driven,” *The Cambodia Daily*, 12 August 2005. After the July 1997 events, P.M. Hun Sen expelled Taiwanese officials whom he accused of colluding to sell arms to Funcinpec. Since then, diplomatic and trade relations with the People’s Republic of China have been very close.


138 Susan Postlewaite, “IMF man …”


141 In 2006, government spokesman, Khieu Kanharith, was quoted as saying, “We’ve succeeded in reducing poverty at the rate of one per cent each year and also right now we have a lot of traffic jams due to all the cars and motorbikes … The poor now at least have a bicycle to ride.” This is an echo of Prince Sihanouk’s claims in the 1960s about velos and wristwatches.

**Conclusion**

1 This action was precipitated by the deadlock following the general elections that were held earlier in the year. For details, see note 7 in the preceding chapter. The Chairman of the CPP and left factional leader, Chea Sim, was effectively abducted and held to ransom until the Prime Minister was assured that the National Assembly would vote to reinstate him in office.


8 CIDS report, p. 13.

9 Ibid.

10 Figures sourced from the CDC and quoted in the CIDS report, p. 9.


Ibid.

Fukuyama, Trust …., p. 7.

Ibid., p. 49.