CHAPTER 3
Trade, the Sea Prohibition and the “Folangji”, 1513–50

Introduction
Soon after their conquest of Malacca in 1511, the Portuguese set their sights on China as the next move toward their goal of expanding their trade in the region. They soon came to be known to the Chinese as the Folangji, a term that might have been borrowed from Muslim traders. In 1513, the Portuguese first appeared on the China coast and in the years 1549–50 the Zoumaxi Incident brought to an end the era of roaming adventure, leading a few years later to the establishment of a permanent base in Macao. The Portuguese were received by the Chinese with mixed feelings of hatred and amicability. The images of the Portuguese held by the Chinese varied according to different circumstances and time periods. Broadly speaking, men who had a stake in maritime affairs often tended to hold views different to those who had no connection with littoral society and economy and were concerned with Confucian ideals and order.

Modern Chinese scholarship on Sino-Portuguese relations sometimes provides divergent interpretations even when identical sources have been used. For example, the oft-cited commentary published 60 years ago by Chang Wei-hua in the chapter on the Folangji in the Ming shi (Standard dynastic history of the Ming) presents a somewhat detached view. On the other hand, Dai Yixuan’s study based

3. See ibid., p. 147, for the discussion of a similar idea.
on the same material and published three decades ago, contains a heavy dose of nationalistic rhetoric.\(^4\)

In recent decades, scholarship on sixteenth-century Sino-foreign relations has also begun to articulate socioeconomic change and the internal dynamism of Chinese littoral society. Explaining the surge in maritime activities along the southeast coast during this period, scholars have argued that this society was moving from a phase of agrarian frugality "to a more hustling and bustling phase of agrarian affluence greatly promoted by the rising tempo of handicraft and commercial activities".\(^5\)

The Chinese-Portuguese encounter during this period has been substantially covered by many fine scholarly works, and Chinese as well as Portuguese sources have been meticulously combed through. However, the literature often perpetuates such stereotypes as dynastic decline, official intrigues and ossified Confucian institutions, and contains details that often prove confusing and contradictory.

This chapter takes a fresh look at this volatile period of Chinese maritime history and Ming-foreign relations and clarifies a number of ambiguous or misinterpreted aspects of the events. It considers both macro and micro perspectives. On the macro level, the littoral trade, that was clandestine in nature, flourished and the Portuguese venture was integrated into a larger and expanding multinational network. These developments challenged the imperial government’s Sea Prohibition (haijin) policy that barred its population from engaging in seafaring activities. On the micro level, this period of flux presented local society with new economic opportunities that were met with great enthusiasm. Interaction between various domestic and foreign forces produced both collusion and confrontation. It provided not only impetuses for human endeavors, but also often paved the way for violence. By pursuing

4. The two commentaries are: Chang Wei-hua 张维华, “Ming shi folangji zhuan” 明史佛朗机传 [Chapter on Portugal in the Standard Dynastic History of the Ming], in *Ming shi ouzhou siguo zhuan zhushi* 明史欧洲四国传注释 [A commentary on the chapters on four European states in the Standard Dynastic History of the Ming], *Yenching Journal of Chinese Studies*, monograph Series No. 7 (Peiping: Harvard-Yenching Institute, 1934; reprint, Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1982); and Dai Yixuan 戴裔煊, *Ming shi Folangji zhuan jianzheng* 明史佛朗机传笺正 [A commentary of the chapter on Portugal in the Standard History of the Ming Dynasty] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1984).

the themes of collusion, politics and violence, the chapter will illustrate the multi-faceted implications of the maritime enterprise and development during the period in question.

**Connections and the Abortive Diplomacy**

When Diego Lopes de Sequeira sailed from Lisbon in 1508 to "discover" Malacca, he was given a lengthy set of instructions by King Manuel of Portugal, one of which was to enquire about the Chinese (Chijns). The king was interested in such matters as the frequency of their arrivals in Malacca, the types of merchandise that they brought, the financial position of their merchants, the construction features of their ships and other information about their country. In the early sixteenth century, eight to ten Chinese junks came to trade in Malacca each year, and when Sequeira reached Malacca in 1509, he found three or four Chinese junks lying in the port "with whom the Portuguese seem at once to have got on friendly terms".

The Chinese proved equally friendly when Commander Afonso de Albuquerque anchored off Malacca in 1511 because the latter spared their vessels when he ordered the burning of the ships of the Gujeratis in the harbor.

After the Portuguese had established themselves in Malacca in 1511, they began to collect information about China, cultivated cordial relationships with the Chinese seafarers in Malacca and built up connections along the China coast through these junk traders. The Chinese junk masters "were of great help in conveying Albuquerque’s envoys to and from Siam". They also carried back to China a very favorable report on the character and prowess of the Portuguese.

Tomé Pires, who was to become Portugal’s first ambassador to China, arrived in Malacca in mid-1512. Although he was busy with his official duties in connection with commerce and revenue during the two years

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and three months he lived in Malacca, he used his leisure time to compile an extensive account of littoral Asia, the *Suma Oriental*, that provided the Portuguese merchants with useful information about trade opportunities in China and other regions in the East.

Pires’ account contains interesting information about Sino-Malacca trade. He reports that the chief merchandise that went from Malacca to China was pepper, “of which they will buy ten junk-loads a year”. The Chinese also purchased large quantities of incense, elephants’ tusks, tin, apothecary’s lign-aloes, Borneo camphor, red beads, white sandalwood, brazil-wood and “the black wood that grows in Singapore”. Other important commodities included carnelians from Cambay, scarlet camlets and colored woolen cloths.

The chief items imported from China were many kinds of silk fabrics, seed-pearls in various shapes, musk in powder and in pods, apothecary’s camphor, *abarute* (lead), alum, saltpeter, sulfur, copper, iron, rhubarb, vases of copper and *fuselaira* (?), cast iron kettles, bowls, basins, boxes, fans, needles, copper bracelets, gold and silver, brocades, and porcelain. Although these commodities had been imported from China, some had originated elsewhere. China produced “plenty of good sugar” and was also a major supplier of salt to countries in the region surrounding Malacca. Each year some 15 hundred sailing boats came to Malacca to purchase salt.

The city of Guangzhou (Canton) on the estuary of the Pearl River was the gateway to China for both envoys and traders from Southeast Asia, a place where “the whole kingdom of China unloads all its merchandise, great quantities from inland as well as from the sea”. Upon their arrival, foreign vessels anchored at Tunmen (Tamao) and other nearby islands near the mainland of Nantou, which lay some 30 leagues from Guangzhou. Pires gives a vivid description of how junks from Malacca were received there:

> As soon as the lord of Nantou sees the junks he immediately sends word to Canton (Guangzhou) that junks have gone in among the islands; the valuers from Canton go out to value the merchandise; they receive their dues; they bring just the amount of merchandise that is required: the country is pretty well accustomed to

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12. Ibid., p. 123.

13. Ibid., pp. 125, 127.

estimate it, so well do they know of you the goods you want, and they bring them.

They ... [collect] twenty per cent on pepper, fifty per cent on brazil [wood], and the same amount on the Singapore wood; and when this has been estimated a junk will pay so much in proportion. They receive their dues on the other merchandise at ten per cent; and they do not oppress you; they have genuine merchants in their dealings. They are very wealthy. Their whole idea is pepper. They sell their foodstuffs honestly; business over, each returns to his own country.¹⁵

Pires claimed that the Chinese merchants in Nantou made a profit of 30 to 50 per cent on trade with foreigners.¹⁶ He also observed that no Chinese “may set out in the direction of Siam, Java, Malacca, Pase and beyond, without permission from the governors of Guangzhou, and they charge so much for signing the licence to go and come back that they cannot afford it and do not go”.¹⁷ But, obviously many managed to bribe their way out or simply sneaked off. In Malacca, for example, there were so many Chinese traders that one of the Shahbandars, the harbor-masters who received foreign ships, was made responsible for junks from China.¹⁸ After the Portuguese conquest, Chinese continued to come.¹⁹

During Pires’ sojourn, the Portuguese busied themselves preparing for voyages to China by gathering navigational information. Among the maps drawn by Francisco Rodrigues, a pilot and cartographer at this time, for example, is a rutter for the voyage from Malacca to the Pearl River, in all likelihood based on information gathered from Chinese sailors before the first Portuguese voyage to China.²⁰

In 1513, when the situation in Malacca had stabilized, the Portuguese commander of Malacca, Rui de Brito Patalim, sent Jorge Álvares on a trading expedition to China.²¹ Existing Chinese goodwill toward the Portuguese made this pioneer exploration a success. Álvares and some other Portuguese sailed on board a Chinese junk that was among a returning merchant fleet and was assisted by these junk traders while on the China coast. Álvares and his company were not permitted to land

¹⁵. Ibid.
¹⁶. Ibid., p. 122.
¹⁷. Ibid., p. 119.
¹⁸. Ibid., pp. 265, 268.
¹⁹. Ibid., p. 283.
because their Chinese contacts said it was against their custom to let foreigners enter their dwellings. However, the Portuguese were able “to sell their goods at a great gain”.

Soon after this successful voyage, a second expedition went to China in 1515, under the leadership of Rafael Perestrello, a man of Italian extraction in Portuguese service, who took with him a number of Portuguese. This time they traveled on board a junk belonging to a native merchant of Malacca. Perestrello returned to Malacca in late 1516 with a great profit, and brought back the welcome news “that the Chinese desired peace and friendship with the Portuguese, and that they were a very good people”.

These first contacts with the south China coast by Portuguese merchant-adventurers who sailed from Malacca on Chinese or native junks demonstrated that there was “as great profit in taking spices to China as in taking them to Portugal”. According to one estimate, pepper could be sent from Malacca to China at a profit of 300 per cent.

At the beginning of September 1515, a new governor-general of India, Lopo Soares de Albergaria, arrived at Goa. With him came Fernão Peres de Andrade, whom the king sent as captain-major of a fleet to sail from India “to discover China” and take a Portuguese ambassador there. Tomé Pires, the royal apothecary, was chosen to be the ambassador because he was “discreet and eager to learn”, and “would know better than anyone else the drugs there were in China”.

Andrade went from Malacca to Pasai in December to collect a cargo of pepper. He then returned to Malacca, and in June 1517 sailed to China with seven or eight ships, including three junks. One junk was owned by a Malaccan merchant named Curiaraja, another also by a Malacca merchant called Pulata and a third by Antônio Lobo Falcão. The fleet arrived at Tunmen on 15 August 1517.

They found a conducive environment. The latter half of the fifteenth and the early years of the sixteenth century constituted “a relatively stable and prosperous period in which … [Ming China’s] economy grew, internal trade flourished and along the coast, private overseas trade gradually developed in spite of continuing laws and interdictions carried over from
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Tribute missions still came regularly and passed, for the most part, without dramatic incident. As Roland Higgins explains, despite “official criticisms and restrictions repeatedly placed on tribute missions, trade gradually came to overshadow the other political, ritualistic, obeisance-paying aspects of the tribute formula for managing barbarians.”

The Portuguese ships were fired on by a Chinese fleet cruising off the island to prevent piracy, but Andrade did not return fire, giving every demonstration of peace and friendliness. He sent a message to the Chinese commander, “explaining who he was and that he was bringing an embassy of King Manuel of Portugal his Lord to the King of China”. The Chinese captain welcomed Andrade, saying that “through the Chinese who went to Malacca he also had news of the good faith and chivalry of the Portuguese”, and advised him to address himself to the Commander of the Coastguard (beiwo duzhihui) of Nantou, who was empowered to examine all the ships that came to Guangzhou.

After many messages and delays, Andrade eventually arrived in Guangzhou where he ordered a salute fired by the cannon on his ships as a gesture of respect. Very soon a message came from the Provincial Administration Commissioner (buzhengshi), the highest authority then in Guangzhou, expressing astonishment at such an act of imprudence. Andrade apologized that “he had erred through ignorance, and intended only respect”. Although the Chinese official accepted this explanation, he said that it never occurred to the Chinese that in some part of the earth a demonstration of war implements could be an expression of respect or courteous recognition. Pending further Chinese instructions, Andrade ordered that no Portuguese should go ashore and no Chinese visitors should be allowed on board his ships.

Soon afterwards, the Governor-General of Liang-Guang (Guangdong and Guangxi), Chen Jin, returned to Guangzhou. Andrade sent ashore the factor of the fleet to explain their mission. Governor-general Chen and other high-ranking officials “replied with many words of satisfaction” and promised that they would immediately write to their emperor asking for

30. Ibid., p. 19.
31. Cortesão, “Introduction”, p. xxxi; also Chang Tien-tse, Sino-Portuguese Trade, p. 41. The Commander’s chief function was to guard against the depredation of the Japanese pirates.
33. Chang Tien-tse, Sino-Portuguese Trade, p. 64.
instructions. They also paid a courtesy visit to the ambassador, Tomé Pires, who was lodged in the house-compound in which the Maritime Trade and Shipping Supervisor, Ying Xiang, lived.

Andrade was invited to go ashore, but he declined, saying that he was responsible for the safety of the ships. Instead, he asked the favor of a house owner near the waterfront, “where he might offer for sale or exchange some of the goods he had brought”, and his request was granted.

At this juncture, Andrade received a message that his ships in Tunmen had been attacked by pirates. He left Tomé Pires and his suite at Guangzhou and, at the end of 1517 or beginning of 1518 returned to Tunmen. From there, Andrade sent a message to Malacca reporting “how the ambassador was received, the friendship established with the ‘Governors’ of Canton, and how we were welcomed in those parts”. At the same time, Andrade also sent Captain Jorge Mascarenhas to explore the Liuqiu Islands via Zhangzhou of southern Fujian. Mascarenhas was probably taken to southern Fujian by either the Fujianese or the Liuqiu merchants trading at Malacca. During his sojourn in southern Fujian, he opened trade with the Chinese and found that “one could make just as much profit in Ch‘uan-chow [Zhangzhou?] as in Canton [Guangzhou]”.

Andrade set sail for Malacca with his squadron in September 1518, after nearly 14 months in China. He made a friendly farewell gesture by issuing a proclamation that, “if any Chinese had received any injury from or had any claim on a Portuguese he was to come to him and satisfaction should be made”. During his visit, Andrade had handled his mission “with such skill and tact that he left a very favourable impression of the Portuguese character on the Chinese”.

Before Andrade’s departure from China, he had apparently received the impression from the high-ranking officials of Guangzhou that the emperor had agreed to welcome the ambassador. In fact, Pires and his suite waited in Guangzhou for 15 more months. It seems that the senior provincial officials had been in favor of receiving the envoy, but realizing that Folangji was not among the tributary nations from the South Seas,
they had sought instructions from the Court. The Portuguese request for official relations was referred to the Board of Rites and the deliberation is mentioned in the Ming shilu (Veritable Records of the Ming Dynasty), the Court records of the Ming dynasty, under the entry of February 11, 1518. Not surprisingly, the Board had recommended that the Folangji "be told to leave and their tribute returned", and the emperor had accepted this decision.\footnote{Ming Shilu: Wuzong chao 明實錄:武宗朝 [Veritable records of the Ming Dynasty: Wuzong Reign] (hereafter MSL: WZ), 158: 2a–b.}

The Court later reversed this decision and granted permission for Pires and his suite, numbering 30,\footnote{Cited in Dai Yixuan, Ming shi folangji zhuan, p. 9.} to travel to the imperial capital.\footnote{MSL: WZ, 194:2b.} The standard dynastic history of the Ming explains that "the Portuguese bribed the eunuch who served in the capacity of Regional Commander (zhenshou zhonggui) and were thus permitted to proceed to the capital".\footnote{Ming Shi 明史 [Standard dynastic history of the Ming) (reprint, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974), juan 325, “Folangji”, p. 8430.}

The envoy left Guangzhou on January 23, 1520, and arrived in Nanjing in May. The emperor was in the city, but he decided to meet the Portuguese ambassador in Beijing, to which he returned in February 1521, in accordance with the conventions governing such occasions. While these diplomatic moves were underway, other crises occurred. Simão de Andrade, a brother of Fernão Peres de Andrade, arrived in Tunmen with a small fleet in August 1519. He was surprised to discover that Pires had not even left Guangzhou, and his indignation and irritation led to a regrettable episode. In contrast to his brother, Simão de Andrade has been described as covetous, selfish and despotic.\footnote{Geo. Phillip, “Early Portuguese Trade in Fuhkien”, The China Review, or Notes and Queries on the Far East (Hong Kong) 19 (1891): 45.} He behaved oppressively towards the Chinese, building a fort at Tunmen and contesting the jurisdiction of the Chinese officials. He was also accused of “committing acts of piracy, of enslaving the Chinese and kidnapping girls on the coast”.\footnote{Volpicelli, “Early Portuguese Commerce”, p. 42.} His activities were “the principal cause of the unfortunate end of Pires’ embassy, and of all the misfortunes the Portuguese suffered in China for more than thirty years”.\footnote{Cortesão, “Introduction”, p. xxxvi.}

There were also other incidents involving persons associated with the Portuguese. While in Nanjing, an interpreter in Pires’ suite, a Muslim
Chinese named Huozhe Yasan,\textsuperscript{50} gave bribes to the emperor’s favorite and the most powerful Court official, Jiang Bin, to obtain an imperial audience.\textsuperscript{51} The emperor found the interpreter’s knowledge of several languages amusing and kept him for company. Unfortunately, this overconfident and arrogant man offended a Chinese official named Liang Zhuo, who was in charge of the lodgings for foreign envoys, by refusing to kneel before him. For this insult, he was beaten. Learning of this, Jiang Bin quarreled with Liang and threatened to memorialize the emperor.\textsuperscript{52}

Moreover, Fernão Peres de Andrade’s official letter had been translated by his interpreters in a way that indicated the king of Portugal wanted to be a vassal of the emperor of China. However, when the sealed letter of King Manuel was opened and translated by the Court, the language was found to differ entirely from that of the letter written by the interpreters in the name of Andrade. The Portuguese clearly had no intention of disguising themselves as a tributary mission from the former Malacca Kingdom,\textsuperscript{53} but their Chinese interpreters had followed the customary form of correspondence. The irony is that, if the earlier translation had not been done to suit the Chinese world view, it would not have left the provincial officials any latitude to favor the Portuguese entry.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{50} Huozhe Ya-san himself said he was a Chinese. See \textit{Ming shi, juan} 325, “Folangji”, p. 8431. Another example of using “huozhe” as a title is an Arab (Tianfang guo 天方國) envoy named Huo-zhe A-li (\textit{Ming shilu: Shizong/Jiajing chao} 明實錄:世宗朝/熹宗朝 [Veritable records of the Ming Dynasty: Shizong/Jiajing Reign]) (hereafter MSL: SZ), 164: 5a. I would venture to suggest that their names actually were Haji Hasan and Haji Ali respectively. See also Chang Wei-hua, \textit{Ming shi ou-zhou siguo zhuan}, p. 9 for the view that “huo-che” was a Muslim official title during the Yuan.


\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Ming shi, juan} 325, “Folangji”, p. 8431.

\textsuperscript{53} Chang Wei-hua rightly comments that the claim in Ming records that “the Folangji sent an envoy to pay tribute and request conferment of titles” is an exaggeration. See his “Ming shi Folangji zhuan”, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{54} Diplomatic letters involved values and world views. The Chinese stressed the importance of “the ritual relationship between the emperor and a tributary prince”, whereas European states adhered to “the concept of a community of equal status”. When such letters were translated for submission to the counterpart, the translation was made compatible with the world view of the reading party. For a discussion of the misunderstanding created by translated communications between Imperial China and the European states, see John E.
More complaints also reached the Court. The fugitive king of Malacca sent an ambassador to appeal for Chinese help against the Portuguese “sea-robbers” who had taken his kingdom.55 Officials at Tunmen also sent news about the misdeeds of Simão de Andrade. Censors Chiu Daolong, who formerly served as a magistrate in Shunde of Guangdong, and He Ao, himself a native of Shunde, accused the former administration commissioner, Wu T’inju, who had followed a more flexible maritime policy during his tenure from 1514 to 1517, of being responsible for the sudden influx of foreign mariners into the province and the misdeeds of the Folangji. Chiu’s and He’s impeachment of the Guangzhou officials and recommendation that foreign trade with the exception of designated tribute missions be prohibited were approved by the Zhengde Emperor on January 13, 1521. The Portuguese envoy would now be subject to further cross-examination upon the impending arrival in the capital of the ambassador from the former Malacca kingdom.56

Before the Portuguese envoy’s fate could be decided, the Zhengde Emperor died. Four days after the emperor’s death, which occurred on April 20, 1521, about two months after his return to the capital, Grand Secretary Yang Tinghe, with the support of a few influential eunuchs, persuaded the empress dowager to put Jiang Bin, the patron of the Portuguese embassy, under arrest.57 The new Jiajing Emperor (r. 1522‒66), a youth of 14, ascended the throne on May 27, 152158 and ordered Jiang Bin’s execution on July 11.59

In accordance with imperial precedence, foreign embassies that happened to be present in the imperial capital during the mourning period were courteously asked to withdraw from the country.

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56. MSL: WZ, 194: 2b–3a. He Ao’s attack on Wu could have been caused by personal hard feelings toward the latter. Another impeachment against Wu was made by He in 1525 alleging Wu’s mismanagement of famine relief in Huguang. See MSL: SZ, 36: 7a–b. It could have been because of the sudden death of the Zhengde Emperor two months later that the Malay ambassador was received by the new sovereign only on July 25. Probably, the Court’s decision to keep Pires and his suite in custody was sent to Guangzhou at this time. According to Chang T’ien-tse, however, Tuan Mohammed, ambassador of the Raja of Bintang, son of the fugitive King of Malacca, lodged the complaint against the Portuguese before the Zhengde Emperor (*Sino-Portuguese Trade*, p. 52).
57. MSL: WZ, 197: 4a, 7a.
58. MSL: SZ, 1: 4b.
59. Ibid., 3: 4a.
procedure had nothing to do with the new emperor’s xenophobia, and the Portuguese embassy, together with two other tribute delegations from Hami and Turfan on the western borders of the country, were all suitably rewarded before their departure.⁶⁰ Pires left Beijing on May 22 and arrived in Guangzhou on September 22, 1521. However, imperial instructions had reached Guangzhou ordering that the ambassador and his suite be detained until the Portuguese evacuated Malacca.⁶¹ A few months earlier, in April or May 1521, a Portuguese fleet under the captaincy of Diogo Calvo had arrived in Tunmen. Jorge Álvares also came with his junk and more Portuguese ships from Pattani and Siam joined them later. The ships carried such merchandise as pepper and sandalwood. Despite the atrocity committed by Simão de Andrade, the Guangzhou authorities did not seem to want to order a stoppage of trade.⁶² On the contrary, they stated that these foreign vessels had come to bring supplies to their tribute envoy, a common practice accepted by the Chinese authorities. Such supply missions were allowed to trade after duties had been levied on their merchandise in accordance with regulations. However, the new sovereign was determined not to allow the Portuguese entry into the country. He also announced that other tributary envoys whose arrivals were not on the approved schedule or whose documents were not in proper order should be refused entry.⁶³ These measures were a natural attempt at the beginning of the new reign, that was imbued with the spirit of reform, to rectify the infamous abuses committed by the eunuchs in charge of the ports designated to receive tribute missions.

Following the new order from the Court, the Chinese fleet used force on the orders of the Deputy-Commissioner of Guangdong Coastal Surveillance, Wang Hong, to suspend unauthorized trade and expel the foreigners. This contretemps led to the commencement of a long, fierce battle, during which many of the Portuguese trading ashore or on board the vessels were killed or taken prisoner. In the midst of the fighting, Jorge Álvares died of an illness in early July 1521. Only three junks managed to flee the horrible scene.⁶⁴ The unfortunate Tomé Pires and his suite arrived in Guangzhou shortly after this bitter clash. He was imprisoned there and died there without leaving China again.

An equally bloody confrontation occurred the following year when the Portuguese decided to make an effort to re-establish trade with China

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⁶⁰ MSL: WZ, 197: 5b.
⁶³ MSL: SZ, 4; 27b.
by sending a fleet to Guangzhou. It consisted of four ships and two junks, laden with pepper and other merchandise. Despite Captain-Major Martim Afonso de Melo Coutinho’s peace overtures, and his formulaic assertion that he came to bring necessities to the envoy and his suite, the Chinese refused his ships permission to enter. Hostilities broke out and both sides suffered heavy casualties.\(^{65}\) It is mentioned in Court records dated April 6, 1523 that the Chinese killed 35 of the invaders and captured 42 others, including their leader captain Pedro Homen. The Court later endorsed death sentences imposed on the captives.\(^{66}\)

**Beyond the Imperial Legal Net**

The China coast in the early 1520s became more turbulent than it had been earlier, the unrest fueled by increased smuggling activities and piracy. But the most calamitous event of the early Jiajing era was the eruption of a bloody and alarming conflict in 1523 between two rival Japanese tribute missions that arrived at Ningbo. The two missions represented different Japanese trading houses and each claimed to be the legitimate embassy from Japan. Heavily bribed by a Chinese named Song Shuqing, who was in the service of one of the delegations, the eunuch in charge of the Supervisorate of Maritime Trade and Shipping sided with Song’s party. This partiality led to violence involving both groups and the tribute-bearers turned to piracy. In retaliation, the Ming Court suspended entry permits for all Japanese missions, and temporarily abolished the Supervisorates of Maritime Trade and Shipping at Ningbo, Fuzhou, and Guangzhou.

The Japanese, whether officials or private citizens, had always been dissatisfied with the restrictive tribute trade. Those who failed to obtain trading permits often turned to illicit transactions or piracy, and raiding the Chinese coast had become a favorite occupation of many from southwest Japan, who behaved as pirates or as traders as the occasion demanded. Cutting off the legal outlet for overseas trade only aggravated the situation and, as Higgins observes, “let the trade fall into the hands of smugglers and influential persons who connived with the Japanese and other foreign traders”.\(^{67}\)

The Portuguese were undeterred. The China trade was too valuable for them to abandon, and they continued to visit the China coast despite

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65. Ibid., pp. 56–8.
their expulsion from Guangzhou. They remained in touch with the China market through Chinese traders calling at Pattani, and Chinese domiciled overseas urged them to operate farther up the coast, in Fujian and Zhejiang. To this end, they helped them establish connections with profitable smuggling networks.

A decade after their expulsion from the Guangzhou region, the Portuguese found new opportunities to slip back into the south. In November 1529, the Court approved the request of the Liang-Guang Grand Coordinator, Lin Fu, to reopen Guangzhou to foreign trade. In the petition, Lin Fu argued from the institutional point of view that, although it was proper to expel the Folangji because their presence was unauthorized, permission should be granted to countries such as Annam, Chenla, Siam, Champa, Java, Pahang and Malacca to pay tribute as they had done before. Furthermore, restoration of the supervision system under the Supervisorates of Maritime Trade and Shipping (shibo tijusi/shibo si) would benefit the economy and help raise needed revenue for provincial military and administrative expenses. It would also ensure the supply of products from these countries that were very much in demand. He complained that cutting Guangzhou off from foreign trade only encouraged illicit trade activities elsewhere along the coast, and he singled out Zhangzhou in Fujian as a port where the smuggling trade was flourishing and openly tolerated by local authorities. Lin requested that Guangzhou be reopened to foreign trade, and that illegal trade elsewhere be suppressed immediately.

Lin Fu excluded the Portuguese from the petition because he knew that it would be difficult to obtain the Court’s permission to trade with them; but, after the reopening of Guangzhou for the tribute trade the following year, the Portuguese were able to obtain some of the benefits of the regulated trade, although their presence was still proscribed by the Ming state. One practice adopted by the Portuguese after 1533 was to accompany tribute missions sent by their Malay allies such as Pahang and Pattani.

During the period 1521‒49, Portuguese smugglers often conducted their trade in collusion with local officials who received large bribes. No doubt, the Portuguese met with a good deal of sympathy and support from the Chinese of all classes who were anxious to do business with

69. MSL: SZ, 106: 5a.
70. Yan Congjian, Shuyu zhouzi lu, pp. 322‒4 for Lin Fu’s memorial.
71. Ibid., p. 324; and Stephen Chang, Mingjj dongnan zhongguo, p. 245.
them. Local smugglers, merchants, even petty officials provided the Portuguese with information about trade conditions and movements of government patrols. Expatriate mariners and local fishermen acted as pilots for the Portuguese ships and junks. Moreover, as Chang T’ien-tse remarks, this smuggling trade along the coast of Fujian and Zhejiang could never have achieved such proportions had it not been actively encouraged and backed by the scholar-gentry.  

Elaborating on the smuggling networks, Chang Pin-tsun highlights two groups of people: the onshore group and the seagoing group. The former included “members of the local elite, such as retired bureaucrats, official brokers, rich families and even the incumbent officials”. They played the role of “harboring hosts”, providing storage for contraband and managing the distribution of smuggled goods. The latter group varied. They could be “relatives of powerful local families, small traders, miserable vagrants or even criminals. They formed armed units, risking their lives at sea and transporting the contraband under the severe penalty of Ming law.” These people were most likely to turn to piracy when they were pursued by the authorities or under other desperate circumstances.

Important families along the China coast were also instrumental in the rise of illegal trade because of “their ability to provide capital and manpower” and “protect illicit seafaring undertakings from government’s interference”. The sea prohibition law was never effectively enforced against “the rich and the powerful” of local society. When their ships were seized by the coastguards for illicit trade, they simply went to the local authorities and stated that the sailors were their servants who had been sent to ship back grain and cloth from other provinces. The officials then released the men and the cargoes without a moment’s hesitation. There were also cases when the coastguards were subject to false accusations by powerful people in retaliation for placing their followers under arrest, and many law-enforcing officials died in jail under such circumstances. With this fate hanging over their heads, they were afraid of offending the powerful families.

Assisted by their collaborators operating within the smuggling networks, the Portuguese wintered at various sheltered but obscure islands and anchorages along the Fujian and Zhejiang coasts. Depending

73. Chang T’ien-tse, Sino-Portuguese Trade, p. 70.
75. Ibid., p. 227.
on the circumstances, the gangs either traded as merchants, or raided as pirates. Their enterprise, trade or piracy, was truly multinational in nature. As Higgins has said about coastal piracy:

[It] was not a competitive nationalistic venture, rather it was a system built on personal ties and loyalties within competing collectivities. Often Chinese and Japanese or Malay, etc., joined together in the same band, a cosmopolitan nucleus into which various others, such as captives, refugees, shipwrecked or marooned sailors could be introduced.77

There is a dearth of detailed information about the life and adventures of the pirates and about the trading marts. The travel accounts of Fernão Mendes Pinto offer glimpses of the roving Portuguese adventurers along the China coast at that time. But the authenticity of Pinto’s accounts remains controversial.78 Donald Ferguson observes that the work is not entirely a fabrication, but many of the incidents related are pure fiction. Nevertheless, because Pinto was a contemporary observer and a participant in many of the episodes that he describes, Z. Volpicelli suggests that one can rely on his “general view of the life of the roving Portuguese adventurers of that time in the Far East”.79 The author surely witnessed similar events somewhere, and his adventures, “marvelous as some of them are, must be considered to have generally a small substratum of truth and to be based, if not on what he saw or did, on what he heard others had seen or done. Taken in such a light he gives us a picturesque view of the life of those times...”80

Pinto’s story contains a reference to a “daring and unprincipled”81 Portuguese corsair named Antonio de Faria, who roamed the whole coast as far as Ningbo in the early 1540s, capturing vessels and arming them with Portuguese prisoners he liberated or with piratical sailors he pressed into his service. At one time, he had 4 ships and over 600 men under his command, of whom only about 50 were Portuguese. By chance he sealed a cordial relationship with a Chinese pirate chief, Quiay Panjao, who had 30 Portuguese in his service. Quiay Panjao’s acquaintance with the people of the coast, that enabled him to procure all the supplies and

77. Higgins, “Piracy”, p. 36.
78. See Boxer, South China, pp. xxin2, xxiii; and Ferguson, “Letters”, pp. 439, 439n40.
80. Ibid., pp. 68–9.
81. This description is seen in Andrew Ljungstedt, A Historical Sketch of the Portuguese Settlements in China and of the Roman Catholic Church and Mission in China (Boston: James Munroe & Co., 1836), p. 3.
trade goods that the Portuguese required for their ships, greatly helped António de Faria.82

The coastal situation was fluid. The majority of the so-called Wokou (Japanese pirates) were in fact Chinese themselves with the genuine Wo or Japanese people playing a secondary role.83 The situation became even more complex when Portuguese smugglers and Japanese pirates cooperated with each other along the China coast, something that was especially prevalent after 1542, when the Portuguese extended their trade to Japan. This broader trade network led to an increase in Portuguese activities along the China coast which coincided with an increase in the depredations of Japanese piracy.84

Quarrels among different trading parties were frequent, and led to raiding, plunder and murder.85 Conflicts, disputes and disturbances in coastal society "gradually increased the overall level of violence and instability", and the presence of Portuguese ships, guns and men only aggravated the turbulent situation.86 The various bands involved in clandestine activities often committed acts of barbarity in dealing with their opponents. On one occasion, according to Pinto, António de Faria held unsuccessful negotiations with a mandarin for the release of some Portuguese prisoners, after which he stormed the town with 300 men, including 70 Portuguese, and slaughtered its defenders without mercy. António de Faria allowed his men an hour-and-a-half to carry off what they liked and then set fire to the town.87 The reliability of this story is dubious, but events of this sort are also described in contemporaneous Chinese sources.88 As Zhu Wan observed in 1548, the Chinese and foreign sojourners on the Zhejiang coast not only traded but also raided and pillaged the neighboring regions.89 Zhu was Governor of Zhejiang and concurrently in charge of Min-Zhe coastal military affairs.

82. The affair is summed up in Volpicelli, “Early Portuguese Commerce”, pp. 48–53.
84. Boxer, South China, p. xxxvi.
86. Higgins, “Piracy”, pp. 61, 63.
87. For the account, see Volpicelli, “Early Portuguese Commerce”, pp. 58–60.
88. See, for example, Ming shi jishi ben-mo 明史紀事本末 [Records of events in the Ming history] (1658), 55: 10a, in Wenyuange siku quanshu 文淵閣四庫全書 (hereafter SKQS), Vol. 364, p. 684, concerning pirate attacks on numerous towns and villages in Chekiang and the burning of public buildings and civilian houses in late 1547 or early 1548.
89. Ming jingshi wenbian 明經世文編 [Collected essays on statecraft from the Ming dynasty] (hereafter MJSWB), comp. Chen Zilong, et al. 陳子龍 (1608–47), 徐孚
The Destruction of the International Mart at Shuangyu

The most flourishing centers of trade and smuggling, places that attracted traders from far and wide, were the Shuangyu Island near Ningbo (Liampo) in Zhejiang, and Wuyu and Yuegang (Moon Anchorage) in southern Fujian. Since the early 1520s, the Portuguese had regularly visited or even remained for a time at Shuangyu. The poor in the region welcomed the presence of these foreigners, who provided them a living by purchasing their provisions. Those Chinese merchants who came with the Portuguese helped arrange for the local merchants to bring their goods for sale and, as intermediaries between the Portuguese and the local merchants, reaped a great reward from their role. Shuangyu “attracted traders of all nationalities, including especially Japanese and Portuguese, but also a number of Southeast Asian traders”. A memorial submitted by Zhu Wan in 1548 testifies that, “treacherous people from the interior ... gang up with foreigners like the Japanese, Folangji and those from Pahang and Siam. Their ships are moored at Shuangyu in Ningbo. The evil people of the interior trade with them and supply them necessities. This has been a long-standing practice.”

Trade at Shuangyu flourished especially after 1540. In that year, two former pirate chiefs, Li Guangtou (Li Qi) from Fujian and Xu Dong (Xu Er) from Anhui, accompanied by more than a hundred fellow-inmates escaped from a prison in Fujian. They went to the sea and joined Wang Zhi and others at Shuangyu. Xu Dong had earlier traded in Malacca and had established close connections with the Portuguese.

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90. Boxer, South China, p. xxxiii.
91. Zhu Wan’s memorial in 1548 states that the Chinese and other foreigners, including the Folangji, had occupied Shuangyu for more than 20 years. See MJSWB, 205/1: 13b, 17b.
93. Ibid., p. 92.
95. MJSWB, 205/1: 13b.
According to Pinto’s account, the population of Shuangyu (“Liampoo”) exceeded 3,000, including 1,200 Portuguese, and the place had more than a thousand houses, 7 or 8 churches and 2 hospitals. The bulk of the trade with Japan was conducted from this base by multinational parties and earned high profits. Pinto estimated the annual trade value in the 1540s at three million gold Cruzados. Some aspects of Pinto’s description are similar to the general picture given in Cruz’s work and in Chinese sources. Shuangyu was a bustling settlement overflowing with merchandise, and was undoubtedly an international meeting point for Chinese and foreigners during the trading season. On June 15, 1548, shortly after its destruction by government troops, more than a thousand “bandit boats” (zeichuan) were still being sighted around the island.

However, the population figure for the Portuguese and the extent of their settlement on Shuangyu as given by Pinto cannot be correct, since the Portuguese, along with other Southeast Asians and probably many Fujianese traders, would have traveled south when the northeast monsoon began, as indicated in a Ming source. A contemporary source estimates that the Portuguese active on the China coast numbered five or six hundred, perhaps slightly more.

As to the fall of the settlement, Pinto blamed it on the irritating conduct of Lancelot Pereira, a self-proclaimed magistrate. It is said that Pereira sold goods worth some thousand Cruzados to a Chinese on credit, and then, seeing nothing more of this man, decided to make good his losses. With a band of 18 to 20 men of reckless character, Pereira went to a town two leagues from Ningbo, where they plundered 11 or 12 families and killed a number of people. This act of violence opened the door for an attack on Shuangyu by government troops and brought about its destruction. Pinto says these events took place in 1542, which again cannot be correct.

98. Cruz, “Treatise”.
100. MJSWB, 205/1: 22a. Shuangyu had been occupied by government troops a few days earlier. Many of these boats could have been those of small suppliers from around the region. This was also during the southeast monsoon when many Chinese, Portuguese, and other Southeast Asian trading vessels arrived from the south. They were either not aware of the condition of the place or were still waiting for the right moment to conduct trade.
101. Ibid., 205/1: 20a.
102. Ibid., 165/4: 6a.
However, a similar incident is mentioned in the *Ming shilu* stating that the coastal disturbances in Zhejiang at the time could be traced to the smuggling activities of Chinese merchants and their foreign partners. On land, the prominent Xie clan of the deceased former Grand Secretary Xie Qian of Yuyao was the main business contact of the smugglers. The Xie clan exploited their collaborators by holding down the value of the merchandise and refusing to pay accumulated debts, even threatening to expose the smugglers to the authorities. Both fearful and resentful, the smugglers organized a band whose members included foreigners that plundered the Xie clan, burning their houses and killing several people.\textsuperscript{105} Another source says that a certain Chinese named Lin Jian brought along a pirate fleet of more than 70 ships from Pahang (on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula) and joined forces with Zhejiang pirate chiefs Xu Er (Xu Dong) and Xu Si. They raided the Zhejiang coast and plundered the Xie house. This event took place in the summer of 1547.\textsuperscript{106}

The pirate raids astounded the imperial government. In his memorial Inspecting Censor Yang Jiuze blamed the provincial authorities for their evasive attitude when performing duties that involved cross-provincial matters. To strengthen coastal defenses, he proposed the appointment of a high-ranking official with jurisdiction over Zhejiang, Fujian and eastern Guangdong. The Jiajing Emperor approved the proposal on July 10, 1547, but decided not to include eastern Guangdong.\textsuperscript{107} Probably, the exclusion was for fear of giving the appointee too much power. The Court acted swiftly and two weeks later appointed Zhu Wan Governor (*xunfu*) of Zhejiang and concurrently overseeing the coastal defense and military affairs of Min-Zhe (*tidu Min-Zhe haifang junwu*).\textsuperscript{108} Zhu’s earlier career as former Provincial Administration Commissioner of Guangdong\textsuperscript{109} provided him with the experience and credentials for managing maritime affairs. His main duty as the Governor was to clear the coast of Japanese pirates, Portuguese smugglers and Chinese collaborators. A year later, owing to the increased violence and instability on the coast, the Court granted Zhu’s request to be given authority over the government troops.\textsuperscript{110}

\textsuperscript{105} MSL: SZ, 350: lb–2a.
\textsuperscript{107} MSL: SZ, 324: 7a–b.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., 325: lb–2a.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., 315: 7b.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 335: 7a.
The appointment of a single official with responsibility for the affairs of both Zhejiang and Fujian made it possible for the first time to provide military coordination between the two provinces. In response to raids on Ningbo and Taizhou by the Chinese and foreign maritime elements at Shuangyu that probably occurred toward the end of 1547 or the beginning of 1548, Zhu summoned Lu Tang, the Assistant Military Commissioner (duzhuihui qianshi) of Fujian, to lead a pincer attack with the Fuqing fleet and the Zhejiang troops. In March–April 1548 the government forces scored a decisive victory over the pirate gang, that was forced to retreat to Shuangyu.

Lu Tang directed a second major attack against the trading-cum-pirate settlement in Shuangyu in June 1548, and that campaign, too, was a complete success. Estimates of the number of pirates killed or captured ranged from 55 to a few hundred. It is not clear from the Chinese records if any Portuguese were among them.

Zhu Wan decided to deal harshly with the captives taken in the battles. In a memorial to the Court, he argued his case by citing existing laws. He began by mentioning the sea prohibition adopted in the early days of

111. The Ming shilu, under the entry of February 7, 1548, records that, having received a memorial from Zhejiang Inspecting Censor Pei Shen concerning the plundering raids by sea bandits on Ningbo and Taizhou, the Court called for an investigation into the affair and consolidation of coastal defense (MSL: SZ, 331: 6a–b). Clearly, Roland Higgins’ suggestion (“Piracy”, p. 178) that the incident happened on this date is incorrect, since about a month’s time or longer was needed for the transmission of the memorial and the Court deliberation. According to Ming shi (juan 81, “shihuo 食貨”, 5”, p. 1981), about a hundred “pirate” ships were moored in Ningbo and Taizhou and several thousand men from the ships came ashore and plundered in the 26th year of Jiajing (sometime between January 22, 1547 and February 9, 1548).


114. Boxer, South China, p. xxvii. The number of casualties and captives is given as “a few hundred”, including the pirate leaders and those who harbored them or received “stolen” goods from them. Furthermore, “dark barbarians” and Japanese were included. See Zhejiang tongzhi, 60: 14B; and Fan Lai 范濬, Liang-Zhe haifang leikao xubian 兩浙海防類考續編 [A supplementary edition of the investigation into materials concerning the maritime defense in Zhejiang] (1602 ed.), 9: 43b. Chouhai tubian states that 55, including 2 Japanese, were captured and executed. Many were drowned during the action. See 4: 15a–b, in WYGSKQS, Vol. 585, p. 102.
the dynasty. The Ming Code (Da Ming lü), he said, stated that those who smuggled people and weapons to the sea or foreign lands or divulged information to foreigners were to be executed by beheading. Moreover, the regulations imposed capital punishment on officials or civilians who illegally built two-master vessels, shipped contraband goods to the sea, went to trade in foreign lands, conspired with pirates or guided them in plundering raids.\textsuperscript{115}

Zhu Wan explained that, in the present incident, the captives had been taken off the coast and in battles. Some captives were “dark barbarians”, and he was surprised by their ability to speak the Chinese language. At the trial, the judges had accepted the captives’ contentions that they had been either coerced into taking part or kidnapped by the sea bandits, and imposed lighter sentences than Zhu wanted. Indeed, the judge even released some of them. Zhu Wan submitted a list of 14 “principal culprits” who were Chinese nationals and whose guilt was proven by incontestable evidence, and requested that the Court approve their immediate execution by beheading. He also asked permission to detain the rest of the captives pending further scrutiny and endorsement of the death sentences by the Court.\textsuperscript{116}

\textbf{The Zoumaxi Incident and the Conspiracy Theory}

In 1547, the Portuguese arrived in Zhangzhou, another smuggling center, to trade as usual but turned instead to violence. As Higgins relates:

\begin{quote}
It must have been very shortly after Chu left southern Fukien that it was reported [to the court that] the Fo-lang-chi barbarians had invaded Chang-chou. The report, dated December 27, 1547, stated the Portuguese were attacked and chased away by the coastal circuit Surveillance Vice Commissioner K’o Ch’iao [Ke Qiao]. When the Regional Inspector Censor Chin Ch’eng heard of it, he criticized the Wu-yu Guard Commander Ting T’ung and also the [former] Coastal Circuit Surveillance Vice Commissioner Yao Hsiang-feng for having received bribes and goods and for having let the Portuguese enter the frontier area.\textsuperscript{117}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{115.} MJSWB, 205/1: 10b–11a.
\textsuperscript{116.} Ibid., 205: 12a–b.
\textsuperscript{117.} Higgins, “Piracy”, p. 177. Chang Wei-hua also states that the clash occurred after Zhu Wan’s departure from Zhangzhou (\textit{Ming shi ouzhou siguo juan}, p. 30).
There are several points in this account that require clarification. The first matter is the date of the Portuguese “raid”. December 27, 1547 was the date when the Court finally made a decision about Censor Jin’s impeachment of the military officers and instructed him to arrest the accused. Considering the time required for Censor Jin’s investigation, the transmission of his memorial and the deliberations by the Court, the raid could not have taken place later than November. From mid-November, Zhu Wan was in Zhangzhou. Throughout December and the beginning of the New Year, he remained in the Quan-Zhang region of southern Fujian where he conducted a successful military campaign against the “mountain bandits” in Tong’an. In early February, Zhu Wan “had made his way as far as Xinghua”, a short distance from Quanzhou. He would certainly have mentioned the “Portuguese raid” had it occurred during his presence in the area.

The incident is more likely to have occurred towards the end of the trading season in September–October, when the Portuguese were about to return south on the northeast monsoon. Soon after taking up his new appointment, Zhu Wan might have decided to begin his tour of duty in southern Fujian before heading north to his headquarters in Hangzhou in Zhejiang, in view of the urgency of the matter, it must have been reported to him before his arrival.

The victory claimed by Inspecting Censor Jin Cheng is also puzzling. A passage in Zhangzhou fuchi (Gazetteer of Zhangzhou Prefecture) clearly states:

120. Zhu Wan said in a memorial, that was probably written during his sojourn in southern Fujian sometime after mid-November, that the Portuguese sent two ships for repair openly at an offshore island during mid-August to mid-September when they were rounding up their trade for the season (*MJSWB*, 205/1:7a). The passage did not mention the clash. But placing the date after his departure from south Fujian, as suggested by Roland Higgins (“Piracy”, p. 177), does not seem to leave enough time for the memorial to reach the Court and be deliberated prior to the Court decision on December 27. It is also unlikely that the Portuguese would have stayed so long after the conclusion of the trading season, as noted above. Zhu did not mention the “raid” probably because the official-in-charge, Inspecting Censor Jin Cheng, had already memorialized the Court. It was improper for him to interfere with the matter since a Court ruling was pending. In 1549, for example, when Fujian Inspecting Censor Yang Jiuze reported to the Court on the victory over the Portuguese, he was reprimanded and demoted two grades by the Court because he transgressed the authority of Inspector-General (formerly Min-Zhe Coastal Defense Superintendent) Zhu Wan, who was handling the case (*MSL: SZ*, 347: 4b).
In 1547, there were Portuguese ships coming to trade with their merchandise in Wuyu (near Amoy). Traders from Zhangzhou and Quanzhou hastily went to do business with them. Coastal Surveillance Vice-Commissioner Ke Qiao, Zhangzhou Prefect Lu Bi and the Longxi Magistrate, Lin Song, sent troops to attack them but failed. This led to more intensive trade [later]. At this time, newly appointed Officer-in Charge of Min-Zhe Coastal Defense ... Zhu Wan enforced the sea prohibition and [later] captured more than ninety smugglers.121

The sequence of events in the entry suggests that the commotion occurred before Zhu Wan's adoption of more stringent measures against the smuggling trade, imposed after his arrival.

Another important source only causes further confusion. It is a letter by Lin Xiyuan written shortly after a "second" clash occurred off the southern Fujian coast between Chinese troops and the Portuguese. Lin Xiyuan was a very influential member of the gentry in southern Fujian. By this time he had retired to his home province, retaining the title of Assistant Commissioner without a posting. During or shortly after his inspection tour in southern Fujian at the end of 1547 and the beginning of 1548, Zhu Wan memorialized the Court and accused Lin of building large ships in breach of maritime regulations. The ships were disguised as ferry-boats, but were actually being used to transport contraband goods or loot seized by pirates, and also to trade with the Portuguese on their annual visits to the southern Fujian coast, where prosperous port cities such as Anhai in Quanzhou and Yuegang in Zhangzhou, and such notorious smuggling centers as Yunxiao, Zhao'an and Meiling were located.122

Lin was understandably opposed to the use of force against the Portuguese. He said that the importation of spices, drugs and aromatics was not prohibited in Guangzhou and the Folangji brought these much sought-after commodities. Moreover, the local people were keen on this trade that generated great profits, and the Portuguese did not cause trouble, and had even helped the authorities to suppress piracy. Therefore, he argued, they should be accepted as merchants.123

Lin Xuyuan was certainly not a principled advocate for an "open-port policy", nor was he necessarily pro-Portuguese, as suggested by Fujida

122. MJSWB, 205/1: 7b–9b.
123. Ibid., 165/4: 5a–6a.
When questioned about his seemingly pro-Portuguese attitude by his critics, he defended himself by saying that he had never suggested that the Folangji should not be attacked, but he believed their offenses were minor. Furthermore, gaining a military victory over them would not be easy. Lin said that when he had learned of the government plans to attack the Portuguese, he intended to help the authorities by proposing tactics to Coastal Surveillance Vice-Commissioner Ke Qiao. He also sent some of his disciples, including Circuit Commandant Yu Dayou, to assist the Vice-Commissioner in drawing up a plan for the attack. All this, he said, proved that he was not colluding with the Folangji. By Lin’s own admission, clearly he was more concerned with his own commercial stake rather than those of the Portuguese.

Vice-Commissioner Ke visited Lin later and said, since the Portuguese had not perpetrated any damage, he too opposed using force against them. He added that he had told Yu to go on board the Portuguese ships to explain the uncertain situation, and to advise the Portuguese to withdraw temporarily from the coast. As for the debts owed to them by their Chinese counterparts, the Portuguese could request the assistance of the local authorities in pressing for payment. Lin agreed with this suggestion as he had always favored a peaceful solution.

Not all thought as he did. The Fujian Inspecting Censor, Jin Cheng, advocated the use of force. Vice-Commissioner Ke immediately sent one of Lin’s confidants, Zheng Yue, to urge the Portuguese to follow Yu’s earlier advice. Lin met Zheng before the latter’s trip, and advised him not to tell the Portuguese about the government’s hostility, fearing that the Portuguese would not trust the promise made earlier to collect debts on their behalf. Lin suggested that it would be reasonable to let the Portuguese enter the harbor and allow their merchandise to be subjected to levies. They could then request the authorities to recover their debts for them before withdrawing from the coast. Zheng proceeded to the Portuguese ships and reported what Lin had said. The Portuguese received the proposal enthusiastically, probably believing that it was an official proposition. There were nine ships present, but three others were absent. The three missing vessels were in fact Chinese junks disguised as foreign ships, and the Chinese mariners on these junks secretly proposed to Zheng that, in requital of their misdeeds, they were willing to help the government attack the foreigners. Lin was excited about this development. Now, the government could either tell the Portuguese...
to pay the levies, or launch an attack with the help of the three junks. According to Lin, the government now had the advantage and was sure to triumph over the Portuguese.

Lin’s high-handedness eventually stretched Vice-Commissioner Ke’s tolerance to its limits. Putting Lin’s plans aside, he launched a surprise assault on the Portuguese, some of whom he arrested and treated as bandit leaders. This action clearly broke the cordial working relationship between him and Lin, his former patron, and nullified the promise he had made to the Portuguese.

Lin was furious about the move by Ke, whom he accused of incompetence in the letter cited above, charging that Ke had waivered between pacification and assault in dealing with the Portuguese, had broken promises and had resorted to dirty tricks against the foreigners. Lin claimed that Ke had tarnished the image of the imperial authorities because his action had caused the Portuguese to retaliate by burning houses in Qingpu village and plundering ships. The outbreak of disturbances forced Ke to launch a counter-attack on the foreigners, and this had been unsuccessful, resulting in the burning of a large Chinese vessel, the death of a number of men, plus the loss of substantial public funds. Lin contrasted Ke’s failure with the success of former Guangdong Coastal Surveillance Vice-Commissioner Wang Hong, whose decisiveness had triumphed over the Portuguese in the battle of 1521. After his military setback, Ke accepted the Portuguese proposal for a truce and entertained their messenger with great courtesy. However, subsequently Ke shifted his position yet again. This time, several score lives were lost at sea and public properties were burnt. Lin commented that the disaster was even worse than the “humiliating military defeat of the previous year”.

Lin’s account of the above events mentions two subsequent clashes between the Chinese and the Portuguese off the southern Fujian coast over a period of two years. According to Fujida Toyobachi, the first clash, that Lin dated “the previous year”, occurred in 1548, and the second took place in 1549. Before examining Fujida’s account, the events subsequent to the destruction of Shuangyu require further clarification.

In brief, after the victory at Shuangyu, the anti-smuggling campaign targeted the southern Fujian region. Skirmishes with Portuguese ships in

126. For the above, see Fujida Toyobachi, Tōzai kōshōshi, pp. 453–5, citing Lin Xiyuan’s letter to an official named Weng. As the latter was addressed as “biejia 別駕”, normally used for a person who was an Assistant Prefect (tongpan 通判), it is quite certain that he was Assistant Prefect Weng Can mentioned in MSL: SZ, 363: 6b. For the text of Lin’s letter, refer also to Chang Wei-hua, Ming shi ouzhou siguo juan, pp. 34–6.

127. Fujida Toyobachi, Tōzai kōshōshi, p. 455.
The latter half of 1548 occurred in Wuyu (present-day Jinmen/Quemoy), prompting the Portuguese to send a message to India via Malacca that "the ports of China were all up in arms against the Portuguese".\textsuperscript{128} Despite these hostile conditions, the Portuguese continued to try their luck along the China coast. Although Portuguese adventurers avoided direct contact with the Chinese fleet near the Guangdong-Fujian border, they were unable to dispose of all the cargo before their return to Malacca. Therefore, they left two junks with unsold goods at anchor off Zoumaxi in Zhao’an district. Thirty Portuguese were left in charge of the ships to be assisted by their Chinese collaborators.\textsuperscript{129} These junks were captured by the Chinese commander Lu Tang on March 18–19, 1549.\textsuperscript{130}

Since the second clash described by Lin Xiyuan was a defeat worse than the one experienced during "the previous year", he cannot be referring to the decisive Chinese success in March 1549. Therefore it can be certain that the first clash occurred in 1547, as discussed earlier. The second took place in 1548 around Wuyu, and has received little attention. A Ming source written by He Qiaoyuan even confuses it with the third clash in March 1549 saying that,

\begin{quote}
The Folangji arrived to trade in Yuegang in Zhangzhou. Fearing the strict prohibition imposed by Zhu Wan, the Zhangzhou people dared not communicate with them. The Portuguese were even attacked. In response, they resorted to violence, but were captured... Ninety-six of the Chinese among the captives were executed.\textsuperscript{131}
\end{quote}

In reality, the second clash occurred in the aftermath of the Shuangyu victory, but before the 1549 triumph by Chinese forces in Zoumaxi. During late June and July 1548, as a Ming source records, "the bandits invaded Shatou’ao and repeatedly attacked the outer island of Dadan (in the vicinity of Wuyu). Because of the strong defense put up by [Vice-Commissioner] Ke Qiao, the bandits withdrew."\textsuperscript{132} However, despite another claim to victory in the Ming records, the government troops in fact suffered a second defeat on the southern Fujian coast in two subsequent years, as Lin Xiyuan has mentioned. Another author, Gaspar da Cruz, also touches on the conflict in 1548. He says that a Chinese fleet cruising along the Fujian coast encountered some Portuguese ships off

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{128} Boxer, \textit{South China}, p. xxvii.
  \item \textsuperscript{129} Cruz, "Treatise", p. 194.
  \item \textsuperscript{130} Higgins, "Piracy", p. 192.
  \item \textsuperscript{131} Cited in Fujida Toyobachi, \textit{Tōzai kōshōshi}, p. 452.
  \item \textsuperscript{132} Cited in Dai Yixuan, \textit{Ming shi folangjījuan}, p. 42.
\end{itemize}
Zhangzhou and “they began to fight with them, and in no way did they permit any wares to come to the Portugals, who stayed many days there (fighting sometimes) to see if they could have any remedy for them to dispatch their business”. The account clearly states that the Zhoumaxi Incident followed this earlier clash in 1548. Also, the fact that Lin’s letter mentions his quarrel with Zhu Wan, but not the Zhoumaxi victory and the subsequent executions ordered by Zhu, suggests that it was written shortly after the second defeat and before the government triumph in March 1549.

There is yet another piece of evidence to support the proposition that the second clash occurred in 1548. In his letter, Lin Xiyuan mentions his disciple Yu Dayou as Commandant of Ding-Zhang Circuit (Ding-Zhang shoubei chihui). Yu, who was soon to become a prominent military officer active in the suppression of Japanese pirates, experienced a quick succession of promotions in 1548‒49. After serving as Ding-Zhang Circuit Commandant, he was transferred, sometime in the latter half of 1548, to Guangdong with the title of Acting Assistant Military Commissioner. On Zhu Wan’s recommendation during his second inspection tour of Fujian in 1549, Yu was appointed Anti-Japanese Pirates Military Commissioner of Fujian. As the second clash took place during Yu’s posting as Circuit Commandant in Fujian before his transfers first to Guangdong and then back to Fujian, clearly it must have occurred in 1548 and before the Zhoumaxi Incident in early 1549.

The captives from the Zhoumaxi Incident included 3 “Folangji kings”, 16 “white barbarians”, 46 “dark barbarians” (from the Portuguese band), the notorious pirate chief and self-proclaimed lieutenant “Lada Li Guangtou” and his 112 followers, and 29 females who were the wives of the barbarians. Thirty-three other men were killed in the battles. This list of casualties comes to a total of 239.

The Ming shilu records that the Court received from Zhu Wan, formerly Governor and now Itinerant Inspector-General of Zhejiang, what was probably the latter’s first full report on the military success at Zhoumaxi. In his memorial, Zhu states that the local people had reacted strongly to government suppression and that he found it necessary to act promptly to guard against unexpected emergencies. He had ordered an investigation and 96 of the captives, including Li Guangtou, had been

134. Refer to Lin’s letter reproduced in Chang Wei-hua, Ming shi ouzhou siguo juan, p. 36.
found guilty of colluding with the foreigners. Exercising his discretionary powers, he had ordered Assistant Military Commissioner Lu Tang and Coastal Surveillance Vice-Commissioner Ke Qiao to execute the captives, and this had been done on April 15, 1549.\footnote{MSL: SZ, 347: 5a. For the date of the executions, see Higgins, “Piracy”, p. 192.}

Zhu Wan’s action opened the door for impeachment by Censor Chen Jiude, who accused Zhu of having exceeded his authority in putting to death the prisoners taken at Zhoumaxi without the prior approval from the Court. Chen asked the Court to inflict punishments on Zhu, Lu and Ke. The emperor followed the usual judicial procedure by instructing the Board of War together with the three judicial offices (san fasi)—the Board of Punishments (xinbu), the Court of Judicial Review (dali si) and the Censorate (ducha yuan)—to comment on the case. The enquiry produced a cautious and legalistic recommendation that stated that Zhu Wan had indeed been granted discretionary powers, but noted that the “bandits” had been captured in the second month (March), but that Zhu’s report was sent in only a month later, indicating that the executions were carried out as a result of a later decision and had not taken place on the war front, where exigencies might have required summary punishments. Therefore, it would have been proper for Zhu to have waited for imperial approval on the matter. But the joint Board cautioned the Court that, until more evidence could be amassed, their view might just have been a wrong assumption. For this reason, it suggested sending a Censor to investigate the case.\footnote{Ibid.}

An investigation into the killing of prisoners, presided over by Supervising Secretary Du Ruzhen of the War Office, was ordered by the Court on May 7, 1549. The provincial authorities were also told to calm the coastal population and ensure that the innocent would not be unduly implicated in the affair. Pending the judicial findings, Zhu Wan was relieved of his post and Lu and Ke were subjected to interrogation.\footnote{Ibid.}

The inquest, that was held in Fuzhou, the provincial capital of Fujian, cleared the Portuguese of many of the charges laid against them. Most of the survivors were released from prison and sent into exile in the province of Guangxi. Zhu Wan and several of the provincial military and civil officials were “found guilty of unjustifiably executing traders, embezzling their goods and concealing the truth from the Court”.\footnote{Boxer, South China, p. xxix.}

Zhu’s downfall has often been seen from a conspiratorial perspective in both traditional and modern writings. In the view of the conspiracy...
theorists, it is not surprising that, within officialdom, there were “men with strong local ties representing and protecting vested interests within coastal society”. Moreover, as Higgins explains, some very dramatic political developments occurred in the capital during this period that inevitably affected Zhu’s fate. Grand Secretary Xia Yan, Zhu Wan’s patron at the Court, and “the single most important advocate in the central government of the stronger defense policies Zhu was now trying to carry out on the coast”, was disgraced as a result of a political intrigue set in motion by a rival group led by another Grand Secretary, Yan Song. A warrant was issued on April 25, 1548, for the arrest of Xia, who was condemned to death on May 6 and executed on November 1. Many of Xia’s allies were also purged during the period. Now, the accusations leveled against Zhu by his enemies in the maritime provinces found support from a Court official, Censor Chen Jiude. Zhu’s downfall was, therefore, “a success for the coastal forces opposing Zhu’s enforcement of the maritime trade prohibition” and his political enemies at Court. Even the compilers of the Ming shilu lamented some two decades later that, although Zhu Wan indeed exceeded his authority, his “guilt and merits” had not been duly assessed by his inquisitors. C.R. Boxer’s conclusion that Zhu Wan was “the victim of a court intrigue and thus of a miscarriage of justice” represents the conventional interpretation of the event.

Nevertheless, a deeper scrutiny of the source materials highlights the complexity of the matter. Gaspar da Cruz’s detailed account of the Zhoumaxi Incident, for example, provides useful background information. He claims that, in late 1548, the Portuguese attempted to conclude their trade in southern Fujian, but were frustrated by Chinese troops who were on the alert against them. The captains of the Chinese fleet then sent a message very secretly at night that, if they wanted to trade, they should send them some gifts. The Portuguese were very pleased with this development and prepared a great and sumptuous.

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142. Ibid., p. 188.
143. Ibid., pp. 179–80. For the dates of Xia’s arrest and sentences, see MSL: SZ, 334: 4b, 335: 1b, 341: 1a.
146. Boxer, South China, p. xxx.
147. For example, both So in Japanese Piracy, Ch. 4, and Higgins in “Piracy”, Ch. 4, give a detailed analysis of Court politics and intrigues during the time.
148. In preparing his work, that was published in 1569–70, Cruz was able to meet several of the Portuguese, who had been captured by the Chinese at Zhoumaxi in 1549, including Galeote Pereira.
present that they sent by night as instructed, and from this point goods began to come to them. The trade was conducted in this manner during 1548.\(^{149}\) This account substantiates the accusations made in the verdict of the inquest concerning corruption and cover-ups by the military officers.

Cruz’s account provides another fascinating piece of information. It concerns the manner of delivering the captives to the provincial high authorities, and the motive behind the executions. Cruz suggests that “the chief captain” of the China armada “laboured to persuade four ... [Portuguese] who had more appearance in their persons than the rest, that they should say that they were Kings of Malacca”. They were also told to dress up as such with gowns and caps tailored according to his instructions. Zhu Wan also mentions the capture of three “Folangji kings”.\(^{150}\) Cruz thought that the captain acted out of vainglory and covetousness, wanting to make a great display of the Portuguese captives to show that he had achieved a glorious triumph over the foreign chieftains. At the same time, he was intending to help himself to the goods taken from the two junks. To keep the truth secret, he executed potential eyewitnesses, among whom were some small boys. Three or four youths and one man were spared so that they could attest to the royal identities of the Portuguese and aver that they were pirates.\(^{151}\) The matter came to the ears of the “Aitao” (Coastal Surveillance Vice-Commissioner) who “reproved him [the Chief Captain] severely”, but lost no time entering into an agreement “to divide the goods between them” and “to keep this [plan] in secret”.\(^{152}\)

Although the two personalities, “the Chief Captain, who is the Luthissi”, and “Aitao”, are not clearly identifiable from Cruz’s accounts, C.R. Boxer has made an informed guess that the former was Lu Tang and the latter Ke Qiao. Nevertheless, the title “Anti-Japanese Pirates Military Commander” (beiwo duzhihui) that he gives to Lu Tang is inaccurate.\(^{153}\) Lu Tang’s position at this time was actually Assistant Military Commissioner of Fujian (rank 3a).\(^{154}\) This could be the reason he was addressed as “Luthissi”, a corrupt form of the Chinese term Lu dusi. Although Cruz

\(^{149}\) Cruz, “Treatise”, p. 193.

\(^{150}\) MSL: SZ, 350: la–lb.


\(^{152}\) Ibid., pp. 196–7.

\(^{153}\) Ibid., pp. 195fn2, 196fn1. Li Xiu was the beiwo 備倭 at this time. See MJSWB, 205/l: 4a; and Chouhai tubian, in SKQS, 4: 20b, Vol. 584, p. 104.

\(^{154}\) The Chinese title was Fujian duzhihui qianshi 福建都指揮僉事, often simplified as dusi 都司. He was appointed to this position on Zhu Wan’s recommendation. See Ming shi, juan 212, “Lu Tang”, p. 5608; and juan 76,”zhiguan 職官 (Offices), 5”, p. 1872.
thought that Ke was senior to Lu, the latter in fact enjoyed a higher rank and for that reason his name is often placed before Ke in Ming writings. Ke was Coastal Surveillance Vice-Commissioner of Fujian (rank 4a).155

With regard to the aftermath of the Zhoumaxi Incident, Cruz’s account is equally revealing.156 During the judicial enquiry conducted in Fuzhou by Du Ruzhen with the assistance of Inspecting Censor Chen Zongkuei, the Provincial Administration Commissioner, the Provincial Surveillance Commissioner (anchasi) and other high-ranking officials, both accused and accusers, were cross-examined. The “Commander” and the “Chief Captain” allegedly bribed a Chinese pilot from one of the junks to testify against the Portuguese, and a Chinese youth who served as the Portuguese interpreter was taken away, so that the Portuguese would not have anyone who understood their language to help them in their defense. Luckily, the Portuguese were able to secure again the services of the Chinese youth by means of a petition drawn up for them by a Chinese prisoner.

In Quan-Zhang, southern Fujian, an investigation was also made into Portuguese claims that they were neither kings nor pirates but traders, who had been visiting the China coast for many years. The investigators’ report supported these claims. The Chinese pilot also changed his testimony and revealed information about the goods that the naval officers had seized from the junks.

The verdict of the investigation can be found both in Cruz’s account and in the Ming shilu. The two sources provide similar information. According to the latter, the inquisitors found that the foreigners from Malacca came to trade every year. They were not pirates, nor did they assume any pretentious titles. When they arrived off the southern Fujian coast, the local officials had failed to detain them and their merchandise. Instead, they (the “Aitao” and the “Luthissi”), according to Cruz’s account,157 accepted bribes and let the local people trade with them. It was only when the higher authorities were on the point of finding out about this arrangement that they took action against the Portuguese. The foreigners resisted arrest and in doing so were responsible for some killings. After the “bandits” were captured, the officials did not distinguish between leaders and followers, and ordered

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155. See, for example, Fujida Toyobachi, Tōzai kōshōshi, p. 460; also MSL: SZ, 347: 5a. For the rank, see Ming shi, juan 75, “zhiguan 4”, p. 1840. Ke’s full Chinese title was Fujian anchasi xunshi haidao fushi 福建按察司巡视海道副使, simplified as haidao, or “Aitao”, a corrupt form of the Chinese term in Portuguese documents.


157. Ibid., p. 206; and MSL: SZ, 347: 5a.
executions without the proper authority of the Court. Many innocent people died as a result. Zhu, Lu, Ke and several other officials were found guilty of mishandling the case, but with differing degrees of complicity. Among the captives, four foreigners (two Portuguese and two of their slaves, according to Cruz) were found guilty of killing while resisting arrest. It was proposed they be given the death penalty, and that the rest of the party, numbering 51 (a figure given in both accounts), be banished to Guangxi province. Having examined the pronouncement, the Board of War and the three judicial offices recommended the Court accept the findings and sentences. Both Lu and Ke were condemned to death but later pardoned, and an imperial edict for the detention of Zhu Wan, who was to be brought to Beijing to stand trial, was issued on September 1, 1550. Apprehensive about the impending inquisition, Zhu committed suicide.\textsuperscript{158}

Understandably, the Portuguese survivors hailed the fair and meticulous judicial processes of China and “stated outright that accused persons in a similar position could never have had such a fair trial in Europe”.\textsuperscript{159}

**Ming Policies Revisited**

A closer look at Ming maritime policy is indispensable if the implications of the Zhoumaxi Incident are to be appreciated better. Only then can the theory of Court intrigues and the claims that Zhu’s disgrace was a triumph for the coastal interests and a failure for the advocates of strong defense policies be examined in proper perspective.

Ming foreign policy, as John E. Wills, Jr. has succinctly explained, banned all trade in Chinese ports by foreigners not connected with tribute embassies and forbade all Chinese voyages abroad, “so that China’s only legal maritime trade was that carried on within the framework of the tribute system”.\textsuperscript{160} This sea prohibition law and the institution of Supervisorates of Maritime Trade and Shipping governed Ming China’s relations with the maritime “tribute states”.

\textsuperscript{158} MSL: SZ, 363: 5b–6b. Under the same entry, the compilers of the above sources, while lamenting Zhu Wan’s death, admitted Zhu’s “excessiveness” in his handling of the matter.

\textsuperscript{159} Boxer, *South China*, p. xxix.

From 1370, three designated ports, namely: Ningbo, Quanzhou (Fuzhou from 1469) and Guangzhou, were opened for tributary trade. Ningbo was to trade with Japan, Quanzhou (later Fuzhou) with Liuqiu and Guangzhou with all other countries from the south. The Maritime Trade and Shipping Supervisorates were instituted in these ports to regulate the arrival of overseas tribute ships (gongbo) and the trading ships (shibo) that accompanied each tribute mission. Tributary states were allowed to bring along local products and trade through authorized agents (yahang). As a Ming official observed, “when there were tribute ships, there was also interchange of trade (hushi). It is clear that those who did not arrive as tribute missions would not be allowed to trade.”

Under the regulations, whenever a tribute mission arrived in its designated port, the envoy went through the prescribed ceremonies or else proceeded to the imperial capital. His retinue, many of whom would have been merchants, was allowed to engage in trade at the port under supervision during the sojourn of the mission. The number of tribute vessels and personnel and the frequency of visits were fixed in accordance with the degree of intimacy of that country with China. Private merchants who did not come with a tribute mission were prohibited from engaging in trade and anyone who communicated with them could be punished by death. However, the strict regulations had seldom been followed by the port officials, particularly when eunuchs, many of whom abused their power and were corrupt, were appointed regional affairs overseers. Lured by the prospect of substantial profits, people in high office or from powerful families colluded with foreign visitors in semi-legal or illicit trade.

Although the Ming government inherited the Supervisorate institution from its predecessors, it introduced far reaching changes in the functions of the institution. During Song-Yuan times, as the name of the office suggests, the three Maritime Trade and Shipping Supervisorates in Guangzhou, Quanzhou, and Ningbo administered Chinese and foreign trading ships, managed customs affairs, purchased foreign products and received tribute envoys. During the Ming era, when the sea prohibition was imposed and private trade disallowed, the Supervisorates no longer managed maritime (private) trade (haishi), but their duties were limited to receiving tribute ships and the restricted number of trading ships.

163. The duties of managing both private and tributary trade during Song-Yuan times are stressed in Gao Qi, Fujian shihbo tijusi, 2b, 6a–b.
allowed to accompany the tribute missions. Therefore, the continued use of the name “Maritime Trade and Shipping Supervisorates” during Ming times is somewhat misleading.

As mentioned earlier, foreigners seldom found the regulated trade satisfactory, and consequently often became involved in smuggling activities. The trading ships from Southeast Asia, and later those of the Portuguese, visited the lesser ports around the entrance to the Pearl River where local officials levied taxes on their merchandise, giving de facto authorization to their activities.

Chinese merchants were willing to disregard the prohibitory law and trade with foreigners off the coast. Chinese junks also violated the law by making regular voyages to such foreign countries as Siam, Pattani and Malacca. Many Chinese became sojourners in foreign lands, and some of these sojourners returned to China as interpreters assisting or even acting as foreign envoys, while others played an indispensable role on the China coast as go-betweens or brokers between foreigners and local Chinese. Despite the illicit nature of these coastal activities, local officials had long tolerated them.

In a nutshell, neither the ideology nor the policy that governed Ming foreign relations was coherent or uniformly enforced. Illegal, or as one might call it “private”, trade flourished on the basis of a tacit understanding between the authorized or unauthorized “tribute-bearers”, foreign and Chinese merchants, and provincial officials, including the eunuchs appointed to oversee provincial affairs (zhenshou). While the state was more concerned with coastal security, the provincial officials had both revenue and personal interests in mind. As long as the form of the tribute institution was preserved and coastal security was not threatened, the state and the provincial authorities tolerated such flexibility.

During the Zhengde Reign (1506‒21), government policy toward tribute trade vacillated between firmness and flexibility. Japan is a case in point. The regulations of the early Ming era allowed Japan's tribute mission to come once every ten years, and each mission was limited to two hundred men and no more than two vessels. After 1511, however, the Japanese missions arrived with more than five or six hundred ships.

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164. Ibid., 6b. Gao states that “[the Fujian Supervisorate] manages only tribute ships. Maritime (meaning “private”) trade has not been in operation [since the early time of Ming Dynasty]”. For a detailed study of the shibo institution, see Zheng Youguo 郑有国, Zhongguo shibo zhidu yanjiu 中国市舶制度研究 [A study of the shibo institution] (Fuzhou: Fujian jiaoyu chubanshe, 2004).

people and a larger number of ships but still at ten-year intervals.\textsuperscript{166} In
Guangzhou, foreign maritime traders could also come and go without
much hindrance.\textsuperscript{167} These irregularities prompted Guangdong Assistant
Administration Commissioner (\textit{canyi}) Chen Boxian to propose a ban, that was accepted by the Court, on all unscheduled trade. However, local officials proved reluctant to enforce the restriction. In response to a recommendation by Guangdong Inspecting Censor Gao Gongzhao, the Court re-affirmed the ban in 1515.\textsuperscript{168}

Despite all attempts, the strict application of the Maritime Trade
and Shipping Supervisorate regulations did not seem to work and, on
June 15, 1517, two months before Pires’ arrival, the Court agreed to
accept Administration Commissioner Wu Tingju’s earlier appeal for the
relaxation of strict Supervisorate regulations and the rescission of the
more recent restrictions implemented upon the recommendations of
Chen Boxian and Gao Gongzhao.\textsuperscript{169}

Having served in Guangdong as the Magistrate of Shunde for ten
years and thereafter in two higher-ranking positions, Wu Tingju had
an intimate knowledge of maritime affairs.\textsuperscript{170} He assumed the position
of Guangdong [Right] Administration Commissioner in 1514 and was
promoted to full [Left] Commissioner two years later. Sometime before
August 1517, he became the Grand Coordinator of Huguang, responsible
for famine relief with the title of Vice-Censor-in-Chief.\textsuperscript{171} While serving
in Guangzhou, he called\textsuperscript{172} for flexibility in handling tributary trade. He
had two goals in mind: to meet the Court’s demand for large quantities
of spices (mainly pepper) and aromatic wood and to provide revenue

\textsuperscript{166} MSL: SZ, 80: 7a; also Ming shi, juan 81, “shihuo S”, p. 1980. A new regulation in
1539 allowed three ships, but not more than one hundred men. See MSL: SZ,
349: 4a.

\textsuperscript{167} MSL: WZ, 123: 4b.

\textsuperscript{168} Ibid. It cannot be ascertained from the sources when Chen submitted his
recommendation.

\textsuperscript{169} Ibid., 149: 9a.

\textsuperscript{170} Ming shi, juan 201, “Biography 89: Wu Tingju”.

\textsuperscript{171} Ming shu (Ming history), comp. Fu Weiling 傅維麟編撰, 129: 31a. The work was
compiled during the early Kangxi Reign of the Qing dynasty.

\textsuperscript{172} It is not certain when Wu memorialized the Court. Dai Yixuan places the date
in 1514 (see Ming-shi Folangji zhuoan, pp. 11–2), before Chen Boxian’s call for
strict compliance with the Supervisorate regulations. But from the sequence
of events recorded in the Ming shilu, it is more logical to see Wu’s proposal
as a response to the rigidity in the management of tributary trade upon the
recommendations by Chen and Gao Gongzhao. In other words, Wu’s proposal
was made sometime between Gao’s recommendation in 1515 and the Court’s
adoption of Wu’s proposal on June 15, 1517.
for local military expenses. He proposed that levies be imposed on merchandise brought by foreign vessels, even when their arrival was not on the approved schedule. This measure would have allowed tributary states to visit the country as frequently as they desired and allowed provincial officials some leeway to accommodate private foreign merchant shipping.

This new flexibility was most opportune for the first Portuguese diplomatic mission, that otherwise could have been turned away outright. At this point, it is necessary to refute a long-held assumption that Wu Tingju handled the Portuguese application for trade in his capacity as the Provincial Administration Commissioner of Guangdong. In fact, Wu no longer held the position when the Portuguese arrived at Tunmen on August 15, 1517. By that date he had already been promoted and transferred to Huguang province.

Wu's reforms should not be seen as a measure to promote maritime trade, but simply as a recognition of the reality and an effort to regularize a trade that was increasingly flourishing beyond government control. As a matter of fact, the state would have suffered a great loss of revenue had the rigid regulations been enforced, because officials would have been forced to turn away tributary missions that did not arrive according to the schedule. Furthermore, it was obvious that such rigidity only encouraged smuggling and irregularities, and at times smugglers engaged in plundering activities and brought calamity upon the locality.

When the new sovereign, the Jianjing Emperor, ascended the throne, he decreed on June 13, 1521, that strict Supervisorate regulations should be re-imposed. The reason given was that the laxity in the existing practice had given rise to conflicts among the tribute bearers and caused local disturbances. Furthermore, in reinstating the restriction, the reform-minded young sovereign was responding to a recommendation

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175. Dai Yixuan is correct to point out the confusion in the various sources and suggest that Commissioner Wu's reform was not related to the arrival of the Portuguese mission since it had been proposed earlier. He also suspects that Wu was no longer in Guangzhou when the Portuguese arrived, but fails to provide any direct evidence (ibid.). Under the entry of August 1, 1517, two weeks before the Portuguese arrival in Guangzhou, the *Ming shilu* clearly records that Wu was then the Grand Coordinator of Huguang. See *MSL: WZ*, 188: 5b.
176. One indication is his opposition in 1525 to the promotion of coastal shipping and construction of vessels for such purpose. See *MSL: SZ*, 41: 24a.
177. Ibid., 2: 14b.
by the Board of Rites urging that the frequency of tribute missions be fixed in order to reduce the financial burden of receiving them.\textsuperscript{178}

As he once said about himself, in the early years of his long reign, the Jianjing Emperor was diligent in the governance of the state.\textsuperscript{179} His primary concern was security problems along the borders. In fact, there was a consensus among the Court officials about the need for strong defense policies. Supervising Secretary Xia Yan, who later rose to become the highest-ranked Grand Secretary, was among the hardliners in matters to do with national defense. It is recorded in the \textit{Ming shilu}, under the entry of January 2, 1524, that he suggested sending a Supervising Censor to rectify the laxity in the coastal defense. The situation was revealed in the course of disturbances caused by the two rival Japanese tribute missions in 1523.\textsuperscript{180} His prompting led to the temporary suspension of the Maritime Trade and Shipping Supervisorsates,\textsuperscript{181} but this move only aggravated the problem of coastal defense. The measure, ironically, also contradicted the traditional concept of tributary relations and the true spirit of the sea prohibition that disallowed private, but not tributary trade. Both the tributary relations and the sea prohibition had been upheld concurrently, though often rather flexibly, since the early days of the Ming era.

Meanwhile, debate among the Court officials continued after Guangzhou was reopened to tributary trade on Lin Fu’s recommendation in 1529. For example, in 1530 Supervising Secretary Wang Xiwen argued that tribute missions did not benefit the country at all and should be totally banned. He added that, for security reasons, the fine example of former Guangdong Coastal Surveillance Vice-Commissioner Wang Hong, who expelled the Folangji from Guangzhou a few years earlier, should be emulated.\textsuperscript{182} Nevertheless, after deliberation, the Court agreed with

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{178} Ibid., 4: 10b–11a.
  \item \textsuperscript{179} Ibid., 280: 1a.
  \item \textsuperscript{180} Ibid., 33: 6b–7a.
  \item \textsuperscript{181} \textit{Ming shi jishi ben-mo}, 55: 8a–b, in \textit{WYGSKQS}, Vol. 364, p. 683. In response to any further breakdowns of law and order in the coastal provinces in 1529, Xia Yan also recommended the appointment of an Itinerant Inspector-General (\textit{xunshi} 巡視) for Zhejiang and its vicinity, with the rank of Censor-in-Chief (\textit{tuyushi} 都御史), who would be given authority over military affairs. However, the position was filled only briefly. See \textit{MSL: SZ}, 103: 8b; and Higgins, “Piracy”, pp. 126–32.
  \item \textsuperscript{182} Wang Hong, who was rising fast in his career during the early years of the new reign, was now an influential Court official and was promoted again in 1532 to assume the most prestigious position on the Six Boards, that of the head of the Board of Personnel. \textit{MSL: SZ}, 142: 2b.
\end{itemize}
the view of the Censorate that tribute missions should continue to be received in accordance with the Supervisorate regulations.\footnote{ibid., 118: 2b–3a. A fuller version of Wang Xiwen’s memorial is available in *Dongguan xianzhi* [Gazetteer of Dongguan District], comp. Chen Botao 陳伯陶編撰 (reprint; Taipei: Hsueh-sheng shu-chu, 1968; orig. 1911), 58: 4b–5a.}

Although smuggling involving the Chinese and their foreign collaborators was rampant for the next decade and a half, the Court seemed to have been principally concerned with more immediate threats along the northern border and consequently the rules of maritime trade were no longer strictly observed. Moreover, the Court’s dependence on foreign maritime merchants for supplies of spices and aromatic wood made it imperative to allow the arrival of the foreign merchants. The following entry in the *Ming shilu* indicates the demand of the Court for such foreign goods:

> The palace storehouse sent a communication to the Board of Revenue hastening the delivery for palace consumption of fragrant wood including seven thousand catties of gharuwood, sixty thousand catties of top-quality lakwood, twelve thousand catties of *chen* su *xiang* (*xiang* means fragrant wood), thirty thousand catties of *su* *xiang*, ten thousand catties of *haitian* *xiang* and thirty thousand catties of *huang*su *xiang*. The Board of Revenue requested a reduction in the quantity so that these could be made available by purchase. The Emperor rejected the appeal and ordered the purchase of the required quantity. The Board was also told that the Guangdong authorities should be pressed for speedy delivery.\footnote{ibid., 180: 3a.}

By the early sixteenth century, the practice of storing spices for personal consumption and probably also for resale had become widespread among official or prominent families. When the Zhengde Emperor, for example, ordered the confiscation of the property of a high-ranking official named Zhu Ning in 1519, three thousand cases of pepper were found among his valuables.\footnote{MSL: SZ, 361: 3b. Although the entry is dated July 12, 1550, it gives a very good description of the Court’s demand for such supplies during the period in general.} Even more significantly, foreign merchandise had been allocated to officials in Guangdong in lieu of their monthly emoluments.\footnote{ibid., 180: 3a.} The government as well as the society at large competed for the supply of spices and aromatic wood. To ensure supplies of these items for the palace, there was a ban on the private trading of
quantities of sappanwood or pepper that exceeded a thousand catties.  

Nevertheless, Provincial Administration Commissioner Wu Tingju during the Zhengde Reign and Grand Coordinator Lin Fu of Guangdong in the early Jiajing reign preferred to deal with shortages of supply at the root. In their view, to satisfy the demand of the Court for foreign merchandise, a more flexible policy toward the Supervisorate System was needed.

With the realization of the deteriorating condition of coastal security after the mid-1540s, an intensive discussion of maritime affairs was resumed, leading to Zhu Wan’s appointment as Governor of Zhejiang cum Min-Zhe Coastal Defense Inspector-General in 1547. The contention that Zhu owed his appointment to Grand Secretary Xia Yan and that the latter’s downfall had a profound effect on his career needs to be scrutinized. In the first place, doubts arise because Xia’s case does not seem to have had immediate repercussions on Zhu’s position, since his request for clear-cut authority over coastal affairs, including the command of troops, was granted by the Court on June 4, 1548, almost one month after the death sentence had been imposed on Xia. Furthermore, on October 30, 1548, some three months after his own demotion, Zhu was rewarded with silver cash on the recommendation of the Board of War for his conduct of the successful military campaign in late March of that same year. Suffice it to say that his appointment was an outcome of the Court’s concern about coastal defense and the need for a tougher policy toward maritime disturbances. Therefore, his downfall was more the outcome of his legal impropriety than of any political intrigues.

No doubt, Zhu Wan took his duty seriously. He was also a very competent and upright official. In mid-November 1547, during his first tour of duty in southern Fujian, he took prompt action to suppress a bandit group in Tong’an, although many of the captives later paid bribes to escape punishment. Zhu carried out a probe into local affairs that aroused discomposure and resentment among both officials and elite families. This experience surely had great bearing on his merciless dealing with the later groups of captives.

In 1547, a Japanese embassy with four ships and six hundred men under Sakugen Shuryo arrived off Ningbo in advance of the approved schedule. On December 31 the Court referred the case to Zhu Wan, who

187. Such ban is mentioned under the entry of May 10, 1524 in MSL: SZ, 38: 4b–5a.  
188. Ming shi, juan 325, “Folangji”, pp. 8430, 8432.  
190. MSL: SZ, 335: 7a.  
191. Ibid., 335: 1a–b.  
192. Ibid., 340: 7a.  
was then in Fujian, for his recommendation. Zhu Wan’s handling of the mission points to his positive attitude toward tributary relations and tributary trade. In contrast to Xia Yan, Zhu considered that the institution of the Maritime Trade and Shipping Supervisorates and the Sea Prohibition were not in contradiction to each other in their purposes. Although the prohibition banned private trade (shangbo), it did allow tributary trade (shibo) under the Supervisorates. For this reason, Zhu disagreed with an earlier recommendation by the Board of Rites that the extra ships and personnel of the Japanese tribute mission should be refused entry. He succeeded in convincing the Court that Sakugen Shuryo should be accepted as a tributary envoy and his mission be treated with leniency and flexibility.

Probably Zhu Wan believed that the regulated trade controlled by the Maritime Trade and Shipping Supervisorates would satisfy the demands of the tributary states and, hence, restore law and order on the coast. However, as one observer explained a few years later, the restrictions on the volume and frequency of trade greatly disappointed the Japanese, who depended on China for supplies of both luxuries and daily necessities. Furthermore, during the sixteenth century Sino-Japanese trade had become even more lucrative than before because of the large influx of silver into China. The demand for this metal in Ming China was stimulated by the accelerated commercialization of the country’s economy and the increased circulation of silver as one form of currency. In Japan, that had large supplies of silver, the use of copper coins was more widespread. The exchange rate between one silver Tael and copper coins was 1:750 in China and 1:250 in Japan. Japanese trading ships to China were loaded with large quantities of silver that could be traded at very favorable rates for such Chinese commodities as copper coins, silks and medicinal drugs. The Portuguese joined the Chinese and Japanese to form a triangular network of trade, but Portugal, not being a tributary state of China, was forced to engage only in smuggling activities.

The more turbulent situation in the late 1540s was just one of two major difficulties faced by Zhu Wan. A wave of controversy also confronted him over his appointment. From the outset some Court officials had questioned the wisdom of entrusting one official with such extensive

195. MJSWB, 205/1: 12b–13a; MSL: SZ, 337: 2b–3a, 349: 4a–b.
power. For instance, Censor Zhou Liang and Supervising Secretary Ye Tang both expressed their disapproval and memorialized the Court on the matter in early August 1548. They cited the recent event in Fujian to strengthen their argument that Zhu had overstretched himself. Moreover, it had been difficult for the provincial officials to seek instructions from him because of the large area over which he was obliged to tour. This, they claimed, had affected administrative efficiency and imposed an undue burden upon the local officials.

Zhu Wan’s struggle for survival should also be viewed in the context of the Ming administration. Checks and surveillance were common features of the Ming political institution. Within the central government, the Censorate was established to undertake overall supervisory duties. Eight Censors-in-Chief and several dozen Investigating Censors were appointed to staff this office. In addition, there was a somewhat overlapping institution called the Supervising Secretariat (jishi zhong), comprising six offices to supervise the work of the six Boards respectively. The three judicial offices examined important legal cases. When a case involved matters that were the responsibility of another board, it was also represented in the deliberations.

Moreover, the dilution of power was the principle of a three-level supervisory structure of each provincial government so that no one official had absolute authority over the administration. The three provincial offices (sansi), namely: the Administration Commission, the Military Commission, and the Surveillance Commission, supposedly formed a tripartite body, but actually functioned independently. They were responsible to the related central boards. To safeguard central control to an even greater degree, Investigating Censors were sent to the 13 provinces for up to one year to perform the role of Regional Inspecting Censors (xun’an yushi). Regional Inspecting Censors were responsible to the Emperor rather than the Censorate. On top of these two administrative levels was the Governor (xunfu) or Governors-General (Viceroys, zongdu). As in Zhejiang and Fujian, such appointments were not regular. The Grand Coordinators were often assigned special duties, such as handling coastal defense, and given authority over military affairs (tidu junwu) and the additional title of Censor-in-Chief (duyushi) to enhance their prestige, if not their actual powers. They were also normally granted discretionary powers (bianyi xing shi). Zhu Wan’s appointment was of this nature.

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198. MJSWB, 205/1: 5b.
199. For a general discussion of administrative structures, see Qiu Yongming 邱永明, Zhongguo biancha zhidu shi 中国监察制度史 [A history of the Chinese
The relationship between the Itinerant Inspector-General and the Regional Inspecting Censor was not hierarchical. In 1534 it was specifically made clear that the authority of Regional Inspecting Censors included, among other duties, safeguarding the integrity of local judicature, especially by preventing the arbitrary or improper exercise of judicial power. They were also required to investigate or take part in the hearing of legal cases that involved severe punishments. This arrangement greatly constrained the authority of the Itinerant Inspectors-General. 200 Finally, all sentences of a certain level of severity, generally banishment and above, required the Emperor's endorsement. In case of doubt, a re-trial was conducted by a high-ranking official sent by the Emperor and the verdicts of these officials were in turn subject to re-examination by the three judicial offices. 201

Despite his wide experience, Zhu defined his duties in more theoretical than realistic terms. Upon his appointment, he was given specific terms of reference concerning his duties and authority as Itinerant Inspector-General. As his first duty, he was expected to control civil and military affairs in Zhejiang, including revenues, troop training, the welfare of soldiers and civilians and making administrative improvements. His second duty was related to military campaigns. He would then be given discretionary powers in decision-making and authority over local military personnel. Thirdly, in the case of the southern Fujian coast, he was specifically instructed to "devise means" (shefa) to eliminate the sea bandits, maintain law and order and, in times of emergency, conduct inspection tours of the region. 202

Any attempt to interpret his duties and authority rigidly immediately brought him into conflict with other provincial officials. A case in point is his relationship with the Inspecting Censors. Prior to Zhu's appointment, the Inspecting Censors held overall authority in provincial matters. Consequently, Zhu Wan's assigned duties overlapped in several important aspects with those of the Regional Inspecting Censors. His complaint to the Court that he was often constrained and challenged by these officials clearly indicates the conflict of authority between him and his provincial colleagues. 203 In short, his assignments were simply

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201. Ibid., pp. 70–2.
203. Ibid.
a mission impossible. Under such a cumbersome political institution, getting himself into trouble was only a matter of time.

The deliberations among the Court officials concerning the extensive authority given to Zhu eventually convinced the Emperor that the avoidance of administrative confusion made good sense. Hence Zhu Wan’s demotion to the less powerful Itinerant Inspector-Generalship causes no surprise. But modern scholars as well as traditionalists are more inclined to believe that politics lurked behind the scene, a view even shared by Zhu Wan himself. The disappointment of Ming traditionalists in Zhu Wan’s disgrace can be understood because the latter’s integrity and unwavering execution of his duty served as a perfect role model for the bureaucracy. Having said this, Zhu Wan’s methods of managing maritime affairs were somewhat anachronistic and betrayed a poor grasp of broader economic realities. It was impossible to distinguish legality from illegality and to separate legitimate traders from violent lawbreakers. Instead of restoring law and order, he caused greater and unnecessary violence.

No doubt, Zhu’s dismissal satisfied the coastal interests, but it was certainly premature for them to claim victory. Zhu had submitted a memorial to the Court before his dismissal, exposing the local collaborators of the smugglers and pirates. He mentioned Lin Gong, Yao Guangrui and more than a hundred and ten other people. To prevent trouble in the future, Zhu firmly believe that the Court must get to the root of the problem to be rid of it. Although Zhu was dismissed from his post in May 1549, the Court acted upon his earlier recommendation and on July 28, 1549, decided to take tough measures against the blacklisted people. The Fujian Regional Inspecting Censor and other high-ranking officials were ordered to track them down and condemn them to death. It was also decreed that the Folangji captives and the circumstances of their capture should be carefully examined to uphold the law and in the interests of justice.

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206. Lin Gong, like Li Guangtou, was mentioned with the title “La-da”. According to Fujida Toyobachi, the term was probably a corrupt form of the Portuguese word *comprador* (Fujida Toyobachi, *Tōzai kōshōshi*, p. 460). See also Huai Xiaofeng, *Jiajing zhuanzhi zhengzhi*, p. 138, for the context of its usage as seen in the revised “Penal Regulations of the Jiajing” (1550) that supports Fujida Toyobachi’s suggestion.
Zhu's dismissal did not immediately lead to a change in the sea prohibition policy. On the contrary, the revised penal regulations (wenxing tiaoli) promulgated in 1550 contained more stringent measures to restrict private trade. Now, the death penalty was prescribed for corrupt military officials whose conduct caused local disturbances or killings, people who built large-size vessels and sold them to foreigners for profit (an act that was now considered on par with smuggling weapons to the sea or acting as informants for foreigners) and those officials or civilians who built vessels with more than two masts and shipped prohibited articles (including weapons, coins, and silk products) to trade at sea or in foreign lands, or conspired with pirate gangs and guided them on plundering raids.\(^{208}\)

The Practicalities of Trade

Although the Ming government had developed a most sophisticated tributary concept and its foreign relations were defined in terms that represented the Confucian world view, the system was seldom, if ever, realized in its ideal form. The Maritime Trade and Shipping Supervisorate, the embodiment of this high ideal, was deprived of its rigidity. Despite occasional upsurges in idealism, there was normally room for flexibility to accommodate the wishes of both the Confucian state and local governments when the ideal was transformed into practice. The ability of private trade to survive within the framework of the Supervisorate institution was just one such distortion of high ideals.

The downfall of Zhu Wan removed the primary obstacle to Portuguese trade with the coastal region. By this time, the Portuguese had greatly expanded their triangular trade network with China and Japan that now became primarily a matter of exchanging Chinese silks, gold and porcelain for Japanese silver bullion and copper.\(^{209}\) To take advantage of the rapid development in Sino-Japanese trade, the Portuguese urgently needed a firm base on the China coast. After prolonged negotiations, in 1554 the Capitão-Mor Leonel de Sousa concluded a verbal agreement with Wang Bo, the Coastal Surveillance Vice-Commissioner of Guangdong. Under a mutual understanding, the Portuguese were admitted to the Guangzhou trade not as Folangji but as Siamese, purportedly representing a country that was a tributary state. In 1557, the Portuguese

\(^{208}\) Huai Xiaofeng, *Jiajijg zhuanzhi zhengzhi*, p. 138.

\(^{209}\) Stephen Chang, *Mingji tongnan Zhongguo*, p. 246. While copper was exported to China, copper coins were shipped back to Japan in large quantities.
established a permanent land base in Macao with the tacit approval of local officials, but without the Court’s knowledge.\textsuperscript{210} No matter what measures the Court took to strengthen the prohibitive laws, after the events of 1548–49 the concern with profit and a more orderly trading arrangement again led the Guangzhou authorities and the Portuguese to work out a \textit{modus operandi}. Local maneuverability allowed such a compromise, as had normally been the case in the past.

In sum, the upsurge in private trade cannot be explained adequately by the dynastic decline theory and the loss of control by the state. Despite all its problems, as it entered into the seemingly chaotic sixteenth century the Ming state and its institutions remained vital. Whenever circumstance warranted firm action, a fleet of a hundred junks could be mustered, as happened in Guangzhou in 1523 to prevent the return of the Portuguese,\textsuperscript{211} and successful campaigns could be launched against smugglers-cum-pirates, as in 1548–49. C.R. Boxer also observes, “[j]udging from the accounts of Pereira and Cruz, one would be justified in assuming that the Ming government was functioning exceptionally well at this period, and that the empire as a whole was rich and prosperous.”\textsuperscript{212} On the other side of the coin, the cumbersome institution and treacherous Court politics had not enabled the state to gain a stranglehold on trade, which danced instead to the tune of the irresistible social and economic forces.

As profit drew together a heterogeneous assortment of people along the coast, both collaboration and confrontation were to be expected. The interests of these participants, and the complex trade forces, accelerated the pace of commercial development in Chinese littoral society and enabled trade networks to grow in sophistication. In the process foreign elements made adjustments to become players in the indigenous system, while for their part the Chinese became increasingly more collaborative with strangers from afar.

\textsuperscript{210} Boxer, \textit{South China}, pp. xxxiii, xxxv.
\textsuperscript{211} Higgins, “Piracy”, p. 63.
\textsuperscript{212} Boxer, \textit{South China}, p. xxx.