Epilogue

Archetypal Contradictions within Muslim Reformism in Indonesia: Masyumi as Inheritors and Perpetuators

The Chains of Guided Democracy

Masyumi’s leaders were the main opponents to President Sukarno’s slide towards authoritarianism, and they were to pay a heavy price for this when Guided Democracy emerged. An amnesty was promised to the rebels and promptly given to those who played a military role, but the party figures who had participated in the PRRI uprising found themselves in jail as soon as they returned from Java. Mohammad Natsir was placed under house arrest in Malang in 1960 before being transferred in 1962 to the military prison on Keagungan Street in Jakarta, while Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and Boerhanoeddin Harahap were both arrested in 1961. The government’s crackdown was not confined to the rebels; those who supported them, even if they only did so verbally, were also imprisoned. In 1960, for example,

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1 For more detailed analysis of the questions raised here and of the transformations within Indonesian Islam since the New Order, see Andrée Feillard and Rémy Madinier, The End of Innocence: Indonesian Islam and the Temptations of Radicalism (Singapore: NUS Press, 2006).
Kasman Singodimedjo, who had been detained since 1958 for having given a speech in Magelang in which he “willingly provided help to enemies during a state of war”, was sentenced to three years in prison. The Masyumi leaders who had not participated in the Hijrah—to use the expression employed within the party to refer to the PRRI rebellion—continued to meet regularly after their party was banned. Before they were arrested in 1962, Prawoto Mangkusasmito and Mohamad Roem were the unofficial leaders of this “Masyumi family”, a role which was subsequently adopted by Faqih Usman, the president of Muhammadiyah.

Between 1960 and 1962, numerous members of the Minang diaspora, who “had just come out of the jungle” after their participation in the PRRI uprising, began to gather in certain mosques in Jakarta. An informal network soon sprang up around the Al-Azhar Mosque in the new district of Kebayoran, where activities such as preaching were developed, and themes were elaborated which were to become central to the party’s policies for many years, in particular the denunciation of Christianity.

The main force behind the party’s fragile revival was the former Masyumi deputy, HAMKA. Of Minang origin, he had become a member of Muhammadiyah’s leadership and taken up the position of imam in the Al-Azhar mosque. His virulent opposition to Guided Democracy, which he branded as Totaliterisme in his speeches and in Pandhi Masjarakat—a monthly magazine which HAMKA founded in July 1959 and whose title signified “Society’s Banner”—in which he published an article entitled “Demokrasi Kita” written by the former vice president, Mohammad Hatta, led in August 1960 to the banning of the magazine. He enjoyed very cordial relations with the army’s top ranks, and this no doubt protected him from the first wave of government arrests. According to his son, he regularly received visits from both Lieutenant-

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3 The terms used in the indictment. Abadi, 24 August 1960.
4 Panitia Peringatan 75 Tahun Kasman, Kasman Singodimedjo 75 tahun, Hidup itu berjuang (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1982), p. 224.
General Sudirman, who was the commandant of the Army Staff and Command School, and Colonel Muchlas Rowi, head of the Army's Muslim Spiritual Centre (PUSROH Islam angkatan Darat). In April 1961, these two military figures, acting on behalf of General Nasution, the Army Chief of Staff, encouraged HAMKA to launch a new Islamic magazine, and in April 1962, with the help of money provided by Nasution, the first edition of Gema Islam (“the Echo of Islam”) was published. In theory, Lieutenant-General Sudirman was the newspaper’s publisher and Colonel Rowi its editor-in-chief, but in actual fact, it was run by HAMKA.

The Al-Azhar mosque became a refuge point for those concerned at the growing influence of the Communist Party over the government. As Indonesia at that time was being ruled under a state of emergency, no political meetings were authorised, but despite this ban, every Friday after prayer, numerous figures gathered at meetings presided by HAMKA in order to discuss the country’s future. At these gatherings, the beginnings of an alliance emerged between the army and the Muslim leaders who had not taken part in the Guided Democracy programme. In 1961, General Nasution and his military staff took the symbolic decision to celebrate idul fitri at the Al-Azhar mosque, while Sukarno and his ministers gathered at the Palace mosque. In addition, the system used to organise da’wah at Al-Azhar inspired others to imitate this model: General Sudirman, along with several officers, founded the Higher Institute of Islamic Preaching (Perguruan Tinggi Dakwah Islam, PDTI) and in several regions, local da’wah organisations were created, often run by former Masyumi activists. This burgeoning opposition force made HAMKA one of the favourite targets for the LEKRA and the Lembaga Kebudayaan Nasional (LKR), both of which were cultural organisations close to the Communist Party and the PNI. The magazine Bintang Timur (“the Star of the East”), for example, launched a virulent campaign against him in October 1962, claiming that three of his novels were plagiarised from the Egyptian writer

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8 HAMKA, “Mengiringi Safari Da’wah warga Bulan Bintang”.
9 HAMKA, *Pribadi dan Martabat, Buya Prof. DR. HAMKA*, p. 166.
10 Ibid.
11 *Di bawah Lindungan Ka’bah* (1938), *Tenggelamnya Kapal van der Wijk* (1938) and *Di dalam lembah Kehidupan* (1940).
Mustafa Lutfi al-Manfaluti (1876–1924), while the daily newspaper *Merdeka* denounced the activities of “new-Masyumi” in the Al-Azhar Mosque.

Shortly afterwards, in a second wave of arrests, almost all of the remaining former leaders of Masyumi who had not yet been brought into custody were locked up. Along with Prawoto Mangkusasmito, who had recently called for Sukarno to be tried for violating the Constitution, Mohamad Roem, Yunan Nasution, E.Z. Muttaqien and Isa Anshary were all imprisoned in Madiun. The following year in 1963, government repression hit the outer circle of the Masyumi family, starting in November with the detention of, Anwar Harjono, the leader of GPII, who was held for two months at the army’s headquarters before being placed under house arrest. In late December and early January, HAMKA, Ghazali Sjahlan and Jusuf Wibisono were all arrested: they were accused of having taken part in a secret meeting held a few months previously in Tanggerang at the house of a former Masyumi member, Arif Suhaemi, during which a secret plot was hatched to overthrow the government. The former minister for finance, Jusuf Wibisono, had been one of the few party leaders to clearly condemn the participation of his party colleagues in the PRRI and so his arrest clearly indicated that the regime was hardening its attitude towards all who had occupied a position within Masyumi’s leadership. After the failure of the Constituent Assembly to carry out its mission, he had called for a rapprochement with Sukarno, and he was subsequently appointed to the leadership of the National Front by the president. Wibisono had cut off ties with all his former party colleagues, apart from Soekiman who had withdrawn from public life and as such did not represent a threat for Sukarno’s regime; he was nonetheless held in detention without trial for almost three years.

**Disenchantment with the New Order**

In the wake of the crisis which shook the country between 1965 and 1966, the advent of a new Indonesian order asserting its opposition to

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Sukarno’s abuse of power raised great hopes amongst the leaders of the now-defunct Masyumi. They hoped that the moribund regime’s treatment of the organisation and its members would enable them to claim a prominent role in the new political dispensation. This hope was short-lived, however, as the new government’s strategy towards the two branches of political Islam—traditionalism and modernism—soon turned out to be very similar in nature to the approach adopted by the Guided Democracy system.

In December 1965, while most of Masyumi’s leaders were still in prison, a Coordination Committee for Islamic Activities was created, designed to bring together all the Islamic organisations campaigning for Masyumi’s reinstatement. It received the support of several army officers who wished to see Nahdlatul Ulama’s influence diminished and who were of the belief that the modernist branch within Islam could not remain unrepresented any longer. As the Masyumi leaders were progressively released from prison—the last in early 1967—they began, from May 1966, to hold meetings at 58 Menteng Raya Street in an attempt to adopt a common strategy. These gatherings of Islamic modernists soon gave birth to two competing projects. The first one proposed purely and simply to revive Masyumi, banking on the good relations which existed between its former leaders and certain high-ranking military officers—General Sudirman, in particular. The second proposal was put forward by the former vice president, Mohammad Hatta, and his supporters, who, deeming Masyumi to have been a failure, intended to found a new organisation. This second group was composed of former leaders of Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, notably Mohammad Daud Ali, Ismail Metareum and Nurcholish Madjid (though Madjid later distanced himself from the group), but also received support from figures who formerly belonged to the Masyumi family. Hanwar Harjono, for example, took part for a while in the meetings before rallying behind Natsir, while Jusuf Wibisono, who had always been critical of his former party colleagues’ choice of strategy, also threw his support behind Hatta.

16 Deliar Noer, Aku bagian Ummat, aku bagian Bangsa, otobiografi (Bandung: Mizan, 1996), p. 590. Most of Masyumi’s leaders were released in May and June 1966.
17 Ibid., p. 592.
It was the army who finally settled the debate between these two groups. In the second half of 1966, the president of the Committee for the Revival of Masyumi, Sjarif Usman, held several meetings with influential military officers, such as Generals Amir Machmud, Kemal Idris, Sutjipto and Alamsjah as well as Colonel Murtopo. A spirit of optimism reigned at that time: during the second army seminar organised at Bandung, a resolution was taken to allow the former leaders of outlawed parties to once again take an active part in public life. However, on 21 December 1966, the army’s regional commandants published a report, whose main aim was to prevent any political coups or manoeuvring by Sukarno, stressing that the army would take resolute action against any group that contravened Pancasila or the 1945 Constitution, as Gesapu, Darul Islam, Masyumi, the Socialist Party and the PKI (during the Madiun Rebellion) had all done. This strategy of recalling the party’s rebellious past soon became the New Order’s official policy. On 26 January 1967, General Suharto announced that the armed forces and the soldiers’ families who had suffered during the campaigns against Darul Islam and then against the PRRI were not ready to accept Masyumi’s reinstatement. The government’s decision was an irrevocable one and when Prawoto Mangkusasmito protested strenuously against it, Colonel Ali Murtopo reminded him that “the prison door was still wide open”. In response to this impasse, Deliar Noer, who was able to observe these negotiations at close range, tried to convince Natsir and Prawoto to lend their support to Mohammad Hatta. The two men, however, despite their sympathy for the former vice president’s programme, felt imbued with a sense of moral duty towards their supporters, and so refused to abandon their campaign for the revival of Masyumi. In any case, the question soon became a moot one, as in May 1967, Suharto indicated to Mohammad Hatta that the government would not authorise him to establish his Indonesian Islamic Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Islam Indonesia, PDII).

23 Ibid. At the time, Deliar Noer was part of Suharto’s committee of political advisors.
By mid-1967, the efforts of those who supported a return of Islamic modernism to the political scene had come to naught. At this point, they resolved to begin the foundation of a new political party, the Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi). The government authorised its creation on the express condition that none of the former Masyumi leaders would be able to sit on the party’s governing bodies. When Parmusi’s inaugural congress was held in Malang in December 1968, the participants were firmly reminded of this requirement, which Suharto had promised to remove after the general elections.\(^25\) Initially, the leadership that the party members elected was dominated by former members of the modernist party: Mohamad Roem was the president, and beside him on the executive committee were, amongst others, Anwar Harjono and Hasan Basri. Figures deemed to be too close to the government, such as Agus Sudono, Naro and Sanusi, were overlooked.\(^26\) Although the most troublesome former Masyumi leaders withdrew voluntarily from the election, the government nonetheless let it be known on the last day of the congress that they would refuse to recognise the new party’s leaders. The former Masyumi leaders therefore had to stand down and leave their positions to the provisional leadership which had already received the authorities’ approval in February 1968. The provisional leadership was composed mainly of Muhammadiyah leaders, such as Djarnawi Hadikusuma and Lukman Harun, who had never played any role in Masyumi.\(^27\) The only individual close to Natsir and Prawoto, who served for a while on Parmusi’s leadership, was the former GPII figure, Hanwar Harjono.

Following Parmusi’s congress, the government proceeded to exclude the modernist branch once and for all from the political landscape in two stages. In 1969, the government fomented serious disputes within Parmusi and placed one of its allies, John Naro, at the head of the party. Its credibility with Masyumi’s former electorate had completely disappeared by the 1971 elections, during which the party only received 5.4% of the vote. Two years later, the Suharto administration began a “rationalisation” of political life which consisted in obliging parties to gather under one of three umbrella organisations which were supposed to represent the main currents in society. Parmusi, the

\(^{25}\) Ibid., p. 57.

\(^{26}\) Ibid., pp. 52–3. Natsir was not even present at the congress.

\(^{27}\) For the composition of this provisional leadership, see ibid., p. 38.
PSII, Pertii and NU were all to be part of the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP) representing political Islam. Having already succeeded in sabotaging the political rebirth of Islamic modernism, the government was now attempting to neutralise Nahdlatul Ulama which had almost unwittingly become the symbol of Islamic opposition to the regime. Although the traditionalist party had received the support of almost 70% of Muslims and 18.7% of the total electorate in 1971, it only received 44% of the seats allotted to the PPP representatives in the new assembly. This was scarcely more than the percentage received by Parmusi (with 5.4% of the popular vote), and from that point on, Masyumi’s abortive successor was firmly established as the New Order’s fifth column within the Muslim community.

More than five years after their release from prison, the former leaders of Masyumi remained pariahs on the Indonesian political landscape. Their struggle for the revival of their former party and their attempt to maintain its legacy had both ended in complete failure due to three major obstacles.

They were first of all the victims of the new regime’s fears. President Suharto’s refusal to allow the modernist movement to re-emerge reflected, above all, his concern that those who had appeared as the most ardent defenders of Western-style parliamentary democracy between 1957 and 1960, were to be excluded from political life. Following the example of the Sukarno regime during the 1960s, the New Order reorganised the political landscape by means of a clever manipulation of special interests, and it could not condone the revival of a political movement inspired by Masyumi and Mohammad Hatta which, a few years earlier, had opposed the very same abuse of power. In addition, with its resolutely Western form of modernism and its culture of democracy, Masyumi may have appeared, in the eyes of the New Order generals, as a dangerous rival in their quest for American approval.

The second obstacle which attempts to reinstate the modernist party concerned the interests of its traditionalist rival. With the re-emergence of a modernist party whose legitimacy was reinforced by its long-standing opposition to the PKI, Nahdlatul Ulama was in danger of being subjected to fresh criticism over their support for the Old Order, as well as running the risk of losing its dominant position within

Indonesian Islam and its monopoly over the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Under the leadership of Kiyayi Wahab, NU had adopted a strategy which was radically different to Masyumi’s. The traditionalist party had considered that the struggle against communism would be better served from inside the government, and so took the risk of giving its unconditional support to Sukarno, while simultaneously leading a vigorous campaign to counter the spread of the PKI in the countryside. This struggle culminated during the 1966–67 massacres in which Anshor, the NU youth movement, played an important role. NU’s participation in this dramatic episode which marked the birth of the New Order, did not, however, signify the creation of an alliance between the founders of the new regime and the traditionalists against their modernist rivals. It remains difficult to determine the extent of the former’s participation in the manoeuvres aimed at thwarting the modernists, and what’s more, Nahdlatul Ulama also ended up being a victim of the New Order’s policy of “political rationalisation”. Nonetheless, certain former Masyumi members did not hesitate to make specific accusations. Husni Thamri, for example, declared that two NU leaders, Idham Chalid and Subchan ZE, had approached Ali Murtopo and other New Order leaders in order to convince them to annul the election of former Masyumi figures at the congress in Malang.

Finally, Masyumi’s former leaders were also faced with a significant generation gap between themselves and the young Muslim activists who had played a primordial role in establishing the New Order but who did not support the modernist party’s cause. From 1964, harsh criticism of large Muslim organisations began to circulate in the Koranic schools in Java. The young santris criticised equally Nahdlatul Ulama, whom they accused of being opportunistic, and Masyumi for being too Westernised.

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29 Ward, The Foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia, p. 62n21. Like its predicament in 1959 over how to react to Guided Democracy, NU was divided over the question of which attitude to adopt towards Sukarno, who continued to support the PKI. The young generation who was active in Anshor criticised on numerous occasions the “opportunistic” attitude of the traditionalist leaders, and eventually it was the most anti-communist leaders, such as Subchan Z.E., who prevailed within the movement after September 1965.

30 Ibid., p. 62.

31 Lance Castles “Notes on the Islamic School at Gontor”, Indonesia, 1, April 1966.
E.Z. Muttaqien, Soemarsono, Achmad Buchari and Anwar Haryono—had been imprisoned along with the older counterparts in Masyumi. There was no advantage to be gained for them in participating in the events of 1965–66, and so this left the way clear for the Association of Muslim Students (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, HMI). Although HMI was very close to the modernist movement, it always insisted on maintaining its independence vis-à-vis Natsir’s party. Following the advent of the New Order, some of its leading figures let it be known that they viewed the Masyumi more as “wrecks” of the old regime than as heroes who deserved a place in the new dispensation. In this strained atmosphere of the late 1960s, a new generation of Muslim intellectuals emerged. In 1967 in Yogyakarta, a small discussion group known as the “Limited Group” began to meet regularly at the house of Professor H.A. Mukti Ali, whose main admirers included Ahmad Wahib, Djoohan Effendi, Dawam Rahardjo and Nurcholish Madjid. The latter, who had been president of HMI since 1966, was one of the great bright hopes of the modernist party. He was often called “the young Natsir” (Natsir Muda) and enjoyed an excellent relationship with Masyumi’s former president who saw in him the embodiment of a possible resurgence of the party. Madjid himself, however, soon deflated the hopes which the party had invested in him when, on 3 February 1970, he gave a lecture before a gathering of student organisations entitled “The Necessity for a Renewal of Muslim Thought and the Integration of the Umma” (Keharusan Pembaruan Pemikran Islam dan Maslah Intergrasi Umat). His thesis was founded on a very harsh appraisal of the endeavours of Muslim parties. For Nurcholish, their leaders had lost all credibility in the eyes of public opinion and had discredited the political ideal which they wished to bring about. The prevailing mood within the Islamic community at that time was “Islam, yes! Islamic Party, no!”

Nurcholish Madjid’s lecture was seen as a betrayal by the former Masyumi leaders, especially given that the address was not published in the Muslim press but in the socialist-oriented *Indonesia Raya*. Natsir

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and those close to him castigated the secularisation (sekularisasi) which Nurcholish was promoting. This dispute, which we will revisit later, no doubt contributed to the embitterment of Masyumi’s former leaders and thus to the radicalisation of their message.

The Besieged Citadel and the Sanctuary Afforded by the Da’wah

In 1967, Mohammad Natsir and his closest supporters—Mohamad Roem, Anwar Harjono and Yunan Nasution—founded the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (Denwan Dakwah Islam Indonesia, DDII). DDII emerged from the Indonesian Islamic community’s recognition that they needed a renewal, and it provided them temporarily with an organisation to rally around. As the prospect of their former party’s rehabilitation grew increasingly less likely, it became the sanctuary in which Masyumi’s values could be safeguarded but also one in which they would be transformed. Some of the former Masyumi leaders did not join the DDII, including Jusuf Wibisono and Soekiman who had considered for a period of time the idea of establishing their own party. They envisaged a party which would be founded on Islam but which “mustn’t be too religious” (tidak terlalu agamis). However, having consulted with figures within the new regime, they were soon persuaded to renounce these plans. Jusuf Wibisono decided to join the ranks of the PSII (he claims to have done so in mid-1970), but the party’s poor results, which he attributed to unfair competition from Golkar, led him to retire from politics definitively.

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34 Further reading on this issue can be found in Marcel Bonnef, “Les intellectuels musulmans, le renouveau religieux et les transformations socio-culturelles de l’Indonésie”, in Renouveaux religieux en Asie, ed. Catherine Clémentin-Ojha (Paris: École française d’Extrême-Orient, 1997).
35 On the popularity within Masyumi of the term dakwah (proselytization), which replaced the term tabligh (transmission) and gave a broader dimension to its mission, see Yudi Latif, Indonesian Muslim, Intelligentsia and Power (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), pp. 350–1.
37 K.E. Ward claims that Jusuf Wibisono and Soekiman became members of the PSII shortly after Masyumi was banned in 1960, but Wibisono vehemently contests this claim. Ibid., p. 312.
Dewan Dakwah’s headquarters were located in Masyumi’s former central office at number 45 Jalan Kramat Raya and remained the only stable landmark for a generation of modernists who had grown disenchanted with Indonesia’s social and political transformations. The organisation launched into an energetic publishing programme, with the monthly journal *Serial Media Dakwah*—initially aimed at an educated readership and later to become *Media Dakwah*—becoming its flagship publication. Other publications produced by the organisation included: *Suara Masjid*, geared towards a more modest audience and containing commentaries of sacred texts in very accessible language; *Serial Khutbah Ju’mat*, which proposed sermons to be used by those who preached on Fridays; *Sahabat* aimed at children; and *Buletin Dakwah*, which was a simple leaflet distributed outside mosques after Friday prayer.\(^{38}\)

It was these publications which diffused the modernist movement’s radicalised new message. During the 1950s, the Masyumi leaders were moderate, confident and imbued with a remarkable spirit of tolerance, but like the vast majority of the Islamic movement worldwide, they gradually succumbed to a siege mentality. The West, which up until that point had been seen as an ally against communism, was now considered a threat. There was a marked change in tone towards the Christian community from the early years of the New Order. By 1966, rumours began to circulate within the Muslim community describing mass conversions by Muslims to Christianity, and the triumphalist declarations by Protestant missionaries claiming that they had won over two million converts added further fuel to such talk.\(^{39}\) Although such assertions were not completely baseless, they were nonetheless blown out of proportion. According to Robert Hefner, nearly 500,000 people were concerned by this wave of conversions; in certain towns in West Java, the Christian population rose from one or two per cent of the population in the 1950s to more than 10 per cent in the 1970s.

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\(^{39}\) Further reading on these declarations can be found in Avery T. Willis, *The Indonesian Revival: Why Two Million Came to Christ* (South Pasadena, CA: William Carey Library, 1977).
These converts came for the most part from former bastions of communism where the population had been traumatised by the massacres of 1966–67 and the role played in them by certain Islamic organisations.\footnote{Robert W. Hefner, “Print Islam: Mass Media and Ideological Rivalries among Indonesian Muslims”, \textit{Indonesia} 64 (October 1997): 77–103.}

Masyumi’s former leaders soon became concerned about this phenomenon, and in 1967, HAMKA published his first anti-Christian diatribes in \textit{Pandji Majarakat}.\footnote{HAMKA, \textit{Pribadi dan Martabat, Buya Prof. DR. Hamka}, p. 173.} His tone had changed radically from the 1950s: his tolerant attitude towards the anti-Christian violence perpetrated in Jakarta and Makassar reveals the insularity which had taken hold of his supporters and their feeling that Christians were taking advantage of their economic superiority to compete unfairly with Islam.\footnote{“All of these conflicts arose because of Christians who had apparently taken advantage of the transition period between the Old Order and the New Order to spread their religion within the Muslim community which, at the time, was both politically and economically weakened.” Ibid., p. 174.}

In response to these early incidents, the government organised on 30 Nov 1967 a consultation meeting between the dignitaries of the country’s different religious communities at which the Muslim community was represented by Natsir, Rajidi, Fakih Usman, Prawoto Mangkusasmito and HAMKA. Their call for a \textit{modus vivendi} to be established by the government which would outlaw any proselytising amongst the members of other religions was rejected by representatives of the Christian community on grounds that it would violate human rights.\footnote{Mujiburrahman, “Feeling Threatened: Muslim-Christian Relations in Indonesia’s New Order”, ISIM dissertations, Amsterdam University Press, 2006, p. 41.}

Dewan Dakwah, which saw itself as a sanctuary able to preserve Islam’s threatened identity, sent an increasing number of preachers to the regions it deemed to be the most vulnerable to Christian conversion.\footnote{Hefner, “Print Islam”.} Through the organisation’s publications, former Masyumi leaders showed their adoption of the new Islamist message being spread across the world, which considered the West as a corrupt oppressor to be combated. In the 1950s, the modernist party had focussed its attention on national problems, but now its former leaders were opening up to the causes pursued by the international Islamic community. The Six-Day War in 1967 and especially the Yom Kippur War of 1973...
reinforced their involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, at least at a verbal level. They established an increasing number of contacts throughout the Muslim world and made more and more trips to Malaysia. Mohammad Natsir occupied important positions within international Muslim institutions: during the 1970s, he was vice president of the World Islamic Congress (Muktamar Alam Islami) in Karachi and a member of the World Organisation of Mosques (Organisasi Masjid Sedunia) in Mecca. The foreign ties which Dewan Da’wah’s leaders established allowed the organisation to become part of international Islamic financial networks. It was able to benefit, for example, from the generous donations which came from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt and Pakistan.

The ideology transmitted by the DDII since the 1960s turned out to be based on the same ambivalence as Masyumi’s had been, albeit of a different nature. In the 1950s, the modernist party emphasised a broad-minded approach towards the interpretation of the Koran at the expense of the literalist interpretation defended by Persis; 20 years later, the requirements related to the application of sharia law dominated the question. Moreover, Dewan Dakwah was more efficient in its campaign for the Islamisation of the country’s institutions than Masyumi had been when in government. It was behind vast campaigns which mobilised the Muslim community and forced the government to make significant concessions: a law on marriage in 1974; obligatory religious education in 1988; and most importantly, the 1989 law allowing a large degree of autonomy to sharia courts. The organisation’s main publication, Media Da’wah, became the mouthpiece for a branch of Islam which the political scientist R. William Liddle called “scripturalist” and “fundamentalist”. The magazine reacted violently to the use of these terms. Their response to Liddle’s article was published

46 Hefner, “Print Islam”.
47 On these advances made by Islamic law, see Arskal Salim and Azyumardi Azra, eds., Sharia and Politics in Modern Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003).
below a caricature of the illustrious professor depicted with a Star of
David in the background, thus illustrating his very remarks.\textsuperscript{49}

The former Masyumi members who belonged to DDII none-
theless retained an almost atavistic attachment to the principles of
democracy and for this reason refused to bargain with the New Order.
Very few of them accepted to sit on any of the new regime’s institu-
tions. Although HAMKA accepted the leadership of the newly created
Indonesian Council of Ulama, he was severely criticised for this deci-
sion by his former party colleagues and resigned in 1981 after a dispute
with the minister for religions.\textsuperscript{50}

Relations between former Masyumi members and the government
remained tainted with mutual suspicion. The army had long suspected
the party’s former leaders of their involvement in the violent demonstra-
tions which punctuated the Japanese prime minister’s visit in January
1974.\textsuperscript{51} Mohammad Natsir showed himself to be very critical towards
the regime, and was accustomed to saying that “Sukarno was a gentle-
man in comparison with Suharto.”\textsuperscript{52} In May 1980, along with Anwar
Haryono, he signed the “petition of the fifty” (Petisi 50) criticising the
government’s use of \textit{Pancasila} to muffle opposition to it. Like most
of the petition signatories, Natsir was subsequently no longer allowed
to leave the country, though he did not feel especially intimidated by
this measure. In 1990, three years before he died, he co-authored with
General A.H. Nasution and the former PNI leader Sanusi Hardjinata,
a book entitled \textit{Indonesia at a Crossroads} (\textit{Indonesia di persimpangan jalan}) in which the Suharto regime was criticised for betraying the
social ideals of the Revolution and for concentrating power in a small
number of hands.

\textbf{Inheritors and Perpetuators}

The creation of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals
(Ikatan Cendekawan Muslimin Indonesia, ICMI) in 1990 under the

\textsuperscript{49} Hefner, “Print Islam”.
\textsuperscript{50} HAMKA, \textit{Pribadi dan Martabat, Buya Prof. DR. Hamka}, p. 217.
\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Abadi} was once again banned. François Raillon, \textit{Les étudiants indonésiens et
\textsuperscript{52} George McT\textsuperscript {urnan} Kahin, “In Memoriam: Mohammad Natsir”, \textit{Indonesia} (February
1994).
leadership of Jusuf Habibie, who was at the time minister for research and technology, was the culmination of the subtly elaborated strategy implemented by the Suharto regime which consisted in manipulating Muslim organisations for its own benefit. It also showed the regime's gradual transformation from one which was initially founded exclusively on the support of the army, but was now looking for a new legitimacy by turning to Islam. The initiative considerably boosted the hopes of modernist Muslims, who represented a significant majority within ICMI, convinced that they had at last found the means for their social and political recognition. The new organisation, however, soon came to embody the profound divisions which affected Muslim organisations.

Three different groups vied for the moral leadership of ICMI. The first was composed of the technocrats within the regime who were close to either Jusuf Habibie or senior figures in Golkar, the official party. The second consisted of Muslim figures, such as the intellectual Nurcholish Madjid or the former minister Emil Salim, representing a moderate branch which was concerned above all with gaining recognition for the social aspect of Islam's values. Finally, the third group comprised Muslim leaders, such as Amien Rais, Adi Sasono and Lukman Harun, who, unlike the other two groups, wanted to turn ICMI into a vehicle for their political ambitions. They wanted to be seen as the mouthpiece for a Muslim community which had long been oppressed by the government and was a victim of the growing influence of the Christian minorities in the country. Amongst this third group, the rhetoric used by certain radical preachers such as Imaduddin Abdulrahim became increasingly tinged with fundamentalism. They put pressure on ICMI to find ways of eroding the ascendancy held by the Christian community over public opinion. They launched their own daily newspaper, Republika, and set up a think-tank, the Centre for Information and Development Studies (CIDS) designed to counter the

53 Further reading on the aims and organisation of ICMI can be found in Donald J. Porter, Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia (London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2002), pp. 89–94.
analysis developed by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) which was considered to be both pro-Christian and too close to Javanese mysticism (kejawan).

Suharto’s fall from power in May 1998 and the subsequent election campaign which took place in June 1999 led to the different branches of Islam within ICMI reasserting their autonomy. This newfound freedom brought about a profound reconfiguration of Indonesian Islam in its entirety and was a contributing factor in the disintegration of Masyumi’s political legacy. When studying this period, one is inevitably led to the fundamental issue of the participation by party figures (or at least by those who claimed to defend its legacy) in the radicalisation which a section of the Islamic community underwent at the time. When attempting to convey the diversity of the various intellectual and political paths taken by the members of the Masyumi family, a useful distinction can be established between two currents which former party members typically belonged to. Although these two types of attitude are fairly representative of the complexity of Masyumi’s evolution, one should bear in mind the danger of such a categorisation being too rigid.

The most visible and vociferous of these two currents developed in the same vein as the transformation which had already begun within the DDII. It was one of the main protagonists of the neo-fundamentalist revival which permeated Indonesian Islam from the beginning of the 1980s. The message and the actions of this movement were part of a mutation which saw it evolve from intransient religious insularity to open interreligious violence.

This radicalisation was facilitated by several factors. The first of these was a combination of the former Masyumi leaders’ disenchantment and the provision of financial assistance by the Wahabi propaganda machine at the beginning of the 1970s. Masyumi’s leaders had been openly critical of Saudi Arabia during the 1950s, but having been

55 Several parties and organisations have claimed to be the bearers of Masyumi’s legacy: the Crescent Moon and Star Party (Partai Bulang Bintang, PBB); the New Masyumi (Masyumi Baru); and the Islamic Fraternity Forum (Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyyah, FUI). None, however, have managed to be convincing successors to Masyumi. See Bernhard Platzdasch, Islamism in Indonesia: Politics in the Emerging Democracy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), pp. 30 ff.

56 See Feillard and Madinier, The End of Innocence.
marginalised and left penniless by the dominant New Order regime, they began in the 1960s to accept the money provided by the international proselytising networks put in place by the Saudi monarchy. In 1969, for example, Mohammad Natsir became a member of the Muslim World League (Rabithah al-Alam al-Islami) based in Jeddah in Saudi Arabia. The oil crisis of 1973 bestowed considerable financial means on the League, and in the same year, the DDII was made its official representative in Indonesia, thus becoming one of the principal vehicles for the spread of Wahhabism in the country. The organisation was charged with attributing scholarships to Indonesian students to enable them to pursue their studies in the Middle East, and in the early 1970s, it opened an office in Riyadh.\textsuperscript{57} Later in 1980, the DDII helped in the creation of the Institute of Arabic and Islamic Studies (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab, LIPIA) which, thanks to the financial assistance of the Saudi kingdom, allowed thousands of Indonesians to obtain degrees at the Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University in Ryad, where the brightest students were sent to pursue their studies. The network established by the DDII and the LIPIA also played a key role in the distribution of the financial assistance which came from the large Salafi foundations based in the Gulf countries and allowed the construction of hundreds of mosques on the Indonesian archipelago.

The participation of these Indonesian Muslims in networks which had long been steeped in a neo-fundamentalist ideology contributed, naturally enough, to their radicalisation. The translations they read of books and brochures written in Egypt or in the Gulf countries resonated with their feeling of resentment towards the government, the Christian minorities and the West; this encouraged them to adopt a very black-and-white vision of their struggle as part of an age-old battle of global proportions opposing the forces of good and evil.\textsuperscript{58} Their sense of being part of a final confrontation in which the existence of the entire umma was at stake justified the violence used in the Moluccas, Poso and elsewhere. It was the experience of the Afghan

\textsuperscript{57} Details on the links between the DDII and Saudi Arabia can be found in the extremely well-documented report published on 11 December 2004 by the International Crisis Group.

\textsuperscript{58} During the 1980s, the DDII also published around 20 translations of books written by the most radical members of the Muslim Brotherhood.
jihad, however, which was to play a much more decisive role in the radicalisation of Indonesian Islamist activists than any ideological indoctrination. Several hundred of these activists, foremost amongst them the future leaders of both the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah and the militia group Laskar Jihad, did more than just spend time studying in Mecca or Riyadh. They followed the well-trodden route taken by international militant Islamists during the 1980s, who, on their way home, were invited to spend time in Pakistani training camps close to the border. Very few of them, however, took an active part in the fight against the Soviets; most of them simply received military and ideological training aimed at allowing them to open new fronts in the future global struggle against the enemies of Islam, a struggle which was already beginning to take shape beyond the realms of the Afghan war.59

The influence of these militant networks was particularly strong in Indonesia because of their association with figures who were keen to revive the group which had formerly constituted the Darul Islam movement. Two figures who played a key role in this respect were Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar, whose biographies are indicative of the complexity and disparity of the motivating forces behind this militant Islamist movement. They founded the Ngruki Koranic School near Surakarta in Central Java, and had been imprisoned initially in 1978 for their association with members of the Darul Islam movement which had organised an Islamist rebellion in the 1950s. They had in fact been victims of an intricate operation carried out by the Indonesian secret service aimed at reviving this group, under the pretext of combating communism, with the ultimate aim of muzzling it completely. Their trial turned them into martyrs for the Muslim cause. They were released on appeal in 1983 and two years later, having learnt that the Supreme Court had just overturned the appeal court’s decision, thus obliging them to return to prison, they decided to flee the country for Malaysia. There they took advantage of the very favourable atmosphere for Islamist organisations which reigned in the country. Amongst other activities, they were involved in the recruitment of several dozen

59 Further reading on this involvement in the Afghan war can be found in an article entitled “Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia Damaged but Still Dangerous”, published in the International Crisis Group’s Asia Report, no. 63, 26 August 2003. See also Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).
Southeast Asian youths who were sent to fight in Afghanistan. When the war against the USSR ended, these recruits were to become the backbone of Jemaah Islamiyah and participated in the propagation of the Afghan 
jihad across Southeast Asia. After 1995, for example, with a Muslim rebellion brewing in the south of the Philippines, the organisation moved its training camps there; later in 1999, the group’s militants set up operations in the Moluccas and central Sulawesi to exploit the bloody conflict which had taken hold there. The networks which Jemaah Islamiyah developed at that time played a key role in the descent of a part of Indonesia’s radicals into a blind and nihilistic form of violence. The two attacks in Bali in October of 2002 and 2005 and those which took place in Jakarta (August 2003, September 2004 and July 2009) were proof, as it were, that the use of political and even military means to bring about an Islamic state in Indonesia had failed. For want of being able to mobilise sufficient support to bring about a balance of power which would allow its political claims to be expressed, this disreputable organisation, composed of Indonesians, Malaysians and Filipinos, turned to a sort of primal chaos, whose advent was to be accelerated by large-scale massacres and on which the hope of a Southeast Asian caliphate could be founded. The leaders of the Jemaah Islamiyah took comfort in a phantasmagorical universe made up of a programme—the battle of good against evil—which was as grandiose as it was vague. They ended up not only isolating themselves from other radical movements with more concrete goals but, more importantly, discrediting the use of physical violence in the eyes of the Indonesian Muslim community, who had long been rather tolerant towards the use of such means.\footnote{Rémy Madinier, “L’Asie du Sud-Est musulmane produit d’un imaginaire afghan? Le Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara à l’épreuve des sciences sociales”, in Figures d’Islam après le 11 septembre: disciples, martyrs, réfugiés et migrants, ed. Aminah Mohammad-Arif and Jean Schmitz (Paris: Khartala, 2006), pp. 123–49.}

Other movements were better able to take advantage of the widespread disarray which accompanied the chaotic final phase of Suharto’s regime. Between 1998 and 2002, a number of militias dominated the Indonesian political scene, proposing, in the name of defending Islam’s values, to take the place of a state which was considered to be inadequate. The removal of General Suharto, Jusuf Habibie’s presidency, the elections of June 1999 and finally Abdurrahman Wahid’s short-lived
term in office provided these groups with ample opportunity to attract significant media attention. These organisations capitalised on the resonance which their simple message undoubtedly held for a population disoriented by the scale of the political, social and economic crisis the country was enduring; they recruited a fairly considerable number of new members, and by doing so extended Islamic radicalism beyond the small groups to which it had heretofore been confined. This desire to impose Islamic norms concerned two areas of public life in particular. The first of these was public morals, an issue taken up by a number of groups for its usefulness in mobilising popular support. Across the country, hundreds of militias had sprung up, roaming the disreputable quarters of cities armed with bamboo canes in order to attack brothels, clandestine gambling houses and other dens of iniquity. Although on the surface these punitive expeditions appeared to be spontaneous, the mobilisation of reasonable men who were incensed with the inaction of the police, they often gave rise to a sort of religiously based racketeering. During the largest punitive expeditions, “popular anger” was often quite selective and depended on the sums of money paid by those who ran the dens of iniquity, who were also strongly advised to employ thugs, linked to these self-same organisations, in order to “guarantee their protection”.

Since 2003, the operations carried out by the “moral militia” have become scarcer. The leader of the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI), Habib Rizieq, who has received a lot of media attention, has been arrested twice and has already agreed on several occasions to rein in his organisation’s activities. Although the actions of these militias today are less spectacular than before, their influence remains nonetheless real. They are still dreaded by local authorities looking for legitimacy from Islam as well as by small traders who fear for their stalls; they continue to strive to denounce the “Christianisation of Indonesia”, and they have contributed considerably over the past number of years to the religious one-upmanship prevalent in Indonesia which incites people to prove their purity as Muslims.

The second area in which these organisations endeavoured to replace the mechanisms of a democratic state with religiously based violence was that of inter-religious conflicts. The collapse of the state’s authority which accompanied the deposition of Suharto led in the east of the country to the poisoning of relations between Muslims and Christians, which traditionally had been rather good. In the Moluccas between 1999 and 2001, more than 5,000 people died during the war
that waged between Christian and Islamic militias. The latter received decisive support from different organisations throughout Indonesia. In May 2000, for example, Laskar Jihad, led by Ja’far Umar Thalib, another scion of the Arab network which had fought in Afghanistan, managed to leave Java and go to fight in the Moluccas. Having called on the government to do a better job of defending Muslims—the conflict at that stage was relatively balanced between the two sides—Ja’far managed to land his militia group on the island despite President Abdurahman Wahid’s orders to the contrary. Laskar Jihad undoubtedly benefitted from complicity at the highest military level, as they were welcomed and even partially equipped by the army on their arrival in Ambon. Along with other militias such as Mujahidin Kompak and linked to the Jemaah Islamiyah network, they contributed largely to the wave of violence which shook the east of the country. Having helped to swing the conflict in favour of the Muslim militias, some of these militant groups moved on to the neighbouring island of Sulawesi in an attempt to spread jihad there, and subsequently in the region of Poso, a veritable purge took place against the Christian community.

As a result of the agreements which became known as Malino 1 and Malino 2, signed respectively in December 2001 and February 2002 by representatives of the different religious communities, direct confrontations between the two sides eventually ended. In the following years, however, attacks aimed at Christians were carried out regularly in the Central Sulawesi region, maintaining a climate of fear amongst the Christian population there. Elsewhere in Indonesia, it remains difficult today for religious minorities to open new places of worship, and militias such as the FPI often intervene to demand the closure of churches which have not received the necessary authorisations. Moreover, in recent years, a shift in the nature of religious violence has been observed within the country. While Christian minorities were the main target of attacks during the chaotic period surrounding Suharto’s fall from power, since 2010 these attacks have mainly been directed against Islamic minorities considered to be deviant, particularly Shias and the Ahmadiyya community. Up until now, these minorities have not been granted protection by the authorities, who remain paralysed by an interpretation of Pancasila’s first principle which is extremely timorous.61

This may change, however, with the new president, Joko Widodo, elected to office in July 2014. Widodo is one of the few members of the country’s political class to affirm the Javanese nature of his Islamic belief; this may lead the government to modify its approach in dealing with Indonesia’s multi-confessional society and thus move away from the frustrating attitude adopted by Bambang Yudhoyono during his two terms in office, which was essentially to refuse to deal with such questions.

Although Masyumi’s “perpetuators” were far from being at the root of Indonesian Islam’s violent excesses, they nonetheless, through the alarmist propaganda disseminated by DDII, fuelled feelings of urgency and hatred which pushed some Muslims onto the path of intolerance and violence. Masyumi’s legacy amounts to more than just this attitude of aggressive and fearful insularity, however. The liberal legacy of the party, although it is less spectacular and has received less media attention, continues to have a voice in the debate concerning Islam’s place in Indonesian society. The main figure of this liberal legacy is, of course, Nurcholish Madjid, mentioned earlier. His foundation, Paramadina, has given birth to a university of the same name, which includes several thousand students. Other figures who formerly belonged to the “Masyumi family” have also played influential roles in Indonesian Islam. Amongst these, special mention should be made of Harun Nasution, a graduate of McGill University in Canada and the founder of the State Islamic Institutes (IAIN), which were recently transformed into State Islamic Universities.\(^62\) The high standard of scholarship at these third-level institutions, and more importantly, the possibility of being able to hold reasoned and civilised debates there made it home to an open and tolerant form of Islam.\(^63\) Moreover, radical organisations, whether they were linked to the Muslim Brotherhood or to the Salafi-inspired groups, were much likelier to recruit their members in the mainstream universities—particularly amongst students of science, medicine and computing—than in the institutions devoted to the study of Islam. In keeping with the legacy of Harun Nasution, the State Islamic Universities often have prominent figures

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\(^62\) Harun Nasution was close to Masyumi and wrote his MA dissertation on the party.

\(^63\) This has been confirmed by the violent campaigns carried out recently by radical groups against these establishments.
from the liberal branch of Islam at their head. Two notable examples are Azyumardi Azran, an eminent expert in Indonesian Islam and the rector of the Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University in Jakarta between 1998 and 2006, and Amin Abdullah, the rector of the Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University in Yogyakarta, who was for a long time the leader of the liberal wing of Muhammadiyah. Abdullah had hoped to succeed Syafi'i Maarif, another moderate, at the head of the reformist organisation during its elections in 2005, but the victory of Din Syamsuddin, a member of the movement’s conservative wing and much closer to the DDII, shows the current balance of power between the “inheritors” and “perpetuators” within what was the most important of Masyumi’s constituent organisations.

Despite this defeat, the branch of Islam which claims to be an inheritor of the 1950s liberal legacy retained within Indonesian Islam a significant degree of power, and one which is without doubt unparalleled elsewhere in the Muslim world. Under the leadership of Aburahman Wahid, Nahdlatul Ulama provided a constant and sometimes efficient opposition to the excesses of a version of Islam, backed by the regime in place, which prevailed at the end of Suharto’s reign. Its interventions to appease the interreligious tensions which have been rife in Java since the turn of the century were often successful. More importantly, it is an organisation which emerged from the traditionalist movement which now spearheads an open and confident form of Islam.

The genesis of the Liberal Islam Network (Jaringan Islam Liberal, JIL), founded in 2001, stems from the acknowledgement by a handful of young intellectuals close to NU that the voice of Islam had been hijacked by radicals. Led by Ulil Abshar-Abdallah, these activists used lectures, radio programmes and a particularly active internet site to disseminate ideas which follow directly in the tradition of the reformist movement inherited from the beginning of the 20th century. They denounced in particular any literal interpretation of the Koran or the Sunnah and called for a revival of *ijtihad*.64

The confrontation within Masyumi between reformists and traditionalists, which deprived the party of a lasting place at the cabinet table after the 1955 elections, weakened the party’s liberal legacy for a

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long time. However, this legacy is no doubt more widespread today in Indonesia, in a society where the debate on the role of Islam remains very lively. Although the advent of a democratic system in 1998 may have allowed an intolerant and conservative form of Islamic populism to make a spectacular breakthrough both in public opinion and in the country’s institutions, Indonesia has none of the problems which have paralysed numerous Muslim countries where authoritarian regimes claim to defend an open form of Islam at the expense of democracy. This opens up the prospect of some interesting future developments, as the history of the PKS has demonstrated.

Founded in July 1998, the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan) obtained 1.3% of the vote in the 1999 elections. It subsequently changed its name to the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejaterah, PKS) and made a remarkable breakthrough in 2004, winning 7.3% of the electorate’s support. Despite the drop in support for Islamic parties, the PKS managed to maintain its share of the vote in 2009 with a score of 7.9%, and became the foremost Islamic party in Indonesia. The political deftness it showed in striking an alliance with the party of the future president, Susilo Bamban Yudhoyono, allowed it in 2004 to obtain the speakership of the People’s Consultative Assembly for its president Hidayat Nur Wahid, and later in 2009 to secure several ministerial portfolios. Its unambiguous electoral success was just reward for a party whose activists were both conscientious and efficient and whose image was that of being much less corrupt than other political organisations. It can also be explained, however, by the adoption of a far more moderate line by the party. As it moved closer to joining government, the PKS appears to have undergone a similar transformation to that which Masyumi experienced. The questions of sharia law and an Islamic state, favoured by purists, were to a large extent eclipsed by a political message which emphasised the need to see the values of Islam permeate public life and the workings of the state. Pancasila, which had not been mentioned in 1999, was in 2004 and 2009 considered the natural foundation upon which all political programmes in the Indonesian Republic should be built.65 In 2002, much to the anger

of other Islamic organisations represented in Parliament, namely the United Development Party (PPP) and the Crescent Star Party (PBB), the party also proposed to replace the Jakarta Charter with another concept called the Charter of Medina (Piagam Madinah) which would allow all religions to be treated equally and to apply their own religious laws, including sharia law for Muslims.

These changes in stance by the PKS have raised questions about its sincerity. The participation of the party’s local representatives in the shift towards a stricter form of Islam which has taken a grip over some of the country’s counties and towns in the past few years has also left it open to accusations of extremism. The widespread decentralisation which the country has undergone since the beginning of this century has increasingly allowed local authorities to announce and sometimes implement coercive measures aimed at enforcing respect for a certain form of Islamic morality. Among these measures figure a ban on women being out in public alone after a certain hour, the closing of certain main roads on Fridays during prayer, and fines for Muslims caught drinking alcohol or breaking their fast before nightfall during Ramadan. The power to issue such ordinances did not generally come within the remit of local government and thus they could be, though rarely were, revoked by the Home Affairs Ministry; they are part of a tendency within Indonesian Islam to constantly look for the moral high ground which, in recent years, has profoundly transformed the face of the country. Islam has become the only paradigm able to offer an alternative to globalisation, which has become a byword for Westernisation, and so referring to Islam allows Indonesians to, as it were, bite the hand that feeds it.66 In addition, it offers an anchor to communities whose identities have been shaken by profound changes in society and has also benefitted from the competition which exists between local party elites concerned about the political fallout of not participating in the construction of a society in accordance with Islamic law.

However, the radicalisation of those who either out of conviction or convenience have followed these somewhat irrational inclinations has, in the past few years, given rise to a backlash which may announce a decline in its fortunes. In June 2006, a section of the political elite,

bolstered by the support of nationalist military officers, launched a vast movement calling for a revival of *Pancasila*, the only way, in their eyes, to guarantee peaceful coexistence between religions. Moreover, recent opinion polls have shown a clear shift in public opinion: in 2001 and 2002, a sizeable majority (67%) declared themselves in favour of recognising *sharia* law for Muslims (which would have implied the implementation of the Jakarta Charter), whereas almost 83% of the population declared themselves in favour of *Pancasila* in 2006, and in 2007, 85% affirmed their attachment to a unitary Indonesian Republic founded on *Pancasila* rather than on Islam.67

The parliamentary elections of 2014 seem to have confirmed this underlying trend. Political Islam's share of the vote has stagnated: it received 31% in 2014, better than its score of 29% in 2009, but down from its performances in the previous two elections (37.5% in 2004 and 36.5% in 1999). Within this disparate political family, the most successful parties have been the most moderate ones, more inclined to promote “Islamic values” rather than an “Islamic project”. The PBB, the PPP and in particular the PKS, who represent a more intransigent form of Islam, have on the whole seen their political fortunes decline. Despite the PKS's move towards a more tolerant political message, its share of the vote dropped slightly in 2014, and, more significantly, remains much lower than its Middle Eastern counterparts who, like the PKS, emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood movement.68

It would no doubt be premature to speak of a sea change within Indonesian Islam. However, both the transformations within the PKS and changes in public opinion show the very real confrontation today between the partisans of an intransigent and literalist form of Islam—the perpetuators of an insular tradition which influenced the Masyumi movement from the 1960s onwards—and those who advocate an open and tolerant form of Islam—the torchbearers of the great liberal tradition of the 1950s.
