This chapter differs from the preceding in that it aims to explain new approaches that Russia and China embrace in using strategic communication as part of information warfare to achieve political and military objectives. Different parties label this set of emerging ideas as new generation warfare, hybrid warfare, and gray zone warfare. The elements of information warfare apply to each but there is a lot of confusion about them; the discourse is complicated and nuanced, and a detailed analysis lies beyond the scope of this book. This chapter seeks to clarify the core precepts associated with Russian, Chinese, NATO, and U.S. views.

For the purpose of this book, strategic communication is defined as the use of words, actions, images, or symbols to mold or influence the attitudes and opinions of target audiences as a means to shape their behavior to advance interests or policies or to achieve objectives or a defined end state. The Pentagon’s notion of strategic communication focuses on process and understanding how to forge a strategy and it is not very useful to this discussion. It is important to recognize that a distinction can be drawn between information warfare and strategic communication. Warfare connotes the presence of violence.

Most descriptions of what American experts term hybrid warfare entail violence, not merely information. NATO’s definition embraces violence, but its notion of hybrid warfare is so broad it can be construed to include almost anything. The New York Times has published a commentary arguing that the Russian chief of the General Staff, Army general Valery V. Gerasimov, has pitched information operations as a form of warfare. The Russian military does not embrace a notion of hybrid warfare/new generation warfare, but its political and academic commentators do. Russia expert Ofer Fridman, director of operations at the King’s Centre for Strategic Communications, King’s College London, has set the record straight, pointing out that Gerasimov has never enunciated a new military
doctrine. His speeches and writing discuss non-military means—including “‘hybrid methods . . . to achieve political goals with a minimal military influence on the enemy . . . by undermining its military and economic potential by information and psychological pressure, the active support of the internal opposition, partisan and subversive methods.’” But he wrote in the context of justifying an increase in Russia’s capacity to wage kinetic warfare by strengthening its armed forces.4

Russia’s Hybrid Warfare Approach
Russians invoke the term hybrid warfare, which they have taken from the American use, but their notion of it is distinct. Fridman, Mark Galeotti, and Oscar Jonsson have conducted in-depth studies into the complexities of Russian thinking and their works on the topic are invaluable. Russian commentators have developed different interpretations of hybrid warfare, but the Russian military does not embrace a nonkinetic notion of warfare.

The Russian military refers to new generation warfare. It may employ information and strategic communication before, during, and after an operation, but Russia sees information as a tool to support military action. For Russia, new generation warfare entails the use of armed force. There is no warfare that is won purely by nonmilitary means, because—in this view—that is not war. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui’s theory of unrestricted warfare similarly envisions a mix of military force with indirect nonmilitary means as one strategy to achieve the goals of an armed struggle.5

General Gerasimov’s commentaries and speeches underscore that point. Gerasimov called for new ideas in the context of recent military experience. He identified information warfare as one form of strategic activities that armed forces should pursue. He argued that Russian adversaries possess a hybrid capability that could be used to destabilize Russia, so Moscow needed its own hybrid capability using military and nonmilitary responses to counter internal and external threats. The internet is one tool of hybrid capabilities.6 The perspective from which Gerasimov wrote is defensive.7

Russian military thought draws a distinction between the notion of gibridnaya voyna (hybrid warfare) and the use of military means in a full-scale military operation that may entail use of information and strategic communication to achieve an end. While not part of Russian military doctrine, hybrid warfare represents, to some degree, the Kremlin’s strategic behavior. The Kremlin clearly employs nonmilitary means to disrupt and undercut social and political cohesion in the West.

Russia’s notion of new generation warfare implies violence, economic pressure, subversion, and diplomacy through strategic communication as defined earlier. Its scope entails psychological warfare and can be viewed as a form of political warfare. Fridman notes that gibridnaya voyna “focuses on ways that political players undermine their adversaries by eroding their domestic and international political legitimacy and stability by employing a mix of predominately nonmilitary indirect means and methods.”8

Gibridnaya voyna embraces color revolutions staged in former Russian states that Russia believes the West has organized as part of a long-range scheme to oust Vladimir Putin and his regime from power.

China’s Three Warfares Approach
Today, China employs a doctrine of “Three Warfares,” that includes legal warfare, media public opinion warfare, and psychological warfare.9 While this approach dominates its current strate-
gic thinking, in the late 1990s, Colonels Qiao Lang and Wang Xiangsu offered useful insights as to the potential for information strategy as part of a notion of unrestricted warfare that respects no rules or limits. Such warfare uses information and public opinion to achieve strategic goals. Many believe China practices that approach through its trade, cyber, financial, and other policy initiatives. These reflect China’s desire to maneuver for psychological advantage and to use information warfare as a tool in multidimensional spaces to paralyze an adversary, gain the upper hand in a game with no rules, and force an enemy to submit to one’s will.

China’s Central Military Commission endorsed the Three Warfares approach in 2003, recognizing that nuclear weapons are essentially unusable and that kinetic force offers undesired solutions. A lot has been written on the Three Warfares, but this section draws heavily on a 2013 Pentagon study, *China: The Three Warfares*. Its analysis of the Three Warfares is excellent. Many of the recommendations also offered in the 500-plus-page study raise controversial questions and are debatable. The study itself best explains the Three Warfares approach.

China’s Three Warfares is war by other means. It consists of three confluent thrusts.

- **Psychological warfare** seeks to influence and/or disrupt an opponent’s decision-making capability, to create doubts, foment antileadership sentiments, to deceive opponents and to attempt to diminish the will to fight among opponents. It employs diplomatic pressure, rumor, false narratives, and harassment to express displeasure, assert hegemony, and convey threats. China’s economy is utilized to particular effect: China threatens sale of U.S. debt; pressures U.S. businesses invested in China’s market; employs boycotts; restricts critical exports (rare minerals); restricts imports; threatens predatory practices to expand market share, etc.

- **Media warfare** (also known as public opinion warfare) is a “constant, ongoing activity aimed at long-term influence of perceptions and attitudes.” It leverages all instruments that inform and influence public opinion including films, television programs, books, the internet, and the global media network (particularly Xinhua and CCTV) and is undertaken nationally by the PLA, locally by the People’s Armed Police, and is directed against domestic populations in target countries. Media warfare aims to preserve friendly morale; generate public support at home and abroad; weaken an enemy’s will to fight; and alter an enemy’s situational assessment. It is used to gain “dominance over the venue for implementing psychological and legal warfare.”

- **Legal warfare** (or “lawfare”) exploits the legal system to achieve political or commercial objectives. It has a prominent role in the warfare trilogy. Lawfare has a range of applications. They range from conjuring law to inform claims to territory and resources, to employing bogus maps to “justify” claims. In a distorted application of domestic law, for example, Beijing designated the village of Sansha on the Paracel Islands as a Hainan Prefecture to extend China’s administrative writ.
into the South China Sea. China also uses UNCLOS provisions and other legal conventions for unintended purposes.\textsuperscript{16}

China’s approach is rooted in nationalism and its concept of sovereignty. It assigns to itself a superior status among nations—a radically different notion than sovereignty as envisioned by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. It is designed to counter the projection of U.S. power. The United States is among four key audiences that China targets as part of its broader military strategy of antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) in the South China Sea. The United States embraces the notion of a maritime commons and free passage as an anchor of its strategic position in Asia. China would restrict U.S. power projection by setting the terms for U.S. access.

It applies its doctrine to employ coercive economic inducements to nations in the region to counter U.S. naval presence. China justifies its position through a restrictive interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), adopted and signed in 1982.\textsuperscript{17} Its objective is to counter U.S. surveillance operations and routine U.S. Navy deployments. The Three Warfares are used to expand China’s global reach, fueled by its resources and energy demands. The doctrine aims to neutralize concerns and gain support among regional governments, business communities, and the public for its ambitions. The Three Warfares seeks to hinder U.S. offshore control strategy, establishing a naval blockade to create a no-man’s sea between the China mainland coast and the first island chain. Its success relies on the cooperation of third parties. It aims to condition public opinion in states including the Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, and Malaysia to inhibit those governments from providing the facilities and support needed to service U.S. naval operations in the South China Sea and to deny the United States a favorable regional political environment.

The report \textit{China: The Three Warfares}, written for the Department of Defense Office of Net Assessment, describes how the Three Warfares has been used as an offensive weapon not previously considered in the West. It offers an asymmetrical approach that stands outside most U.S. military thinking and challenges the United States to think anew about what approaches, consistent with American values, are likely to prove most effective as China seeks to establish itself as the premier power in the twenty-first century.\textsuperscript{18}

China’s Three Warfares concept is what should alarm the United States and other members of the international community. It eschews violence or kinetic operations, setting it apart from most definitions of warfare. One has to assess it in the context of a sophisticated, long-term strategy to integrate Europe, Africa, and Asia as an economic system with China at its center.\textsuperscript{19} The concept is part of a grand strategy that includes enticing less-affluent nations as well as Europe into its Road and Belt Initiative, a Trojan horse that loans money to nations for infrastructure—but requires the debtor to use the borrowed money to employ Chinese workers, not works of the debtor nation.

Nations such as Sri Lanka and Pakistan have discovered to their regret that the loans create a debt trap, potentially reducing them to a form of economic slavery as a tributary state. One needs to be clear-sighted about China’s goals. China talks about them openly. It rejects Western constitutional democracy. It rejects the notion of universal values, such as human rights. It rejects a world order comprised of sovereign states who treat one
another as partners in favor of one that it dominates. It would end a rule-based international order. It stands for suppressing freedom of expression at home.

China expert Jonathan Ward observes that abroad it actively attacks Western values, targeting Chinese students overseas to sustain party doctrine. It uses brutal concentration camps to suppress Islam. China seeks to establish itself as economically supreme in the world, possessing the overwhelming share of global gross domestic product. The Chinese system embraces an authoritarian model that functions through a vision of comprehensive social management. It talks about asserting sovereignty over its own territory, but the parameters of that territory keep expanding. It shows no respect for the intellectual property of other nations. Reportedly, China is guilty of half the illegal fishing and half the human trafficking in the world.

While eschewing military force, it employs economic coercion to force nations to submit to its will. China propagates a strategy that touts five principles: 1) respect for territorial integrity; 2) mutual nonaggression; 3) mutual noninterference in internal affairs; 4) equality and mutual benefit; and 5) peaceful coexistence. At the core of its national goals is, as Graham Allison sums up, “a civilizational creed that sees China as the center of the universe.” The principles may sound reasonable on their face. China invokes them to justify its actions. In fact, they represent a sophisticated form of diplomatic sophistry.

These points vastly oversimplify a complicated relationship with China. What policies the United States should pursue must be left to political policy makers; this book expresses no opinion on that. But China’s ambitions, its sophisticated Three Warfares concept—which is also an outgrowth of precepts discussed in Unrestricted Warfare—define obvious challenges for the United States.

There is no simple counter, although one may argue that while rooting the precepts in U.S. values, we should adapt the Three Warfares concept and add a fourth concept to it: diplomatic warfare. Each of these requires strategies, operations, and tactics rooted in actionable legal authorities, resources, and doctrine that the United States currently lacks.

China poses such a threat. The United States needs to decide and understand what its relationship with China can or should be and how to use strategic communication to achieve desired goals. The year 2049 lies not far over the horizon. U.S. security interests mandate confronting this challenge, forging international alliances and partnerships to address it as an international community—and to do so smartly and immediately.

NATO’s Definition of Hybrid Warfare
NATO’s definition of hybrid warfare means everything and nothing, rendering it more or less unproductive. It defines hybrid warfare to include “propaganda, deception, sabotage and other non-military tactics,” characterized by increased “speed, scale and intensity, facilitated by rapid technological change and global interconnectivity.” NATO’s commander, General Philip M. Breedlove, USAF, defines it as “a continuum of threat, including unconventional and conventional methods” that “bridges the divide between the hard and soft power.”

In 2010, NATO defined hybrid threats as “those posed by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives.” In setting forth a strategic approach,
NATO states that hybrid threats will apply pressure, across the entire spectrum of conflict, with action that may originate between the boundaries artificially separating its constituents. They may consist of a combination of every aspect of warfare and compound the activities of multiple actors. Experience from current operational theaters has demonstrated that adversaries can now conduct hostile actions through a broad array of conventional or unconventional means and methods, and have a favourable outcome against a force that is superior, both technologically and militarily.27

NATO sets forth a “comprehensive approach” and a “framework response.” As Ofer Fridman observes, its approach covers everything: military and nonmilitary, covert and overt, “combined to achieve certain political goals.”28 These set forth general precepts for how NATO should address hybrid threats, but it is hardly an action plan, a cohesive doctrine, or a strategy. NATO needs to think through its notions of hybrid warfare and information warfare, including the relationship to both of strategic communication.

**American Notions of Gray Zone and Hybrid Warfare**

Many American military officers use the term gray zone warfare to describe warfare that combines kinetic and nonkinetic means. General Joseph L. Votel, USA, and his colleagues have described the gray zone in these terms: “The Gray Zone is characterized by intense political, economic, informational, and military competition more fervent in nature than normal steady-state diplomacy, yet short of conventional war.”29

They describe gray zone warfare as unconventional warfare that involves an indirect application of power to leverage foreign population groups to advance or maintain U.S. interests. It is discretionary and clandestine. It may be covert. It can be, Votel et al. argue, subtle or aggressive. The United States employed unconventional warfare to support the mujahideen (those engaged in jihad) in Afghanistan in their battle against the Soviet 40th Army. The concept animated Kurdish Peshmerga forces in northern Iraq during the 2003 invasion of that country. Tactics Votel et al. identify include mobilizing “mass protests, work slowdowns or stoppages, boycotts, infiltration of government offices, and the formation of front groups.” These, they contend, can undermine “the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of the government or occupation authority.”30

Other tactics include sabotage against military or industrial facilities, economic resources or other targets. Guerrilla warfare operations are carried out against military or security forces to reduce their effectiveness or hurt their morale. Much of Votel and his colleagues’ writing focuses on examples from World War II and the Cold War. A core challenge is that the United States’ military strategies, operations, and tactics need to be rooted in the core American values of freedom, respect for life, embrace of democratic processes, fair play, justice embodied in the rule of law, and the goal of achieving peace and stability in the world. Gray zone warfare is a label, not a defined concept. One challenge confronting the U.S. Department of Defense is to develop concepts, doctrines, and actionable strategies to define and make the concept actionable.

The more common term for this is hybrid warfare, a term attributed to Frank Hoffman of the National Defense University, currently serving as a special advisor to the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Hoff-
man’s thinking is informed by the work of multiple scholars, including Michael Evans, Colin Gray, Stephen Bank, John Arquilla, Bruce Hoffman, and John Robb.31

Hoffman articulates two related concepts: hybrid warfare and hybrid threats. Hybrid warfare “incorporate[s] a range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.”32 Hybrid threats encompass “any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism and criminal behavior in the battle space to obtain their political objectives.”33

Hoffman’s focus is tactical and operational. He considers himself an operator, not an academic, and his approach aims to support operators. He argues that convergence characterizes the evolving character of conflict that includes the convergence of the physical and psychological, the kinetic and nonkinetic, and combatants and non-combatants. So, too, we see the convergence of military force and the interagency community, of states and nonstate actors, and of the capabilities they are armed with. Of greatest relevance are the converging modes of war. What once might have been distinct operational types or categorizations among terrorism and conventional, criminal, and irregular warfare have less utility today.34

At its core, Hoffman’s view of hybrid warfare embraces violent conflict between regular or conventional forces and irregular or nonstate forces, such as militias or guerrilla forces, and involves the use of kinetic and information operations in a blurred or blended nature of combat. Hybrid wars blend the lethality of state conflict with the fanatical and protracted fervor of irregular warfare. They exploit modern technical capabilities. Hoffman’s approach offers guidance for tactical and operational activities in a battlespace.

He cites the 2006 Lebanon War, or the Second Lebanon War, as an example. A nonstate actor, Hezbollah, combined kinetic warfare and strategic communication in fighting the Israel Defense Forces. Israelis insist they won. The better view is that they learned and applied the lessons from a conflict that produced for them an unsatisfactory outcome to achieve subsequent success.35 The conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan provide further illustrations of major armed hostilities that combined different types of military forces, actions, and technology with strategic communication to achieve political and military objectives.36

Hoffman has been critical of U.S. military efforts—notably the 2003 Iraq War—to employ information warfare to battle adversaries such as Islamist extremists:

Today, many small groups have mastered “armed theater” and promoted “propaganda of the deed” to arouse support and foment discord on a global scale. There are a plethora of outlets now in the Middle East and an exponentially growing number of websites and bloggers promoting a radical vision. These outlets constantly bombard audiences with pictures, videos, DVDs, and sermons. Ironically, in Iraq and in the Long War we are facing a fundamentalist movement that is exploiting the very modern and Western technologies to reestablish an anti-Western social and political system.37

In modern hybrid conflicts, Hoffman argues for achieving dominance in the cognitive domain, declaring, “We have to recognize that perception matters more than results in the physical battlefield.”38
We have to influence and shape audience behavior rather than imposing our will. Majors Timothy B. McCulloh and Richard B. Johnson, USA, vary Hoffman’s ideas in formulating seven principles of hybrid warfare that add nuance but do not alter the thrust of his thinking.39

Hoffman’s approach recognizes the pivotal importance that networks and connectivity play today. His concept of hybrid warfare is not new; it has been employed since ancient times. The Germans employed it to defeat the Romans in 8–9 CE.40 Portuguese irregulars helped the British defeat the French in the Peninsular War, 1807–14.41 The American Revolutionary War pitted colonial militias against British regulars and Hessian mercenaries.42

Colonials befuddled a Britain that had underestimated the American support for independence. But the gold medal for imagination in the use of information warfare goes to Lieutenant General Lord Charles Cornwallis. His loss to General George Washington and the Marquis de Lafayette at Yorktown, Virginia, was the action of a player who knew when to fold in the face of overwhelming enemy superiority, not the dunce too many American children grew up imagining. Strategically imaginative, Cornwallis had earlier moved into Virginia and, in a stroke of genius, offered to free the enslaved people there, who comprised 40 percent of the state’s population. Half of them defected, providing intelligence and other support. Cornwallis knocked the American patriots back on their heels. His gambit demonstrated imaginative strategic communication. Had Cornwallis’s jealous superior, Sir Henry Clinton, left Cornwallis to his own devices, Cornwallis might have shifted the momentum of the war, despite conventional wisdom that for the British, who underestimated colonial sentiment for independence, the war was unwinnable.43

William Donovan’s Office of Strategic Services (OSS) operatives adroitly used information warfare in carrying out their missions during World War II.44 Vietnam presented war by Communist guerrillas as well as mainline North Vietnamese units against U.S. and South Vietnamese conventional forces. Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan are poster children for Hoffman’s notion of hybrid warfare. These conflicts are about warfare. They entail violence and armed hostilities or confrontation. Strategic communication plays a role, but in support of military action. Hoffman’s notion is sound and relevant in that context.

The Need for New Thinking

The United States needs to develop a doctrine, strategy, and approaches for information warfare and the strategic use of communication and needs to organize itself to execute them. This stands apart from the urgent challenge that China poses. China’s coherent, integrated grand strategy to achieve global supremacy by 2049 excludes from its doctrine the application of violence. China relies on nonmilitary means—backed up by military power—to achieve its goals.

Discussions of hybrid warfare (or whatever label is placed on its variants) are too Russia-centric. Unless we allow matters to escalate out of hand—always a challenge—it neither poses, nor does it wish to pose, an existential threat to American prosperity or survival. Russia is a regional disruptor with whom this nation can and should, as President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher concluded years ago, do business, identify areas of mutual security concern, and lessen tensions rather than allow rising emotions to escalate relations out of control. No one expects Russia to become a trusted ally or best friend to the West. Reagan’s adherence to the Rus-
sian proverb “trust but verify” stands. We need to be hard-nosed, clear-sighted, and realistic in dealing with the Kremlin and Russians. They play tough; we need to play tough. Still, the security interests of Russia and the West mandate identifying and acting on common security concerns, especially how to counter Chinese economic imperialism, not looking for reasons to heighten hostilities between them.

What other challenges require strategies that employ strategic communication to gain a competitive advantage? Drug cartels pose a clear and present danger within our own borders. The current debate tends to treat drug dealing as a high-intensity crime, and it is. It is also low-intensity conflict and terrorism, which requires in its solution a whole-of-government approach that includes the military.

Migration has disrupted Europe. Pressure on U.S. borders has polarized American politics and raised questions about America’s relationship to nations south of its border. Dealing with these challenges requires an approach that entails strategic communication or information warfare. The U.S. military will continue to engage in Africa and the Middle East. Information warfare and strategic communication will play a key role in the nation’s strategies, operations, and tactics.

The United States needs to forge a strategy on a grander scale—one that takes into account the most urgent challenges, with approaches that avoid nonmilitary means and focus on the use of information to exert influence on target audiences and, in line with the National Defense Strategy, accord this nation a competitive edge for influence in the emerging threat environment. Information is a vital element in satisfying this requirement. The U.S. government is neither organized nor able to meet this requirement, and its survival and prosperity depend upon surmounting this challenge.

Endnotes
1. See Farwell, Persuasion and Power, which analyzes the notion at length in light of historical examples.
4. Ofer Fridman, “On the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’: Why the West Fails to Beat Russia to the Punch,” Prism 8, no. 2 (2019). Fridman is a lecturer in war studies and ranks among the top experts on the topic. This book’s comments on Russian discussions of hybrid warfare/new generation warfare draw heavily on his work, as well as that of Mark Galeotti, Oscar Jonsson, and Frank Hoffman (through his writing and author’s engagements with him by email in 2019). See Oscar Jonsson, The Russian Understanding of War: Blurring the Lines between War and Peace (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019); Ofer Fridman, Russian “Hybrid Warfare”; Mark Galeotti, Russian Political Warfare: Moving Beyond the Hybrid (New York: Routledge, 2019); Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007); and Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Force Quarterly 52 (1st Quarter 2009), 34–39. These scholars have intensively studied the Russian literature and pronouncements on this modality of war. The failure of many Western leaders to do so has produced misinterpretation of Russia’s strategic view. Both the West and Rus-
 sia are guilty of mirror-imaging in assessing one another’s strategic intentions and goals. Each misses signals the other communicates. The Ukraine conflict illustrates the knock-on consequences of this failure.
5. Fridman, Russian Hybrid Warfare, 159.
10. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing, China: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999), 12. In their words, “it is likely that a pasty-faced scholar wearing thick eyeglasses is better suited to be a modern soldier than a strong young lowbrow with bulging biceps.” Liang and Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, 44. Information warfare encompasses a far broader spectrum than cyber (digital) domains but includes it. They refer to it as network space, a “technological space that is formed by a distinctive combination of electronic technology, information technology and the application of specific designs.” Although written in the 1990s, Liang and Xiangsui were clear-sighted in envisioning the longer-range potential for cyber engagements (including theft of intellectual property to ruthlessly loot an adversary’s military and strategic assets and degrade its strengths) or conflicts. Liang and Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, 42. Ofer Fridman’s analysis of their book is worth reading. See Ofer Fridman, Russian Hybrid Warfare, 11–19.
12. Liang and Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare. As with this book, its footnotes are important. The book was written in reaction to the U.S. success in Iraq during Operation Desert Storm. Some argue that it represents neither a revolution in military thought nor an executable doctrine for future warfare, but rather is a collection of tactics, techniques, and procedures that have been used before and will be used again. See Maj John A. Van Messel, USMC, “Unrestricted Warfare: A Chinese Doctrine for Future Warfare?” (master’s thesis, U.S. Marine Corps University School of Advanced Warfighting, 2005).
14. Halper, China, 12, emphasis original.
15. Halper, China, 12–13, emphasis original.
16. Halper, China, 13, 23–101, emphasis original.
19. Jonathan D. T. Ward, China’s Vision of Victory (Washington, DC: Atlas Publishing and Media, 2019), loc. 3282 of 6590, Kindle. This work draws upon Ward’s writing, but he is one of many who—in this author’s opinion—correctly espouses similar views. See also Francois Bougon, Inside the Mind of Xi Jinping (London: Hurst, 2019); and Newt Gingrich, Trump vs. China: Facing America’s Greatest Threat (New York: Center Street, Hachette Book Group, 2019). Former Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich is a strong ally of President Donald J. Trump and much of his recent writing aims to support the president. This book scrupulously has avoided wading into domestic political debates or partisanship. Our security interests must rise above party politics; this author cites Gingrich’s book because it offers an excellent analysis of the security challenge that China poses to the United States. This analysis, with which this author concurs, stands separate from whether one supports or opposes the president.
20. Ward, China’s Vision of Victory, loc. 3433 of 6590, Kindle.
22. Ward, China’s Vision of Victory, loc. 3900 of 6590, Kindle.
27. “Part II—Hybrid Threats,” in Bi-SC [Strategic Command] Input to a New NATO Capstone Concept for the Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid Threats (Norfolk, VA: NATO Allied
Command Transformation, 2010), also cited by Fridman in Russian Hybrid Warfare, 154.


31. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges.”


34. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” 34. See also Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century, 28.


39. Maj Tim McCulloh and Maj Rich Johnson, Hybrid Warfare, Joint Special Operations University Report 13-4 (Tampa, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2013), as discussed by Fridman in Russian Hybrid Warfare, 38. The principles address uniqueness of hybrid warfare to geographic, culture, and historical settings; the existence of a specific ideology within the hybrid force; a perceived existential threat that drives a hybrid force to abandon conventional warfare; asymmetry between hybrid forces and adversaries; a mixture of conventional and unconventional elements in technologies, weapons, and tactics; and imposition by hybrid organizations of a war of attrition in both the physical and cognitive domains.


43. See Gregory J. W. Urwin, “When Freedom Wore a Red Coat: How Cornwallis’ [sic] 1781 Virginia Campaign Threatened the Revolution in Virginia,” in Richard G. Davis, ed., The U.S. Army and Irregular Warfare, 1775–2007: Selected Papers from the 2007 Conference of Army Historians (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2008). Cornwallis’s strategy degenerated operationally into a certain chaos, for lack of strong support of the initiative by his superiors. Had the British carried Cornwallis’s strategy to its logical conclusion and implemented it with discipline, vigor, and decisive action, the outcome of the war might have been different, even in the face of other challenges confronting the British.

