Introduction

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At 9 P.M. on Saturday, February 12, 1949, a breathless announcer interrupted a popular musical program on Radio Quito with the urgent breaking news of a Martian landing at Cotocallao on the northern edge of the Ecuadorian city. A reporter on the scene provided a terrifying description of the death and destruction that aliens were leaving in their wake as they advanced on the capital. The minister of government came on the air to urge calm in order to facilitate the evacuation of the city. The mayor told women and children to flee to the surrounding mountains, and called on the men to defend the city. Church bells tolled in warning, and listeners could hear a priest begging for divine intervention. Frightened citizens, some only in their pajamas, rushed into the streets in panic thinking that the world was coming to an end. A stream of police cars with their sirens blaring and lights flashing rushed north to Cotocallao to battle the Martian invasion.

If this narrative sounds familiar, it is because local producers adapted this radio depiction of H. G. Wells’s classic novel *The War of the Worlds* from Orson Welles’s broadcast of October 30, 1938, that claimed that aliens from Mars had invaded New Jersey. That airing terrified thousands in the United States, but the outcome in Ecuador was far worse.

Welles had informed his listeners that the broadcast was radio theater, but his Ecuadorian counterparts did not bother with those niceties. The radio station only belatedly explained that the broadcast was a hoax. Officials pleaded for people to remain calm, but watched helplessly as the crowd’s fear turn to rage with the realization that they had been duped. The mob descended on the radio station and set it ablaze. Because the police had gone to Cotocallao, the government called in the military to restore order. The army responded with tanks and tear gas to disperse the crowd, but not before the station was reduced to rubble with the besieged staff of one hundred still inside. Some managed to escape out of a rear exit, but others were trapped on upper floors. As many as fifteen charred bodies lay in the wreckage. The daily newspaper *El Comercio*, Quito’s oldest...
newspaper, owned the radio station and was located in the same building. The fire destroyed the newspaper’s presses and files, and for three days it was not able to publish. When the paper resumed distribution, it was thanks only to the generosity of their competitor *El Día* who lent them their printing press.

The communists had nothing to do with the broadcast or the resulting riot and ruin, but that did not stop the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from assuming that radicals must have been behind the mayhem. After all, the events matched the agency’s preconceived notions of how communists operated. Rather than engaging in a serious political program to build a better world, US government officials charged that the communists were subversives bent on death and destruction designed to disrupt the smooth functioning of society. For that reason, the CIA was on the lookout for communist inspiration or instigation of violent events. In this case, however, the agency concluded that the riot had no political undertones, nor did any evidence emerge that it was communist-inspired. From an investigation into “sources inside the higher echelon of the National Headquarters of the Ecuadoran Communist Party in Quito,” the CIA concluded that the communists were not aware in advance of the broadcast, nor did they have plans to exploit the carnage left in its wake. In fact, according to the CIA’s sources, two communists lost their lives in the fire.

Few people today remember or know about the broadcast of “The War of the Worlds” in Quito, but the CIA report speaks volumes on both the pervasiveness of US surveillance operations as well as the potential possibilities, boundaries, and obstacles to their knowledge and understanding of leftist movements in Latin America. United States officials were determined to implicate the communists in coup plots as they repeatedly pointed to external support for subversive movements. This included the fabled search for “Moscow gold” even as they were never able to find any concrete evidence to support their charges. Their investigations were ultimately misguided as they failed to comprehend the domestic roots of radical critiques of society. At the same time, CIA surveillance offers glimpses into internal debates within the communist party, and presents an opportunity to gain unique insights into the actions and thoughts of those involved in leftist, labor, and other social movements that challenged US hegemony in the region. The resolutions and platforms that emerged out of their congresses and other meetings illustrate the presence of intense discussion and a deep commitment to advancing a political agenda. Communists sought to empower marginalized workers and peasants to enable them to assume control over society—and this posed a threat to the economic interests of United States corporations, as well as those of the domestic ruling class in Latin America.
Disempowered people imagined another world without racial discrimination, sexual violence, and economic exploitation, one in which they democratically made decisions as to how they would run their lives. Examining the actions and motivations of communists who supported these struggles and the challenges that they confronted provides an opportunity to analyze the emergence of mass popular movements dedicated to the creation of a more just and equal society.

The artistic directors of the “The War of the Worlds” did not intend for the radio play to be an allegory on the cold war, but it was broadcast in that environment. The events of that Saturday night soon disappeared from the pages of the newspapers, but they reflected a much larger clash, as the socialist economist Manuel Agustín Aguirre would put it later that year, between two worlds and two different types of economies. On one hand was the current liberal, capitalist, laisse faire economy with all of its problems, and on the other hand the promises of a centrally planned socialist one. Capitalism had abandoned people to the blind forces of the market, whereas socialism promised to introduce a rational economic system that would lead to the liberation of humanity. “Slavery and freedom: two opposed and opposite worlds,” Aguirre concluded. “It does not seem difficult to choose between them.” The conflict would lead to a confrontation between two different worldviews, but Aguirre was optimistic that ultimately the future was bright.³

That the United States government would intervene in the internal affairs of a Latin American country to undermine the realization of such lofty goals comes as no surprise to scholars and even casual observers of the region. In 1950, the State Department readily admitted that it sought “to combat this Communist threat” in the region. It did so even as it claimed that the United States government adhered to a policy of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries.⁴ Such high-minded declarations were obviously rhetorical and self-serving, as the long history of United States involvement in Latin America immediately makes apparent. Only four years later, Dwight Eisenhower’s administration supported a military coup in Guatemala to overthrow the popularly elected Jacobo Arbenz government, followed by attempts to assassinate Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic and Fidel Castro in Cuba.⁵

The goal of this book is not to document or analyze these interventions, nor to parse out the semantic differences between what an advocate might present as international solidarity versus what an opponent would denounce as imperial endeavors. Rather, as with my previous book on the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in Latin America during the Second World War, my intent is to use information that the CIA and other United States agencies gathered in
the postwar period to document progressive movements for social change in a context where few other sources exist.⁶ Even with all of the inherent limitations of foreign agencies, their extensive surveillance networks provided effective coverage of internal developments in Latin America. While one might question the wisdom or rationale behind those investigations, they do leave historians with a remarkable documentary record through which scholars can reconstruct the history of the left.

**Surveillance**

The postwar left in Latin America has been the subject of relatively little academic study. In comparison to the size of protest movements in the 1940s and 1960s, leftist mobilizations during the 1950s can appear small and insignificant. Even participants largely ignore those years in their memoirs, preferring to skip from the excitement of the mid-1940s antidictatorial battles to the intensity of the 1960s guerrilla insurrections.⁷ Organizational capacity declined during these years, particularly from its height during a postwar democratic spring. This was due to a variety of factors, including cold war paranoia of communist subversion that led to a suppression of popular organizing efforts. The external ideological and economic interests of United States capitalists intermingled with those of the domestic ruling class in Latin America and reinforced a common agenda of repressing leftist aspirations. Furthermore, the emphasis that orthodox communist parties placed on peaceful paths to power contributed to the disappearance of 1950s activism from scholarly treatments and hence from popular memory as well. A result, as the scholar of social movements Hernán Ibarra observes, is a decade that has received little academic or popular attention.⁸

Despite this lack of study, making sense of organizational developments between the Second World War and the Cuban Revolution (what I term here as “the 1950s”) is critical to gaining a better appreciation for the heightened level of militant mobilizations in the 1960s. The sociologist Floresmilo Simbaña has called the 1970s and 1980s the “worst” studied decades in Ecuador, not in the sense of a lack of studies but because the investigations that scholars have undertaken do not adequately account for the degree of social movement organizing during those years that influenced subsequent and much more visible political developments in the 1990s. His argument is that to understand contemporary Indigenous mobilizations properly, we need a better comprehension of the organizing activities that laid the groundwork for them.⁹ Indigenous activists celebrate the 1990s as a “gained decade” in terms of large protests, but those
participants could not have realized those achievements were it not for advances in grassroots organizing efforts during the 1980s, even though those years are remembered as a “lost decade.” Similarly, political activism in the 1960s can only be properly understood if we have a clear analysis of what preceded it during the 1950s. Intense and continual organizing efforts in the years after the Second World War laid the groundwork for subsequent militant mobilizations that would not have happened were it not for those earlier, less visible actions. Political strength does not emerge out of a vacuum, but is built on much longer organizational trajectories.

Even though the 1950s represents a void in studies of Ecuador’s social mobilizations, it is not objectively speaking a decade during which nothing happened. Militant leftists remained actively involved in a wide range of political movements and engaged in intense debates over how to transform their society. Much as the neoliberal 1980s provide an important context for understanding heightened levels of Indigenous protest in the 1990s and the advances of the pink tide in the 2000s, the conservative 1950s are key for a proper interpretation of the radical and turbulent 1960s. Without an appreciation for the context that a longer trajectory of social movement organizing provides, subsequent militant actions can appear to be an aberration rather than the result of sustained political engagement.

One explanation for a lack of adequate studies of the 1950s is a paucity of sources that chronicle social movement activities. As a reflection of this absence, Ibarra only includes one document from the 1950s in his impressive anthology on the communist left from 1928 to 1961. This lack of written material is part of a broader phenomenon among progressive activists. Brad Duncan sought to chronicle the printed legacy of the US radical left in the 1970s in his book *Finally Got the News*. In an interview, Duncan comments:

> Most participants never kept any of those flyers, because ultimately they were organizing tools meant to mobilize people for specific events. So they’re by definition ephemeral, which is why almost no one keeps them, which makes studying the history of radical movements more difficult. We know that our enemies want to erase this history. So do your part for people’s history and don’t throw away a damn thing.

As I note in my previous book on the FBI, activists rarely took the time, or had the inclination, to record their actions. This is particularly the case when repressive governments could use that information to prosecute them. Militants sometimes destroyed their own archival records rather than being caught red-handed
with incriminating evidence. Military regimes, furthermore, routinely burned subversive material because they feared its contents. As a result, little communist party material from the 1950s survived in Ecuador.

In the absence of other sources of information, police surveillance can provide an important opportunity to reconstruct the history of popular movements. They allow scholars to see and understand aspects of this history that government agencies were not looking for or did not find particularly important or interesting. As such, these records have remained underutilized and undertheorized as a window through which to critique social movement challenges to exclusionary government structures.\textsuperscript{14} In my previous book, I drew on FBI counterintelligence documents that I serendipitously discovered among State Department records to write a history of the political left in Ecuador during the 1940s. Long before the cold war, FBI director J. Edgar Hoover famously maintained a paranoid and irrational fear of communism and that fixation carried over when Franklin D. Roosevelt extended the bureau’s mandate to include Latin America. With the signing of the National Security Act of 1947, those surveillance operations moved from the purview of the FBI to the newly created CIA. Unsurprisingly, intelligence gathering continued without a break under the new agency, seemingly utilizing the same tactics, drawing on the same sources, and perhaps even employing the same agents. The CIA perpetuated Hoover’s anticommunist agenda without pause, even though, as with the FBI, its officers reported on the presence of weak and small parties that provided little threat to United States security concerns.\textsuperscript{15}

While governments typically establish agencies such as the CIA for the collection and analysis of intelligence, they tend to drift into covert operations instead.\textsuperscript{16} Much has been written about the CIA’s attempts to subvert democracy in pursuit of the US government’s imperial agenda, and little need exists to revisit that history here.\textsuperscript{17} Nor is that the purpose of this study. Rather, another aspect of the agency’s work provides scholars with a rich fount of information on the social and political history of other countries. Whereas anticommunist operatives might plant fraudulent documents and advance derogatory narratives to undermine their opponents, if functioning properly those who gathered intelligence would seek to create an accurate and unfiltered record of political events, especially since these documents would be only for internal use rather than public dissemination as propaganda tools.\textsuperscript{18} A review of CIA documentation before it drifted into covert regime change operations reveals a preponderance of items about Latin American from the late 1940s and early 1950s that contain a wealth of information on domestic developments. This book mines the massive archive
that the CIA and other agencies created, not for what it can tell us about those agencies or United States policy objectives and decisions, but rather what we can learn from the activities that government officials investigated.

In 2000, the CIA released some of their declassified intelligence documents in redacted form in the CIA Records Search Tool (CREST) database at the US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) at College Park, Maryland. Although advertised as a publicly accessible repository of CIA records, in reality the material was available only on a limited basis on a stand-alone workstation that was not always operational. In January 2017, the CIA published the records of the CREST collection online in their Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Electronic Reading Room that provides for their easier and wider dissemination. The release of these and other CIA surveillance documents fill in gaps in a context where few other sources exist, and as such offer scholars an excellent opportunity to explore the history of the Latin American left in more depth than was previously possible. This study turns to these artifacts to chart social movement organizing efforts during a “lost decade” of political activism during the 1950s.19

My training is as a social historian, and this book does not purport to be a diplomatic study, nor is it particularly concerned with national security issues, United States policies, or the intricacies of intelligence gathering (although, of course, by necessity it is framed by those investigations).20 The diplomatic historian Alan McPherson has quipped, “The more historians find out about the Cold War in the hemisphere, the more that Cold War itself fades to the background.”21 That paradox holds true for this work. It is not specifically about the cold war per se, except that chronologically the period it covers corresponds with the first decade of what historians have traditionally understood to be the cold war. My concern is not US-USSR relations, but instead how activists in Latin America advanced an alternative vision of how to organize the world. It shares with the historian Greg Grandin an understanding of this epoch as a sociological process and historical experience that is best interpreted through the lens of intellectual history and bottom-up mobilizations.22 And, in that fashion, it does directly engage issues of a capitalist versus socialist mode of production that was at the heart of the cold war. The cold war was peripheral to the events chronicled in this book even as that larger political context profoundly informed and prescribed the world in which militants operated.
Toward a Deeper Study

CIA documentation provides an especially important opportunity to explore a variety of issues that communists as well as the broader left faced in the early postwar period, with ramifications that extend well beyond both that time frame and the borders of Latin America. While both United States and Latin American government officials could be blinded by their own anticommunist assumptions and attitudes, the information that they assembled offers a unique opportunity to delve deeply into the internal workings of communist parties. While the communist party in Ecuador was never particularly large or strong, its members struggled with universal issues of organization, strategy, and tactics as they sought to advance their political agenda. In the process these militants created the conditions for heightened levels of political activism in the 1960s. Advances during the 1950s were very much part of a longer trajectory of active engagement that has either been lost or largely forgotten. Although politically antagonistic to communism and the left in general, CIA surveillance provides convincing documentation of the persistence of social movement organizing during that decade. The data that CIA officers generated allows us to push at the edges of our knowledge and understanding of how communists operated, in Ecuador and elsewhere.

The opening of the Third or Communist International (Comintern) archives in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union contributed to an explosion of studies of local communist parties. As the historian Barry Carr aptly notes, most of these studies examine the period from the creation of the Comintern in 1919 to its formal closing in 1943. Access to available sources inform and constrain many of these studies, particularly with an abundance of material in the Comintern archive from the 1920s through the first half of the 1930s, after which the volume drops off noticeably. Carr observes, “As a result of this imbalance we know much more about the development of Latin American communism during its first two decades than over the last four or five decades of its evolution.” He calls for studies that explore local parties in the aftermath of the closure of the Comintern, particularly during the onset of the cold war.23

Not only do we need better examinations of the postwar period, but we also need to understand variations both between parties in different countries and among disparate political tendencies within a single country. Despite being organized as national parties of a centralized movement, communists never functioned in a univocal fashion. Carr states, “We have to distinguish between the policies and prescriptions elaborated by the directorates of political parties (‘the
policy of the Central Committee’) and the actions of the members and cadres in the local cells and committees.” Carr urges us to think of communisms—in the plural—to understand better how these ideologies and strategies were debated, and the influences that peripheral actors had on the formation of centralized policies. This approach also acknowledges and incorporates expressions that were not part of the pro-Soviet communist party, including other leftist tendencies such as anarchist, socialist, Trotskyist, Maoist, social democratic, and left-liberal parties.24

My work takes up Carr’s call by delving into crucial events in Ecuador. Both politically and historiographically this country existed on the periphery of CIA operations and US-Latin American relations and the cold war itself. Even so, significant and broader issues of political strategies and strategic alliances that have long plagued the left played out during the postwar period in Ecuador, and are worthy of a deep and penetrating study.

By no means is the CIA documentation perfect. CIA history staff member Woodrow Kuhns excuses the intelligence agency’s failures. “Dramatic, sweeping events, such as wars and revolutions, are far too complex to predict or analyze perfectly,” he states.25 A more fundamental problem is the underlying political agenda that drove its intelligence collection efforts and colored its perspectives and analyses. A large part of the dissident CIA officer Ralph McGehee’s complaint about the agency with which he worked for a quarter century was the disinformation campaigns that attempted to mold public opinion, and the manufacture of false intelligence to justify policies and advance institutional or personal interests.26 These shortcomings, however, are the limitations of any historical documentation. Even with all of their inherent deficiencies, these surveillance records present scholars with penetrating insights into the struggles and difficulties that the Latin American left confronted in the postwar period. Inadvertently, they highlight how activists responded to the challenges and opportunities that they encountered. More sources are better than no sources, and as historians we work with the sources we have rather than the ones we wish we had. It is in this context that the opening of long-closed archives and the release of declassified documentation have led to calls to reexamine the cold war, as “not only a possibility but a necessity.”27 This book contributes to that larger historiographic project.