Notes

NOTES TO PROLOGUE


2. For a contemporary concern with mobilization across difference, see Anna Tsing, "Is There a Progressive Politics after Progress?" Cultural Anthropology website, accessed June 26, 2018, https://culanth.org/fieldsights/1133-is-there-a-progressive-politics-after-progress.


NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

1. Their occupations at the time: Fawwaz Traboulsi (student), Wadad Charara (school teacher), Wadad Chakhtoura (school teacher), Ahmad al-Zein (lawyer), Christian Ghazi (film director), Madonna Ghazi (school teacher), and Mahmoud Soueid (lawyer).


ory, Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), offers a more appreciative reading of the potential of Left melancholy than Brown, who interprets it as “Benjamin’s name for a mournful, conservative, backward-looking attachment to a feeling, analysis, or relationship that has been rendered thinglike and frozen in the heart of the putative left,” 22. I am deploying Left melancholy in Brown’s sense to point to a structure of feeling among leftists in Lebanon of different generations, who mourn the good old days of the 1960s and 1970s. Having lived through these times is of course not necessary to be afflicted by Left melancholy. See Nicolas Dot-Pouillard, “Boire à Hamra: Une jeunesse nostalgique à Beyrouth?” [Drinking in Hamra: A Nostalgic Youth in Beirut?], in Jeunesses Arabe—Du Maroc au Yémen: Loisirs, Cultures et Politiques [Arab Youth—From Morocco to Yemen: Entertainments, Cultures and Politics], ed. Laurent Bonnefoy and Miriam Catusse (Paris: La Découverte, 2013), 125–33.

13. Talal Asad’s early work is exemplary in this respect, and so are the reflexive writings in the 1980s, such as James Clifford and George Marcus, eds., Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), and James Clifford, The Predicament of Culture (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988).


15. For a recent reflexive work that turns its ethnographic gaze inward to investigate the practice of Middle East anthropology in the US academy, see Lara Deeb and Jessica Winegar, Anthropology’s Politics: Disciplining the Middle East (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016).


19. “What we call our data,” as Clifford Geertz put it in his memorable phrase, “are really our own constructions of other people’s constructions of what they and their compatriots are up to.” Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 9.
20. See Vincent Crapanzano’s *Tuhami: Portrait of a Moroccan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980) for an early methodological reflection on the consequences of the effacement of the anthropologist’s mark in both of these two moments.


32. See Bruno Perreau, *Queer Theory: The French Response* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016). “Thus, when the category ‘queer’ travels from one shore of the Atlantic to the other,” Perreau writes, “it retains the same terms, but its meaning is literally distorted. . . . I bring to light the numerous modulations of queer theory, showing how sexuality, nation, and community are conceptually and politically interwoven,” 9.


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34. For a divergent position that argues for forgoing critical theory for historical narrative in the study of contemporary Arab thought, see Yoav Di-Capua, *No Exit: Arab Existentialism, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Decolonization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018), 20–23.

35. Among the key political events and structural economic, legal, and educational transformations that have destroyed certain ways of being in the world and brought forth new ones are Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt (1798); the Ottoman Tanzimat (1839–76), which included the codification of parts of the Shari’a put forth in the Mecelle since 1869; the integration of Mount Lebanon’s silk-centered production into the world economy; dense missionary activity and competition; the French Mandate in Syria and Lebanon since 1918; the declaration of the Lebanese Republic by French colonial powers in 1926; and its independence in 1943.


37. Dense missionary activities and competition resulted in the founding of the Syrian Protestant College (1866) by American Protestants, which later became the American University of Beirut (1920), and the Université Saint-Joseph (1875) by Catholic Jesuits. These two elite private institutions of higher learning founded by missionaries in the nineteenth century are still active today. Currently, their predominant languages of instruction are English and French, respectively.

38. In their teaching career at the Lebanese University, Charara and Beydoun relied a lot on existing translations in Arabic or translated the material they wanted to teach from French into Arabic themselves. This was a labor that Traboulsi, teaching in English in the private elite universities, was spared.


40. They translated writings by authors from the revolutionary tradition such as Karl Marx, Isaac Deutscher, V. I. Lenin, Leon Trotsky, Antonio Gramsci, John Berger, Mao Tse-Tung, and Cornelius Castoriadis; anthropological authors such as Claude Lévi-Strauss and Evans Pritchard; poets such as René Char, Pierre Tardieu, and Yannis Ritsos. In the past two decades, Fawwaz Traboulsi translated some of Edward Said’s later works including his autobiography, *Out of Place: A Memoir* (New York: Knopf, 1999). Waddah Charara, who was for a number of years the editor of *Sahafat al-‘Alam* (the World Press supplement) of the Saudi-owned Arab daily *al-Hayat*, translated a number of newspaper, magazine, and journal articles that were published every Wednesday.

42. “Focusing on transfiguration,” Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar and Elizabeth Povinelli write, “rather than translation—the refunctioning of a text as such for different demanding-sites—orient our analysis toward the calibration of vectors of power rather than vectors of meaning-value. We will care more about the distribution of power than of meaning, more about institutions of intelligibility, livability, and viability than about translation.” Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar and Elizabeth A. Povinelli, “Technologies of Public Forms: Circulation, Transfiguration, Recognition,” Public Culture 15, no. 3 (2003): 396.

43. Talal Asad, “A Comment on Translation, Critique, and Subversion,” in Between Languages and Cultures: Translation and Cross-cultural Texts, ed. Anuradha Dingwaney and Carol Maier (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995), 330. Take, for instance, the Algerian journalist and writer Kamel Daoud, whose novel The Meursault Investigation (Meursault, contre-enquête), written in French, was crowned with three prestigious French literary prizes: the Prix François Mauriac and Prix des Cinq Continents de la Francophonie in 2014 and the Prix Goncourt in 2015. After consecration, the writer’s culturalist statements—“Is the refugee a ‘savage’?” he asked—about the sexual misery of the Arab world, its sick relationship to women, bodies, and desire that he professed in Le Monde (January 29, 2016) in the wake of New Year’s Eve’s sexual assaults on women in Cologne circulated globally (the article was also published in the New York Times), spawning discourses pointing out the author’s racist and colonial account, while others came to his defense. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35653496.


64. For two different critiques of how difference is configured as a site of resistance against universal homogenizing forces that engages Dipesh Chakrabarty’s *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), see Zahid R. Chaudhary, “Subjects in Difference: Walter Benjamin, Frantz


66. In addition to countering the anachronistic readings of texts, this method also bypasses causal explanation by attempting understanding through a redescription of the linguistic action in terms of its ideological point and not “in terms of an independently specifiable condition.” Tully, *Meaning and Context*, 10.

67. Skinner’s historical method, centering as it does on the figure of the author and the contrast-effect her intervention creates in a field of arguments, operates at a different level of analysis than Michel Foucault’s archaeologies, which dilute the author in a deep episteme, and the Foucauldian-inspired critique of discursive assumptions. See Michel Foucault, *Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines* [The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences] (Paris: Gallimard, 1966).


73. Scott, “David Scott by Stuart Hall.”


75. Part of the differences between Scott and Skinner on the uses of historical inquiry can be understood in light of their different intellectual projects and objects of inquiry. Skinner, the historian of early modern political thought, seeks to unearth traditions of political argument that have faded from view in the past five centuries, and therefore destabilize the current liberal idioms through which political thinking proceeds in the present. While Scott’s interest in *Conscripts of Modernity* is in a much more recent mid-twentieth century anticolonial history, and his project is not to re habilitate lost treasures, as Skinner would put it, but to escape antiessentialist presentism that dismisses the older generation’s work, through reconstituting their intervention in their context and to interrogate whether our present demands of us a different kind of intervention and different practices of criticism. While both thinkers engage in a historical reconstruction, their objects, periods of inquiry, and projects are different: Skinner’s past has long ago faded from view, while Scott’s past is still active in the present, and therefore the uses historical reconstruction are put to are of a different order.

76. Scott, *Conscripts of Modernity*, 55.

77. For an insightful reconstruction of the problem-space of French political anthropology, and its comparison with the US, which ends with a call for a critical French political anthropology, see Didier Fassin, “La politique des anthropologues: Une histoire

**NOTES TO CHAPTER 1**

11. For those of them who are of Shi’i descent, they are lodged between the “religion to modern secular ideologies” generation of Husayn Murruwwa (1910–87), who moved from being a Shi’i cleric to a central committee member of the Lebanese Communist Party, and the militant Islamic revival generation that came in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution—Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary general of Hizbullah, was born in 1960.
16. The Maronites, an indigenous Christian sect in communion with the Roman Catholic Church, are Lebanon’s largest Christian community.
18. Walid Khalidi, *Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East* (Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs Harvard University, 1979), 35.
19. Borrowed from the famous 1949 quip of George Naccache, the Lebanese Franco-phone journalist and editor, “Deux négations ne font pas une nation” [Two negations do not make a nation].

21. In the aftermath of independence, the Lebanese elites agreed on “the distribution of the chief political and administrative responsibilities, among the six largest communities: Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Sunni, Shi‘i, and Druze. At the suggestion of General Spears, the British delegate in Beirut, the number of parliamentary seats proportionally assigned according to data from the 1932 census was to be a multiple of eleven: for each six Christian deputies, the chamber would include five Muslim and Druze deputies. In the government and civil service, the ratio accepted was 50:50, but according to a hierarchy in which the Maronites still held the top positions: the presidency and the command of the army. The office of prime minister went to the Sunnis, the presidency of the parliament to the Shi‘is, and the vice presidency to the Greek Orthodox. Thus, on the pretext of securing an “equitable” distribution of power and its prerequisites, the criterion of communitarianism took precedence over that of competence at every level of the political hierarchy: the administration, the judicial apparatus, the municipal councils, the army, and even the banking sector.” Elizabeth Picard, *Lebanon, a Shattered Country: Myths and Realities of the Wars in Lebanon*, trans. Franklin Philip (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1996), 70. The literature on Lebanon uses communitarianism, confessionalism and sectarianism interchangeably to denote the system of political representation based on quotas for the different religious minorities constitutive of Lebanon, as well as for the form of sectarian loyalty that hinders allegiance to the nation.

22. For instance, a substantial number of Christian Palestinian refugees were granted Lebanese citizenship under the regime of President Camille Chamoun in the 1950s. In the aftermath of the Syrian revolution (2011), Lebanon received more than one million, predominantly Sunni, Syrian refugees. They are living in extremely precarious conditions under constant threat of xenophobic attacks and police and army roundups, as well as the overtly racist discourses circulating in the public sphere by some government officials, politicians, and the media.

23. Some of its ideologues sought to bypass Arab history and identity by anchoring the Lebanese nation in Phoenician times, and calling in its extreme right-wing versions to drop the Arabic script and classical Arabic and adopt a Latinized alphabet to write the Lebanese dialect.


25. Kassir, *La Guerre du Liban*, 55. Samir Kassir, a professor of history at the Université Saint-Joseph in Beirut, was a distinguished and courageous leftist political editorialist. He was assassinated on June 2, 2005, in Beirut, in the turbulent times that followed the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic al-Hariri on February 14, 2005, and the subsequent withdrawal of Syrian troops from the country under substantial internal and international pressure in April of the same year. Kassir in the last years of his tragically interrupted life wrote fiery articles against the Syrian Ba‘th regime and its domineering influence in Lebanon, and was politically involved in the political movement (March 14th) calling for reclaiming Lebanese sovereignty from Syrian tutelage in a very tense regional and international conjuncture, characterized by the US occupation of Iraq in 2003, the worsening of its relations with Syria, and direct UN interference (*UNSC 1559*), which called
“upon all remaining foreign forces [i.e., Syria] to withdraw from Lebanon” and “for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias,” referring mainly to Hizbullah’s guerrilla force. It is widely believed that the Syrian regime or its local allies and acolytes are behind Kassir’s assassination.


31. Kawtharani’s father owned a grocery store in Beirut while Soueid’s father was a Sunni cleric in a poor southern village. Charara’s father, a prolific author, worked at the Bibliothèque Nationale Libanaise, and Abbas Beydoun’s father was a school teacher and local intellectual. Ahmad Beydoun’s case is different. He is the son of Abdel Latif Beydoun, a notable from Bint Jbail who was twice elected to the Lebanese Parliament.


35. November 1, 1954, is the date of the first radio appeal to the Algerian people broadcast by the Front de Libération Nationale and is used to mark the beginning of the war of independence.


40. James, “Whose Voice?”


42. Muhsin Ibrahim, interview by author, August 4, 2008, Beirut, Lebanon.

43. Charara’s second baptism was traveling with his father to Damascus in 1954 on the day the newspapers were discussing Czech arms deals, and being present among family, politician, and poet friends of his father who were discussing the implications of this
important event. He dubs listening to Nasser’s entire speech on the day of the nationalization of the canal his third baptism.

45. “Established in 1929,” the school, which was created “because of the discrimination and socioeconomic difficulties confronting rural and poor Shi’ite migrants to Beirut,” also doubled in its beginnings as a “socioreligious center for many Shi’ites” where the new migrants commemorated ‘Ashura. Shaery-Eisenlohr, Shi’ite Lebanon, 56.
47. Mahmoud Soueid, interview by author, July 7, 2008, Beirut, Lebanon. For Olivier Carré, the French political sociologist, Nasserism was characterized more by an attachment to a charismatic leader than it was to a doctrine. Carré mentions the diatribes between Nasser and the Ba’th in the aftermath of the union’s rupture. Numerous writings by the Ba’th, from 1961 to 1965, accused Nasser of Arab inauthenticity, while Nasser replied, accusing it of being a fascist and atheist party in 1963. The question of Palestine and the Arab-Israeli struggle was at the heart of these quarrels. To Nasser’s position in 1964–65, that the battle against Israel was not possible until Arab unity was attained, the Ba’th replied, naming Nasser the Pétain of the Arab Nation, and that the champion of the Battle of Suez (1956) was a traitor to Israel, and would be punished by the Arab people. See Oliver Carré, Le nationalisme Arabe (Paris: Payot, [1993] 1996), 105–8.
52. Ahmad Beydoun, interview by author, July 11, 2007, Beirut, Lebanon. The Phalanges are a right-wing Christian Lebanese nationalist party founded in 1936. They were one of the major political and military players in the first years of the Lebanese civil and regional war, facing the predominantly Muslim Lebanese National Movement (LNМ), a pro-Palestinian coalition of leftist and Arab nationalist parties.
53. The historical background supplied in this section relies on Fawwaz Traboulsi’s History of Modern Lebanon.
55. Charles Malik (1906–89)—the new foreign minister—was a philosopher by training, graduating from Harvard in 1937 after a period of study in Germany in the early 1930s. Malik was one of the drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights at the United Nations and succeeded Eleanor Roosevelt in chairing the commission for human rights in 1951, after her retirement. Later on, Malik was also Lebanon’s representative at the nonaligned conference in Bandung that took place in April 1955, a few months after the signing of the Baghdad Pact, where he pushed for the acknowledgment of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the confer-
ence’s final statement. Malik’s active political life at the time lends itself to be read retrospectively as encapsulating some of the features that came to define the political conjuncture after World War II, from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to Bandung, via the Eisenhower Doctrine. Much later, in the mid-1970s, Malik became one of the ideologues of the anti-Palestinian, Christian right-wing National Front, which fought against the predominantly Muslim, pro-Palestinian Lebanese National Movement.

56. As the CIA’s main operative in Beirut at the time, Wilbur Crane Eveland wrote, “Throughout the elections I traveled regularly to the presidential palace with a briefcase of Lebanese pounds, then returned late at night to the embassy with an empty twin case.” Traboulsi, *History of Modern Lebanon*, 132.


63. The Syrian Social Nationalist Party, a radically secular organization advocating for a pan-Syrian union, aligned itself with President Chamoun and the Lebanese nationalists against the Arab nationalists Muslims during the 1958 civil clashes. Fawwaz Traboulsi, interview by author, August 2, 2008, Beirut, Lebanon.

64. Waddah Charara, interview by author, June 9, 2007, Beirut, Lebanon.


68. Abbas Beydoun, interview by author, July 31, 2008, Beirut, Lebanon. Mikhail Naimy (1889–1988), also a staple of the school curriculum, was an “influential Lebanese immigrant writer of the same period [as Khalil Gibran]. Born in Mount Lebanon in 1889, Naimy spent years studying in Palestine and then the Ukraine before moving to Washington State and eventually to New York. His publications, both in English and Arabic, also abound in the deification of the Lebanese terrain and reinforces themes that Gibran would make popular,” in Elise Salem, *Constructing Lebanon: A Century of Literary Narratives* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003), 17. The stories of Maroun ‘Abbud (1886–1962) also deal with village life in Mount Lebanon: “The ‘Lebanese’ ‘Abbud writes about are Christian villagers who live deep within the rugged Maronite terrain. The inhabitants are very religious and have total faith in the powers of St. Maroun. The stories revolve around village characters and their beliefs, generational differences, shocking Western innovations, etc.” Salem, *Constructing Lebanon*, 54.

70. Abbas Beydoun, interview by author, July 31, 2008, Beirut, Lebanon.


72. The comparison between the road to Najaf and the road to Damascus and Beirut—previously quoted—is extracted from the introduction to the book of biographical interviews that Abbas Beydoun conducted with Husayn Muruwwa entitled *Wulidtu Shaykhan Wa Amutu Tiflan* (1990). The title is based on a word pun. Shaykhan could either mean an old man or shaykh as in cleric, and the title plays on the double meaning, which could be rendered in English as “I was born an old man and I die a child” or “I was born a cleric and I die a child.”

73. Abdel Latif Charara, however, unlike Husayn Muruwwa and his brother Muhammad, did not pursue a religious curriculum in Najaf, but graduated around the mid- to late 1930s from the “center for elementary school teachers” in Beirut, a Lebanese public institution for the preparation of primary school teachers.


76. This text, written in April 1967, three months before the June 1967 defeat, did not contain any index of the author’s Marxist political militancy at the time. Socialist Lebanon was an underground organization.


81. From the Arabic Ahli, which denotes those who are related either by blood ties, by inhabiting the same place, or by belonging to the same clan or tribe. It could also denote those united by a common occupation, such as the practice of a craft. Charara uses Ahli to denote mostly the communal—sectarian, regional, and kin—infranational solidarities at work in Lebanese society.


83. Frantz Fanon died in 1961.

84. Waddah Charara, interview by author, June 9, 2007, Beirut, Lebanon.


86. Merleau-Ponty’s exact sentence is “Nous n’avons pas le choix entre la pureté et la violence, mais entre differentes sortes de violence” [We don’t have the choice between purity and violence, but between different kinds of violence], *Humanisme et terreur* (Paris: Gallimard, 1947), 118.

**NOTES TO CHAPTER 2**


5. “State Administration doubled in size through the employment of 10,000 new functionaries. . . . Under Sham’un, the Maronites constituted 29 per cent of the population but held at least half of the administrative posts; by the end of Shihab’s mandate they held no more than a third.” Traboulsi, History of Modern Lebanon, 140.


7. Traboulsi, History of Modern Lebanon, 139.


10. In Lyon, he also met Hassan Hamdan (1936–87), six years his senior, who was studying philosophy. Hamdan later became the main theorist of the Lebanese Communist Party, known under his pseudonym, Mahdi ‘Amil, and Charara’s colleague at the Lebanese University.

11. The ANM’s slogan at the time was “Unity, Liberation, Vengeance,” while the Ba’thists’ slogan was “Unity, Freedom, Socialism.” It is, as would be expected, the term “Vengeance” that provoked accusations of fascism toward the ANM. It would later drop it, for “regaining Palestine.” See Walid Kazziha, Revolutionary Transformation in the Arab World: Habash and His Comrades from Nationalism to Communism (New York: St. Martin’s, 1975).


14. “The tableau of Ba’th was something different from the one you know now. It was a broad alliance that had everything in it, the Arab Spirit [Michel] Aflaq folks, the Algerian model people, and those supporters of armed struggle, as well as a large leftist bloc.” Fawwaz Traboulsi, interview by author, August 2, 2008, Beirut, Lebanon.

15. Traboulsi, Portrait of the Young Man in Red, 40.


17. Traboulsi, Portrait of the Young Man in Red, 41.

18. Traboulsi, Portrait of the Young Man in Red, 45. In the late 1950s, Yemen was in the last years of the Zaidi imams’ rule. The 1962 revolution would give rise to the Yemen Arab Republic. The port of Aden, which fell under British rule in 1839, remained under British control until the establishment of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in 1967. See Messick, Calligraphic State, 8–12, for a synopsis of Yemeni history.


21. Among those Lebanese cadres who split was Waddah Charara’s older cousin, Talal Charara, who was instrumental in Charara’s Ba’thist experience and who will later play a role in introducing him to Fawwaz Traboulsi.


23. Ismael, Arab Left, 45.


26. Traboulsi, *Portrait of the Young Man in Red*, 47. After the coup, the new rulers engaged in “a policy of recrimination and physical liquidation against the Iraqi Communists, Qasimites [proponents of the deposed and executed president ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim], and opponents to their rule.” Ismael, *Arab Left*, 27.

27. Roneos, another name used for mimeographs, the predecessors of photocopiers, are duplicating machines that produce copies from a stencil. Roneos could not be bought without registering the machines; however, the group succeeded in obtaining a machine through a Jewish comrade who managed to buy it from a store that sold stationery, one of the last remaining Jewish stores in Beirut in the mid-1960s.

28. Fawwaz Traboulsi, interview by author, August 2, 2008, Beirut, Lebanon. The first issue was dated September 1966 and the last one in my possession (issue 17) was published in March 1970. Ahmed Beydoun granted me access to his personal archive from that period. Beydoun, who later became a distinguished historiographer, kept an extensive archive of their militant activity. I suspect, through the conversations I had with members of the group, that overall Socialist Lebanon may have published around twenty or twenty-one issues, that is, about three more issues after the one dated March 1970.

29. According to Fawwaz Traboulsi’s present estimate, not records. Personal communication with Traboulsi, July 12, 2010.

30. Fawwaz Traboulsi, interview by author, August 2, 2008, Beirut, Lebanon. Hassan Qobeissi (1941–2006) studied philosophy at the Lebanese University, and later at the University Saint Joseph. He taught philosophy in Lebanese public high schools, and later at the Lebanese University, and assumed editorial functions. Qobeissi was also a prolific translator of philosophy and anthropology. He translated Jean-Paul Sartre, Claude Lévi-Strauss, E. E. Evans-Pritchard, and John Locke among other authors.


32. Union National des Etudiants de France, France’s major university students’ syndicate, which was active in support of Algerian independence in the 1950s.


35. Lubnan Ishtiraki [Socialist Lebanon], “Ma‘rakat al-Tullab al-Thanawiyin al-Muqbila” [The Coming Battle of Secondary School Students], Issue 5, April 1967. Charara mentioned writing a text in support of the secondary students’ struggles using Bourdieu at the time. And since “The Coming Battle” is clearly written under the sign of Bourdieu, but not signed, I am inferring that it is the same article he recalled writing—forty years later—in 2007.


38. The Dziga Vertov Group, a cinematographic collective that included Jean-Luc Godard, Jean-Henri Roger, and Jean-Pierre Gorin, for instance, was founded around the


40. When François Maspero stepped down, he handed the direction of the house to François Gèze on the condition that the name be changed. It became Éditions la Découverte.

41. Le Monde Diplomatique, still published on a monthly basis, was founded in 1954 by Hubert Beuve Marie, as Ignacio Ramonet, the monthly editor in chief from 1990 to 2000, noted, in order to give foreign affairs their due place. Until 1973, still according to Ramonet, the monthly followed Le Monde’s editorial line on international politics, itself a reflection of Beuve Marie’s politics, which were characterized by “a late realization of the necessity of negotiation with the colonies independence movements, a cult of La Francophonie set up as a ‘neutral’ space facing the American and Soviet blocs as well as constant anti-communism balanced by a severe anti-Atlantism.” Ignacio Ramonet, “Cinquante Ans” [Fifty Years], Le Monde Diplomatique 74 (April–May 2004). http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/may/74/RAMONET/10882.

42. Ahmad Beydoun, interview by author, July 28, 2008, Beirut, Lebanon.

43. Azza Charara Beydoun, who joined Socialist Lebanon in the late 1960s and married Ahmad Beydoun in 1969, was the first math teacher in the English language in the Lebanese public school system in the mid-1960s, revealing the dominance of French until that time in Lebanese public high schools.

45. Lubnan Ishtiraki, “Madkal li–qira‘at al-Bayan al-Shuyu‘i” [An Introduction to Reading the Communist Manifesto], Dirasat ‘Arabiyat [Arab Studies], 5, no. 7 (1969): 38–80. Hereafter, this work will be referred to as the “Introduction,” and cited parenthetically as IRCM.


50. “When the army mobilized itself on July 23rd, it was expressing the people’s hopes that for a long time the people had struggled for; its hopes for opening up new horizons over which the banners of ‘Sufficiency and Justice’ would flap . . . and today brothers, now that this road has been paved for us, and we have declared political democracy for the entire people, not for the people’s enemies, and that we have declared social democracy and established socialism in our midst, and that we’ve declared that we will build a society on the basis of justice and sufficiency.” These are excerpts from a speech delivered by President Nasser on December 19, 1961. Khitab al-Ra‘is Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasir fi ‘Id al-‘Alam [Speech of President Gamal Abdel Nasser on Flag Day], December 19, 1961. http://nasser.bibalex.org/Speeches/browser.aspx?Sid=1006&lang=ar.

51. They translated writings by authors from the revolutionary tradition such as Karl Marx, Issac Deutscher, V. I. Lenin, Leon Trotsky, Antonio Gramsci, John Berger, Mao Tse-Tung, and Cornelius Castoriadis.


NOTES TO CHAPTER 3


4. “In so far as it manifests a rupture with external demands and a desire to exclude artists suspected of obeying them,” Bourdieu writes, “the affirmation of the primacy of form over function, of mode of representation over the object of representation, is the most specific expression of the claim to the autonomy of the field and of its pretension to produce and to impose the principles of a specific legitimacy as much in the order of production as in the order of reception of the work of art... The artist challenges any external constraint or demand and affirms his or her mastery over what defines him or her and what belongs to him or her by right, that is, the manner, form, style—art in short, thus established as the exclusive purpose of art.” Pierre Bourdieu, *The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field*, trans. Susan Emanuel (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 299–300. See Fadi A. Bardawil, “Art, War and Inheritance: The Aesthetics and Politics of Ziad Rahbani” (master’s thesis, American University of Beirut, 2002) and Jessica Winegar, *Creative Reckonings: The Politics of Art and Culture in Contemporary Egypt* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006).


6. Hereafter, I will refer to Abu Rabi’i’s book in the text.


19. Socialist Lebanon, “An Attempt to Understand,” 12. Socialist Lebanon held similar views on the Egyptian regime, whose nationalizations “transformed the ones in power into a core of a state bourgeoisie that controls, through ruling, the surplus production and consumes that surplus to the detriment of development issues and the building of the economic base.” Socialist Lebanon, “Mawd’at Awwaliyya fi Itar al-Ma’raka” [Primary Topics in the Context of the Battle], Issue 8, November 1967, 7. Instrumental to their critiques were the conceptual works of an older generation of Egyptian Marxist thinkers, written and published in France, that were critical of the Nasser regime; see chapter 2.
27. Said, Out of Place, 293.
28. Said, Out of Place, 279.
35. al-Azm met Edward Said during the 1970 Association of Arab-American University Graduates conference, which provided an institutional space of encounter between intellectuals at home and those in the diaspora who were supportive of the Palestinian struggle. They became good friends, until the publication of al-Azm’s critical review of
Orientalism in 1981—that I look into in chapter 6—after which Said severed his relation with al-Azm, refusing to resume contact despite a number of attempts by common friends to reunite them. Sadik Jalal al-Azm, interview by author, August 4, 2008, Beirut, Lebanon.


38. The first went through “ten printings between 1968 and 1973 (despite being forbidden and confiscated in many countries) excluding the independent printings that took place in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.” Sadik Jalal al-Azm, “Taqdim ba’d Tul Inqita’” [A Preface after a Long Absence], in Al-Naqd al-Dhathi ba’d al-Hazima [Self-Criticism after the Defeat] (Damascus: Dar Mamduh ‘Idwan li-l-Tibā‘a wa-l-Nashr, 2007). Both books were published by Dar al-Tali’a in Beirut. The publishing house, owned by the Beiruti “Liberal” Ba’thist Bashir al-D’a’uq, also issued the vibrant journal Dirasat ‘Arabiyya, to which al-Azm and the members of Socialist Lebanon contributed collectively, or individually, with pseudonyms.

39. The philosophy department chair who opposed Sadik al-Azm was Charles Malik (1906–87)—see chapter 1 for a brief synopsis of Malik’s political career. On a different register, Malik was married to the first cousin of Edward Said’s mother and played an important role in his intellectual and political growth before their subsequent political divergences: “From Uncle Charles, as we called him, I learned the attractions of dogma, of the search for the unquestioning truth, of irrefutable authority. From him I also learned about the clash of civilizations, the war between East and West, communism and freedom. In addition to telling us about this in Dhour, he played a central role in formulating all this for the world stage. Along with Eleanor Roosevelt, he worked on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; names like [Andrei] Gromyko, [John Foster] Dulles, Trygve Lie, [Nelson] Rockefeller, and [Dwight] Eisenhower were the common currency of his conversation, but so too were [Immanuel] Kant, [Johann Gottlieb] Fichte, [Bertrand] Russell, Plotinus and Jesus Christ.” Said, Out of Place, 265–66.


41. See chapter 2 for the different answers provided by Socialist Lebanon and the Arab Nationalist Movement in Lebanon.

42. “To say, therefore, that the Arab is a victim of imperialism is to understand the statement as not only to the past, but also to the present, not only in war and diplomacy but also Western consciousness. There are signs, however, that with much of the Third World, the Arab has now fully recognized this as his predicament: he is demanding the West, and of Israel, the right to reoccupy his place in history and in actuality.” Edward Said, “The Arab Portrayed,” in The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June 1967: An Arab Perspective, ed. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 9.

44. al-Azm, “Self-Criticism after the Defeat,” 78.
46. al-Azm, “Self-Criticism after the Defeat,” 140.
48. The Lebanese Communist Party was established in 1924 during mandate Lebanon. It spread its activities toward Syria in the following year, founding the Communist Party of Syria and Lebanon in 1925. In the next four decades the party would split and reunite a number of times. In January 1944, a month after Lebanese independence from France, a decision was taken to split the two parties, keeping a common central committee though. In 1950, Khalid Bikdash, the secretary general of the Syrian party, who held control over both parties with an iron fist since he gained the secretariat in the 1930s, feeling his power under threat, decided to reunite the two parties. In 1958, in the wake of the union, Bikdash split the party again and fled to Eastern Europe.
52. Ismael and Ismael, *Communist Movement in Syria and Lebanon*, 78. The relationships with Arab nationalists was not always confrontational. In 1954, Khalid Bikdash won a parliamentary seat in Damascus as part of a progressive front that included the Ba’th, which had won sixteen seats. This rapprochement with the national forces was in alignment with the post-Stalinist doctrine of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. By 1955, the Soviet Union began establishing close links with Nasser, its inaugural iconic moment being the approval of Czech-Egyptian arms deal (1955). In the aftermath of the twentieth Communist Party of the Soviet Union Congress (1956), during which the collaboration with progressive factions in the Third World was confirmed, dropping the Stalinist requirement of the dictatorship of the proletariat, “the USSR often paid little attention to the needs and conditions of Arab Communists.” Arab communist parties were stuck between the hammer of the national regimes’ repression and the anvil of allegiance to the Soviet Union, which was allied to their oppressors. See Ismael, *Communist Movement in the Arab World*, 22–23.
53. Waddah Charara did not mention this episode in any of our numerous meetings.
55. The argument for joining the opposition wing of the Lebanese Communist Party, according to Traboulsi, revolved around the idea that Socialist Lebanon was a small group, so why not join the Lebanese Communist Party and try working from the inside to influence it. Fawwaz Traboulsi, interview by author, August 2, 2008, Beirut, Lebanon.
58. The early precursor to the Lebanese National Movement of the 1970s was mainly composed of Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party, the Lebanese Communist Party, and the Arab Nationalist Movement.


61. In The Organization of Lebanese Socialists, What For? (The Arab Nationalist Movement from Fascism to Nasserism): An Analysis and a Critique (1970), Muhsin Ibrahim in a gesture of auto-critique of the ANM’s Nasserite past, writes, “The movement had practiced a pro-unity policy that was romantic and foggy. [This policy] was characterized by severe verbal persistence [in advocating] unity. Such an attitude manifested itself in slogans like ‘Unity regardless of the Price’, or ‘Unity comes first and last’ and/or ‘Unity is the path to Liberation and the Key to all Problems Confronting the Arab Society.’ This made the movement unable to see the Unity slogan in its proper historical context. It stripped the slogan of all progressive class contents. . . . Again when the movement declared its full support of the establishment of the United Arab Republic, it failed to see its petty-bourgeois contents.” Cited in Ismael, Arab Left, 70–71.

62. There were 2 fidayi operations launched from southern Lebanon in 1967, 29 in 1968, and 150 in 1969. See Kassir, La Guerre du Liban, 63.

63. The guerrillas made their entry into the village of Khiam, the first to welcome them in 1968, accompanied by the inhabitants of the village who occupied the headquarters of the army intelligence in the village, expelling its occupants. Kassir, La Guerre du Liban, 64.

64. Kassir, La Guerre du Liban, 64.

65. Kassir, La Guerre du Liban, 64. Between 1968 and 1974, Israel violated Lebanese territory three thousand times, and eight hundred Palestinian and Lebanese victims fell as a result of Israeli aggression.


67. A few months after the promulgation of the agreement, “Phalangist militants attacked a Palestinian convoy in Kahalé (March 25th, 1970), which was followed by clashes in the suburbs of Beirut.” Kassir, La Guerre du Liban, 73.


70. The accords recognized the Palestine guerrillas’ right to “be present on and move around Lebanese territory, especially to and from the ‘Arqub region, and provided a form of extra-territoriality for the Palestinian camps, long under the heavy hand of the Lebanese security services, and recognized a Higher Palestinian Commission, headed by a Palestinian veteran Shafiq al-Hut, as a de facto Palestine embassy in Lebanon.” Maaroun, History of Modern Lebanon, 154.


74. Underlined in the original. “The entity,” as in the Lebanese entity, is a designation used pejoratively by political commentators and actors wishing not to bestow legitimacy and recognition. Israel, for example, is sometimes referred to as the Zionist entity, while fervent Syrian nationalists refer to Lebanon as the Lebanese entity.


77. Underlining in the original.

78. There were around 1,000–1,500 Organization of Lebanese Socialists members as opposed to less than 100 for Socialist Lebanon. Estimates of previous adherents note that Socialist Lebanon (1964–70) did not move beyond thirty to forty members in the first few years of work, inflated to less than a hundred members by the time of fusion with the Organization of Lebanese Socialists in 1970.

79. Abbas Beydoun, interview by author, July 31, 2008, Beirut, Lebanon. Al-Hurriyya, a weekly magazine, was the mouthpiece of the Arab Nationalist Movement, founded in 1960 and edited by Muhsin Ibrahim in the 1960s. After the radicalization of the movement and its splintering post-1967, it was shared by its Lebanese faction, the Organization of Lebanese Socialists (OLS), and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). After the union of SL and OLS in 1970, it would become the common platform of the Organization of Communist Action in Lebanon and the DFLP until 1977, when it became associated only with the latter.


84. “A date [1982] that certain authors are not hesitant to propose as the endpoint of the adventure of the Nahda, understood in its wider historical sense. It is true, that until then, the spirit of the Renaissance remained constantly present in the Arab world.” Samir Kassir, Considérations sur le Malheur Arabe [Being Arab] (Paris: Actes Sud, 67.


NOTES TO CHAPTER 4


2. The merger between the two organizations took place in 1970, and the common body was referred to as the “unified organization.” A year later, and in the aftermath of the nascent organization’s first conference, the Organization of Communist Action in Lebanon was officially declared.


7. Among the SL cadres that left were Hassan Qobeissi, Jinan Sha’ban, Rashid Hassan, and Roger Nab’a. Abbas Beydoun, interview by author, July 31, 2008, Beirut, Lebanon.


9. Abbas Beydoun offers a retrospective interpretation of the split and Charara’s departure, noting: “No one was aware of this, but he was very disturbed [by the split]. He may have woken up to the fact that what happened was directed against him essentially. The split was against him. If you want to interpret it now away from class analysis and political yammering, it was a battle against him . . . and I think between him and those who were there, there were enmities that are still present.” Abbas Beydoun, interview by author, July 31, 2008, Beirut, Lebanon.

10. Abbas Beydoun, interview by author, July 31, 2008, Beirut, Lebanon. Gauche Prolétarienne, a French Maoist group, was established in the wake of May 1968. It
rejected the Leninist organizational model, and advocated following the masses, namely through the principle of établissement: “the implanting of its (mainly intellectual) members in factories. . . . Its slogans in the workplace were direct and simple: slowdowns, sabotage, and direct action against bosses and supervisors in the form of sequestrations; they even went so far as to call for the lynching of Deputies. They hated the existing unions (particularly the Communist-led CGT) and, as one of their internal bulletins said: ‘Demands, unions and lists of demands smell of the reformist litany.” Mitchell Abidor, *La Gauche Prolétaireenne*, http://www.marxists.org/history/france/post-1968/gauche-proletarienne/introduction.htm. Gauche Prolétaireenne (Proletarian Left), a hub of militant intellectuals, combined its call to follow the masses with high visibility in Parisian intellectual circles, establishing relations with Sartre, Foucault, de Beauvoir, and Althusser. Benny Lévy, who was briefly mentioned in chapter 2, known as Pierre Victor at the time, was one of its main leaders.


12. “Fusion with the Palestinian struggle in this conjuncture is a decisive element between defeat and preparation for future battles. Since the [observation of] forces being prepared by imperialism make every position that does not prepare, starting today, for a certain confrontation, an ostrich’s position and one of national abandonment.” *al-Majmu’a al-Mustaqilla’an Munazzamat al-Amal al-Shuyu‘i Tudiib Wijjatu Nazariya* [The Group Independent from the “Organization of Communist of Action” Clarifies Its Point of View], 94. It was widely known among the comrades as *al-Kirras al-Azraq* [The Blue Pamphlet]. The text is divided into three major sections of approximately thirty pages each that follow a preface written by Ahmad Beydoun and an introduction. The tripartite structure begins with a history and narrative—an auto-critique—that seeks to answer the question “Where has the OCAL gotten to?” The second section moves out from the internal issues of the OCAL toward providing a theoretical and political examination of the major battles of the “movement of the masses.” The third section, building on the auto-critique and the analysis of the second section, draws the appropriate political conclusions, calling for “a national mass line.”


14. Traboulsi, *Portrait of the Young Man in Red*, 127–28. In addition to these two major splits, in the summer of 1972 the organization also witnessed the exit of one of its student groups, which joined the Maoist tendency within Fatah. It also witnessed the split of Muhammad Kishli, one of the OLS’s cadres, at the head of a small group, who joined the DFLP.


17. See Traboulsi, *History of Modern Lebanon*, 164–70, for a breakdown of the major protest activities according to the three sectors. Hereafter cited in the text.

18. Organization for Communist Action in Lebanon, Traboulsi is using the shorthand OCA instead of OCAL. Recent accounts cast doubt on the accepted narrative of al-Khawaja’s membership in the LCP: see the film *Shu’ur Akhar min al-Hubb* [A Feeling Greater ‘Than Love], directed by Mary Jirmanus Saba, 2017.
19. “A private franchise-holding company since 1935, whose franchise was extended until 1973, the Régie also held the exclusive right to export Lebanese-produced tobacco, import cigarettes and produce local cigarettes.” Traboulsi, *History of Modern Lebanon*, 165.


22. “And it should be clear that this critique is an auto-critique at the same time. For we have participated fully in the revisionisms we are now criticizing, and some of us bear the greatest part of responsibility in them, which in our view consolidates our critique and gives it a practical basis” (TBP, 7).


24. Although the text does not name specific individuals one can infer from the descriptions that one of the main targets of *The Blue Pamphlet* in the leadership is Muhsin Ibrahim, the leader of the Organization of Lebanese Socialists, who later on during the Lebanese war became the secretary general of the OCAL. Initially, the OCAL had a central committee and a politburo but no secretary general.

25. The precursor to the Lebanese National Movement, which included Kamal Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party and the LCP. The rally was launched officially in June 1973 in opposition to a draft law on political parties, under Prime Minister Salam, which “greatly curtailed freedom of thought and association.” See Traboulsi, *History of Modern Lebanon*, 174.


27. Charara does not mention Trotsky’s book *Our Political Tasks* (1904), in which he criticizes substitutionism. That said, Charara’s critique bears a close resemblance to Trotsky’s. The latter writes, “In the internal politics of the Party these methods lead, as we shall see below, to the Party organisation ‘substituting’ itself for the Party, the Central Committee substituting itself for the Party organisation, and finally the dictator substituting himself for the Central Committee.” https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1904/tasks/.


31. “In all the practical work of our Party, all correct leadership is necessarily ‘from the masses, to the masses.’ This means: take the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas) and concentrate them (through study turn them into concentrated and systematic ideas), then go to the masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace them as their own, hold fast to them and translate them into action, and test the correctness of these ideas in such action. Then once again concentrate ideas from the masses and once again go to the masses so that the ideas are persevered in and carried through. And so on, over and over again in an endless spiral, with the ideas becoming


33. See Ross, May ’68.


40. Ross, May ’68, 95.

41. “With the opening up of the Arab domain, the Lebanese bourgeoisie appears it is really is, i.e. as the result of exploiting the whole Arab area. This is what stops it [the bourgeoisie] from restricting its battle with the masses to the isolating Lebanese, sectarian, frame. In this case, its defense of its interests and privileges appears clearly as a political, interest-based defense that cannot veil itself with sectarianism. This transforms a sectarian war into a civil war.” Socialist Lebanon, “The Two Resistances: The Palestinian and the Lebanese”, 7.

42. See “People’s War” in Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), 88–99.


44. For a much later critique that shares points of contact with Charara’s, see Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Labor History and the Politics of Theory: An Indian Angle on the Middle East,” in Workers and Working Classes in the Middle East: Struggles, Histories, Historiographies, ed. Zachary Lockman (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 321–33.


5. Charara’s flatmate at the time, who was also a leftist, was influenced by the Iranian Revolution in 1979. He exited from Marxism and became a Shi’i cleric. The circle is closed. While in the 1940s southern Shi’i clerics were dropping their religious garb and joining pro-Soviet communist parties, their non-Soviet-aligned New Left children under the influence of the Iranian Revolution dropped their “guerrilla” fatigues back for the robes. While the first story can be mapped as a “tradition” to “modernity” story during the high tides of anticolonialism; the second story is more symptomatic of the postcolonial moment of revival of religious traditions, which in the case of the Iranian Revolution was coupled with militant anti-imperialist politics and discourses articulated in an Islamic idiom.


9. “Isolationist” was the term by which the LNM referred to the Christian Phalange Party. In his memoir, *A Portrait of the Young Man in Red* (158), Traboulsi engages in a retrospective auto-critique of the LNM’s policy advocating the isolation of the Phalanges, that is, the isolationists: “The biggest mistake committed by the LNM that the communists were drawn to and theorized was the slogan of isolating the Phalange: the call to refuse the participation of representatives of that party in the ministers’ cabinet, and to isolate it as a punishment for its role in the massacre of ‘Ayn al-Rummana [The Bus Incident], and finally the call for an Arab boycott of the party. We spent a lifetime calling for the isolation of the Phalange. And in reality it was not the Phalange who were isolated in the Arab world, but us. Regardless, instead of convincing the ‘isolationist’ Phalange to break their isolation and open up to the rest of the Lebanese, and to accept a dialogue with them, and this is the important thing, we called for . . . their isolation.” And in *A History of Modern Lebanon* (188), Traboulsi the historian notes, “That slogan [isolation of the Phalange] only led to increasing the influence of the Phalange among the Christian public.”

11. Salkind and Traboulsi, “Organization for Communist Action,” 5. The program was mainly formulated by Muhsin Ibrahim, who had become the main leader of the LCP by the beginning of the war; George Hawi, the assistant to the secretary general of the LCP at the time; and Kamal Jumblatt, the LNM’s leader. The veteran Palestinian historian Walid Khalidi in 1979 described the Lebanese Nationalist Movement thus: “All were at least left of Center. Most were undeflectedly confrontational. Their overriding target was a revolution in the status quo. Their battering ram: deconfessionalism. Their enemy: both the Maronite and the Muslim establishments. Their strategic ally: the Palestinian commandos. Their patron saint and mentor: Kamal Jumblatt.” Walid Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East (Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1979), 75–76.

12. Fawwaz Traboulsi, Portrait of the Young Man in Red, 153. The program called for “the abolition of the system of political and administrative sectarian quotas; a voluntary civil code for personal status; a new electoral law based on proportional representation in which Lebanon would become a single electoral district; extensive administrative decentralisation and the convocation of a constituent assembly on a non-sectarian basis.” Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon, 189.

13. Bold in the original text.


18. This is what Dipesh Chakrabarty’s work does very well. Take for instance Chakrabarty’s critical engagement with the elementary categories of political economy: price, labor efficiency, and land. Chakrabarty mentions the contested genealogy of the category of land, particularly in settler colonial societies, such as Australia, where “it is both a tool of disinterested analysis and at the same time a tool of ideological and material domination if not also of epistemic violence.” Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Can Political Economy Be Postcolonial? A Note,” in Postcolonial Economies, ed. Jane Pollard, Cheryl McEwan, and Alex Hughes (London: Zed Books, 2011), 31. See also Dipesh Chakrabarty, Rethinking Working Class History, Bengal, 1890–1940 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989); and Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe.

19. In this sentence, Charara inserted a footnote referring to his usage of “bourgeoisie.” He wrote, “I am using this designation from the angle of a function limited by the
confines of a specific role” (WS, 240). It’s a convoluted formulation reminding the reader of the “technical” usage of the “bourgeoisie” in this context, one that the author sought to distance from the ideological normative charge this concept carries in Marxist political literature.

20. Charara attached a footnote to the above-cited sentence in parenthesis, noting in a gesture of auto-critique: “… in which [i.e., the illusions of the Left] the author of this effort has enthusiastically participated” (WS, 246). The three dots (“…”) at the beginning of the footnote are inserted to connote the author’s detachment from, and regret about, his past political enthusiasms—an “auto-critique” in a footnote. The author, no longer a militant leader who ought to justify how his past analysis led to a political deadlock that the present political line would deliver him and his comrades from, and no longer writing from within and accountable to a political collectivity, recovered his past after the closure of political activity as a personal enterprise, to which a mention in a footnote sufficed.

21. This is probably why Wars of Subjugation neither refers to Origins’ argument nor cites the book.


23. Ahmad Beydoun, Identité confessionnelle et temps social chez les historiens Libanais contemporains [Confessional Identity and Social Time among Contemporary Lebanese Historians] (Beirut: Publications de L’Université Libanaise, 1984), 463.

24. “‘Al-Haraka al-Tullabiyya fi Zawahruha al-Jadida, min al-Haraka al-Qita’iyya ila al-Haraka al-Siyasiyya” [The Student Movement in Its Recent Manifestations: From a Sectorial Movement to a Political One], in WS.


31. I borrow the notion of distilling political experiences into texts from Russell Jacoby, who wrote that Georg Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness and Karl Korsh’s Marxism and Philosophy, which were both published in 1923, “distilled past political experiences.” Russell Jacoby, Dialectic of Defeat: Contours of Western Marxism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 83.

33. Collini, “Marxism and Form.”

34. Collini, “Marxism and Form.”

35. Collini, “Marxism and Form.”

36. Collini, “Marxism and Form.”


49. Charara is referring to the massacre of as many as five hundred unarmed men, women, and children committed by US army troops in South Vietnam in March 1968.

50. The *New York Times*’s review of Solzhenitsyn’s novel described it as “a non-fictional account from and about the other great holocaust of our century—the imprisonment, brutalization and very often murder of tens of millions of innocent Soviet citizens by their own government, mostly during Stalin’s rule from 1929 to 1953.” The novel relies on the author’s own experiences between 1945 and 1953 in Soviet camps as well as the testimonies of 227 survivors, “supplemented by information from official, samizdat, and even several Western publications. They are assembled in a powerful narrative which combines the prose styles of epic novelist, partisan historian and outraged moralist, interspersed with Russian proverbs, black humor, prison camp language and parodies of Soviet bureaucratese.” Solzhenitsyn’s argument in the novel rejects the view of the camps as a Stalinist “aberration,” relating them instead to “the original nature of the Bolshevik revolution and Soviet political system—that there was a ‘straight line’ between the Lenin and Stalin eras—and specifically from the Marxist-Leninist ideology.” Stephen F. Cohen, “The Gulag Archipelago,” *New York Times*, June 16, 1974, [http://www.nytimes.com/books/98/03/01/home/solz-gulag.html?_r=1].

52. Michael Scott Christofferson, *French Intellectual against the Left: The Anti-Totalitarian Moment of the 1970s* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004), 103. Christofferson notes that both Lefort and Glucksmann wrote theses under Raymond Aron in the 1960s and were both involved in revolutionary politics and both reacted against communism.


54. “The grounds for Clastres’s exaggerated, and monomaniacal, hatred of the state are partly biographical. Many ex-communists have felt it. But Clastres took the fanatical suspicion of the state, familiar among some ex-communists, to an altogether new level of theoretical sophistication. And there is the circumstance of the 1970s in which he wrote, the years of Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s *Gulag Archipelago*, and the widespread conviction in France that the rejection of totalitarianism counted as the beginning of political wisdom.” Samuel Moyn, “Of Savagery and Civil Society: Pierre Clastres and the Transformation of Political Thought,” *Modern Intellectual History* 1, no. 1 (2004): 72. Furet argued that the French Revolution “planted the seeds of twentieth-century totalitarianism.” “Today the Gulag forces us to rethink the Terror,” he wrote, ‘precisely because the two undertakings are seen as identical,’” quoted in Andrew Jainchill and Samuel Moyn, “French Democracy between Totalitarianism and Solidarity: Pierre Rosanvallon and Revisionist Historiography,” *Journal of Modern History* 76, no. 1 (March 2004): 109.

55. Michael Scott Christofferson, “Quand Foucault appuyait les ‘nouveaux philosophes’” [When Foucault Backed the ‘Nouveaux Philosophes’], *Le Monde Diplomatique*, October 2009, http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2009/10/CHRISTOFFERSON/18219. Foucault erased the term “archipel carcéral” [carceral archipelago] from the later editions of the book, which according to Christofferson was probably related to his fear of it being used to confound all persecutions (i.e., between those taking place in the socialist East and the capitalist West) and to relieve the stress on the French Communist Party (and its relation to Moscow) by comparing institutions in the West to Soviet repression.


60. “Cold civil-communal peace” is borrowed from the title of Charara’s magnum opus, *Al-Silm al-Abli al-Barid: Lubnan al-Mujtama’ wa-l-Dawla 1964–1967* [The Cold Civil/Communal Peace: Lebanon, the Society and the State 1964–1967] (Beirut: Ma’had

### Notes to Chapter 6


2. For a similar observation regarding the poverty of Western social and political theory and a conceptualization of the modalities of political practice in India, see Chatterjee, *Lineages of Political Society*.


26. Souheil al-Kache, “Convaincre discours de répression” [To Convince: A Discourse of Repression] (PhD diss., Université de Paris VIII Vincennes, 1979). The dissertation is not numbered. al-Kache defended his dissertation on November 29, 1979, under the supervision of François Chatelet and with a committee that included Jean-François Lyotard, the former member of Socialisme ou Barbarie.
27. al-Kache, “Convaincre discours de répression.”
28. al-Kache, “Convaincre discours de répression.”
40. Orientalism’s critique, which is predicated on the coupling of the West’s knowledges and its will to dominate, when transposed to the theoretical and political stakes of al-Azm’s Levantine problem-space, would lose the power part of the power/knowledge couple.
42. Said, Orientalism, 107.
43. Gramsci, after all, was central to both Edward Said’s and Waddah Charara’s theories. The first put Gramsci to use, in showing how Orientalism is a hegemonic Western structure that keeps on reproducing itself, while the second concluded around the same time that the multiplicity of modalities of power at work in Lebanese society weakens the establishment of hegemony. Power in this case operates as a formal dominance that does not rework the internal relations of communities and fashions subjectivities, while Said underscored the power of Orientalism in fashioning the “Orient” and the “Oriental.”
44. Said, Orientalism, 25.


3. John G. Gunnell, *History, Discourses and Disciplines*, ed. Christopher C. Robinson (New York: Routledge, 2017), 165. These debates, which Gunnell observes, are precipitated by works of the likes of “Thomas Kuhn and Rorty, who disclaims the ability of philosophy to supply the transcendental ground of scientific truth,” are a “displacement of the theory/practice problem that haunts all meta-theoretical problems” (165–66). I am thankful to Lisa Wedeen and Linda Zerilli, who introduced me to the work of John Gunnell, which I read with great profit.

4. Gunnell, *History, Discourses, and Disciplines*, 166. In a similar vein, Didier Fassin calls into question his inflated account of the powers of critical theory on political developments in the world. “Is it not too hastily putting the guilt on and simultaneously giving credit to social scientists for the treacherous influence of their knowledge?,” Fassin asks, before adding, “is it not complacently granting them too much indignity as well as too much honour?” Didier Fassin, “The Endurance of Critique,” *Anthropological Theory* 17, no. 1 (2017): 4.


6. “One sign of this,” Talal Asad had noted a bit less than three decades ago, “is the fact that anthropological textbooks on the Middle East—such as Gulick’s or Eickelman’s—devote their chapter on ‘Religion’ entirely to Islam. Although Christianity and Judaism are also indigenous to the region, it is only Muslim belief and practice that Western anthropologists appear to be interested in. In effect, for most Western anthropologists, Sephardic Judaism and Eastern Christianity are conceptually marginalized and represented as minor branches in the Middle East of a history that develops elsewhere—in Europe, and at the roots of Western civilization.” Asad, “Idea of an Anthropology of Islam,” 3.

8. Lara Deeb gives an illustrative thumbnail sketch of the historical and social-scientific scholarship on sectarianism in Lebanon. She writes: “Max Weiss shows how a Shi'ī sectarian political identity and set of institutional practices were forged during the mandate period, via both top-down and ground-up processes. Scholars, including Joseph, Melani Cammett, Bassel Salloukh et al., Paul Kingston, Joanne Nucho, and Maya Mikdashi, among others, have also shown how sectarianism in contemporary Lebanon is maintained, reinforced, and reproduced at the levels of the state, municipality, civil society, elite networks, citizenship, and personal status law.” Lara Deeb, “‘Til Sect Do You Part? On Sectarianism and Intermarriage in Lebanon,” *Jadaliyya*, September 14, 2017, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/27137/-%E2%80%9Ctil-sect-do-you-part%E2%80%9D-on -sectarianism-and-interm.

9. Leila Ahmed poignantly highlights this dimension of colonial power in her encounter with US non-Muslim feminists who claim that they are able to articulate feminist positions from within their religious traditions, while Muslims have to give up their tradition to truly become feminists. Leila Ahmed, *A Border Passage: From Cairo to America—A Woman’s Journey* (New York: Penguin Books, 2000), 292.


11. Deeb, “‘Til Sect Do You Part?”


14. For a recent critique of metropolitan oppositional scholarship’s focus on the critique of imperialism in the discussion of violence against women in the Muslim world as well as its denouncing of Muslim feminists as westernized, see Rachel Terman, “Islamophobia, Feminism and the Politics of Critique,” *Theory, Culture and Society* 33, no. 2 (2016): 77–102.

15. Audra Simpson, writing on the contemporary ethnographies of Native North America, noted the disjunction between what was written about her own people and what mattered to them. In doing so, Simpson underlined the poverty of anthropological and postcolonial literatures that could not account for the multiple articulations of consciousness. “There was not a doubleness to their consciousness,” Simpson writes, “a still-colonial but striving to be ‘post-colonial consciousness’ that denied the modern
self that Fanon, Bhabha and Giddens speak of and from.” “There seemed rather to be a tripleness, a quadrupleness, to consciousness and an endless play,” she adds, “and it went something like this: ‘I am me, I am what you think I am and I am who this person to the right of me thinks I am and you are all full of shit and then maybe I will tell you to your face.’” Audra Simpson, “On Ethnographic Refusal: Indigeneity, ‘Voice’ and Colonial Citizenship,” *Junctures* 9 (2007): 74.


18. The modern project of fashioning peasants into citizens, whether you call it a social reform or a disciplinary project, is also suffering from an additional set of complications. International organizations, since the Bretton Woods Agreement, have the authority “to oversee not only relations between states but the conditions of life of their citizens as well.” This aspect of these organizations’ work was reinforced when, in addition to their humanitarian effort to alleviate poverty, a concern for human rights was added to their mandate. “With this switch,” Elyachar writes, “the person being counted became no longer a citizen of a nation-state but an individual in a universal humanity.” Elyachar, *Markets of Dispossession*, 76.


22. This of course is not exclusive to the Arab world. “South Africans,” James Ferguson writes, “responded to the 1990s academic critiques of modernism and enlightenment with the dismayed objection: ‘You all are ready to abandon it before we’ve even gotten to try it!’” James Ferguson, “Theory from the Comaroffs, or How to Know the World Up, Down, Backwards and Forwards,” “Theorizing the Contemporary,” *Cultural Anthropology* website, February 25, 2012, https://culanth.org/fieldsights/271-theory-from-the-comaroffs-or-how-to-know-the-world-up-down-backwards-and-forwards.
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