Cold War Anthropology
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Published by Duke University Press

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Cold War Anthropology: The CIA, the Pentagon, and the Growth of Dual Use Anthropology.

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NOTES

Preface

3. I am grateful to Roberto González for suggesting the theme of dual personality features after reading an early draft of this preface.

ONE Political Economy and Intelligence

1. President Truman used the fifty-six-page, top secret “Park Report” to discredit, and disband, the oss as an amateurish outfit, infiltrated by communists.
2. IRIS later became the Bureau of Intelligence Research.
3. The span of time between the dissolution of the oss (October 1, 1945) and the establishment of the cia (July 26, 1947) was 664 days.
4. While the cia viewed the rising anticolonialist movement as a potential threat, anthropologists like John Embree, Raymond Kennedy, and Jack Harris championed these transformations as hopeful developments. Ironically, the cia had tried to recruit Jack Harris, though he declined its offer in part because the oss had broken promises to individuals who had helped him out of “difficult situations” during the war (Melvern 1995: 55).
5. The 1954 Doolittle Commission was appointed by President Eisenhower to evaluate the range of secret work undertaken by the cia.
6. Peter Richardson reports that the cia undertook retaliatory action against Ramparts, including increased surveillance on the magazine’s staff and a range of “dirty tricks to hurt their circulation,” and other acts that included considerations of blackmail against vulnerable staff (Richardson 2009: 79–80).
8. In 1974, John Marks published a methodologically improved effort to identify cia agents in his essay “How to Spot a Spook,” which focused particularly on identifying embassy “political officers” (Marks 1974).
10. The committee was chaired by Rockefeller and consisted of John T. Connor, C. Douglas Dillon, Erwin N. Griswold, Lane Kirkland, Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Ronald Reagan, and Edgar F. Shannon Jr.; attorney David W. Belin served as executive director.

11. After publishing *Inside the Company*, Agee faced ongoing CIA surveillance and harassment while living abroad (Agee 1987). The State Department revoked Agee’s passport in 1979, but he continued to travel on Grenadian, Nicaraguan, and German passports, returning to the United States in the early 1990s.

12. This passage is not suggesting that “the big three” (Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie) did not also collaborate with the CIA; this is simply not under consideration here.

13. A CIA memo from a few years earlier expressed agency concerns that Ford Foundation applicants were asked to affirm that they were not linked to American intelligence agencies (FOIA CIA-RDP80B01676R0040000140025-8, 5/2/53).

14. In 1998, CIA historian Gerald Haines published an analysis drawing on internal CIA documents and other sources on the Pike and Church committees’ investigations. Haines contrasted Pike’s independence with Church’s cooperative work with CIA staff, observing that the Pike Committee “and its staff never developed a cooperative working relationship with the Agency or the Ford administration” (Haines 1998: 81). This animosity and contempt for the CIA’s lawless behavior created difficulties in obtaining documents, which impacted their analysis.

**TWO World War II’s Long Shadow**

1. The AAA recorded that in 1948, seventy-nine U.S. colleges and universities offered anthropology courses (*NBAAA* 1948 2[1]: 22).

2. The book was never completed.

3. Leighton described the riots at the 1948 Bogotá Inter-American Conference and noted that the CIA had warned the State Department that such protests were likely, adding that “no use was made of his findings” (Leighton 1949: 128).

4. On October 10, 1951, the Marshall Plan was replaced by the $7.5 billion Mutual Security Act.

5. Emilio Morán observed the Marshall Plan had “little use for anthropologists” (1996: 27).

6. The CIA’s archives contain records of an OSS interview, a month after the Nazis’ surrender, in which Claude Lévi-Strauss told the OSS agent that with the war over in France, “it might have been better to kill 50,000 collaborationists immediately” than to face these quislings in the years to come or let the French judicial system deal with them (Mehlman 2000: 181).

7. The “new Ruth Benedicts” showed few positive measurable results, designing and joining programs like Human Terrain Systems (see González 2010; NCA 2009).

8. This work stands in contrast to the national character studies conducted by Gorer, Mead, and others, which essentialized culture and personality in ways that did not allow such rapid shifts and adaptations due to deep cultural trends.
9. From 1949 to 1951, John W. Bennett was the chief of the Public Opinion and Sociological Research Division of the Civil Information and Education Section at GHQ, working under the supreme commander for the Allied powers in Japan. In 1951, Bennett was funded by the ONR for Japanese field studies (Bennett 1951).

10. Tami Tsuchiyama was the first Japanese American woman to earn a PhD in anthropology at the University of California, Berkeley. During the war she conducted covert research among Japanese Americans interned at the Poston, Arizona, camp, assisting sociologist Dorothy Thomas’s Bureau of Sociological Research and the Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Study (D. H. Price 2008a: 143–70).

11. For more on these processes, see Steven Millhauser’s short story “The Next Thing” (2008).

12. One 1951 advertisement for a job at Maxwell Air Force Base notified applicants that “security clearance is necessary” (NBAAA 1951 5[4]: 4).

THREE Rebooting Professional Anthropology

1. The Temporary Organizing Committee consisted of Homer Barnett (chair), Julian Steward, John Provine, Clyde Kluckhohn, and Frank Roberts (Frantz 1974: 9).

2. In 1993, I learned of David Stout’s reported history of American anthropology during the Second World War; my correspondence with members of the anthropology department at SUNY and with Stout’s widow failed to locate this manuscript.

3. This study was authored by a group dominated by Princeton scholars: Ansley J. Coale (Office of Population Research, Princeton University); W. Phillips Davison (Council on Foreign Relations); Harry Eckstein (Center of International Studies, Princeton University); Klaus Knorr (Center of International Studies, Princeton University); Vincent V. McRae (Office of Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Washington, DC); Lucian W. Pye (CENIS, MIT); Thomas C. Schelling (Center for International Affairs, Cambridge, MA); Wilbur Schramm (Institute for Communications Research, Stanford University).

4. Huizer and Mannheim observed that “each foundation is controlled by a single family, such as Ford, Duke, Rockefeller, Carnegie, Kellogg, etc. To prevent the loss of family-controlled businesses through inheritance taxes, large blocks of stock are entrusted under the name of the foundations. The family members then place themselves, or their representatives, as trustees of the foundation. In this way foundations exist on the outer fringe of the capitalist system and experiment constantly with new ‘nonviolent’ ways by which the social organization of the society can better serve the economic needs of the ruling class” (1979: 481).

5. Steward’s concerns about the politicization of the discipline betray a narrow conceptualization of political action. At the 1949 AAA annual meeting, a resolution was passed by the membership supporting Point IV, even while the AAA was taking extremely weak protective actions for Richard Morgan and Morris Swadesh, appointing FBI informant George P. Murdock to the association’s committee protecting members’ academic freedom (Price 2004b: 71–80).
6. See http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/5829/CIA-RDP80R01731R003400050047–3.pdf. During the postwar period, there were other efforts to compile rosters of anthropologists. In 1947, the Viking Fund and the AAA provided grants to the NRC’s Committee on International Cooperation in Anthropology for the production of an international anthropological roster (AAA 1948, 50[1]: 176).

7. In 1947, the NRC compiled a list of “anthropologists outside of the United States” (NBAAA 1[3]: 25).

8. Prior to approaching the Executive Board with this proposal, Johnson had privately told David Stout of the CIA’s involvement with this project. In February 1951, Johnson briefed Stout about the roster. Johnson wrote: “Shortly I shall prepare a memorandum for the Executive Board which will explain a proposal made by the [handwritten: “Central”] Intelligence Agency. In essence they propose to do all the work connected with compiling a roster except for the mailing. Also the roster will be officially a project of the Association. Please do not jump to conclusions about this nor broadcast the idea until I can get the memorandum distributed” (AAA 36, FJ to DS, 2/19/51; more correspondence in D. H. Price 2003a).


10. My FOIA requests for CIA and FBI records pertaining to the AAA produced limited results, and statements that records relating to the association had been destroyed.

11. It is possible that the “Francis Kelly” referenced here and earlier is the Francis J. Kelley identified by Ray et al. (1979: 518) as working for the CIA in Liberia and Cyprus during the 1960s and 1970s.

12. In 1945, Johnson had instructed Steward, “It might be a good idea to add [provisions within the restructuring of the AAA] permitting balloting on questions by mail in the event that an annual meeting cannot be held. You will remember I did this with the SAA when we raised our dues. It was illegal as hell but practical and necessary so nobody kicked — but they could have done so and upset the whole thing” (AAAP 131, 10/5/45).

13. My FOIA requests for CIA records on the AAA were denied, “to the extent that [my] request seeks records that would reveal a covert connection between CIA and the [AAA’s 1952 roster project].” The CIA claimed these records should remain undisclosed despite Executive Order 12958 (CIA to DHP 8/14/98).

14. Kenneth Holland worked for Nelson Rockefeller at the Committee on International Activities Abroad during the war and later became president of the Institute of International Education (IIE). At IIE he compiled lists of scholars working on international research for the Central Index of Education Exchanges. Holland oversaw the compilation of a list of more than two hundred thousand students participating in international education program (see BAAA 1955 3[1]: 13). Gerald Colby and Charlotte Dennett described Holland’s IIE years during the 1960s as functioning as a “CIA conduit that administered the Fulbright Scholarship and student exchanges from its offices at U.N. Plaza. Holland had served on the [Organization of American States] Task Force
on Education and was considered well informed on student affairs during the tumultuous 1960s” (1995: 832). A CounterSpy article linked Holland to the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), a CIA asset (CounterSpy 1975 2[2]: 42). In 1952, Holland joined the Board of the Foundation of Youth Student Affairs, where he “not only provided cover for the CIA but also annually screened applicants for [the National Student Association’s] International Student Relations Seminar, a summer program that recruited (secretly) and trained future NSA international-staff” (Paget 2006: 77). Under FOIA, the CIA released documents establishing correspondence and meetings between DCI Dulles and Holland during the early 1960s (CIA-RDP80B01676R003500110024–8).


FOUR After the Shooting War

1. For Rockefeller, see Stocking 1985.

2. Among exceptions to this trend were several Bureau of Indian Affairs projects and Carnegie’s Yucatan Community Studies’ Maya Program (Redfield 1948).

3. The conference was held in New York on November 28–30, 1947, and had 106 participants (75 university faculty, 17 from federal government, 5 from foundations, and 9 from scholarly institutions) of which 24 were anthropologists, from nineteen universities and about two dozen academic departments (Wagley 1948: 3). Columbia, Yale, and Harvard sent the most individuals (14, 12, and 11 respectively); the State Department sent 9 individuals (Wagley 1948: 53–57).

4. Among those attending the conference were A. E. Hindmarsh (U.S. Naval Intelligence School); Elbert G. Matthews (Division of South Asian Affairs, Department of State); John A. Morrison (National War College); Howard Piquet (Select Committee on Foreign Aid, U.S. House of Representatives); Henry Lee Smith Jr. (Foreign Service Institute); Llewellyn E. Thompson Jr. (Division of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State); Rudolph A. Winnacker (National War College) and Bryce Wood (Rockefeller Foundation) (Wagley 1948: 53–57).


7. Friedrich’s considerable linguistics skills and his father’s prominence at Harvard contributed to his selection for this work. His father, Harvard political theorist Carl Friedrich, studied totalitarianism and coauthored the classic Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (1956) with Zbigniew Brzezinski.
9. Sweet later taught anthropology for many years at the University of Manitoba.

10. There is conflicting information surrounding who created the Modjokuto Project. Geertz remembered it originating with Oliver (see Handler 1991: 604–5), while Oliver remembered Kluckhohn’s and Millikan’s involvement in the project’s conception (Oliver interview 7/10/95; Geertz phone interview 7/19/95). In 1952 the News Bulletin of the AAA announced, “Rufus Hendon will replace Douglas Oliver as director of a Gadjah Mada U. (Djokjakarta)–Harvard University Project” (nbaaa 1952 6[4]: 8).

11. The Modjokuto Project fieldworkers were Alice Dewey, Donald Fagg, Clifford Geertz, Hildred Geertz, Rufus Hendon, Robert Jay, and Edward Ryan.

12. For more on CENIS and the political context of “the three I’s,” see Blackmer 2002: 67–69.

13. Gilman observed that “Geertz nowhere made his political position explicit” (2002: 15). But Geertz’s silences, his opposition to applying academic knowledge to political movements opposing the Vietnam War, and his Council of Foreign Relations membership shed some light on his political engagements and orientation (see Rosen 2005).

14. Paul Rabinow described the Committee for the Comparative Study of New Nations as “one of numerous Third Way attempts that marked the twentieth century” (2006: 6), but this missed how analyses by Geertz, Fallers, and other project participants restated Rostow’s modernization theory in ways that expanded dependencies and had nothing to do with progressive visions of “Third Ways.”

15. The Council on Intercultural Relations, later known as the Institute for Intercultural Studies, was created during the Second World War as a clearinghouse for anthropologically informed work on national character research of enemy cultures “at a distance” (Mandler 2013: 68–70; Métraux 1980: 362).

16. Mead and Bateson described the roots of their interdisciplinary approach as influenced by pre- and postwar Macy Conferences, which pioneered studies of cybernetics and other innovative work (Brand 1976).

17. The political bias of this culture and personality work was critiqued by Soviet and Chinese anthropologists for its oversimplifications, and in China, it was said to “hide racist assumptions about the superiority and inferiority of different peoples. Mead’s championing of the American model seemed to declare American culture a cut above others and worthy of imitation” (Guldin 1994: 121–22).

18. Wolff wrote Mead in 1940 concerning his research on “psychobiological aspects of peptic ulcer” (MM C6, HW to MM 9/3/40). Mead later suggested to Edwin Embree that Wolff join Gregory Bateson, Lyman Bryson, Mead, and Embree on a project (MM M1, MM to EE 3/5/43). Mead asked Wolff to help Mark Zborowski get Nimh funding in 1951 (MM M17, MM to HW 3/21/51).

19. Instead of celebrating or protecting Steinbeck’s free speech rights, the FBI undertook extensive surveillance and harassment for his critiques of American capitalism (H. N. Smith 1949: 35–36; FBI HQ–9–4583, HQ 100–106224).
20. Kluckhohn and Parsons helped bring Nicholas Poppe, a Russian scholar of Mongolian ethnography, to the United States. At the war’s end, Poppe was held by the Soviets as a Nazi collaborator. Poppe later claimed he had only translated for the Nazis “in the interest of the local people” (Poppe quoted in Oppenheimer 1997:77), but others found he assisted “the Nazis at the Wannsee Institute and his research helped round up Jews and Gypsies for the death squads,” and that he was “a kind of ‘Nazi sociologist’” (Porter 1996: 606, 608; see also O’Connell 1990; Oppenheimer 1997). Documents released under the CIA Sources Methods Exemption 382B Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act confirm CIA knowledge of Poppe’s Nazi connections even as the CIA worked to bring him to the United States without detection (FOIA CIA, vol. 1_0001, outline of Poppe movements 5/17/49–4/2/50). Parsons, Taylor, and Kluckhohn helped Poppe establish a teaching position at the University of Washington (GET 1/34: GET to Clyde Kluckhohn 7/18/49; GET 1/34: CK to GET 7/27/49, http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/1705143/POPPE%2C%20NIKOLAIA%20%20%20VOL%201_0056.pdf). A 1949 CIA cable stated, “Taylor has made a firm offer which Poppe . . . has accepted, anything that we might do would be after the fact of the contract” (FOIA CIA “Secret CK NR 194 to: Seattle from Washington/ from [Lyman B.] Kirkpatrick,” 7/21/49). Another CIA cable documents that Taylor was not told of the CIA’s contact with Poppe (FOIA CIA, 7/21/49, L. B. Kirkpatrick to Acting Chief, Seattle Office; Poppe vol. 1_0057).

21. Rauch wrote, “The [Viking] Fund’s founder, Axel L. Wenner-Gren, is a Swedish-international industrialist and financier who in May–July, 1939, figured in international politics. He was the non-publicized contact man in the Goering-Chamberlain efforts towards an English-German rapprochement based upon a common enmity towards the Soviet Union. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, 3rd series, VI (London, 1953), 736–42. More recently, Wenner-Gren has been spending $10 million on a Bahama Island playground for international aristocracy. Time, March 22, 1954, 39–40. Mr. Wenner-Gren also has purchased major holdings in the Ruhr steel producing firm manufacturing 25% of West Germany’s annual output and, after his meeting with Alfred Krupp, speculation has been rife that Wenner-Gren will gain control of Krupp’s important Constantine coal mine. New York Herald-Tribune, October 1, and 23, 1954” (Rauch 1955: 416).

FIVE Anthropologists and State

1. Results of my 1999 Defense Information Systems Agency FOIA request for defense projects indexed as involving “anthropology” located 237 projects, 18 percent of which were archaeological projects (DTIC-RSM, FOIA 99–125, 4/19/99); other identified projects included CIMA and SORO projects and a range of ethnographic studies, including ONR-sponsored Tlingit research—exemplifying dual use research unarticulated from direct militarized ends, furthering culture and personality models (de Laguna 1952: 1).

2. Fischer’s arguments were identical to those made by contemporary anthropologists’ explanations of their reasons for engaging with Pentagon and intelligence agencies:
arguments that they are not “tools” (cf. Fischer 1951: 133), claimed abilities to mitigate “the amount of natural disturbance” (133), to “serve as a channel of communication from the people to the administrator” (133).

3. Because John Embree died as he was developing this critique, questions remain about where his critique would have gone next. When he died, Embree was undergoing an extensive FBI background check as part of his clearance relating to a governmental employment opportunity. Given his radical critique, had Embree lived, he might have been the target of McCarthyist attacks, with the same sort of career problems as those faced by anthropologist critics such as Richard Morgan, Gene Weltfish, Jack Harris, and Morris Swadesh.

4. In August 1953, remaining IIAA projects were transferred to the TCA and the FOA.

5. Stephen Reed, Lucien Hanks, John Useem, David Mandelbaum, Lauriston Sharp, and Fred Eggan were associate editors for the manual project (AA 1951 [3]: 449; AA 1952 (2)287).

6. In 1949, Willey consulted with Wendell Bennett, Julian Stewart, John H. Rowe, Harry Tschopik, Frederick Johnson, Cora Du Bois, and Edward Kinnard about Point IV plans.

7. Rostow later wrote that this memorandum was essentially “a rough first draft” of what would become their 1957 book, A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy (see Rostow 1972: 89).


9. Anthropologists listed in the 1969 SEADAG directory are William L. Bradley (Rockefeller), Edward M. Bruner (Illinois), Clark Cunningham (Illinois), Fred Eggan (Chicago), Clifford Geertz (Chicago), Peter R. Goethals (University of North Carolina), Joel M. Halpern (UMass), Gerald Hickey, Jasper Ingersoll (Catholic University), Robert R. Jay (Brown), Charles Fenton Keyes (Washington), A. Thomas Kirsch (Princeton), Melvin Mednick (Temple), Michael Moerman (UCLA), Manning Nash (Chicago), Herbert P. Phillips (Berkeley), Lauriston Sharp (Cornell), Wilhelm G. Solheim II, Robert B. Textor (Stanford), and Aram A. Yengoyan (Michigan).


11. Marchetti and Marks (1974: 76) described the CIA convincing unwitting National Student Association officers to sign what they believed to be normal nondisclosure agreements, before revealing that the association had secret links to the CIA.

SIX Cold War Anthropologists at the CIA

1. See also NBAAA 1948 [2]: 22. Andrews had worked with Hooton analyzing somatotype photographs of members of the U.S. military (NBAAA 1[3]: 49).

2. Dubberstein committed suicide in 1983 while facing charges claiming in 1977 he had passed along sensitive intelligence about regional military capacities to Muammar Gaddafi (Ayres 1983).


6. The CIA refused to release records on James Madison Andrews IV under FOIA, replying that “to the extent [my] request might concern records containing information that would divulge the identity of an unacknowledged employee, it is denied” (CIA to DHP 6/3/98).

7. The memo described Andrews as “(Edward) Wyllis Andrews IV, #2769, a former OSS/CIA employee who has lived in Mexico for many years and has continued to have social contacts with representatives of this Agency in Mexico as well as with Agency employees from Headquarters who visit him from time to time. ANDREWS, like CAIN, was born in Chicago of parents who also were born in the general area of Chicago” (CIA 104–10419–10321).

8. Bessac’s claim of joining the CIA, prior to its creation in September 1947, presents its own problems. As Laird argues, while the CIG was the official governmental intelligence institution in July 1947 when these events occurred, “CIG’s name was changed to the CIA informally as early as May 1, 1947, though it would not be formalized until September” (2002: 23).

9. Bessac later told people in Tibet he was not an official U.S. representative but was instead “a lost Fulbright scholar,” thereby using his Fulbright status as a cover for his CIA-linked work (Laird 2002: 220).

10. Bessac claimed that soon after he resigned from the CIA, he “continued his language studies and applied for a Fulbright scholarship.” The legal prohibitions against CIA agents using Fulbright fellowships as a cover for intelligence work present the most parsimonious explanation for Bessac’s inconsistencies (Laird 2002: 98).

11. Bessac knew that “recipients of Fulbright grants were explicitly warned not to use their research as cover for intelligence work for the CIA” (Bessac and Bessac 2006: 79).

12. Laird rejects the possibility that Bessac resigned, citing information from Mongol and American sources. A former CIA agent told Laird that “Bessac would not have been allowed to quit after being sent back to China as a contract undercover agent” (Laird 2002: 57).

13. In the late 1970s, the AUFFS’s institutional members were the University of Alabama, the Asia Society, the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, Brown University, the Institute for the Study of World Politics, the University of Kansas, Michigan State University, the University of Pittsburgh, Rampo College of New Jersey, and the University of Wisconsin (JLA, Box 10, LD to JLA 11/23/78).
14. See chapter 11 for a discussion of Elizabeth Bacon’s suspicions of the AUPS as a CIA front.

15. Fischel was a key player in MSUG’s CIA work in Vietnam (Ernst 1998). At Michigan State, Hanifi initially studied police administration, later taking up anthropology. When I asked Hanifi about the CIA’s presence in international policing studies during this period, he replied: “I doubt that the choice of my studying police administration involved the CIA. As I remember this decision was grabbed out of the air by the Afghan minister of finance (Abd al-Malik Abdulrahimzai) on the spot. He and my father were friends and of the same Pakhtun tribe. I guess they both thought (or hoped) I could become rich like all other customs high officials in the country!” (MJH to DHP 11/5/05). Hanifi recalled “large numbers of Vietnamese who were brought to MSU for police training” (MJH to DHP 11/5/05).


17. John Allison later reflected: “I think it was Jack (John) Shroder at University of Nebraska, Omaha, who told me this story that typifies the swash-buckling clown version of Dupree’s image: There was a major dinner for Europeans and [Americans] with Afghan political leaders and privileged members of the ruling class, maybe even the King was there. Dupree was one of the main [American] guests. At the time dinner began, Louis and Nancy had not arrived. Then, when dinner was over, and the drinking was beginning, there is a knock at the door. When the door is open, Louis leaves a well-dressed Nancy standing at the door and comes running in and does a series of forward hand flips across the marble floor, and ends up standing in front of the Afghan and Euro-American dignitaries, smiling. He is more or less well dressed, but, he has on a red dress shirt and has pulled the shirt front through the zipper of his pants suit and zipped it up so the red shirt is sticking straight out through the zipper, resembling, for all to see, a dick” (2012).


19. Examples of such dubious assertions include his claims to have originated the idea of moving the monuments at Abu Simbel displaced by the Aswan Dam, and engaging in wife sharing in the Egyptian village of Gurna (Wilber 1986: 15, 17).

20. Other American anthropologists working in Iran during this period include Elizabeth Bacon, Henry Field (summer 1950) (NBAAA 1950 4[3]: 4), and Carleton Coon (summer 1949) (NBAAA 1949 3[3]: 5).


22. In his book Countercoup, Roosevelt described Wilber’s involvement in the planning of the coup, though it did not identify him by name. Roosevelt wrote, “Another Persian expert — an exceptionally thin man with a razor-sharp mind and less guilt-ridden than our other professional friend — participated in a key role during preparation of much of the plan. He enjoyed it thoroughly and in return gave much enjoyment to his co-workers. Soon after I had first met him, he unnecessarily informed me that he had a
‘lithp.’ He was not, in appearance, anyone’s idea of a secret operator, being very tall and very shy, with a diffident air and a modest almost, self-deprecating grin. His sense of humor was deceptively casual, and even after one knew him well, it was difficult to be sure whether he was serious or teasing in his proposals” (1979: 128). Wilber later confirmed that this passage referred to him (Wilber 1986: 188).

SEVEN How Funding Fronts Shaped Research

1. In 1961, Frederick Praeger offered to publish a book by Allen Dulles, but Dulles declined (FOIA CIA-RD580B01676R00350210012-0, 8/19/61).

2. Fodor’s distributors denied CIA connections, but Hunt claimed that Eugene Fodor was “a former agent for the C.I.A. in Austria” (Hersh 1974a: 4). Fodor admitted he “had cooperated with the Central Intelligence Agency” but denied Hunt’s accusation he was a CIA agent in Austria, while refusing to comment on Hunt’s claim that he used his status as a travel writer as cover for CIA operations (Van Gelder 1975).

3. Hunter’s intelligence links stretched back to the war, when his OSS service overlapped with that of Gregory Bateson, Julia Child, and Cora Du Bois at the OSS installation in Kandy, Ceylon (Hunter 1959: 12, 14).

4. The CFA’s board included presidents of the University of California, Stanford, and Standard Oil and the novelist James A. Michener (Defty 2004: 207; Cummings 2010: 48–49).

5. This quote by John F. Sullivan comes from a cover letter, dated March 25, 1953, found in the interlibrary loan copy I read (in 2010) of Land Reform: Communist China, Nationalist China, Taiwan, India, Pakistan.

6. Ekvall, born to American missionaries, spent decades in China and undertook graduate studies in anthropology at the University of Chicago.

7. This was the Conference of the Western Regional American Assembly on the United States and the Far East (RB 1,6).

8. The foundation personnel and the assigned geographic regions listed in the directory were President Robert Blum, Robert B. Hall (Japan), Laurence G. Thompson (Korea), Earl Swisher (Taiwan), James T. Ivy (Hong Kong), L. Albert Wilson (Philippines), Edgar N. Pike (Viet Nam), Leonard C. Overton (Cambodia), Noel F. Busch (Thailand), Patrick Judge (Malaya), Raymond V. Johnson (Indonesia), John H. Tallman (Burma), William T. Fleming (Ceylon), Richard J. Miller (Pakistan), and Harold L. Amoss Jr. (Afghanistan) (Morehouse 1957: 52–53).

9. Sources in Morehouse 1957: Association of Asian Studies (56); Boy Scouts of America (64); East Asia Teacher Training (70); Burmese scholars (56); Japanese scholars (71); book buying (83); citizen education (86–87); business education (143); summer study (239); radio commentaries (289); economic analysis (395).

10. I first reported this CIA-AAA relationship at the 2011 AAA annual meeting (D. H. Price 2011a).

11. The AAA’s Asia Foundation grant committee was composed of David Mandelbaum, Richard K. Beardsley, Cora Du Bois, and Edward Norbeck.

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12. This count of 413 individuals includes some who participated for multiple years. The gaps in the AAA’s records suggest that the total number of recipients was likely higher than the recorded 413 (AAAP 73).

13. One AAA document from 1958 records that Kwang-Chih Chang was awarded $205.90 to travel from Cambridge to Memphis and back to observe a Peabody Museum excavation that was under way (AAAP 49, Du Bois to Godfrey 4/17/58). In 1959, the following Asian anthropologists were provided hundreds of dollars in Asia Foundation grants to enable them to attend the AAA annual meeting in Mexico City: R. P. Srivastava, Yih-yuan Li, K. N. Sharma, Hiroko Sue, and Alfredo Villanueva (AAAP 73, BM to DM 10/19/59). Another Asian anthropologist at a New England university received ninety-eight dollars to attend the AAA annual meeting in Chicago in 1958 (AAAP 49, M. Nag to W. Godfrey 1/27/58); in 1959, five Asian anthropologists were provided hundreds of dollars to attend that year’s AAA annual meeting in Mexico City (AAAP 73, BM to DM 10/19/59).

14. For Robert Spencer, see BIC 2014c; for Agehananda Bharati, see Bharati 1970: 263; for Wilton Dillon, see AAAFN 1966 7[7]: 8. While several conspiracy-minded writers have attempted to connect President Obama’s mother to the CIA through Asia Foundation funding or other means, I know of no evidence supporting such a connection. Stanley Ann Dunham received Asia Foundation funds in 1972 for Indonesian research more than five years after the CIA stopped funding the Asia Foundation (for misleading claims of Obama-Dunham CIA links, see Madsen 2012).

15. Asia Foundation board members identified by the New York Times were President Haydn Williams (former U.S. assistant secretary of defense); Robert B. Anderson (former secretary of the Treasury); Barry Bingham (publisher); Ellsworth Bunker (U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam); Arthur H. Dean (State Department); Mortimer Fleishhacker Jr. (San Francisco businessman); Caryl O. Haskins (president, Carnegie Institute of Washington); Charles J. Hitch (vice president, University of California); Paul Hoffman (former president, Ford Foundation), Grayson L. Kirk (president, Columbia University); Turner H. McBain (San Francisco lawyer); Walter H. Mallory (former executive director; Council on Foreign Relations); Robbins Milbank (New York advertising professional); Mrs. Maurice T. Moore (chair, Institute of International Education); Lucian W. Pye (professor of political science, MIT); Edwin O. Reischauer (former U.S. ambassador to Japan); Russell G. Smith (vice president, Bank of America); J. E. Wallace Sterling (president, Stanford University); Adlai Stevenson (U.S. representative to the UN); and J. D. Zellerbach (U.S. ambassador to Italy) (Turner 1967: 17).

16. The 303 Committee — named after National Security Action Memorandum No. 303 establishing its existence on June 2, 1964 — was the oversight body reviewing CIA covert actions. The 303 Committee reported to the president; it was first chaired by McGeorge Bundy and was succeeded by the 40 Committee.


18. Marchetti and Marks (1974: 200–201) report the foundation secretly received a large severance package.
19. Attending the April 17–18 meeting in New York City were Irving Rouse (president), Cora Du Bois (president-elect), Harold Conklin, David French, Conrad Arensberg, Helen Codere, Dell Hymes, David Schneider, Charles Frantz (executive secretary), Ward Goodenough, and Edward Lehman (business manager).

EIGHT Unwitting CIA Collaborators

1. Without direct evidence, McCoy speculates that Stanley Milgram’s research was covertly funded by the CIA under such programs; Milgram’s biographer rejects this possibility (cf. McCoy 2006: 49; Blass 2006).

2. Expenses for the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology’s expenses included a high-rent townhouse ($1,200 a month) and $180,000 a year in salaries and other operating expenses; the organization spent $5 million of CIA funds during its last three years (G. Thomas 1989: 153–54).


4. DCI Dulles wrote Wolff a personal reply after receiving a copy of the interrogation article “Every Man Has His Breaking Point” (1960) (FOIA CIA-RDP80B01676R0003700110110, 3/28/60).

5. Some Human Ecology Fund records survive in Wolff’s professional papers at Cornell Medical School. Draft materials for the 1957 report, cut from the final report, include a list of six proposed studies considered for funding: (1) studying “comparable groups of frequently ill and essentially healthy people drawn from a homogeneous working population”; (2) social mobility among business executives; (3) studying the population of New York’s National Diabetes Association camp; (4) ecological factors contributing to coronary occlusions; (5) lab research on functions of the central nervous system; (6) publish data from previous Human Ecology studies (HW 6, 15).


7. Rhodes participated in a series of unethical drug experiments, including efforts to dose unsuspecting people with an aerosol of LSD supplied by an MK-Ultra research program (Marks 1979: 156–57, 99).

8. Mead maintained a friendship with Wolff for several decades; they had known each other since at least the mid-1940s (MM M3, HW to MM 5/24/45). A story in the November 1951 issue of the News Bulletin of the AAA stated that Mead was the “representative of anthropology” at the NIMH-sponsored Work Conference in Mental Health Research, where she worked alongside Wolff (NBAAA 1951 5[4]: 4–5). In 1951, Mead corresponded
with Wolff regarding Mark Zborowski’s anthropological studies of pain (MM M17, MM to HW 4/21/51). In 1958, she alerted Wolff to Daniel Gadjusek’s research into Kuru among the Fore of New Guinea (MM C41, MM to HW 7/21/58). Wolff, who was on the board of IFIS, received funds from the Research in Contemporary Cultures project for “a medically oriented project, studies in Human Ecology–China” that he directed (R. Métraux 1980: 362).

9. See also AAAFN 1966 7[2]: 8; erratum AAAFN 1967 8[4]: 8.


11. Stephenson received a grant from the SIHE in 1956–57 (BIC 2014a).


14. Human Ecology–funded grants appearing to fit this model include Janet Hartle’s $948.75 grant to reexamine Central Mongol skulls (HEF 1963: 19); Robert C. Suggs’s $700 grant to compare Marquesan behavior with that found on various Polynesian islands (HEF 1963: 18); ethnomusicologist William Kay Archer’s study of “the ecology of music” (Archer 1962, 1964); a study on psychological impacts of circumcision on Turkish boys—though it is possible that this and other studies provided information on cultural elements of separation, trauma, and reintegration that are core elements of the interrogation literature (Marks 1979: 158). Human Ecology’s interest in funding research by Dr. Beatrice Berle (wife of Human Ecology board member Adolf Berle) on family illnesses in Harlem remains unclear (HEF 1963: 41). It may be that the fund provided a board member’s spouse with a nepotistic kickback unrelated to MK-Ultra’s interests.

15. Charles Osgood later stated he did not know he was receiving CIA funds for his Human Ecology–sponsored cross-cultural communications research. These communications projects aligned with larger MK-Ultra projects studying effective propaganda techniques, with specific emphasis on cultural barriers to effective cross-cultural communication (see Tanaka, Oyama, and Osgood 1963).


17. The emphasis occurs in the original document and likely signified that these terms were cross-indexed in the CIA files.

18. From 1959 to 1964, Samuel B. Lyerly (former editor of Psychometrika) was the research director of the Human Ecology Fund, a position that likely required knowledge of the CIA’s involvement in the fund (POQ 1964).

19. Prior to receiving this grant, Carr produced papers such as “China’s Young Communist League, Functions and Structures” (see Franke 1959: 549). In March 1964, Carr
joined Human Ecology’s staff (*AAAFN* 1964 5[5]: 6; see also Carr and Tullock 1965). Years later, Human Ecology grant recipient Leon Stover (1974) wrote on Chinese cultural ecology, but this work appears unconnected to these projects.

20. Hall previously taught cultural sensitivity at the Department of State and the Strategic Intelligence School (Coffield 1959).


22. In 1959, the CIA’s journal, *Studies in Intelligence*, reviewed Hall’s book *The Silence Language*, stressing that “the understanding of foreign cultures is critical to intelligence operations and to intelligence analysis; and such a considerable contribution to new thinking as *The Silent Language* makes can but stimulate more progress toward this understanding” (Coffield 1959).

23. Air Force contract No. AF 18(600)1797.


25. Sociologist Jay Schulman was part of Human Ecology’s program studying Hungarian refugees (see U.S. Senate 1977: 60). There may be a publication by Schulman describing his work with Human Ecology that I am unaware of, or Scott may have been thinking of Stephenson’s account (1978) or the article by Greenfield (1977) that quotes Schulman.

26. Another Human Ecology research project undertaken by Howard organized data he collected in fieldwork studying Rotuman sexuality (Howard and Howard 1964: 282). Almost two decades later, Howard coauthored a paper (with no connection to Human Ecology) examining symbolic and functional features of torture traditionally practiced by the Huron on prisoners of war and other cultural groups (Bilmes and Howard 1980).

27. Howard and Scott’s 1965 article acknowledged the help of Leonard Cottrell Jr., who had chaired the Defense Department’s advisory group on psychological warfare and sat on similar boards at the air force and army (Simpson 1994: 61).

28. DCI Stansfield Turner mistakenly testified that the Privacy Act prevented the identification of all scholars working on MK-Ultra projects at Human Ecology (U.S. Senate 1977: 13). At least one witting researcher, Harold Wolff, was dead and thus had no Privacy Act protections.

29. Among Wolff’s surviving papers is correspondence with a Bureau of Narcotics officer, George H. White, on the topic of political prisoner abuse (e.g., HW 6; GHW to HGW 12/27/56). White was later exposed during the Church Committee hearings, and Kennedy’s Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research Senate hearings for his role in doping unsuspecting members of the public with LSD and other powerful drugs, and operating a safe house at 225 Chestnut Street in San Francisco.

### NINE Cold War Fieldwork

1. Howell observed that “an indicator of the degree of trust and good will of the local population is probably found in the frequency with which investigators are accused of
spying, a charge that is difficult to defend against when one is there in search of information, and the uses to which it will be put cannot easily be explained to the locals” (1990: 97).


6. Kennedy’s classroom attacks on religion, as a “matter of ghosts, spirits and emotions,” in his “Introduction to Anthropology” course so offended his undergraduate student William F. Buckley that Buckley wrote Man and God at Yale, in part as a reaction to Kennedy (Buckley 1951: 14).


8. Kattenburg speculated that Darul Islam might have been involved in the murders or that Kennedy and Doyle may have been “victims of local thugs intent on capturing the several thousand U.S. dollars that many in West Java knew Kennedy had with him” (Gardner 1997: 68n50).


10. In a 2012 conversation, Harold Conklin told me he had not known Kennedy, but as a graduate student at Yale with a working knowledge of Indonesian, he was asked to edit Kennedy’s notes; see also Conklin 1998: xxiv.

11. For example, one entry in his field notes reads: “The KNIL [Koninklijk Nederlandisch Indisch Leger] is about 40,000 strong, highly trained, consisting mainly of Ambonese, Minahasans and Indo” (1953b: 222).

12. Between the war and his work for the CIA, Millegan briefly worked for the Department of State (see Far Eastern Quarterly 1948, 7[4]: 411; Millegan 1942; J. W. Hall 1952: 294).

13. Handy founded Genethnics Inc., a corporation collecting data on heredity, personality, and environmental data on individuals with hopes of developing explanatory theories.

14. Nine years later, Millegan’s master’s thesis (1959) examined Indonesian heterogeneity and the political context of Indonesian Protestantism, exploring Indonesian Protestants’ alignment with the Indonesian state’s opposition to communism.

15. Axel Wenner-Gren’s FBI file began in 1940 with a report monitoring the travels of his yacht, The Southern Cross, and his reported contacts with Nazis. One letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle expressed concern over Wenner-Gren’s “contacts with Field Marshal Herman Goering of Germany” (FBI 65–885783,
9/10/40). George Dixon's story in the Washington Times Herald (3/22/49) on Wenner-Gren's successful campaign to get his name removed from the State Department's blacklist, described Wenner-Gren as a “one time crony of Herman Goering” and as having pulled “every wire at his command to have the barrier lifted” (FBI 65–8857–A). Dixon credited former New York state senator John A. Hastings with helping remove Wenner-Gren from the blacklist.

FBI reports summarized Wenner-Gren’s financial dealings with the Nazis during the war as linked to his financial control of the Bofors Armament Works (previously held by Krupp). One FBI report quoted a “confidential source” who reported “hearing Goering say in 1933 that Wenner-Gren was one of the most powerful instruments which the Nazis would be able to use in their economic operations with important people in England, France, and the United States” (FBI 100–769–33538, 1/16/61). The report stated: “Goering allegedly claimed that Wenner-Gren mentioned important connections in the United States and England, claimed he was personally acquainted with the President of the United States and indicated he might negotiate a peace settlement. Goering allegedly stated that Wenner-Gren’s peace plan was regarded by Hitler as a very confused project and was rejected. Goering further was reported to have stated that he personally believed Wenner-Gren was an opportunist, who, when in Berlin, was very flattering concerning the National Socialist system and its successes, but undoubtedly was just as critical of National Socialism when he was talking with persons not sympathetic to Nazism” (FBI 100–769–33538, 1/16/1961; FBI 65–8857–862).

We are left with more questions than answers concerning Axel Wenner-Gren’s alleged links to the Nazis; but regardless of the veracity of these allegations, his foundation would likely have complied with government requests made during these postwar years. Like other postwar foundations, some Viking Fund projects in this period had links to governmental concerns (see Ross 1999), including projects such as the $10,000 provided in 1947 to the National Research Council and the “Pacific Science Board for anthropological work in Micronesia” linked to CIMA and ONR funding (Viking Fund 1951:15).

16. Inga Arvad’s extensive FBI file (exceeding one thousand pages) documents FBI investigations of her wartime sexual relationship with John F. Kennedy and her meetings with Adolf Hitler, Joseph Goebbels, and other high-ranking Nazis (FBI 65–39058).

17. Fejos wrote Millegan in 1954, requesting a final report for his 1950–51 (no. 508) fellowship. Millegan responded that his parents had died in a plane crash in December 1950; that his “preliminary work” in Indonesia was carried out between September and October 1950; and that illness, the death of his parents (December 1950), and housing problems prevented him “from completing the survey and publishing the results” (LSM, LM to PF 1/19/55). Fejos requested more information on Millegan’s accomplishments and an accounting of funds for the Board of Directors (LSM, PF to LM 1/27/55). Millegan again sent a copy of his June 15, 1951, preliminary report, which Fejos accepted as a final report (LSM, PF to LM 2/12/55).

18. “Dr. Eckel” was apparently Paul Edward Eckel, who may have had contact with Millegan while both conducted OSS Asian intelligence work during the war. Eckel worked at the U.S. Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service and was with the CIA for years.
He was reportedly the CIA agent who assisted in South Africa’s arrest of Nelson Mandela in August 1962 (see Albright and Kunstel 1990).

19. An otherwise unknown individual identified as George Nievel was listed as providing start-up funds (FBI 100–346660–1, 8/26/46).

20. Pacific Book’s incorporation date of 1946 predates the establishment of the CIA, though this was a period in which Lloyd Millegan’s son Chris reports his father was associated with one of the military intelligence branch units bridging the transition between OSS and CIA (KM 9/28/10).

21. This appears to be Kenneth Landgon, whose wife, Margaret Langdon, wrote The King and I, in part based on their years in Thailand in the diplomatic corps.


24. Anthropologists gathered other forms of Cold War-linked data from remote corners of the world. For example, some of Napoleon Chagnon’s fieldwork among the remote Yanomami of Brazilian-Venezuelan rain forests was funded by the Atomic Energy Commission as he assisted James Neel’s efforts to retrieve blood samples from the Indians to measure levels of trace fallout radiation from distant nuclear weapons tests (see Ferguson 1995).

TEN Cold War Counterinsurgency Dreams

1. One 1951 CIA memorandum on “intelligence support for psychological operations” stressed the importance of anthropological research for such operations. The memo described anthropologists providing information on topics such as “level of education, standard of living, political views or cultural ties of various groups such as French labor, Uzbek tribesmen, etc.” (FOIA CIA-RDP80R01731R003500180010–8, 6/14/51).

2. HRAF was founded in 1948 as a “cooperative interuniversity organization” originally consisting of ten universities and the Office of Naval Research (Roe 2007: 53).


4. Graham was the former executive secretary of the Department of Defense’s Committee on Psychological and Unconventional Warfare. At the Brookings Institute, Graham studied how military and intelligence organizations could better access academic research (see Graham 1954; HRAF 1959: 24).
5. Committee members included Robert K. Merton, Clyde Kluckhohn, Max Millikan, and Samuel A. Stouffer.

6. HRAF’s use of this quote in its annual report stopped short of stating that years of HRAF data collection and classification had “been supported by grants from the military departments” (Bauer et al. 1958: 225).

7. The production of these reports later shifted from HRAF to SORO’s Foreign Area Studies Division (FASD).

8. Vreeland was a student of Owen Lattimore and a scholar of Mongolian society. Despite his marriage to a White Russian and pro-military associations, he was suspected by the FBI of being a Communist after Lattimore’s 1952 perjury indictment (FBI 128–5130).

9. After HRAF’s subcontractors completed the initial text for the Army Handbooks, SORO oversaw revisions and expansions of the handbooks for military consumption (SORO Box 1, SORO memo, Standing Operating Procedures for the Production of Foreign Area Handbooks under Contract DA-49–083-OSA-2427, 10/16/63).

10. Riddleberger later became a spokesperson at the World Bank.

11. In 1965, while on leave from the University of Kansas, Moos received a $61,000 Unconventional Warfare and Counterinsurgency Research SORO grant to study “SORO Elements of Human Factors and Operations” (associated with the “Research Office — Korea”) (SORO Box 1 Final Report Subcommittee on Behavioral Sciences Defense Science Board, 1965 DoD, 40; see also AAFN 1965 2 [1]: 7).


13. See the discussion of Maday in chapter 3.

14. Horowitz wrote that Galtung rejected the premise that the military could be involved in reducing conflict and “was deeply concerned about the possibility of European scholars being frozen out of Latin American studies by an inundation of sociologists from the United States. Furthermore, he expressed fears that the scale of Camelot honoraria would completely destroy the social science labor market in Latin America” (1965: 5).

15. Nutini told Ralph Beals that he “absolutely never said that Camelot would be financed by NSF” (RB 75, HGN to RB 9/17/66).

16. Murdock was then the head of the NAS/NRC Social Science Division.

17. The NRC’s Advisory Committee on Government Programs in the Behavioral Sciences (ACGPBS) included psychologists, sociologists, geographers, economists, and political scientists, as well as anthropologists: Allen Holmberg, George Foster, Alexander Spoehr, and Donald R. Young (chair) (see Deitchman 1976: 206). The committee argued that, while military and intelligence agencies sought specific forms of behavioral science knowledge, “the primary responsibility for government support for behavioral science research and training conducted in foreign countries by universities in the United States [should] be placed in agencies and programs committed to basic research and research training, particularly the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, and the proposed Center for Educational Cooperation under the International
Education Act” (ACGPBS 1968: 9). The committee recommended increased general NSF funding for social sciences.

18. Rohde (2007: 284–93) indicates the credited m-vico authors were at Soro during the following periods: James Price (1962–69), Barbara R. Butler (1962–65), Doris Condit (1956–70), Bert Cooper (1961–69), Michael Conley (1964–69), and Richard H. Moore (1964–68). From this information we can fix the date of m-vico as between 1964 (when Conley and Moore began working for Soro) and 1965 (when Butler left Soro). None of the m-vico authors were anthropologists, and the authors came from the following disciplines: Price, Butler and Cooper: international relations; Condit and Conley: history; Moore: military science (Soro 2 roster; Rohde 2007).

19. The introduction to m-vico refers to cinfac in the future tense, writing that it “will be conceived and organized along pragmatic lines” (J. R. Price et al. ca. 1964–65: intro. 1).

20. It is unclear whether hraf was aware that Soro had adopted and republished its copyright-protected OCM as a governmental document.

21. A CIA memo, “Unauthorized Release of OCR Intelligence Publication Index (IPI) to Department of Army Contractor” (1967), indicated that from 1962 to 1965, Cress had access to the DIA’s classified Intelligence Publication Index (CIA documents, sent 6/25/09).

22. Rohde identified Cress’s director, psychologist Preston Abbot, as continuing this director role at the American Institute for Research (AIR) (2007: 250). Abbot had been director of Research Programs at the Human Ecology Fund; in 1975 he left AIR, founding Abbot Associates, which produced intelligence policy reports on the Middle East (Rohde 2007: 256; AAAFN 1966 7 [2]: 8).

23. The eighteen identified “tribal groups” were the Bahnar, Bru, Cua, Halang, Hre, Hroi, Jarai, Jeh, Katu, Koho, Ma, M’nong, Muong, Raglai, Rhade, Sedang, Stieng; the seven chapters on “other minority groups” discussed the Binh Xuye, Cao Dai, Cham, Chinese, Hoa Hao, Khmer, and Indians and Pakistanis (Schrock et al. 1966).

24. Among the social scientists whose work was cited were Gerald Hickey (Schrock et al. 1966: 52), Frank LeBar, Gerald Hickey, and John K. Musgrave (88), David Thomas (52), Georges Coedès (87), Georges Condominas (523), George Devereux (647), Frederic Wickert (649), John D. Donoghue (717), and Paul K. Benedict (1119).

25. Suspicions and accusations of links between the SIL and the CIA are widespread among anthropologists. Most claimed links are circumstantial. I made extensive CIA FOIA requests for SIL records (resulting in the release of cables relating to reports of kidnapped missionaries and other news accounts) and have read the published literature critiquing SIL and made several archival inquiries. Although Colby and Dennett and Stoll establish a series of clear symbiotic relationships between the SIL and American economic, military, and intelligence ventures, there remains a lack of firm documentation establishing direct, directive connections between the CIA and the SIL (see Colby and Dennett 1995; Stoll 1982).

26. References to this 1954 CINFAC and HRAF document can be found in Schrock et al. 1966: 920, 929.
27. Ember misrepresented his knowledge and that of others at HRAF about HRAF’s CIA connections by claiming that the board had not been told (while Shweder confirmed that as a HRAF board member he was aware of HRAF’s CIA links). Ember wrote to me that “the CIA was an Associate Member of the HRAF consortium between 1979 and 1983, and I don’t think that the Board of Directors was told about it” (ME to DHP 7/18/95).

28. There are enough instances of the military republishing and translating the published writings of unaware anthropologists that it is possible they did not consult HRAF about this adaptation of their rubrics—though Soro’s relationship with HRAF at American University reduces this likelihood (see Condominas 1973).

Eleven

Uses of Disciplinary Knowledge

1. The provision granting fellow status to some anthropologists holding bachelor’s degrees did not mean that most graduate students could vote; it meant that working anthropologists (frequently archaeologists), “actively engaged in anthropology,” might be granted voting rights.

2. Suggs and Carr received Human Ecology Fund grants, and in 1964 Carr joined the Human Ecology Fund’s staff (AAAFN 1964 5[5]: 6).

3. See also AAAFN 1962 3[7]: 4–6; AAAFN 1962 4[5]: 2.

4. After the 1965 AAA annual meeting, Peter Kunstadter protested to the Executive Board what he misunderstood to be an official resolution by the AAA Council disapproving of anthropologists’ “negotiations with the Department of Defense to carry out research” (RB 75, EB Minutes 5/20–21/66). After Kunstadter received more information on the board’s position, he withdrew his complaint.

5. Beals came from a family with radical political roots. During his childhood, his mother had run for state office and was a Socialist; Beals fled to Mexico with his brother Carleton during the First World War, as Carleton sought to avoid the draft (AB to DHP 1/16/05).

6. Because of his government contract work, Kunstadter was viewed by some anthropologists with suspicion during the 1970 Thai controversy (see Wakin 1992: 181).

7. Without hesitation, the three anthropologists working in Afghanistan I asked to speculate on the identity of this individual named Louis Dupree as the anthropologist referenced here, though Dupree began his Afghanistan work in 1949, not 1959.

8. My FOIA requests for CIA records on the AAA led to the limited release of documents but included the (undated) CIA’s “Report on the Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association,” in which it was reported to the CIA that “prominent at the meeting in the lower-level organizational roles were individuals from... and the Committee of Returned Volunteers (CRV), a group of largely Peace Corps returnees active in the protest movement. A CRV member said... that they had sponsored a trip of an individual to Thailand” (CIA FOIA F94–1900).


Notes to Chapter Eleven
For the following sources on these foundations as CIA fronts: for American Friends of the Middle East, see Eveland 1980: 125; Wilford 2008: 126; 2013. For the Asia Foundation, see Turner 1967; for Operations and Policy Research, Inc., see Sheehan 1967b.

Testifying in 1977 before the U.S. Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations, holding confirmation hearings for Andrew Young's appointment as UN ambassador, Alan Ogden (U.S. Labor Party) expounded on several far-fetched conspiracy theories pertaining to Young's background, including claims of Field Foundation CIA links and Tri-lateral Commission plots (U.S. Senate 1977: 50–55).

This concern was addressed by later press and congressional investigations establishing that long-standing foundations channeled the CIA's funds to front foundations.

The other contributors to this volume (there were two editions, from 1956 and 1962) were Charles A. Ferguson, Dr. Peter G. Franck, and Dr. Pieter K. Roest. Ferguson was a linguist with strong governmental and military connections. He established an Arabic language training program for U.S. foreign service officers in Beirut in 1947, and in 1953–55, the Foreign Service Institute Field School of Arabic Language and Area Studies Department of State from 1953–1955 (Rouchdy 1992: 209). Peter G. Franck was a diplomatic adviser to Afghanistan in 1948–60. Pieter K. Roest served in postwar occupation of Japan, where he was a lieutenant colonel. He had a PhD in anthropology and sociology from the University of Chicago and had done postdoctoral international relations work at USC (Koikari 2008: 55–56).

The AAA's statement was printed in the Washington Post on July 8, 1966.

The New York Times and international news coverage of Beals's findings renewed international concerns about anthropologist-spies. News of the CIA sold newspapers, and the New York Times did a story on Beals warning that “secrecy and pressures by United States intelligence agencies were eroding the effectiveness and prestige of American scholarly research abroad” (Raymont 1966: 1).

See the letter from Mario C. Vásquez and Julio Romani Torres, president and secretary, respectively, of the Asociación Peruana de Antropólogos, voicing concerns about anthropologists and counterinsurgency research (AAAfn 1967 8[1]: 14).

For example, see letters by Robert W. Ehrich, John P. Gillin, George P. Murdock, Alexander Spoehr, and Arthur Neihoff (AAAfn 1967 8[2]: 7–9) or by Raoul Naroll (AAAfn 8[4]: 10).

See also letters by Richard Frucht (AAAfn 1967 8[6]: 8), Stephen P. Dunn (AAAfn 1967 8[6]: 9), Raoul Naroll (AAAfn 1967 8[4]: 10), and Kathleen Gough Aberle (AAAfn 1967 8[6]: 11).

Van den Berghe was contacted because he was raised in the Congo and because of his academic expertise.

Abt Associates was a contractor, based in Cambridge, Massachusetts, that developed computer models for counterinsurgency operations (see Herman 1998: 118; Klare 1972: 104–5).

Deitchman wrote of Kunstadter's concerns that the Defense Department had so “saturated the area with social scientists studying the local people for 'applied' reasons, [Kunstadter] would not be able to continue his research on the culture in the existing
state. Our interpretation was that, in effect, he was concerned that we would be spoiling his museum” (1976: 302). Deitchman’s Spenserian logic insisted that modernization was coming to northern Thailand, “and that if the DOD were supporting research on how the changes affected people and on how to ease the inevitable burdens of their cultural evolution, this was an objective which they would not condemn” (303).

22. Under the 1968 rules, resolutions to be voted on at the AAA council meeting had to be mailed out to all AAA voting members before the meeting was held.

23. The sources of these characterizations are as follows: “legislate a socio-ideological system” (Anthony Leeds, AAAFN 1969 10[6]: 3); Nazi comparisons (Laura Thompson, AAAFN 1969 10[7]: 4); totalitarian tactic (Esther Goldfrank, AAAFN 1969 10[7]: 4); Animal Farm (Otto von Mering, AAAFN 1969 10[7]: 5); “Censorship Committee” (Joe Pierce, AAAFN 1969 10[8]: 2); “Ethical Surveillance Committee” (Igor Kopytoff, AAAFN 1969 10[10]: 8).

TWOELVE Counterinsurgency in Southeast Asia

1. Francis Ford Coppola indicated his contemporary source for Kurtz was not Poe but Green Beret commander Colonel Robert Rheault (Branfman 1975: 56–58; M. Isaacs 1999).

2. Rostow viewed strategic hamlets as a laboratory for proving his theories of modernization, and while Rostow never acknowledged the failures of the program, in the years after its failure, as an advisor to President Johnson, he advocated Operation Rolling Thunder, the Vietnam War’s showcase of armed hard power (Milne 2008: 200–203).

3. If we compare these recommendations with those made by World War II anthropologists at the War Relocation Authority camps, we find groups advising that better management and control could be achieved by adding more elements of normalcy to the daily lives of these constrained populations (D. H. Price 2008a: 142–70).


5. Hickey worked with Dr. Richard Pitman and David Thomas, of Wycliffe Bible Translators. Hickey drew on these relationships when he later needed translators to produce RAND counterinsurgency reports (Hickey 2002: 68).

6. This report acknowledged his reliance on the Institute for Defense Analysis, ARPA, USAID, and the CORDS program and made development recommendations for highlander economic programs.

7. Hickey’s final work in Vietnam was for the “Herbicide Study Group,” in which he documented the horrors Agent Orange brought to highland villages. This report was highly critical of U.S. military action and was submitted to the U.S. Senate in February 1974 (Hickey 2002: 341–46).

8. Sahlins’s trip to Vietnam “was self-financed, but it was suggested by a meeting of those involved in the Vietnam Teach-In in Washington, the National Teach-In in May” (MS to DHP 8/1/14).

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1. This bylaw change allowed graduate students and individuals with PhDs from aligned fields to vote and extended fellow status to non-PhD-holding anthropologists. (This amendment passed by a vote of 546 to 119 [73 percent to 27 percent] [NAAA 1970 11(3): 1].) All AAA members became voting members in early 1970; this ended a two-tier membership system in which elder anthropologists’ voices determined AAA policies and opened the door for more activism within the association.

2. While the Asia Society’s funding was not connected to the CIA (not to be confused with the Asia Foundation), as a pet project of John D. Rockefeller III, the Asia Society was aligned with the same sort of counterinsurgency “state-building” strategic philosophy that pervaded the CIA-funded Asia Foundation (Colby and Dennett 1995: 572).

3. The copy of the letter I consulted was located in Wolf’s papers, so Wolf eventually learned of these accusations.

4. I have not found a copy of this letter in the archives I consulted.

5. These thirteen resolutions were sent to the membership for ratification. Four other floor motions were adopted but not sent to the membership in mail ballots (NAAA 1971 12[1]: 2).

6. After reading tens of thousands of pages of FBI reports on hundreds of anthropologists, I find the FBI’s 1969 report entertaining the possibility that an antiradical like George Foster might be a Communist to be illustrative of the routine comedic levels of paranoid blindness that prevailed in Hoover’s FBI (FBI SF 105–24157 C 1/7/69).

7. The report recommended how the AAA could better respond to contemporary and future problems. Recommendations included changes to the proposed ethics code, stressing that bans on secrecy did not address issues of nonsecret data being used to harm studied populations, and proposing that applied anthropologists follow a separate ethics code from the AAA’s (Wakin 1992: 293–98).

8. The Radical Caucus organized multiple sessions on Marxist anthropology at the 1971 AAA meeting. One session, organized by Peter Newcomer and James Faris, featured Marvin Harris as a discussant and included papers by Brian Turner, Harold Hickerson, Brian Hill, Karen Sacks, James Faris, and Peter Newcomer; the second session featured discussants Harry Magdoff (Monthly Review) and Stanley Diamond, with papers from Jack Stauder, Judy Torres, Kathleen Gough, Eric Larson, Bernard Maguband and John O’Brien, and David Epstein (MM E11).

9. The statement distributed by Wolf and Jorgensen at the 1971 AAA council meeting was later published in the Newsletter of the AAA (NAAA 1972 13[1]: 3).

10. Given Mead’s role on the advisory board of the CIA’s MK-Ultra-funded Research in Mental Health Newsletter (Marks 1979: 159), there is some irony that she would use this “mental health” research as her example of harmless trendy research (see also NAAA Nov. 1951: 4–5).

11. In December 1971, Herbert Phillips wrote Donald Blakeslee, at the University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee Department of Anthropology, asking about the ARPA report Eric Wolf claimed Blakeslee had written titled “Low-Altitude Visual Search for Indi--
vidual Human Targets.” Blakeslee replied that he was a graduate student working in North American archaeology, with no connection to Thailand or ARPA (mm E12, HP to DB 12/15/71; MM E12, DB to HP 1/27/72). Wolf had confused him with another Donald Blakeslee who was not an anthropologist.

Phillips wrote James Gibbs and the AAA Executive Board, informing them that Wolf had misidentified Blakeslee. Phillips wrote Gibbs about two other AAA members with ARPA connections, Lee Huff and Bob Kickert, adding that Kickert “resigned from ARPA a few months before the Cambodian invasion because he refused to complete and submit his ethnography of the Akha to ARPA — a resignation that they initially refused to accept, but eventually did. He has since been unemployed living in Vienna. It is possible that he may eventually try to publish his Akha materials and other data from Thailand” (MM E12, HP to JG 12/29/71).

12. To avoid confusion between the two groups known as ARPA, in this book I refer to the Advanced Research Projects Administration as ARPA and spell out Anthropologists for Radical Political Action, though both were known simply as ARPA.

13. This previous violation had occurred when a floor motion opposing the construction of the Dos Rios Dam in California passed and the board then sent this resolution to the full AAA membership in a mail ballot.

14. See Marvin Harris’s article “Why a Perfect Knowledge of All the Rules One Must Know to Act Like a Native Cannot Lead to the Knowledge of How Natives Act” (1974), which argues that all organizations operate under conflicting sets of rules, and that rather than focusing primarily on rules as if they governed human behavior, anthropologists should also study behaviors and differential power relations if they want to understand why some rules are selected for enforcement over others.

15. Whitney and Benjamin admitted that while it was “not explicit in the By-Laws” the association had apparently come to an informal understanding that there were assumed differences between what a “motion” or “resolution” was (NAAA 1973 14[8]: 1, 8). The AAA leadership’s distinction between “motions” and “resolutions” was not found in Robert’s Rules of Order, the guiding rules of AAA council meetings. Had Anthropologists for Radical Political Action members used Robert’s Rules to fight the establishment’s assertion of authority, they might well have prevailed (or at least muddied the waters to a satisfying degree), but as radicals committed to using any means necessary, their use of prim rules of order as a line of defense was far less attractive than continuing to organize and carry out a floor takeover of the council meetings, even if the results of this political theater were less officially binding. The parliamentary procedural ruling did not diminish their ability to control the business meetings — it only diminished their ability to set official association policy.

16. Under the 1971 AAA By-Laws (Annual Meeting, Section One), “new legislation or resolutions proposed by members of the Council” had to submit these to the Executive Board “at least one week in advance of the annual meeting if they are to be placed on the agenda” (NAAA 1973 14[8]: 1). Members could still add agenda items from the floor (following the procedure in Robert’s Rules of Order). Thus, in the early 1970s, AAA members could add motions from the floor of the AAA’s annual business meeting.
1. One example of these distant influences is found in future DCI William Colby’s interest in anthropology courses while he was a freshman at Princeton, which his biographer speculated influenced his approach to “pacification” in Vietnam in later years (Prados 2003: 24–25).

2. Other theoretical schools had similar blind spots. Orin Starn (1991) observed that ecological and structural Andean anthropologists working in Peru were so focused on exploring and refining the details of their paradigmatic analysis that they equally (catastrophically) failed to anticipate the coming of the Sendero Luminoso’s revolutionary upheaval in that country.

3. Because the AAA leadership traditionally has conceived of the association as primarily not involved in political matters, it has refrained from taking official stances opposing anthropologists’ involvement in military and intelligence operations. The inconsistency of the AAA’s claims of remaining removed from political statements can be seen in its adoption of policies and position papers for a number of political issues (e.g., race, gay marriage, refugees) and its having officially mobilized in support of specific military operations (such as World War II).

4. I have disengaged from analysis and critiques that I am concerned might have other, unintended uses for military and intelligence readers, yet I also understand my work may inform military and intelligence training in unforeseen ways (see D. H. Price 2007c: 21–22).

5. After Stauder was suspended from his professorship in Harvard’s Department of Social Relations in 1969 over political fallout stemming from his “Radical Perspectives in Social Change” course, anthropologists from across the country rallied to support him (see Goldhaber 1969a, 1969b). For more on Stauder’s post-1960s political journey, see Stauder 1995.