In the 1950s... fledgling anthropologists went into field situations innocent of counterinsurgency plots spawned in the emergent globalization system, and of the role that we might unconsciously play. Now too much is known about undercover plots to ignore or deny U.S. intervention in the field sites we choose.

JUNE NASH | 2007

NINE COLD WAR FIELDWORK WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE UNIVERSE

Over the decades, numerous anthropologists in the field have falsely come under suspicion of being spies. Such accusations are thematically linked to why intelligence agencies have occasionally sought to use anthropologists to collect intelligence. These reasons include expertise in foreign cultures, familiarity with local languages, ease of traveling in remote areas, reliance on participant observational methods, and working in regions with colonialist histories that remain of interest to military and intelligence agencies of the global north.

False accusations of spying were among the dangers facing anthropologists conducting fieldwork identified by Nancy Howell in *Surviving Fieldwork*, her monograph on dangers facing anthropologists in the field. Howell recounted archaeologist Bruce Schroeder’s arrest by the Syrian Border Patrol while he was surveying sites in Lebanon as an example of dangerous outcomes of these widespread suspicions (1990: 97). Fifteen percent of anthropologists surveyed by Howell reported accusations or suspicions that they were spies; her research identified these accusations by geographic regions— with the Pacific Islands and Asia being associated with the most accusations, though we may assume geopolitical developments can quickly alter such trends. While false accusations of spying have been an ongoing threat to anthropologists in the field, Howell acknowledged that “sometimes the suspicion is correct,” pointing out that Louis Leakey used his fieldwork to broadcast anti-insurrection propaganda during Mau Mau uprisings in Kenya (98).
False accusations of spying can have devastating impacts. Former CIA agent John Stockwell once recounted how after a lecture on a university campus, one of the organizers of the event described how, when she began studying in Zambia, she had been warned that an American scholar there was known to be CIA. Stockwell later wrote, “Her story made me want to cry. As supervisor of CIA activities in Zambia during the time she was there, I was intimately familiar with every ‘asset’ the CIA had in the country and the person she named was not one of them. Americans in Zambia mistrusted and avoided one another because the CIA had poisoned the environment. Frankly, my guess is that if Congress were investigating this aspect of CIA operations, they would find that most CIA managers actually preferred that other Americans in the country not trust one another” (1991: 104).

Anthropologists occasionally benefited from mistaken beliefs that they are CIA operatives. While conducting Malayan fieldwork in 1968, anthropologist Douglas Raybeck spent days in a rural police station collecting historical demographic data from birth and death records. After several days of this work, one of the police officers asked Raybeck how long he had worked with the CIA. Raybeck protested vigorously against this suggestion, and he produced his passport and letters of introduction from his dean at Cornell to demonstrate his academic legitimacy. The police officer looked at the documents but remained unconvinced, assuming that any CIA plant would also be able to produce such papers. Raybeck later learned that most of the Malayan governmental officials he had contact with assumed he was a CIA operative collecting information on Chinese Communists because, “after all, I was staying in a small village only fifteen miles from the Thai border. . . . This whole misperception could have greatly altered my relationship to the villagers, made my work difficult or impossible, and possibly even endangered Karen and me. Fortunately the governments of Malaya and Kelantan, as well as the villagers, thought the CIA was a wonderful organization because it was opposed to Communism” (Raybeck 1996: 87–88). While Raybeck may have benefited from the misconception that he had CIA ties, most anthropologists suffer when such misconceptions occur.

In 1982, Jon Kalb, an American geologist, was expelled from Ethiopia after false rumors circulated that he was a CIA agent. Ethiopia soon banned all foreign scientists, and fears that similar rumors could lead to research bans in other countries spread through the paleoarchaeological community (New Scientist 1982: 552). Kalb argued that these false claims grew from his past disputes with a colleague (New Scientist 1982: 552). Kalb believed these claims first appeared during the peer review process for his 1977 NSF grant application, and
he filed more than a hundred FOIA requests seeking NSF records. After Kalb showed the NSF had been party to discussions in which Kalb’s colleagues and funding competitors raised rumors that he was secretly a CIA operative, he won an out-of-court settlement from the NSF for damages (see Kalb 2001).

At times, CIA operations intruded into fieldwork settings, spreading suspicions of anthropologists in ways that impacted their interactions with locals. June Nash has written that when she began fieldwork in Bolivia in 1967, “Che Guevara was still fighting in the tropics of Santa Cruz,” and political tensions were high (1979b: 4). Nash’s and anthropologist Doris Widerkehr’s interests in mining and labor organizations led to accusations of their being CIA agents of “Yanqui imperialism” (Nash, 1979a: 359–60). Nash published articles in local outlets demonstrating her allegiances with the miners’ struggles, but the political upheaval cast suspicion on her. She responded to accusations with a letter and a meeting with union officials to explain her methodology and her analytical approach to Bolivian mining. These incidents intensified during the political upheaval of October 1970, and Nash took precautions to protect her field notes and family during this time, while student protesters blew up the doors of the USIS building and burned its books. Crowds of protesters were fired upon, and some protesters were killed; Nash’s home was targeted by sniper fire (362). Later, when one of her research audiotapes accidentally came to be played for others (after she had loaned out her tape recorder with a tape accidentally still in it), suspicions were again raised. After Nash explained what had happened, though, the union believed her because, “despite their hatred of the CIA, they had a very high regard for the agency’s performance, and this blunder did not fit the image” (363).

It was common for American anthropologists during the Cold War to be falsely suspected of spying (e.g., Mars 2003; Verdery 1996: 7). Stuart Kirsch recounted how when he was doing fieldwork in New Guinea in the mid-1980s, he encountered a university scientist trying to determine if rabies had entered the country with dogs accompanying refugees. The scientist wanted Kirsch to ask refugees about their dogs, but other work kept him from making inquiries. Years later, a refugee told Kirsch that when he first arrived he was suspected of being a spy. Kirsch wrote, “Curious about this claim, I asked him whether they had ever seen a spy. He said that an Australian spy visited the camp the year before I arrived. I asked him how they knew that the Australian visitor was a spy. He explained that it was obvious, because the Australian man claimed to be a doctor, but spent all of his time talking to people about their dogs” (2006: 239n15).

In Nicaragua in the 1980s, Roger Lancaster found himself accused of being a CIA operative one day while shopping for a chicken. A drunk man started
raving that Lancaster was a CIA agent, come to spy on Nicaragua. This man’s “proof” was that when he spoke to Lancaster in English, he “pretended” to not understand, arguing, “Now why else would he do that unless he was trying to conceal his nationality? And why would he conceal his nationality unless he were trying to hide something? He must be CIA. Arrest him!” But Lancaster was defended by the shopkeeper’s wife—whom he had never met, but who surprised him by listing his credentials as a UC Berkeley anthropologist and even the specific topic of his dissertation, noting, “When he goes back [to the United States] he’s going to tell the truth about Nicaragua, and our revolution, and it will be good for us” (Lancaster 1992: 75–76).

While accusations of spying from locals are common motifs in ethnographic writings, anthropologists have rarely discussed being investigated by the FBI or the CIA, although such investigations occasionally intersected with fieldwork during the Cold War. In 1958, a CIA field agent stationed in East Africa became suspicious of anthropologist Leo Silberman, who claimed to have a grant from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to study the “Somaliland-Ethiopia border disputes.” The FBI made inquiries at the University of Chicago’s anthropology department. Entries in a compilation of CIA reports claimed, “L.S. has reputation for being glib, slick, quick-tongued, fast-talker, creates impressions which are not true” and indicated that Silberman “[has] a marvelous gift of gab, writes exceedingly well, and has considerable experience in Africa” (FOIA CIA DOC_0001152250, 4/3/58). In 1959, the FBI monitored Oscar Lewis’s research in Mexico and Cuba, while some people in Mexico falsely accused him of being an FBI agent; the FBI also suspected that Lewis might be a communist because they misread his work on poverty as having Marxist undertones (D. H. Price 2004b: 237–54). In 1957, Marvin Harris was expelled from Mozambique for researching practices of racial segregation. On the advice of a Ford Foundation representative, he shipped his field notes home to New York using the U.S. embassy pouch, only to later discover that once his notes and data finally arrived, they had been repackaged and obviously combed through (D. H. Price 2002: 16). Stanley Diamond’s FBI file indicates that he contacted the FBI in October 1960 to report that his car had been broken into on the streets of New York, and his field notes documenting his recent political and economic research in Central Africa were taken (FBI 105–131338–4. 10/12/60). June Nash wrote that she learned years later that in 1970 the “Dirección de Investigaciones Criminales, the Bolivian equivalent of the U.S. FBI, had, under orders from the CIA, investigated me” (Nash 2007: 165).
But it was Stanley Diamond who most succinctly explored the circumstances of anthropologists being suspected of spying, writing that, “Logically enough, anthropologists are frequently taken as spies because of the inquisitive nature of their work; their concern with local affairs in the remote places to which they go, their tendency to fade into the background of local custom in living up to the canons of participant observation. They have, also, a certain limited academic immunity; they travel freely, and what better cover could a secret agent desire.” But Diamond did not stop there, drawing attention to the dual use dynamics supporting such fieldwork, noting that, “Of course anthropologists are spiritual double agents. That is, they are marginal to the commercial-industrial society that created them, but they eagerly explore the areas opened up to them by colonialism” (1974:89; see D.H. Price 1998: 419n1).

Actual spies have at times posed as anthropologists conducting fieldwork, a practice that creates problems for real anthropologists. During the Second World War, Special Intelligence Service (a now defunct US intelligence division) agent William Clothier (who later worked for the CIA from 1952 to 1979) used archaeology as a cover, while working on a Harvard expedition, to spy in Peru (see D. H. Price 2008a: 210–11). Archaeologist Payson Sheets described how once, when traveling in El Salvador, he took a side trip to visit Ixtepeque, a Salvadoran obsidian source site. When he asked for directions in a small town along the way, the mayor told him that “two CIA agents, masquerading as archaeologists, had been discovered and killed by guerrillas the year before. One body had been fished out of the Motagua River and the other had not been found. Local people were ready to kill any other self-declared archaeologist who wandered into the area” (Sheets 2001: 3). In 1967, Ralph Beals described the killing of an archaeologist in Guatemala: “The murder was believed to have been committed by guerrillas who thought the victim was an agent of the Central Intelligence Agency” (1967: 18). Beals later noted that the same issue of the New York Times that reported news of this murder published a front-page story in which he had been quoted as saying “there was good reason to believe that the CIA had used anthropologists as agents abroad or that CIA agents had passed themselves off as anthropologists” (18; see Raymont 1966). Michael Lewis writes of Smithsonian administrator and conservationist David Challinor’s account of an unidentified “young man who the Smithsonian helped fly to India, supposedly to do anthropological research, who unknown to them was also using a grant from the department of defense to interview refugees from Communist China-controlled Tibet” (M. Lewis 2002: 2325).
During the 1950s and 1960s, the CIA focused concerted efforts on recruiting sociologists, anthropologists, historians, political scientists, and others working in Africa. In 1965, Rene Lemarchand was approached by Miami’s CIA station chief while on the campus of the University of Florida and asked to provide information on developments in Burundi politics: Lemarchand rejected these advances in no uncertain terms (Blanchard and Scheinbaum 1977b). Sociologist Jay Mullen spied for the CIA while living in Uganda, where he used his position as an instructor at Makerere University to gather intelligence about Idi Amin. Mullen later bragged that his operatives planted bugs and wiretaps in Amin’s headquarters and in the homes of various Russian and Chinese individuals living in Uganda (Lawrence 1979: 86; see also Mullen 1979; Siskiyou 2011). Historian James R. Hooker was recruited by the CIA in the 1950s, and during his years living in Africa he kept files on individuals he met in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland during the 1950s and 1960s (Lawrence 1979: 84–85). When Hooker famously and disparagingly claimed that “anthropology could not escape its European origins; it remained a discipline peopled by whites who looked at darker, dependent persons,” he did not similarly reflect on the impact of his own position within the CIA on his professional writings (see Hooker 1963: 458).

Many interactions between the CIA and anthropologists and other academics occurred on university campuses. Theodore Graves described CIA efforts to recruit anthropologists at the University of Colorado and UCLA, where CIA representatives roamed the campuses with promises of laundered “research” funds for anthropologists who would align their work with agency interests. Once Graves began teaching at the University of Colorado, he had annual visits from a CIA employee offering funding for graduate students willing to do fieldwork in “sensitive parts of the world.” Graves refused to cooperate, yet the CIA representative returned each year. Graves was told these funds would be “channeled through ‘respectable’ agencies” to hide any CIA connection.” He encountered scholars funded by these CIA grant programs while he was conducting fieldwork in East Africa in 1967–68, and he learned that “one of the tenured faculty at UCLA apparently recruited students for research in politically sensitive areas of the world for many years, with secret financial support from our government” (Graves 2004: 315).

In the wake of the Church Committee hearings’ revelations of CIA activities on campus, Paul Doughty, chair of the University of Florida’s Department of Anthropology, reported that it had become routine for him and other anthropologists, upon returning from fieldwork abroad, to “receive debriefing
and personal information forms from the CIA” asking for “personal information about persons whom Doughty said he has been closely involved for many years.” Doughty ignored these queries, and the CIA eventually stopped contacting him (Blanchard and Scheinbaum 1977a: 14–15). Other anthropologists presumably briefed the CIA; the extent of such briefings remains unknown, but ongoing reports of such requests by those who refused to cooperate suggest the likelihood that others did comply with these requests (Blanchard and Scheinbaum 1977b).

Anthropological field research sometimes facilitated intelligence operations by nonanthropologists. For example, in 1952, F. Trubee Davison, assistant director of the CIA, planned to use his connections to the American Museum of Natural History to join a trip to Sarawak to collect artifacts and make an ethnographic film. But Davison’s CIA links brought additional political attention to the trip. Declassified CIA memos show agency interest in Davison gathering firsthand information on “what appears to have been Communist terrorist activity [that has] taken place in recent months in the southwestern part of Sarawak in and around Kuching” (foia CIA-RDP80R01731R000500020001-8, 9/24/52).³ Davison, who had only recently stepped down from two decades serving as museum president, wrote Allen Dulles, describing his plans to travel with his wife under the auspices of the American Museum of Natural History. In broad terms, the purpose is to obtain documentary motion pictures of the tribal life and collect artifacts used by the various tribes. I am naturally concerned to know whether or not the political conditions are suitable and safe.

Our contact in Sarawak is one Tom Harrisson, Government Ethnologist and Curator of the Sarawak Museum. I am enclosing a copy of a letter which has just been received by the head of the Department of Anthropology at the American Museum who is organizing our end of the trip. I thought you might be interested in seeing Mr. Harrisson’s letter. (foia CIA-RDP80R01731R000500020005-4, 9/11/52)⁴

In June 1952, Harrisson reported delays in securing a houseboat because of political troubles, explaining that “there is now a state of emergency declared.” He noted that it was “not practical to plan very much for the moment” and that movements were currently restricted. He wrote that the current situation was “not unpleasantly serious,” but he advised the museum to postpone its plans for the present (TH to Shapiro, foia CIA-RDP80R01731R000500020005-4, 8/23/52).
Field Agents

During the Cold War, the CIA occasionally used archaeological projects as cover for collecting foreign intelligence. A onetime CIA chief of station, Baghdad, Wilbur Eveland later described the agency using archaeology covers in Iraq during the 1950s, when “part of the CIA station in Iraq operating under diplomatic cover was so understaffed that even its two secretaries arranged communications drops and safe-house meetings with agents. Wives of the few CIA officers under ‘deep cover’ (education and archaeological) typed their reports and sequestered their children while their husbands met with informants at home” (1980: 46).

Engineer, philanthropist, and archaeological enthusiast John M. Dimick had no formal training in archaeology, but he was an active presence in major archaeological excavations in Guatemala, Egypt, Turkey, Italy, Greece, and elsewhere from 1946 into the late 1960s. His memoir, Episodes in Archaeology, described how observing excavations at the Herculaneum in 1939 kindled his passion for archaeology. This interest led to fund-raising and managerial roles in archaeological excavations on three continents (Dimick 1968). But there was more going on than Dimick described in his memoir; as his November 29, 1983, Washington Post obituary disclosed, “Following service in Spain during World War II, Dimick combined government assignments with archaeological interest while working in Latin America for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.”

In 1946, Dimick contacted United Fruit company founder Sam Zemurray and persuaded him to provide $430,000 for three years of work on Mayan monumental archaeological remains in Guatemala (1968: 26). From 1946 to 1960, Dimick directed the project, hiring Alfred Kidder to undertake the initial surveys. Dimick selected Zaculeu for major restoration efforts, and the crew cleared and excavated the massive temple complex (NBAAA1949 3[3]: 4).

 Missing from Dimick’s account of Zemurray’s Guatemala is any depiction of a Yankee banana republic; instead, we have a description of Zemurray as a kind benefactor looking out for Guatemalans’ interests. Dimick praised his patron, writing that during his “own years in Guatemala the usual derogatory comment on the Fruit Company was invariably sweetened with stories of how it had conquered the Latin America by force. That is not only unjustified, but untrue. The conquistador was Zemurray. He with his wisdom, his love for the country as well as for self-benefit, was the power who employed the force of arms” (1968: 20).

In 1954, two years after Nasser’s Officers Revolution in Egypt, Dimick directed University of Pennsylvania excavations of the Apis embalming house at Mit Rahineh (Dimick 1968: 66). Dimick and his wife, Teena, took an apartment
on the top floor of the Semiramis Hotel in Cairo, where they were near “the living quarters for King Saud of Saudi Arabia” (67). Dimick claimed his work with Arab colleagues in Egypt generated mutual aid and assistance, with “no subterfuge, no double talk” (81). Documents from the Eisenhower administration’s negotiations with the Nasser administration during Dimick’s time in Egypt include notes from diplomatic meetings of American envoy Robert Anderson (who traveled with several CIA personnel in his party) and establish that Dimick provided briefings on the political climate of Egypt, including his own evaluations of Nasser and his administration. Records from a U.S. Egypt Evaluation Team meeting of May 19–20, 1955, report “an Egyptologist,” identified in Alterman’s endnotes as “Dimick,” “with experience in the CIA and OSS [who] opined that Abdel Nasser was ‘well intentioned and reasonably capable, within his limits. He does not know how to run a government. His advisers are totally incapable’” (Alterman 2002: 130, 163n130). Alterman wrote that, “although the precise details of the CIA’s involvement with the Anderson mission remain classified, many years later CIA regional chief Kermit Roosevelt admitted to playing a leading role as an intermediary between Anderson and the Egyptians” (118). These records confirm Dimick’s later claims of being a CIA operative, yet the specific details of how his CIA position articulated with his years of archaeological adventuring remain unclear. At a minimum, his presence in developing nations undergoing revolutions and counterrevolutions provided the CIA with background reports on what he saw while working on archaeological projects; but he may also have played less passive roles, either running CIA operatives, working as a CIA currier, or performing other tasks for the agency.

Archaeologist Frank Hibben told New Yorker writer Douglas Preston that while he was on an expedition in the 1950s retracing the route of Roy Chapman Andrews’s Mongolian travels, he smuggled a device into Outer Mongolia that was capable of remotely monitoring Chinese atomic bomb tests at Lop Nor (Preston 1995: 80–81). Hibben claimed Chinese troops chased and shot at him. While Hibben’s central role in the Sandia Cave scandal (in which Hibben claimed to have excavated undisturbed 25,000 year old human remains—a claim rejected by many other archaeologists), diminishes his general credibility, some evidence supports his claims. In response to my FOIA requests, the FBI released portions of Hibben’s FBI file, including a report indicating that the FBI conducted a background investigation on him for an unspecified sensitive project administered through the Department of Energy, raising the possibility that this was the governmental agency that possibly hired him for this claimed operation in western China.
Fieldwork in a Time of Crisis

June Nash has written about her lack of political awareness during her initial Guatemalan fieldwork in 1953, referring to herself as naive. Her later reflections capture the political orientation of the era, when she and her husband, Manning Nash, “were not concerned with paramilitary or guerrilla operations, nor did we feel that we had to justify our presence. America had just won a war against Fascism, and had not yet embarked on our own imperial campaigns. The ethnographic frame was on the functioning of traditional societies and the structures that maintained coherence in the face of modernizing changes” (Nash 2007: 105–6).

For her dissertation fieldwork, Nash planned to study a community of textile factory workers and the contexts of modernization, ethnicity, village governance, class, and education. But the political backdrop for this research came to dominate her experience. The Guatemalan election of 1950 brought Jacobo Árbenz to the presidency, and his land reform policies alarmed the U.S. State Department and the CIA because they threatened American corporate interests in Guatemala, especially large landowners like United Fruit.

Tensions mounted in May 1954 as a Czechoslovakian shipment of Soviet-manufactured arms arrived in Guatemala, and the U.S. government denounced the spread of Soviet influence in the Western Hemisphere. As June and Manning Nash completed a year of fieldwork that summer, they heard rumors that Colonel Carolos Castillo Armas was planning a revolt with five hundred soldiers to seize lands taken by Germans during the Second World War. Government security agents arrived in the town where the Nashes lived, asking questions about the U.S. researchers staying there, but the locals lied and told the officials they had no such foreign researchers (Nash 2007: 108). On June 25, 1954, the CIA toppled President Árbenz’s government, and after a series of presidential successions, Armas was installed as the American-backed president, rolling back Árbenz’s nationalization project. Nash later wrote that, after the coup,

rumors circulated about who was being jailed and who had fled. The jails were filled with five thousand suspects when Richard Adams received a grant to study the penetration of Communist ideology in the countryside. He asked us to assist him, assigning Manning [Nash] and a number of Guatemalan students to the jail interviews and me to compile the results. Among the prisoners was a student who advised the team about the prisoners’ interpretation of the questionnaire. Convinced that the interviews were part of a scheme to distinguish militant Com-
munists from those who were apolitical, the prisoners had worked out responses that minimized their involvement in the revolutionary government, and indeed, our summation of the interviews confirmed this. But the moderate views they expressed reflected a well-grounded support for the Arévalo-Árbenz government that was not based on fomenting a violent revolution. This was the allegation of the U.S. National Security Council when they approved plans for a coup against a government that had for the first time in Guatemalan history made strides in advancing rural education and health, and that had permitted democratic participation in unions and cooperatives. (110)

The Nashes were later denounced as “communists” to the U.S. embassy by the factory weaving master, but an intervention by friends halted efforts to force their return to the United States (110).

In July 1954, June and Manning Nash were unexpectedly visited at their Chicago apartment by a CIA agent. Without forethought on how to respond to such intrusive pressures, their answers to the agent’s request for specific information they had learned from the fieldwork were a model for anthropologists concerned with protecting those they study. June Nash later recalled that this CIA agent “waited in the stifling heat of our basement apartment for Manning to rouse himself, only to be told that he could read whatever Manning might publish, but that he (Manning) had nothing to say. Although the agent had not tried to debrief me, it was then that I began to realize our research might fit into a larger domain of state intrigue that may even have influenced the funding of our research. The book, Machine Age Maya, probably had little that would have interested the CIA, then or even later” (2007: 110–11). This awareness that research areas influenced funding came late, yet for many anthropologists such awareness was never voiced. And the interest or usefulness to the CIA was not always apparent. As Asia Foundation president Russell Smith later observed, often research projects that appeared to have little importance or to be “frivolous” to CIA interests turned out to be valuable, especially given the usefulness of firsthand information from regions of interest (FOIA CIA 1/28/63, DTPILLAR VOL. 3_0024, 2).

Using the pseudonym Stokes Newbold, Richard N. Adams published a report on his interviews with Guatemalan prisoners in the journal Economic Development and Cultural Change (ISA 4, GF to RNA 5/10/51). Adams interviewed a sample of the fifteen hundred to two thousand pro-Árbenz Guatemalans who had been arrested and imprisoned in the Guatemala City Jail soon after the coup. Manning and June Nash assisted with these interviews (Newbold 1957: 338n1). Adams observed that, “while interviewing jailed persons immediately
after a highly emotional revolution is obviously a most unsatisfactory method of obtaining data, it was considered more realistic to attempt the study in this way than after the jailed population had been released and dispersed once more through the countryside” (342). These interviews collected socioeconomic and demographic data on the prisoners. Adams found that Árbenz’s supporters had “more contact with outsiders and would as a result tend to be more literate than non-members” and would be more likely to come from municipal capitals (348); he also found higher-than-average literacy rates and that the population was largely rural, religiously active, and relatively economically well off (349, 360; cf. S. C. Schlesinger and Kinzer 1983: 220).

Because Adams’s report found that few of those arrested appeared to be communists or to know much about communism, it supposedly irritated many at the CIA and the State Department (see S. C. Schlesinger and Kinzer 1983: 22), and any uses to which governmental agencies might have put it are unknown. This report significantly impacted Adams’s later life and career, as news of this collaboration with a State Department intelligence venture limited his access to work and travel in Central America (RNA to DHP 10/1/96). But, as Marc Edelman observed, “During the rest of his long career, Adams developed a pronounced concern about research ethics and a strongly critical stance regarding US policy in Guatemala and the Guatemalan military’s abysmal human rights record, as did June Nash, who also participated in the survey” (2009: 252n23).

**Indonesian Fieldwork on the Front Lines of the Cold War**

During the Second World War, Raymond Kennedy worked at the OSS Morale Operations Branch, helping design anti-Japanese propaganda operations in Indonesia; he also worked with the OSS’s secret Marigold Unit (Soley 1989: 161). As the war’s end approached, Kennedy expressed strong opposition to America aligning its national interests with the colonial and neocolonial policies of European nations hoping to return to dominance in Asia. Kennedy’s anticolonial views were not well received in the State Department. In his reports he bluntly expressed concerns. In one 1945 State Department memo discussing U.S. post-war policy options, he argued that “American military operations in Southeast Asia involve potential danger to American prestige among the peoples of the area, because the latter are bound, regardless of our protestations to the contrary, to link American military forces with the reentering Anglo-Dutch-French military and civil administrations” (Kennedy in G. Smith 1999: 2). He cautioned that “America should take care to pursue a policy which will ensure
that the ‘emerging nations’ of Southeast Asia will be ideologically sympathetic to the United States” (RK 1, 2/22/45). The Atlantic Charter of 1941 was signed as a war statement designed to destabilize Axis occupations, but at the war’s end its declaration of self-determination for people under occupations undermined colonial and neocolonial claims of legitimacy. While many in the United States ignored these contradictions at the war’s end, Kennedy argued for American policies that remained consistent with principles of liberation, anticolonialism, and self-determination (see Kennedy 1944, 1945a, 1945b; Kennedy and Kattenburg 1948; D. H. Price 2013b).

Kennedy returned to Yale after the war, but he continued working as an intelligence consultant at the Propaganda Intelligence Section of the Secret Intelligence Branch, commuting to Washington, DC, on a regular basis. He read intelligence reports and made “suggestions concerning the form and content of reports, and [suggested] Intelligence guidance for field operations in Southeast Asia” (FOIA CIA Mori Doc ID: 242537, RD to RCR 1/9/46). Given his contributions to postwar intelligence, it is likely that Kennedy continued consulting at the newly formed CIA. No records confirming such a relationship were released in response to my FOIA requests, though this may reflect CIA unwillingness to supply documents in response to FOIA requests more than it reveals whether or not Kennedy had an ongoing relationship with the agency.

Kennedy took a sabbatical from Yale in 1949, using a $3,000 Viking Fund grant for fieldwork studying “acculturation in selected sections of Indonesia” (Viking Fund 1951: 39, 132). In Indonesia, Kennedy visited new villages every few days, studying acculturation and focusing on topics ranging from folk knowledge to political divisions and orientations.

On April 27, 1950, Raymond Kennedy and Robert Doyle, a Time-Life correspondent traveling with him, were murdered in rural Indonesia (Gardner 1997: 68). Kennedy had been en route to meet Paul M. Kattenburg, a State Department employee who was a fellow OSS alumnus, and Southeast Asian scholar (OSS Society Newsletter, Fall 2004: 10–11). Kennedy had mentored Kattenburg in government and academic settings (Gardner 1997: 68), and they coauthored several scholarly works on Indonesian political developments. The Australian press reported that Kennedy and Doyle were “shot by a gang of four or five Indonesians dressed in military uniform, according to stories told by villagers who were forced by the murderers to bury the bodies” (West Australian, April 29, 1950, 1).

Four decades later, Kattenburg remained unsure who murdered Kennedy and Doyle, writing that “we thought then that the Darul Islam, an early extremist
Islamic movement, was responsible for the assassinations. It is also possible that Kennedy and Doyle were set up by criminals in Jakarta or simply victims of local thugs intent on capturing the several thousand U.S. dollars that many in West Java knew Kennedy had with him” (qtd. in Gardner 1997: 68). George Kahin and Clifford Geertz later assumed Kennedy was killed either by men working for Turk Westerling (Raymond Pierre Paul Westerling) or by Darul Islam (Kahin 1997: 39n3; cf. Geertz 2010: 213).8

Former oss analyst and State Department officer John F. Cady later described Kennedy’s Indonesian trip not as ethnographic fieldwork but as Kennedy being “sent to Indonesia” to “keep abreast of developments there” as part of a larger effort by the U.S. government sending American experts “out to the field to examine the potentialities of particular situations and to explain what could happen” (qtd. in McKinzie 1974: 23–24).9 Robin Winks wrote that Kennedy continued his intelligence work “after the war [when] the intelligence community called on Kennedy again, for his field notes, his photographs, and his political point of view, which had so cogently put the anticolonial position, were valued as they had not been during the war” (1987: 50).

After a four-month investigation in Indonesia, Alexander Marshack published an exposé titled “The Unreported War in Indonesia” in American Mercury. Marshack wrote that Kennedy had angered Dutch loyalists in Indonesia by publishing an article “condemning the activities of the Netherlands official” (1952: 39). Marshack determined that days before their deaths, “Doyle and Kennedy registered in Bandung at the beautiful ultramodern Dutch-owned Savoy Homann Hotel, which was at this time (though they did not know) the center of the nefis-ivg and Dutch intelligence organization for West Java. And having registered they began circulating through the city asking questions” (1952: 39). Kennedy’s questions were not drawn from the 267 questions listed in his detailed ethnographic research questionnaire; these were more immediate political questions that “concerned the roots of the Westerling-nefis affair. Immediately two Indonesians riding a blue sedan began tailing Doyle and Kennedy in their movements” (39). Marshack concluded:

The motive evidently was not robbery. It was political assassination of two Americans. Significantly, villagers near the killing were brusquely ordered by the Dutch troops to bury Kennedy and Doyle, forget them, and keep quiet. One woman, hesitantly, talked, and Indonesian military police went in and dug Doyle and Kennedy up. The identification papers, passport, and notes of Professor Kennedy had been taken. For he was the already well-known hated member of the twosome. Doyle
of *Time-Life* was newly arrived, had not yet filed his story, and was therefore unknown to those interested in Kennedy. And so Doyle’s notes were found, complete, on his person. It was Kennedy they were after. (40)

Doyle’s notes showed that he had made inquiries in Bandung about Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil (APRA). This paramilitary unit, which Westerling formed with sympathetic Dutch expatriates after resigning from the Dutch armed forces, hoped to seize power from the coming Indonesian government and to restore Dutch rule. After Westerling’s botched coup attempt, APRA launched small-scale rural paramilitary operations against the new Indonesian state.

Most of the reporting on Doyle’s and Kennedy’s deaths ignored the political context of Americans collecting information on the “culture change” of a nation rapidly heading toward what appeared to be widespread rural commitment to communism in the wake of its postcolonial freedom (e.g., *Life* 1950: 42).

**Unresolved Questions about Kennedy’s Fieldwork**

Three years after Raymond Kennedy’s death, HRAF published the first of three volumes of his *Field Notes on Indonesia: South Celebes, 1949–1950* (1953b). These volumes were transcribed and edited by Harold Conklin, whose knowledge of Dutch and Indonesian was vital for the publication of the notebooks (Kennedy 1953b: xiv; see also Kennedy 1953a, 1953c), which were published by HRAF as HRAF coded texts — indexing Kennedy’s notebooks using HRAF’s cross cultural index system. In the introduction to *Field Notes*, Ruby Kennedy described how she and Raymond sailed to Indonesia from Norfolk, Virginia, bringing a jeep, books, and other supplies (Kennedy 1953b: vii). Raymond Kennedy was a frenetic fieldworker, often working more than twelve hours a day and typing a dozen pages of field notes in a single evening. During eight months of fieldwork, he produced more than nine hundred pages of single-spaced typed notes, as well as detailed letters home that supplemented these observations and analysis (viii).

Kennedy planned to investigate at least three villages in six Indonesian culture areas, focusing on the impact of Islamic, Christian, and local religious traditions. He spent the last months of his life in eastern Indonesia and completed surveys in South Celebes, Flores, Ambon, Ceram, and Borneo. The South Celebes field notebook was published by HRAF in 1953, with limited microfiche editions of the notebooks from his work in Flores, Ambon, Ceram, and Borneo released next.
Field Notes described changing Indonesian social relations, with notes on Kennedy’s random encounters. Kennedy hired local research assistants to administer a standardized questionnaire of 267 items, many of which focused on agricultural practices and were adapted from a turn-of-the-century British survey. He intended to contrast contemporary responses with existing data for a longitudinal understanding of culture change.

The questionnaire’s sections on economy and political life included questions on technological changes, ownership and distribution of automobiles, landownership, debt, wage labor systems, shifts in political organization, the role of family, and class relations in everyday life. The section on political dimensions included the following questions: “Are there parties in the village, for instance, conservative, radical, etc.?”; “Have there been changes in the horizons of political thought?”; and “To what extent is there knowledge of world politics? How have the people obtained this?” Other questions explored the role of religion in politics, and still others inquired about political parties’ organization and function (Kennedy 1953b: 235–37).

Field Notes contained information on social structure, sexual mores, rituals of life and death, and agricultural production, and it recounted local political observations. Kennedy evaluated the extent of socialist or communist thought in the new Indonesian state. He interviewed locals about political “radicals” and views of anticolonialism, and he gathered information on the relative strength of various military factions (1953b: 216–17). Kennedy recounted discussions with Riekerk, a civil servant, who believed that the first elections selected “nobles,” while current voting patterns brought more egalitarian trends, yet “the influence of the nobles is still strong” (26). One note stated, “The school is the only new institution in the kampong now, and this is the real revolutionary factor. Riekerk is a Socialist and I get the idea that many Dutch in the State of East Indonesia service are left wing. Van Heekeren is also quite liberal. I wonder what the percentage would be” (26).

Kennedy interviewed an “Indo” engineer named Resink, whom he described as “a radical.” Kennedy filled several pages of notes with Resink’s views, such as his opinion that Indonesian society was divided between “a small upper, rich class” and the “Sjahrir”—a “socialistic” group (221–22). Resink viewed Sukarno as “an opportunist” who would align with whatever interests would maintain his power. Resink described the nature of Indonesian identity politics and the nuances of local shifts in identity from an old ethos aspiring to be “100 percent Dutch” to a new positive longing “to become completely Indonesian” (222). Kennedy reported:
Resink feels that the danger today is that the United States, big business, and the Dutch and others will join with the bourgeois Republic of Indonesia group and sell out the masses. If this happens, the latter will revolt in a few years. They will ask themselves, “Are we better off or not?” And if the answer is not, there will be trouble. He said there are plenty of Communists here and although they are not strong they are ready. They are mainly Chinese trained by Russia. They come via southeast Asia or through Holland. They are largely students. Also, some of the Indonesian students go to Czechoslovakia to study and to get orders there from Moscow. If they are able to ask the people later on if they are any better off, there will be revolution. All is set. Resink’s plan is state socialism and development of, for example, bauxite in Riouw, water power in Asahan (for aluminum especially), and textiles in Java. He agreed that if Indonesia goes socialist the United States under big business and propaganda pressure will tag them “communistic.” This means America will not help. The thing to do then will be to turn to Russia, and the United States, thus caught, will have to give help even though Indonesia is socialist. This looks like good hard-headed thinking. Certainly the United States won’t help a socialist state unless forced to by fear of Russia. Rahim says that the United States is now gypping Indonesia; what happens is that the United States gets rubber (and at a cheaper price than other lands, and insists on this or it won’t give exchange), and then forces Indonesia to take a certain percentage of automobiles, instead of machinery, which is really needed. This even applies to buses. The cars are used by the bureaucrats alone, and are hence useless. As for Marshall aid, it has now stopped. This was foolish, he said, and when it is restored it will probably again be channeled via Holland. This is bad because the Dutch have been shamelessly milking Indonesia since the war and will probably continue. Thus, for example, they won’t sell yarn, which the folks here could use to weave for themselves and make cheap textiles. Instead they insist that Indonesia buy textiles from them which they can sell at a high price. He is violent on the subject of big business and says that unless the United States realizes that Indonesia needs socialism, they will have Russia and/or revolution there. He also says the United States is being very foolish to spread propaganda (U.S.I.S.) about the virtues of United States capitalism everywhere, and how all people must be like Americans. Such freedom can be afforded only in the United States and the latter must get the idea that poor lands must have a different system. (Can he be a crypto-communist? The line Resink takes could be a Communist one indirectly, and he is clearly trying to get me to tell it. He says the United States believes only Americans, and that is why I am important. On the other hand he may be merely a sincere sociologist.) Anyway it is interesting to see that my point (in the Linton symposium) on former colonies
Kennedy’s ethnographic skills produced rare representations of the political consciousness of villagers in different regions of Indonesia. As an old OSS hand, Kennedy understood the value that such ethnographic details from a region poised to move toward communism provided to American intelligence agencies.

While documents establish Kennedy’s work with the OSS, his postwar intelligence work, his political writings on postcolonial Indonesia, the extent to which his ethnographic field notes focused on the emerging political shifts of post-Dutch Indonesia, and the informed speculations of Winks, Cady, and others that he was working with the CIA at the time of his death, we are left without documentation establishing links to the CIA or other intelligence agencies at the time of his murder (see McKinzie 1974: 34; Winks 1987: 50).

Although I found no documents firmly establishing that Kennedy’s fieldwork was linked to the CIA at the time of his murder, I identified a CIA operative, funded by the same anthropological research foundation, who was carrying out ethnographic research in Indonesia similar to Kennedy’s just months after his murder.

Lloyd Millegan, Replacement Ethnographer?

I first learned of Lloyd S. Millegan’s Indonesian research in the 1951 Viking Fund annual report listing him as receiving a predoctoral 1950 fellowship for fieldwork “to aid anthropological studies in Indonesia since independence, and prospects for future studies” (Viking Fund 1951: 157). His project was the only listed grant without a university affiliation, instead listing his affiliation as “Fairfax, Virginia.” When I consulted Viking Fund records, I learned that Millegan’s CV listed years of CIA employment.

During the war, Millegan worked at OSS for Joseph Ralston Hayden, an adviser to General Douglas MacArthur (see JRH; Gehrke 1976: 204, 216). Millegan worked on several intelligence and insurgency operations, and during the final months of the war he developed recommendations for the U.S. plan “for the cultural reorganization of the Philippines” (JRH, 42–27).

The Viking Fund sponsored Millegan’s “Survey of Anthropological Studies in Indonesia since Independence and Prospects for Future Studies,” and Millegan
expressed interest in undertaking “similar surveys in Burma, Thailand, Malaya and Indonesia” (LSM, CV 9/6/50). Millegan’s Viking Fund grant application listed his employment in the CIA as a research analyst and chief of the Southeast Asia Branch, from 1946 to 1950. The application described his research plan as follows:

I am scheduled to leave the United States for Indonesia on 30 September to undertake a survey trip for Pacific Books, Inc. to determine the feasibility of establishing a bookstore or chain of bookstores in Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries. During the two months I expect to be in Indonesia I will be traveling widely and will visit most of the educational and research institutions in the area. The nature of my visit will offer a unique opportunity to undertake the proposed survey. I would contemplate making a detailed report which would be available for publication and as a guide to those interested in anthropological studies in Indonesia. I plan to return to the United States early in December for a short period and contemplate returning to the area to undertake further survey work in Burma, Thailand, Malaya and Indochina. (LSM, 9/6/50 application)

Millegan listed “other personnel involved” as including his consultations with John Embree, Dr. and Mrs. Edward S. C. Handy, and “officials of the Viking Fund.”

Millegan requested $3,000 to cover a year of research in Burma, Indochina, Indonesia, Malaya, and Thailand (LSM, 9/6/50 application). Pacific Books, Inc. covered Millegan’s travel to Indonesia. Millegan listed John Embree (Yale), Dr. Edward S. C. Handy of Oakland, Virginia, and Mr. David Bernstein as personal references. The same day that Millegan’s application was marked as received, Paul Fejos sent an internal Viking Fund memo to Mr. R. C. Hunt recommending that his application for a predoctoral fellowship be approved for $1,500. Millegan had no anthropological training and no academic affiliation, and his project had no identified anthropological content, yet Fejos found “the candidate and aims are worthy of Viking Fund aid” (LSM, PF to RCH 9/8/50). That same day, an award letter and check for $1,500 were sent to Millegan, authorizing Viking Fund grant number 508 (LSM, PF to LM 9/8/50).

One week after Fejos approved Millegan’s grant application, the Viking Fund received its first letter of recommendation supporting his application. David Bernstein, of the Federal Security Agency, praised Millegan, noting their work together at the OSS. Bernstein wrote that Millegan would “make a real contribution to anthropological studies. He is intimately familiar with the Indonesian scene and has had many opportunities to establish and strengthen his personal
contacts, as well as the possibilities for rapid acquisition of information there” (LSM, DB to PF 9/15/50). Edward Handy’s recommendation letter stated that “war service and subsequent work with the Central Intelligence Agency have given [Millegen] a wide acquaintanceship with the whole region of Indonesia and Southeast Asia probably unexcelled by any American at the present time” (LSM, SCH to PF 9/16/50). John Embree wrote that he had known Millegen for “several years” and knew him to be “able and reliable,” though he noted, “Mr. Millegen has no formal training in anthropology.” Embree believed Millegen would produce a good report on the “current situation in Indonesia” (LSM, JE to PF 11/19/50).

Millephan’s résumé, application, and recommendations clearly informed the Viking Fund that it was financing a recent CIA employee. Fejos acted outside of normal Viking Fund protocols by immediately approving a predoctoral fellowship for an individual with no demonstrable plans to enroll in any graduate program and no links to any academic institution. Millegen was not an anthropologist. He had no anthropological training. He had no plans to pursue graduate work in anthropology. It seems likely that Fejos’s support for Millegen’s application was guided by information not recorded in Millegen’s file. While the details of how Millegen came to be funded are unclear, the CIA may have directly encouraged the Viking Fund to support him.

Viking Fund founder Axel Wenner-Gren’s postwar problems with the FBI and the State Department (problems involving his reported ties to German war interests) likely made the Viking Fund eager to cooperate with a CIA request, if personnel were discreetly contacted about funding Millegen’s “research” in Indonesia. It is also possible that the FBI’s extensive investigations of Paul Fejos’s wife, Inga Arvad, as a suspected Nazi agent may have led Fejos to assist an apparent CIA operation. There are no records of contacts between Viking Fund personnel and the CIA on this matter.

Exactly what Lloyd Millegen did while in Indonesia is unclear. His son, Kris Millegen, confirmed that his father traveled to Java in 1950. In a telephone interview (KM 9/28/10), Kris Millegen told me that his father’s CIA assignment was to establish an American bookstore in Indonesia, which was to function as a CIA front organization where he would run operatives collecting intelligence in the countryside that would monitor shifting political attitudes, especially those relating to the spread of communism (KM 9/28/10).

Millephan’s research plan hinged on gleaning information from American and Dutch anthropologists who had conducted fieldwork in Indonesia. In September 1950, before leaving for Indonesia, Millegen met with John Embree and
Harold Conklin at Yale, and with William Thomas at the Viking Fund, each of whom provided him with contact information for Indonesia’s top anthropologists (“including, Vand der Hoop, Von Vaal Basil, Hooykas, Cense, Grader and others”). Once he was in Indonesia, Millegan discovered that these anthropologists had left the country (LSM, 6/15/51).

Millegan traveled to Indonesia in October 1950, where he set up his Pacific Book store in Java and began establishing connections with various people (KM 9/28/10). He also worked at an Indonesian museum, where a librarian told him he “would find very little information on current work because of this exodus of the Dutch Anthropologists,” but he wrote that he “collected all the material I could and secured some information concerning Indonesians who may be continuing some work in Anthropology.” He found that, “in general, it appears that anthropological research is at a low ebb in Indonesia and will continue until some younger Indonesians have been stimulated in developing an interest in this field” (LSM, 6/15/51).

Millegan contracted dysentery, which prevented him from concluding his planned research. When the news of his parents’ death in a plane crash reached him in December 1950, he returned to the United States. Millegan went back to Indonesia in early 1951, but in his reports to the Viking Fund he wrote that he did not accomplish the research he had hoped to undertake.17

On June 15, 1951, Millegan sent the Viking Fund his brief “Preliminary Report: Survey of Anthropological Studies in Indonesia since Independence and Prospect for Future Studies.” This report mirrored established CIA methods for harnessing the field research of others, a process in which the CIA contacted academic experts on the foreign area of interest and these scholars briefed CIA operatives before these operatives traveled abroad (see SII 1983). Millegan used his status as a Viking Fund–sponsored “anthropologist” to gain the confidence of, and access to, Indonesian scholars.

In 1951, the Viking Fund changed its name to the Wenner-Gren Foundation. Once back stateside, Lloyd Millegan and his wife, Eudora, had dinner and other social interactions with William L. Thomas, the Wenner-Gren assistant director of research. Correspondence mentions family dinners and includes indications of a friendly social relationship. Millegan later wrote Thomas on behalf of Frank Sakran, who was working on an upcoming Arab State Exposition, inquiring whether Sakran could receive Wenner-Gren funds for this work (LSM, LM to WT 11/14/52). In other correspondence, Millegan mentioned a “Dr. Eckel,” a likely reference to Far East scholar, OSS, and CIA employee Paul Eckel (LSM, LM to WT 9/30/50; see Albright and Kunstel 1990).18 Thomas wrote
Millegan, asking for information on anthropologist H. R. Van Heekeren's work in Indonesia (lsm, WT to LM 9/4/51). In later correspondence, Millegan inquired about contacts with museum anthropologists and archaeologists working in the Middle East, and Thomas passed along the names of Froelich Rainey, Schuyler Camman, and Carleton Coon (lsm, WT to LM 9/20/52). Millegan's Wenner-Gren file documented several years of correspondence as the foundation struggled to collect Millegan's final report on his Indonesian fieldwork.

Millegan’s Wenner-Gren file contains a 1955 pamphlet for a global missionary program launched by Millegan called Missions Unlimited. This pamphlet described his CIA work and other activities under the heading “Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. 1956–51”: “As an Intelligence Analyst, Intelligence Officer and Branch Chief in this agency assisted in the organization and development of a research unit, composed of twelve professionals and three clericals, conducting research on all of the Southeast Asian countries east of India and Pakistan, together with the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, and all the smaller Pacific Islands. As Chief of this unit participated in the research program for all of Asia” (lsm, 1955 pamphlet). The pamphlet acknowledged Millegan was in the CIA during the period that he traveled to Indonesia with Viking funding. His file also listed his work as president of the Pacific Book and Supply Corporation (New York City and Djakarta, 1951–52) (lsm).

**Pacific Book and Supply**

It was unusual for the Viking Fund to sponsor a research proposal seeking to establish a bookstore in another country. Pacific Book and Supply was first incorporated in Wilmington, Delaware, in 1946, by Lloyd Millegan (president) and officers of the corporation: Henry H. Douglas (vice president), Guy J. Millegan (secretary and treasurer), and Harry C. Shriefer (FBI 100–346660–2, 12/23/46).

In September 1946, the FBI investigated Pacific Book, with suspicions that its interests in publishing books relating to Asia indicated links to international communism. The FBI learned that Pacific Book had accepted five manuscripts for publication and noted links to the East West Association, the China American Council of Commerce and Industry, and the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR); IPR later became a target of FBI investigations for links between American academics and communism. The FBI reported that “a number of visitors have called at the Pacific Book office, among whom are a number of Chinese military officers and one individual known as Sam Halpern.” At that time
Halpern was conducting U.S. military intelligence work, often working with Edward Lansdale in Asia. Halpern would later work on the CIA’s Bay of Pigs operations in Cuba. The FBI noted Millegan’s and Douglas’s connections to Kenneth Langdon of the Department of State (FBI 100–3466601, 9/18/46). In 1951, Publishers Weekly listed Lloyd Millegan as the “President of Pacific Book and Supply . . . now living in Djakarta” and identified Cass Canfield, Harold H. Stern, and Edgar Allen Prichard as corporation directors and Alvin Grauer as the corporation manager.

In 1951, Pacific Book’s director, Edgar Allen Prichard, was the mayor of Fairfax, Virginia, a prominent Washington, DC, lawyer, and a veteran of the OSS. Canfield, Grauer, and Franklyn Forkert each established permanent careers in publishing. Cass Canfield’s wartime intelligence work included posts at the Office of War Information and the Board of Economic Warfare. Canfield was the president and publisher at Harper and Row, a founder of the journal Foreign Affairs, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, with long-standing CIA ties. In 1972, Canfield played a role in the CIA’s efforts to censor Alfred McCoy’s book The Politics of Heroin. After McCoy completed the manuscript in 1972 under contract with Harper and Row, he was told by Harper and Row president, Winthrop Knowlton that the CIA sent Cord Meyer Jr. to visit his old friend Canfield, hoping to convince him that McCoy’s book represented a national security threat (see McCoy 1991: xvi). In The Cultural Cold War, Frances Saunders mentioned a range of passive and active relationships Canfield maintained with the CIA, describing Canfield as having “enjoyed prolific links to the world of intelligence, both as a former psychological warfare officer, and as a close personal friend of Allen Dulles, whose memoirs The Craft of Intelligence he published in 1963” (1999: 136). Canfield directed Bantam Books, Grosset and Dunlap, and Harper Brothers, but he also worked with CIA personnel on publishing projects, including facilitating Richard Crossman’s CIA-backed book detailing the stories of disillusioned former communists, Lost Illusion, and Arthur Koestler et al.’s book The God That Failed (Saunders 1999: 64; 136).

Canfield sat on the board of the Farfield Foundation, a CIA funding front directed by CIA agent Frank Platt (Saunders 1999: 136); the Board also included William A. M. Burden, Godfrey S. Rockefeller, Whitelaw Reid, and Charles Fleischmann (see Swanepoel 2007: 143). As a CIA conduit, the Farfield Foundation directed CIA funds to the Council on Cultural Freedom and other organizations the CIA hoped to nurture and influence (see Saunders 1999).

In 1951, Pacific Book produced an eighty-five-page catalog listing and describing about a thousand titles in the company’s inventory. The catalog’s introduction
stressed these books’ importance to Indonesia’s development. Catalog copy claimed that with the assistance of the U.S. office the company provided books “that will help in the great work of raising Indonesia to her rightful place among the nations of the world” (Indira 1951: iv).

Pacific Book stocked a diverse selection of titles, including collections on the sciences, engineering, technical agricultural, and medicine, as well as current and classic works of literature, history, and political science. This was not just a collection of pro-American books pressing CIA conceptions of anticommunism and democracy; it was a mix of technical books and historical and political analysis, including critical works like Owen Lattimore et al.’s 1950 Pivot of Asia and anticolonialism collections, such as volumes of Jawaharlal Nehru’s writings. There were also books more obviously aligned with CIA ideology, including John Foster Dulles’s China and America (1946), Kermit Roosevelt’s Arabs, Oil and History (1949), T. Cuyler Young’s (1951) Near East Culture and Society, and Dwight Eisenhower’s select speeches. The catalog included a mixture of books on Islamic civilization, ranging from the work of orientalists Harold Lamb, H. A. R. Gibb, Harry St. John Bridger Philby, and Philip Hitti to the writings of Ibn Khaldun. There were books by Will Durant, Aristotle, Bertrand Russell, Pitirim Sorokin, Sigmund Freud, Herbert Spencer, Ashley Montagu, Lewis Mumford, Robert Frost, Walt Whitman, Hortense Powdermaker, John Steinbeck, Gertrude Stein, Cora Du Bois, Kingsley Davis, Anna Louise Strong, Carleton Coon, Mark Twain, and Margaret Mead.

The company’s catalog had a predominance of books on engineering and economics, and technological books aligned with the infrastructure needs of new nations, supporting the needs of the coming Rostowian push for modernization. The specific selection of titles stocked by Pacific Book may have been of little importance depending on functional uses of the front. If Pacific Book and Supply primarily served as an outpost for CIA intelligence collection and shipping functions in Indonesia, the book titles stocked may have had little significance.

At Pacific Book in 1951, Millegan became the exclusive Indonesian distributor for Time-Life International publications (Publishers Weekly 1951, 160: 2251). Publishers Weekly described Millegan’s Viking Fund–financed trip to Indonesia as an “exploratory trip to southeast Asia to test the immediate market and perfect his plans for an American company which would purchase books directly in America and sell to its own customers abroad” (Publishers Weekly 1952 162: 242). At the time of Millegan’s resignation, Publishers Weekly announced Franklyn Forkert was “in Indonesia representing the Pacific Book and Sup-
ply Corporation and working with Indira, an Indonesian firm, on the sales of American trade and technical books and American education supplies” (Publishers Weekly 1952, 162: 242).23

**Enticements of the Field**

While there are several documented instances of anthropologist-spies, few anthropologists have historically used their professional credentials and fieldwork as covers for espionage. Yet, archaeologists and cultural anthropologists have been accused of engaging in spying, and rumors of field-based espionage have long circulated within the field. Rumors of links to the CIA and other intelligence agencies create dangers for those under suspicion and for others working in the field; even scholarly examinations of historical interactions between anthropologists and spies make many in the discipline uneasy. Some anthropologists worry that documenting past disciplinary connections to the CIA could increase suspicion of contemporary anthropologists and archaeologists.

Anthropology articulates with the world it studies through fieldwork. Whether on large, organized archaeological expeditions or small-scale, self-funded research trips undertaken on dilapidated buses or by bush taxi to remote villages, anthropologists during the Cold War frequently traveled to regions of interest to the CIA and Pentagon planners at rates higher than those in most other professions, and the discipline had a mixture of real and imagined interfaces with military and intelligence agencies. Fieldwork scattered hundreds of individual anthropologists in the backwater villages of a world imagined by the Pentagon to soon be the front lines of a global battleground with international communism, and the unobtrusive, often undirected queries of anthropologists seeking knowledge about topics like postmarital residence patterns or language drift brought many legitimate anthropologists and occasionally provided cover for a few anthropologist-spies. Participant observation’s approach to cultural understanding gave ethnographers the sort of cultural knowledge that made the discipline attractive to intelligence agencies wanting to understand the hearts and minds of those living in lands of geopolitical interest.24

While many anthropologists privately discussed being approached by governmental officials asking for briefings upon their return from fieldwork, and some (like Marvin Harris, discussed earlier in this chapter, and John Allison, discussed in chapter 6) described suspicions that their field notes may have been read or taken by governmental agencies, there has been little scholarly discussion of these possibilities. Some of these activities appear to have continued
after the end of the Cold War. In 1995, an American anthropologist writing under the pseudonym “Brooks Duncan” described being approached in the 1990s by FBI, CIA, and State Department personnel requesting information on his research in Russia. When Duncan refused to cooperate, he was harassed by FBI agents; later his research notes disappeared when “the Pan Am bag (supplied to me at the airport by Pan Am for repacking) containing all my scholarly documents, lists of contacts and writings and syllabi materials disappeared en route to my research in Russia and was never found” (Duncan 1995: 9). When he sought help from colleagues, senior professors and civil liberties groups advised him to “do nothing unless I felt like sacrificing my career. They expressed their belief that wherever I applied for a job, someone on the faculty would make things difficult for me” (9).

Even in instances where individuals had witting CIA links that sent them out into the world to gather information or establish networks (cases like John Dimick or the claims of Frank Hibben), they created inverted-duplicitous forms of dual use anthropology. And given the secrecy surrounding CIA operations, we are left with more questions than answers regarding many of these interactions. With the passage of time, scholars will gain access to more archival records and documents under the Freedom of Information Act, which will shed more light on such interactions between anthropologists and intelligence agencies.

Many questions remain about Kennedy, Millegan, and others discussed in this chapter. Though several scholars assert that Kennedy was gathering information for the U.S. government and was linked to the CIA at the time of his death, documentation of this relationship has not been released by the CIA or found in accessible archives. Likewise, there is no documentation establishing that Lloyd Millegan was sent to conduct faux ethnographic research as a direct replacement for the slain Raymond Kennedy. But even with gaps in our knowledge, we can view Kennedy’s ethnographic project — like all ethnographic research in Indonesia during this period — as easily fitting into CIA agent Millegan’s research plan (as financed by the Viking Fund) of combing existing ethnographic research, looking for information of interest to be synthesized into reports. Such reports have dual audiences and dual uses, and there were likely other reports for other audiences drawing on these same data.

While ethnographic reports from the field were of interest to the CIA and the Pentagon for various reasons, it was the promise of using specific cultural knowledge to inform counterinsurgency operations — as a desired means of controlling other populations through some imagined deep cultural competence — that kept interest in ethnographic research alive in military and intelligence circles.
Unlike efforts to use the eyes and ears of anthropologists to gather reports of developments in distant lands where they conducted fieldwork as a means of gathering specific intelligence, intelligence programs linked to counterinsurgency operations drew more frequently on the funding reports or published academic works of anthropologists writing up the findings of their research long after they had returned home from their fieldwork.