Cold War Anthropology

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US AID is the CIA’s little sister.

FATHER GEORGE COTTER | 1981

FIVE ANTHROPOLOGISTS AND STATE

Aid, Debt, and Other Cold War Weapons of the Strong

Assuming the role of a powerful victor in the postwar world, the U.S. State Department asserted new global powers that brought opportunities for anthropologists interested in working for State or other civilian governmental agencies or as civilians working for military branches. One mid-1950s anthropologist working for the U.S. government described the activities of Mutual Security Agency anthropologists as ranging from helping “explain to American businessmen the differences in cultures to be taken into consideration in planning aid and reorganization of foreign industries” to acting as advisers to R. L. McNamara on developments in Southeast Asia (MacGregor 1955: 423).

Anthropologists found a broad range of civilian governmental employment opportunities at home and abroad. In 1950, Edward Jandy left his anthropology professorship at Wayne State University to become cultural officer at the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv (nbaaa 1950 4[3]: 3). In 1948, Philleo Nash, Harry S. Truman’s presidential specialist on minority matters, helped draft Executive Order 9981, which racially integrated the armed forces (MacGregor 1985: 309–14). T. Dale Stewart helped identify the remains of dead U.S. soldiers for the army during the Korean War; Edward T. Hall and Glen Fisher taught cultural sensitivity training courses at the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute (FSI) (424). Civilian archaeologists worked on many military cultural resource management projects that were at times linked to development or acquisition of American military bases.1

Responding to a request from John Bennett and Clyde Kluckhohn, in late 1950, Harvard anthropologist John Pelzel produced a report on two Korean villages occupied by North Korean forces (Oppenheim 2008: 228). The American embassy in Lebanon developed a “special branch of the Foreign Service Institute”
that employed anthropologist Kepler Lewis and linguist Charles Ferguson to provide “intensive training for younger foreign service officers preparing for a career in the Near East” (MacGregor 1955: 426). Secretary of State John Foster Dulles appointed David Mandelbaum to the U.S. National Commission to UNESCO (baaa 1957 5[3–4]: 1). During the late 1940s, several anthropologists took positions at the FSI, where they continued in roles that had become familiar for the discipline during the war. At FSI, Edward Kennard became a professor of anthropology, Henry L. Smith directed the FSI’s School of Language Training, and George Trager took on a professorship of linguistics (nbaaa 1949 3[1]: 5). And while these and other anthropological contributions to civilian governmental tasks at the State Department and elsewhere were considerable and widespread, many anthropologists considered this work as peripheral to the discipline’s core.

After the war, Cora Du Bois moved from OSS to the Department of State, where she was the chief of the department’s Intelligence Research Southeast Asia Branch from 1945 to 1949. The FBI investigated Du Bois as a possible communist because of her anticolonialist views, her participation in progressive political movements, and her past employment by Owen Lattimore, American scholar of China accused by Senator Joseph McCarthy of being a Communist spy (see D. H. Price 2004b: 293–97). Du Bois’s exit from governmental employment illustrates the narrowness of political thought that was tolerated in governmental service during the postwar years.

During the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s and into the early 1960s, advertisements for military, intelligence, or State Department positions routinely appeared in the News Bulletin of the AAA (e.g., nbaaa 1952 6[6]: 4). One advertisement from 1952 described positions in the State Department’s Office of Intelligence Research, which was seeking anthropologists to conduct “interpretive studies of areas, ethnic and linguistic groups”; the advertisement requested that applicants provide their dissertation abstracts for governmental distribution (nbaaa 1961 5[2]: 5). Among those anthropologists who answered the State Department’s call was John Embree, one of America’s most knowledgeable scholars of East Asia.

John Embree’s Vision for Anthropologists of State

Because of his prewar fieldwork in Japan and his travels in Asia, John Embree’s ethnographic knowledge was in high demand by military and intelligence agencies during and after the war (D. H. Price 2008a: 152–53, 173–76). In 1947,
Embree became the first cultural relations adviser at the U.S. embassy in Bangkok; a year later he took a USIS position at the American embassy in Saigon, then soon left to assume a position in Yale’s Southeast Asia Area Studies Program (NBAAA 1947 1[1]: 8; NBAAA 1948 2[1]: 12).

Embree’s governmental work led to a significant critique of governmental applied anthropology. He questioned the likelihood that anthropologists’ efforts could remain unentangled from the corrupting influences of governmental sponsors (NBAAA 1948 2[4]: 61). In recounting the problems facing anthropologists working as cultural officers abroad, Embree described the double binds anthropologists faced as they tried to spread “knowledge among nations for the ultimate good of all,” while their governmental sponsors expected them to spread knowledge in ways favoring U.S. geopolitical interests as defined “by the current government in Washington.” Embree warned his colleagues that “an anthropologist who serves as cultural officer is thus soon faced with a problem in professional ethics” (1949: 156).

Embree broadly critiqued the philosophical basis and implementation of postwar applied anthropology. He attacked the commonplace rankings of cultures as either simple or complex, noting that before World War II Japan was widely described as a “progressive” nation, yet when the war broke out, many anthropologists described Japanese culture as “evil,” “pathological,” or “adolescent” (Embree 1950: 430). He ridiculed wartime anthropologists who had tried “to show that Japanese society was not only different from western European — an acceptable anthropological proposition — but also tried to demonstrate that their peculiar culture made the Japanese warlike and aggressive as individuals and expansionist as a nation. This was done by resort to ingenious theories concerning toilet training, Emperor worship and food habits” (430).

Embree described U.S. anthropologists’ work in Micronesia as demonstrating a paternalistic “white man’s burden” (1950: 430) attitude toward Micronesians that was reminiscent “of French and British colonialists who have devoted their lives unselfishly to administration of the affairs of their little brown brothers” (431). He critiqued George Murdock’s ethnocentrism, writing that Murdock had brought the discipline “full circle,” back to the “views and sentiment of the nineteenth century foreign investors, convert-seeking missionaries, and writers such as Kipling singing the praises of the docile brown man — when ruled by western man” (431).

Embree was outraged that anthropologists managed people in ways that served administrators, instead of giving voice to the desires of studied peoples. He denounced the “recent trend” of applied anthropology, declaring that international
projects managed local populations in ways that met the needs of government administrators abroad, while industrial applied anthropologists sold out workers to their managers at home. Embree argued that America needed to “learn some self restraint if she is not to ruin the people and cultures of the world.” He hoped American anthropologists would play a role in offering “intellectual leadership” while remaining aware of the dangers of “falling in love with their own culture and their own professional folkways to such an extent as to lose sight of their primary object: to study the nature of man and his culture, of the relations between men and their cultures” (Embree 1950: 431–32).

Embree’s critique brought several responses that were published in American Anthropologist. John Fischer, an anthropologist working for the Civil Administration Unit of the Ponape Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, admitted that Embree’s piece “struck a very sympathetic note,” acknowledging that governmental anthropologists must support the rule of administrators and reduce “trouble” with the locals, and that most administrators essentially want to Americanize those they administer. Fischer conceded that “an applied anthropologist who devoted his major effort to opposing this general goal would, I believe, accomplish very little except the eventual termination of his employment” (1951: 133). Yet Fischer defended these practices, arguing that these applied anthropologists were not “simply a tool of the administration” (133). He stressed that an applied anthropologist working between the cultures of administrators and the culture he was hired to study must “be careful of passing judgment on the ways of the inferior group (inferior in the social sense), he must also be careful about passing judgment on the ways and values of the superior group which employs him” (133). With such derogatory language, Fischer only dug deeper the hole begun by Embree; he appeared only a few quatrains away from channeling Kipling.

Fischer argued that “when a politically and economically powerful society takes over a weaker society we may expect the weaker society to change more in conformity with the more powerful than the reverse.” Fischer claimed the directionality of these changes existed not because of differences between military might, but “partly because the weaker society seeks to imitate the more powerful in order to become more powerful itself” (1951: 133). Fischer claimed this situation would be made worse if the “superior culture” inhibited the “inferior culture’s” emulation, but he acknowledged things would be different if the “inferior group” hired its own applied anthropologists (134). Fischer compared the role of applied anthropology to that of past waves of American missionaries sent to proselytize in the undeveloped world, writing that he hoped “perhaps in
the present age there would be some public support for anthropological ‘missionaries,’ who would however try to help dependent peoples hold, develop, and realize their own systems of values in the face of alien domination instead of imposing on them a foreign system” (134).

Douglas Haring rejected Embree’s critiques, declaring that he upheld “the right of native tribes to adopt civilized ways, and the right of any ethical human being to encourage such adoption, especially if by education and experience he is fitted to foresee the probable extinction of natives who fail to make the change. This does not for a moment grant the right of superior military or political power to enforce such acculturation merely in the interest of power politics. If this be ethnocentrism, I accept the onus” (1951: 137).

But Jules Henry embraced Embree’s critique, adding his own attack on the dominance of personality and culture studies that focused on “studies of the enemy” and pointing out how frequently these studies found enemy cultures to be “rigid,” “hypochondriacal,” “paranoid,” “neurotic,” or suffering from “mass megalomania” (1951: 134). Henry declared that “a study of ‘enemy’ personality that finds the enemy [to have a] diseased mentality is hardly worthy of scientific consideration” (135).

In December 1950, Embree was killed by a drunk driver, and thus he was unable to respond to these comments; his death left American anthropology without a clear voice that could critically straddle the gap between Ivy League academia and governmental anthropology. Embree’s critique of the political realities of Cold War applied anthropology remained largely dormant for the next decade and a half, and the rising political chill of McCarthyism provided incentives for anthropologists to develop other arguments (D. H. Price 2013b). Within this silence, the ubiquity of the dysfunctions identified by Embree came to be seen as normal features of these interactions. Increasing numbers of anthropologists and bureaucrats working on these projects internalized these contradictions in ways that helped camouflage ethical and political shortcomings as inevitable parts of the workplace environment.

As Cold War global patron-client relations developed, the Pentagon and State Department supported new economic assistance programs. Some of these provided agricultural or technological assistance, others provided military aid, and some supplied both. During the first sixteen years after World War II, several agencies (under both State and Defense, with names like the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA), the Mutual Security Agency (MSA), and Point IV) distributed this aid, and anthropologists provided a steady supply of labor for these programs. The birth, life, and death of these short-lived postwar
assistance programs can best be understood in the context of a larger administrative evolutionary framework stretching from the creation of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA) in 1942 to the establishment of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in 1961.

**USAID’s Prehistory: Alphabet Soup, TCA, MSA, and Others**

In 1942, the Institute of Inter-American Affairs (1942–55) began as a wartime agency collecting regional intelligence and providing economic and technical assistance to poorer nations of North and South America. In Europe, the Marshall Plan was overseen by the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), an agency directed by both the Department of Commerce and the State Department, though the ECA’s charge and operations were temporally limited to the years 1948–52, as specified war restorations ended and new agencies took up variations on these initial postwar projects. Many of these economic assistance programs were elements of American counterinsurgency operations, broadly defined as practices designed to prevent uprising and to support the legitimacy or powerbase of existing regimes (see Price 2010a: 162).

As the Cold War developed, two new agencies emerged. The Technical Cooperation Administration (1950–53) delivered humanitarian technical assistance programs (Point IV) without direct military aid, while the Mutual Security Agency (1951–53) mixed technical assistance with military aid. Both programs developed independently until political forces favored the creation of a single agency (into which the remains of IIAA, MSA, and TCA were merged): the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA, 1953–55). The FOA provided technical assistance and “mutual security activities” to politically aligned nations—a shift that explicitly transformed the supposedly neutral aid of Point IV into a soft power Cold War weapon. The FOA needed people with anthropological skill sets to help implement these assistance programs, and anthropologists contributed to FOA projects in India and the Philippines (MacGregor 1955: 424).

In 1955, the International Cooperation Administration (ICA, 1955–61) was formed as an agency administering nonmilitary assistance projects. Finally, the creation of USAID in 1961 established an agency that merged humanitarian assistance and development assistance with what would develop as a broad range of counterinsurgency programs (figure 5.1).

The institutional evolution of agencies housing these Cold War aid programs reveals congressional and executive ambivalence over which types and programs to fund, as well as connections between aid and raw Cold War politics.
Establishing the CIA during the war presented few political problems, especially because it was overseen by Nelson Rockefeller, one of the world’s richest men, who at times mixed his own long-term financial interests with the interests of the institute. Creating the MSA and TCA, as two separate agencies, enabled the United States to spread military power and the appearance of humanitarian goodwill. The lack of political backing for Point IV as a relatively more neutral political tool demonstrated America’s low commitment to soft power projects and nonmilitary aid during the period. With time, this evolution through transitional forms (FOA and ICA) led to the establishment of USAID as an agency supporting passive military- and diplomatically linked counterinsurgency operations that were extensions of U.S. international political agendas.

**Point IV**

In his 1949 inaugural speech, President Harry S. Truman announced a four-point plan for his administration. First, there would be continuing support for the United Nations; second, the United States would support the postwar global economic recovery; third, the United States would exhibit solidarity with the North Atlantic alliance; and fourth, the United States would “embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas” (Truman 1949). The last item in this four-point plan, the commitment to global development aid, came to be known as “Point IV,” and anthropologists were soon identified as important agents in its development. As historian Peter Mandler noted, Point IV “portended both opportunity and danger. On the surface the tremendous opportunities opened up by Point IV gave at last a point of direct entry into postwar international politics for anthropologists interested and expert in the less-developed world. However, by blurring the boundaries between multilateral UN programmes and bilateral US programmes, Point IV also had the potential to draw anthropologists who were either uninterested in or overtly hostile to America’s interests overseas into compromising situations” (Mandler 2013: 262).

In 1949, the AAA established the Committee on Anthropology and Point IV, chaired by Gordon Willey and composed of Gordon Bowles, Wendell Bennett, John Embree, George Foster, and Frederick Johnson (AA 1951 [3]: 447, 449). Willey wanted to position the discipline so that once Congress funded Point IV, “an anthropologist [would] be appointed to the staff of the General Manager of Point IV, and others be attached to Technical Cooperation Missions in those countries where there will be sizable Point IV operations, and that still others be attached
to action field projects dealing with fundamental education, public health, maternal and child welfare, nutrition, irrigation and reclamation, housing and general industrialization” (AA 1950 52[1]: 155). The Smithsonian’s Institute of Social Anthropology, with its wartime roots and governmental connections, was seen as the logical point to coordinate anthropological contributions to Point IV, and George Foster was to facilitate these links (ISA Series 1, Box 1 “Resolution”).

Willey worked as a liaison with the State Department, and in May 1950 he began writing “a general anthropological indoctrination manual” to be used by Foreign Service personnel (AA 1951 [3]: 448). The manual used anthropological perspectives to ease difficulties in culture contact. A month before his death, John Embree was appointed to work with the NRC and Point IV to oversee the production of a Point IV training manual, a task that was later taken on by Conrad Arensberg (AA 1951 [3]: 449; AA 1952 [2]: 285).

Gordon Willey’s report, titled “Anthropology and the Point IV Program,” described the value of anthropology’s relativistic outlook for Point IV and outlined how anthropologists working as members of academic teams with economists, agricultural technicians, and other experts could implement development programs abroad. Willey envisioned anthropologists working as intermediaries, helping translate “native” viewpoints to Western developers; he provided hypothetical examples of ways that “native beliefs in the supernatural nature of disease and its treatment by . . . medicine” or traditional beliefs about agriculture could be mitigated by anthropologists taking active roles in the development process (ISA 1, 1, 9/22/49). He acknowledged that some anthropologists would be critical of linking research with such an overtly political project, conceding that “scientific research which is administratively united to the applications of the results of the research stands always in [a] very real danger of having its objective investigative function warped by the administrative outlook and desires” (ISA 1, 1, 9/22/49). Willey argued against dismantling the ISA or transforming it into an agency that was primarily devoted to Point IV. Instead, he recommended that a board of anthropologists (and the AAA’s executive secretary) with diverse geographic areas of expertise consult with a chief Point IV anthropologist (ISA 1, 1, 9/22/49).

The State Department’s TCA, established in 1950, oversaw Point IV’s development. The TCA did not sponsor military aid, instead focusing on programs to transfer technology or agricultural techniques to underdeveloped nations. Separate from the TCA, but with some overlapping functions, was the MSA, established in the following year), which provided both military and technical assistance to underdeveloped nations that were of strategic interest to the United States.
A 1952 Point IV job advertisement in the *News Bulletin of the AAA* described Point IV assistant program officer position openings in South Asia, the Near East, and Africa. The ad, which sought applicants trained in cultural anthropology, linked Point IV to past governmental projects drawing on anthropological expertise; it stated that “qualification for these positions requires previous field experience with people of two or more cultures, experience in the applied social science field, for example community analysts with War Relocation Authority, or teaching at the assistant or associate professor level” (*NBAAA* 1952 6[3]: 4).

In general, anthropologists who supported Point IV publicly characterized it as a politically neutral program. Elliot Chapple claimed that it “asked nothing in return” from the countries it would aid, unlike other programs such as the MSA, which “operated on the simple principle that in return for its cooperation it expected military assistance and political allegiance in the struggle against communism” (Chapple 1953: 2).

Point IV was terminated in 1953, after having enacted only pilot projects in Iran, Israel, and Pakistan. Anthropologists held key positions, with H. Naulor, R. Minges, and R. C. Albers working on TCA Point IV projects in Iran and K. Orr working on the early stages of a planned project assisting Bedu in Jordan (MacGregor 1955: 424).

**Walt Rostow and Cold War Theories of Global Development**

Point IV’s political difficulties with Congress arose in part because its supporters lacked a clearly articulated ideological justification for these projects. Walt Rostow’s modernization theory later became a prominent persuasive ideological tool used by Cold War academics and policy makers to rationalize these kinds of Third World economic interventions. It mattered little how flawed Rostow’s theory was; it provided a useful rationalization for establishing valuable patron-client relationships of dependence, but such arguments were not well developed in the early 1950s.

The Center for International Studies supported Rostow as he wrote numerous articles and contributed to nine books that endorsed the strategic philosophy behind these economic aid programs. A mixture of CIA, Ford Foundation, and Rockefeller Foundation funds financed the development of arguments for using foreign aid as an arm of U.S. policy. Rostow’s *Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (1960) provided rationalizations for
development policies linked to American counterinsurgency strategies. Rostow argued that the United States could counter the spread of international communism by identifying and replicating the same historical stages that had occurred within American capitalism. In Rostow’s world, nations’ successful economic development progressed through four universal stages of capitalism: a traditional stage, a take-off stage, the drive to technological maturity, and high mass consumption. Modernization theory’s unilinear evolutionary schema maintained that if underdeveloped countries could progress through the same historical stages of economic development as had occurred in the West — with foreign aid accelerating their technological development — then prosperity would follow. Rostow envisioned an evolutionary progression for underdeveloped nations, culminating in their achievement of a lifestyle of high mass consumption; or, as Marshall Sahlins put it, Rostow was “among the first to perceive that the culmination of human social evolution was shopping” (2000c: 504).

Modernization theory provided the intellectual veneer needed by policy makers seeking to rationalize neocolonial ventures, and the accompanying international economic programs became key components of U.S. Cold War counterinsurgency strategy. Rostow was but one of many postwar American social theorists who focused on “modernization”; others who did so included Edward Shils, David Apter, Lucian Pye, Cyril Black, and Daniel Lerner, and even Talcott Parsons’s adaptations of Weberian notions of traditional and legal rational authority were rooted in analyses of societies mired in traditions that inhibited modernity. Nils Gilman observed that efforts by Parsons, Millikan, and Rostow to reinvent Weber as an optimistic supporter of development capitalism required some academic sleight of hand. Gilman noted, “Just as Marx used the Hegelian dialectic to read the economic history of mid-nineteenth-century Britain, so the modernization theorists used Parsonian theory to understand the postwar changes in impoverished parts of the regions” (2003: 94). Rostow argued that the economic prosperity or poverty of nations could not be reduced to economics, and that prosperity could be engineered by rich nations providing technological infusions along with accompanying ideological overhauls. Rostow’s materialist infusions of hardware provided the poor with new technologies — often sold under interest-bearing loans — while calling for ideological shifts channeling Norman Vincent Peale, as cultures needed to think themselves into modernity and prosperity.

As former colonial states in Africa and Asia gained independence, the attractions of socialism and communism for people ravaged by northern imperialism
were obvious, and Rostow recognized the threat that decolonization represented to American hegemony. Rostow argued that in the 1950s, global decolonialization and the rapid expansion of Chinese and the Soviet economic aid programs in Asia and Africa undermined American authority in would-be client states, developments that could lead to the spread of communism. Because of the necessary parallels to Leninist theories of imperialism Rostow was reluctant to directly critique the historically crippling effects of colonial imperialism. However, he advocated large-scale U.S. economic assistance in the form of technological infusion programs to modernize agricultural or industrial processes, or to bring improved roads or sanitization facilities. Cold War anthropologists and other social scientists often worked as foot soldiers, interacting with local populations, solving logistical problems, or getting “local buy-in” for development projects. Yet many of these programs were of the type later excoriated by John Perkins in Confessions of an Economic Hitman (2004) as undertakings that delivered minimal goods or services and established debts that were used to manipulate domestic policies in client states.

In May 1952, Millikan and Rostow sent DCI Dulles a memorandum titled “Notes on Foreign Economic Policy,” which argued that developed nations should invest in development projects in order to create a “higher real income [to] every free world citizen” (FOIA CIA MORI ID 30405, 5/21/54, 1). They advocated capturing underdeveloped economies as dependent allies in the struggle between capitalists and socialists. They believed underdeveloped nations could be converted into consumers or producers of goods in ways benefiting developed nations. They identified two fundamental “weaknesses” in the current system of economic relationships. First, underdeveloped nations cannot sustain growth. Second, industrial nations lack a source for inexpensively produced goods, which “in the free world economy, properly handled, could be converted into assets: the underdeveloped areas need the products and markets the industrialized areas can supply; the industrialized areas need the markets and products of the underdeveloped countries” (FOIA CIA MORI ID 30405, 5/21/54, 6–7). Millikan and Rostow believed that “in the short run communism must be contained militarily. In the long run we must rely on the development . . . of an environment in which societies which directly or indirectly menace ours will not evolve. We believe the achievement of a degree of steady economic growth is an essential part of such an environment” (FOIA CIA MORI ID 30405, 5/21/54, 3). They argued that the United States had “a particular responsibility in this regard in view of its twofold position as the largest creditor country and as leader of the free world partnership” (FOIA CIA MORI ID 30405, 5/21/54, 17).
Rostow’s work informed CIA approaches to counterinsurgency. On March 15, 1960, he wrote DCI Dulles a memo predicting that at the Paris Summit that was to take place that May, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev would make grand gestures of offering international aid. Rostow advised Dulles that the United States needed to be prepared with contingency plans and listed advantages to the United States producing its own aid initiatives (FOIA WWR to AD, CIA-RDP80B01676R0003700040046–0).

There was nothing hidden about the political role Rostow envisioned modernization theory playing in America’s Cold War struggle against communism. While Rostow subtitled his magnum opus *A Non-Communist Manifesto*, the governmental agencies initiating programs based on modernization theory’s propositions (such as USAID) were seldom viewed as implementing counterinsurgency programs. Many development anthropologists have been uncomfortable acknowledging Rostow’s ideological end goal for world development, instead preferring visions of Third World self-sufficiency that ignore development programs’ legacies of debt and their failures to live up to envisioned outcomes.

The United States was not the only superpower funding Cold War economic development and educational and cultural exchanges; the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China launched their own programs. The CIA worried that communist-financed aid programs presented serious soft power threats to American international dominance (see discussion of Edward S. Hunter in chapter 7). In its secret working paper titled “Soviet Policy toward the Underdeveloped Countries” (1961), the CIA analyzed Soviet efforts to win the hearts and minds of the underdeveloped world and voiced fears of an impending aid race. Summarizing the Soviet Union’s efforts to expand its global influence through economic development projects, the CIA noted a 1954 Soviet Institute of Ethnography symposium that focused on African “cultural achievements and political and economic developments.” The Soviet Africanists at the symposium argued that Western policy for Africa was mired in racist assumptions and sought economic exploitation, whereas these Soviet scholars “advanced an interpretation of African developments based on a ‘long and original path of historical development,’ of a past golden age which was destroyed by Western political and economic intrusion, and in general attributing to Western influence all negative features of African life” (CIA 1961: 24).

A CIA secret intelligence report titled “Communist Cultural and Propaganda Activities in the Less Developed Countries” (1966a) described two Nepalese cultural agreements with the Soviet Union. One program called “for the exchange of delegations, publications, exhibits, films, and radio programs” on an
annual basis; under this program, Nepal received a Soviet performance ensemble, an exhibit of Soviet stamps, one lecturer, an exhibit of photography, and the services of radio experts and “the USSR would receive an 18-member cultural delegation, 25 Nepalese students, three literacy experts, and an exhibit of photography,” as well as exchanges of books and musical recordings, with most of the incurred costs being funded by the host nation (cia 1966a: 8). The CIA report detailed a similar exchange program between Nepal and China and noted that many of these programs created financial difficulties for poorer nations as they struggled to reciprocate (cia 1966a: 8); in these struggles, the CIA found opportunities for the United States to capitalize on these hardships. American programs such as Fulbright Scholar Program (which had no CIA links), as well as programs with CIA links, established relationships similar to those with the Soviets, but without requiring these poorer nations to provide funds.

**Dual Use Aid: USAID as Assistance and Counterinsurgency**

After the relatively rapid succession of short-lived international aid organizations (e.g., ECA, MSA, TCA, FOA, ICA), at times clumsily mixing technical assistance and military aid, the establishment of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in 1961 marked a new era in international assistance. The range of Cold War USAID projects spanned agricultural improvement, technology infusion, postharvest production transportation plans, irrigation improvement, rural education, rural electrification, and road improvements to democracy reform operations or police training programs. The diversity of projects, themes, motivations, and outcomes of thousands of USAID projects negates the possibility of isolating simple themes that connect all the Cold War USAID projects to which anthropologists contributed.

Many of USAID’s Cold War era projects supported the general tenets of counterinsurgency in its broadest definition. These projects used soft power to support political regimes aligned with U.S. geopolitical interests, effectively using aid to pacify potential challenges to U.S. clients’ political legitimacy. Economic assistance programs became important parts of these schemes. From the perspective of dual use science, the individual motivations or ideologies of the participating anthropologists mattered little (there were free-market capitalists, Marxists, and theorists who were little interested in particular projects but wanted access to the field): these projects served larger counterinsurgency goals. Many of these dynamics shifted with time; as Steve Weissman observed, as the Cold War developed, there were shifts in the ways that funds for foreign
aid as “a tool for instant counterinsurgency” moved from coming directly from USAID and other branches of the U.S. government to coming from multilateral agencies like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (1974: 15). From USAID’s earliest days, anthropologists contributed to projects that expressed humanitarian motivations and altruistic desires to improve the lives of others, yet many anthropologists working on these projects ignored the political contexts in which the projects were embedded, which included leveraging the clients’ significant debt resulting from these projects.

A now declassified CIA executive memorandum from 1962 described a six-week training program in which the CIA added a USAID counterinsurgency training course consisting of two weeks focusing on area studies and a special two-day course titled “Communist Theory, Communist Threat in Developing Countries, Soviet Economic Potential, Communist Global Propaganda, Unconventional Warfare, and Communism and Free Labor.” The CIA reported that approximately seven hundred USAID personnel received this counterinsurgency training each year and that “USAID intends to coordinate with FBI to determine where the program can be drawn in more direct counterinsurgency terms.” Middle-grade USAID personnel attended a twenty-one-week course at Johns Hopkins University’s Institute for International Development or a similar program at Boston University’s African Area Studies Program. Stressing the central importance of counterinsurgency for USAID, the memo continued: “Nearly all of the major USAID training programs are in a terminal stage and set to be replaced or reviewed. In whatever substantive continued form, counterinsurgency training will be appropriately emphasized.” The memorandum mentioned USAID’s counterinsurgency operations training of foreign nationals through the Inter-American Police Academy and other U.S. training programs (FOIA CIA-REDP80B01676RO0001000032–7, 6/21/62).

The CIA and USAID combined forces to run the Office of Public Safety (OPS), training political figures and paramilitary units around the world (see Blum 1995: 200–206); in Vietnam, these police training sessions taught aggressive paramilitary techniques. During the 1960s and 70s, USAID’s oversight of the OPS police training programs linked USAID with CIA personnel. During the Vietnam War, soldier, strategist, and Kennedy Administration advisor Roger Hilsman and British counterinsurgency expert Robert Thompson trained special branch police units to establish counterinsurgency operations designed to monitor and control communist activities in the Vietnamese countryside (Valentine 1990: 73–75). Specially trained “policing” units were the key components of this program, acting as counterinsurgency operations’ eyes and ears; USAID was the
administrative body publicly responsible for the program, and the policing program was run as a CIA operation.

Anthropologists were an enticing prospect for USAID functionaries looking for someone to interface between USAID and rural communities. They were hired by USAID to work on projects such as Latin American science exchanges and as staff advisers for programs like the newly established Community Development Division (AAAfN 1962 3(2): 1). Many anthropologists viewed these programs as altruistic means of assisting poorer nations, yet views within the CIA recognized other uses. The humanitarian face of USAID was an effective public distraction from the other roles USAID played in supporting CIA efforts to disrupt certain political developments. Eva Golinger described the impact of these USAID efforts to subvert foreign elections:

One of the first documented misuses of USAID funds was during the early 1960s in Brazil. The CIA was heavily involved in attempts to thwart João Goulart from succeeding in the Brazilian presidency because he was viewed as a leftist who supported “social and economic reforms” that in the eyes of the CIA had “communism” written all over them. The CIA and USAID spent approximately $20 million to support hundreds of anti-Goulart candidates for gubernatorial elections in 1962. USAID was used as a cover to invest heavily in the Brazilian labor movement. The funds were filtered through the international branch of the AFL-CIO, then American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), now known as the American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS), and were controlled on the ground by the CIA. In 1964, President Goulart was overthrown by a CIA-backed coup that resulted in a brutal US-sponsored dictatorship that lasted nearly twenty years.

In the 1980s, as part of the move toward “democratic intervention” models, the State Department established the USAID Office of Democratic Initiatives, with the goal of supporting and “strengthening democratic institutions.” From 1984 to 1987, USAID utilized that office to filter more than $25 million into electoral processes in Latin America. Although NED later assumed similar operations, USAID has continued to use the office, now known as the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), to intervene in nations involved in crises that “threaten democracy.” USAID and the NED also overlap in funding initiatives for the IRI and the NDI both core NED grantees. A large portion of USAID and NED funds are channeled into electoral intervention efforts and civil society penetration. In the case of Venezuela, more than $20 million has been invested by USAID and NED since 2001 to foment conflict and instability in the name of “promoting democracy.” (2006: 21–22)
In Chile in 1963, the CIA and USAID cofunded anti-communist social programs organized by Jesuit priest Roger Vekeman, shifting political forces in an effort to undermine Chilean democracy in favor of American hegemony (Blum 1995: 207–8).

In Southeast Asia, USAID’s counterinsurgency projects included agricultural development programs promoting economic stability or rewarding groups that were working with the Americans and South Vietnamese authorities. The “Land to the Tiller” (LTTT) law supported counterinsurgency goals by providing free land to farmers who were willing to live on and farm lands in military zones, with differing amounts of land available in different regions (Newberry 1971: 1), and more land available for those who actively cultivated rice (see Newberry 1971; Russell 1971). As a counterinsurgency operation, LTTT offered tangible rewards to soldiers and families of soldiers aligned with the Americans, though it inverted the forms of “land reform” advocated by their communist opponents.

Control Data Corporation surveys measured whether or not the LTTT program was taking lands away from the families of soldiers who were serving in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), who were fighting alongside the Americans. Most ARVN soldiers supported the program, and other data showed that few of these soldiers came from landowning families. These reports contained statistical breakdowns of comments by ARVN soldiers and also included profiles of sample statements of those interviewed. Many respondents complained that even with family serving in the army, they still did not qualify for land (Newberry 1971: 18). But the law was popular among ARVN soldiers, as Newberry concluded, because “the consensus seems to be that LTTT is the type of law no poor man could oppose” (26).

In a 1969 briefing on USAID activities and programs in Vietnam, Joseph Mendenhall, the USAID assistant administrator for Vietnam, summarized USAID’s mission in the region by highlighting the crucial counterinsurgency support role for the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) paramilitary program. Mendenhall described USAID’s objectives not in the humanitarian language generally used in public discussions but in strategic military terms. Mendenhall stated that USAID continued to support prosecution of the war and to mitigate the effects of the war on the people and the economy of Vietnam. In this field which is primarily the field of the military of course — ours is not the primary role; ours is the supporting role, but it is nevertheless an important one. About twenty percent of the funds that we’re seeking in the Fiscal Year 1970 are for programs that are directly connected with
the war effort, with the military conflict — that is refugees, medical care, pacification and police. In addition, more than fifty percent of the funding that we're seeking in Fiscal Year ’70 will be spent on combating the inflationary pressure which is brought about as a result of the military conflict and the very heavy military expenditures in the Vietnamese budget.

The second objective is that we seek through economic and social development assistance to strengthen the non-communist political forces in South Vietnam. (1969: 1–2)

Mendenhall emphasized the importance of USAID’s mission as an element of counterinsurgency strategy that was “necessary to improve living conditions in the poorer quarters in the urban areas to help prevent the communists from gaining a toehold there” (3). He said that USAID’s goal was to essentially work itself out of a job as South Vietnam reached economic stability in independence, but he assured his internal audience that significant levels of foreign aid would be needed to maintain stability for a decade after an armistice (4). He summarized USAID’s work to resettle the four million Vietnamese who became homeless during the war, especially after the 1968 military offensive, spending more than $60 million on various refugee projects (4, 6).

The involvement of CORDS in village relocation programs linked with the Strategic Hamlet Program and other counterinsurgency operations was extensive, with USAID providing $25 million a year for Vietnam in the late 1960s; the military provided about six thousand individuals working on CORDS, with USAID supplying one thousand CORDS advisers (Mendenhall 1969: 10). Along with a national ID card program, the police’s role included “the campaign for eliminating the Viet-Cong political infra-structure at the village and hamlet level,” a polite phrase that allowed Mendenhall to gloss over the bloody tactics used by Vietnamese CIA operatives to “eliminate” such Vietcong operations, as well as efforts to block the flow of arms from the Vietcong (10).

Mendenhall described the discomfort of some USAID workers in rural provinces as they came to understand the contradictions of having “two bosses,” one being the humanitarian calling of working on issues like public health, the other being CORDS’s military links, with CORDS necessarily trumping such conflicting dual use needs (1969: 27). Mendenhall optimistically reported on the successes and popularity of new high-yield rice varieties, arguing that agricultural development in Vietnam was a measure of stability and offered the promise of peace in the war-torn land (16–18). With the help of anthropologists and other aid workers, development, economic assistance, agrochemistry, debt, and de-
pendency became tools of waging war by other means, as wars in Asia and Africa became opportunities to expand development’s patronage of hope, with little accounting for USAID’s serial failures. When it came to international development schemes, failure was a marketable commodity that sold itself with built-in financing.

**SEADAG: USAID’s Soft Power War Brain**

In 1966, USAID established the Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group (SEADAG), which funded conferences, publications, and research opportunities that helped scholars of Asia from a variety of disciplines to address Asian development issues. This group’s parent organizations were USAID and the Rockefeller Foundation–funded Asia Society (SEADAG 1969: vii). To stimulate research that would be of use to U.S. governmental development agencies, SEADAG fostered communication between scholars and government officials. Its network of scholars and officials freely exchanged information relating to Southeast Asian development. The group avoided using the word “counterinsurgency” in its documents, though with the central importance of the period’s Southeast Asian wars, counterinsurgency was the reason for undertaking many of the development-related research projects funded by SEADAG.9

Each year, SEADAG organized three topical seminars and reimbursed participants for related expenses (SEADAG 1969: ix). With funds from Rockefeller and USAID, SEADAG seminars were held in enticing locations (such as Hawaii) where academics could relax and USAID personnel could benefit from their expertise (see SEADAG 1969: ix).10 The United States Agency for International Development played a central role in setting the agenda for these seminars and also directed “ad hoc meetings” when problems arose that needed specific consultation.

The relationships between SEADAG, the Asia Society, and USAID blurred institutional boundaries in ways that bypassed normal peer review processes and connected university scholars with the needs of state. An overview of SEADAG activities in the late 1960s reported that “the Asia Society initiated an AID-funded program of research grants through SEADAG, and recommended to AID, after a large number of proposals from various sources had been screened by appropriate seminars and then by a Screening Committee of eminent scholars from outside the SEADAG organizations structure — according to criteria of evaluation established by the Executive Committee. A final approval by AID of these grants will be made directly to researchers and will be administered by
the Asia Society” (SEADAG 1969: x). On the surface, this appeared like a normal academic conglomeration bringing together groups of scholars through a generous funding source, but the flow of funds, proposals, and screening occurred within a small circle of actors with shared political concerns.

Through these procedures, SEADAG facilitated the distribution of peer-reviewed proposals, and while the three separate administrative bodies (USAID, Asia Society, and SEADAG) each technically played a separate role, they functioned as one, and the conflicts of interests between them narrowed SEADAG’s range of vision and short-circuited an impartial peer review process. This community of scholars linked public (USAID) and private (Rockefeller’s Asia Society) groups interested in Southeast Asian research that could inform American policies in Asia. Some scholars applying for these funds met at meetings sponsored by USAID or the Asia Society, where participants learned which research topics were being funded. Although almost everyone involved scrupulously avoided stating it as such, counterinsurgency was a thread connecting many of these projects.

With the rise of Rostow’s modernization theory, the measurable outcomes for development often had little to do with improving the lot of underdeveloped nations per se; development aid was a weapon against communism, a tool to be used against insurgents. In the context of the wars of Southeast Asia, aid became a tool of the powerful against the weapons of the weak (Scott 1985). In the mid-1960s, anthropological research became increasingly connected to counterinsurgency theory. In his SEADAG paper titled “Political Consequences of Rural Development Programs in Indonesia” (1967), Guy Pauker described the Indonesian massacres of 1965–66 as arising from “overcrowded rural areas” due to recent rapid population growth, while “the peasant-cultivated area was enlarged by only 11 percent,” resulting in high population densities of about two thousand people per square kilometer (1967: 1–2). Pauker conceded that earlier work on agricultural involution by his protégé Clifford Geertz described a process that “had probably already gone as far it could” (2). Pauker analyzed the successes of the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) in terms of taking advantage of these economic and demographic crises by “inciting the poor and landless peasants” (2), and he used Geertzian and Parsonian theory to analyze the background of the PKI’s insurgent tactics:

If the Javanese village — as Clifford Geertz describes it — lacked structural solidity and traditional resiliency and was therefore open to penetration by ideologically based structure originating in supra-village political life, the unilateral action of the PKI and BTI must have introduced or in any case sharpened social conflicts in
the village. A population which was delicately matching agricultural output with population growth by a complex pattern of land ownership rotation systems, communal work requirements, elaborate reciprocal labor lending customs, sharply defined rights to work on one’s relatives’ land . . . [etc.] — in short, the pattern of response to a worsening economic situation through a division of the economic pie into smaller and smaller pieces — which Clifford Geertz has so aptly called “shared poverty” — was bound to experience greatly enhanced tensions as the result of “unilateral action” and the ensuing violent clashes. (2–3)

Pauker theorized that the killing of several hundred thousand individuals in the uprisings of 1965–66 was caused by a “disruption of village solidarity” brought about by the Pki and Bti’s “unilateral action” (3). Geertz’s images of the social forces guiding village life were used to explain the massacre, hypothesizing that these individuals were identified by villagers as “trouble-makers” and labeled as “Communists.” When it was time to deal with them, the other villagers did so in what Pauker described as “the Javanese way,” which was, “as Geertz graphically puts it — is to ‘do all things quietly, subtly, politely, and communally — even starve,’ these individuals acted in stark contrast with local custom. [The Pki- and Bti-linked local insurgents] had therefore made themselves not just enemies of the more prosperous elements in the village, in a class-conflict sense, but enemies of the community as a whole, whose ancient ways they were disrupting. I suspect that these considerations, more than genuinely ideological controversies, may have been the decisive factor behind the killings” (3). Embracing modernization’s central talisman, namely, bioengineered rice varieties, Pauker advocated for further reliance on high-yield rice to bring peace through increased food production and theorized coming reductions in population levels.

Anthropologist Terry Rambo’s doctoral research in Ca-Mau on Vietnamese peasant social systems was funded by SEADAG (see Rambo 1973). On the surface, the published version of Rambo’s dissertation reads like a typical early-1970s ecological anthropology dissertation. The literature he addressed cited Leslie White, Julian Steward, Morton Fried, Marvin Harris, Andrew Vayda, Roy Rappaport, Eric Wolf, Elman Service, and other leading ecological anthropologists of the period, yet his analysis also had clear political applications to the Vietnam War. Rambo analyzed the evolution of social organization in the northern Red River region and the lower Mekong Delta, “with the Northerners constituting a closed corporate peasantry and the Southerners being an open peasantry” (1973: 362). Rambo argued these variations in social structure followed adaptations to different ecological niches: in the North, the fundamental
unit of social structure was the “corporate village,” while in the South, it was the “nuclear family.” Differences in population density (lower in the South, higher in the North) followed different subsistence strategies (cash crop rice in the South, a more mixed economy in the North), and differences in exchange types (vertical in the South, horizontal in the North) led to different levels of specialization (high in the South, lower in the North) and fundamentally different forms of social organization (Rambo 1973: 362).

Rambo speculated on whether Edmund Leach’s pendulum model of gumsa and gumlao shifts explained these different structures, or whether some other form of cyclical evolution or linear evolutionary model was at work (1973: 363–69), with more applied reports to USAID and SEADAG exploring how these shifts might relate to exposures to the Vietcong. Rambo and Neil Jamieson (1973: 35–46) used Florence Kluckhohn’s value orientation scale to measure communist-linked shifts in social structure. Rambo’s theoretical analysis engaged with the ecological cultural evolutionary anthropology of his day, but he avoided addressing the political realities of war impacting the people he studied, as well as the reasons that SEADAG and USAID funded his, and others’, fieldwork. The ethnographic present created by Rambo was an ecological laboratory without politically active sponsors or Vietnamese deaths complicating his efforts to measure, model, and explain Vietnamese social structure.

While much of the social science research funded by SEADAG was linked to development projects designed to bring stabilizing counterinsurgency ends (for example, anthropologist Jasper Ingersoll’s work on the Nam Pong Project in northeast Thailand), SEADAG also funded more critical progressive or radical work, including that of antiwar critics (e.g., Ingersoll 1968; Scott 1975). By funding a range of political work, SEADAG exemplified the broad Cold War funding strategy successfully used by public and private organizations to generate knowledge, even extremely critical knowledge. In financing scholarship that could at least in part inform military and civilian policy in Southeast Asia, SEADAG got what it paid for, but it also sponsored critiques and radical analysis not to the liking of many policy makers.

**USAID and “The Family Jewels”**

When news of the CIA’s “Family Jewels” report was released in 1974 (see chapter 1), the public first learned of the CIA using USAID for a range of clandestine operations. The report included a folder (on pages 594–609) relating to the CIA’s Counter Intelligence Staff, Police Group (CI/PG). The CI/PG maintained a
“liaison with the Office of Public Safety, Agency for International Development (ops/aid) and its training facility, the International Police Academy (ipa)” (cia 1973: 597). The cia coordinated daily information exchanges with usaid, including information on training programs and “arranging for ipa/ops aid briefings and tours for foreign police/security representative sponsored by cia Area Divisions” (597).

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[redacted, but likely “The cia”] does not maintain direct contact or liaison with any law enforcement organization, local or federal at home or abroad. When the need arises, such contact is sometimes made on our behalf by [likely “usaid”] has such contacts at home and abroad because of the nature of its activities (training of foreign police/security personnel at home and abroad), and its Public Safety programs around the world. [usaid] has such contacts at home — local and federal level — because its personnel are personally acquainted with law enforcement officers throughout the United States. Members of the [usaid] have appeared as guest lecturers at such federal institutions as the U.S. Park Police, ipa, the U.S. Secret Service, and the U.S. Treasury Enforcement Division. (cia 1973: 599)

Angleton described Dan Mitrione as “a bona fide ops/aid officer assigned to the aid mission in Uruguay, and was never a cia employee or agent” (599). Mitrione was a usaid “policing” specialist who worked with the cia to teach South American anticommunists the arts of interrogation and torture, until he was kidnapped and murdered by the Tupamaros while working on a usaid assignment in Uruguay, advising Uruguayan police on the use of torture techniques when conducting interrogations. Mitrione was the shadowy archetypal American torturer, providing the basis for the Philip Michael Santore character in Costa-Gavras’s film State of Siege (1973) (Norman 2005).

Angleton also described a joint cia-usaid training program for foreign law enforcement personnel in which cia personnel taught counterterrorism tactics, techniques for making booby traps, methods for neutralizing explosives, and so forth. Angleton indicated that the course had “26 participants from ten (10) foreign countries. Nine (9) are financed by aid, eight (8) by cia and nine (9) by their own governments” (cia 1973: 601). The cia estimated that about seven hundred foreign police officers received training each year in this cia/usaid program (602). “The Family Jewels” included portions of a chapter by
James R. Schlesinger (“Strategic Leverage from Aid and Trade”) in which he argued that foreign aid could be used for policy leverage (J. R. Schlesinger 1963, reproduced in CIA 1973: 608).

Other CIA sources detail how USAID worked with the CIA during the Cold War. William R. Johnson, a CIA veteran, described USAID missions as a “major source of information” providing intelligence directly from in-country sources (1976: 50; see also 63–64, 66). Victor Marchetti and John Marks described how during the 1960s and 1970s in Laos and Vietnam, the CIA’s “Clandestine Services had a fairly clear idea of how many local tribesmen were in its pay, but the operators were never quite certain of the total number of mercenaries they were financing through the agency’s numerous support programs, some of which were fronted for by the Department of Defense, the Agency for International Development, and, of course, the CIA proprietary, Air America” (1974: 87).

Several former CIA employees later described the agency’s close relationship with USAID in the 1960s and 1970s, with DCI Helms testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1970 that the CIA had used USAID as cover for operations in Laos (Marchetti and Marks 1974: 90; Prados 1986: 292). Former CIA agent Philip Agee (1975: 264) detailed how USAID functioned as a front for CIA work in Ecuador in the 1960s. Marchetti and Marks described a CIA employee who sometimes “posed as an official of the Agency for International Development to entrap unsuspecting [National Student Association] officers, revealing his ‘cover’ only after extracting pledges of secrecy and even [National Student Association] commitments to cooperate with specific CIA programs” (1974: 77).

Ted Shackley, a CIA operative, described how in the 1960s, the CIA in Southeast Asia worked with the USAID on counterinsurgency operations, at times transferring CIA funds to USAID for needed projects (Shackley and Finney 2005: 108–9). In other instances, Shackley took locals who had been hired by USAID to work on agricultural development projects and used them to gather intelligence for the CIA; in one instance he relocated them from working on vegetable gardens to working as “trail watchers” gathering CIA intelligence (Corn 1994: 144–45). Sometimes, CIA pilots operating illegally in Laos were paid through USAID contracts; by the early 1970s, USAID had provided Air America with more than $83 million for chartered flights (Blum 1995: 142; Marchetti and Marks 1974: 168).

At times USAID was a channel used to secretly fund CIA-supported programs. The CIA used USAID as cover when funding their agent Tony Poe in Laos, and CIA operations in Laos depended on networks maintained by USAID (Branfman 1975: 57–58, 64). During the 1960s, Sam Wilson, chief of USAID’s Pacifica-
tion Program in Vietnam, used his USAID position to coordinate elements of the Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation Program (also known as ICSEX) assassination program linked to CORDS and the Phoenix Program (Trento 2001: 339). In 1963, USAID began oversight of the CIA’s Vietnamese defector program (named Chieu Hoi, “open arms”), which combined field recruitment techniques with political indoctrination (Valentine 1990: 51). While employed by USAID in the late 1960s, John Paul Vann, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel, helped oversee the U.S. military’s CORDS counterinsurgency program designed to pacify resistance in South Vietnam (Milne 2008: 2004). A 1967 address by CIA officer Richard Bissell to the Council on Foreign Relations described the CIA’s reliance on public and private institutions to provide “deep cover” for agency operations. Bissell described the use of nonsecret “exchange-of-persons programs” through which foreigners are exposed to American ideas. Among the organizations involved in these open exchanges was USAID, and at times the CIA was also secretly involved in these exchanges. In a passage originally redacted by CIA censors but restored in their published book, Marchetti and Marks explained, “On occasion, the agency [i.e., CIA] will sponsor the training of foreign officials at the facilities of another government agency. A favorite site is AID’s International Police Academy in Washington. The academy is operated by AID’s Public Safety (police) Division, which regularly supplies cover to CIA operators all over the world. And the CIA takes advantage of exchange programs to recruit agents” (1974: 81).

Frank Wisner, chief of the CIA’s Office of Policy Coordination (the CIA’s covert action division), at times used USAID to direct funds to foreign students attending universities in the United States, under an operation through which the CIA would later establish contacts with students the agency hoped would return home and assume positions of power. William Corson, a retired marine lieutenant colonel and a onetime deputy director of the Southeast Asia Intelligence Force, later claimed that many of these students were “‘recruited’ by blackmail and coercive techniques”—though further evidence of this claimed practice is lacking (1977: 310–11).

The Agency for International Development functioned in tandem with the CIA so well that after the CIA was caught in 1967 secretly passing funds to the AFL-CIO in order to “create counter-revolutionary labor movements in under-developed countries,” USAID publicly carried on what had previously been the CIA’s covert role in this operation (Greider 1969, A1). The CIA had formerly used the Andrew Hamilton Fund (a CIA front) to finance the Granary Fund, which acted as a conduit to pass money to Retail Clerks International to finance CIA-backed
international labor programs, and USAID took up this CIA work without difficulty. According to William Greider, writing for the Washington Post, “This ‘union to union’ diplomacy, ‘uninhibited by formal Governmental relations,’ as one AID official explained, is just the sort of thing which the Central Intelligence Agency used to pay for secretly—before the CIA’s cover was blown [in 1967] and it had to abandon its network of dummy foundations” (1969, A1). The CIA, and later USAID, backed labor unions not because the capitalists it protected wanted labor unions but because they were a useful tool to agitate its communist enemies.

Gifts of Coercion

A half decade after the Church and Pike congressional investigations documented multiple connections between USAID and intelligence agencies, Father George Cotter, a Maryknoll Catholic priest who had worked for years on humanitarian projects in Latin America and East Africa, described the interactions between humanitarian development projects, USAID, and the CIA that he had witnessed during the Cold War. Cotter observed that CIA agents rarely visited missionaries in the field, instead establishing contact through the non-governmental organizations with which missionaries worked. He described the connections between humanitarian-based missionaries, nongovernmental organizations, and intelligence agencies as “silken threads which grow into strings. With such strings, spies can fish out sensitive information about leaders” in regions that were of special interest to the CIA and others (Cotter 1981: 324). Cotter wrote that his curiosity led him

to learn about sources of funds for mission work, I spent two years visiting private voluntary organizations (PVOS) in Europe, Canada and the United States. Many directors of American organizations told me they had received government grants. These grants enabled the PVOS to fund certain types of church work. During these years I also attended a course given by USAID on how to write project proposals, and I studied USAID’s practices. Around this time I learned that its administrator, John Gilligan, had said that the agency had served as a sort of graduate school for CIA agents. “At one time, many AID field offices were infiltrated from top to bottom with CIA people,” he said. “It was pretty well known in the agency who they were and what they were up to. . . . The idea was to plant operatives in every kind of activity we had overseas, government, volunteer, religious, every kind.” His statements startled me. (321)
Father Cotter understood that because some American humanitarian groups received funds from USAID, their reports made the groups they assisted legible to USAID, and through USAID, this information was passed along to the CIA (321–22). He described USAID as “the CIA’s little sister” (323), and he worried that those working on humanitarian and assistance projects were being “plugged into an information network that starts with the U.S. government and to which the CIA is connected” (322).

Cotter also understood that the CIA valued missionaries because, like anthropologists, they tended to “spend years working with grass-roots people and helping the unfortunates among them, they win trust and confidence. People will tell them about their hopes and fears, about village happenings, and about whatever there is of interest. They learn who are the most promising leaders, what are the region’s problems, and they are often given access to people and areas closed to most outsiders. This is the information wanted by the CIA, and wanted in steadily flowing streams” (Cotter 1981: 323–24). While groups such as Anthropologists for Radical Political Action (see chapter 13) developed critiques of military-linked anthropological projects, at times singling out USAID projects directly linked to war zone counterinsurgency operations, during the Cold War, American anthropologists were slow to develop such broad critiques of the ways that modernization theory, USAID, and other development projects directly and indirectly connected with the CIA and Cold War politics.

Modernization theory provided a philosophical justification for hundreds of development projects in which anthropologists played supportive roles on the ground. This work seldom required anthropologists to critically evaluate the successes or failures of their projects: they simply needed to complete assigned work in a well-funded bureaucratic process of institutional self-replicating reification. Some applied anthropologists found themselves serving as cheerleaders of progress, or working as apologists for the failures of the Green Revolution, facilitating evacuations of indigenous peoples in the way of hydraulic projects, acting as brokers for overpriced irrigation or technology transfer projects, or advising the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, or major corporations interested in “developing” new markets and sources of (or dumping ground for) goods in the Third World. Perhaps the most measurable outcome of modernization theory’s development projects was underdeveloped nations’ posture of alignment — through debt and policy control, not Rostow’s claimed goals of economic development (see Frank 1997; Ross 1998a; D. H. Price 2007a).

The national debts created by many of modernization theory’s development projects had a greater societal impact than the intended demographic, social,
health, economic, or agricultural benefits. Development strategies built on debt damaged the autonomy and health of underdeveloped nations as the creditors set and manipulated national policies, ranging from setting food prices to determining debtor nations’ military policies. As Eric Ross states in his analysis of Cold War applied anthropology’s Vicos project in Peru, that project was “far more productive for the discipline (and its need for professional status) than it has been — and should have been — for those it studied” (2011: 149).

While development, modernization, and USAID brought anthropologists working on international projects into the CIA’s orbit of influence, the Cold War also brought other, more direct, connections between anthropologists and the CIA, as some anthropologists made careers working within the CIA.