PART I COLD WAR POLITICAL-ECONOMIC DISCIPLINARY FORMATIONS
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The CIA, after all, is nothing more than the secret police of American capitalism, plugging up leaks in the political dam night and day so that shareholders of US companies operating in poor countries can continue enjoying the rip-off.

PHILIP AGEE | ex-CIA agent, 1975

ONE POLITICAL ECONOMY
AND HISTORY OF AMERICAN COLD WAR INTELLIGENCE

The end of the Second World War left the United States in a unique position among the victors. Not only was it the only nation on earth possessing a new weapon capable of instantly leveling entire cities, but the lack of damage to its industrial home front gave America the exclusive economic opportunities befitting a global conqueror.

The United States entered an era of economic prosperity the likes of which the world had never seen. With an expanding global economic system, and much of the world slowly recovering from the war, America found itself with what George Kennan secretly described as a nation holding “about 50% of the world’s wealth but only 6.3% of its population. . . . In this situation, we cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment. Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity. . . . To do so, we will have to dispense with all sentimentality and day-dreaming; and our attention will have to be concentrated everywhere on our immediate national objectives. . . . We should cease to talk about vague and . . . unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of living standards and democratizations” (1948: 121–22). Kennan understood that U.S. foreign policy could not seriously support efforts to improve human rights, raising standards of living and introducing democratic reforms, though he underestimated the importance of the need to “talk about” these vague and unreal objectives as tools of domestic and international propaganda. Kennan’s cynicism was
matched by the inability of many U.S. social scientists of the era to acknowledge that such self-serving motivations lay at the base of many Cold War American foreign policies and programs linked to American academics.

The war’s end brought uncertainty for American intelligence agencies. Under President Truman’s Executive Order 9621, the OSS disbanded on October 1, 1945, and the agency’s functions were reassigned to the Department of State and the War Department. Had President Roosevelt lived to the postwar period, the OSS may have remained a permanent agency, but OSS director William Donovan lacked Truman’s support. Truman’s fiscal approach to government envisioned a smaller postwar military and intelligence apparatus, and he initially opposed expanded postwar intelligence functions.¹

Before the war, the United States had no permanent agency devoted to international intelligence. When Truman disbanded the OSS, 1,362 of its Research and Analysis Branch personnel were reassigned to the Department of State’s Interim Research and Intelligence Service, and another 9,028 of OSS Operations personnel (such as covert action) were transferred to the War Department (Troy 1981: 303; 313–14). The OSS’s Research and Analysis Branch was renamed the Interim Research and Intelligence Service and placed under the leadership of Alfred McCormack.² When OSS’s Secret Intelligence (SI) Branch and Counterespionage (X2) Branch were relocated to the War Department, they became the new Strategic Services Unit (SSU). Three months later, in January 1946, President Truman created the Central Intelligence Group which took over the responsibilities, and many of the personnel, of the War Department’s SSU. All of this shifting, realigning, and relocating of intelligence personnel was short-lived. The permanent restructuring and relocation of both the analysis and the covert action functions of American international intelligence shifted to a new centralized agency in the summer of 1947, when Truman signed the National Security Act on July 26, establishing the Central Intelligence Agency.

During the 664 days between the dissolution of the OSS and the creation of the CIA, American intelligence personnel continued many of the types of tasks undertaken by OSS during the war, though there was greater institutional disarray, with less intense focus than had existed under a culture of total warfare.³ Had Truman stuck with his initial decision to divide intelligence analysis and operations into two separate governmental agencies (analysis at State, operations at the War Department), the practices and uses of American intelligence might have developed in profoundly different ways than occurred during the Cold War. Combining analysis with operations structurally fated the CIA to a
history of covert action and episodes of cooking analysis to meet the desires of operations and presidents.

When the National Security Act of 1947 established the CIA, the American military and intelligence apparatus was reorganized with the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC), and the June 12, 1948, NSC Directive of Special Projects (NSC 10/2) authorized the CIA to undertake covert action and intelligence operations. The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 later provided budgetary authority to the agency and authorization to undertake domestic and international activities.

During the CIA’s early years, its employees’ work was divided between the Intelligence Division (Office of Collection and Dissemination; Office of Reports and Estimates) and the Operations Division (Office of Operations; Office of Special Operations). The CIA sought to become the eyes, ears, and mind of America. It envisioned itself as an elite body harnessing the intellectual power of its citizens to gather information. The CIA’s charter authorized no domestic or international law enforcement authority; instead, the agency was charged with the collection and analysis of intelligence relating to national security. The CIA was administered by the executive branch, with a bureaucracy providing oversight by a group known as the Forty Committee, which could authorize CIA covert operations in consultation with the executive branch. The looseness of its charge allowed the agency to undertake a wide range of operations with no oversight outside of the executive branch.

From the CIA’s earliest days, its analysts monitored postwar, postcolonial shifts in global power. As postwar independence movements reshaped global relations, CIA analysts considered how these shifts would pit American anticolonialist historical values against America’s emerging role as a global superpower.

“The Break-Up of the Colonial Empires and Its Implications for US Security”

The CIA’s confidential report *The Break-Up of the Colonial Empires and Its Implications for US Security* (1948) described the global setting in which the anthropological field research of the second half of the twentieth century would transpire (CIA 1948). Most anthropologists undertook this fieldwork without reference to the dynamics described in this report, yet these dynamics shaped the funding of particular research questions and geographic areas. The report stated the agency’s understanding of the problems facing the postwar world,
where shifting power relations presented threats and opportunities to the new American superpower:

The growth of nationalism in colonial areas, which has already succeeded in breaking up a large part of the European colonial system and in creating a series of new, nationalistic states in the Near and Far East, has major implications for US security, particularly in terms of possible world conflict with the USSR. This shift of the dependent areas from the orbit of the colonial powers not only weakens the probable European allies of the US but deprives the US itself of assured access to vital bases and raw materials in these areas in event of war. Should the recently liberated and current emergent states become oriented toward the USSR, US military and economic security would be seriously threatened. (CIA 1948: 1)

The report identified upcoming dominant Cold War dynamics, as the United States and the Soviet Union would spend trillions of dollars in the next four decades struggling over postcolonial loyalties around the globe. The key elements to future strategies were the collapse of European colonialism, growing native nationalism, the likelihood of Soviet efforts to capture clients in these new states, the presence of (cheap) raw materials needed for U.S. economic growth, and envisioned conflicts with the Soviet Union over control of these nations and resources.

The CIA observed that the postwar collapse of existing European and Japanese colonialism in Asia and Africa fueled “the release of bottled-up nationalist activities,” and it conceded the “further disintegration” of global European colonial holdings was “inevitable” (CIA 1948: 1). It stressed the economic impact of anticolonial movements, lamenting that “no longer can the Western Powers rely on large areas of Asia and Africa as assured sources of raw materials, markets, and military bases” (2). Capturing the “good will” of nations achieving their independence was vital, and a failure to do so would result in antagonism toward the United States and a loss of vital clients (3).

At this moment in history, the CIA could have positioned itself to side with the liberation of people of the world who were ruled and taxed without direct representation, but agency analysts instead framed this primarily as a proxy struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, noting that “the gravest danger to the US is that friction engendered by these issues may drive the so-called colonial bloc into alignment with the USSR” (CIA 1948: 2). The CIA explained native nationalist liberation movements as deriving from a mixture of historical, social, political, and economic forces, and it identified the five primary causes as increased awareness of stratification, colonial powers’ discrimi-
natory treatment of subject populations, the “deep-seated racial hostility of native populations,” the global spread of Western values favoring independence and nationalism, and “the meteoric rise of Japan, whose defeats of the European powers in the Russo-Japanese War and especially World War II punctured the myth of white superiority” (5).

The CIA noted the neocolonial control of the British in Egypt, the French in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, and the Italians in Libya and mentioned burgeoning independence movements in Indonesia, Madagascar, and Nigeria. It understood that “states like India and Egypt have already brought colonial issues into the UN and may be expected increasingly to take the leadership in attempting to hasten in this and other ways the liberation of remaining colonial areas” (CIA 1948: 7).

Even in 1948, the CIA recognized the role that foreign aid and promises of technical assistance and modernization could play in courting would-be independent nations. As explained in its report, “The economic nationalism of the underdeveloped nations conflicts sharply with US trade objectives and these countries tend to resent US economic dominance. On the other hand, they urgently need external assistance in their economic development, and the US is at present the only nation able to supply it. The desire for US loans and private investment will have some effect in tempering the antagonism of these states toward US policies” (CIA 1948: 8). Under the direction of Cold War economists and strategists like Walt Rostow, Max Millikan, and Allen Dulles, aid later became a powerful soft power component of American international policy.

The CIA viewed coming colonial collapses as “inevitable” and predicted these developments would favor the Soviet Union (CIA 1948: 9). The agency was concerned about the Soviet alignment with international liberation movements. Without addressing Leninist critiques of imperialism, the CIA observed the Soviets were “giving active support through agitators, propaganda, and local Communist parties to the nationalist movements throughout the colonial world” (9). The agency acknowledged the USSR held advantages over the United States because as a non-colonial power, the USSR is in the fortunate position of being able to champion the colonial cause unreservedly and thereby bid for the good will of colonial and former colonial areas. Its condemnation of racial discrimination pleases native nationalists and tends to exclude the USSR from the racial animosity of East toward West. The Communists have sought to infiltrate the nationalist parties in the dependent and formerly dependent areas and have been, as in Burma,
Indonesia, and Indochina, among the most vocal agitators for independence. The Soviet Union has found the World Federation of Trade Unions an effective weapon for penetrating the growing labor movements in Asia and Africa and for turning them against the colonial powers. (9)

Nationalism was expected to have increasing importance for poor nations undergoing rapid transformations, and the CIA believed that cultural differences between colonizers and the colonized would increase antagonism in historic colonial regions like Indochina, Indonesia, and North Africa (10).

The CIA identified opportunities for American interests given that newly independent nations would need help from “the great powers for protection and assistance” in the new “power vacuum” (CIA 1948: 11). Establishing the “good will” of the leaders and peoples of these countries would be key, and the report noted that American racial segregationist policies allowed the Soviets to portray the United States as a bigoted nation.

The report identified five impacts that the collapse of the global colonial system would have on U.S. security. First, colonial liberation would economically weaken America’s European allies, which would diminish access to cheap minerals and other natural resources and strategic military outposts. Second, political upheaval could leave the United States with reduced access to these same resources. Because of this threat, the CIA insisted that “the growing US list of strategic and critical materials — many of which like tin and rubber are available largely in colonial and former colonial areas — illustrates the dependence of the US upon these areas. The US has heretofore been able to count upon the availability of such bases and materials in the colonial dependencies of friendly powers; but the new nations arising in these areas, jealous of their sovereignty, may well be reluctant to lend such assistance to the US” (CIA 1948: 12). Third, if the Soviet Union established close relationships with new nations in Asia, such relationships would undermine U.S. interests. Fourth, the CIA recognized dangers for American interests if the United States was identified as supporting colonial powers. Finally, the Soviet Union was expected to create unrest in colonial regions and to exploit any resulting upheaval to its political advantage (12–13).

The agency concluded it was vital for the United States to generate goodwill in these new nations. It recommended that the United States temper its support for European allies engaged in colonial control of foreign lands in order to not be identified with colonialism. The CIA predicted colonialism would become a losing venture for Europe and that “attempts at forcible retention of critical
colonial areas in the face of growing nationalist pressure may actually weaken rather than strengthen the colonial powers” (cia 1948: 13).4

It is worth speculating on what lost strands of U.S. intelligence analysis favoring postcolonial independence might have developed in an alternate universe where Truman left the oss’s former intelligence and operations branches disarticulated into the State Department and War Department, but in a world where intelligence and operations were conjoined, and Kennan’s Cold War game plan aggressively guided American policy, such developments were not to be. As a result, cia reports questioning the wisdom of aligning American interests with colonial powers were destined to be ignored and overwritten by emerging hegemonic Cold War desires.

Seeing Like a CIA

From its beginnings, the cia established links with academia. These earliest links exploited connections with academics with wartime oss service who returned to university positions after the war. An article in the cia’s journal Studies in Intelligence noted that “close ties between the Central Intelligence Agency and American colleges and universities have existed since the birth of the Agency in 1947” (Cook 1983: 33). Given the connections of oss personnel to Harvard, Yale, Columbia, and other elite universities, it was natural that “a disproportionate number of the new recruits came from the same schools. Similarly, professors who had joined the Agency often turned to their former colleagues still on campuses for consultation and assistance. This ‘old boy’ system was quite productive in providing new employees in the professional ranks. Thus, there was an early linkage between the Agency and the Ivy League, or similar schools” (Cook, 34; Jefreys-Jones 1985).

In 1951, the cia launched its University Associates Program, which secretly connected the agency with university professors on fifty U.S. campuses. Select universities became “consultant-contacts who would receive a nominal fee for spotting promising students, steering them into studies and activities of interest to the Agency, and eventually nominating them for recruitment” (Cook 1983: 34). But the cia’s recruitment techniques narrowed rather than expanded its views. In 1954, the Doolittle Commission Report found the cia’s close link to World War II networks hampered its development, and that the heavy use of elite universities for recruitment limited the agency’s potential. It recommended that the cia fire some of its oss-era employees and expand its campus
recruitment efforts to a broader variety of university campuses (Doolittle et al. 1954: 25).

The CIA secretly groomed campus contacts, known within the agency as “P-Sources” (professor sources) (Cook 1983; Price 2011f). P-Sources, who had high value within the agency, sometimes provided debriefings after travel to foreign nations and at other times wrote papers relating to their academic expertise. The number of these P-Sources is unknown, but William Corson, a historian and a Marine Corps lieutenant colonel, estimated that by the mid-1970s as many as five thousand academics were cooperating with the CIA on at least a part-time basis (Corson 1977: 312). During the early 1950s, professional organizations like the American Anthropological Association at times secretly, or unwittingly, worked with the CIA, providing it with membership lists and lists of area specialists (see chapters 3 and 7).

The agency sometimes secretly drew on groups of academics possessing desired knowledge to supplement its understanding of issues. One such group, known as the Princeton Consultants, was established in early 1951 and was tasked with complementing the work of the CIA’s newly established Office of National Estimates. The original group consisted of eight scholars who were paid a modest stipend and met in Princeton with CIA personnel four times a year to discuss specific problems of interest to the agency, bringing outside views and broader approaches to problems (Steury 1994: 111; see CIA 1959b: 2). The group, which grew in size, continued to meet in Princeton for decades (CIA 1959a; see table 1.1).

When the existence of the Princeton Consultants became public in the 1970s, members Cyril Black and Klaus Knorr “denied any relationship between the National Intelligence Estimates and the CIA’s covert activities” (Cavanagh 1980). Black’s and Knorr’s denials were in one sense true given that most of their work was aligned with making projections for the Office of National Estimates and the improbability that they had access to details about covert actions. However, as Cavanagh (1980) noted, Calvin Hoover’s memoirs suggest some of the work provided by the Princeton Consultants was consistent with the preparatory work undertaken in plotting the CIA’s 1953 Iranian coup.

In 1963, the CIA’s 100 Universities Program sought to improve the agency’s public image and to boost campus recruitments by expanding its presence on American campuses (see CIA 1963c). Former CIA case officer John Stockwell described the agency’s Foreign Resources Division as its “domestic covert operations division,” linking CIA case officers with professors and students at “every major campus in the nation. They work with professors, using aliases on
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<th>Name</th>
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<td>Norman Armour</td>
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<td>(Steury 1994: 110)</td>
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<td>Hamilton Fish</td>
<td><em>Foreign Affairs</em></td>
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<td>Samuel Bemis</td>
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<td>Richard Bissell</td>
<td>CIA, Deputy Director of Plans</td>
<td>(Steury 1994: 110)</td>
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<td>Cyril Black</td>
<td>Princeton University, Soviet Studies</td>
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<td>Vannevar Bush</td>
<td>OSRD, NACA</td>
<td>(Montague 1992: 135)</td>
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<td>Burton Fahs</td>
<td>Director of Humanities, Rockefeller Foundation</td>
<td>(Steury 1994: 110; Montague 1992: 136)</td>
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<td>Gordon Gray</td>
<td>Secretary of the Army/national security adviser</td>
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<td>Joseph Grew</td>
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<td>Caryl P. Haskins</td>
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<td>Calvin Hoover</td>
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<td>William H. Jackson</td>
<td>CIA, Deputy Director</td>
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<td>Career, Foreign Service etc.</td>
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<td>Harold F. Linder</td>
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As part of its effort to monitor and control international developments, the early CIA collected and curated global knowledge. The agency envisioned that even the almost random collection of knowledge could eventually, if organized and retrievable, later be used in intelligence capacities. The scope of its approach to collecting disarticulated bits of knowledge is shown in Jane Schnell’s classified article “Snapshots at Random” (1961), which described a CIA collection known as the “Graphic Register.” This was the agency archive of photographs collected from all over the world showing routine features and elements of physical culture. These photographs were cataloged and analyzed for use at some unknown date in CIA operations.

Schnell encouraged CIA employees planning future trips to “some less well frequented place” to contact agency personnel maintaining the Register to see if it was interested in providing them with film and a camera (Schnell 1961: 17). The CIA wanted almost any image from abroad. Schnell wrote, “The fact that an object may have been photographed previously by no means disqualifies it: changes, or the absence of changes, in it over a period of years or of weeks may be important. And changes aside, it is amazing how many pictures of the same object can be taken without telling the whole story” (18).

The scale of Schnell’s project revealed core CIA conceits from this period, as if the unguided particularist collection of at-the-time meaningless information could inevitably lead to useful breakthroughs later. The CIA believed that if enough information was collected from enough angles, American intelligence could develop a comprehensive view of the world it sought to control. No mundane event or artifact was too insignificant for collection. According to Schnell:

If a new gas storage tank is being built in the city where you are stationed and you drive past it going to work every day, why not photograph it once a week or once a month? The photos will tell how long it takes to build it, what types of materials and methods of construction are used, and how much gas storage capacity is being added. Maybe you don’t know what a gas storage tank looks like, and all you see is a big tank being built. Take a picture of it anyway; obviously it is built to store something. What you don’t know about it the analyst will. That is what he is an analyst for, but he can’t analyze it if you don’t get him the pictures. (1961: 18–19)
This project was an emblematic representation of the CIA’s midcentury project: it was well funded, global, brash, panoptical, without borders or limits. It was funded despite the unlikelihood that it would ever produce much useful intelligence, and working under conditions of secrecy removed normal general expectations of outcomes or accountability.

Other Cold War intelligence agencies also established massive collections they imagined could be of use at some hypothetical future date. While enrolled in a spycraft lock-picking class, former British MI5 counterintelligence agent Peter Wright encountered a massive cellar room with thousands of keys, meticulously cataloged and arranged on walls. His instructor told the class that MI5 made it a practice to secretly collect key imprints “of offices, hotels, or private houses . . . all over Britain.” The instructor’s explanation for the collection was simply that “you never know when you might need a key again” (Wright 1988: 51). In The File (1998), Timothy Garton Ash described the East German intelligence agency, Stassi’s, massive collection of personal items (including underwear and other articles of clothing) that might be of use at some unknown future date if Stassi needed to use tracking dogs to locate the owner of the stolen item. These items were processed and placed in plastic bags, then sorted and stored in Stassi’s immense, efficient archival filing system for unknown future uses. Edward Snowden’s more recent disclosures of rampant National Security Agency (NSA) electronic monitoring establish that the agency collected previously unfathomable amounts of data on billions of people on the assumption the information might be of use at some future date (Greenwald 2014; Price 2013c).

Intelligence agencies’ vast collections of (immediately) useless objects illustrate institutional commitments to establishing stores of intangibly useful resources that might have intelligence uses at unforeseen future times. A powerful national security state collecting unlimited numbers of obscure, useless snapshots with no conceivable direct applications thought nothing of supporting area study centers (teaching a spectrum of languages, which ranged from having obvious to nonexistent security applications), and a broad range of nonapplied anthropological research grants without direct applications to intelligence work. Academics might well collect needed bits of unconnected knowledge that CIA analysts could later use for tasks yet to be determined.

But this rapid growth in intelligence activities also brought unease as President Eisenhower (1961) raised awareness of the “danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite.” The secret report, titled “Conclusions and Recommendations of the President’s Committee on
Information Activities Abroad” (ciaa 1960), more commonly known as “The Sprague Report,” captured the unease, philosophical position, and growing reliance on academics as the CIA embarked on a new phase of the Cold War. The report described the agency’s use of U.S. labor unions to establish relationships with labor union movements in communist countries and noted political gains from open academic exchange programs funded by public or private means (ciaa 1960: 53–54, 65). Academic exchanges were acknowledged as important Cold War weapons that needed funding because “in our exchange programs we must outdo the Sino-Soviet Bloc in selection of leaders and students with leadership potential, quality of programs offered, and treatment accorded visitors” (78).

George Ecklund’s secret article “Guns or Butter Problems of the Cold War” unapologetically noted that “the world now spends about $135 billion annually on the war industry, roughly as much as the entire income of the poorer half of mankind. The United States spends a little more than a third of the total, the USSR about a third, and the rest of the world a little less than a third” (1965: 1–2). Ecklund described the negative impacts of such high levels of military spending on the Soviet economy and the problems this presented for the Soviets’ ability to spend funds on human needs at home and on those they hoped to influence in international technical assistance programs. He projected that such continued levels of military spending would be devastating to economic growth for the Soviet Union.

Ecklund did not consider whether American runaway military spending would establish domestic crippling economic deficits or direct federal spending priorities away from national health care, mass transit infrastructure, education, and other programs. Instead, Ecklund asked and answered questions in ways that ignored what these developments meant for the homeland while stressing the anticipated devastating impact on the Soviet system.

The Fourth Estate Reveals Ongoing Patterns of CIA Lawlessness

The decade between 1966 and 1976 brought numerous journalistic exposés that revealed CIA involvement in widespread covert and illegal activities. White House and congressional investigations followed, as did startling revelations by disillusioned former CIA agents. Both mainstream and alternative newspapers and magazines played crucial roles in uncovering these activities. Many Americans viewed these secret programs as undermining the possibility of American democracy. These revelations shocked the public and pushed Congress to pass
legislation limiting specific practices and establishing increased congressional oversight of the CIA through the Hughes-Ryan Act of 1974.

The CIA used dummy foundations known as funding fronts to provide the appearance of neutral funds for scholars conducting research of interest to the agency. Early public revelations about these fronts financing academic research and travel were made by Sol Stern in *Ramparts* magazine in 1967. Stern discovered this CIA connection as a result of Representative Wright Patman’s 1964 congressional hearings investigating the impacts of nonprofits on American political processes (U.S. Congress 1964). Patman’s subcommittee investigated Internal Revenue Service (IRS) documents of various groups and uncovered anomalies in the records of several foundations. When Patman inquired about irregularities in the Kaplan Fund’s records, Mitchell Rogovin, assistant to the IRS commissioner, privately told him that the fund was a CIA front, used to finance programs of interest to the agency, an arrangement that was confirmed by the CIA representative Patman contacted. Patman identified eight nonprofits that had financially supported the Kaplan Fund while it was operating as a CIA conduit: the Gotham Foundation, the Michigan Fund, the Andrew Hamilton Fund, the Borden Trust, the Price Fund, the Edsel Fund, the Beacon Fund, and the Kentfield Fund (U.S. Congress 1964: 191; Hailey 1964). Patman publicly revealed these CIA–Kaplan connections after the CIA refused to comply with his requests for information about these relationships (U.S. Congress 1964: 191).

After Patman’s revelations, several newspapers condemned these practices. The *New York Times* called for the end of CIA funding fronts, arguing that they allowed “the Communists and the cynical everywhere to charge that American scholars, scientists, and writers going abroad on grants from foundations are cover agents or spies for C.I.A. All scholars — especially those involved in East-West exchanges — will suffer if the integrity of their research is thus made suspect” (NYT 1964: 28). On September 7, 1964, the *Pittsburgh Post Gazette & Sun* wrote that “the CIA’s intrusion into policy-making, its reported defiance of higher executive authority on occasion and its secret operations in the domestic field are enough to make citizens wary of its role in a democracy” (reproduced in U.S. Congress 1964: Exhibit 48). Because Patman did not further pursue CIA wrongdoing (Pearson 1967), even with such concerns over unlawful interference in domestic activities, there were no further investigations into the agency’s use of these fronts until three years later, when Sol Stern published his exposé in *Ramparts*. Stern’s article established that the CIA secretly had provided the National Student Association with $1.6 million since 1959, during a period in which the association was experiencing funding difficulties.
Starting with information from 1964 news reports on Wright Patman’s hearings, Stern used Patman’s discoveries and identified more CIA funding fronts, conduits, and recipients. Stern determined that the CIA had used fronts identified by Patman to fund the National Student Association and to manipulate policies within the association. He learned that, in 1965, the CIA had approached the president of a “prominent New England foundation” requesting access to the foundation’s list of funded organizations. After viewing the list, CIA agents explained that they would like to use the foundation to support some already funded and new organizations of interest to the CIA, so that they could “channel CIA money into the foundation without it ever being traced back to the CIA. They said they were very skilled at these manipulations” (Stern 1967: 31). This foundation’s board rejected the CIA’s proposal, but other foundations accepted CIA funds and passed them along to unwitting individuals and programs.

One *Ramparts* reporter found that when he tracked down CIA front foundation addresses, he “usually found himself in a law office where no one was willing to talk about the Funds” (Stern 1967: 31). Stern traced CIA funds passing through several intermediary foundations (e.g., the J. Frederick Brown Foundation and the Independence Foundation) that were themselves funded by CIA fronts (31), with other money coming from the CIA-linked Rabb, Kaplan, Farfield, San Jacinto Foundation, Independence, Tower, and Price Funds and eventually reaching the National Student Association with no visible links to the CIA (32).

Stern’s report had a significant impact on the public. *Ramparts* purchased large ads in the *New York Times* announcing the piece, and there were widespread reactions to the story. Art Buchwald (1967) wrote a humorous piece, spinning ridiculous CIA cover stories, including one in which the CIA had accidentally funded the National Student Association, thinking it was giving money to the National Security Agency. While numerous editorials on these fronts criticized the CIA, Thomas Braden published “I’m Glad the CIA Is ‘Immoral’” (1967) in the *Saturday Evening Post*, describing his role in passing CIA funds to the American Federation of Labor to bolster anticommunist unions in Europe. Braden disclosed that CIA funding had helped the Boston Symphony Orchestra, the International Committee of Women, and the Congress for Cultural Freedom advance against the forces of international communism. He bragged about the CIA secretly using Jay Lovestone, the former leader of the Communist Party USA and an anticommunist, to subvert communist advances in French labor struggles. Carl Rowan, former director of the U.S. Information Service (USIS), claimed in his syndicated column that the National Student Associa-
tion exposé in *Ramparts* was part of a communist plot (Richardson 2009: 78). Stern’s investigation did not need communist agents passing on CIA front identities: his information was in the congressional record, and Rowan’s USIS background suggests his attack was nothing more than “disinformation from the CIA propaganda machine” (Richardson 2009: 78).6

Stern’s revelations led mainstream media outlets to investigate the CIA’s use of funding fronts to infiltrate domestic organizations (see *Newsweek* 1967). Public concerns led President Johnson to appoint Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach to lead a commission investigating CIA programs that stood to “endanger the integrity and independence of the educational community.” But with Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Richard Helms on the committee, there was little chance of uncovering anything that the agency did not want made public, and even less chance that the committee would recommend criminal trials for CIA employees violating the agency’s charter limiting its domestic activities. President Johnson later received political payback for appointing a committee supporting the status quo; “having ‘saved’ the Agency, he demanded its loyalty on the Vietnam issue. His demand produced further cosmetic exercises, including an attempt to discredit political protest against the war and the suppression of dissent within the CIA” (Jeffreys-Jones 1989: 156). But even as the Katzenbach Commission downplayed CIA criminal wrongdoing, it confirmed widespread CIA infiltration of domestic political organizations and revealed that the agency covertly funded the publication of more than a thousand books for academic and general audiences, as well as magazines like *Encounter* and *Partisan Review* (Wilford 2008; U.S. Senate 1976: 189).

Movements to keep the CIA off American campuses began in 1966; with time this campaign spread and focused on keeping both CIA recruiters and sponsored research off campus (Mills 1991; Price 2011). A confidential 1968 CIA report titled “Student Reaction to CIA Recruitment Activities on Campus” summarized the stages of the movement’s growth and credited *Ramparts* with spawning antirecruitment campaigns at Grinnell College, the City College of New York, San Jose State, and Harvard in 1966 (CIA 1968b: 1). The CIA found that while these protests brought unfavorable publicity to the agency, a “*New York Times* series of articles on the Agency’s world-wide activities did much good and no perceptible harm. On the whole, the publicity and free advertising did more good than harm for the recruitment effort — inspiring a great many write-in candidates of whom we might never have heard otherwise — and emphasized the fact that the press and the reading public will take a special interest in what the Agency does” (1).7 The following year brought more anti-CIA
campus campaigns, with an increase from four campus incidents in 1966 to twenty-seven in 1967, including “a physical incarceration of two recruiters at Columbia University” (2). By 1968, there were seventy-seven anti-CIA campus protests, with the agency identifying the [Students for a Democratic Society] as the “primary instigators” (2).

In 1968, Julius Mader published *Who's Who in the CIA*, claiming to identify hundreds of individuals with CIA connections. Mader’s methodology was crude, drawing mostly on published biographical details of Americans working in diplomatic and other capacities, focusing particularly on individuals with wartime intelligence links, but also on those in roles traditionally fulfilled by CIA agents at foreign embassies. Mader’s scattershot approach led to several errors, and his work was rumored to have been produced with KGB and Stasi assistance.8 This book and a growing number of nonscholarly works making untrue claims about the CIA fed growing public concerns about the agency’s unchecked powers.

President Johnson’s efforts at damage control and at managing public opinions about the CIA had limited results. The period from 1967 until the mid-1970s brought ongoing revelations about CIA, the FBI, and military intelligence engaging in widespread illegal activities, including unlawful use of these agencies to monitor and manipulate domestic political developments. These activities affected American college campuses, with the FBI not only monitoring anthropologists and other students on campus but at times also using young future anthropologist agent provocateurs to infiltrate, disrupt, and spy on campus political movements (see Divale 1970). In 1970, Christopher Pyle, a former army employee, revealed that the army had a secret intelligence network devoted to spying on U.S. citizens protesting the Vietnam War. Pyle disclosed that “The Army employed more than 1,500 plainclothes agents, coast to coast, to watch every demonstration of 20 people or more” (2002). Investigations led by Senator Sam Ervin and the Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights substantiated Pyle’s revelations.

On March 8, 1971, a small group of activists broke in to the FBI Field Station in Media, Pennsylvania, and stole records documenting the FBI’s illegal Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO), which harassed and spied on leftist political groups (see Medsger 2014). These records established how groups ranging from the American Indian Movement to the Black Panthers were infiltrated, harassed, and at times encouraged to engage in illegal activities by the FBI. With each revelation, the American public came to understand that open democratic processes had been covertly subverted by a hidden network of in-
Intelligence agencies; with further leaks documenting CIA and FBI lawlessness, pressures built for congressional investigations.

**The CIA’s Family Jewels**

Richard Helms resigned as the director of the CIA in February 1973 and was replaced by James R. Schlesinger. In May 1973, Schlesinger directed the agency to conduct a classified secret in-house study identifying all past and present CIA operations that were likely outside of its operational charter. By the time the report was completed, William Colby had replaced Schlesinger as DCI. The report, known as “The Family Jewels,” was a 693-page compilation of portions of memos and files that provided a detailed account of the CIA’s illegal activities. “The Family Jewels” described the agency’s involvement in extensive illegal domestic intelligence operations including broad surveillance of U.S. news reporters and American political dissidents (including compiling almost 10,000 pages of files on anti–Vietnam War protesters); break-ins at homes of defectors, former CIA employees, and CIA critics; forging of ID documents; and kidnappings and assassination plots against state leaders (Fidel Castro, Patrice Lumumba, and Rafael Trujillo). News reporting on this document caused a political eruption that the executive and legislative branches could not ignore.

On December 22, 1974, Seymour Hersh published a *New York Times* story, titled “Huge CIA Operation Reported in US against Anti-war Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years,” that drew on leaked portions of “The Family Jewels” (Hersh 1974b); President Ford and members of Congress first learned of this program from Hersh’s article. After Hersh revealed Operation CHAOS’ illegal monitoring of more than one hundred thousand U.S. citizens, Ford asked DCI Colby for a background report on CHAOS. Colby briefed the president on a range of illegal activities revealed in the report, including the Inspector General’s 1967 report on the CIA’s program for assassinating foreign leaders. A few weeks later, in an “off-the-record” meeting with the *New York Times* editorial board, President Ford raised concerns that congressional investigations could unearth the existence of CIA’s assassination programs.

The *Times* did not report on the CIA’s assassination program. But when CBS newsman Daniel Schorr, who had no ties to the *Times*, learned that Ford had acknowledged CIA involvement in assassinations, Schorr (incorrectly) assumed these were domestic assassinations, and when Colby responded to Schorr’s efforts to get more information on the program, Colby inadvertently redirected Schorr’s focus to international assassinations. With this information Schorr
broadcast the news of an international CIA assassination program on CBS television on February 28, 1975 (see Schorr 1977: 144–49). The Church Committee hearings later examined CIA efforts to assassinate a number of foreign leaders, including Fidel Castro of Cuba, Ngao Dinh Diem of Vietnam, Patrice Lumumba of the Congo, General René Schneider of Chile, and Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic.

Wishing to preempt a disruptive congressional investigation, President Ford appointed Vice President Nelson Rockefeller to chair the eight-member fact-finding commission.10 The Rockefeller Commission report (Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities within the United States, June 1975) identified several illegal CIA activities and issued recommendations for CIA reform, including that a CIA database on hundreds of thousands of Americans be destroyed (N. Rockefeller 1975). The commission provided descriptive summaries rather than specific accounts of a range of illegal activities, and its weak recommendations reduced its impact and indicated Ford’s desire to limit Americans’ knowledge of CIA activities.

The Rockefeller Commission established that the CIA had read more than 2.3 million pieces of American mail in its Soviet mail monitoring program; indexed 7 million individual names (under Operation CHAOS) (Rockefeller 1975: 24–34, 41); and used the Agency for International Development and an unnamed American university to run a CIA counterinsurgency “training school for foreign police and security officers” in the United States, which also “sold small amounts of licensed firearms and police equipment to the foreign officers and their departments” (39). Despite the report’s admonitions that the CIA should not repeat these illegal and inadvisable acts, no one at the agency was arrested, and no concrete forms of oversight were forthcoming as a result of the Rockefeller report.

In 1975, former CIA agent Philip Agee published Inside the Company: CIA Diary, providing detailed accounts of his activities as a CIA operative in Ecuador, Uruguay, and Mexico. Agee identified 250 CIA agents or officers, as well as Latin American presidents who collaborated with the CIA, and he recounted bugging operations and CIA torture and described how he had recruited and managed CIA spy networks abroad. Inside the Company publicized how the agency undermined foreign democratic movements aligned with socialism, depicting it as a cynical organization supporting authoritarian governments aligned with U.S. business interests.11 Agee’s later work with Louis Wolf on the book Dirty Work and in the magazines CounterSpy and Covert Action Information Bulletin led to the publication of hundreds of other CIA employee names.
The Church Committee

In response to the revelations of ongoing press reports on “The Family Jewels,” Watergate, and COINTELPRO and growing suspicions of illegal activities undertaken by the FBI and the CIA, in 1975 the U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities held hearings investigating the CIA’s illegal activities. The committee, which came to be known simply as the Church Committee (after its chair, Senator Frank Church, D-ID), produced fourteen volumes of reports documenting hundreds of illegal activities ranging from kidnapping, murder, and drugging of unsuspecting civilians to the widespread infiltration and subversion of domestic academic institutions.

Book 1, section 10, of the Church Committee’s report summarized the committee’s findings on the CIA’s ability to covertly influence the production of academic knowledge. The committee found that the CIA’s Domestic Collection Division routinely contacted American academics traveling abroad, and that the Foreign Resources Division was “the purely operational arm of the CIA in dealing with American academics.” Between these two divisions, the CIA had contacts “with many thousands of United States academics at hundreds of U.S. academic institutions” (U.S. Senate 1976: 189).

The CIA’s Office of Personnel secretly worked with university administrators to facilitate the recruitment of students. The CIA’s operational use of academics raised “troubling questions as to preservation of the integrity of American academic institutions” (U.S. Senate 1976: 189). The report described extensive covert contacts with American academics, yet the committee chose not to identify specific individuals or institutions compromised by the CIA.

The Church Committee’s investigations into the use of funding fronts for international research projects had significance for anthropology, as the committee determined the following:

The CIA’s intrusion into the foundation field in the 1960s can only be described as massive. Excluding grants from the “Big Three”—Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie—of the 700 grants over $10,000 given by 164 other foundations during the period 1963–1966, at least 108 involved partial or complete CIA funding. More importantly, CIA funding was involved in nearly half the grants the non-“Big Three” foundations made during this period in the field of international activities. In the same period more than one-third of the grants awarded by non-“Big Three” in the physical, life and social sciences also involved CIA funds. . . . A 1966 CIA study
explained the use of legitimate foundations was the most effective way of conceal- 
ing the CIA’s hand as well as reassuring members of funding organizations that the 
organization was in fact supported by private funds. The Agency study contended 
that this technique was “particularly effective for democratically-run membership 
organizations, which need to assure their own unwitting members and collabora-
tors, as well as their hostile critics, that they have genuine, respectable, private 
 sources of income. (U.S. Senate 1976: 182–83, emphasis added)

In most instances the academics receiving these funds were unaware that the 
CIA funded their work. The committee identified “several hundred” instances 
in which the CIA had established covert relationships with academics at more 
than a hundred university campuses performing CIA-backed jobs, including 
“making introductions for intelligence purposes” and writing books or “mate-
rial to be used for propaganda purposes abroad” (U.S. Senate 1976: 190). At 
most universities no one outside of the CIA contact knew of these relationships, 
and all such contacts were guarded by the agency, which considered “these op-
erational relationships with the United States academic community as perhaps 
its most sensitive domestic area and [imposed] strict controls governing these 
operations” (190).

One of the ways that the CIA shaped the funding of international research 
was by planting agency employees in key positions on foundations. In 1955, DCI 
Dulles responded to a request by Don K. Price, acting president of the Ford 
Foundation, to loan a CIA employee to serve on the Ford Foundation staff, writ-
ing that he would make a CIA employee (female, identity redacted) available to 
the foundation for two years, adding that “we consider her competency such 
that, with a period of service with you, she and this Agency will gain significantly” 
(FOIA CIA-RDP80B01676R004000140015–9, AD to DKP, 8/13/55). The strategic 
placement of one such CIA employee within Ford or other Foundations could 
influence untold numbers of funding decisions; though the record is incom-
plete (due to the CIA’s refusal to publicly release its own records), we can as-
sume that this relationship at Ford was replicated at other key foundations.13

Recently declassified CIA reports have shed light on some of the ways that 
the CIA, the Pentagon, and other governmental agencies working on counter-
insurgency projects or other intelligence matters influenced and benefited from 
government-funded social science research during the Cold War. Henry Loomis 
(of the Psychological Strategy Board [PSB]) produced “Report on Social Science 
Research in Cold War Operations” (1952), a CIA report outlining strategies for 
using American social science research to further the agency’s knowledge and
goals (foia cia-cia-rdp80R01731R001700230005–8, 4/11/52). Loomis worked with Max Millikan (foia cia-rdp80R01731R003300090002–9, 5/5/52) where he advocated letting the psb oversee this cia-linked research within and outside the agency (foia cia-rdp80R01731R003300090003–8, 5/19/52). The articulations of such relationships were described in some detail in a 1962 CIA report:

The External Research Division maintains an index of government sponsored contractual research on foreign areas, obtaining the pertinent data from the sponsoring agencies. Each calendar quarter it publishes an inventory of contracts. (The publication is classified “Secret.”) A tabulation of some 400 contracts reported in the publication over a period of several quarters reveals that the Agency for International Development reported roughly 155 contracts, Air Force reported 125 and CIA reported 56. Other agencies varied from a low of one (NSA and Arms Control, one each) to a high of 22 for Army. The information on these contracts is usually gathered and published after the research contracts have been let. Advance coordination through the External Research Division is not required and, therefore, there is not a uniform method of coordination. Some offices (OSI for example) conduct a search of the quarterly published inventory prior to entering into new contracts. ORR, in addition to searching the published inventory, coordinates its external research requirements through the Economic Intelligence Committee (USIB) and the EIC, in turn, requests the External Research Division to conduct a search of its records. The offices do, however, make consistent use of the inventory. The value of a central record such as that maintained by the External Research Division was demonstrated recently when the Division, in response to a request from Senator Fulbright, was able to supply the Senator with a consolidated report of government sponsored external research on the USSR and Communist China.

...In addition to the records maintained and published on government sponsored research, the Division maintains a private research catalogue of social science research conducted in the United States on foreign areas and international affairs. Information for the catalogue is obtained through annual surveys of universities, foundations, research centers, etc. The catalogue is unclassified and is open to the public. External Research lists of current private research on foreign areas and international affairs are published and distributed throughout the government and to university libraries, department heads, individual scholars, and foreign academic institutions. (foia cia-rdp80B01676R002400030004–1, 7/26/62)

During 1962 discussions on how the CIA, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Air Force Intelligence, and other governmental agencies might
best coordinate the use of the social and behavioral science research being produced, the CIA suggested the formation of a “working group” with “a number of coordinating specialists thoroughly familiar with the literature in the relevant fields whose duty it would be to maintain liaisons with all government agencies and research scholars” (FOIA CIA-RDP80B01676R002400030004-1, 7/26/62).

Between 1952 and 1967, the CIA covertly funded U.S. scholars to write more than a thousand books representing views the agency wished to propagate. Of these books, the Church Committee determined that “approximately 25 percent of them were written in English. Many of them were published by cultural organizations which the CIA backed, and more often than not the author was unaware of CIA subsidization. Some books, however, involved direct collaboration between the CIA and the writer” (U.S. Senate 1976: 193). Former CIA agent E. Howard Hunt’s testimony confirmed CIA books were distributed in the U.S., and the Church Committee concluded “that such fallout may not have been unintentional,” adding that U.S. citizens were “a likely audience” when this propaganda was published in English (U.S. Senate 1976: 198–99). When asked by the committee (which was concerned that the CIA had illegally engaged in domestic propaganda) if the agency took steps to limit domestic exposure to the CIA books published by Praeger or others, Hunt replied:

It was impossible because Praeger was a commercial U.S. publisher. His books had to be seen, had to be reviewed, had to be bought here, had to be read. . . . If your targets are foreign, then where are they? They don’t all necessarily read English, and we had a bilateral agreement with the British that we wouldn’t propagandize their people. So unless the book goes into a lot of languages or it is published in India, for example, where English is a lingua franca, then you have some basic problems. And I think the way this was rationalized by the project review board . . . was that the ultimate target was foreign, which was true, but how much of the Praeger output actually got abroad for any impact I think is highly arguable. (U.S. Senate 1976: 198–99)

In response to Hunt’s revelations that Praeger had published CIA propaganda in the United States, the committee concluded that, “given the paucity of information and the inaccessibility of China in the 1960s, the CIA may have helped shape American attitudes toward the emerging China. The CIA considers such ‘fallout’ inevitable” (U.S. Senate 1976: 199).
Pike Commission

The House investigations of the CIA were more aggressive than the Senate's, and unlike the Senate's Church Committee, the House proceeded largely without the CIA's cooperation. The House Select Committee on Intelligence began its investigation in February 1975 under the leadership of Congressman Lucien N. Nedzi. The initial selection of Nedzi as chair raised concerns that his previous role as chair of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence had compromised his ability to conduct an independent investigation. When a New York Times story revealed that DCI Colby had privately briefed Nedzi about the CIA's “Family Jewels” in 1973, Nedzi was replaced as chair by Congressman Otis Pike.

Conflicts between Pike and DCI Colby began before the hearings were convened. Pike interpreted congressional oversight of CIA to include the right to declassify documents and information as Congress saw fit. The CIA maintained it had control of what information would be given to Congress (see Haines 1989: 84). Colby was contemptuous of the Pike Committee and refused to disclose the CIA’s budget in public session, while within the agency, Colby was despised by many CIA loyalists who resented him allowing any critical public scrutiny of the agency.

In an effort to understand the range of CIA actions and the oversight that the Forty Committee had exercised over CIA activities, the committee reviewed all CIA covert actions between 1965 and 1975 (Pike Report 1977: 187). The committee devised six historical tests to measure the effectiveness of the CIA’s analytical abilities to correctly foresee significant political events: the 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam, the August 1968 Soviet action in Czechoslovakia, the 1973 war between Israel and Syria and Egypt, the April 1974 coup in Portugal, the CIA’s monitoring of India’s nuclear arms program, and the 1974 Cyprus crisis. The committee found that the CIA failed to meaningfully anticipate any of these developments, and that these failures left America in a weakened position.

The Pike Committee found that even after President Johnson wrote directives prohibiting the CIA from covertly funding U.S. educational institutions (after the 1967 National Student Association revelations in Ramparts), the CIA “unilaterally reserved the right to, and does, depart from the Presidential order when it has the need to do so” (Pike Report 1977: 117). The committee determined that between 1965 and 1975 about one-third of the covert actions approved by the Forty Committee involved CIA efforts to influence the outcomes of foreign elections (190). Another third (29 percent) of the CIA’s Forty
Committee–approved covert activities during this period involved “media and propaganda projects” (190). These projects included covert CIA control of the publication of books and magazines within the U.S. and abroad, though “by far the largest single recipient has been a European publishing house funded since 1951,” with a “number of similar operations in the region” (190). About a quarter of the funds (23 percent) for the CIA’s operations during this period went to the procurement and distribution of arms and covert paramilitary training, and “at times, CIA has been used as a conduit for arms transfers in order to bypass Congressional scrutiny” (191).

The report evaluated three types of CIA covert operations: “election support” (e.g., subverting democratic movements abroad), arms support, and the backing of independence movements of the National Front for the Independence of Angola (FNL A) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in Angola. Investigation into the CIA’s use of USAID “foreign police training” programs on American university campuses found these programs were also used by the CIA to monitor campus activities (Pike Report 1977: 228–29).

Whereas the Church Committee found the CIA to at times be a “rogue” agency engaging in unauthorized illegal activities, the Pike Committee found that the CIA bypassed congressional oversight and operated under executive branch control. This finding of consistent executive branch CIA oversight was the crucial finding of the Pike Report. It showed how presidents, through the NSC, the Forty Committee, and at times directly through DCIS, used the CIA as a covert tool of executive branch policy. As former career CIA agent Ralph McGehee later wrote, “My view backed by 25 years of experience is, quite simply, that the CIA is the covert action arm of the Presidency” (1983: xi). The Pike Report concluded that “all evidence in hand suggests that the CIA, far from being out of control, has been utterly responsive to the instructions of the President and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. It must be remembered, however that the CIA director determines which CIA-initiated covert action projects are sufficiently ‘politically sensitive’ to require Presidential attention” (Pike Report 1977: 189). While the executive branch exercised control of the CIA’s covert actions, proposed CIA covert actions also came from others, including “a foreign head of state, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, an Ambassador, CIA, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, a cabinet member or the President himself” (Pike Report 1977: 187). As Pike put it, “The CIA never did anything the White House didn’t want. Sometimes they didn’t want to do what they did” (Pike qtd. in Haines 1998: 88). House Republicans blocked publication of the final report, but Daniel Schorr
leaked an early draft to the *Village Voice*, which published it in its entirety (Schorr 1976; Pike Report 1977; Benson 1976).

One short-term outcome of press revelations and of the findings of the Rockefeller, Pike, and Church committees was the establishment of new congressional oversight of CIA activities. President Ford signed Executive Order 11905, banning political assassinations, creating the new National Security Committee on Foreign Intelligence, replacing the Forty Committee with the Operations Advisory Group, and clarifying the necessity of reporting illegal activities to the executive branch. In 1978, President Carter signed Executive Order 12036, restructuring oversight groups, a change that was widely interpreted as providing more CIA oversight, yet the executive branch retained oversight control over the agency. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (1978) established new congressional and judicial oversight of the CIA’s domestic surveillance abilities.

Although the CIA appeared publicly complacent with presidential and congressional reform efforts, it resisted efforts to curtail its covert relationships with universities. When pressed by Senator Edward Kennedy to contact individuals and universities that had unwittingly received CIA funding through MK-Ultra projects (discussed in chapter 8), the CIA refused to undertake these most basic of reparations (U.S. Senate 1977: 36, 45).

*Writing the CIA into Disciplinary Histories*

The United States’ postwar global political stance shifted American orientations toward the peoples anthropologists studied. As the United States and the Soviet Union competed for the hearts, minds, debts, and arms contracts of the world’s nonaligned nations, there were tangible uses for the forms of intangible knowledge that anthropologists brought home from the remote areas where they worked; whether their work involved esoteric symbolic studies or radical Marxist analysis, the CIA saw prospects of useful knowledge.

Anthropology departments grew with the postwar wealth that flowed from GI Bill tuition, and this growth was nurtured by the dual use dynamics of Cold War research needs. Anthropologists sought training funds, opportunities for field research, linguistic training, and travel funds so that they could pursue research questions of interest to them and their discipline. Postwar governmental agencies needed knowledge about the peoples of the world where the new American superpower developed relationships favoring American dominance. These were often symbiotic relationships allowing academics to research topics of their choosing or to pursue theoretical questions of interest; in other
instances, the questions or geographic regions of inquiry were more closely shaped by the availability of funds. Either way, fields of knowledge were funded that benefited individual anthropologists and generated knowledge for a brain trust.

Rarely was this brain trust a concrete conglomeration of scholars, of the type exemplified by the Princeton Consultants; generally the knowledge was far more diffuse and participants pursued knowledge in what appeared to be a mostly free-range manner. Yet the revelations, first from a wave of journalistic investigations, then from a wave of presidential and congressional committees disclosing the CIA’s influence on international scholarship during the early Cold War, were “massive.”

What is easily lost on readers in later years marked by increased surveillance is the level of shock and outrage that these initial revelations of CIA lawlessness unleashed in America in the 1960s and 1970s. The CIA’s reliance on assassinations, lying, cheating, death squads, destabilizing foreign democratic movements, torture, bribery, kidnapping, or cooking intelligence reports to fit the needs of the executive branch directly undermined American ideals of democracy and openness. The American public’s lessening ability to be shocked by revelations of CIA lawlessness and domestic programs is remarkable, but anthropologists recognize how the numbing tendencies of enculturation can normalize atrocities. Sustaining shock is always difficult, outrage’s half-life is short, and the toll of cognitive dissonance weighs heavy. With time the outrageous and offensive can be seen as the “unfortunately necessary,” and the currency of shock is short-lived as once current events become historicized.

Revelations of the CIA’s lawlessness, its role in covert actions, its use of funding fronts, and its self-serving use of unwitting citizens have now become staples of the American imagination. In the milieu of these press and congressional revelations were films like Sydney Pollack’s *Three Days of the Condor* (1975), Costa-Gavras’s *State of Siege* (1972), Francis Ford Coppola’s *The Conversation* (1974), and Alan Pakula’s *Parallax View* (1974), or even Pakula’s Watergate journalistic detective story based on Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein’s book *All the President’s Men* (1976). America’s popular imagination comfortably incorporated Condor’s CIA funding fronts, The Parallax View’s assassinations, The Conversation’s borderless surveillance panopticon, and All the President’s Men’s all-encompassing lawless cancer on the presidency.

There remained lasting visible and invisible fallout from the Church and Pike investigations throughout American culture. Initially, a general distrust of the CIA and FBI spread, but the cultural incorporation of this new knowledge of
CIA practices took many forms, some based on fact, others on fantasies or delusions. Revelations of CIA practices spawned a range of paranoid conspiracy theories that often began with facts or partial facts about actual CIA programs unearthed by the press or congressional hearings, but these facts were mixed with a range of delusional fantasies involving supposed successful mind control programs with imagined “monarch slaves” and a host of international conspiracies involving bankers and agents of the Illuminati. While the CIA’s MK-Ultra program funded a bizarre range of scientific research exploring the possibility of “mind control,” other than some new techniques for “enhanced interrogations,” the CIA did not develop any effective “mind control” program (beyond its covert use of newspapers and academic presses to influence public discourse). With time, the mixing of fact and fiction in popular accounts of CIA activities contributed to the American public’s confusion about the agency’s history, as documented CIA atrocities became indistinguishable in the public memory from absurd claims. This haziness of Americans’ shared CIA memory mixed with the popularized paranoid fantasies about this history, along with post-9/11 Hollywood fantasies of CIA saviors operating beyond the law, diminished the likelihood of the American public demanding new levels of CIA accountability.

While the leaked Pike Report and released Church Committee Report expanded public knowledge about CIA wrongdoing and ongoing lawlessness, the findings of these committees brought little long-term change in the way the agency did business, or how Congress exercised due oversight of the agency. Congressional and journalistic revelations increased the American public’s distrust of the CIA and the FBI. These disclosures weakened the confidence of many educated Americans in the CIA and strengthened growing movements to keep the CIA off of American university campuses.

Several years after the fact, in the pages of the CIA’s in-house classified journal, Studies in Intelligence, Timothy S. Hardy gloated that, while Seymour Hersh and other journalists had successfully spawned White House and congressional investigations of CIA activities, “yet Hersh may not even merit a historical footnote, perhaps, because the ball he started rolling never really knocked down all, or even any of the pins . . . . The CIA is thriving in Langley, its constituent parts all strung together, its basic mission unchanged. The Defense Department still spends more than 80 percent of the billions of national intelligence dollars in ways only vaguely known to the American public” (1976: 1). Given the depth of anti-CIA feelings at the time Hardy wrote this, his remarks may seem like a form of dismissive denial, but if one takes the long view, Hardy’s focus on the speed at which Americans came to adjust to and accept news of the CIA’s
lawlessness proved to be profoundly accurate. Americans were enculturated to learn to accept CIA death squads, wiretaps, kidnappings, covert arms dealing, support for foreign dictators, and even massive NSA metadata surveillance as necessary details of the modern world. In post-9/11 America, the acceptance of CIA torture, invasions of domestic privacy, assassinations, and attacks on international democratic movements updated this enculturation process to a point where increasing numbers of Americans accept these practices as necessary and just, while the agency’s history and the public’s outrage over past revelations disappear from public memory.

While this overview of Cold War strategies, revelations of CIA lawlessness, and interactions with academics during the Cold War is crucial for our consideration of how American anthropology interacted with military and intelligence agencies during the period, it is important to keep in mind that most anthropologists were then unaware of the secret shifts in American policy and practices during the earliest days of the Cold War, as fighting of the Second World War subsided and the postwar era began. Although this lack of awareness shaped anthropologists’ motivations, innocence did not mitigate harm; as Thomas Fowler argued in The Quiet American, “Innocence is like a dumb leper who has lost his bell, wandering the world, meaning no harm” (Greene 1955: 36).