Notes

1. In Santiago, in the north of Spain, Catholic resistance against Islam was formed around the twelfth century. The Christian Reconquest of Iberia made the cult of Saint James (Santiago) and the pilgrimage to his site a major symbol of Christian mobilization against the east. After the final defeat of the Moors in 1492, the symbol of Santiago Matamoros (Saint James the Moors Killer) became the figure of national unity for Catholic Spain under Ferdinand and Isabelle. While proposals to include Christianity as the religion of Europe abound around the project of a European constitution, it might be worth noticing that “for the Council of Europe, what is now a signposted routeway—the Camino de Santiago—becomes a symbol of European cultural itinerary, a symbol of the ideal of European integration” (Graham 26).

2. By this I mean a post-Bismarckian kind of political science. For Bismarck, we remember, “anyone who speaks of Europe is wrong.” Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell suggest that this assertion, scribbled on the back of a telegram form 1876, only meant “that designations such as ‘Europe’ are empty and arbitrary” (15).

3. “Claiming to speak in the name of intelligibility, good sense, common sense, or the democratic ethic, this discourse tends, by means of these very things, and as if naturally, to discredit anything that complicates this model. It tends to suspect or repress anything that bends, overdetermines, or even questions” (Derrida, Other Heading 55).

4. History is understood here in the sense of Marc Bloch’s “historical semantics” (Craft) and Antonio Gramsci’s philological “history of terminology,” as “a study of words [that] can help us understand the very limit of words, and avoid that metaphors materialize themselves, almost mechanically, [into truth statements]” (Gramsci 85).

5. This is a theory, incidentally, that became instrumental in the eighteenth century to claim not so much a Christian, but a Frankish origin of Europe: Charles Martel’s Europe of Poitiers, maturing in Charles’s grandson’s, Charlemagne, Holy Roman Empire, would be, according to such theory, the origin, kernel, and truest essence of Europe. In chapter 3 of this
book, I will discuss the way in which Juan Andrés will question the Franco-centricism of this theory and will propose another with Arab Spain at its center.

6. Or, in the pseudo Aretino’s less orthodox version: “Per Europa godere, in bue cangiossi / Giove, che di chiavarla avea desio; / e la sua deità posta in oblio, / in più bestiali forme trasformossi” (Aretino 189).

7. If we accept Momigliano’s theory—that since the Greeks started talking about Europe, they must have also begun it—then it follows the recurrent claim that “the forerunner of European civilization . . . is to be found in the Hellenic world” (e.g., Likaszewski 40). Not that such claim, trite as it may sound, will (or should) be without contention: as we will see by the end of this introduction, such a Mediterranean beginning of Europe (Said’s “A”) will be quite inconvenient when the objective is to argue (B) a more northern essence of Europeanness on the part of, say, the French philosophes of the eighteenth century. For that, Robert Bartlett’s Charlemagne (or Bernard Lewis’s Charles Martel) will undoubtedly do much better.

8. Edith Hall identifies Aeschylus’s Persians as “the first unmistakable file in the archive of Orientalism, the discourse by which the European imagination has dominated Asia ever since by conceptualizing its inhabitants as defeated, luxurious, emotional, cruel, and always as dangerous” (99). Thomas Harrison warns, however, that “the assumption of a continuous tradition of the Orient—and a corresponding idea of Europe—may indeed play into the hands of those who ascribe very different values to East and West, who believe . . . that . . . the Western community is nevertheless . . . called upon to lead the world” (42). It should be remarked, however, that Aeschylus does not use the term Europe himself and that such discussions, in the last analysis, may be more revealing of our concerns about Europe than of the Greeks.

9. “Europe, in Strabo’s definition, included Iberia, Celtica (between the Pyrenees and the Rhine), and Brittany. In the east, it was divided by the Danube. On the left bank were the Germans, the Getae, the Tyregetae, the Bastarnae, and the Sarmatians; on the right bank were Thracia, Illyria, and Greece . . . . Strabo had practically no knowledge of Scandinavia (since he confused the Baltic with the Ocean) or of the huge plain which stretches between the lower Baltic and the Don” (Duroselle 64–65).

10. “The limes, the ‘frontier line’, was a vital feature of the Empire’s defence. It was not, as is sometimes supposed, an impenetrable barrier. From the military point of view it was more of a cordon, or series of parallel cordons, which, whilst deterring casual incursions, would trigger active countermeasures as soon as it seriously breached. It was a line which normally could only be crossed by paying portaria and by accepting the Empire’s authority. It was, above all, a marker which left no one in doubt as to which
lands were subject to Roman jurisdiction and which were not. Its most important characteristic was its continuity. It ran up hill and down dale without a break, and along all frontier rivers and coasts. In places, as in Britain, it took the form of a Great Wall on the Chinese model. Elsewhere it might carry a wooden stockade atop earthworks, or a string of linked coastal forts, or, as in Africa, blocks of fortified farmhouses facing the desert interior” (Davies 185–88).

11. “The medieval ‘r-o’ maps represent the earth schematically divided into three by the Nile and Tanais running north and south forming the head of the ‘T,’ the Mediterranean running West from the juncture of the ‘T,’ sometimes marked as the site of Jerusalem in the center of the world, and the whole thing inscribed in the circle of ‘the Ocean.’ These maps express the blend of the classical and biblical heritages characteristic of the West. They superimpose onto the three sons of Noah—Sem, Ham, and Japheth, iconic ancestors of the world’s races—the divisions devised by the Ionian historians and geographers, who took the Aegean to be the fulcrum of meaningful contact and conflict. The inner sea, ever since Isidore of Seville called the Mediterranean such, is the upright leg of the ‘T,’ the axis around which this universe revolves” (Moulakis 16).

12. “Can other aspects of Europe’s distasteful recent past be reconciled with the notion of European identity? Europeanness has to embrace the unacceptable: Srebrenica and Auschwitz as well as High Gothic cathedrals, romantic castles, utopian Renaissance town planning and symphonic music. The memorable history of Europeans embraces pogrom, persecution and prejudice, near-continuous internecine war, oppression and genocide. The twentieth century has seen mass death, carpet-bombing of cities and, above all, the Jewish Holocaust of 1933–45. This remains archetypically ‘European’ heritage, and arguably the most serious challenge facing contemporary European society in creating a sense of common identity. European Jews—ironically the principal European people not nationally defined—were deported and murdered by Europeans in Europe in pursuit of a European ideology” (Graham 44).

13. “Medium Aevum, ‘the Middle Age,’ was a term first used by devout Christians who saw themselves living in the interval between Christ’s first and Second Coming. Much later it was taken up for different purposes. Renaissance scholars began to talk in the fifteenth century of the ‘Middle Age’ as the interval between the decline of antiquity and the revival of classical culture in their own times. For them, the ancient world stood for high civilization; the Middle Age represented a descent into barbarism, parochiality, religious bigotry. During the Enlightenment, when the virtues of human reason were openly lauded over those of religious belief, ‘medievalism’ became synonymous with obscurantism and backwardness. Since then,
of course, as the ‘Modern Age’ which followed the Middle Age was itself fading into the past, new terms had to be invented to mark the passage of time. The medieval period has been incorporated into the fourfold Convention which divides European history into ancient, medieval, modern, and now contemporary sections. By convention also, the medieval period is often subdivided into early, high, and late phases, creating several successive Middle Ages. Of course, people whom later historians refer to as ‘medieval’ had no inkling of that designation” (Davies 291).

14. Just to avoid possible misunderstandings deriving from my sometimes synonymic use of Frank and German: the Franks were, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, one of the “Germanic nation, or coalition of nations, that conquered Gaul in the 6th century.”

15. “It is true that Christians are made—by baptism—not born, but the vast majority of those born in Christian Europe . . . underwent baptism as a matter of course. They could easily think of themselves, not as voluntary recruits to a particular community of believers, but as members of a Christian race or people. . . . The ethnic sense of ‘Christian’ can be found repeatedly and perhaps increasingly in the High Middle Ages. The term ‘the Christian people’ (populus Christianus), which was common, implies no more than ‘the community of Christians’; but when the Saxons were forcibly converted by Frankish arms in the decades around the year 800, adoption of the new religion made them ‘one race, as it were (quasi una gens), with the Franks’ ” (Bartlett 251).

16. “Medieval Europeans commonly referred to Muslims as ‘Saracens,’ an epithet derived from the Arabic word sharakyoun or ‘easterner’” (Davies 258).

17. According to William of Malmesbury, however, the pope himself claimed, when preaching the Crusade in 1095, that nothing less than “Europe” was at stake (see Hay 30–31).

18. Parataxis being, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, “the placing of propositions or clauses one after another, without indicating by connecting words the relation (of co-ordination or subordination) between them.”

19. “April 1215 . . . is the first time that the word universitas is attested as a description for the collected academic world in Bologna. Perhaps this date can be regarded as the birthday of the universities, though this is a slightly misleading interpretation, as there was nothing special in the word universitas. This was a purely technical term taken from the doctrine of corporations in Roman law. . . . It has no special ideological content and is used quite neutrally of the total mass of teachers and students at the Bologna law schools. It was only much later that the word acquired a specially philosoph-
ical meaning: in the middle ages *studium generale* was and remained the official term of the university* (Pedersen 144–45).

20. “Certain doctrines of Aristotle’s writings did not harmonize with Christian revelation: namely, his judgments concerning the eternity of the world, the immortality of the soul . . . and, lastly his concept of a Supreme Being who took little account of the world and the men in it. . . . Perhaps for reasons like [these], the bishops of the dioceses near [the university of] Paris met in a local synod and decided to forbid ‘books of Aristotle on natural philosophy . . . .’” Yet the 1255 curriculum of Paris “was very heavily weighted in favor of Aristotle. The very books forbidden by the provincial synod some forty years before now formed part of the ordinary lecture materials” (Daly 82–83). On the Europeanness of Aristotle, Nicolas Bakhtin had to say: “Europe was always essentially Aristotelian. Also it still is in so far as it remains truly Europe” (qtd. in Botz-Bornstein 179–80).

21. “Crusader, linguist, philosopher, ornithologist, patron of the arts, protector of Jews, and master of a harem, Fredrick ii was twice excommunicated by the Pope for disobedience and officially condemned by a General Council as a heretic. He ruled in the south as a despot, imposing an efficient, centralized administration on Church and State alike. He even encouraged an imperial cult of his own person. He presided over a brilliant, cultured court at Palermo—a magnificent blend of Latin, German, Jewish, Greek, and Saracen elements. To his contemporaries he was quite simply the *stupor mundi*, the ‘wonder of the age’” (Davies 351).

22. Hay talks instead of a “confusion” between Christendom and Europe: “From 1400 to 1700, and in certain areas and contexts perhaps beyond this terminus, the new unity was confounded with the old” (96).

23. “In Abraham Ortelius’s *Thesaurus geographicus* (1578) we have a telling entry under the word ‘Christiani’: ‘vide Europaei’” (Hay 109).

24. One should keep in mind, however, that a difference between name and adjective may not have been perceived with the same intensity by Enea Silvio as it is by us. Fourteenth- and fifteenth-century grammars (Thomas of Erfurt, Nicholas Perotti, Aldo Manuzio, Antonio de Nebrija) see the *nomen adjectivum* as a mere modal variation of *nomen substantivum*. A real separation between the two classes of words will not be achieved until the eighteenth century (see Scarano 12).

25. What becomes increasingly inaccurate to maintain, as *Europe (in Theory)* intends to show, is that there is such a thing as a Romano-Germanic unity of Europe: “The Romano-Germanic world was itself by no means homogeneous. Differences arising from their different backgrounds had deeply marked the various societies of which it was composed. Yet, however pronounced these differences may have been, how can we fail to recognize,
over and above them, the predominant quality of a common civilization—
that of the West?” (Bloch, Feudal xx). Such a theorization of Europe as “the
West,” which relies on the bracketing away of differences between north and
south in the name of a “predominant” yet indemonstrable “quality of a
common civilization,” is exactly what Europe (in Theory) means to question,
looking instead at the crisis between north and south in the theorization of
Europe.

26. The quotation marks hope to indicate my relative position regarding
the use of the term discovery as it is applied to America: more explicitly, I
stand between Edmundo O’Gorman, who suggests that discovery is a mis-
leading term since “Indians” already knew the continent quite well, and
Alphonse Dupront, who reevaluates the term discovery as the necessary
European false consciousness that could legitimize and even entail conquest.

27. According to Federico Chabod, Machiavelli’s would be “the first for-
mulation of Europe as a community which has distinctive features beyond
mere geography, with characteristics that are purely ‘earthly,’ ‘secular,’ non-
religious” (48).

28. Whereas previous ages had not privileged a single orientation for their
maps, the north was now definitely “up” in all European maps, as “the result
of historical process, closely connected with the global rise and economic
dominance of northern Europe” (Turnbull 8).

29. On the small size of Europe, already Pierre de Ronsard had noticed
that “L’Europe est trop petite” (Europe is too small) (1:299).

30. “Historians . . . have tended to pay little attention to what Marx
regarded as the second major source of primary accumulation, namely,
colonial plunder. Such indifference is unfortunate; for it is not possible to
imagine how a credible history of capitalism can be reconstructed without
comprehending colonialism . . . the Spanish mining of silver with forced
labour in the Americas; the forcible transfer of millions of Africans as slaves
across the Atlantic; and the levying of tribute on Asian shipping and land.
England came in time to be the major beneficiary from all these three
practically simultaneous processes of forcible subjugation and destruction
of non-European economies” (Habib 21).

31. As a persona, Europe also had one story to tell, and one history to
unfold: “The sixteenth century also marked the beginning of an endless
series of histories of Europe leading off with the Florentine Pier Francesco
Giambullari’s Historia dell’Europa (1566) and the Spanish Alfonso Ulloa’s
Historia de Europa (1570)” (Mikkeli 41).

32. Lusitania was the old Roman province comprising today’s Portugal
and part of Spain.

33. “The point of this contrast—which from every point of view is extreme
—lies surely in the nature of the Dutch achievement: its entirely practical
nature. And this in turn brings to mind its overwhelmingly prosaic character; beginning with sieges and dikes and ending with sermons and paintings. ‘Prose’ is not a term of contempt or denigration: there can be a poetry of prose. But consider; is it even imaginable that this society should, like Spain, produce a picaresque novel? (In 1600 Amsterdam is indignantly suppressing vagrancy, if necessary, by shutting up the offenders.) Or a Don Quixote? There are no two ways about it; there is no context in the life of the Dutch Republic in which Don Quixote, with his strain of lofty and pathetic idealism as well as his ridicule, could have a meaning in relation to perceived reality around Holland: whether in his capacity as the socially aimless, crazed hidalgo subject to endless delusion (forget the unfamiliarity with windmills) or as a symptom of some deep cultural want” (Lehmann 166).

34. Since then, “the cardinal problem in defining Europe has centered on the inclusion or exclusion of Russia” (Davies 3).

35. Also Curzio Malaparte sees the Reformation as the crisis dividing north and south that begins modern Europe: “The Reformation is not the birth of a critical modern spirit proper of Western and Northern civilizations, but the separation of such spirit from catholic dogmatism, which belongs instead to Eastern and Southern civilizations, and which is the essence of Latin civilization. When these two contrary tendencies finally separate, and when the former escapes the control of the latter, and becomes in turn the hegemonic one, what happens is a crisis. The history of Europe is contained, in its entirety, in this irreconcilable contrast” (358–59).

36. In 1642, the French statesman Demarets de Saint-Sorlin had dramatized a similar line of thought in his play Europe: “Europe was not a successful play, but it is none the less symptomatic that a statesman should interest himself in propagating his hostility to Spain (the ‘Ibere’ of the play) in terms which some generations earlier would have seemed purely mythological. ‘Europe’, the princess, is full of concern for all her children (and it is stressed that all the nations are of common stock) but chooses to be defended by ‘Francion.’ It was a programme of a European peace in which peace would be kept by an alert and powerful, but beneficent and disinterested, France” (Hay 119).

37. Ideas of peaceable federations, in fact, go well beyond the chronological limits I suggest: already Dante, in De Monarchia (1308), had for instance theorized the possibility of a unity of different principalities under the princeps unicus, the pope. At the other end of my chronology, Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt made some references to Sully (Rougemont 93), and their project of an Atlantic Charter was explicitly inspired, at the end of World War II, by Sully’s one for perpetual peace. The European Union, fantasized by and realized in the Treaty of Rome (Savinio), is another fruit growing in Sully’s plant.
38. According to Paul Hazard, however, the east retained a fundamental role as the antithesis of Europe and the mirror of her identity: “Of all those regions which competed for her [Europe’s] attention, she responded most readily to the East. It was an East gravely distorted by the European view of it; nevertheless, it retained enough of its original impressiveness to loom forth as a vast agglomeration of non-Christian values” (*European Mind* 28).

39. This reevaluation of the Greek and Roman past was part of a more general trend: “The seventeenth century also saw a departure from established cultural patterns. Knowledge of some Greek, but particularly Latin, continued to be required in all schools above the primary level, but little writing was done in Latin after 1600 except in international law, natural science and Roman Catholic theology. . . . Outside the academy, new approaches in science began to emphasize empiricism and induction, rather than the essentially deductive reasoning that the earlier religious orientation of education had required. . . . Even in literature the ancients were revered more in terms of themselves and as adornments of an educated person than as practical guides, and they certainly had little impact on creative activity” (Nicholas 430).

40. To complicate the whole matter, Europe was not only the end of history but also, more often than not, its beginning: a new interest in the chronology of world epochs (Hazard, *European Mind* 41–48) began, with a clear intention to disprove the claims, supported by Egyptology and sinology, that Chinese and Egyptian societies were not only older than European ones but even older than the three thousand years proposed by the Bible as the age of post-Flood civilizations. For the most complete treatment of these chronological controversies, see Paolo Rossi’s work. For the ways in which the claimed anteriority of Europe vis-à-vis the so-called New World legitimated, in turn, claims of Europe’s (colonial) superiority, see Antonello Gerbi.

2 Montesquieu’s North and South

1. A more recent return of the atavist theory can be found in Banfield; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti; and Fukuyama. It must be kept in mind, however, that 1870 is the year of Italy’s unification: as north and south are united, in theory, for the first time, theory starts articulating internal differences and disunities.

2. Similarly, Benjamin Disraeli notices the “legacy of oriental sires” still remnant in Mediterranean Europe (Pemble 146).

3. The inspiration of the Argentinean criminal code of 1921, Enrico Ferri’s *Sociologia criminale* (1884) argued for the necessity to couple punitive mea-
sures with preventive ones: among these, physical education was a remedy for crime.

4. Already in a public lecture to the Academy delivered on August 25, 1720, titled “Of the Causes for the Transparency of Bodies,” Montesquieu had been clear about the ineptitude of the Greeks in tackling the most serious problems facing modern science: “At first sight, it would seem as if Aristotle knew what transparency was, since he defined light as the act of transparency as transparency; in truth, however, he knew nothing of either transparency or light” (Oeuvres 1:27). And in the Pensées (number 1458), he wrote: “The majority of the ancients’ reasonings are not exact” (1:1345).

5. Trying to open a trading route with the east, Jean Baptiste Colbert had failed, first, to found a colony in Madagascar. He had managed, instead, to establish ports in Bourbon and Ile-de-France (now Réunion and Mauritius), but by 1719, despite such success, the French Eastern Company was already near bankruptcy. The company would finally be dissolved in 1769, when it was clear to everybody that it was unfruitful to maintain.

6. In fact, a look at book 8, chapters 15–20, also informs us of the political and social dangers of territorial expansions. Prefacing the discussion with the assertion that “I cannot be understood until you have read the four chapters that follow” (2:362), Montesquieu tells his reader that “a small territory” is more proper to a republic, and an “average extension” to a monarchy. Only despotism can guard over huge territories: “Do not even think to counteract my argument by mentioning Spain here; Spain only proves what I have already said. To control America, it did worse than despotism itself: it destroyed the inhabitants” (2:362–64). And despotism, as we know, is not a properly European form of government.

7. The war of the Spanish succession (1701–14) was precipitated in 1700 by the death of King Charles II of Spain, the last of the Spanish Hapsburgs. Charles II had died without heirs and had named the grandson of King Louis XIV of France, Philip, as his successor. The prospect of united Spain and France led Britain to form an alliance with the Austrian Hapsburgs and to declare war on France and Spain.

8. In C. B. Macpherson’s more skeptical understanding of the issue of property limits, “Locke’s astonishing achievement was to base the property right on natural right [nature’s fruits are originally given by God to man] and natural law [man needs to appropriate nature for his living], and then to remove all the natural law limits from the property right” (199). This elimination of all limits, which would open the alley, theoretically speaking, to capitalist accumulation, would be done not only by claiming the supposedly vacant lands of the Americas but also by the introduction of money: as “gold and silver do not spoil; a man may therefore rightfully accumulate unlimited
amounts of it” (204). On these issues, see also Tully, “Aboriginal Property” 58-62; and, including a discussion of the limits and legacy of Macpherson, Tully, *Approach* 71–136.

9. Although Montesquieu is correct here, and although, by 1830, three quarters of European commerce is in fact intercontinental, it can be noticed, against Montesquieu, that the products from the colonies provide a very substantial, and economically integral, part of eighteenth-century inter-European commerce (see Goodman and Honeyman 53).

10. Also the “Causes that Can Affect the Spirit” insists on this division of Europe: “In our Europe, there are two kinds of religions: the Catholic one, which demands submission, and the Protestant one, which wants independence. The peoples of the north have embraced Protestantism from the beginning; those of the south have defended Catholicism” (Montesquieu, *Oeuvres* 2:62).

11. Etymologically, the word *Sirocco* connects the south with the east again: according to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, *Sirocco* derives from the Arab *sharq*, east—the same root for the word *Saracen*. Under this wind, southern Europe is “Saracen.”

12. On how much that “almost” could cover, interpreters have fervidly fought: criticizing R. N. Stromberg’s indictment of “Montesquieu’s monstrous and historically barren error in attributing all human differences to geographic environment,” Roger B. Oake has, for instance, stressed that “even ‘savages’ are stated only to be *almost* entirely dominated by ‘climate’” (59; original emphasis).

13. “In the last analysis, only Europe seems to know the mutability of time. . . . Here’s Europe, then: a geographical and historical space” (Goldzink 145).

14. Originating from Isocrates (see chapter 1), the commonplace of the coincidence of the history of Europe with a history of freedom is central, for instance, in François Guizot. In the *Cours d’histoire moderne* (see Verga 38–47), a series of lessons he gave at the Sorbonne in 1828, the palimpsest of Montesquieu is clearly visible: France is the center of Europe because it is its most modern and progressed nation; France’s progress, which is central to European progress, is the progress of freedom, which coincides with a modernization of the law (and a progressive privatization of natural resources). As we will see in chapter 4, also German historiography and philosophy—from the Schlegel brothers to Hegel—makes Europe coincide with a concept of freedom. Against Montesquieu and Guizot’s faith in progress—as progress of continuous civilization—the Schlegels and Hegel seem to think in terms of destiny: it is the destiny of Europe to realize freedom.

15. Jacob Grimm’s *Deutsche Grammatik* (1819–37) had not only confirmed the derivation of French from Latin but also its fundamental un-
Germanness: whereas Germanic languages, in the course of their evolution, had seen the transformation (the so-called Grimm’s Law) of unvoiced consonants \( p, t, k \) into their aspirate equivalents \( ph, th, kh \), French instead, along with the other Romance languages, had remained extraneous to such changes. Latin \textit{pater} had, for instance, changed to the German \textit{Vater} and the English \textit{father}; but in Romance languages, there had been no shift from the \( p \) to the \( ph \) sound: there was the French \textit{père}, the Italian and Spanish \textit{padre}, and the Portuguese \textit{pai}. With Grimm’s Law, the destiny of French southernness, of its belonging to an un-German Romance margin, would for ever be sealed. Montesquieu’s German aspirations, however, had absolutely no premonition of all this.

16. “The individual, it was thought, is free inasmuch as he is proprietor of his person and capacities. The human essence is freedom from dependence on the will of others, and freedom is a function of possession. . . . Society consists of relations of exchange between proprietors. Political society becomes a calculated device for the protection of this property and for the maintainance of an orderly relation of exchange” (Macpherson 3).

3 Republics of Letters

1. The \textit{Encyclopédie}, which would soon start defining a whole epoch, had started as the simple idea of the printer André Le Breton to translate Chambers’s English \textit{Cyclopedia} into French. Denis Diderot, nominated by Le Breton as the editor in chief for the project, transformed the original idea, with the help of D’Alembert and Jaucourt, into a more ambitious attempt at creating a true synopsis of knowledge. The seventeen volumes of the \textit{Encyclopédie}, which were distributed and read throughout most of Europe, were published between 1751 and 1772; supplements were added in 1777 and 1780. The initial subscription for the text counted five thousand people.

2. However, already in the “Discours sur les motifs qui doivent nous encourager aux sciences” (1725), Montesquieu had argued that Europe’s difference from savagery (in the specific case, America) consisted in the fact that Europe had (European) arts and sciences, whereas savage nations did not (\textit{Oeuvres} 1:53).

3. Such a linguistic shift certainly fit well the nationalist ambitions, for instance, of Gallican Protestantism. It also reflected, as Mark Painter has pointed out, a profound crisis of traditional linguistics, most notably, the Augustinian faith in a coincidence between Word and World, between sign and thing. In this sense, “The very question of knowledge seems already caught up in the dynamics of language” (6). The belief of pre-Lutheran theology is that the word, as possessed by humankind, is a reflection of God’s order—or, in the terms of classical philosophy, of \textit{logos}. A word carries with
it an ontological significance. The word not only brings humankind closer to
God but it also offers a way of knowing God’s creation as logos. Humankind
finds itself in an ordered cosmos, and language, separating humankind from
nature, gives access to and knowledge of that order. But since, in Lutheran
theology, God’s order is ultimately unknowable, language, the guarantor of
such knowledge, loses its privileged position. Incapable of accessing the
theologized logos, language remains bound to knowing only earthly matters.
Neither Latin nor Greek or Hebrew are thus any way closer to knowing the
will of God. National languages, at least, have the advantage of knowing the
will of the state!

4. Curricular changes suggested by D’Alembert in the entry “Collège” for
the encyclopedia included: “Close study of French grammar; substitution of
French for Latin composition, since study of Latin is for the single purpose
of reading the texts of great authors; introduction of foreign language into
the curriculum; development of history courses, a study that should be done
à rebours, that is to say with the contemporary period as the point of de-
parture (an idea that D’Alembert considers ‘very just and philosophical’);
prededence of philosophy over rhetoric, ‘for, after all, one must learn to
think before one writes’; moral instruction based on Seneca, Epictetus, and
the Sermon of the Mount; early training in geometry and experiments in
physics” (Mortier 65). For a concise summary of Cartesian modern educa-
tion, exemplified in the Logique de Port-Royal, see Perkinson. On the refor-
mation of European schools to meet the requirement of usefulness, the
institution of curricula in engineering, accounting, and modern medicine,
see Hof 215–16.

5. “[After the decision] people say the Pope is haunted by visions. People
say he strolls around the Papal rooms, screaming he has been forced to sign
the decree of suppression: ‘Compulsus feci! Compulsus feci!’ He suffers a
herpes that deforms his face . . . . After a long agony, he dies on September 22,
1774. Rumor has it that he has been poisoned . . . . Obviously, the assassins
are the Jesuits” (Del Rio 145).

6. It may be a stretch, especially when compared to the nearby and argu-
ably more lively Milan where Cesare Beccaria had published Of Crime and
Punishment (1764) under the influence of De l’esprit des lois; where the Verri
brothers had disseminated the ideas of the French Enlightenment through
the journal Il caffè (1764–66); and where Giuseppe Parini had begun to
divulge his antiaristocratic sentiments in the Gazzetta di Milano since 1769.
At any rate, the historian Carlo Denina, in Le rivoluzioni d’Italia (1793),
compared the Mantua of Andrés and Bettinelli to the cultural wealth of
Weimar: “where Wieland, Goethe, Herder, and Berthuch live” (qtd. in Car-
panetto and Ricuperati 393).

7. Mantua had become a safe haven for many exiled Jesuits, including
Andrés’s archenemy Esteban Arteaga. Andrés, however, did not pursue a career in state education, and, more traditionally, became preceptor of the Marquis Bianchi’s family (the stipend being supplemented by a pension still coming from Madrid). Andrés studied mostly in the Bianchi’s library, and, through the marquis, he got to know, in quite typical Italian fashion, the Mantua that counts, which introduced him to a membership in the local Accademia Reale di Scienze e Belle Lettere.

8. “Differently from what happened in France, where the philosophes formed, although not without internal contrasts, a front opposed to government, the academics of Milan . . . starting with Pietro Verri, devoted their entire careers to public office, and collaborated with the government to implement reforms” (Bonora 97).

9. “Therefore, we declare that we did not dare facing all alone a task bigger than our own strengths. Our role as editors has then consisted merely in giving order to the materials in great part provided by others” (D’Alembert) 75.

10. An eighth volume was added to the 1785 Parma edition (printed by Bodoni); it is the one on which I am basing this study. For a history of the text’s various editions and translations, see Mazzeo 78–79, 194–96.

11. “Regarding literature in eighteenth-century literary historiography, it is a known fact that the term was understood in the pre-modern sense, as a term whose meaning covered the entirety of human knowledge in written form, and not only the belles letters” (Valero 171).

12. “The discipline of comparative literature . . . is unthinkable without the historical circumstances of exile” (Apter 86). Also: “It does not seem casual . . . that the first contemporary scholar of what he calls ‘the Andrés case’ is an exile of the last civil war, Francisco Giner de los Ríos” (Párez 16).

13. “Jesuit and other missionary activities raised two problems to which Europe was very alive even at the end of the eighteenth century. One of these problems was how to reconcile a new religion [Christianity] with a traditional culture. This led men like De Nobili to identify themselves totally with the local culture. They recognized the differences between the two cultures and the danger of asking the Indians to give up their way of life while embracing a new religion. This was perhaps the first understanding, however vague it might have been, of the problems of imposing one culture upon another” (Mukherjee 10).

14. Wellek’s resistance to Andrés can be easily explained through Wellek’s aporetic resistance to historicism, which, as I will discuss in a moment, is the very basis of Andrés’s method. For Wellek’s hostility to history, and for his notion of the work of art as “monument, not document,” see Wellek, “Review” 254–55.

15. Already in 1939, Robert Palmer warned the scholar of the eighteenth
century about seeing “two distinct groups . . . pitted against each other, a group of philosophes who favored new and enlightened ideas and another group, mostly clerical and frequently Jesuit, who stood directly across the path of intellectual development. This view of the matter is essentially that of the philosophes themselves” (“French Jesuits” 44). The kind of opposition to enlightenment I am arguing here is in no way an obscurantist maneuver, but a chapter in the readjustment of the idea of Europe that included also, but not exclusively, those who had remained faithful to the Roman Church.

16. In 1969, Benjamin Keen complained: “References to the Black Legend almost invariably proclaim foreign rivals’ envy of Spain’s American riches and their desire to take over the empire as the principal reasons for the creation and diffusion of the Legend.” This amounted, for Keen, to absolving Spain from its historical actions in the Americas, whereas other, and more authentic reasons, were behind the fortune of the Black Legend: alongside imperial interests, also “nationalist aspirations and religious and other ideological conflicts with Spain of the Counter-Reformation, sometimes even an authentic humanitarianism . . . all played their part” (713–14). Without absolving Spain, and without questioning “authentic humanitarianism,” I would, however, insist on the weight imperial designs had in the spread of the legend.

17. Since my English spell-checker keeps flagging historicism, let me move to historicism by first reminding my reader that only by the 1940s the latter term, fashioned after Benedetto Croce’s Italian storicismo, started competing with, and finally replacing, the former, inherited instead by the German historiographical tradition of Historismus.

18. Abdesselam Cheddadi insists on the Europeanness of history—and the instrumental way in which the Islamic ta’rikh is often translated as “history” only to establish a comparison whereby the Eastern ta’rikh would appear as faulty history. See Ibn Khaldun and Cheddadi. For Giovanna Calasso, who draws from Cheddadi, a supplementary difference between ta’rikh and an eminently European sense of historiography consists in the fact that in “the ‘ta’rikh’ by Arab authors, we find no trace of the concept of ‘universal history’” (205).

19. Georg Iggers (who sees the emergence of historicism in Friedrich Schlegel’s 1797 “Of Philology”) similarly claims that historicism had introduced in the analysis of human events an “orientation which recognized individuality in its ‘concrete temporal-spatiality’ . . . distinct from a fact-oriented empiricism,” as well as from an objective Cartesian reason (130).

20. Viconian is for instance Andrés’s claim (Dell’ origine 1:1) that poetry (not reason or philosophy) is the first language: “The first writings that came to us from antiquity are historical and poetical, not philosophical.” Also in
tune with Vico is the attempt to “diminish” the alleged antiquity of some non-European cultures—Chinese, Egyptian—to some kind of national pride (1:3–4), what Vico had called “boria delle nazioni.” On some of these points in Vico, see Dainotto.

21. “When, in the second half of the eighteenth century, one advocates a ‘philosophical perspective,’ what is meant by the term implies, in general, the defense of the new critical method, from which a complete vision of all knowledge can be built. . . The new literary history, in its attempt to give a totalizing and integrated view of all knowledge, coincides then with encyclopedism” (Valero 183–84). On the opposition between philosophical method and erudite method in the context of eighteenth-century literary historiography, see Guglielminetti 14–15.

22. Another Spanish Jesuit in Italian exile, Francisco J. Llampillas, had already devoted to the anti-Gallic and pro-Spanish cause the volumes of his Saggio storico apologetico della lettratura spagnola (1778–81), another example of Italian Jesuit literary historiography.

23. On Andrés’s albeit partial and tentative reevaluation of Russia as part of Europe, see Bérkov 461–69.

24. As late as 1942, Provençal poetry still defined Europe. During the Congress of the European Youth, held in Vienna in that year, Baldur von Schirach spoke: “The song that once upon a time filled the valleys of Provence; that same song that is today the triumphal song of Europe and its civilization; the song of the troubadours as expression of those superior sentiments that distinguish us from the Jews and from Black American’s jazz—that song is something that the Jewish mind will never be able to understand” (qtd. in Lippens 103).

25. That the French liked to claim a French origin for everything was a fact that Andrés really took at heart to dispute time and again. As if the question of poetry and the roman were not enough, also the invention of a language for deaf-mutes had been claimed by the French for their Abbé Apée. Andrés, however, could not let the lie pass and explained to the whole world who the real (and un-French) inventor was (see Andrés, Lettera dell’origine).

26. “The influence of Arab culture was so pervasive that it was hardly necessary to leave Occitania to hear the melodies of Andalusia and Arabia. Much of southern France had been conquered by Moslem invaders in the mid-eighth century. Although the Saracens, as they were called, did not maintain their hold for long, they left their mark in place names, and, undoubtedly, in the folk imagination. Toward the end of the eleventh century refugees from southern Spain began to settle in the area of Nîmes and Montpellier, bringing Arabic and Arab culture once again to Occitania” (Bogin 46).

27. Barbieri’s is the often-cited book, incidentally, that Girolamo Tira-
boschi reprints in Modena in 1790, in the midst of the Arabist polemics, with the new programmatic title *Dell’origine della poesia rimata*. On this, and the general controversy, see Eusebi.

28. Wilkins would later retract his theory of the invention of the sonnet by claiming, arguably not very convincingly, that the idea of the sextet came to the Sicilian Giacomo from Lentini in a burst of sheer inspiration. See Wilkins, *Invention of the Sonnet* 35.

4  Mme de Staël to Hegel

For the quite adventurous biography of Mme de Staël (interesting but beyond the scope of this chapter), see Balayé; Diesbach; and Winegarten.

5  Orientalism, Mediterranean Style

1. Said himself, however, found in Raymond Schwab’s writing “the avoidance of ethno- and anthropocentric attitudes” and “an interest in oriental literature for its own sake” (Schwab xv). It is hard, on the other hand, not to see *Orientalism*’s point. A collusion of knowledge and power in that discipline was certainly not lost, for one, on the founder of the British Asiatic Society, William Jones, who wrote in 1771: “Since a variety of causes which need not be mentioned here give the English nation a most extensive power in that kingdom [India] . . . the languages of Asia will now perhaps be studied with uncommon ardour . . . the limits of our knowledge [will be] no less extended than the bounds of our empire” (qtd. in Mukherjee 80). Also, Italian fascism did not miss the nexus of colonialism and Orientalism. Discussing Italy and the Orient in the Florentine *Fascist Studies*, Carlo Capasso wrote in 1932: “The Great Powers have always had stakes in the Orient. It is therefore natural that, in all the major European countries, a voluminous literature on the Orient has been produced. . . Italy has come last in this interest for the Orient” (v–vi). For a panorama of reactions to Said, see Marrouchi 210–14.

2. Lest my point is mistaken for a simplistic variation on the National Rifle Association theme that “it’s not guns that kill,” let me drop a more theoretically appropriate allusion to Antonio Gramsci’s discussion of Caesarism, which “can be both progressive and reactionary” (Gramsci, *Selections* 217).

3. “To hail revolution while avoiding censorship” is revealed to be, a posteriori, in a preface of 1851, the very program, and problem, of Michele Amari’s first historical book (*Guerra* xxvi).

4. “History needs heroes of ideas as well” (Amari, *Guerra* 2:323). Accordingly, this chapter assumes a fundamental discrepancy between Amari’s deeds and ideas: whereas his deeds move from initial positions of radical
democracy to the moderate Cavourism of his later years, his ideas grow toward a rather heroic opening of the very concept of Europe.

5. These included the financial support of the fatherless family, which meant, in turn, a humiliating clerical job for the Bourbon secretary of state that put thirty-five monthly ducats into Amari's pockets—barely enough for "a piece of bread" (Bonfigli 3).

6. "The gift is . . . something that must be given, that must be received and that is, at the same time, dangerous to accept" (Mauss 215).

7. "The feeling of veneration for the past, which in the pages of Hume and Gibbon had already become value and meaning of national history, was given by Scott all the power of imagination" (Romeo, "Michele Amari" 160).

8. So, for instance, Alessandro D’Ancona sees *Marmion* as a gift of love to the unreciprocating Agatina Peranni, while Renata Pucci Zanca views it as a vague hymn to heroism to compensate for the father’s cowardice. See Amari, *Carteggio* 315–97; Pucci Zanca 254–55.

9. For those interested in biographical details, there is actually a little mystery concerning Amari’s personal knowledge of Dumas before 1842. At any rate, it is certain that in 1842 Amari held Dumas in such consideration as to send him a copy of his new book. See Marcolongo 66n.

10. Indebted to the style of Scott and Dumas, Amari’s story is also strikingly similar to the Arab humanists’ notion of *akhbar*, or narrative history, as opposed to chronology history, or *ta’rikh*. For Arab humanists and scholastics, "*akhbar*-history is . . . one of the three divisions under prose composition, along with applied rhetoric, i. e. letter-writing and speech-writing" (Makdisi 170).

11. Amari alludes later to the commonplace (and historic problem) of Sicily as “eternal colony”: “From early histories to recent ones, many foreign peoples came to walk on the soil of Sicily: Carthaginians, Vandals, Goths, Byzantines, Germans, French, Spaniards. . .” (Storia 1:105). The citation of a pathetic Sicilian prince is at this point de rigueur: “We are old, Chevalley, very old. For more than twenty-five centuries we’ve been bearing the weight of many superb and heterogeneous civilizations, all from outside, none made by ourselves, none that we could call our own. We are as white as you are, Chevalley, and as the Queen of England; and yet for two thousand and five hundred years we’ve been a colony” (Tomasi di Lampedusa 170).

12. The parallelisms between the insurrection of the vesper and the failed one of 1820 had already been established in Michele Palmieri’s 1834 *Customs of the Court and the People of the Two Sicilies*, published in French in Paris. See Giarrizzo.

13. “Nationalism usually conquers in the name of a putative folk culture. Its symbolism is drawn from the healthy, pristine, vigorous life of the peasants, of the Volk” (Gellner 57).
In this, one can detect Amari’s skepticism regarding the usefulness of secret plots in revolutionary action—and a very direct attack against the underground sects of Freemasons and carbonari, who, in Amari’s mind, were usurping the people’s historical place.

Hints of that can be found in Leonardo Sciascia: “And I must say that, of all the reasons he [Amari] offers against the theory of the courtly plot... the most convincing remains the one he adduces as a Sicilian who know Sicilians” (979).

Also Said identifies the nexus freedom-Europe as “an idea that will acquire [after the Crusades, and climaxing in Chateaubriand] an almost unbearable, next to mindless authority in European writing: the theme of Europe teaching the Orient the meaning of liberty” (Orientalism 172).

“The passion with which native intellectuals defend the existence of their national cultures may be a source of amazement; but those who condemn this exaggerated passion are strangely apt to forget that their own psyche and their own selves are conveniently sheltered behind a French or German [or British] culture which has given full proof of its existence and which is uncontested” (Fanon 209). “Before Said, Fanon, his maître à penser, recognized that in the triangular dialogue between the settler, the native, and the native intellectual, there is ‘a prominent confrontation on the phantasmatic plane.’ Versions of origins are offered and resisted in a continuing dialectic” (Marrouchi 288).

Back to Gramsci’s Caesarism. Like it, sicilianismo “can be both progressive and reactionary” (Gramsci, Selections 217). On “reactionary” and “progressive” sicilianismo, see Marcolongo 9.

Amari was, however, more cautious when writing for a French public: “Sicily is the only Italian state which has possessed for a long time this form of monarchic and representative government that is called today ‘constitutional.’ The Sicilian people has been the first in Italy to use this word, ‘constitution,’ rather than the more abstract ‘reform.’” (Quelques observations 1).

As Giuseppe Mazzini put it in 1852: “The literature of Europe in the last few years has been largely political, revolutionary, made for war. Out of ten historical works, seven at least discussed, whether favorably or not, of a realized or an unfinished revolution; out of ten polemical, economical, or political works, no less than seven welcome or reject the symptoms of an imminent revolution” (Opere 2:541).

As in Alessandro Manzoni’s authentic horror of diversity: “Haven’t you heard, great and good Lamartine, that there is no worse word to throw at Italy than diversity? And that this word only reminds Italy of a long time of suffering and decay?” (qtd. in Bollati 61).

On the French “genius of the market,” an ironic variation on the theme of the genius of the French language mentioned in chapter 2, Giuseppe
Mazzini wrote: “French intelligence creates little, but assimilates a lot; led by a manufacturing instinct, it always receives its raw materials from abroad. Quick, agile, active, and full of self confidence; naturally inclined to monopoly, and helped by a clear and distinct language, the French genius takes ideas, embellishes them, and puts them into circulation. Often, to make things easier, French intelligence dismembers ideas, reduces them into little fragments. . . In all this lies the life and the importance of the French genius” (Opere 2:552). I should mention, without meaning by this a dismissal of the Italian anti-French polemics as simply fascist, that much of this fervor against France, which is also a redimensioning of the French Revolution as the event that changed the world forever, will become central in Italian fascism’s understanding of its own (alleged) revolution.

23. On January 12, the birthday of King Ferdinand II, the Sicilian revolution takes Palermo, then all of Sicily. Once again, the requests are for autonomy and a constitution. The insurrection soon moves to the Italian mainland, and then to France, Austria, Hungary, and Germany. Ferdinand’s bombing of Messina and Palermo earned him the nickname of King Bomba, by which he is known in the annals of American literature (Melville).

24. On the problems Amari had to face because of his anticlericalism, see Carino 279. For a sample of Amari’s anticlericalism, the following: “Everybody knows that the curia is not an aristocracy, but the fattest part of the middle and lower bourgeoisie” (Biblioteca 1:324–25).

25. Like Vico’s “giants,” Amari’s early Arabs “They are tall, robust, lean, pure caucasian visages, moderate beard, strong teeth, self-assured, penetrating eyes” (Amari, Storia 1:141).

26. Mostly from the Aghlabid families from Kairouan (in today’s Tunisia), it is unclear who these Arabs really were, or from where they came. They were probably a coalition coming from different places, including Africa (Berbers as well), Spain, and Asia. Also, their social extraction was quite varied. From around the year 948, the rule of the Sicilian colony goes to the Kalbite families from Syria (and possibly of Yemeni descent).

27. On the Arabic derivation of troubadoric poetry and of the very word troubadour, see Menocal “Close Encounters.”

28. On the “xenophoby” of French nationalism, see Vovelle (18–19). At this point of his narrative, however, Amari had to bracket away the way in which Christians and Sicilians did not enjoy, in fact, equal rights in Muslim Sicily: non-Muslims were, as Amari will acknowledge only in the last chapters of the Storia, “protected persons” (dhimmi), “barred from enjoying some crucial liberties that are available to Muslims” according to a strict interpretation of Islamic law (Moosa 202).

29. “Terrible and perhaps unnecessary right” was property right for Bec- caria (71).
30. “The living legacy of Sacy’s disciples was astounding. Every major Arabist in Europe during the nineteenth century traced his intellectual authority back to him. Universities and academies in France, Spain, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and especially Germany were dotted with the students who formed themselves at his feet” (Said, *Orientalism* 129).