Introduction


1. The conventions of publishing make it difficult to indicate that this book is a product of ongoing coauthorship. It could not have happened without our equal collaboration in developing and refining our theoretical and methodological framework and our ability to draw from our different linguistic skills.

2. As in most cities in Turkey, in Mardin the name of the city and the province are identical. Thus, Mardin refers to both the city and the province. The city is the district where the provincial administrative seat is located. The province is composed of several districts, with their own municipalities and villages. In Turkey’s administrative structure, provinces are different from territorial divisions designated as provinces in other countries, such as Canada. While Canadian provinces contain more than one city, in Turkey, there is only one city in each province. Each province therefore is a city-region.

3. The terms “minority” and “migrant” or “migrant background” are defined differently in different countries, regions, and periods. “Minority” is a particularly contested and contextually defined term (Council of Europe 1995). In this book, we focus on people residing in cities who migrated across international borders, but we do not situate cross-border and internal migrants within different analytical frameworks, as do methodological nationalists. In two of the cities we studied, Halle/Saale, Germany, and Manchester, New Hampshire in the United States,
people with a cross-border migration history are generally assigned to a migration category (refugee, legal immigrant, failed asylum seeker, international student, etc.). Historically, in Mardin, besides categories of migrants, various populations such as Armenian and Syriac Christians have been seen as minorities. When Syriac Christian émigrés returned from Europe to Mardin, they were generally positioned in regeneration narratives as a “minority,” rather than as migrants. In Mardin, we identify internally displaced people in our analysis to highlight the violent displacement and dispossession dynamics that they experienced and that played a role in their emplacement processes.

4. In other writing, we have developed this concept further, using the term “methodological ethnicity” (Glick Schiller and Çağlar 2008). With the rise of diaspora studies, long-standing minorities, such as the Chinese in regions of Asia, were increasingly approached as diasporic populations. Although scholars of these populations rightly emphasized their diversity of class and history and the role of these populations within state and class formation, many of these scholars continued to operate within an ethnic category and/or ended up contributing to the reproduction of an ethnic category, such as Chinese (Nonini 2015; Hearn 2016).

5. In Europe the terms “undocumented” or sans papier are used by political activists and scholars to defy the aspiration of “illegality.” In the United States, the term “undocumented” has increasingly been used as a pejorative, casting these migrants as illegal and criminal, although border crossing is not a criminal act. Some scholars in the United States refer to this status as “unauthorized,” but since this term is not widely known, we use the term “undocumented” but reject the binary between legality and illegality established on the basis of documents.

6. Citing further examples in the United States, the Atlantic magazine ran an article under the headline, “Why American Cities Are Fighting to Attract Immigrants” (Hesson 2015b). The article notes that “many metro areas with large foreign-born populations have thriving local economies. And now local governments all over the U.S. are trying to replicate their successes.” James Brasuell (2015) argues that “new immigrants revitalized Main Street” in Nashville, Philadelphia, and Minneapolis–Saint Paul.

7. Urban anthropologists and sociologists previously called attention to the stigmatization processes that accompanied the dispossession of the urban poor in urban renewal programs in the post–World War II era (Safa 1974; Gans 1962; see also Harvey 2012).

8. In earlier writings, we have used the term “incorporation” in an effort to theorize settlement outside the expectations of assimilation and the political values embedded in integration discourses. We find the term “emplacement” more useful because it emphasizes the ongoing processes of establishing social relationships within space and time and situates both migrants and non-migrants within these processes.

9. For a different conceptualization, see Kalb’s exploration of critical junctions (2005).

10. In keeping with the Institutional Review Board protocols of the University of New Hampshire, in the United States, and the University of Manchester, in the United Kingdom, we have anonymized all interviews with migrants and with all actors other than public officials, with the exception of those migrants who became public figures in the course of our research and who gave us permission to use their
names. In Halle, Nina Glick Schiller initially worked with Julia Wenzel, Marcus Rau, Martin Sieber, and a handful of student volunteers. Between 2003 and 2005, Halle’s ethnographic team of student researchers was managed by Evangelos Karagiannis and co-led by Nina Glick Schiller and Ayşe Çağlar. Julia Wenger contributed to updating research material and additional interviews beginning in 2013. Ronn Müller also provided data and advice. From 2003 to 2005, another ethnographic team, led by Nina Glick Schiller and Thaddeus Gulbrandsen, included Peter Buchannan and built on the previous and continuing work of numerous student assistants. Further assistance was provided by Molly Messinger and Geraldine Boggs, who focused on the study of refugee resettlement in New Hampshire. In Manchester, Hubert Weterwami, Helene Simerwayi, and Faten al Hassun contributed additional interviews, updated research material, and provided analytical perspectives. In Mardin, the research team was composed of Ayşe Seda Yüksel and Ayşe Çağlar.

11. Our approach resonates with the work of scholars who have examined postsocialist transformations as part of global neoliberal restructuring of capital. Our framework also speaks to the recent Marxist critique of new social movements. However, our focus in this book is on migration and urban studies.

Chapter 1

1. Apparently, all these wonders have been located by archaeologists, except for the Hanging Gardens of Babylon, which are now thought to have existed in the capital of its rival Assyrian empire, Nineveh (Dalley 2013).

2. Hillsborough County also contains the smaller city of Nashua, with a population of 86,788 in 2000 (NH Employment Security 2017). In contrast, Boston was a city of 667,137 in 2016 (US Census 2017a).

3. The funds came in large part from the Manchester Housing and Redevelopment Authority (MHRA), which sold 50 million dollars’ worth of bonds to finance the arena and then leased the arena to the city. As redevelopment continued, this public housing authority channeled public funds into private investment projects while serving as a conduit for massive amounts of federal money from the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). This money also supported private real estate development and construction, although applications to HUD for public funding claimed that funded programs provided housing and services for the impoverished local population and for refugees who had been concentrated in the downtown and surrounding neighborhoods.

4. The volatility of defense industry funding is apparent in the contracts awarded each year. In 2003, the percent of contracts awarded increased 50.3 percent from the previous year. Between 2004 and 2006, there were annual increases (2004: 75 percent; 2005: 24.5 percent; 2006: 11.1 percent.) Then 2007 and 2008 were years of declining contracts (2007: –3.5 percent; 2008: –33.8 percent). The years since the 2008 recession were marked by both sharp growth (2010: 32.3 percent) and decline (2011: –6.6 percent) (Donahue Institute 2015). In 2011, there were 560 “New Hampshire firms and institutions tied to DOD and DHS [Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security] contracts” (Anderson 2012), while in 2013 there were only 470 such contractors (Donahue Institute 2015).
5. **MEDO** was a city agency which described itself during its tenure as the “face of economic activity of the City” and “responsible for marketing the city” (Office of the Independent City Auditor 2013, 4, 6).

6. After the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, the United States Congress and President George W. Bush passed the USA PATRIOT Act. It initially “significantly expanded the search and surveillance powers of federal law-enforcement and intelligence agencies” and, when amended and reauthorized in 2003, extended surveillance into “the privacy of telephone and electronic communications, the operation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, money laundering, immigration, and other areas.” (Duignan 2017)

7. It is important to remember that, nationally as well as locally, there were leading Republican and Democratic politicians who saw new immigrants as part of their constituencies. These were the years when, nationally, George W. Bush, a Republican president, proposed immigration reform that would have given “legal status to millions of Americans,” a strategy that the *New York Times* argued was designed to appeal to Hispanics groups (Bumiller 2004).

8. Official numbers included long-term residents and naturalized citizens as well as newly arrived legal refugees and immigrants. These statistics did not count those without legal residence papers, nor did they include migrants from Puerto Rico who came as US citizens but whose numbers were added to the growing Hispanic population in official demographic statistics.

9. There were a considerable number of poor in Manchester, but they were working poor. The percentage of individuals living in poverty according to official definitions was 9.8 percent in 1990 and even higher, 10.6 percent, in 2000 (City Data 2009).

10. After closure by Napoleon, the University of Wittenberg was merged with the University of Halle in 1817 and today is the Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, primarily located in Halle.

11. The term “ethnic Germans” (classified as Volksduetche, Aussiedler, and Spätaussiedler) is used to designate people whose ancestors are classified as of German origin. These people either lived outside of Germany after various wars led to a redrawing of the state’s borders or were the descendants of people who migrated as part of the expansionist projects of various German rulers.

12. In 2013, the number of such attacks doubled from the previous year, and in 2014, 150 such racist attacks were registered in Germany (Abdi-Herle 2015).

13. It included funding for the replacement of demolished buildings with green spaces. Beginning in 2010, the emphasis was on renovating buildings constructed before 1948. This implied revaluing the land and properties of the inner city (Baum, Vondroušová, and Tichá 2014, 22–23).

14. While this was the case throughout the eurozone, the mandated lower wages in eastern Germany aggravated structural impoverishment for most city residents.

15. “Quartier management” refers to a form of district management in urban planning and governance in Germany.

16. Major German Christian organizations initiated the intercultural week in 1975 as a Day of Foreign Co-Citizens. Celebrated in Halle since 1992, in 2001 activities of the Intercultural Week / Day of Foreign Citizens were launched by a speech from
the mayor and hosted by a broad range of organizations. The day continued to be celebrated in 2015 within the nationwide theme of diversity. The opening ceremony in the central marketplace emphasized migration (Jugendwerkstatt 2015). African Week in Halle was celebrated in the city center for a number of years with a public ceremony and speeches by public officials, such as the vice mayor. It then moved to Halle-Neustadt.

17. One of the oldest monasteries in the world, the Syriac Orthodox Saffron Monastery (Dayriu‘z Zaffaran Monastery) is in Mardin.

18. The Patriarchate is the office of jurisdiction of an ecclesiastical patriarch.

19. The population of Mardin was 564,967 in 1980, reached to 652,069 in 1985, and then dropped drastically to 557,727 in 1990 (Mardin Valiliği 2013).

20. There was also unrestricted military and police control, with regular curfews, roadblocks, identity checks, and the suspension of human rights between 1925 and 1927, 1978 and 1980, and 1980 and 1987. After the OHAL governorship was lifted, Mardin continued to have a special legal status until 2002.

21. The rate of net migration was 70.2 percent between 1985 and 1990 and 67.6 percent between 1995 and 2000 (Results of General Population Census 1980–2000).

22. In Turkey, governors are appointed by the national government (president) and are responsible for the implementation of national legislation and government decisions in the province to which they are appointed. Governorship refers to the local bureaucratic apparatus of the governor.

23. See also the website of Mardin OIZ (http://www.mardinosb.org.tr/Sayfalar/7/0/14/mardin-osb.aspx).

24. In addition to numerous articles on Mardin in Turkish and international newspapers, such as the Guardian and the New York Times, articles about Mardin’s uniqueness and aura, appeared in Turkish Airlines and affiliated airline company magazines (such as Skylife and AnadoluJet).

25. As Biner (2007) correctly underlines, the distinction city leaders make between restoration and rehabilitation (using the concept of iade-i itibar) is significant. This distinction highlights what we have addressed, namely, the consciousness of the glorious past in the face of Mardin’s current disempowerment.

26. This housing administration was initially established as a social housing institution in 1984, but since 2002, its bureaucratic status, financial structure, and scope of activities have significantly changed.

27. According to the governor at that time, land prices exceeded prices in New York (Haberler 2012).

28. It is important to note that, in debates about Christian minorities in Mardin at the turn of the millennium, Armenians from Mardin who were subject to genocide in 1915 were absent. The statuses of Armenians and Syriacs in terms of their rights and recognition within the Republic was very different. Furthermore, the global disputes and conflicts about the Armenian past in Turkey in general and in the region in particular have been different from those surrounding Syriac Christians, although both groups were subject to systematic state violence in 1915.

29. This was the title of a very well received exhibition about Mardin that was first displayed in that city and later in Istanbul. It was appropriated as a slogan to promote the city (Biner 2007, 35).

31. The Syriacs were the only non-Muslim minority who were not granted official minority rights in the Lausanne Treaty (1923), which defined and secured the borders of the Turkish Republic. In contrast to the other non-Muslim minorities, such as Armenians, Greeks, and Jews, Syriac Christians were not granted linguistic and religious rights.

32. The city was able to pay only $590 of this debt in 2009.

33. Invest in Mardin is itself part of the Invest in Turkey campaign fostered by the Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Investment Support and Promotion Agency. DİKA functions as an entrepreneurial hub for attracting and assisting potential investors.

34. Mor Gabriel is one of the oldest active monasteries in the world. It serves as the seat of the Bishop of Tur Abdin.

35. Syriacs are thought to be among the first populations in the world to adopt Christianity. A close association between Syriacs and Christianity is very prominent in the Syriac Christians’ and Eastern Christian Churches’ narratives about their history and their importance for world civilization and Christianity.

36. However, her candidacy from the BDP caused some controversies in Mardin. Several Syriac associations (in Mardin and in Europe) suggested another Syriac candidate for the 2014 elections.

37. The Peoples Democratic Party is often referred to by its Turkish initials, HDP.

38. For the differences, dynamics, and conflicts between organizations focusing on culture and those concerned with human rights and discrimination in Mardin, see Biner 2007.

Chapter 2


1. This interview was conducted by Nina Glick Schiller with assistance from Dr. Minh Nguen, who kindly provided the translation from Vietnamese to English and shared her ethnographic insights.

2. The public transport company HVG said that funding came from the STADTBahn Halle program. Money for upgrading the tramline came in part from the federal government’s Municipal Transport Financing Act, which provided 18 million euro, with both Saxony-Anhalt and Halle contributing some funding (Halle Spektrum 2013). The plan to obtain light-rail development money as a means of repairing key intersections was also described by the local online press. “The streets in Halle (Saale) must be rehabilitated. But the city lacks the money. Therefore, Halle now wants to participate in the ‘rail program 2025.’ The great advantage of this is that at the same time funds for road development can flow through the expansion of the tram network. And most of it is intended to come from grants, a whopping 305 million euros over the next 15 years. Halle must provide only 12.5 million Euros” (Seppelt 2011).

3. Light (1972) subsequently developed and clarified his position, stressing the signifi-
cance of class resources, which, as Light and Gold noted, included financial, social, human, and cultural forms of capital (Light and Gold 2000).

4. When migrants are seen in social movements, researchers generally focus on struggles for economic or immigrants rights rather than on broader movements for social justice. See, for example, Theodore and Martin (2007). It is important to note that scholars examining spatialized claim making and land rights within urban restructuring and gentrification in Asian cities have highlighted complex “cultural politics of place” among minority and migrant populations (Yeoh 2005, 954).

5. There were claims that, according to “the official price index as a whole, . . . the changeover from D-Mark to euro did not play a major role in pushing up prices” (Deutsche Bundesbank 2002). Our daily experience in Halle at the time and that of our respondents, including shopkeepers buying from wholesale sources, was that the prices of many goods doubled.

Chapter 3


1. The “diversity visa lottery,” often referred to as the “green card lottery,” is a US system of immigrant visas issued by the luck of the draw. It extends legal entry with a permanent resident visa to people from countries that the US government deems historically underrepresented in terms of settlement in the United States (US Department of State 2016).

2. In many ways, the refugee support networks in European cities resembled the network of sanctuary cities in the US, where citizens voted to make their cities sanctuaries for undocumented migrants (Mount 2015). In the face of President Trump’s intensification of deportations, many US mayors and public officials promised to protect the undocumented migrants settled in their city.

3. Those who popularized his research concluded that too many “foreigners” were a threat to the national social fabric. A robust debate has since taken place about whether Putnam’s findings and construction of a trust variable could be substantiated in the United States and were as globally applicable as he claimed. His work has generated numerous critiques and debates (Li, Pickles, and Savage 2005; Gijsbersts, van der Meer, and Dagevos 2012).

4. Openness to commonality can be called “situated cosmopolitanism,” a topic explored elsewhere (see Glick Schiller 2015a, 2012b; Frykman 2016; Nashashibi 2013). While some of our respondents used the term “friend” to designate those with whom they formed domains of commonality, we must note several caveats. On other occasions, some of these same people might contrast those relationships with true friends left behind “back home.” We don’t always know whether the local person also used the term “friend” in describing these relationships. We are also aware of the ambivalences imbricated in the concept of “friend.” However, our concern here is neither to designate who is or is not a true friend nor to disentangle a friendship from other forms of interpersonal relationships marked by positive affect (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984).

5. City planning documents spoke of neighborhoods, but the planning process in most
cases neither reflected nor created a contemporary sense of neighborhood identity (City of Manchester 2009; City of Manchester 2010a). With differing degrees of success, elementary schools worked to build a localized identity among parents whose children attended them. See Young (2015) and Rogers and Garner (2015).

6. The global financial crisis of 2008, rising unemployment, and the subprime mortgage crisis, which further displaced many city residents, including migrants, in some respects made Manchester less welcoming, but over the years, there was polarization rather than rejection. The Obama administration’s mass deportations that “removed” 2.5 million people (more than the total deported by all nineteen US presidents from 1892 to 2000) affected the daily sociabilities and levels of trust that were possible for both authorized and unauthorized migrants. Subsequently, after the election of Donald Trump, both antimigrant politics and a politics of open support for migrants, including those without papers, increased in a range of cities around the United States, including Manchester.

7. According to a 2009 city planning document, the vacancy rate of 0.8 percent in 2000 fell to 0.5 percent the following year, indicating a very tight rental market with escalating costs and poor affordability (City of Manchester 2009).

8. Often the terms “institution” and “organization” are conflated or used in overlapping ways. Here, we use the term “institution” to refer to established, normatively endorsed, long-standing “social structures” that may be public, private, or nonprofit foundations, charities, political parties, hospitals, established religious bodies, schools, and media all count as “institutions.” In contrast, we use the term “organization” as it is used in the migration literature, that is, to refer to more short-lived social groups that are reliant on voluntary activity but tend toward professionalization and may receive public funding to deliver certain services. Storefront-type churches would be organizations in this categorization. Of course, these are ideal types, and in English the two words are often used interchangeably.

9. There were some exceptions. For example, Korean migrant store owners referenced Korean Protestant congregations, and a student researcher visited one such church. These churches may have provided means of emplacement. Language-based masses in Catholic parishes provided social and religious activities for participants. Our research within these parishes revealed a tendency on the part of church leadership to homogenize migrants in terms of “communities,” organizing Vietnamese language and Hispanic language masses.

10. Der Spiegel, an influential German news magazine, reported that “in the train stations of major cities, . . . Germans wearing bright yellow vests kneeled next to the foreigners to serve them tea and sandwiches. . . . Wherever they arrived, it was to the applause of local residents, and even mayors, standing along the platform. . . . Citizens’ initiatives were formed in cities and villages—not in opposition to, but in support of these new neighbors” (Kermani 2015). With the support of local public opinion behind them, mayors across Europe welcomed refugees. The City of Sanctuary network stretched across Europe and to forty cities in the United Kingdom (Mount 2015): “Twenty-four hours after Barcelona’s city hall published an email address for citizens who want to help, . . . it received 1,200 offers of everything from housing to language lessons. . . . People in both France and Germany have set up housing sites known as ‘Airbnb for refugees’ whereby private citizens can offer bed-
rooms or complete apartments and crowdfund rent for the migrants they take in" (Mount 2015).

Chapter 4


1. The names of the pastors and the migrant-initiated churches or religious organizations have been changed in keeping with University of Manchester and University of New Hampshire Institutional Review Board interview protocols.

2. During our research, the Miracle Healing Church and the Resurrection Crusade identified themselves predominantly as born-again rather than Pentecostal. In subsequent years, they spoke more directly of links to Pentecostal churches and networks. Pastor Mpenza had led a Pentecostal congregation before coming to Europe but claimed that his church was “independent.” For a fuller exposition of the belief system of the congregations in which we worked, see Glick Schiller and Çağlar (2008).

3. The celebration dates to GDR times. African students initiated African week in Halle in 1988. However, in 2002, the week became a prominent public celebration organized by the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, the Green Party Foundation. The lord mayor endorsed the week, the deputy mayor spoke at one of the events, and official sponsorship also came from Saxony-Anhalt, Martin Luther University, the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, and a number of NGOs, civil and religious (field notes 2002). The weeks’ festivities included “Oriental” dancing from North Africa, a workshop on African cooking, and African music and dancing.

4. In Germany, the term “Evangelical” refers to a mainstream organization that links Lutheran, Reformed, and United regional churches (Landeskirchen), which together form the Evangelical Church in Germany (Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland, EKD) (Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland 2016). The EKD is allocated tax revenues paid by citizens who are official members of these denominations. The Evangelical Church does not include members of independent Pentecostal con-
gregations. Pentecostal congregations are accorded official recognition through a separate organization, the Organization of Free Churches (Bund freikirchlicher Pfingstgemeinden). Member churches received no tax revenues and were supported by donations from their congregants.

5. This interview was conducted by Evangelis Karagiannis.
6. This interview was conducted by Evangelis Karagiannis.
7. The Christian Coalition was founded in 1989 by preacher Pat Robinson with the goal of “defending America’s Godly heritage by getting Christians involved in their government again” (Christian Coalition 2005).
8. When Donald Trump came to power in 2017, right-wing Christian activists gained influential positions in the US administration, including Vice President Mike Pence, Secretary of Education Betsy Devos, and presidential advisor and member of the National Security Council Steve Bannon. Foundations linked to Devos and her family donated large sums to the Family Research Council (FRC) and to Focus on the Family. These organizations have been interlinked at various points of time but publicly differentiate their missions, with the FRC working on public policy and Focus on the Family functioning as a ministry (Rizga 2017; Family Research Council 2017).

Chapter 5


1. A mukhtar is the elected head of a village or a neighborhood in Turkey.
2. In 2016, only 1,765 Syriacs were living in Tur Abdin, the area referred to as the ancestral homeland of Syriac Christians (Güsten 2016, 9).
4. Not all the inhabitants of some of these other villages were Syriac, and in these cases the returnees faced more difficulties than the case of Kafro would suggest (field notes, May 2015).
5. About 182 Syriac families from Kafro had been living in different European countries.
6. Tur Abdin refers to an area bordered by the Tigris, by the mountain ranges of southeastern Anatolia to the north and the east, and by the Syrian plains to the south.
7. At the turn of the century, Syriacs numbered around two hundred thousand in the region. According to some sources, half of them were killed during the massacres in 1915 (Gaunt 2006).
8. For an excellent and elaborate analysis of intercommunity relations in Mardin and abroad, see Biner and Biner (2007; 2011).
9. Around forty thousand Syriacs are estimated to have emigrated from Turkey since the 1980s.
10. The numbers of internally displaced people are reported differently by various
agencies. According to reports by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2 million people were forced to leave their villages. Reports by the UN Helsinki Commission and Turkish Grand National Assembly state that the number of people forced to leave their villages was 1 to 3 million, and 400,000, respectively (Kurban et al. 2008).


12. Between 1985 and 1995, at least fifty-two Syriacs were killed in Mardin (interview L., May 19, 2015).

13. For an excellent account of this complex landscape, see Biner (2011).

14. Although seasonal returns of Syriac Christians from Europe to the Mardin city-region reached the thousands, permanent returns never exceeded one thousand people (Güsten 2016).

15. According to the president of the World Council of Arameans (Syriacs), twenty-five thousand Syriacs in the diaspora are affected by expropriations in Tur Abdin (Güsten 2015).

16. MAREV was initially established primarily (but not only) by Syriac Christian businessmen from Mardin. We are thankful to the members of MAREV for the support they have provided to our research.


18. Funding schemes of EU projects for the second term IPA were 85 percent EU funds and 15 percent public (national) funds: 7,819,815 euro of the 9,199,782-euro project came from the EU, with the remaining 1,379,976 euro contributed by the national government.

19. Development agencies were public institutions, and they had no direct link to the EU. Although they served as entrepreneurial hubs for attracting EU funds, their main financial supporter was the Turkish government. As stated in the law 26303, the budget of development agencies consisted of (1) funds from the central government, (2) funds from the local governorship, (3) funds from the municipalities, and (4) funds from local chambers of commerce (Resmi Gazete 2006). EU funds were attracted through local development projects and were channeled directly to project-specific aims.

20. The number of people working in certified tourist facilities in 2013 was 1,564 (Mardin Strategic Tourism Plan 2014).

21. Allocation of the building to the Sabanci Foundation and negotiations with the governorate, treasury, and municipality had been a complicated process, with some conflicts and changes in the terms of ownership and the directorship of the museum (interview E., March 23, 2015).

22. It is noteworthy that not all displaced Christians from Turkey (such as displaced Greeks or Armenians from different parts of Turkey) were addressed by this call, al-
though the question of religious freedom affected all Christian minorities in terms of religious and theological education and the situation of their monasteries (see Griffith 1999).

23. The EU’s insistence on securing and facilitating Syriac migrants’ return was also partly related to the desire of some EU member states to see refugees in Europe return to Mardin on the premise that they were no longer in danger as a religious minority in Turkey (Wikileaks no. 06Ankara5835_a, field notes May 16, 2015).


25. Some of these HTAs were Nusaybin Süryani Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği, in Midyat; Öğündük (Midin) Köyü Kalkındırma ve Kültür Derneği, in İdil; Gülgöze (İvardo) Süryani Kültürü, Dayanışma ve Kalkındırma Derneği, in Midyat; and Yemişli (Enhil) Köyü Kalkındırma ve Uzlaştırma ve Kiliselerini Koruma Derneği, in Yemişli.

26. Sabro means “hope.” It was printed in Istanbul, but its main office was in Midyat.

27. In the United States, the negative report of the visit in 1994 stopped the delivery of some military arms to the Turkish army (Milliyet 1998). According to the chairman of the secretary of state’s Advisory Committee on Religious Freedom Abroad, who paid a second visit in 1998 and reported on it, this visit to Mardin was initiated by the Turkish military in relation to the delivery of military equipment (i.e., Cobra helicopters) (personal communication, March 2016). These visits and reports continued after 1998 until 2003, despite a change in chairmen of the Advisory Committee on Religious Freedom Abroad.

28. The silent presence of NATO in Mardin became a topic of public debate once plans to convert the castle into a public park were put on hold due to NATO’s presence there. In 2012, the difficulty of transferring control of this landmark from the Turkish Defense Ministry to the Ministry of Culture because of NATO’s presence became apparent (Gazete Vatan 2012).