Most current discussions of social inequality, downward social mobility, and injury fail to account for the systemic nature of the multiple massive dispossession taking place around the globe as a new conjunctural alignment emerges (Johnston 2014; Sandbrook et al. 2007). Data gathered by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) document substantial contractions in public expenditure as structural adjustment measures exacerbate the multiple dispossession processes that erode livelihoods (Oritz and Cummins 2013). Using the concept of “expulsions,” Saskia Sassen (2014) has begun to analyze current transformations of the global economy and the new complexities, curtailments, and forms of brutality these transformations are producing.

Increased migration and desperate searches for a haven are part of the processes of displacement that accompany war and capital destruction and accumulation by dispossession. These displacements are facilitated by new, complex legal and financial structures; different forms of truth claims and knowledge production; and a migration industrial complex built on accumulating profit by detaining and storing living bodies (Sørensen 2013). The resurgence of xenophobic, antimigrant nationalism in the midst of intensive global interconnections is a potent manifestation of the emerging contradictions and disparities.

Migrants and City-Making speaks to these contradictions by offering a perspective on the question of dispossession and displacement that differs from those common in debates about mobility, cities, urban restructuring, and struggles for rights to the city. In so doing, we have challenged the concept that a metropolitan revolution offers a spatial fix for contemporary crises and economic stagnation and disparities (Katz and Bradley 2013). Our comparative analysis has tracked the spiraling trajectories of debt and displace-
ment produced by policies that have promised “economic recovery” through celebrations of tourism, neoliberal public–private governance, urban rebranding, the creation of business- and investment-friendly environments, and the fostering of “ethnic” entrepreneurs.

We have developed an analytical vocabulary and framework that explicates how city residents participate in the processes and struggles that remake their cities and our world. We approached all residents of cities—migrants, minorities, and non-migrants alike—as city-makers operating within unequal networks of multiscalar power. We traced dispossession back to reconstituted forms of obtaining capital through the direct seizure of land, resources, and bodies. Then we showed how these economic processes relate to cultural processes of the racialization, stigmatization, and delegitimization of claims to humanity and the rights associated with such claims. We highlighted how all residents of a place were imbricated in the processes that displaced them. Yet, tracing the entanglements of dispossessive forces does not lead us to conclude that there is no exit. Rather, our analysis not only critiques categories often deployed in discussions of the relationships between migrants and cities but also serves as an approach to city-making processes and migrant agency that can strengthen social movements.

To formulate this approach, we questioned the penchant for theorizing from research on urban restructuring and migrant settlement in world centers of political and economic power. Migrants and City-Making provides comparative studies of the multiscalar networks of power within which residents of disempowered cities, migrant and non-migrant alike, build their lives. We have argued that research in disempowered cities can provide new insights into established analytical categories and organizing mantras, including “local actors,” “global cities,” “diversity,” “difference,” “multi-sited ethnography,” “social citizenship,” “new mobilities,” and the “right to the city.”

Our argument in Migrants and City-Making for the usefulness of theorizing from disempowered cities and our elucidation of the displacements and emplacements integral to city-making in three such cities—Halle/Saale, Germany; Manchester, New Hampshire, in the United States; and Mardin, Turkey—contributes to our broader agenda of speaking to the nature of struggles for social justice in our times. Our comparative analytical framework calls for an examination of relationships that all of us, everywhere, have to the dispossessive and reconstitutive powers of contemporary capitalism. Our analysis allows us to raise questions of general interest: we ask who ben-
efits from dispossession and displacement, and we ask how these processes engender struggles for dignity, respect, and life with meaning. It is our hope that such an analysis contributes to global movements that aspire to social and economic justice (Narotzky 2016).

In this concluding chapter, we emphasize how our comparative analytical framework highlights three insights that are crucial for further research on relationships between migrants and city-making. First, our work demonstrates the necessity of situating social analysis and action within a shared temporality of all a city’s inhabitants as the city transforms within changing historical conjunctures. As we note in the introduction, we built on John Clarke’s approach to conjunctural analysis not as a theory but as an orientation from which to assess “the forces, tendencies, forms of power, and relations of domination” that at any moment in history can lead to different yet interdependent regional and local political, economic, and social arrangements (Clarke 2014, 115).

Second, we have argued that analyses of city-making processes must be multiscalar because conjunctural forces always involve multiple globe-spanning actors within intersecting social fields of power. Moreover, the constellation of forces at a given historical conjuncture—their mix and relative potency, so to speak—is an integral component of place making. When economic “bubbles” burst, when politics in a place, state, or region turn anti-immigrant, when demagogues seize the moment, when new communication technologies transform information flows, and when religious, social, or political movements rise or fall, peoples’ lives are affected not only in specific places but also in ways that intersect and interact within interconnected networks. All these forces, coming together in what Doreen Massey (2012) termed a “power geometry,” were apparent in the data we collected and in our analyses of conditions in Mardin, Halle, and Manchester. Each city’s disempowered positioning and its leaders’ repositioning efforts were part and parcel of its distinct constitution of these forces.

Finally, our analytical framework makes clear that it is essential to move beyond concepts of urban citizenship and the right to the city when addressing the complex terrain of rights, legality, and social justice claims. To seek the transformative change necessary for social justice and for the empowerment of the dispossessed, researchers and activists must directly address multiscalar globe-spanning relationships of power, including the changing and increasingly fraught processes of capital accumulation.
1) The Importance of Thinking about Shared Temporality within Changing Historical Conjunctures

**Temporality**

Research on the relationship between cities and migrants serves as a potent critique of the ethnographic present. As we conducted the research that led to this book, it became clear that even the relatively brief fifteen-year period in which we analyzed the history of these city-making processes contained drastic fluctuations and variations that our analytical framework had to address.

By focusing our analysis of migrants and city-making in three disempowered cities on the shifting historical conjuncture and conditions of urban restructuring, we sought to move debates beyond the static temporal focus of much urban restructuring literature, namely, the focus on the neoliberal moment that began in the 1970s. Such formulations in migration and urban studies have paid too little attention to the trends that so clearly emerged from our comparison of the three disempowered cities: the recent transformations in processes of capital accumulation that reconfigured processes and structures of accumulation; the heightened intensity and prevalence of nationalism, racism, and anti-immigrant, antiminority discourses; and the significance of war. Wars shaped by and constitutive of new fields of power led to untold death, destruction, and desperate movements of refugees in one location and to opportunities for employment and the growth of new industrial sectors elsewhere. Mardin, Halle, and Manchester, seemingly so disparate, proved to be interconnected not only because their leaders deployed similar restructuring strategies but also because of their relationships to the death and destruction wrought by war.

To highlight the synergies among all actors within a process of city-making as part of the power geometry at a historical conjuncture—namely, at a meeting of intersecting forces within a place and a time—the concept of temporality proved useful. The importance of time became clear when we analyzed the social relationships that various actors forged within the realignment of conjunctural forces. In much of the migration literature, those captured by the terms “migrants/minorities” and “non-migrants” are approached within different temporal frames, producing what Fabian (1983, 2006) has called the denial of coevalness, that is, the denial of contemporaneity. The ethnic lens deployed by many mainstream migration scholars is based on and reproduces just such a denial of shared temporality (Çağlar 2013). Scholars analyze migrants within the “categorical time” of culture, of elsewhere, and outside of
contemporary time while analyzing non-migrants as actors within historical
time and subject to the conjunctural forces of the political economy. By de-
nying coevalness, migration scholars disregard the experiences, values, and
practices that migrants and non-migrants share as they become embedded
in common contemporary social, economic, and political processes (Çağlar
2016b).

A disregard for shared temporality within changing historical conjunc-
tures underlies the various literatures critiqued in our ethnographic chapters
including those based in the concept of ethnic entrepreneurs, the study of
urban life as if it was lived within discrete neighborhoods, claim making as
an avenue to social citizenship, and hometown ties as a natural outcome of a
transnational ethnic community. In our ethnographic chapters, we took the
shared temporality of all actors as our analytical entry point in assessing the
significance of their differential access to multiscalar institutions, differential
engagements in processes of capital accumulation and dispossession, and dif-
ferential racializations.

By deploying this perspective on temporality in chapter 2, we demon-
strated that migrant small businesses in Halle were subject to the sectorial
and dispospossive dynamics of urban regeneration in that city. In confronting
these forces, our starting point for analysis was the constraints and oppor-
tunities confronting small businesspeople within a disempowered city. We
could not have made this analysis without insisting on the contemporaneity
of all actors and discarding the tendency of scholars to assume that migrant
businesspeople were constrained by differential logics deriving from their
ethnic and cultural backgrounds. In the growth and demise of their busi-
nesses, and in their displacements from the city center, migrant small busi-
nesses were coeval to non-migrant small businesses in Halle.

Because we considered migrants and non-migrants to be sharing the same
temporal frame—contemporaneous and operating within the same conjunc-
tural configuration—we were able in chapter 3 to theorize and make visible
domains of commonality that emerged in Manchester and Halle. By high-
lighting the conditions within which “domains of commonality” emerge, we
could distinguish our approach from the scholarship of multiculturalism,
diversity, superdiversity, and tolerance for difference. As migrants and non-
migrants confronted the range of dispospossive multiscalar forces constitut-
ing their lives, sought ways of living within them, and struggled to reshape
these conditions, they built sociabilities of emplacement.

Our studies of relationality in chapters 3 and 4 moved beyond method-
ological individualism to situate emergent sociabilities of emplacement within time and place. In chapter 3 we drew on data from Manchester to explore various locations and situations in which migrants and non-migrants forged domains of commonality based on a common sense of their humanity. We could have presented similar data from Halle, but to expand on the concept of sociabilities of emplacement, we instead drew from our studies of born-again Christians in both cities.

In chapter 4, our temporal frame made clear the commonalities within shared conjunctural forces that brought together born-again Christians in Halle and Manchester. We noted the relationships between believers’ critique of governmental power and the dispossession they experienced. We documented their efforts to respond to their displacement and disempowerment by participating in powerful globe-spanning Christian networks that put aside narratives of national or cultural difference. We suggested that, to address their experiences within changing conjunctural conditions, people in different locations around the world situated themselves within their shared biblical understanding of God’s prophecy and power.

In chapter 5, we noted that the frames and references of action for Syriac Christians returning to Mardin were anchored in the same sense of time in which other city residents operated. All individual, organizational, and institutional actors were shaped by the urban restructuring unfolding in Mardin, although their experience in the city was shaped by their unequal access to the networks of power that differentiated city residents. Taking as our analytical entry point the shared conjunctural forces that were reconfiguring geopolitics in the region and the location of the Turkish state in these changing relations, we explored how all residents sought to respond to the opportunities and constraints at the turn of the millennium. In this way, we were able to see that in some cases these shared conditions led to heightened tensions between local actors. We situated the return and emplacement of Syriac Christians in Mardin’s city-making within the new, contentious dynamics unleashed by the minority rights and geopolitical agendas of global and religious networks of power. We also noted that, as the historical conjuncture changed with the expansion of the Syrian Civil War, the changing power geometry in the region, within Europe and the EU ultimately marginalized minority rights and peace process agendas. Syriac Christians as well as other minority groups increasingly lost their value to more powerful actors, and their emplacement in city-making altered drastically.
Throughout this book, we sought not only to challenge concepts that have shaped migration studies and approaches to urban restructuring but also to set the stage for further work on the relationship between historical conjuncture and theory production. As we examined the contemporary literature on migration and urban restructuring, the implications of the fact that migration scholars often live at a different conjunctural moment than that in which their key concepts were constituted became clear (Glick Schiller 2015b; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). Many scholars write as if conceptual tools forged under one set of conditions can be used to speak to a very different world.

For example, the concept of assimilation reflected the developing US economy in the twentieth century. The concept reflected and enabled the growth of an imperial American economy within the context of twentieth-century war, revolution, and Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union (Piketty 2014). In that context, assimilation was assumed to entail upward social mobility. Theories of assimilationism past and present (and their multiple derivatives), including those acknowledging a period in which migrants maintain their transnational homeland connections (Waldinger 2015), disregard the configuration of conjunctural forces that made possible the post–World War II settlement of immigrants and their social mobility. Such theories discount how radically different the world is now.

Disregarding the historical conjuncture in which theories and concepts were constructed, migration scholars generalized and universalized US post–World War II patterns of immigrant settlement into a universal and timeless assimilation theory of migrant emplacement. However, conditions faced by migrants and as well as by non-migrants are qualitatively different today because of transformations in the processes of capital accumulation and dispossession and the austerity narratives and reductions in public services that have accompanied and legitimated these changes. Yet, in Europe, integration scholars, political pundits, and policy makers have repeatedly declared that if refugees would only assimilate by learning the language and culture of the country of settlement, then they would be able to enter the mainstream, as generations of immigrants previously did in the United States (Heckmann 2015). Such assumptions about migration processes are provincial (Chakrabarty 2000), lacking a sense of space as well as time.

Migration theorists’ failure to reflect on the empirical bases and historical conjuncture that shape specific theories resembles studies of modernity
that universalize a particular reading of the specific European experience as a valid theory for everywhere and any time (Therborn 2003; Beck and Grande 2010). In both cases, analysts fail to reflect on the conditions that shape their theory and fail to theorize the temporal-spatial dimensions of their core concepts.

2) Multiscalar as Method/Theory/Analysis

The multiple intersecting trajectories of forces that a conjunctural analysis brings into view are always multiscalar. Throughout the book, we repeatedly used the term “multiscalar” not as a metaphor of complexity or connectedness but as an essential form of methodology, theory, and analysis. Building on our argument that theory, method, and analysis are ongoing processes of engagement with the world (Xiang 2016; Hertz 2016; Harrison 2016), we explored the multiple disparate but interconnected ways in which the daily lives of residents in the three cities were situated within networks that made them actors within simultaneous, interconnected local, regional, national, supranational, and global relations of power.

Our observations, interviews, and data collected from multiple sources made it clear that, had we approached various city leaders and residents, both migrant and non-migrant, as “local actors,” our analysis would have been distorted. Whether or not they were “mobile people,” they entered into and refashioned multiple intersecting networks of social, economic, political, and religious relationships across space and time. In many cases, it was by scrutinizing collected documents and websites and, toward the end of the research, Facebook (when many organizational websites changed their media interfaces) that we became fully aware of the scope of the multiscalar networks, whose substantiation had been unfolding before our eyes. Thus, we more fully comprehended the extent to which social relations were indeed multiscalar, enacted by individual people as they lived their daily lives.

The multiscalar analysis of this book reframes and deepens the critique of methodological nationalism that we and a growing number of authors have put forth (Beck 2002; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002; Amelina et al. 2012; Çağlar and Glick Schiller 2011; Glick Schiller 2005b, 2010, 2015b; Glick Schiller and Çağlar 2011a, 2011b; Nowicka and Cieslik 2013; Clarke et al. 2015). We demonstrated that we need to do more than critique the conflation of national and societal boundaries. *Migrants and City-Making* traced the globe-spanning institutional, corporate, financial, and cultural configurations of
power that connect actors, places, resources, and forms of coercion, dispossession, and persuasion.

We demonstrated that to reposition their city, the leaders of Halle, Manchester, and Mardin sought ways of reconstituting their connections to power hierarchies. We delineated their strategies of urban reempowerment: reinvigorating local histories and creating new, welcoming city narratives; working to attract new investment; changing tax policies or property assessments; negotiating loans on the basis of public credit; and redrawing institutional lines of authority. In each case, our exploration of these repositioning efforts made it clear that not only city leaders but also city residents became actors within broader configurations of regional, national, and global power. Our explorations of urban regeneration projects and the actors involved in their development—small entrepreneurs and consumers, apartment dwellers and homeowners, employees of urban institutions, individual newcomers seeking social ties, born-again Christian organizations and formerly persecuted returnees, migrants seeking their rights and place in their city’s political, economic, and social life and citizens aspiring to political office—made clear that the local was not a level of analysis or a discrete domain but an arena of multiple institutional actors within the power geometry of a specific conjuncture.

Disempowering processes that shaped cityscapes in each region—including unmet promises of new economy jobs, the replacement of public services with public debt, and new inequalities built into transformed housing stocks and neighborhoods—provided the terrain on which daily life played out and social relations were constituted for all city residents.

At first glance, the social relations we traced between newcomers and non-migrants, who met variously in city shops and on city streets, in places of worship and of education, and even at local political meetings, would not seem to require a multiscalar analysis. However, as we tried to make sense of the welcoming narratives of each city, we found they were very much embedded within efforts to regenerate the city, which required challenging negative images of that city: terror and poverty in Mardin, racism in Halle, disreputable abandonment in Manchester. Through a comparative analysis of regeneration, we were able to understand each city’s residents’ experiences of displacement, their daily practices, and their politics, including their sociabilities. And in each city, these daily sociabilities situated residents within multiscalar social fields.

The data in our ethnographic chapters extended our discussion, begun in
the introduction, of the inadequacies of the current penchant to celebrate ethnographies of daily life. While multisited research is necessary for the study of specific topics—for example, commodity chains or human mobility—we have argued that multiscalar research must be a component of all ethnography (Gardiner and Lem 2012a; Miraftab 2014). By examining city-making processes in three disempowered cities, we have demonstrated that working in a single site is not synonymous with a bounded ethnography of the local. Migrants and City-Making documents the multiple ways in which all sites are interconnected through time within hierarchies of differential power.

SIMULTANEOUS MULTISCALAREMPLACEMENT

Because each ethnographic chapter emphasizes a different aspect of the processes of displacement and emplacement, the fact that migrants and non-migrants engage in simultaneous forms of city-making may not be obvious. However, it is important to take note of the simultaneity of their engagements. We mean by simultaneity that individuals may be entangled at the same time in multiple networks organized around different spheres of life, each of which is multiscalar. By tracing city-making processes as the simultaneous relational constitution of scales, we have demonstrated that, whether we as individuals build personal transnational networks or maintain that we live within the confines of a single neighborhood or locality, we are all actors within multiple simultaneous processes that make and remake the mutually constituting scales of locality, region, nation-state, the supranational, and the global. This simultaneity and multiplicity allows individuals multiple forms of belonging, multiple possibilities for finding domains of sociability, and multiple possibilities of becoming politically active within a range of social movements.

There are many ways to document the simultaneity and multiplicity of multiscalar interconnections. They pervade our data and run through our chapters. Throughout the various chapters, we provided examples for each city of how the networks of individuals were both multidimensional and inserted into multiple different social fields. In each case, these individuals participated simultaneously in personal, economic, political, and religious networks that connected them, directly or indirectly, to multiple elsewheres.

Much of the literature on migrants’ daily lives in cities misses migrants’ multiple simultaneous forms of relationality and participation in economic, political, religious, social, and cultural city-making processes. This is because, as our review of the literatures on migrant businesspeople, social citizenship,
and hometown associations in chapters 2 through 5 demonstrates, scholars tend to study single domains of migrant life or focus on neighborhoods. It was only through tracing the multiscalar networks of various migrants as they entered into a range of different relations of emplacement and by finding that they appeared as actors in many different domains—sometimes as main players and sometimes in walk-in roles—that we fully appreciated the importance of theorizing simultaneous multiscalar networks of emplacement. However, we emphasize that scholars must always be cognizant of the very different power of institutions and of individual actors in these networks.

**MULTISCALAR FIELDS AS TRANSFORMING AND TRANSFORMATIVE**

Multiscalar analysis must always be carried out with an eye to changing conjunctural conditions. Multiscalar social fields are never fixed. The power geometry of changing conjunctures means that political climates can alter dramatically across city, state, nation, and region. Recent transformations have altered the possibilities for and barriers to emplacement of migrants and non-migrants. As our research ended, we began to witness new spirals of capital accumulation, dispossession, and displacements as new opportunity structures and barriers to emplacement and sociability emerged, affecting—differentially—the residents of the three cities.

Our research began in one conjectural moment and extended into transformations accompanying the emergence of a new historical conjuncture. Therefore, throughout the book, our challenge has been not only to assess the intertwined multiscalar forces at play within each city’s re-empowerment efforts and to analyze the relationship between the city and its migrants within these dynamics but also to pay close attention to conjunctural transformations. Our discussion of urban regeneration in Mardin, with outcomes configured by dramatically shifting geopolitical terrains, provides a clear example of the importance of noting transformations from one alignment of globe-spanning forces to another within an emergent historical conjuncture.

As Mardin’s relationships to military battlefields and Turkey’s relationship to the EU and to the Middle East changed, its urban restructuring and narratives of multifaith harmony also dramatically changed. Almost overnight, the emplacement of the Syriac Christian minority and returnees within EU institutions, the Turkish state, and global Christian networks that we had been documenting and their potential roles in city-making were rapidly transformed. By the summer of 2016, even various newspaper archives and
websites we had used to document urban regeneration in Mardin had been taken down from the Internet. As repression increased, many of these media were banned.

Attention to changing historical conjunctures was also necessary for assessing the relationship between migrants and Halle’s regeneration efforts. Our story began at the moment that residents and newcomers were beginning to come to terms with the demise of socialist governance and to assess the emergent and ongoing transformations in neoliberal governance in which they were enmeshed. By the end of our research, relations between migrants and their cities were being altered by a different concomitance of political, economic, religious, and cultural forces and actors. Conditions seemingly distant and disconnected—continuing warring in the Middle East centered on heightened war making in Syria, terrorist attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan, intensified accumulation by dispossession in the form of vast land privatization by Chinese, European, and US corporate interests in Africa, together with land clearance via militia activity—brought a new wave of migrants to Halle. They arrived in the city and region when costly urban regeneration had intensified income equalities, increased residential segregation, failed to eliminate high unemployment, and strained public coffers.

Consequently, the arrival of refugees was met with growing contestation. On the one hand, the new nationalist, anti-immigrant populist party, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), was growing in strength. This political party spoke to non-migrants’ frustrations at the failure of neoliberal urban regeneration to alter their various ongoing dispossessions: job insecurities, increasingly privatized services, and shrinking proportions of the national wealth and of prospects for social mobility. Frustration took the form of attacks on or threats to buildings sheltering refugees and random acts of violence against refugees on the street.

At the same time, Halle and surrounding villages witnessed an upsurge in support for refugees as volunteers came forward offering food, clothing, and services. Old multiscalar networks of support were reinforced and new ones built joining non-migrants and migrants who had become emplaced in the city. City leaders worked with an array of civic and religious organizations. New funding arrived from the EU, the German state, and Saxony-Anhalt to coordinate volunteer services. Local nuns offered sanctuary for failed asylum seekers. Migrants in the city found the streets both more welcoming and more dangerous. Some new migrants joined the Miracle Healing Church, which continued within its multiscalar networks. But in the changing con-
junctural moment, nationalist rhetoric in the United States and Europe began to reduce the saliency of born-again Christians’ global anti-racist stance.

Conjunctural analysis was also essential to disentangling the dynamics of urban restructuring in Manchester, New Hampshire. On the surface, Manchester might seem remote from the dramatic changes transforming the other two cities. However, Manchester’s possibilities and constraints were also linked to the broader dynamics of finance capital and subprime markets as well as to the US and global military industrial complex’s changing modes of war making, war funding, and production chains. Unemployment rates dropped as weapons production increased in relation to enlarged US war efforts in Syria and Iraq.

Meanwhile, growing public anger across much of the country, which was fueled by vast new inequalities produced not only by urban regeneration but also by new waves of dispossessive accumulation, was evident also in Manchester. These dispossessions in Manchester and elsewhere took multiple forms. Banks and finance corporations developed new loan instruments to sell automobiles and housing to the poor. Local governments increasingly used a structure of fines and penalties to fill public coffers that were no longer supplemented by state and federal subsidies. Politicians, particularly those in the Republican Party and centered in the Trump political movement, gave vent to public angers by targeting immigrants, people of color, Muslims, and government regulation. Meanwhile the US refugee resettlement program continued to settle newcomers across the country. After a pause fueled by the protests of some local Republican leaders, in 2016 Manchester was once again a city of refugee resettlement. As in Halle, newcomers were met by both public and private welcome and local acts of individual hostility. In Manchester, the anti-immigrant political narrative was by 2016 orchestrated by the national and state Republican Party.

When we began our research, the Republican Party had welcomed immigrants on national and state levels as well as within Manchester city politics. Heightened tensions and a political realignment that positioned the Republican Party as militantly anti-immigrant altered the multiscalar connections and possibilities in Manchester but certainly did not end the development of sociabilities of emplacement. The types of Republican networks that we described in chapter 1, which allowed Carlos Gonzalez or Saggy Tahir to become, first, party activists and, then, elected officials and made Tahir the first Muslim elected to a US state legislature, were no longer possible. After 2009, in the aftermath of the subprime mortgage crisis, Godsword abandoned his
efforts to become a Christian political activist in Manchester and recentered his Resurrection Crusade in Nigeria. Although the development of the local health-care industry in the city center continued with a public funding for redevelopment, Manchester’s political leadership had generally abandoned their high-profile efforts to reposition and re-empower the city amid public debt and reduced funding streams.

However, new, more politicized organizations and networks uniting migrants and non-migrants developed in response to the inequalities, growing racism, and demands for social justice. Activities ranged from actions within the local, state, and national Democratic Party to demonstrations in support of the Black Lives Matter movement. In the summer of 2016, Black Lives Matter demonstrators, including people of migrant and non-migrant backgrounds, marched through the regenerated city center to the same park where Godsworld celebrated the National Day of Prayer in 2004 (Galioto 2016; WMUR 2016). They were followed by small bands of counter demonstrators carrying guns. Several children of the migrants, whose emplacement through domains of sociability we traced in this book, emerged as activists in Manchester’s emerging social justice movements. They built their own domains of sociability and political solidarities in the changed conjunctural conditions they confronted.

By addressing the dynamics and processes of conjunctural multiscalar restructuring in Manchester, Halle, and Mardin, we went beyond a structural reading of these convergences. We explored how the historical and discursive legacies of each disempowered city contribute to the terms and imaginaries within which migrants are situated and mobilized as part of urban redevelopment processes. In these cities, as in many others, city leaders and developers projected a version of cosmopolitan urbanism and culture-led or knowledge-led regeneration that often has ignored the contributions of migrants or addressed their presence primarily through narratives that rebrand a city as open and diverse.

As we have seen, on occasions, migrants, together with other urban residents, advocated and strengthened neoliberal discourses that legitimated growing social and economic inequalities. On the other hand, as they confronted the inequalities, displacements, and insecurities that accompanied social and economic inequalities, migrants and non-migrants joined together in movements for justice and against various forms of structural adjustment. However, the configuration of and possibilities for the emergence of such social movements vary with changing conjunctures.
3) Beyond Urban Citizenship and Toward Social Movements of the Dispossessed

As our review in chapter 4 of the social citizenship literature made clear, many contemporary scholars have sought to move beyond the state-centered liberal model of citizenship by arguing that, in the context of globalization, cities rather than nation-states are the axis and locus for political belonging and membership. They have argued that, rather than legal status, residence and participation are pivotal for rights and entitlements (Sassen 2001; Bauböck 1994, 2003; Benhabib 2007; Varsayni 2006; Lazar and Nuijten 2013; Lazar 2013). Those who look to cities and struggle for the right to the city as the new terrain for struggles for social justice point to the deprecations of state authority that result from neoliberal governance. Commenting on the contemporary situation in which the state shares its powers of control and discipline with other actors and agencies, Rose and Osborne (2000, 108) have noted that “citizenship is no longer primarily realized in relation with the state” but instead through “a set of dispersed and non-totalized practices.”

While recognizing the significance of claim making through acts of social citizenship performed by asylum seekers, migrants without papers, and those whose rights within the state are devalued, Migrants and City-Making critiques the celebration of “urban citizenship” as an alternative site for rights and entitlements. Although cities are crucial units of governance and strategic sites for generating wealth and amassing power, their powers and their citizens’ struggles for rights and justice take place within global hierarchical networks of power and concomitant processes of capital accumulation. Both cities and neoliberal states do indeed, as Rose and Osborne remind us, share the powers of control and discipline with other actors and agencies. Our analysis of the intersecting multiscalar networks of power and their changing conjunctural configurations makes this clear.

Moreover, in our assessments of the potentiality and limitations of social movements organized to claim “the right to the city,” we cannot ignore the continuing role of nation-states as identity makers, definers of membership, and enforcers of difference. In the last few years we have seen a resurgence of political leaders, demagogues, and intellectuals organizing what Rose and Osborne (2000) have labeled “citizenship games.” These games refer to those practices, such as drawing lines of difference based on racism or tolerance, by which persons with citizenship in nation-states seek to constitute themselves as players. Constituting themselves in this way, citizens become part of the games that govern them as they play their own parts. As they seek belonging, the dispossessed who identify themselves as natives join mobilizations and
political movements against those who face even greater degrees of precarity. In these processes, scholars and policy makers play a role. Much contemporary scholarship in migration and urban studies contributes to institutionalizing categories of difference in public discourse and, most importantly, in migration and urban policies. These distinctions and semantics are central to the “policy worlds” and often to the governmentality of populations (Shore, Wright, and Pérò 2011).

The lessons from the transformations wrought from the new conjuncture of intensified nationalism built on categories of difference should be clear, but often they have been lost underneath the slogan of “rights to the city.” Even if formally granted by urban authorities, urban-based rights can never be secured. Those able to practice urban social citizenship are particularly vulnerable to changing local and national power geometries within new institutional, local, or state-level political configurations (Varsayni 2006). Even people with formal citizenship rights granted by the state are finding their urban citizenship entitlements negated within such transformations.

The example of Mardin makes this clear. Formal citizenship neither guaranteed the rights of Syriac Christians and Kurds who entered local city-making as legal citizens nor protected them from persecution. Despite the multiple governing bodies involved in securing and monitoring the rights of minorities, including the EU, Turkish state power was crucial for the enactment of Syriac Christians’ and Kurds’ citizenship in Mardin, including office holding, and state power could take these rights away. In 2015, when the global and regional positioning of Turkish state power changed, the same Turkish state that had urged Syriac Christians in Europe to return in 2001 and promised to protect their rights as citizens did not hesitate to violently deprive these Syriac Christians and Kurdish citizens of Mardin of their citizenship rights. Many local Kurdish office holders, including the Kurdish co-mayor of Mardin, were persecuted and some of them were imprisoned. Thus, any analysis of formal, as well as social and urban, citizenship must account for the historical conjuncture within which relations between state power and multiple governance structures are shaped. Beginning in 2017, the US federal government began to abrogate long-held rights of even legal immigrants and naturalized citizens of migrant background.

In Rebel Cities, Harvey (2012) questioned the potency of rights to the city movements, which limit their terrain of struggle and organizing power to demands for access to local resources and spaces. He calls on people to organize social movements around their experiences of struggling against dispossession. If demands for the right to the city are to yield social justice movements

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with staying power, they must recover the original understanding of the phrase “right to the city,” which arose from anticapitalist struggles (Lefebvre 1996; Harvey 2003, 2008). That is to say, struggles for urban citizenship and the right to the city cannot be separated from anticapitalist struggles that confront the global power of capital. Harvey argues that urban contestations must be waged as multiscalar struggles, and we agree. As we have shown by tracing the ongoing disempowerment of Halle, Manchester, and Mardin, cities cannot be taken as units of analysis. And of course, city limits also should not become the horizons of political struggles.

In each city, we identified diverse forms of precarity that are shaped by the many forms of dispossession and displacement that residents of these disempowered cities experienced daily. Those facing precarious lives and the loss of prospects range from the urban poor to larger sectors of people who considered themselves middle class. Our analytical framework makes it possible to join older questions of class struggle against those who control the means of production with the emergence of contemporary struggles of the dispossessed.

How to construct solidarities among city residents of diverse social, political, and economic backgrounds and legal statuses has been a major challenge for those aspiring to alternative visions of society and urban life (Harvey 2012; Mayer and Boudreau 2012; Mayer 2017). All agree on the importance of building solidarities beyond institutionalized lines of race, class, ethnicity, and migrancy and on the importance of building on bonds that occur between people and places (Lazar 2013; Harvey 2012). However, rather than glossing over forms of social relations that are crucial to social movements by speaking of “forces of culture,” “cultural solidarities,” a “collective sense of the self,” and “collective memories” (Harvey 2012, 148, 151), we focus on the sociabilities of the displaced. We argue that these sociabilities, which we have situated within “domains of commonality” rather than tolerance of difference, are built by city dwellers, migrant and non-migrant alike, upon shared affect, mutual respect, and aspirations.

Ironically, unlike much of the research that has emerged from more powerful cities, our research in the disempowered cities of Halle, Manchester, and Mardin made visible sociabilities that may prove crucial to building movements for social and economic justice. Because of their initial relative disempowerment and their leaders’ regeneration strategies, these cities could not increase revenues or provide many public services. Confronted by increasing dispossessive processes of capital accumulation and the drain on public resources for the provision of public services to city residents, these
cities could not institutionalize difference based on religion, ethnicity, or race. Under these conditions, domains of commonality established despite differences became more visible and may well be more significant for the displaced and the dispossessed than in more powerful, well-resourced cities.

However, the importance of conjunctural forces in building sociabilities of displacement was also very clear in all three cities. Among the results of the changing conjuncture of global and regional power hierarchies, manifested and escalated by global warring in Syria and Iraq, were the massive dispossessions and violent displacements of fleeing refugees. These changes altered the formation of the sociabilities, out of which the solidarities of social movements emerge. In Mardin, social movements were violently destroyed, in Halle and in Manchester they were polarized and politicized.

At the current moment, antiglobalization movements that critique political and economic projects actuated by neoliberal flexible accumulation seem to have morphed into a resurgent nationalist fervor and repressive surveillance of difference, reinforced by racist and antimigrant rhetoric and policy. Mobilized by leading politicians, in most places these sentiments voice the angers of a militant, albeit frightening, minority whose path to power is to mobilize the nationalism of the dispossessed “natives.” However, some movements that seem right wing in essence encompass many people who can find no other political outlet for their rage (wNYC and Nation 2016; Hochschild 2016). Through the lens of disempowered cities, we have sought to understand the nature of dispossessive globe-spanning processes that generate and legitimate rhetorics of rage against difference and to theorize how dispossessive capitalism situates those categorized as migrants and those categorized as natives within the same processes of displacement and search for emplacement.

Migrants and City-Making has placed both people categorized as migrants and people categorized as non-migrants under a common analytical lens that can recognize domains of commonality while speaking to the divisive powers of racialization, criminalization, Islamophobia, and multiple disempowering forms of otherizing. Therefore, our analysis calls for rethinking discussions of governance, the universe of policies and scholarship on migrants and city-making processes, and the historiography of cities. In this sense, we see this book as a political act.