Moral Economies of Corruption

Pierce, Steven

Published by Duke University Press

Pierce, Steven.

For additional information about this book
https://muse.jhu.edu/book/64130

For content related to this chapter
https://muse.jhu.edu/related_content?type=book&id=2279895
NOTES

Introduction

2. “Maryam Abacha Launches a Major Offensive to ‘Save’ the Abacha Loot,” Tempo (Lagos), 23 September 1999.
3. For an excellent ethnography of these schemes in southeastern Nigeria, see Smith, Culture of Corruption.
5. See Pierce, “Punishment and the Political Body.”
8. Olivier de Sardan, “Moral Economy of Corruption in Africa?” Olivier de Sardan uses “corruption-complex” to designate a variety of practices (not simply the diversion of money but nepotism, influence peddling, deviations from the norms of bureaucratic rules), all of which would fall under what I have termed material practices interpreted through a technocratic paradigm.
9. Anderson, Imagined Communities; Vail, Invention of Tribalism in Southern Africa; Ranger, “Invention of Tradition”; “Invention of Tradition Revisited”; Young, Ethnicity and Politics in Africa.
12. van Klaveren, “Corruption as a Historical Phenomenon.”
13. My thanks to Tomoko Masuzawa for her insight on the intellectual context of nineteenth-century Europe.
14. Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel; Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups; Parrillo, Against the Profit Motive; Guyer, “Representation without Taxation.”
15. Progressive-era authors wrote about the phenomenon with considerable insight. See, for example, Steffens, *Shame of the Cities*. A pioneering political scientist wrote about the corruption Steffens and other crusading journals condemned with considerable insight. Brooks, “Nature of Political Corruption”; “Attempted Apologies”; *Corruption*.


17. Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power*; Wilson, *Island Race*; Ballhatchet, *Race, Sex, and Class under the Raj*.

18. On this ambivalence, the classic work is Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power*. On the dialectic of scandal and reform, see Rao and Pierce, “Discipline and the Other Body.”

19. On the relationship between vernacular and specialized uses of political terms, see Pierce, “Pointing to Property.”

20. See, for example, Lugard, *Dual Mandate*; Temple, *Native Races and Their Rulers*; Geary, *Nigeria under British Rule*.

21. For a discussion of how modern technocratic views of corruption have depended on a public–private distinction, see Bratsis, “Construction of Corruption.” For a more extended discussion of the complexities of the political extension of “public” and “private” in colonial northern Nigeria, see Pierce, “Public, the Private, and the Sanitary.”

22. Most influentially Rostow, *Stages of Economic Growth*. It is a slight exaggeration to say he posited a universal sequence, since part of his object was to posit a capitalist trajectory to development in the twentieth century as opposed to state socialism. For slightly earlier (and also very influential) discussions of political development, see Apter, *Ghana in Transition*; Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy.” At this late date, it is unnecessary to rehearse the complex history of modernization theory and its critics. For the initial critique of the “dependency” theorists, see Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*; Amin, *Neo-Colonialism in West Africa*; Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. For a celebrated overview, see Cooper, “Africa and the World Economy.”

23. Wraith and Simpkins, *Corruption in Developing Countries*.

24. van Klaveren, “Comment.”


28. Much of the later literature retains these assumptions, though imported in a somewhat indirect way. See Williams, *Political Corruption in Africa*; Rose-Ackerman, “Democracy and ’Grand’ Corruption”; *International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption; Corruption and Government; Corruption: A Study in Political Economy*. Rose-Ackerman in particular has been important in touching off a vast literature in economics, starting with a famous article, “Economics of Corruption.” But though the formal innovation of the approach was viewing corruption as rent-seeking behavior usually (though not inevitably) within govern-
ment, the approach was nonetheless substantially similar to Nye’s. See Williams, “New Concepts for Old?”


31. For an excellent and far more comprehensive overview focusing on Africa and anthropology, see Blundo, “Corruption in Africa.” See also Anvag and Fjeldstad, “Corruption”; Debiel and Gawrich, “(Dys-)Functionalities.” A comprehensive collection of key works is available in Johnston, Public Sector Corruption.


33. Rose-Ackerman, “Political Economy of Corruption.”

34. Rose-Ackerman, “Corruption: Greed, Culture, and the State.”

35. I am grateful to Obi Ojimiwe, whose work on how governments are determined to be “serious” about development has shaped my own thinking. Ojimiwe, “Malaria Control.”

36. This included politically canny descriptions of political struggle during the nationalist period. See Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties; Coleman, Nigeria; Dudley, Parties and Politics; Whitaker, Politics of Tradition. An important early synthesis was Scott, “Analysis of Corruption.”

37. Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya; Schatz, “Pirate Capitalism.” For a more recent application of the insight, see Cooper, Africa since 1940.

38. Ekeh, “Two Publics.”

39. For an early formulation, see Zolberg, Creating Political Order. More recently, Christopher Clapham’s formulation of neo-patrimonialism has been extremely influential. Clapham, Third World Politics. On corruption in particular, see Medard, “Public Corruption in Africa.” For a criticism of such approaches, see Wai, “Neo-Patrimonialism.”

40. Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics. On ethnicized politics and corruption in Nigeria, see also Diamond, Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria; Graf, Nigerian State. For a recent assessment of Joseph’s book, which concludes it has stood up remarkably well, see Adebanwi and Obadare, Democracy and Prebendalism in Nigeria.

41. See also Laitin, Hegemony and Culture.

42. Reno, Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone; Warlord Politics and African States; “Crisis and (No) Reform in Nigeria’s Politics.” See also Hoffmann, “Fairy Godfathers.”

43. Mamdani, Citizen and Subject; Herbst, States and Power in Africa; Bates, Markets and States.


46. Smith, *Culture of Corruption*.

47. Ellis and MacGaffey, “Research on Sub-Saharan Africa’s Unrecorded International Trade”; MacGaffey, *Entrepreneurs and Parasites*; MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga, *Congo-Paris*; MacGaffey et al., *Real Economy of Zaire*.


50. Fuller and Benei, *Everyday State*. See also Brownsberger, “Development and Governmental Corruption.”

51. Gupta, *Red Tape*. This work builds on Gupta’s important earlier work, some in collaboration with James Ferguson, on the ways in which such narratives also give the state the appearance of a particular spatial structure, one with “higher” levels, in which power is centralized, even as this accords imperfectly with the complex web of actors and actions which in fact constitute state activity. Ferguson and Gupta, “Spatializing States”; Gupta, “Blurred Boundaries.” See also Ferguson, *Anti-Politics Machine*.

52. Rose-Ackerman, “Corruption: Greed, Culture, and the State,” 131, 137.


55. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*. For a more recent use of the concept in relation to political speech, see Butler, *Excitable Speech*. Butler discusses political speech, the power of words to injure (as those concerned with regulating hate speech have argued) or conversely the ability of sovereign authority to act through saying. As chapter 5 will discuss at length, the ideological underpinnings of state authority are crucially tested, and for that reason usefully revealed, by discourses of corruption. Butler provides a singularly useful account of the productive space between intention and effect in which speech acts do their work, which is the location in which much routine governance takes place.

Chapter One: A Tale of Two Emirs

2. Barth, *Travels and Discoveries*, 1, 452. Barth consistently termed Emir Bello (and other emirs of the Sokoto caliphate’s component emirates) “governor” to indicate their status as subjects of the sultan of Sokoto. I follow the modern convention of rendering them as “emir.” Both emirs in the caliphate and the pre-jihadic Hausa kings are termed sarki in Hausa, which can be variously translated as “chief,” “king,” and “emir”—or indeed sultan, for the sultan of Sokoto is the Sarkin Musulmi.
4. Barth, *Travels and Discoveries*, 1, 460.
5. Barth, *Travels and Discoveries*, 1, 462.
11. In Hausa there is a linguistic and conceptual distinction between masu sarauta and talakawa (sing. talaka), which would normally be translated as “commoners,” while masu sarauta might be rendered as “aristocrats.” Some offices might be reserved for the royal lineage or might be hereditary in another family, but for the most part the “aristocracy” was not a discrete group a talaka could never aspire to enter. M. G. Smith points out that although the masu sarauta/talakawa distinction is ideologically important, it does overlook large numbers of intermediate people—deposited masu sarauta, holders of minor offices rather than great offices of state, and so on. He argues for a much more nuanced appreciation of hierarchies of social status within Hausa society—a point that is well taken but that does not obviate the basic importance of this distinction. Smith, “Hausa System of Social Status.”
13. Adeleye, *Power and Diplomacy*; Last, Sokoto Caliphate; Smith, *Writings of Professor Abdullahi Smith*; Sa'id, “Revolution and Reaction.”
15. In the text I make a distinction between northern Nigeria, which is the northern part of what is now the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and Northern Nigeria, which
is a political unit. It was created with the proclamation of the Royal Niger Company protectorate, and it persisted (under different guises, including the Northern Provinces and the Northern Region) until 1967, when what was then a federation of four regions was broken up into a twelve-state federal system.

19. Lugard, *Dual Mandate*; 1918 Political Memoranda; 1906 Political Memoranda.
22. About Lugard as propagandist, see also Nwabughuogo, “Role of Propaganda.” Nwabughuogo contends Lugard’s propaganda in favor of his system did not stem from an attempt to euphemize an extreme strategy emerging from colonial poverty but rather was an attempt to make distinctive a tenure that otherwise would have appeared a failure given the protectorate’s lack of economic development. He suggests indirect rule was then picked up by Liberal critics of the colonial enterprise such as Mary Kingsley and E. D. Morel, a position that somewhat oversimplifies the context of early twentieth-century politics. The governor who followed Lugard (and who was aligned with reformist factions) adopted indirect rule as a rhetoric to explain policies that differed greatly from Lugard’s. They were, he claimed, necessary for achieving true indirect rule, which was the overarching (and entirely Lugardian) imperative. See Pierce, *Farmers and the State*, chapter 3.
24. The following summarizes arguments developed in Pierce, *Farmers and the State*, chapters 1 and 3.
26. For good descriptions of the process in Kano, see Ubah, *Administration of Kano*; Fika, *Kano Civil War*; Watts, *Silent Violence*.
33. Arnett, *Gazetteer of Zaria Province*.
37. Northern Nigeria, *Annual Report*, 1907–8, 36, Zaria Province. It was really only through the emir’s intervention that the school received any Muslim students

38. By contrast, Brian Larkin’s interpretation of early-colonial attitudes toward Western technology reads Wákár Díga as evidence of the “colonial sublime,” a local northern Nigerian appreciation of the ultimately indescribable power of colonial technologies. Signal and Noise, 38–39.

39. This paragraph is based on Smith, Government in Zazzau, 178–93.


41. Unless otherwise noted, this paragraph is based on Smith, Government in Zazzau, 212–21.

42. Pierce, “Punishment and the Political Body.”

43. Arnett, Gazetteer, 26.

44. NAK SNP 8/4 58/1917. Palmer quoted in Lieutenant Governor to Governor, 26 May 1917.

45. NAK SNP 8/8 6/1921, Acting Lieutenant Governor to Resident Zaria, 15 January 1921.

46. National Archives (UK), Public Record Office (TNA PRO) CO 583/99 Conf. 7 February 1921, Aliyu, Emir of Zaria: Deposition of, Clifford to CO, 7 February 1921.

47. Arewa House (AH) file no. 15,346, Slaves (Females), Attorney General to Chief Secretary, 26 May 1921.

48. AH file no. 15,346, Acting Lieutenant Governor, 16 July 1921.

49. Miller to Lugard, 29 July 1903, cited in Ayandele, Missionary Impact, 145, emphasis in original.

50. Miller, Reflections, 124.


52. Miller, Reflections, 128.

53. Miller, Reflections, 133–38.

54. Cf. Baba of Karo’s account of raids sponsored by the emirs of Maradi and Kontagora. Smith, Baba of Karo, 66–73. The latter was in the caliphate rather than outside of it, but there was some justification because of the questionable legal status of Emir Kwassau’s regime. Similarly, even if Wombai Aliyu had sponsored raids against Muslims, it is likely these also could have had some pretext.

55. Miller, Reflections, 139.

56. TNA CO 583/94 Tel, 3 December 1920, Charges against Emir of Zaria.

57. TNA CO 583/99, Conf. 7 February 1921.


59. NAK SNP 8/8 6/1921, Lieutenant Governor, Northern Provinces, to Resident, Zaria Province, 15 January 1921.

60. NAK SNP 8/8 6/1921, W. F. Gowers, 16 February 1921. When the decision was questioned in the House of Lords some years later, the Parliamentary undersecretary of state claimed that the reason for the deposition was Aliyu’s interference in a court case. Hansard, 11 March 1925, Lords Sitting.

61. TNA PRO CO 583/99 Conf. 7 February 1921, Aliyu, Emir of Zaria: Deposition of.

62. TNA PRO CO 583/99 Conf. 7 February 1921.

63. TNA PRO CO 583/99, Conf. 7 February 1921.
During the colonial period, taxes were payable after the harvest came in at the end of the rainy season, which generally ended in September. From the second decade of colonial rule, taxes were levied in sterling rather than in kind or in cowries. Thus, the tax season ran into the new year, and there were occasions in which farming families increasingly needed to convert a portion of their crops into cash in order to meet their tax burdens. As Michael Watts notes, even without the increase in the absolute incidence of tax that accompanied colonial rule, this schedule substantially increased the burden taxation placed on families’ food supply. In the precolonial period, tax was levied toward the end of the dry season. Thus, in the colonial period poor families were forced to sell agricultural produce to cover their tax liabilities at harvest time, just when produce prices were at their lowest. Watts, *Silent Violence*.

As it turned out, the regime’s hopes for cotton production were dashed, and what cotton was grown was absorbed by the local textile industry, which paid higher prices than merchant exporters would offer. Instead, both small producers and large landholders concentrated on producing groundnuts for export. Okediji, “Economic History”; Hogendorn, *Nigerian Groundnut Exports*; Salau, “Slave Labor in Groundnut Production.”
it by others, some cultivate it on behalf of someone else (this is particularly true of
gonaki owned by women), and some engage in a form of cash cropping. See Pierce,
Farmers and the State, chapters 2, 3, 6; Starns, “Land Tenure among the Rural Hausa.”
80. Pierce, “Looking like a State.”
81. NAK SNP 10 844/P/1913, Kano. Report on Taki Assessment.
82. Pierce, Farmers and the State, chapter 6; Garba, “Taxation in Some Hausa Emir-
ates”; Watts, Silent Violence, 274–305.
83. Kano State History and Culture Bureau (HCB) SNP 9 603/1924, Sumaila District,
Kano Emirate, Re-Assessment Report.
84. NAK SNP 17/8 K.5093, Kano Emirate Assessment, 30 April 1927.
85. See Pierce, “Looking like a State.”
86. NAK Kanoprof 5/1 2953, Emir’s Instructions to District Headmen (1922–48). The
most pointed warning, dated 6 February 1922, reads “Any hakimi or dagaci, or
ward head, or subordinate of theirs who takes land or cattle tax, except for that
written in the land or cattle tax register, has committed a crime.” Translation mine.
87. Northern Nigeria Annual Report, 1910–11, 738. See also Smith, Government in
88. Ubah, Administration of Kano; Fika, Kano Civil War; Smith, Government in Kano.
Peter Tibenderana is perhaps too extreme in his characterization of the sultan of
Sokoto as having lost control of the structures of his own emirate government,
but his basic point is well taken, that extreme characterizations of indirect rule
as having allowed emirs absolute latitude are quite inaccurate. Instead, British
authorities intervened consistently and systematically into emirate affairs, and
the modes of government that emerged were different from those in the precolo-
nial period. Nonetheless, Nigerian authorities retained considerable freedom to
maneuver in these new circumstances. See Tibenderana, “Irony of Indirect Rule
in Sokoto Emirate.”
89. Sean Stilwell develops an insightful and subtle account of this process of bureau-
cratization in the Kano Native Authority, with particular attention to the manner
in which the new apparatus substituted for the old system of royal slavery. Stil-
well, “Constructing Colonial Power.” Moses Ochonu’s study of indirect rule in the
“minority” middle belt of the North provides an important account of how the
process played out in a culturally distinct area. Ochonu, Colonialism by Proxy.
90. Watts, Silent Violence, 282.
91. See Ochonu, Colonial Meltdown.

Chapter Two: The Political Time

2. The outlines of these developments have been admirably traced by a number
   of scholars. See Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties; Whitaker, Politics of Tradition;
   Dudley, Parties and Politics; Yakubu, Aristocracy; Paden, Ahmadu Bello; Religion
   and Political Culture in Kano; Reynolds, Zamanin Siyasa.
3. Paden, Religion and Political Culture in Kano.
4. This was only a temporary defeat for the emirs and their supporters. The system of indirect election was conducted through a series of electoral colleges that began among adult men at the village level and culminated at the provincial level, which selected representatives to send to the House of Assembly. The native authorities were allowed to “inject” up to 10 percent of the members of the final electoral college by appointment, and these appointees became a disproportionate number of the final members of the assembly. See Sklar, *Nigerian Political Parties*, 30; Bello, *My Life*, 70–72.


6. Lugard, *Dual Mandate; 1918 Political Memoranda*.

7. For an extended discussion, see Pierce, *Farmers and the State*. Sara Berry has argued for viewing colonial representations of tradition as continually in flux, an ongoing topic of debate that constrained government practice rather than a positive system in its own terms. *No Condition Is Permanent; Chiefs Know Their Boundaries*. See also Ranger, “Invention of Tradition Revisited”; Spear, “Neo-Traditionalism and the Limits of Invention.”


10. Adebayo, “Jangali.”


12. There certainly were African employees of the British colonial administration—clerks, soldiers, teachers, medical doctors, and many other categories—but there were limits to how far such employees could advance, and they were always under the administrative supervision of British officials.

13. In a somewhat sensational memoir published only online, Harold Smith, who had worked in the Labour Department in Lagos during the 1950s, recalled considerable bribe taking among British officials and claimed a colleague told him, “You can’t stop these people taking money. If you make a fuss, which you do, they just keep your share! You can have as many black girls as you want . . . [or] boys if you fancy some black bum.” Smith, *Blue-Collar Lawman*, chapter 8. The colonial government was extremely delicate in disciplining British officials who did not properly observe the strictures of administrative behavior. The case of J. F. J. Fitzpatrick, who served as a political officer in a number of provinces, is instructive in this regard. Fitzpatrick became an embarrassment to the regime because he had a penchant for flogging, and in several instances his activities touched off international scandals. He was finally separated from the colonial service because of a government-owned typewriter, which he sold for private profit. In this case, the typewriter was clearly a pretext for dispensing with an official who was problematic for other reasons. Nonetheless, even in this instance the government was careful not to label his activities as “corrupt,” merely as “improper.” Pierce, “Punishment and the Political Body.”

15. Ochonu, Colonial Meltdown, 100–120. Ochonu demonstrates that a set of popular responses to the Great Depression created a set of institutions and a political tradition of dissent that was not itself nationalist but that then was taken up for nationalist purposes after World War II. I am deeply indebted to his brilliant, innovative account.


17. Anderson, Imagined Communities. More generally, see Warner, “Publics and Counterpublics”; Habermas, Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere.


20. CO 554/237, Political Situation, Governor’s Deputy to Secretary of State, 16 November 1953. In fact, on the Nigerian government’s advice, the Colonial Office supported Sanusi in response to a parliamentary question from a Labour MP who noted Sanusi was more a Machiavellian prince than a Hitler but that policing in Kano was conducted “in a way which we have come to accept as normal in a Fascist and police State, but which ought not to be permitted under the British flag.” Hansard HC Deb., 17 November 1953, Vol. 520, c. 1678, Mr. George Wigg (Dudley).

21. Pierce, “Farmers and ‘Prostitutes.’”

22. CO 554/237, Political Situation.


24. For example, in a discussion of district heads who improperly included young boys on lists of taxpayers, the senior district officer for Kano wrote to the madaki saying, “This is exactly the sort of injustice which they like to find. They know that it is both illegal and contrary to accepted principle and they know well how to profit from it.” H.C.B COSL R.583, District Taxation—Principles Governing Exemption from Assessment: Instruction Policy, SDOK, to Madakins Kano, 5 April 1957.


29. Paden, Religion and Political Culture in Kano.

30. Dudley, Parties and Politics, 213–14. The assistant treasurer of the Kano Native Authority at the time would later allege the shortfall had come about because the NA was developing an industrial area under instructions from the regional government. The regional government withdrew its guarantee for the NA’s letter.

31. HCB MLG NAF/361, Warning to Kano NA Officials by North Regional Government on Muffett Inquiry.
32. TNA DO 186/13, Relations between the Emir of Kano and the Northern Regional Government, H. A. Twist to J. O. Moreton, 20 September 1962.
33. TNA DO 186/13, Relations between the Emir of Kano and the Northern Regional Government, H. A. Twist to J. O. Moreton, 20 September 1962.
34. TNA DO 186/13, Relations between the Emir of Kano and the Northern Regional Government, Twist to Moreton, 7 November 1962.
35. TNA DO 186/13, Telegram Kaduna to Lagos, 5 December 1962.
38. TNA DO 186/13, Twist to Moreton, 7 November 1962.
40. Umar, “Fatwa and Counter-Fatwa.”
41. Muffett, “Legitimacy and Deference.”
42. Yakubu makes precisely this point. Yakubu, Aristocracy, 193. His assertion that Muffett was “erroneous” in calling Tukur “the usurper” goes too far. That succession did lead to the Kano civil war, and the events of the time demonstrate Tukur suffered from a certain lack of legitimacy. The issue was more complex than popular dissatisfaction with the lineage position of rival claimants to Kano’s throne, which does demonstrate Muffett’s position was disingenuous at best. See Fika, Kano Civil War. Regardless, the succession of Usman I after the death of his father Ibrahim Dabo in 1846 also would undermine the thesis.
43. Oyediran and Gboyega insightfully discuss the process of democratization in southern local councils during this period but suggest that the retention of a chiefs-in-council model of local governance retarded the process in the north. I would agree that the transfer of direct administrative authority to elected local councils took place in a later period in the Northern Region, to such an extent that emirs and their subordinates remained the embodiment of local government. Nonetheless, the shift between native authorities and the secular state during this period had powerful consequences. Oyediran and Gboyega, “Local Government.” See also Olufemi Vaughan’s excellent study of chiefship in southwestern Nigeria, Nigerian Chiefs, for an account of how politics in that region actually worked to strengthen chiefly institutions.
44. Cf. Tignor’s important argument that “corruption” had long been a charge leveled at indigenous African systems of government that took on new coloration as Nigeria moved to self-government. Where I have emphasized the ubiquity of official practices susceptible to being called “corrupt,” Tignor suggests a degree of skepticism. Most of the direct evidence for corruption, he argues, comes from commissions of inquiry, and these turned up many rumors but relatively little legally actionable malpractice. As is clear from my argument up to this point, I agree with him that the actual extent of malpractice is epistemically murky but
disagree on whether legal admissibility is the correct standard for assessing its prevalence. Tignor, “Political Corruption in Nigeria.”

45. Richard Joseph famously termed this political logic “prebendal politics.” See Democracy and Prebendal Politics. His argument will be addressed more systematically in chapters 3 and 5, below.

46. Vaughan, Nigerian Chiefs; Achebe, Farmers, Traders; Female King; Afigbo, Warrant Chiefs; Ochonu, Colonialism by Proxy; Nadel, Black Byzantium; Apter, Black Critics and Kings.

47. Ochonu, Colonialism by Proxy.


49. See Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, 35–38. Abba has stressed that Nigerian politics must not be seen solely through an ethnic lens, emphasizing the class and ideological dimensions of party contests both in this period and during the Second Republic in the 1970s and 1980s. His point is well taken, particularly since the dominance of the big three parties in their home regions partially masks other tendencies—NEPU’s class-based challenge to the NPC in the north, for example. This is an important reminder, though Abba’s account tends to ignore appeals to ethnic sentiments retailed by politicians as a part of their electoral strategy and to view ethnicity as a constant identity that exists or not. The difficulty with such an argument is that ethnic identities themselves shift, becoming more and less salient over time, consolidating and fragmenting. Nigerian politicians have not just capitalized on identities that objectively existed but acted to consolidate and make them politically relevant. Abba, “Misrepresentation of Nigeria by Nigerians and Others.” See Cohen, Custom and Politics in Urban Africa; Laitin, Hegemony and Culture; Young, Ethnicity and Politics in Africa.

50. Cooper, Decolonization and African Society; “Modernizing Bureaucrats.”


53. Helleiner, “Fiscal Role.”

54. Cooper, Africa since 1940. Cf. formulations of the comprador state, for example, Nore and Turner, Oil and Class Struggle; Graf, Nigerian State.

55. Diamond, Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria; Graf, Nigerian State.

56. There is an immense literature on ethnicity and the role politicians and retail politics have played in the mobilization of ethnic tension. See, for example, Anthony, Poison and Medicine; Diamond, Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria; Young, Ethnicity and Politics in Africa; Cohen, Custom and Politics in Urban Africa; Laitin, Hegemony and Culture; Melson and Wolpe, Politics of Communalism.
57. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties.
59. Nigeria, Report of the Tribunal Appointed to Inquire into Allegations Reflecting on the Official Conduct of the Premier of, and Certain Persons Holding Ministerial and Other Public Offices in, the Eastern Region of Nigeria, [Cmd. 51, 1957], 42.
63. Coker Report, 33.
64. Coker Comments, 16.
67. Coker Comments, 16.
68. Soyinka, You Must Set Forth at Dawn, xiii.

Chapter Three: Oil and the “Army Arrangement”

1. Ahmad Khan, Political Economy of Oil; Ikein and Briggs-Anigboh, Oil and Fiscal Federalism; Nore and Turner, Oil and Class Struggle; Watts, State, Oil, and Agriculture in Nigeria. Michael Watts’s more recent scholarship has been the most important and insightful examination of the implications of oil for Nigeria’s political economy. See, for example, “Shock of Modernity”; “Resource Curse?”; “Oil as Money.”
2. Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics. For an important recent reassessment of Joseph’s paradigm, see the essays in Adebanwi and Obadare, Democracy and Prebendalism in Nigeria.
3. Apter, Pan-African Nation. Apter discusses of the transformative effects of oil revenue and in particular the ways in which the petro-naira reworked systems of value; the Nigerian state increasingly operated through what Apter terms a politics of spectacle, channeling goods bought with oil rents and thus affecting the Nigerian public in their capacity as consumers. For an influential account of a similar process in Venezuela, see Coronil, Magical State.
5. Nigeria has had three elected civilian regimes, the First Republic (1960–66), Second Republic (1979–83), and Fourth Republic (1999–present). The presidential election that would have completed the transition to the Third Republic was annulled in 1993, and the short-lived “transitional” government that year was also

8. “The Sun Exclusive: Buhari Bares It All,” Sun, 24 December 2012. Solarin and Awojobi were both prominent critics of the Nigerian government and played key roles in publicizing the missing money. Awojobi died soon after the coup in 1984, of hypertension, at the age of forty-seven. Solarin was imprisoned.
9. The other brother to be detained, Dr. Beko Ransome-Kuti, was repeatedly jailed under the Babangida and Abacha governments as well. Ironically, he would testify before the Oputa Human Rights Violations Investigations Committee and compel the testimony of then-President Obasanjo on the subject of the 1977 raid. The irony stems from Ransome-Kuti’s simultaneous complaint about his imprisonment in 1995 under General Abacha, which came about because of Dr. Ransome-Kuti’s activism about Obasanjo’s imprisonment, for allegedly plotting a military coup.
11. Elaigwu, Gowon, 135–39; Clarke, Gowon, 135–43.
13. There were members of “majority” ethnicities living in these states, but they did not make up a majority of the population.
22. Smith, Blue-Collar Lawman. Smith’s memoir caused a great stir in the Nigerian and Nigerian diasporic public sphere when it went online in 1998. Smith’s major
contention was that the British colonial government had systematically falsified the census and conspired to rig the elections of 1956 in order to marginalize the Action Group and its leader Obafemi Awolowo.

27. The formulae did not reflect the areas from which revenue was derived for a considerable period, which led to grievances among the Niger Delta peoples, whose land was degraded from oil production. It was not until the violence began there during the 1990s that the federal government began again to move toward compensating states for the wealth produced within them.
28. Usman, “Middlemen, Consultants, Contractors and the Solutions to the Current Economic Crisis.”
33. Azikiwe, *Democracy with Military Vigilance*.
39. This allegation was first made in 1969, but Stonehouse denied it at the time. It was only confirmed by a Czech defector in 1980. The Conservative government in power at the time did not publicize the tidbit, which was not released until 2010, after Stonehouse's death. Alan Travis, “Margaret Thatcher in Cover-Up after Czech Spy Exposed John Stonehouse,” *Guardian*, 30 December 2010.
40. The accounts invoke Princess Jeanne but do little other than use the glamour of royalty to make the story more exotic. The princess was a colorful figure by any measure. Born in Tennessee and named Thelma Jeanne Williams, Princess Jeanne married Prince Carol of Romania, whose legitimacy was questionable. Carol's father, crown prince at the time of Carol's conception, either was not married to Carol's mother or was married morganatically. Carol was not acknowledged as a member of the royal family by his father or his half brother, King Michael. The couple traded on their royal connections for the bulk of their marriage, leasing a mansion near Poole from the local council and running up debts with the surety


45. Peter Niesewand, “Concrete Jungle,” *Guardian*, 17 October 1975. The “black cultural Olympics” was a reference to the plans for *Festac*, the spectacular festival held in Lagos in 1977.

46. “Nigeria: The Cement Block,” *Time*, 27 October 1975. This story, though primarily about Nigeria, notes at the end that it is not the only oil producer suffering from a certain inefficiency in processing its imports, quoting a U.S. Defense Department official who noted Iran’s ports made him think of “a chaotic flea circus.”


51. Apter argues that this process was driven by wide-ranging transformations of value brought on by the oil economy, which created the appearance of development and an industrialized economy by enabling the purchase of consumer goods and building a facade of modernity while in practice channeling the bulk of oil rents through ethnicized chains of patronage. Apter, *Pan-African Nation*, 40–45.

52. First, *Barrel of a Gun*.

53. Nigeria Lagos to Secretary of State, 1 August 1975, Wikileaks.


55. The provision touched off a lawsuit, since President Shagari’s victory only arguably met that requirement. Two-thirds of 19 is 12–2/3, and the NPN candidate only met his quota in twelve states. The Supreme Court, however, ruled that since he had won two-thirds times one-fourth of the vote in a thirteenth state, his victory precluded a runoff. Nigeria, “Awolowo V. Shagari and Others.”

56. Except where otherwise noted, the following is based in the superb account of Second Republic party politics in Joseph, *Democracy and Prebendal Politics*. 

Notes to Chapter Three  247
57. The zoning question is particularly troubled at the time of this writing. The president in office at the time of Nigeria’s 2015 elections, Goodluck Jonathan, was from the south-south zone, and he first came to the presidency to complete President Yar’Adua’s 2007–2011 term. Yar’Adua came from the northwest zone, and his death in office foreshortened the north’s claim to the presidency after eight years in which it was occupied by an incumbent from the southwest zone. President Jonathan’s maneuvers preparing to contest the presidential election of 2015 precipitated a split in his People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the departure of a significant percentage of its leadership to an emergent national rival, the All-Progressives Congress. This crisis was central to the PDP’s devastating defeat in 2015.

58. In the NPN’s scheme, the zones were north, east, west, and minorities, though Joseph notes that in practice the “minorities” zone, which did not have an easy or straightforward geographical expression, became conflated with the southeastern groups in the Niger Delta.

59. Funk, Life, 272–73. Before his career as a political consultant, Funk had served in the Jimmy Carter administration as a specialist in the National Security Council for Africa. If anything, he comes across as inclined to give NPN politicians the benefit of the doubt, opining at some length about the excellence of the elections of 1983 and the legitimacy of the ruling party’s victory in them. That position required a certain credulity, but it does demonstrate Funk was not inclined to exaggerate the personal failings of Second Republic officials.

60. Othman, “Classes, Crises and Coup.”


64. Dikko, “Buhari, Danjuma and I.”


69. Obotetukudo, Inaugural Addresses.


77. “The Trial of Tam David-West,” New Nigerian, 14 December 14 1990. The New Nigerian was owned by the Nigerian government, and its coverage of the David-West affair was generally supportive of the prosecution and government policy. This article, however, was the first installment of its summary of the complete prosecution and defense cases, along with the eventual verdict.


Chapter Four: Moral Economies of Corruption

1. At the time, the ₦50 note was the largest denomination available, equal to about U.S. $0.60 at exchange rates then prevailing.

2. There were two military governors between Colonel Wase’s death and the advent of civilian rule, but they are not much discussed either.

3. During his second term (2011–2015), Governor Kwankwawaso left the then-ruling PDP and went over to the new opposition alliance, the APC. Former governor Shekarau, who held office under the aegis of the ANPP, recently joined the PDP.

4. The reason for going to court in the absence of a dispute is to have the judge assign the proper proportion of the state to each inheritor, which then (at least in theory) allows the family to divide up the “hidden” portion appropriately. This does not always work: some families are forced to go to court several times when they are unable to agree on how to divide parts of the estate not already allocated. Pierce, Farmers and the State, chapter 4.


6. Yakubu, Aristocracy; Stilwell, “Constructing Colonial Power.”

7. Balarabe is based on a real individual, though in the interest of protecting his anonymity I have substituted a composite of others’ experiences for certain details of his story.

8. The question of land litigation is explored in more detail in Pierce, Farmers and the State.

9. “Oppression” by itself is not necessarily an official act. It is something anyone with more power may do to anyone with less.

10. M. G. Smith made a very similar point in a classic article on corruption in the Zaria emirate (Smith, “Political Corruption among the Hausa”), though our emphases are somewhat different.


13. To give just one instance of how difficult such an estimate would be, consider how influential Transparency International’s annual ranking of most- and least-
corrupt countries is. For Nigeria, a major point of transition was 2004. In years previous to that, it had always been listed among the most corrupt countries. Following that, it has tended to be twenty or thirty countries down the list. The reason for the change was not some sort of absolute decrease in the incidence of corruption (or at least, it has not claimed that to be the case) but rather the passage of a raft of legislation aimed at curbing corruption, including the institution of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). While the EFCC and especially its first chairman, Nuhu Ribadu (who ran for president in 2011 as candidate of a major party), did engage in a number of high-profile prosecutions, including that of Tafa Balogun, the real effects have been largely cosmetic. For a challenging and wonderfully detailed contrary argument that Ribadu’s EFCC was extremely effective, see Adebanwi, Authority Stealing.

15. Polanyi, Transformation, 46.
17. The case of Dahomey has received particular attention, for Polanyi made a very strong case the Dahomeyan crown reserved for itself the right to determine the price of slave exports and to determine the price of key commodities. Africanist scholars who have done extensive work in the area, however, have demonstrated his contentions were based on a set of misunderstandings and that market mechanisms were critically important even during periods that Polanyi claimed must be archaic. Johnson, “Polanyi”; Hogendorn and Johnson, The Shell Money of the Slave Trade; Law, “Posthumous Questions”; Ouidah; “Royal Monopoly.” For a similar criticism of Polanyi’s discussion of the ancient Middle East, see Silver, “Karl Polanyi.” These criticisms should not be taken as implying that all human societies depend on a fundamentally similar set of market mechanisms. Quite the contrary, modes of establishing and reworking equivalence and valuation are historically contingent and culturally complex. The difficulty of Polanyi’s work is that it ultimately boils down to one historical transformation that is replicated through human societies and that ultimately results in modern market mechanisms. For a state-of-the-art discussion, see Guyer, Marginal Gains.
18. Thompson, “Moral Economy Reviewed.”
20. Roitman, “Économie morale, subjectivité et politique.”
26. It would be possible to argue that various uprisings—from the Maitatsine riots in 1980 through the Niger Delta conflicts to the Yusufiyya violence current at the time of this writing—represent precisely the violent response to corruption one would expect when moral-economic consensus had been abrogated.
27. I emphasize: the claim that female sexual morality had degenerated was not my own conclusion but rather a point made by any number of friends and acquaintances. See Pierce, “Farmers and ‘Prostitutes’”; “Identity, Performance, and Secrecy”; “Public, the Private, and the Sanitary”; “Prostitution, Politics, and Paradigms.”


29. White, *Speaking with Vampires*.

30. In this, I agree with Gupta on the centrality of narrative of corruption to experiences of the everyday state. Gupta, *Red Tape*.

31. The Paris Club debt was retired in 2006, three years after the essay’s publication.

32. This usage presents something of a contrast to the six-zone system that had been worked out for the constitution written under Abacha, which was never fully implemented but which has informed the ruling PDP’s allocation of major offices. That scheme terms the Middle Belt “North Central,” and Ofeimun’s Arewa is divided into “North West” and “North East.”

33. Hoffmann, “Fairy Godfathers.”

**Chapter Five: Nigerian Corruption and the Limits of the State**


6. For a detailed and well-informed account of EFCC investigations under Ribadu, see Adebanwi, *Authority Stealing*. It is based on extensive interviews with Ribadu and many officials and anticorruption activists, though it suffers from a tendency toward hagiography. See also Obuah, “Combating Corruption”; Lawson, “Politics of Anti-Corruption Reform.”

7. Shariff, “Anajemba Story.”


9. “Corruption Costs Nigeria 40 percent of Oil Wealth, Official Says,” *Boston Globe*, 17 December 2004. Both ideas are attributed to Ribadu, but only the second is reported as a direct quotation.


14. Governor Ibori garnered international notoriety several years later, when he pleaded guilty in a British court to charges of money laundering. In his plea, the governor admitted to laundering $50 million, but many commentators claimed the actual amounts abstracted from the Delta state government were far higher. One aspect to the story that received enormous attention was that the governor had perjured himself in his affidavit before running for governor in 1999 by claiming he had no previous convictions, a requirement for political candidates. In fact, the governor had a considerable record of petty theft from a previous stay in the United Kingdom. He avoided the records of those convictions by falsifying his passport. Thus in retrospect, it turned out the governor was ineligible for the office that he subsequently misused.


17. Political parties in the Fourth Republic have been somewhat fluid, apart from the ruling PDP. Nonetheless, the southwest has been a center of strength for a party called the Action Congress, later the Action Congress of Nigeria, which bears continuities to Obafemi Awolowo’s old Action Group and Unity Party of Nigeria.

18. Albin-Lackey, “Corruption on Trial?” Researchers who sampled a multiethnic sample of people living in the southwestern Nigerian town of Abeokuta in 2009 found that people believed the EFCC had succeeded in reducing public corruption and advance-fee fraud, though the body was subject to interference from senior government figures. Sowunmi, Adesola, and Salako, “Performance.”


22. On this topic Leena Hoffmann provides a particularly insightful recent analyst. See Hoffmann, “Fairy Godfathers”; “Big Men and the Pot at the Centre.” See also Ikpe, “Godfatherism and the Nigerian Polity.”

23. Chief Okotie-Eboh’s death is equally explicable as a matter of ethnicity and of NCNC factional politics, so one would not wish to press the point of corruption discourse too strongly.

24. See, for example, Almond, “Comparative Political Systems.”

25. For an intellectual history of this development, see Mitchell, “Limits of the State”; “State Effect.” See also Hansen and Stepputat, States of Imagination; Sharma and Gupta, “Rethinking Theories of the State.”

26. For a much earlier discussion in a similar vein, see Brooks, “Attempted Apologies.”


30. Weber, Methodology, 90.
31. Peter Ekeh’s famous essay on the two publics predominant in postcolonial Africa is an interesting variation on this theme, suggesting the coexistence of patrimonial and bureaucratic notions of public life and public office. Ekeh, “Two Publics.”
32. Eisenstadt, Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrimonialism; Clapham, Private Patronage and Public Power; Medard, “L'état néo-patrimonial”; Bratton and van de Walle, Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa; Bach, “Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism.”
33. Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In.
34. Very fine works on Nigerian politics written in the 1950s and 1960s are distorted by this clumsy framework. See, for example, Coleman, Nigeria; Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties. Even Whitaker’s admirably subtle study of the imbrication of the northern native authorities in First Republic politics, which in no way assumed “traditional” emirate structures, were in the process of giving way to “modernity,” nonetheless depended on somewhat teleological assumptions. Whitaker, Politics of Tradition.
36. For an excellent assessment, see Adebanwi and Obadare, Democracy and Prebendalism in Nigeria.
37. Lewis, “Prebendalism to Predation.”
38. Adekanye, Retired Military.
39. Ikpe, “Godfatherism and the Nigerian Polity”; Hoffmann, “Big Men and the Pot at the Centre”; Albert, “Explaining Godfatherism”; Omotola, “Garrison Democracy.” Onwuzuruiygbo usefully points out that political patrons and patronage as such are nothing new in Nigerian politics but less convincingly argues that contemporary political problems come about because of distortions engendered by the colonial period. Onwuzuruiygbo, “Concept of Godfatherism.”
40. Hoffmann, “Fairy Godfathers”; “Big Men and the Pot at the Centre.” Ultimately, a court overturned Governor Ngige’s 2003 election, and he left office after three years in power.
41. Hill, Development Economics on Trial; Jerven, Poor Numbers.

Notes to Chapter Five 253
43. For a stimulating discussion of the complexities of this situation, see Ojimiwe, “Malaria Control.”
47. Meagher, “Social Capital.” Meagher has also developed a very useful assessment of the utility of Tillyan approaches to the state as a variety of protection racket, one which potentially becomes institutionalized across long periods. “Strength of Weak States?”
50. Mbembe, *On the Postcolony*. For a brilliant analysis of how the Togolese dictator Gnassingbe Eyadema enacted and epitomized this mode of power, see Piot, *Nostalgia for the Future*. For a discussion of magic and religious powers undergirding some Nigerian political networks, see Ellis, “Okija Shrine” Marshall, *Political Spiritualities*. Despite many points of similarity, Bayart has condemned Mbembe (and the entire field of postcolonial studies), for a lack of subtlety or appreciation for variation. Mbembe’s reply points out that few of Bayart’s objections to postcolonial studies accurately describe the field, and he implicitly suggests their substantive positions (on anything other than perhaps considering France to be the center of the world of theory) are quite similar. Mbembe, “Provincializing France?” See also Young, “Bayart’s Broken Kettle.” For a more successful criticism of postcolonial studies (though with only indirect bearing on the positions outlined above), see Cooper, *Colonialism in Question*.
52. Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou, *Criminalization of the State*. Olivier de Sardan’s suggestion that African corruption has a distinct moral economy also fits neatly into this approach. My use of the term “moral economy” is indebted to Olivier de Sardan’s formulation but differs from it profoundly. See chapter 4. Olivier de Sardan, “Moral Economy of Corruption in Africa?”
53. For a similar critique, see Ochonu, “Corruption and Political Culture,” 32–33.
54. For an allied critique of such approaches, see Pitcher, Moran, and Johnston, “Re-thinking Patrimonialism.” They suggest the problem is commentators’ tendency to take patrimonialism as being a particular type of state rather than being a mode through which states are legitimated.
56. This argument was influentially laid out in Althusser, “Ideological State Apparatuses.” See also Butler, *Psychic Life of Power*.
57. Mitchell’s first formulation was in Mitchell, “Limits of the State.” A revised version that underlined the congruence of his work with Abrams’s was published as “State Effect.”

Notes to Chapter Five
58. Fernando Coronil has perhaps pushed this line of reasoning to its ultimate conclusion in *The Magical State*. See also Sharma and Gupta, “Rethinking Theories of the State”; Hansen and Stepputat, *States of Imagination*; Brown, *States of Injury*.

59. Ferguson and Gupta, “Spatializing States.” See also Harris, “State as Socio-Natural Effect”; Roitman, “Africa, Otherwise.”

60. Das and Poole, *Anthropology in the Margins of the State*. For important studies of how these dynamics play out at the edges of Cameroon and Ghana, see Roitman, *Fiscal Disobedience*; Chalfin, *Neoliberal Frontiers*.

61. Cooper, "Africa and the World Economy"; *Africa since 1940*; Bayart, "Extraversion."

62. Scott, *Seeing like a State*.

63. Pierce, “Looking like a State.”


### Conclusion


3. The Corruption Barometer is a measure distinct from the Corruption Perceptions Index. The latter is based on a variety of measures taken from experts in the field—businesspeople, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the like. The former is the result of public opinion surveys conducted in countries around the world.


10. Mikkelsen, “In Murky Waters.”
