NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1 Churchill, India, 126.
2 Nitin Bose’s 1934 Chandidas was a remake of Debaki Bose’s 1931 film of the same name. Nitin Bose was the cameraman for the original film.
3 Shohat and Stam, Unthinking Eurocentrism, 100.
4 Over the last few decades nation-states all over the world have confronted secessionist movements and supranational economic alliances, so it is not surprising that interrogating the embattled definition of a nation gained prominence within and outside academia. Key social and political texts read in various disciplines across the humanities have included Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities, Ernest Gellner’s Nations and Nationalism, Eric Hobsbawm’s Nations and Nationalism since 1780, Miroslav Hroch’s Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe, and Anthony Smith’s Theories of Nationalism. “National cinema” is now a normative category for structuring university courses in cinema studies, particularly for non-Hollywood cinemas. A few indexical examples show that the nation, though accepted as a legitimate category to organize analysis, is also always interrogated. Consider, for instance, the kinds of questions raised in Edinburgh Magazine 2 (1977), Screen 26, no. 1 (January–February 1985), Philip Schlesinger’s “On National Identity,” Stephen Crofts’s “Reconceptualizing National Cinema/s,” Susan Hay-
ward’s French National Cinema, Andrew Higson’s Waving the Flag, Mette Hjort’s and Scott MacKenzie’s Cinema and Nation, Sarah Street’s British National Cinema, Tom O’Regan’s Australian National Cinema, and Sumita Chakrabarty’s National Identity in Indian Popular Cinema, 1947–1987. Nevertheless, I argue that the category of the “nation” is inadequate as a grounding framework for an analysis of colonial and global forces defining British and Indian cinema at the end of empire in that it risks reifying the very entity that was produced and deployed by competing factions.

5 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 26. Here he dismantles the a priori conceptual unity assumed for constructs like “science” and “literature.”

6 Perry Anderson, “Modernity and Revolution.”

7 The term expression evokes Fredric Jameson’s notion of expressive causality. He proposes a theory of historical mediation in which distinct aspects of social life register similar contextual processes without necessarily transmitting identical messages or being directly connected to each other. Jameson’s larger argument is that cultural texts rework the contradictions of real and possible social relations between individuals and dominant politico-economic relations, thus entailing a level of political fantasy. Both regulatory and aesthetic texts participate in the production of this political fantasy and are connected in that sense. Consult Jameson, The Political Unconscious, 17–102 and Colin MacCabe’s preface to Jameson’s The Geopolitical Aesthetic, x–xvi.

8 At the 1926 Imperial Conference, following an Inter-Imperial Committee Report by Arthur Balfour, dominions were defined as “autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations” (Eggar and Rajagopaul, The Laws of India and Burma, pt. 3, 1–2). India was recognized as “practically having an equal status with the Dominions” (Havighurst, Britain in Transition, 207).

9 Officially, Britain’s Cabinet of Dominion Affairs was not renamed the Cabinet of Commonwealth Relations until 1947, when India and Pakistan became independent nations, but the term commonwealth had appeared earlier, in 1901, when Australia was granted dominion and commonwealth status.

10 “I do not believe in a Little England,” said Joseph Chamberlain in 1903. Chamberlain, an influential British colonial secretary and liberal unionist, created enduring political controversy with his proposal that Britain should abandon free trade to pursue tariff reform and reciprocity within the empire. The imperial tariff was a political hot potato and led to Chamberlain’s resignation from Balfour’s unionist cabinet, which started a string of ministerial resignations protesting free trade orthodoxy. (Havighurst, Britain in Transition, 53; Judd, Empire, 187–200.)

11 Prior to World War I London had been the center for redistributing American films to other foreign markets for a number of reasons, including Britain’s edge in shipping, its numerous theaters, and an absence of British tariffs on film imports.
Between 1915 and 1916 London lost its edge as the British State began regulating imports by imposing duty on American films, demanding licenses on all films exhibited, taxing luxury items to raise money for the war, and limiting currency outflow. Hollywood had the profit margins to withstand a restricted British market, and American studios whittled away British resistance through such practices as block booking (in which a set of films were booked into theaters as part of a package) and blind booking (which required unseen or unmade films contracted for production to be given a booking). (Chanan, “The Emergence of an Industry”; Low, Film Making in 1930’s Britain; Richards, The Age of the Dream Palace; Thompson, Exporting Entertainment.)

12 For more on Film Europe consult Higson and Maltby, “Film Europe” and “Film America.”

13 Chowdhry, Colonial India and the Making of Empire Cinema.


16 In MacKenzie, Imperialism and Popular Culture, valuable essays demonstrate that Britain’s investment in the empire did not diminish between the two World Wars. I agree, but emphasize Britain’s necessary (material and symbolic) adjustments to reap the benefits of empire. In so doing, I deviate from the “dominant ideology” thesis of imperial power proposed by Constantine in the same anthology (192–231).

17 Typically, the terms “soft power” and “hard power” differentiate economic neo-imperialism from direct forms of political aggression and military control. For recent use in the context of U.S. power see Harvey, The New Imperialism.

18 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 166–67.

19 The following sources offer a sampling of perspectives on Indian historiography: Bahl, “Situating and Rethinking Subaltern Studies for Writing Working-Class History”; Chandra et al., India’s Struggle for Independence; Guha and Spivak, Selected Subaltern Studies; and Prakash, “Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism.” Bipan Chandra and Vinay Bahl criticize the Subaltern Studies Collective on shared grounds. Bahl argues that the scholars create a new foundational category of the self-determining “subaltern” and in so doing retrieve the rational humanist subject they attempt to deconstruct. (Gayatri Spivak’s introduction to the Selected Subaltern Studies anthology provides an excellent analysis of this question in the collective’s early work). Both Bahl and Chandra argue that subaltern historians focus primarily on the differences between elite and subaltern groups and in so doing reify difference, simultaneously depriving the subaltern subject of instrumentality by equating subalternity with failed or partially manifested resistance. Both also find problematic the subalternist’s use of colonial archives as primary sources, which risks turning the project into a discourse-analysis of elite historiography. My affinity with the work of the Subaltern Studies Collective should be
evident in this book, particularly in my analysis of the socioeconomic complexity and material significance of colonial discourses and archives, which are simplified by Bahl.

20 Manu Goswami addresses this lack with her historical theorization of the contradictory forces of nationhood and nativism in Producing India.

21 The colonized world has experienced an intersecting variety of imperial practices rather than one historical dynamic. Imperialism includes phases of informal colonization (prior to settlement or direct administration), formal colonization, and postcolonial underdevelopment. Africa, for instance, was subjected to slave trade long before it was subsumed under colonial administration by European settlements. For a discussion of imperial periodization consult Brewer, Marxist Theories of Imperialism; Bukharin, Imperialism and World Economy; Stoler and Cooper, Tensions of Empire; Lenin, Imperialism; and Nairn, The Break-up of Britain, particularly chapter 1, where he discusses the British state’s constitutionalism, which evolved over several centuries. The revolutionary era of 1640–1688 laid conditions for the end of absolutism and feudalism while simultaneously initiating modern expansionism, making chronologies of empire messy and its modernity contradictory.

22 Stoler and Cooper, Tensions of Empire, 31. Also Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, 83–111; Cohn, Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge.

23 Harlow’s and Carter’s Imperialism and Orientalism provides an extended text of Thomas Babington Macaulay’s “Minute on Indian Education,” delivered on 2 February 1835 (56–62). For other scholarly analyses of the same see Anderson, 91; and Viswanathan, Masks of Conquest.


25 For details on the rise in cinema attendance in Britain during the 1930s consult Richards, The Age of the Dream Palace, 11–33.


27 World Film News 2, no. 8 (November 1937): 5, emphasis added.

28 Memorandum attached to an FBI letter to the government titled “Cooperative Marketing of British Empire Films: F.B.I. Offer to the Government” (10 November 1926), ref. no. 300/J/11, British Film Institute.

29 Said, Culture and Imperialism, 107.

30 For details consult Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire.

31 Hobson, Imperialism, xvii.

32 For the submergence of imperial discourse under moral justifications see chapter 3. Another shift in discourse has emerged as American “neo-cons” openly re-claim the language of imperialism, presenting it as a prioritization of U.S. national security and a protection of American interests.

33 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities; Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism; Prakash, “Who’s Afraid of Postcoloniality?” The theorists proffer their analysis to different ends. Hannah Arendt argues that “in theory, there is an abyss between
nationalism and imperialism; in practice, it can and has been bridged by tribal nationalism and outright racism” (153). Gyan Prakash indicts Europe’s political contradictions: “Europe had to endure the slaughter of millions in two world wars, undergo the terrible experience of colonial oppression coming home to the European soil with the ferocious rage of the return of the repressed . . . before it could reflect on the implications of the inner incompatibility of empire and nation” (193). And Anderson argues that contradictions between empire and nation radicalized the colonized elite (91).

34 I’m thinking of John Stuart Mill’s “Considerations on Representative Government.”

35 Kent, British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944–49, 152.

36 As Kent shows, Ernst Bevin (foreign secretary to the postwar Labour government) and Bernard Montgomery (chief of the Imperial General Staff) worked toward a West European union to undertake colonial development. Such measures required long-term planning, while the costs of World War I demanded short-term colonial exploitation. In this sense, trade within the empire promised a stronger Britain while simultaneously serving as a reminder of Britain’s dependency on foreign resources.


ONE  FILM POLICY AND FILM AESTHETICS

See Dana Polan’s “Inexact Science” for an insightful analysis of Barthes’s semiology.

1 This will be clear from the British journals quoted in chapters 2 and 3, and from the Indian journals in chapter 7. As an example of the latter see filmindia 4, no. 1 (May 1938).

2 The Film in National Life, 1.

3 The Film in National Life, 132.

4 Theorists of liberalism emphasize different social institutions as central to the state’s political process. In Hegel’s thesis the twin institutions of family and civil society actualize the universal principle of Reason, forming “the firm foundations not only of the state but also of the citizen’s trust in it and sentiment towards it. [Family and civil society] are the pillars of public freedom since in them particular freedom is realized and rational” (“The Philosophy of Right,” 73). Hegel also develops this thesis in Reason in History. For Mazzini, writing about “The Duties of Man,” work, votes, and education are key institutions of the state. Within a Foucauldian framework, state rationality—no longer an expression of universal will but a function of the historical shift from a principle of sovereignty to governmentality—is dispersed over an entire population rather than located within a family unit. The state’s authority derives from the management of this populace because “the finality of the government resides in the things it manages and in the
pursuit of the perfection and intensification of the processes which it directs; and the instruments of government instead of being laws, now come to be a range of multiform tactics” (Foucault, “Governmentality,” 95).

5 This idea, developed as “biopower,” is discussed in Foucault, The History of Sexuality; Donzelot, The Policing of Families; and Hardt and Negri, Empire. Recent film scholarship that broadens the scope of analyzing the state in relation to culture include Lewis and Miller, Critical Cultural Policy Studies and Street, British Cinema in Documents. Street offers key sources to investigate the British State’s involvement with British cinema beyond censorship.

6 Cohn, Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge, 4. The imperial center used its colonies as a laboratory for modern economic, administrative, and educational systems, subsequently imported back into the empire’s “metropolis,” while internal and external colonies shaped themselves in engagement with the imperial nation-state. Particularly useful texts that present and extend this insight include Cohn, An Anthropologist among the Historians; Dirks, Castes of Mind; McClintock, Imperial Leather; Said, Culture and Imperialism; Stoler and Cooper, Tensions of Empire; Trumpener, Bardic Nationalism; Vishwanathan, Masks of Conquest.

7 Marx, “The British Rule in India,” 94.

8 Though this perspective has not radically revised the study of colonial cinema, recent studies in globalization fruitfully reassess cultural production at the heart of empire from the perspective of its economic and territorial peripheries. Scholars of American popular culture demonstrate links between North America’s regional, international, and domestic politics as the United States established a new paradigm of imperialism during and after the Cold War, and scholars of Asian and African diasporic and transnational culture destabilize the notion of a unitary hegemonic global center by recasting power relations in terms of alternative globalizations and multiple modernities. See, for example, Klein, Cold War Orientalism; Grewal and Kaplan, Scattered Hegemonies; Desai, Beyond Bollywood.

9 Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments, 5.

10 To use the exceptions to prove the norm: John M. MacKenzie’s anthology Imperialism and Popular Culture examines the “centripetal” effects of empire on British social history and popular psychology, but its containment within the field of empire studies has meant that it has not had an impact on fertile revisionist work on British national cinema in recent years, of which the essays in Justine Ashby’s and Andrew Higson’s British Cinema, Past and Present are a good example. This anthology begins with a thoughtful piece by Jeffrey Richards, a pioneering historian of 1930s cinema, who invites further reconceptualizations of the decade, an invitation that I accept in this book. Michael Walsh’s essay in the same volume analyses Irish and British films on Northern Ireland in the 1980s, referring to challenges to British national identity since the 1960s. I believe there is a need to raise similar questions about the instabilities of the earlier era of decolonization. Regarding India, in an important anthology edited by Ravi S. Vasudevan, Making Meaning in Indian
Cinema, Stephen P. Hughes’s essay focuses on colonial India. Another anthology, Rachel Dwyer’s and Christopher Pinney’s Pleasure and the Nation, includes four excellent essays on colonialism and culture. Someswar Bhowmick, Prem Chowdhry, and Gautam Kaul’s books attend to colonialism and censorship, and S. Theodore Baskarang gives a vivid image of the Tamil film industry during the colonial era in The Eye of the Serpent and The Message Bearers, though the pre-independence period is only briefly discussed in the former text. Despite these important contributions, as well as pieces on the aesthetics of silent Indian cinema published in the Journal of Arts and Ideas, the pre-independence period of Indian cinema remains less represented in Indian film scholarship, partly because of archival difficulties and partly because the conceptual framework of national cinema forces scholarly efforts to begin with the formal arrival of nationhood.

11 Censorship in colonized India was not centralized under one board but housed in the provinces of Bombay, Madras and Calcutta, which were the chief ports of film import. The Commissioner of Police for the province was the ex officio chairman of each board, which meant that the Chairmen of Censor Boards were typically British. A combination of executives and non-official members made the board membership somewhat bi-partisan (including British and Indian members). Prior to 1922, a film banned in one province could run in another, but subsequent to a case over D. W. Griffith’s Orphans of the Storm (banned in Bengal but screening in Punjab), it was decided that if one province banned a film, it had to send a copy of its order to other provinces. Certificates issued for a film by any one board were valid throughout the country though provinces could re-examine films, and banning films was relatively easy because certified films could be “uncertified” by the Central government at any point. For further discussion of film and press censorship, consult: Baskaran The Message Bearers; Barrier, Banned; Chowdhry, Colonial India and the Making of Empire Cinema; Kaul, Cinema and the Indian Freedom Struggle.

12 Thus British India was distinct from self-governing dominions (Australia, Canada, Newfoundland, New Zealand, South Africa, the Irish Free State), Crown colonies (Ashanti, Bahama Islands, Barbados, Bermuda, Ceylon, Cyprus, Falkland Islands, and others), protectorates (Basutoland, Bechuanaland, North Borneo, the Native States of India), and mandates from the League of Nations (Palestine, Iraq, Tanganyika, New Guinea, and others) (Eggar and Rajagopaul, The Laws of India and Burma, 1–14).

13 I use this theoretically overdetermined term, autonomy, with caution. In autonomist theories developed in the context of Italy in the late 1970s Antonio Negri and Mario Tronti inverted orthodox Marxism’s emphasis on capital as the productive force that transforms the worker into “a particular mode of existence of capital,” instead putting labor’s struggle against capital at the center of their analytic. By emphasizing labor’s insubordination of capital, the autonomists could redefine the history of class struggle as a process through which capital incessantly restructures itself to adapt to its antagonist: labor. Despite Hardt and Ne-
gri’s objections to postcolonial theory, the field similarly reverses understandings of incipient global economic and political power by putting the colonized front and center in order to reevaluate the terms under which larger parts of the world were proletarianized and, in irregular ways, inducted into a world market. I use the term autonomy self-consciously, to evoke theories invested in starting their examination of power from the perspective of productive agents rather than regulating structures. See Lumley, States of Emergency; Negri, Marx beyond Marx; Lotringer and Marazzi, “Italy”; Hardt and Negri, Empire; Guha, “On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India” in Selected Subaltern Studies.

14 There were exceptions, as in 1940, when the state created a film advisory board to assist in the production of Indian documentaries in support of the World War II effort. But the industry also proved to be a safe haven from the state, when the same war led to an infusion of undeclared taxes or “black money” into the industry. Starting as an act of civil disobedience against the imperialist government’s war, India’s independence didn’t alter the influx of disorganized and illegal capital into the film industry.

15 Shah, Proceedings, 157. The IMPC brought together representatives of “Indian producers, distributors, exhibitors, artistes, technicians, musicians, film journalists, authors, and film directors and authors” to “protect and advance the interests of the Indian Motion Picture Industry and allied industries, trades, arts and sciences” (2).


17 Ibid.

18 Koch, Franz Osten’s Indian Silent Films, 16.


20 In “From Monopoly to Commodity” Brian Shoesmith challenges the orthodoxy of the 1930s as a studio era, arguing instead that the decade is better explained “in terms of a struggle between competing forms of capitalism in a volatile and changing market place” (68).

21 For a discussion of the competing interests in the colonial film market in relation to which Indian cinema stabilized itself see Jaikumar, “Hollywood and the Multiple Constituencies of Colonial India.”

22 Barnouw and Krishnaswamy, Indian Film, 69.

23 So the cultural autonomy described here may be understood more as a “semi-autonomy (in the Althusserian sense),” which is to say that the independence and self-sufficient internal coherence of the object or field in question” should
be understood “dialectically to be relative to some greater totality (in relation to which alone it makes sense to assert that it is autonomous in the first place)” (Jameson, *Signatures of the Visible*, 201).


25 See Ashish Rajadhyaksha’s essay “The ‘Bollywoodization’ of the Indian Cinema” for an astute analysis of the differences between the structure and aesthetics of Indian cinema in relation to the state before and after “Bollywood” emerged as a globalized enterprise in the 1990s in response to the state’s interest in formalizing the industry and its encouragement of investment capital.

26 NAI, *Home (Political)*, 80/XXI/1928, “Subject: Supply to the Cinema Committee of Papers Relating to the Measures Taken in Foreign Countries to Encourage the Production and Exhibition of Their Own Films: Report of the Royal Commission on the Moving Picture Industry in Australia.”


28 In addition to references above, consult Baskaran’s *The Eye of the Serpent* and Kaul’s *Cinema and the Indian Freedom Struggle* for titles of nationalist Indian films from the 1920s to the 1940s. Overtly nationalist films were produced during the “Congress interregnum,” a period in which the Indian National Congress held political office at the provincial and national levels for twenty-eight months, starting in 1935.

29 Lisa Odham Stokes and Michael Hoover make a similar argument in *City on Fire*, their study of Hong Kong cinema. They note that British state censorship produced a “dialectical process whereby the dictates of state prohibitive power are circumvented” by films which anticipate censorship (259).

30 See Green, *Dreams of Adventure, Deeds of Empire* for an analysis of this literature.

31 “Following the E.M.B.’s Lead,” *The Bioscope Service Supplement* (11 April 1927): British Film Institute, iii.

32 Landy, *British Genres*; Richards, “Patriotism with Profit.”

33 I use the term revulsion in Martin Green’s sense.

34 In “Patriotism with Profit” Richards argues that “none of the [empire] films sought to tackle the contemporary issues” (252). Despite our disagreement on this point, I remain influenced by Richards’s larger body of work, which comprises the most extensive analysis of British imperial film and music to date. See Visions

35 As Jameson argues, both artistic and social forms are symptomatic of their dominant relations of production, where the “dominant” is itself a variegated field of pre-existing and emerging social and economic relations. At times of radical historical change, when the past and the present are “visibly antagonistic,” these contradictions move to “the very center” of social life and aesthetic form. I connect policy and different kinds of cinemas (commercial, trade, and documentary made with public and private funding) through an “ideology of form” that can be read in the “contradiction of the specific messages emitted by the varied sign systems which coexist in a given artistic process as well as in its general social formation” (Jameson, The Political Unconscious, 98–99, 95). See also Raymond Williams’s Marxism and Culture for his discussion of “Dominant, Residual, and Emergent” cultures (121–27).

36 See “Following the E.M.B.’s Lead,” The Bioscope Service Supplement (11 April 1927): iii, British Film Institute, which also mentioned the Quota Act.

37 Stollery, Alternative Empires, 190.

38 Alexander Korda entered a profitable tie-up with United Artists (UA) following his film The Private Life of Henry VIII (1933). Korda’s London Films was to produce between six and eight features for UA for approximately £100,000 a year, which allowed his films to find good distribution in the United States. The following accounts give information on Korda’s inroads into Hollywood, his fluctuating career, and his influence on the economics of British film making: Kulik, Alexander Korda; Street, “Alexander Korda, Prudential Assurance and British Film Finance in the 1930s” and Transatlantic Crossings.

39 The Times, 20 March 1934, p. 11, emphasis added.

40 PRO, CO 323/974/1, “Colonial Office Conference 1927.”

41 Richards, “Boys Own Empire,” 154.

42 My analysis of British empire cinema could be productively related to Richard Dyer’s White and Robyn Wiegman’s American Anatomies. Tracking similar maneuvers in other contexts, Dyer examines the redefinition of racial hierarchies for the manufacture of apparent egalitarianism in the post–World War I era, and Wiegman does so for the post–Civil Rights period in America.

43 Said, Culture and Imperialism, 69.


45 As my later chapters should make clear, Elephant Boy falls between a realist text and a romance text in narrating the adventures of an orphaned Indian boy who is nevertheless firmly subordinated to his British commissioner. Similarly, The Great Barrier is something of a romance-modernist text, depicting an antisocial Englishman who goes to Canada to gamble and womanize, only to be transformed in the frontier land by love and a patriotic duty to protect the Canadian Pacific Railways for British investors.
Imperial modernism was rare in the cinema of the 1930s, compared to literary fiction of the same period. Early silent British shorts typically combined realist and romance modes, as in *With the Indian Troops at the Front*, *With the Kut Relief Force in Mesopotamia*, *With Our Territories at the Front* (all circa 1914–1918), and in *The Battle of Jutland* (1921), *Armageddon* (1923), *Zeebrugge* (1924), and *Ypres* (1925), several of which incorporated actuality footage with adventure plots. Silent expedition films such as *Pearls to Savage* (1924), *The Vast Sudan* (1924), *Kilimanjaro* (1924), and *To Lhasa in Disguise* (1924) were similar. (My thesis here is based on reading about these films rather than viewing them.) Following the success of British empire films in the United States, empire-themed productions proliferated in Hollywood. These were primarily in the adventure/romance mode, as in the case of *Trader Horn* (Van Dyke, 1931), *Lives of a Bengal Lancer* (Hathaway, 1935), *Stanley and Livingstone* (Brower and King, 1939), *Gunga Din* (Stevens, 1939), *The Charge of the Light Brigade* (Curtiz, 1936), *Clive of India* (Boleslawski, 1935), and *Lloyds of London* (King, 1936). Romance was and remains the most popular form of imperial cinema. It has made its appearance in technicolor melodramas, campy adventures, and science-fiction films like *Cobra Woman* (Siodmack, 1944), *She* (Day, 1965), the *Indiana Jones* series (Spielberg, 1981, 1984, 1989), and the *Star Wars* series (Lucas, 1977, 1999, 2002; Marquand, 1983).

54 Debates among postcolonial scholars and political economists have been bogged down by the perception that the former group evacuates context, while the latter ignores culture. R. Radhakrishnan’s postcolonial reading criticizes Bhabha for creating occasions where his “metropolitan theory rereads a postcolonial dilemma as a poststructuralist aporia” (“Postmodernism and the Rest of the World,” 58). Arif Dirlik rejects postcolonialism, claiming that “the postcolonial rush to culture is an escape not only from the structures of political economy but more importantly from revolutionary radicalisms of the past” (“Is There History after Eurocentrism,” 39). I believe that creating solidarity between these theoretical positions in their battle over interpretation involves understanding the significance of history and the complexity of culture, which is inseparable from political economy especially since culture’s commercialization under modernity. For concise statements on both sides of the debate consult Parry, “Problems in Current Theories of Colonial Discourse”; essays in Afzal-Khan and Seshadri-Crooks, The Pre-occupation of Postcolonial Studies (particularly the introductions); and Shohat, “Notes on the ‘Post-Colonial.’”

55 Jameson, Signatures of the Visible, 177. Jameson observes that Hollywood’s classical “realism” is a “genre system” that is “parceled out among the specific genres [romantic comedies, gangster films, and so on], to whose distinct registers are then assigned its various dimensions and specialized segments” (176).

56 The term “genre memory” is from Mikhail Bakhtin. It is elaborated in the context of cinema and culture by Morson and Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin; and Burgoyne, Film Nation.


58 The Great Barrier, which takes place in Canada, is an exception.

59 The Film in Colonial Development, 21.

60 A case in point: the Hollywood films The African Queen (Huston, 1951), Snows of Kilimanjaro (King, 1952) and Mogambo (Ford, 1953) were censored at the request of India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, for their demeaning portrayal of Africans. With newfound empathy for Africa as the object of representation, a British newspaper noted, “Why... do American producers patronize Africa so much?... They do not even try to understand the ideas and feelings of foreigners, especially those belonging to the East”; further, “not only have the Asians had to protest against the undue share of unscrupulousness, brutality and cunningness which is attributed to them in US films, even the British have not been able to appreciate their portraits as dull, conventional and unsocial people” (BFI, Subject Cuttings: India Cuttings up to 1959. The paper’s name and page numbers are not recorded; it is dated 1 June 1956.)

61 Songs were an important medium of nationalist messages. Examples include Bandhan’s “Chal chal re naujavan” (Keep Moving Ahead, Young Man), Brandy ki Botal’s
“Jhanda ooncha rahe hamara” (May Our Flag Fly High), and Janmabhoomi’s “Hai desh hamara hara-bhara, phir bhi har prani mara-mara” (Our Lands Are Lush and Green, and Yet Are People Listless). Neetcha Nagar’s “Utho ki hamein vakt ki gharghish ne pukara” (Arise, for our destiny beckons) ends with the refrain “Azaad hain, azaad hain, azaad rahenge” (We are free, we are free, and free we shall remain). Thyagabhoomi contains songs about the Charkha (the spinning wheel, representing Gandhi’s message of self-sufficiency, later a symbol on the Indian flag) and the land, like “Jaya Bharata Punya Bhoomi” (Hail to India’s Sacred Land). For more examples consult Kaul, Cinema and the Indian Freedom Struggle, 91–109; and Baskaran, The Message Bearers, especially “Nationalist Songs Books Proscribed During the Civil Rights Movement” (62). Film sets also incorporated nationalist symbols directly or indirectly. Records reveal, for example, that Ranjit Film Company’s College Girl (1935) was uncertified for showing an anti-Government poster in a scene (MSA, Home Department [Political] 1935, file no. 248, “Cinematograph Film ‘College Girl’”). Film dialogues censored for nationalist content are too numerous to mention, but an example is the silent film Patriot (1930), also by Ranjit Film Company, which was uncertified for several intertitles like the following.

**PETITIONERS:** But Sire, is it a crime to make a demand for our Rights?

**REGENT:** Rights? What Rights? Are you fit to acquire Rights? What are your sufferings? Is service of the King a suffering?

A later exchange:

**REGENT:** You are young and inexperienced. I will give you riches and honour.

**REPLY** [Unknown warrior, who is in fact the rebelling prince in disguise]: I would prefer death in the cause of freedom for my country.

**REGENT:** If you join my service, you will be rewarded.

**REPLY:** I would rather starve and would live in my poor cave and fight for my poor country. (MSA, Home Department [Political], 1930, file #301, “Cinematograph Film ‘Patriot’.”)

63 Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments, 116–57; Gupta, Sexuality, Obscenity, Community; Hasan, Forging Identities, particularly the essays by Metcalf and Devji; Mani, Contentious Traditions; Jayawardena, Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World.
64 Gupta, Sexuality, Obscenity, Community, 24.
65 Ibid., 23.
66 Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments, 130.
67 Scholars of Indian cinema tend to emphasize the underlying conservative neotraditionalism of women’s apparent emancipation by nationalism. See Ashish Raja-dhyaksha’s reading of the Diler Jigar character Saranga in “India’s Silent Cinema,” and Neepa Majumdar’s analysis of Amar Jyoti’s Queen Saudamini in “Female Star-
dom and Cinema in India, 1930 to 1950” (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 2002). See chapter 7 for my analysis of both films and for the debt my reading owes to Miriam Hansen’s notion of the ambivalence of female figures (“Fallen Women, Rising Stars, New Horizons”).

68 Social histories offer abundant evidence of this. In Forging Identities, for example, Zoya Hasan notes that the Indian Constitution’s allowance for Muslim personal law is “resented by the majority as socially and culturally inferior because it allows multiple marriages and easy divorce” (xx). This “personal law is of no help to [Muslim] women; in fact, it undercuts and undermines their rights. Nonetheless it is seen as discriminatory by many people because it signifies the ‘privileged’ treatment of Muslims by the Indian State” (ibid.). Thus, secularism is defined by promoting an exceptionalism resented by the majority and by protecting an oppressive regulation of women among the minority.

69 See Premchand’s Yesterdays Melodies, Todays Memories for details on the composers and singers.

70 Kesavan, “Urdu, Awadh and the Tawaif,” 255.

71 Ibid., 249. Regarding Urdu alone, Kesavan argues persuasively that its linguistic “ability to find sonorous words for inflated emotions suited the purpose of stylized melodrama” better than a Sanskritized Hindi (255). “Urdu didn’t simply give utterance to the narrative characteristics of Hindi cinema, it actually helped create them” (249).

72 Mufti, “A Greater Story-writer than God,” 32. For a definition of the “social” as an early template of Indian cinema’s dominant melodramatic narrative form see Rajadhyaksha and Willemen, Encyclopaedia of Indian Cinema, 219.

73 Appiah, In My Father’s House.

74 Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason, 332.

75 Jameson, The Political Unconscious, 18.

76 Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe.

two  ACTS OF TRANSITION


2 PRO, CO 323/974/1, “1926 Imperial Conference Proceedings.”

3 For historical debates on the impact of colonial markets on British economy consult Darwin, The End of the British Empire; Davis and Huttenback, Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire.

4 BFI, Subject Cuttings: British Films Abroad, “Co-operative Marketing Of British Em-
pire films: FBI Offer to Government,” 10 November 1926, ref. no. 300//11, 1. (This cutting and The Times article referred to below were in the stated FBI file in 1995 but not on my subsequent research visits. I own copies of both documents.)

5 BFI, Subject Cuttings: British Films Abroad, article in The Times, 7 Oct 1926, n.p.


7 These organizations are discussed further in chapter 3. Some examples include British Instructional Films Proprietors, founded in 1919 to produce and distribute films on educational, scientific, and nature subjects of national and imperial interest, including short films on naval battles and dramatic films; British Dominions Film, proposed in 1927 to launch a 50-percent British film program for Britain, New Zealand, Australia, India, Egypt, Canada, and the smaller colonies; and British United Film Producers, proposed in 1930 to distribute British films in the empire, with the recommendation of the Film Group of the FBI. For details see PRO, CO 323/974/1.

8 All quotes relating to the BFI can be found in BFI, Subject Cuttings: B.E.F.I., including the clipping “Fight against American Stranglehold,” The Times, 9 December 1928, n.p.

9 Despite claims (by Parry, Dirlik and others) that analyzing colonial discourse leads to a neglect of its enabling political and economic institutions, the institutional and discursive aspects of colonial film policy are inseparable, as this chapter shows.

10 The proportion of British films to be exhibited was calculated by multiplying “the total number of feet of each registered British film . . . by the number of times the film was exhibited within the period” and comparing this figure with “the total number of feet of each registered film” also multiplied by the times each of those films was exhibited (“Provisions as to Exhibitors Quota,” provisions 19(1)(a) and (b) of the Quota Act, printed in “The Bill: Full Text of the Cinematograph Films Act, 1927,” The Bioscope (17 March 1927): 49). British Film Institute.

11 PRO, CO 323/994/4 provides the full text of the act. See clause 26.3 for the definition of a British film.

12 The Association of British Film Directors had suggested a six-point definition of a British picture at a meeting held on 31 January 1927. Mr. Sidney Rogerson of the FBI submitted this definition to the BOT for consideration at the 1926 Imperial Conference. For versions of the quota bill consult The Bioscope (17 March 1927): 50 and PRO, CO 323/974/1.

13 “Following the E.M.B’s Lead,” The Bioscope Service Supplement (11 August 1927): iii, British Film Institute.

14 PRO, CO 323/974/1.
15 Ibid.

16 The text of this two-page memorandum titled “To Revive Production: F.B.I’s Summary of the Rival Plans” is reprinted in Kinematograph Weekly (6 August 1925): 30–31. For more on the FBI see Dickinson and Street, Cinema and State.

17 Germany’s quota ratio was approximately 1:1, or one German film per import.


20 BFI, Subject Cuttings: British Films Abroad, clipping from The Times, 7 October 1926, n.p.

21 See discussion in Hartog, “State Protection of a Beleaguered Industry.”

22 The Film in National Life, 129.

23 Constantine, “‘Bringing the Empire Alive,’” 200.

24 Tallents, The Projection of England, 18, emphasis added. Tallents prefaced the publication with a note that he was writing in his personal rather than his official capacity. Nevertheless, his praise for Soviet films such as “Eisenstein’s ‘The Cruiser Potemkin,’ Pudovkin’s ‘Storm over Asia,’ Turin’s ‘Turk-Sib’ and Dovjenko’s [sic] ‘Earth’” shows why he was able to realize John Grierson’s vision for EMB’s film unit: to make films that would enlighten British viewers about the heroism of colonial and domestic labor through a combination of propaganda and artistry (31).


26 Pronay and Spring, Propaganda, Politics and Film 1918–45, 53. For an analysis of the Empire and the BBC also consult MacKenzie, “In Touch with the Infinite.”


28 PRO, CO 323/974/1.

29 PRO, BT 64/1, “Cinematograph Films Bill.”

30 Consult Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity; Jameson and Miyoshi, eds. The Cultures of Globalization; Sassen, Globalization and Its Discontents; Wilson and Dissanayake, Global/Local.

31 PRO, CO 323/974/1, “Colonial Office Conference Proceedings of 1927,” 2, 5. In a private letter, members of the BT requested Cunliffe-Lister to provide “an authoritative explanation” at the conference “of the policy we are pursuing at home,” as it “would be most helpful in getting Colonial Governments to follow our lead in spite of local difficulties.” Handwritten letter in file PRO CO 323/974/1, stamped 30 March, n.p.

32 The Canadian market was too precious to the United States for them to permit Britain to secure any percentage of it through regulations. For details consult Pendakur, Canadian Dreams and American Control, 78–89, 134.
Historians of the Australian film industry argue that the New South Wales quota for local films was marginal, and the passage of an empire quota after the Australian Royal Commission's 1927–28 report primarily supported the entry of British films into Australia (Baxter, *The Australian Cinema*, 40–53).

Along with the *icc Report*, four volumes of “evidence” are available at the NFAI.

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The individual films are difficult to date accurately, given that their year of production in India must be accessed through incomplete government gazettes. They are mentioned, respectively, in *Film Report* (18 January 1930): 568; (15 February 1930): 571; (26 April 1930): 581; and (7 June 1930): 587. British Film Institute.

A detailed discussion of the reasons for Hollywood’s apparent universality are beyond the scope of this book, but consider the arguments in Miller et al., *Global Hollywood*, and Stephen Crofts’s statement that “Hollywood is hardly ever spoken of as a national cinema, perhaps indicating its transnational reach” (“Reconceptualizing National Cinema/s,” 50).

As Jeffrey Richards notes, Balcon was production chief of Gaumont-British at the time (“Patriotism with Profit,” 249).

Refer to Barr, *Ealing Studios*.


“There is . . . a risk that if we report prematurely to a public concerned with graver matters, we may lose an opportunity. On the other hand, if action is not soon taken by responsible authority, there is a very real danger lest the development of the film as an instrument of education and culture get into
the wrong hands, and the new medium be turned to our disadvantage” (The Film in National Life, 3).

52 “To Revive Production,” 30.

53 Dickinson and Street describe the reciprocity talks prepared in Britain on April 1926 to persuade the Americans to distribute more British films (Cinema and State, 24–25).

54 Lapworth, “Production and the Exhibitor,” 32.

55 In the 1930s the Latin American market was a major importer of American films, but this changed over the next decade. See Street, “The Hays Office and the Defence of the British Market in the 1930s,” and Jarvie, “International Film Trade.”

56 Lapworth, “Rival Remedies,” 27.

57 Milton, Concerning Legislation to Encourage Empire Films, 6.

58 Ibid., 9.

59 Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes, 94.


61 Ibid.

62 United Artists was the only major American company that did not create temporary production houses in Britain merely to fulfill a quota as the others had done. Instead, they chose to enter into partnerships with reputable British production houses and gave British films first billing. From April 1933 to the end of 1935, UA distributed films by independent British producers, including Korda’s Denham films and Wilcox’s British and Dominion films in the British and American market (Richards, The Age of the Dream Palace, 39; Low, Film Making in 1930s Britain, 146). Sarah Street suggests that UA’s amenability to entering into partnerships with high-quality British filmmakers was due in part to the lackluster box-office performance of films by D. W. Griffith, Howard Hughes, and the “dwindling output” of Mary Pickford, Charlie Chaplin, and Douglas Fairbanks in the Depression years (“Alexander Korda, Prudential Assurance and British Film Finance in the 1930s,” 162).


64 Low, Filmmaking in 1930s Britain, 50. The exhibition sector had anticipated that substandard British films might be produced to meet the quota and had insisted on a “quality clause” in 1927, which was ultimately neglected (Dickinson and Street, Cinema and State, 22).

65 Street, British National Cinema, 9.

66 Hartog, “State Protection of a Beleaguered Industry,” 65–66. The government and the FBI hoped that protective legislation would push the industry toward vertical integration, following the model of Hollywood’s major studios or Germany’s Universum Film Aktiengesellschaft (UFA).

67 Richards, Dream Palace, 36.
According to Rachael Low, after 1938 dominion films were made ineligible for the film quota (Filmaking in 1930s Britain, 50). My research indicates that dominion films were excluded from the renter’s quota.

Nevertheless, the BT guaranteed that “the situation [of excluding dominion and Indian films] would of course be altered if effective reciprocity were offered on a Dominion-wide basis” (PRO, BT 64/91, letter from the office of the secretary of state to Hon. Vincent Massey, Canadian high commissioner [16 February 1938], n.p.).

In the House of Commons “representations were made from all quarters against the unchanged continuance of the quota provisions of the 1927 Act” because “producers in Canada, India and Australia had been able to sell their films in this country for the purpose of renters quota, thus ousting a considerable number of United Kingdom films which would otherwise have been made” (PRO, BT 64/91).

The traditional concept of just war [bellum justum] involves the banalization of war and the celebration of it as an ethical instrument, both of which were ideas
that modern political thought and the international community of nation-states had resolutely refused” (Hardt and Negri, Empire, 12).

5 The British economist John A. Hobson’s cost-benefit analysis of imperialism in 1902 repudiated what he called “the moral and sentimental factors” of British jingoism to present a discussion of the “economics taproots” of empire. The text presents a convenient marker of change in Britain’s discourse on imperialism, dividing those who supported empire (like Churchill) from those who (like Hobson) were concerned with the diminishing returns of imperial expansion. Hobson is also significant because he provided a point of departure for Lenin’s later study of imperialism as the decay of capitalism. Hobson argued against Ricardian economics, which proposed that under British capitalism, there was a Malthussian growth in population, necessitating an import of goods and an export of people to other territories in order to prevent a domestic scarcity of resource and space. Proponents for the colonization of Australia and New Zealand shared this belief. (See De Schweinitz Jr., The Rise and Fall of British India; Hobson, Imperialism; Lenin, Imperialism.)

6 To extend the argument: if the political defense of economic domination was not ethically sustainable in the democratic West after World War II, neither was it entirely necessary after the overdetermined induction of postcolonial nations into capitalism by the late twentieth century. The coercive state apparatus of colonialism was replaced by a “civil society” in the postcolonies, where class-based principles of consumption, pleasure, leisure, and profit corroborated to maintain global hierarchies. Global finance capitalism became the mode of neo-imperial power structures.

7 Myths have always accompanied the practice of political imperialism, obstructing easy identifications of imperialism’s financial sine qua non. In Dreams of Adventure, Deeds of Empire, the literary theorist Martin Green observes that since the sixteenth century, Western adventure narratives provided “energizing myths” for imperial politics (7).

8 Arora, “‘Imperilling the Prestige of the White Woman.’”

9 Chowdhry, Colonial India.


11 In many ways, the British image of African film audiences satisfied both fantasies: of naïve, insatiable hyperconsumers (see chapter 4). The mention of colonial and eastern markets lingers like an inconvenience in FBI memoranda and popular journals through the 1920s to the 1940s. In 1937 the BBC director and television producer Dallas Bower stated, “The British film industry has paid comparatively little attention to the marketing and distribution of its production in the East. Obviously, the reason cannot be lack of awareness of the huge potential revenue awaiting carefully handled exploitation; most producers are fully alive to the possibility of making the vast millions of the East cinema conscious” (“British Films in the Orient,” 909). Here, Bower imagines the East as simultaneously teeming
with people yet empty of the technological or cultural advances required for a prosperous film industry, making invisible indigenous traditions of filmmaking.


14 For the idea of a “coauthorship” of colonial-nationalist ideology see the discussion of the native intellectual in Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World, and the idea’s development by Lydia Liu (“The Female Body and Nationalist Discourse,” 39). I am not suggesting an absence of opposition between imperialism and colonial nationalism, merely that assuming self-contained coherence in imperial and anticolonial positions manufactures a contest prior to analyzing it. Here I join other scholars who caution against producing a hagiography of the Indian nation-state and re-reading 1947 as a triumphant culmination of colonial nationalism. See Gyanendra Pandey’s critique of the retrospective “biography of the [Indian] nation-state” frequently imposed on the colonial context, and Ashish Rajadhyaksha’s extension of this critique to historical work in cinema studies (Pandey, “In Defence of the Fragment”; Rajadhyaskha, “Indian Cinema”).

15 *icc* Report, xii, 10.

16 On 22 January 1925 the Hon. Sir Ebrahim Haroon Jaffer (subsequently a member of the *icc*) expressed dissatisfaction in the Council of State about the lack of centralization of censor boards. He also called attention to the fact that subordinate police inspectors (instead of police commissioners) conducted inspections of films in Bombay and Calcutta. On 15 September 1925 Jaffe asked for the number of films produced in India and the amount of capital invested in the industry, to which the government had no answer. This question had also been asked 30 August 1927 by Khan Bahadur Sarfaraz Hussain Khan in the Indian Legislative Assembly, to which the home member Hon. J. Crerar answered that the government was considering an examination into the industry’s condition (*icc* Report, 8–9).

17 *NAI*, Home (Political), 48/VIII/1927, and *icc* Report, 10. Someswar Bhowmik also recounts some of these debates in *Indian Cinema, Colonial Contours* (71–74).

18 *icc* Report, 10–11.

19 After the Government of India Act of 1919, 33 of a total of fifty members in the Council of State were elected, while the remaining twenty-seven members were nominated by the Governor General of India. The Legislative Assembly had 104 elected members, with the Governor General nominating 41 members. Thus, some scope was given to Indian representation in the legislature via elections, though at the time Indians elected to Parliament could not stand on behalf of a political party, and the Secretary of State for India (representing the British parliament and Crown) had final power to legislate for India or repeal legislation. (Eggar and Rajagopaul, *The Laws of India and Burma*, 63–75; Chandra et al., *India’s Struggle for Independence*, 241.) Regarding the Simon Commission, Bipan Chandra
notes that 1927 was the year that “the Conservative Government of Britain, faced with the prospect of electoral defeat at the hands of the Labour Party, suddenly decided that it could not leave an issue which concerned the future of the British Empire in the irresponsible hands of an inexperienced Labour Government” and appointed the all-white Indian Statutory Commission later known as the Simon Commission (262; also 260–63).

20 ICC Report, 12.
21 Ibid.
22 B. D. Garga, So Many Cinemas, 68.
23 ICC Evidence 1, 80.
24 Ibid., 10.
25 For these links consult ICC Report (3) and the reprint of a speech by B. V. Jadhav (M.L.A. [Member of Legislative Assembly]) at the Indian Legislative Assembly (“Indian Film Industry,” 5).
26 Occasionally to amusing effect: when Crawford asked Rustom C. N. Barucha, a Bombay film distributor, “Have you been to the west?” Barucha answered, “Not yet, Sir. I narrowly escaped going there.” Crawford bristled with, “You can only give an opinion.” Chairman Rangachariar added, “You have strong views. Quite right. Nothing like expressing them.” (ICC Evidence 1, 141.)
27 ICC Evidence 1, 10–11, 79, 98, 141. The state maintained that film was a luxury item that would acquire a market if the films were salable. In his interview with the ICC D. Healy, who was both the British commissioner of police and president of the Bombay Board of Film Censors, pointed out elliptically that intervening on behalf of empire films would require a reversal of this position, or a selective application of it. If Indian films were not worthy of state support, he argued, empire films shared the same nonessential commodity status. If Indian films were to earn audiences on their own merit, it followed that American films attracted audiences because they intrinsically merited them. Otherwise the state’s position was riddled with logical inconsistencies. (ICC Evidence 1, 98.)
29 The total receipts from Empire, Pathé, and Wellington Cinemas, which screened Western films, were Rs. 2,42,061, while the receipts from the Imperial, Majestic, and Krishna, which screened Indian films, amounted to Rs. 2,83,580 (ICC Evidence 1, 23, 45; ICC Evidence 3, 304). Both Britain and India were on the predecimal system, and in general the following conversion rate applied for the 1930s. 1 rupee = 1 shilling 6 pence, where 1 pound = 20 shillings and 1 shilling = 12 pennies.
30 I’m drawing on Foucault and Habermas here. Consult Barry, Osborne, and Rose, Foucault and Political Reason, 8; Habermas, “The Public Sphere,” 49–55.
31 A fourth volume collates written statements from witnesses not examined orally. My particular argument about Indian responses to British Empire film schemes far from exhausts the wealth of the ICC interviews, particularly as I limit myself to volume 1 for the sake of concision. Another caveat to the following discussion is
that ICC witnesses spoke of broad trends within the industry rather than of particular films, and my analysis reflects this tendency. For a more textured sense of specific Indian films and film personalities, I direct the reader to the concluding section of this chapter and to chapter 7.

32 ICC Evidence 1, vi–vii.
34 Bhownik, Indian Cinema, Colonial Contours, 84.
35 Ibid., 73.
36 Barnouw and Krishnaswamy, Indian Film, 44; particularly the chapter “Empire” (39–58). The authors state, “Great Britain’s careful approach to this problem and the delicate wording of the resolution [of the Imperial Conference] reflected the nature of the relationship that existed in 1927 between Great Britain and British India” (43). Beyond this, the authors do not examine the imperial encounter in detail.

37 ICC Evidence 1, 141.
38 Ibid., 130, emphasis added.
39 Ibid., 383.
40 Ibid., 140.
41 Ibid., 1, 24.
42 These titles were mentioned in various interviews (see, for example, ibid., 1, 24, 327, 339). Madan Theaters touted Savitri as their co-production in Rome, using Italian actors in Indian dresses, but according to Ashish Rajadhyaksha and Paul Willemen, the film was an Italian import originally made by Giorgio Mannini for Cines in Rome (Encyclopaedia of Indian Cinema, 139).

43 Ibid., 1, 1.
44 Ibid., 121. Engineer was of the opinion that Hindus preferred Indian films and “Parsis, Mohammadans and Europeans and Anglo-Indians” saw “foreign pictures” (123). Most data points to the fact that both Hindus and Muslims liked Indian films, though the upper classes of both communities favored American films.
45 Ibid., 16.
46 Ibid., 1–10.
47 Ibid., 214–16. For more on Yajnik see Rajadhyaksha and Willeman, Encyclopaedia of Indian Cinema, 239–40. Others such as Mohan Dayaram Bhavnani, director, Imperial Studio, and Ardeshir Irani demanded the abolition of duties on raw materials needed for film production, including heavy machinery and transport (165). Several witnesses were also in favor of the government offering incentives to Indian filmmakers, such as removing taxes on raw film stock or offering concessions for the use of equipment, railways, troops, horses, and public resources utilized by Indian filmmakers in their productions. (More about the cost of Indian films can be found in ICC Evidence 1, 28, 334.)
48 Prior to the adoption of a decimal-based monetary system where 100 paise were
equivalent to 1 rupee, a rupee was made up of 16 Indian annas. Each anna was further divisible into 4 pice. The consensus was that an 8,000-foot film cost approximately Rs. 2,000 to import, including Rs. 300 in customs tax. A film of similar length in India cost about Rs. 20,000 to produce. The cost of renting these films varied proportionately for the exhibitor. (ICC Evidence 1, 165.)

49 Ibid., 348.
50 Ibid., 179.
51 ICC Evidence 3, 1011.
52 ICC Evidence 1, 181.
53 Ibid., 338.
54 Ibid., 140.
55 Ibid., 364.
56 Ibid., 144.
57 Wadia, “I Remember, I Remember,” 93.
58 ICC Evidence 1, 439-48.
59 Ibid., 382.
60 Ibid., 332, 339.
61 Ibid., 539.
62 Ibid., 503-511.
63 Ibid., 17.
64 ICC Report, 104. See “The Resolution of the Imperial Conference Concerning the Exhibition within the Empire of Empire Films,” 99–104.
66 ICC Evidence 1, 98. On the same topic see also 1OR, L/E/8/137, draft of a letter from R. Peel, secretary, Public and Judicial Department, India Office, dated 25 April 1934.
67 ICC Report, 100
68 Ibid., 103.
69 Ibid., 101.
70 ICC Evidence 1, 165.
71 ICC Report, 103.
72 ICC Evidence 1, vi.
73 ICC Report, 166.
74 Ibid., 164.
75 Ibid.
76 Comments on the ICC Report can be found in the section “The Cinema and the Empire” in The Film in National Life (particularly 131–33).
77 BFI, Subject Cuttings: India Cuttings up to 1959, clipping from The Times, 9 August 1928, n.p.
78 Mehta, Liberalism and Empire, 8.
79 MSA, Home Department (Political), 1928, file no. 208, “Information Regarding Film
Producing Companies in the Bombay Presidency,” letters from the BT, 8 December 1927; Ganguly, 23 March, 1928; and the commissioner of police, 28 April 1928.

For a brief discussion of the relationship between the production of knowledge and its assumption of norms refer to Foucault’s “History of Systems of Thought.”

Garga, So Many Cinemas, 60; Kaul, Cinema and the Indian Freedom Struggle, 26.

“Indian Circuit for British Group?” The Bioscope (21 March 1927): 27.

For a brief discussion of the relationship between the production of knowledge and its assumption of norms refer to Foucault’s “History of Systems of Thought.”

Garga, So Many Cinemas, 60; Kaul, Cinema and the Indian Freedom Struggle, 26.

“Indian Circuit for British Group?” The Bioscope (21 March 1927): 27.
15 May 1935, identifying an associate organization that was to assist the BUFP in selecting suitable films for the colonies (IOR, L/P&I/6/1995, file 372, “Parliamentary Notice: Session 1934–35.”)

92 Guha, Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India, 259.

93 Ibid.

94 IOR, L/P&I/6/30, “Move to Check Foreign Films in India: British Scheme in Preparation: Government to Be Asked for Subsidy,” The Morning Post, 25 August 1937. The article quotes Britain’s need to counteract America’s hold in India as the rationale for a subsidy.

95 IOR, L/P&I/8/30.

96 Jha, Indian Motion Picture Almanac, 789.

97 Baskaran, The Eye of the Serpent.

98 IOR, L/P&I/8/30, Legislative Assembly debates of 20 September 1937; filmindia 4, no. 8 (December 1938): 9. As noted earlier, 1 anna equals 1/16th of a rupee.

99 To state the obvious, I have access to these rumors because they were tracked for their controversial status and filed by the Economic and Overseas Department of the India Office and the British Board of Trade.

100 IOR, L/P&I/8/30.

101 IOR, L/P&I/8/30. In a memorandum to the India Office on 19 April 1934 the FBI again proposed imperial preference in India “so as to counteract the influence of foreign films.” In a memorandum sent a day earlier to the India Office, the FBI stated, “[It is] understood that British Government Departments as well as the Indian Government are anxious that British films should obtain more general exhibition in India than hitherto, so as to present the British rather than the foreign (or American) angle of things to the vast audiences which annually attend film pictures in India. To this end certain sections of the British film industry have recently made special efforts to facilitate production of films suitable for the India market, and also to increase the distribution in India of films produced in the United Kingdom for general exhibition.”

102 IOR, L/P&I/8/30, letter dated 27 October 1937.

103 BFI, Subject Cuttings: India Cuttings up to 1959, The Film Daily (6 May 1938): n.p.

104 The editorial page of Sound 3, no. 5 (May 1944) declares it a “biting, fighting” journal. These journals, along with popular newspapers, launched a sustained attack on what they considered worldwide “Anti-Indian Propaganda” in American and British films. For a collation of this outcry consult MSA, Home Department (Political)/71/1935.

105 IOR, L/P&I/8/30.

106 IOR, L/P&I/8/30, “Cinematography: Financial Subsidies to British Film Industry in India.” The same wording was repeated in different drafts of the letter, written by W. T. Amman and Peel (India Office) to Fennelly (BT) on 13 January 1938.

107 IOR, L/P&I/8/30, “Copy of Minutes Written in Department of Overseas Trade,” 27 January 1938.
109 ICC Evidence 1, 5, 80, 86; 1OR, L/E/8/137, “Indian Film Industry,” 16.
110 Phalke’s quote, originally in the popular magazine Navaug (September 1918), is reprinted in “Birth of a Film Industry,” Cinema Vision India 1, no. 1 (January 1980): 19 (Siddharth Kak, ed., Cinema Vision India [4 volumes], Bombay: BH, 1980). Rai’s comments can be found in ICC Evidence 3, 1005. Also consult Proceedings of the First Session of the Indian Motion Picture Congress and Other Sectional Conferences for S. Satyamurthi’s comments on cinema and swadeshi (173–79; 203–4), and Chandulal J. Shah’s comments on Indian cinema’s international and national character (158–64).
111 ICC Evidence 1, 141.
112 ICC Evidence 3, 998–1015.
114 Barnouw and Krishnaswamy, Indian Cinema, 45.
116 Rajadhyaksha and Willemen consider him the founder of the historical and social genre of Indian films. (Encyclopaedia of Indian Cinema, 169). Though he made mythologicals, Painter’s films were highly visual, meticulously avoiding intertitles and incorporating trick photography that he had learned on his trips abroad. By all descriptions, Painter’s films displayed a diachronic modernism through combining mythic content while exploiting cinema’s facility for visual manipulation. He returned to painting after the introduction of sound film because he felt that sound compromised the medium’s true aesthetic form. Rai, on the other hand, was more of a classical realist.
117 ICC Evidence 3, 1014.
118 See Dnyaneshvar Nadkarni’s and J. B. H. Wadia’s accounts in Cinema Vision 1, no. 1 (January 1980): 39–43 and 93–95, respectively.
119 Koch, Frantz Osten’s Indian Silent Films, 25.
121 ICC Evidence 3, 998.
122 Shantaram and Narwekar, V. Shantaram, 22. The Hindi- and Marathi-language filmmaker V. Shantaram started his career in the Gandharava Natak Mandal, with stalwarts of theater like Bal Gandharava, Govindrao Tembe, and Ganpatrao Bodas.
123 For a personal account of these actresses, see Manto, Stars from Another Sky, 85–102, 172–81.
124 Nadkarni, “A Painter Called Baburao,” 40. By this account, the wrestler-turned-actor Balasaheb Yadev tried directing and eventually took to organizing mob scenes in films (43).
125 ICC Evidence 1, 364.
126 Dorabji noted in his written statement that “one who can read his own language only, finds other Indian languages to be as foreign as English” (349). According
to Ardeshir Bilimoria, Madan produced their own films in Bengal, but they didn’t exhibit them in Bombay because the films had been made “according to the Bengali custom” (ICC Evidence 1, 327). Additionally, films made in Bengal had to be titled in Gujarati and Hindi to be comprehensible to Bombay audiences. The Bombay Board of Film Censors talked of the “differences between the large towns like Bombay, or Calcutta and the less enlightened country districts” (84), and Chunilal Munim, representative BCCTA, noted that translations “mar the beauty of the picture or story” (10). According to him, the difference between films popular in Bengal versus those in Bombay were among “the main difficulties we have to face in developing this industry in India” (11). Bilimoria similarly noted, “So far as history, customs and mythology is concerned, it is confined to each province” (341).

127 ICC Evidence 1, 347.
128 Proceedings of the First Session of the Indian Motion Picture Congress and Other Sectional Conferences, 158. In 1937 the interim Congress Party under C. Rajagopalachari attempted to make Hindi the official language of the Madras presidency (including modern Tamil Nadu, parts of Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh) to widespread protest in Tamil Nadu.

130 See Desai’s Beyond Bollywood for a filmography and analysis.
131 All statements by Wadia in this paragraph are taken from his recollections, reprinted as “I Remember, I Remember” in Cinema Vision I, no. 1 (January 1980): 92–93.
132 Chatterjee has argued that the colonial middle class “was simultaneously placed in a position of subordination in one relation and a position of dominance in the other,” referring, of course, to its subordination to the colonizers and its “cultural leadership of the indigenous colonized people.” (The Nation and Its Fragments, 36). As I discuss above, for Indian aspirants of the film industry battling social prejudices against their profession, the position of cultural leadership was less obvious.

133 IOR, L/E/8/137, Legislative Assembly Debates, “Resolution re Indian Film Industry,” 1 March 1933, 1434.
134 IOR, L/E/8/137, Legislative Assembly Debates, “Resolution re Indian Film Industry,” 1 March 1933, 1439, emphasis added.
135 IOR, L/E/8/137, Legislative Assembly Debates, “Resolution re Indian Film Industry,” 1 March 1933, 1438–41. Several suggestions for the recuperation of state income through other sources were forthcoming but not accepted.
137 IOR, L/P&I/8/30, letter from Amman and Peel (India Office) to Fennelly (BT), 13 January 1938.
FIVE  REALISM AND EMPIRE

1  Christopher Williams, Realism and the Cinema, 12. In a review of Auerbach’s Mimesis, Terry Eagleton offers a characteristically entertaining overview of different traditions of realism in fiction (“Pork Chops and Pineapples”).


3  Examples include Laura Mulvey’s “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” Colin MacCabe’s “Theory and Film” and his earlier “Realism and the Cinema,” and Peter Wollen’s “Godard and Counter-Cinema,” which defines political cinema by its structural departures from realism. The anthologies Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology, edited by Philip Rosen, and The Sexual Subject collate much of this work, particularly of the screen theory that presented a sustained analysis of film texts in relation to ideology, subjectivity, sexuality, and gender.

4  Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus.”

5  In “Falling Women, Rising Stars, New Horizons” Miriam Hansen suggests that conceptualizing Hollywood cinema in purely classical-realist terms fallaciously reserves modernist aesthetics for alternative experimental and avant-garde film practices, ignoring the extent to which Hollywood was associated with the modern. I concur that classical-realist fiction is best understood in relation to modernity, which refers to the triumph of Western capitalism, mass consumption, industrialization, urbanization, and changes in visual, social, and economic relations. But it is possible to maintain that realism contains narrative elisions of its own modernist impulses while also arguing that theoretical models (like Bordwell’s and Thompson’s, mentioned by Hansen) that conflate modernity or modernization with aesthetic modernism divorce classical realism from its historical moment. For nuanced distinctions between the “dialectics of modernization and modernism” consult Marshall Berman’s All That Is Solid Melts into Air and a useful review by Perry Anderson, “Modernity and Revolution.”

6  Lukács, Essays on Realism, 51–52.

7  Ibid., 53–54.


9  Though all cinema relies on artifice, realist art exaggerates the paradox through its claims to realism. In André Bazin’s words, “But realism in art can only be achieved in one way—through artifice” (What Is Cinema? 27). And in Signatures of the Visible Fredric Jameson notes, “‘Realism’ is, however, a peculiarly unstable concept owing to its simultaneous, yet incompatible, aesthetic and epistemological claims, as the two terms of the slogan, ‘representation of reality’ suggest” (159).

10  For another discussion of realism and imperialism consult Shohat and Stam, on “The Question of Realism,” in Unthinking Eurocentrism, 178–82.

Rhodes takes the heterogeneity a step further, using high-contrast lighting in indoor shots of the Boer leader to codify him as evil. Expressionist stylistics combine with narrative realism in the film.

Karol Kulik provides these accounts in his biography of the director, Alexander Korda. They are also excerpted in the National Film Theater’s programming notes on the film (see BFI, Subject File: Elephant Boy). Quoting from the latter, “over fifty-five hours of film had been shot in India, all background material to a still non-existent story. This was a customary state of affairs on a Flaherty picture. Apparently in the last stages of production, Flaherty had no control on the film” (n.p).

Robeson, a radical leftist, political activist, and champion of racial equality accepted the role of Bosambo because of his interest in Africa. A linguist, he also learnt a few African languages during his visits to Africa for the film shoot. “I believe it would be a good thing for the American Negro to have more consciousness of his African tradition, to be proud of it,” he said in an interview with Marguerite Tazelaar, “Robeson Finds a Natural Link to the Songs of African Tribes,” New York Herald-Tribune (October 27, 1935). Reprinted in Foner’s Paul Robeson Speaks, 103.

Comolli, “Historical Fiction.” A vast body of literature theorizes the relationship of history to cinema. Some representative examples include Grindon, Shadows on the Past; History and Theory 36, no. 4, a theme issue that includes Ann-Louise Shapiro’s “Whose (Which) History Is It Anyway?” Paula Rabinowitz’s “Wreckage Upon Wreckage,” and Shapiro in conversation with Jill Godmilow in “How Real is the Reality in Documentary Film”; Kaes, From Hitler to Heimat; Rollins, Hollywood as Historian; Rosenstone, Revisioning History; Sorlin, The Film in History; Toplin, History by Hollywood.


Churchill, India, 96.

See Roman Polanski’s Repulsion (1965) as a modernist film that experiments with ruptures between the subjective and the objective (like Black Narcissus) in contrast to the operation of Sanders’s realist constructions of point of view.


Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 38.

The introduction of alcohol into interactions between the British and African natives disrupts the hierarchy entirely, as when inebriated Africans in King Mofalaba’s land forget their subordinate position and overstep behavioral boundaries. Representations of the British Empire make clear that mastery over the social codes of exchanging conversation and alcohol carry great significance with regard to inclusion in or exclusion from the ruler’s exclusive coterie (see more on this in chapter 5). The last scene of Sanders that involves a private conversation between Sanders and Bosambo seems to break down this binary schema, but in fact the men are still not allowed spatial equivalence: Sanders sits as Bosambo stands.

Richards, “Korda’s Empire,” 127.
Physical violence also provides spectatorial pleasure in empire films, and in Sanders it erupts at unexpected moments, as in the war song that Bosambo teaches his young son.

Off, Off, into Battle,  
Make the War-drums Rattle,  
Mow them Down like Cattle,  
Onward, On, On into Battle,  
Bite them into the Dust, Into the Dust.  


To the Africans, Sanders is known as “Sandi the Tiger. Sandi the Eater of Kings.”

The British repeat the transmogrifying legends of “Sandi” with wry disdain, but in the absence of attributing a thousand eyes to Sanders, they are at a loss to explain his knowledge of the land. When Sanders claims to know the strange African found by Hamilton, the latter says incredulously, “You’re not going to tell me that out of the two million souls here, you know that man I picked up an hour ago.” “I might,” says Sanders enigmatically.

Bhabha sees the displacement of orientalism’s fixity to be the result of an over-determination of a manifest orientalism by a latent orientalism, the former being the site of historical articulation and the latter of unconscious repositories of fantasies, imaginative writings, and ideas (ibid.). I demur from conceptualizing the imperial unconscious in any form other than its historical particularity, not to fetishize the historical but to accept the manifest as the only legible discourse.

Realist films like Sanders and Rhodes of Africa are plentiful in their references to natives as children. In Sanders Father O’Leary advises Ferguson, “You must be quick and strong now like a father with his misguided children.” When two men dis-
tribute gin and firearms to the natives, one of them says, “His [Sanders's] black children have become pretty civilized,” so “it would be considerable pleasure to teach his black children a thing or two while he’s cooing and billing in London.” In Rhodes the following conversation transpires between Cecil B. Rhodes (Walter Huston) and Anna Carpenter (Peggy Ashcroft).

RHOADES: I always think of them—the natives I mean—as children. One has to be patient and understanding. Educate them.

CARPENTER: Generations of these children in your hands—makes me happy.


36 Useful early discussions of Grierson’s documentaries are included in Armes, A Critical History of the British Cinema; Ellis, The Documentary Idea; Swann, “John Grierson and the G.P.O. Film Unit, 1933–1939”; Winston, Claiming the Real.

37 This was Flaherty’s second film, following Nanook of the North.

38 Private companies also funded documentary production. For accounts of Grierson’s work for the oil company Shell International and Basil Wright’s sponsorship by the Ceylon Tea Propaganda Board, consult Ellis, The Documentary Idea, especially “Institutionalization: Great Britain, 1929–1939” (58–77).

39 Flaherty was an influential figure for the entire movement, of course, and served as a mentor to several young British documentary filmmakers.

40 Stollery, Alternative Empires, 172–75. See also Ellis, The Documentary Idea, 61.

41 Aitken, Film and Reform; Stollery, Alternative Empires; Street, British National Cinema, 150–60. The assessment of the British documentary movement as modernist rather than realist points to a shift in film criticism as well. Only a few decades ago, in the 1980s, radical rereadings of British cinema distinguished the 1930s documentaries from modernist, avant-garde film production in Britain in order to redress an overemphasis on British documentaries and reclaim independent films as a part of British film history. See Don MacPherson’s and Paul Willemen’s Traditions of Independence and Anne Friedberg’s discussion of this work in Close Up.


44 BFI, Microfiche: Sanders of the River, Zoltan Korda, “Filming in Africa.”

45 In “Engendering the Nation,” Kathryn Dodd and Philip Dodd describe nineteenth-century accounts of the bestial and depraved poor that documentarists aimed to rectify (42).

46 BFI, Microfiche: Sanders of the River.

47 Dodd and Dodd, “Engendering the Nation,” 46–47.


In a Lacanian sense, the imaginary prescribes a full relation between the word and the thing with a mysterious unity of sign and referent. According to psychoanalytic film theory, a text that breaks the imaginary relationship between sign and referent also participates in breaking down spectatorial identification, given that mechanisms of identification govern the organization of a realist text. Consequently the disruption of identification is posited as an essential criterion for subversive texts by MacCabe in “Theory and Film” (184, 194–95).

I agree with Miriam Hansen that “we seem to be faced with a gap between film theory and film history, between the spectator as a term of cinematic discourse and the empirical moviegoer in his or her demographic contingency. The question, then, is whether the two levels of inquiry can be mediated” (Babel and Babylon, 5). MacCabe voiced this concern earlier: “Realism is no longer a question of an exterior reality nor of the relation of reader to text, but one of the ways in which these two interact” (“Theory and Film,” 194–95).

World Film News 1, no. 12 (March 1937): 5, British Film Institute.

Powell mentions this in an interview conducted by Martin Scorsese (Black Narcissus, CD, directed by Michael Powell and Emeric Pressburger [1947; Los Angeles: Criterion, 1998]).

Richards, “Korda’s Empire,” 123.

MacCabe, “Realism and the Cinema” 26.

Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 74.

Moore, Savage Theory, 40.

Ibid., 2.

Renov, “Towards a Poetics of Documentary.”

five ROMANCE AND EMPIRE

1 Frye, The Secular Scripture.
2 Ibid., 15.
3 Ibid., 15. A good example of such sacralization is The Projection of England, a short book published by Sir Stephen Tallents, president of the Empire Marketing Board. Tallents declared that the fame of England broken up into its “primary colours” would consist of the following national institutions and virtues. “The Monarchy (with its growing scarcity value); Parliamentary Institutions (with all the values of a first edition); The British Navy; The English Bible, Shakespeare, and Dickens . . . ; In international affairs—a reputation for disinterestedness; In national affairs—a tradition of justice, law, and order; In national character—a reputation for coolness; In commerce—a reputation for fair dealing; In manufacture—a reputation for quality . . . ; In sport—a reputation for fair play.” According to Roy Armes, Tallents also proposed these as appropriate topics for films by the E.M.B. Tallents, The Projection of England, 14; Armes, A Critical History of British Cinema, 133.
4 De Certeau, The Writing of History. Nicholas Dirks observes, “History is surely one
of the most important signs of the modern. We are modern not only because we have achieved this status historically, but because we have developed consciousness of our historical depths and trajectories, as also our historical transcendence of the traditional” (“History as a Sign of the Modern,” 25).

5 Barthes, Image-Music-Text, 169. Also see Barthes, Mythologies. In Tropics of Discourse Hayden White discusses overlaps between history and fiction through shared semiotic structures embedded in dominant ideology. Also consult Hayden White’s The Content of the Form.

6 The amirs agreed to give Britain exclusive navigational rights around the region in return for a peace treaty. The British broke their treaty by blowing up the Imam Garh fortress and butchering around five-thousand Sindis (the people of Sind).

7 Consult Hopkirk, The Great Game; Maley, The Afghanistan Wars; Wolpert, A New History of India, 219–56.

8 The Four Feathers is also set against the backdrop of fierce enemies of the British Empire, against whom the British accepted defeat at least once. The Haden Dowah tribes of The Four Feathers were much admired by the British for this reason. To quote Alex Waugh, who was responsible for making location arrangements in Sudan for the film, “As soon as I arrived at our desert location I had to go up to the Red Sea hills, and bring some other tribesman—the Haden Dowah or the Fuzzie Wuzzies as they are usually called. The people we had booked already were Arabs, of course. We wanted these chaps because they were the only tribesmen who ever had been known in British history to have broken the famous British square. They actually formed part of the Khalifa’s attacking force on Kitchener’s troops at the battle of Omdurman” (Waugh, “Filming ‘The Four Feathers,’ ” 899). Rudyard Kipling includes a tribute to these fighters in his poem “Fuzzy Wuzzy: Sudan Expeditionary Force.” The poem contains variations of the following verse, written in a mock cockney accent.

So ’ere’s to you, Fuzzy Wuzzy, at your ’ome in the Soudan;
You’re a pore benightened ’eathen but a first-class fightin’ man;
We gives you your certificate, an’ if you want it signed
We’ll come an’ ’ave a romp with you whenever you’re inclined.

(Gunga Dind and Other Favorite Poems, 25–29)

Also see Churchill’s The River War.

9 Though Korda’s Sanders is based on Edgar Wallace’s stories and The Drum on a novel by A. E. W. Mason, there’s a cross-referential system in colonial adventure tales that gives this fiction its own dense reality. As the film historian Jeffrey Richards points out, Mason’s novel depicts Carruthers as the younger brother of Sanders, who now ranks below the governor. In the exclusive world of Britain’s aristocratic diplomacy depicted in the film and the novel, Carruthers marries the governor’s niece, Marjorie. (See Richards, “Korda’s Empire,” 131.)

Technicolor technology came to Britain with the musical extravaganza Wings of the Morning (Schuster, 1937), under the cinematography of Jack Cardiff, who was also the cinematographer for Black Narcissus. Early examples of Technicolor include Disney’s Flowers and Trees (Gillett, 1932); La Cucaracha (Corrigan, 1934); Becky Sharp (Mamoulian, 1935); The Garden of Allah (Boleslawski, 1936); The Wizard of Oz (Fleming, 1939); and Gone with the Wind (Fleming, 1939).


The magazine added that “the use of color has given the interiors a tawny hue and sequences do not always match, but the mountain backgrounds are impressive” (“The Drum,” Motion Picture Herald, 46).


Niranjana, Siting Translation, 3.

Street, British National Cinema, 41.

Makdisi, Romantic Imperialism; Sudan, Fair Exotics. See also Fulford and Kitson, Romanticism and Colonialism; Richardson and Hofkosh, Romanticism, Race, and Imperial Culture.

A “pure” form of the Gothic narrative does not exist, but I have culled the main tropes from Brooks’s and Frye’s analyses, as well as from the works of fiction named above. Anne Radcliffe’s novels, Edgar Allen Poe’s poetry and short stories, and Emily Brontë’s Wuthering Heights are considered landmarks of the Gothic romance tradition. Brooks relates modern melodramas by Balzac and James to early Gothic novels as well.

Brooks, The Melodramatic Imagination, 4. According to Northrop Frye, the revolutionary quality of a romance lies in “the polarization between the two worlds, one desirable and the other hateful” (The Secular Scripture, 163). Though this may be hair-splitting, I’d suggest that as soon as the division permits a clear identification of the elements that need to be expunged, the polarization loses its revolutionary
aspect, as the text is no longer unsettled by the presence of its “abject” elements (more on this ambiguity in chapter 7).

26 Ibid., 75–76. See Elsaesser, “Tales of Sound and Fury,” 78–79, for differences between westerns and melodramas (distinct from melodramatic westerns).
28 In “Notes on Sirk and Melodrama,” Mulvey notes that all films deal generously with male fantasy (76).
29 See Ella Shohat’s and Robert Stam’s chapter “The Western as Paradigm” (Unthinking Eurocentrism, especially 114–21). Also see Bazin’s essays “The Western, or the American Film Par Excellence” and “The Evolution of the Western” (What Is Cinema?, 140–57). Other sources include Cawelti, Six Gun Mystique; Grant, Film Genre Reader 3; Kitses, Horizons West; Wright, Sixguns and Society; Slotkin, Regeneration through Violence; Tompkins, West of Everything; Walker, Westerns.
30 As Richard Abel argues in The Red Rooster Scare, the North made a poor template for tales of white Anglo-Saxon American masculinity when compared to the cinematic and ideological potential of the western frontier.
31 Shohat and Stam, Unthinking Eurocentrism, 115.
32 As Shohat and Stam argue, “Even within an already condensed spatiotemporality, these westerns privilege a period roughly fifty years, and return time and again to particular sites and events. Although historical Native Americans generally avoided direct confrontation with the White military — according to the Nation Parks Service, there were probably only six full-scale attacks on US cavalry forts between 1850 and 1890 — the Indian raid on the fort, as the constructed bastion of settled civilization against nomadic savagery, nevertheless became a staple topos in American western” (ibid., 115–16).
33 Like Will Wright in Sixguns and Society (49–50), John Cawelti in Six Gun Mystique observes that simple differentiations between “good” and “bad” or “self” and “other” are impossible when the western is considered in all its variations from the 1930s to the early 1970s. Depending on the film, evil is shown to reside within society (corrupt authorities, oppressive community) as much as outside it (in the outlaws, “Indians”), and protagonists rarely integrate with a community given their affinities with an unfettered wilderness, which provides a viable alternative to civilization’s degeneration. Cawelti does not incorporate the same nuanced level of differentiation into his analysis of British empire films. He notes that an imperial film’s Manicheanism varies from a western’s dialectical symbolic structure. In empire films, he argues, the wilderness remains alien and either affirms civilization or threatens it (40; see also Kitses, Horizon’s West, 10–11). Wright agrees that imperial films are more binary than westerns and have an affinity to Icelandic sagas or Greek myths in which the hero is never challenged as an outsider to society but remains a man of aristocratic birth temporarily alienated from his exalted status through a predestined sequence of events (150–51). I believe a discussion
of the realist, romance, and modernist modes of empire cinema makes such distinctions between westerns and empire films untenable.

34 This is Peter Brooks’s argument when he notes that the “Promethean search to illuminate man’s quotidian existence by the reflected flame of the higher cosmic drama” followed the destruction of the institutions of church and monarchy after the French Revolution (The Melodramatic Imagination, 21).

35 Wright, Sixguns and Society, 130–84.

36 Of particular interest here is the debate on the role of the family in melodrama between Chuck Kleinhans (“Notes on Melodrama and the Family under Capitalism”) and Christine Gledhill (“The Melodramatic Field”). Kleinhans proposes that the bourgeois domestic form’s coincidence with the rise of Western capitalism can be traced to the simultaneous commodification of the domestic sphere (where self-gratification is defined in terms of a family’s choices in consumption and lifestyle) and its distance from the productive base of an economy (suppressing the possibility of meaningful social action through the family). This produces the primary conflict of melodrama wherein the family is fraught because “people’s personal needs are restricted to the sphere of the family, of personal life, and yet the family cannot meet the demands of being all that the rest of society is not” (“Notes on Melodrama and the Family under Capitalism,” 200). Gledhill takes this reading to task because she sees it as positing a realm of real conflict against which the representation of the family in melodrama offers “a mystifying resolution,” thus prioritizing “a set of socio-economic relations outside the domestic and personal sphere, to which issues of sexual relations, of fantasy and desire are secondary” (“The Melodramatic Field,” 13).

37 Altman, Film/Genre, particularly “Why Are Genres Sometimes Mixed?” (123–43).

38 For an early critique of feminist film theory’s color blindness, consult Gaines, “White Privilege and Looking Relations.” My aim is to triangulate all the categories of analysis in play here, prominently race, gender, sexuality, and nation.

39 E. M. Forster, A Passage to India, 289. The novel was first published in 1924.

40 As an interesting biographical sidebar, the imperial heroes Baden-Powell, Rhodes, Gordon, and Kitchener were known in their time as misogynists, celibates, or to prefer the company of young boys (Judd, Empire, 174–78).

41 Elsaesser, “Tales of Sound and Fury” 69.

42 This is also true of David Lean’s Lawrence of Arabia (1962). There, too, the eponymous Lawrence shares his story with other British and Arab men of power, gaining meaning through his interactions with them rather than radiating significance to all characters and aspects of the narrative, as in the case of the protagonist in Sanders. It was also Peter O’Toole’s first major role, and he did not possess the star currency he was to acquire after the film.

43 “The Drum,” The Cinema 48, no. 3610 (12 May 1937): 25. In many ways The Drum can be understood as Prince Azim’s story. He is the heir-apparent, unseated by his uncle’s evil machinations, who stoically survives his days as a pauper. Depictions
of Sabu visually anticipate the iconic image of the familiar street thief from The
Thief of Baghdad, shirtless and living off his wit—an image retained in the Disney
productions of the Aladdin films in the 1990s.

44 For a narrative of how Korda and Flaherty worked together in The Elephant Boy,
consult Rotha, Robert J. Flaherty.


46 Britmovie, “The Drum,” http://www.britmovie.co.uk/genres/drama/filmography
01/033.html (accessed 17 April 2005).


49 Ghul, like the figure of the native ally Azim, complicates binaries. As Carruthers
admits to his wife, “It’s the old story of the mad dreamers of this world, who are
half empire builders and half gangsters. If they succeed, history books call them
great.” By virtue of the fact that he will not stay in the place to which he has been
assigned in the imperial order of things, Ghul becomes causal to the problems
propelling the film’s narrative.

50 J. A. Hobson, Imperialism. 93.

51 The dialogue is as follows.

AZIM: Always [tell the truth]? That will be very hard!
CARRUTHERS: Yes, I expect it will. But promise to try, will you?
AZIM: Tell the truth! All right. I promise.
CARRUTHERS: That’s fine.
AZIM: But nobody in Tokot ever does!

52 Shohat, “Gender and the Culture of Empire,” 54.

53 Shohat and Hansen approach the film differently in part because Shohat is less
mindful of periodizing cultural shifts, as she ambitiously traces the underlying
operation of orientalism across a range of Western texts. Studying Valentino’s
films more historically, Hansen argues that the deliberate construction of an erotic
male object for female spectators exposed contradictions in the shifting role of

54 Hansen, Babel and Babylon, 292.

55 Holder is a leader among the drummer boys and conducts himself with boyish
swagger; at his first appearance he receives a whipping for smoking. The sequence
is shown though shots of another drummer boy wincing in pain as Holder is punish-
ished.

56 Butler, Gender Trouble, 136.

57 Creekmur and Doty, Out in Culture. Consult also Doty’s Making Things Perfectly Queer
and Flaming Classics.

58 Chowdhry, Colonial India and the Making of Empire Cinema, 89. See also her sociologi-
cal reading of The Drum in relation to the acceptance of homosexuality in Pathan
culture (70–72).
Justin’s quote is from an episode in the BBC’s *Rear Window* series, “Sabu: The Elephant Boy” (Channel 4 Television, 1993).

The vision of torture in a wooden cage is a recurrent one and reappears in Shekhar Kapur’s *The Four Feathers*.

Versions of *The Four Feathers*, which was based on A. E. W. Mason’s 1902 novel, were filmed in 1915, 1921, and 1928 (see Richards, “Korda’s Empire” for details); the most recent screen adaptation was by the Indian film director Shekhar Kapur in 2002. Karol Kulik notes in *Alexander Korda* that *The Four Feathers* was an important film for the producer because he used it as collateral to get loans to the effect of $3,600,000 from U.S. banks, including Security National Bank of Los Angeles and Bankers Trust Company of New York.

The scenes of suffering include Durrance and Faversham struggling in the desert sand as the blind man flails around for a gun to shoot himself; Durrance’s delirious talk of his love for Ethne when he is driven half mad by thirst; and Faversham’s difficult incarceration at the Kalipha’s fort, where he is crushed amid a thousand natives and slurps food and water from troughs.

*nfai*. The Bombay Government Gazette (7 February 1946): 7, *The Four Feathers* (ser. no. 33286). Scenes of Arab natives being whipped by white men were also curtailed.

I call the bodily excesses potentially regenerative to represent Bakhtin’s argument that the principle of degeneration is deeply positive in Rabelais. According to Bakhtin, “The body discloses its essence as a principle of growth which exceeds its own limits only in copulation, pregnancy, childbirth, the throes of death, eating, drinking, or defecation” (*Rabelais and His World*, 26).

Readers may be reminded of Linda Williams’s analysis of women’s melodramas. Examining *Stella Dallas*, Williams notes that the iconic and institutional notion of motherhood is reinstated when the woman submits herself to suffering and devaluation for her family’s sake. Williams goes on to explore the mechanisms of pleasure embedded within this patriarchal narrative structure, arguing that “these melodramas also have reading positions structured into their texts that demand a female reading competence,” which relates to the “social fact of female mothering.” The notion that suffering is both a primary source of pleasure in women’s melodramas and a socially gendered experience is relevant to my concluding observations. (Williams, “Something Else besides a Mother,” 312.)

Jameson, *The Political Unconscious*, 271. Jameson’s analysis of Conrad’s *Lord Jim* as a heterogeneous combination of modernism and premodernism and of Conrad as perhaps a postmodernist ahead of his time can be revisited by thinking of the same text as divided between imperial romance and modernism in the ways discussed in this book.


Ibid.

The idea of seeking the infinite in the minute comes from Lillian R. Furst’s *Roman-
ticism, wherein she defines English literary romanticism as a tradition in which essences are sought or imagined within the real. See her discussion of Fairchild (2).

70 Robson and Robson, The Film Answers Back, 174–75.

71 Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, 31. Harvey is talking about the emergence, in the interwar years, of a modernism he witnesses as heroic but reactionary and fraught with danger, as exemplified by Italian futurism (with its faith in militarization and Mussolini), Nazi Germany (with its Bauhaus-style death camps), social realism (with its mythologizing of the proletariat), and Heidegger. In imperial romance’s desperate search for a mythology I see a type of heroic modernism.

six MODERNISM AND EMPIRE

1 Peter Wollen’s classic essay, “The Two Avant Gardes,” may be related to this observation, as it identifies opposing tendencies in U.S. and European avant-gardes, one pulling toward “purist” formal experimentation and the other toward political agendas expressed through form.

2 Summarized from Lunn, Marxism and Modernism. See in particular the chapter “Modernism in Comparative Perspective” (33–71).

3 Jameson, “Modernism and Imperialism,” 43–69; Said, Culture and Imperialism, particularly the chapter “Note on Modernism” (186–90).

4 The works of Alberto Giacometti, Amedeo Modigliani, and Pablo Picasso stand out as prominent examples of modern art influenced by primitivism. For different readings of the presence of the primitive within European avant-garde and modernist cinema and art, consult Burch, “Primitivism and the Avant-Gardes”; Moore, Savage Theory; Perloff, “Tolerance and Taboo”; Stollery, Alternative Empires; and Torgovnick, Gone Primitive.

5 Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism, 36.

6 From the chapter “Production of the Archers” in James Howard’s Michael Powell (57). The element of fantasy and artifice in the film is underscored by the fact that it was shot primarily on set.

7 Michael Walker, “Black Narcissus.” Walker’s essay treats the film in terms of the Freudian syndrome “the return of the repressed,” arguing that this syndrome structures the horror genre and that its manifestation leads to the film’s melodrama. Throughout the film there is “the sense of something terrible and/or un-controllable coming/returning to haunt or plague the ‘helpless’ protagonist(s)” (10). That “something” in Black Narcissus is primarily the sexually repressed, according to Walker. In Damned If You Don’t (1987) video artist Su Friedrich uses excerpts from Black Narcissus in a manner that dissects the relationship between the nuns and presents them as repressed lesbians. In the video, an anonymous viewer watches Black Narcissus on television, and the 1947 feature is re-edited to expose
it as a male-oriented narrative working to repress passionate lesbian attractions between the female nuns (Gever, “Girl Crazy”).
8 Shohat and Stam, Unthinking Eurocentrism, 166.
10 Vesselo, “British Films of the Quarter,” 76.
13 Ibid.
14 Howard, Michael Powell, 60.
18 Christie, “In the Picture,” 17.
19 Segal, “Political Paranoia,” 35.
21 In this chapter, rather than referring solely to the rich literature in film melodrama, I am choosing to formulate a semiotic definition of both melodrama and irony because I wish to raise a set of questions about the form of melodrama in relation to the imperial mode of address: here the melodramatic and the ironic aspects are mutually constitutive and their related but oppositional forms help reconcile a past of imperial affirmations with the imminence of imperial failure.
22 Brooks, The Melodramatic Imagination, 199.
23 Forster, A Passage to India, 144, 146.
24 “The term irony . . . indicates a technique of appearing to be less than one is, which in literature becomes most commonly a technique of saying as little and meaning as much as possible,” states Frye, positing irony or eiron (the one who deprecates self) as a tragic mode in literature that is opposed to stories of the alazon (the one who pretends or attempts to be more than she or he is) (Anatomy of Criticism, 40). Interestingly, he places Conrad’s protagonist Lord Jim in the latter category. In light of potential axes of similarities between Sister Clodagh as a romantic heroine and Lord Jim as a romantic hero, explored in this essay in relation to the film’s conclusion, it is provocative to think of Sister Clodagh’s internal progression through this film as a move from the alazon to the eiron. In other words, we may consider whether her ability to deprecate herself to Mr. Dean at the conclusion of the film draws her closer to tragic irony than to melodrama.
26 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 78.
27 One of the prominent groups against imperialism in the late nineteenth century
and early twentieth was a coalition of some liberals and radicals, the Low Church, Quaker millionaires, and missionary societies. These “ethical imperialists” disapproved of wars and land grabbing, but approved of “benevolent stewardship” (MacDonald, The Language of Empire, 6). I mention this group to note that dividing missionary work from militarism and mercantilism hardly captures the complexity of imperial politics.

28 Hobson, Imperialism, 201.

29 In his analysis of The Jewel in the Crown Richard Dyer links the television series’ operation of gender with liberalism: “There is a further sense in which Jewel might be seen as addressing women. This is its liberalism. A liberal position is not necessarily or exclusively feminine, but it very often is and men espousing it are often thought, at the least, unmanly” (White, 193). Though not the same as my argument above, there is an overlapping interest in the work gender does for politics.


31 The paradox is somewhat similar to the Hegelian master-slave paradigm of two entities locked in a relationship where the master has no familiarity with the surrounding realities except through the slave. The master’s position is one of subjective projection and practical dependence on the slave, while the slave develops a consciousness of his (her) materiality and situation through constant interactions with it. With the collapse of this relationship, the slave is able to consolidate the familiarity with surrounding realities while the master is left without a vocation or identity.

32 This is not far from Old Bones of the River (Varnel, 1938), mentioned previously for its spoofing of films like Sanders of the River. Tibbets, who is Sanders’s assistant in Sanders, but a lifetime member of TWIRP or Teaching of Welfare Institution for the Reformation of Pagans in Old Bones, discovers that the missionaries who preceded him taught compound multiplication to his forest-dwelling community. Tibbets’s own lessons are just as useless because the pupils are far more knowledgeable than their teacher.

33 Framing this film as a breakdown of imperial coherence allows one to elucidate Marcia Landy’s distinction between British empire films as belonging to the “genre of order” (in that they deal with violent disequilibrium and its restitution) and “a woman’s film” like Black Narcissus, which Landy notes “seems to be a variation on the films of empire” (British Genres, 138, 233). I would argue that as both an empire film and a woman’s film, Black Narcissus uses women as subjects to explore the breakdown of the genre of order.

34 The argument that the “West” produced itself as rational in relation to a sensual “East” is discussed, of course, in Edward Said’s Orientalism and books that have followed in its wake, like Rana Kabbani’s Europe’s Myths of the Orient and Robert G. Lee’s Orientals.

35 At this level the film is readable as a horror story, anticipating the “plasmapsychosis” of David Cronenberg’s Brood (1979). In Black Narcissus invisible forces of colo-
nial place produce corporeal disfigurements when they take their toll on the imperial conscience.

37 Ibid., 24.
38 Ibid., 57.
39 Ibid., 69.

The scenes between the whites and the nonwhites continue to be dramatically divided, but they are used to comment or instigate reflection on the Europeans. Thus, when Sister Clodagh and Mr. Dean examine Kanchi with her watermelon and flowers, the dark woman’s untamed sexuality is exoticized, but Kanchi is less important qua Kanchi than as an element that brings out the subtext of Clodagh and Dean’s flirtation. Similarly when the young general speaks to Sister Clodagh, his naïve questions about the convent and Christ make him a buffoon, clumsy in his attempts to emulate Western ways, but his remarks are also presented as ironic comments on Sister Clodagh’s own attitude toward her faith.

41 Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 62.
43 Howard, Michael Powell, 59. David Farrar, who played Mr. Dean, felt that Black Narcissus had “the right form of expression” for a talkie film and that it made judicious and cinematic use of sound (58). Mr. Dean was his favorite character among the various roles of his career.

44 Sheehan, “Black Narcissus,” 37. This dominance of music over dialogue in specific segments is characteristic of Powell’s cinematic style and anticipates The Red Shoes (1948), where the choreographed sequences are literally ballet performances in addition to being symbolic reworkings of the film’s plot.

45 Brooks, The Melodramatic Imagination, 49.

46 Ibid., 48.

47 Brooks proposes that each dramatic form has its corresponding sense deprivation. Thus tragedy, which deals with insight, finds meaning in figurative or literal blindness. Comedy, the realm of miscommunications, deploys characters that overhear, cannot hear, or pretend not to hear. And melodrama, a form about explicit expressions, finds symbolic value in muteness. (The Melodramatic Imagination, 57.)

48 Godden, Black Narcissus, 163.

49 See chapter 5 for full quote from Dallas Bower (“British Films in the Orient,” 909).

50 Mulvey, “Notes on Sirk and Melodrama,” 76.

51 The film is occasionally sensitive to this. Recall the memorable shot that dissolves from Clodagh’s face in Ireland, as she says, with a faraway look, “I don’t want to go away. I want to stay here like this for the rest of my life,” to her face in a chapel in Mopu, miles away from home.


53 Bersani, The Culture of Redemption. According to Bersani, if we were to react to tragedy as primarily moral, it could appear to be an illustration of the inherently
sacrificial possibilities of a redemptive aesthetic. Bersani argues that the moment of death (or loss of worldly power) is also the moment of self-comprehension and cognition for tragic heroes like Oedipus, Lear, Othello, and Racine’s Phedre. The awareness of defect absolves the catastrophe of the defect, and self-cognition at death redeems a life of error.

54 Conrad, *Heart of Darkness*, 70.
58 The 1930s debates in Marxist aesthetic theory (between Lukács and Bloch, Adorno and Benjamin) over the relationship between fascism/imperialism and modernism/expressionism are worth invoking here for their ratiocinations over the social functions of modernism in totalitarian and democratic societies (see Bloch et al., *Aesthetics and Politics*). My theorization of the multiple aesthetic modes of empire aims to describe some of the heterogeneity and contradictions of an empire in retreat, as discussed in the introduction.
59 In *Present Past* Terdiman makes a similar argument about modernity. He argues that the disruption of community life by the forces of urbanization, industrialism, and capitalism, and the breakdown of conventional modes of apprehending the world lead to a lack of transparency in interpreting one’s past, vocation, and behavior. This may be read as the loss of a culture’s sense of place within a continuous flow of time. Modernity, according to Terdiman, is characterized by the isolation of a culture from its own history, resulting in the active creation of history as a response to this rupture in memory. The “crisis in representation” associated with modernity is an aspect of its crisis in memory.

seven  HISTORICAL ROMANCES AND MODERNIST MYTHS

1 Rajadhyaksha, “India’s Silent Cinema,” 26.
5 Freitag, “Vision of the Nation,” 34–49. I also thank an anonymous reviewer at Duke University Press for this observation.
6 Chakravarty, *National Identity in Indian Popular Cinema*, 82.
7 For other discussions of a foregrounded spatial code, as opposed to the production of realism through the cause-effect chain in cinema, see Burch, *Theory of Film Practice*; Thompson and Bordwell, “Space and Narrative in the Films of Ozu.”
8 Consult Appadurai, Modernity at Large.
9 Huyssen, After the Great Divide, vii.
10 Chakravarty, National Identity in Indian Popular Cinema, 117.
11 Chakravarty argues that films of the 1950s mark a “metaphoric site of displaced intellect­ual anxiety” in their use of realism, particularly when village life, rather than urban space, is made a persistent symbol of Indian authenticity (ibid., 85).
12 Ibid., 238.
13 Prasad, Ideology of the Hindi Film, 60.
14 Ibid., 50.
15 Ibid., 62.
16 Ibid., 64.
19 Prasad, Ideology of the Hindi Film, 65, 67, 69. Prasad periodizes changes within the dominant film form in relation to the postcolonial Indian state’s relationship to capitalist development.
20 Prasad’s theory offers a good heuristic device in that it (a) differentiates between melodrama as a generic mode as opposed to its specific presence in the dominant Indian film form; (b) considers realism as the aesthetic correlative of a middle-class cinema that, by its emergence, provokes a shift in the structure of populist cinema; and (c) periodizes form as responsive to sociopolitical shifts in state structure by theorizing the relationship between realism and melodrama in the development of a bourgeois nation-state. In some ways Prasad completes his project too well: his theoretical apparatus consumes films within a machinery of internal divisions and conceptual gravity, making culture all too rationalist. The impulse derives from a turn in Marxist formalist analysis that reads aesthetics as materially connected to state and economic structures. My sympathies with this move are evident, though I accept (with Spivak) that such an analysis remains circumscribed by its primary reference to “cultural dominants.” The solution may lie in attending to textual details that demonstrate the manufacture of social compromise and consensus as well as antithetical pressures. Quoting Vasudevan, “Looking further afield from the overarching system of ideological coherence, we may simultaneously explore local moments and disaggregated elements for the different stances and resources mobilized in the accession of Indian fictional processes and spectator situations to the realm of modernity. These need not be dominant elements, but that does not make them negligible” (Making Meaning in Indian Cinema, 24).
21 According to Prasad, this predominantly melodramatic form emerged close to India’s independence and experienced a crisis in the 1970s when the delegitimation of political consensus in India during the National Emergency broke the contract between state and citizen.
23 Appiah, “The Postcolonial and the Postmodern,” 120.
   In analyzing Satyajit Ray’s work, Vasudevan insightfully extends Kapur’s detailed arguments about modern Indian art and its modes of authentication.
25 Kapur, “When Was Modernism in Indian/Third World Art?” 477, 481, 480, 482 respectively. Modernism has also been discussed in relation to the West’s recognition of modernist “auteur” cinemas from the Third World, or in the context of more recent experimental cinemas in the postcolonies, by Rajadhyaksha (“Realism, Modernism, and Post-colonial Theory,” 416).
26 Kapur, “When Was Modernism in Indian/Third World Art?” 475. She expands her arguments in the book *When Was Modernism*.
28 Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments* (see the introduction and chapters 6 and 7).
29 In Chatterjee’s words, “The world is a treacherous terrain of the pursuit of material interests, where practical considerations reign supreme. It is also typically the domain of the male. The home in its essence must remain unaffected by the profane activities of the material world—and woman is its representation” (*The Nation and Its Fragments*, 120). Matching this “new meaning of the home/world [*ghar/bahir*] dichotomy with the identification of social roles by gender, we get the ideological framework within which nationalism answered the women’s question” and defined itself in the process (121). At the same time, Chatterjee invites an analysis of the “specific forms that have appeared, on the one hand, in the domain defined by the hegemonic project of nationalist modernity, and on the other, in the numerous fragmented resistances to that project” (13).
31 Ibid.
32 Kapur, “Mythic Material in Indian Cinema,” 81. Kapur intricately draws out two opposing operations of realism in the pre-independence Sant Tukaram (Marathi, Damle and Fattelal, 1936) and post-independence Devi (Bengali, Ray, 1960). She argues that the historical and social representation of Saint Tukaram’s life also serves an emblematic function, as it condenses reformist messages against caste discrimination into an iconic presentation of Tukaram in the manner of a Gandhi nationalist praxis. Myth and realism coexist here, as they do not under the post-independence mistrust of iconicity visible in Devi. For the rational, progressivist Satyajit Ray, realism becomes an occasion to show myth as a “bad object,” in a film about the fatal consequences of the superstitious deification of a young woman by her father-in-law. As a synopsis, this is necessarily a simplification of Kapur’s more textured argument.
33 Kapur, “Mythic Material in Indian Cinema,” 80.
35 Ibid.
36 Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments, 151.
37 Ibid., 156.
38 For descriptions of each genre, their overlaps and influences, consult Rajadhyaksha and Willemen, Encyclopaedia of Indian Cinema, 106, 155, 219.
39 NAI, Home (Political), 27/II/1929, see Amba Prasad and Tilak’s case.
40 Barnouw and Krishnaswamy, Indian Film, 111.
41 Rajadhyaksha, “India’s Silent Cinema,” 34.
42 A. K. Ramanujan, A Flowering Tree and Other Oral Tales from India, 218. In this uncompleted work, Ramanujan collects South Indian stories in the Kannada language.
43 By the previous definition, for instance, the first all-Indian feature film Raja Harishchandra (Phalke, 1913) would be anomalous as a male-centric story as it is about (religious) devotion and moral fortitude. Most narratives based in the bhakti (devotional) tradition, such as biographies of saints (like Tukaram), would be more “feminine” than “masculine” as they involve spiritual battles fought at home rather than external quests with an alien enemy. And this is precisely my point. Male-centered tales that find their way to popular colonial cinema cannot always be identified as popular masculinist quest narratives in Ramanujan’s sense.
44 The last statement is not by or to Hameer, but he is associated with those who cannot abide by tyranny.
45 “The liberation [of the woman] effectively inaugurates the hugely popular convention of demure women turning into masked Western challengers who simultaneously fight for independence and yes, in the end, are revealed to be as faithful and chaste as they ‘always’ were” (Rajadhyaksha, “India’s Silent Cinema,” 35).
46 More historicals may have depicted women in a position of physical valor than we are aware of, given our insufficient records. For instance, we know of a silent film The Valiant Princess a.k.a. Rajkuvarini Ranagarjana (Kohinoor, 1930), because it attracted the attention of censors in India. Among other deletions, reel 5 was excised for dialogues on patriotism and duty to the country. (NFAI, The Bombay Government Gazette 1929–1938 [9 October 1930]: 2532, ser. no. 9506.)
49 Gupta, Sexuality, Obscenity, Community, particularly chapter 2; Mufti, “A Greater Story-writer than God,” 8.
51 In addition to the texts already mentioned, consult Jyotika Virdi’s The Cinematic ImagiNation for a recent analysis of the family as a symbolic notation of the nation in independent India.
52 In the 1970s and beyond, the crisis of state authority was primary negotiated through images of rebellious masculinity, with Hindi films like Zanjeer (Mehra,
1973), Deewar (Chopra, 1974), and Sholay (Sippy, 1975) laying the basis for the angry male proletariat hero in conflict with representatives of state law. As M. Madhava Prasad, Vijay Mishra, Ranjani Mazumdar, and others argue, the historical shift was epitomized by the rising stardom of Amitabh Bachchan as the masculine “subaltern hero” of the proletariat, whose films variously thematized the inefficacy, betrayal, and qualified redemption of the nation-state’s authority. Femininity in these films manufactured a new consent between the rebelling proletariat and the delegitimated masculine law of the state, symbolically recuperating a qualified statist doctrine for the new order (Mishra, Bollywood Cinema; Mazumdar, “From Subjectification to Schizophrenia”). Though a detailed analysis of this historical moment is neither relevant nor necessary here, the seventies should be marked as the second significant misalignment between state and community, the first dating back to the colonial era when the definition of a modern and national state was still in process.

53 My appeal here is not to a formal determinism but to form’s responsiveness to context. It would be ridiculous to claim that the mythological or historical genre intrinsically untethers female characters from their ideological positioning within a patriarchally defined nationalism; the television serializations of the Ramayana and the Mahabharata clearly reveal otherwise.

54 Huyssen, After the Great Divide, 30.
55 For a discussion of the social hierarchy of genres see Prasad, Ideology of the Hindi Film, 135; Kakar, “The Ties that Bind.”
56 NFAI, Saar [plot], Bandhan songbook.
57 Particularly memorable are arguments between Saudamini and her prisoner Durjaya (Chandramohan). He accuses her of being dependent on an entire galley of men instead of one man as a married woman might be. She in turn derides his love for Princess Nandini, because of his presumption that a woman may love a man irrespective of his appearance or condition. Durjaya, at this point, is unkempt and chained as a slave.

58 Neepa Majumdar, Female Stardom and Cinema in India, 1930 to 1950, 133.
60 Ibid.
61 From her autobiography Mi Durga Khote as reproduced in Watve, V. Damle and S. Fattelal, 7.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., 52.
65 Rajadhyaksha and Willemen note that Khote’s class background and her feminism “allowed her to assume different images from the conventional Sangeet Natak stereotypes,” and that her acting “recalled the Talmadge sisters or Mary Pickford” (Encyclopaedia of Indian Cinema, 125). Sangeet Natak style combined the traditions
of Sanskrit classics and Shakespearean theater with Parsi theater and Ravi Verma paintings to produce a template for Indian film images (ibid., 205).

66 See also the special issue on V. Shantaram in South Asian Cinema 1, nos. 3–4 (2002).
67 Shantaram and Narwekar, V. Shantaram, 9.
68 Kapur, “Mythic Material in Indian Cinema,” 82.
69 Ibid., 84.
70 Ibid., 89. The unity of idea and image links this representational ethos to the tradition of bhakti saints, according to Kapur. The bhakti tradition, which Kapur analogizes to Gandhian spiritualism, was part of a devotional movement (800–1700 AD) that influenced Hinduism, Islam, Sikhism, and Jainism through its saint-composers of varying religions, classes, and castes. They achieved divinity through ecstatic songs and dances that made spirituality accessible to ordinary people. See Sharma, Bhakti and Bhakti Movement; Mullatti, Bhakti Movement and the Status of Women.
72 Personal conversation with A. V. Damle, Law College Road, Pune (6 August 2000). Also see Rajadhyaksha and Willemen, Encyclopaedia of Indian Cinema, 214.
73 Samik Bandyopadhyay, Indian Cinema, 12–13.
74 The influence of European cinema’s modernist and realist traditions were evident in the films produced in the late 1940s and 1950s by the Indian People’s Theater Association (IPTA), a progressive group of playwrights, artists, and filmmakers informally affiliated with the Communist Party of India. Their films combined Indian folk forms and neorealist and expressionist aesthetics with socially relevant themes to create alternatives to the commercial products generated by Indian and U.S. film industries. For details see Bhatia, “Staging Resistance.”
75 Rajadhyaksha and Willemen, Encyclopaedia of Indian Cinema, 214.
76 Kaul, Cinema and the Indian Freedom Struggle, 66.
77 Baburao Patel, editor of filmindia, refuted the claim that Admi was based on Waterloo Bridge, arguing that MGM released the film in New York on 17 May 1940 and in Bombay on 23 August 1940. Prabhat’s Admi had already been released by this time. However, MGM’s film was apparently based on a Universal film by the same name released in Bombay on 21 October 1931. (filmindia 6, no. 10 [October 1940]: 37–40.)
78 Rajadhyaksha and Willemen, Encyclopaedia of Indian Cinema, 130, 88, respectively.
80 For more on Osten consult Schonfeld, “Franz Osten’s ‘The Light of Asia.’”
82 Rajadhyaksha and Willemen, Encyclopaedia of Indian Cinema, 265.
83 Film historians Barnow and Krishnaswamy argue that Shantaram abjures his fa-
miliar realities in Amritmanthan and Admi. “By necessity Shantaram, producing in Hindi, a language foreign to him, for a huge audience he did not know and whose entertainment requirements were made known to him via distributors, statistics, and trade press, was moving into a world of quasi-realistic fantasy” (Indian Film, 93). As must be clear from my discussion, I find it more productive to understand Shantaram’s use of multiple styles as a sign of his aspiration to address local markets while creatively engaging global styles, rather than as an unwitting error on his part.

84 Elsaesser, “Tales of Sound and Fury,” 43.
85 This echoes a sentiment underscored by Moti’s neighbor in the preceding scene, in which he reminds the young man of the many kinds of love in the world (like maternal and paternal love) other than romantic.
86 *Filmindia* 6, no. 10 (October 1940): 39–40. This review celebrates Indian cinema’s realism by emphasizing Shantaram’s message of social uplift, but is less articulate about the film’s stylization. Expressionist experimentation in a later IPTA film, *Neecha Nagar* (1946), similar to Shantaram’s work, was reportedly considered pretentious in retrospect by the film’s director Chetan Anand (according to Chakravarty, National Identity in Indian Popular Cinema, 92).
87 Counterpoints to the expressionist scenes in Amritmanthan can be found in sequences in which the young hero Madhavgupt teaches Rani Mohini about the natural charms of life in a forest, mostly recreated in a studio but intercut with documentary shots of deer and rabbits. Though Amritmanthan cannot be characterized as realist, these sequences demarcate themselves as “natural” within the film. The young queen, who has been misled by Rajguru, learns lessons in simplicity, poverty, and humility once she steps out of the artificial life of the palace.