III :: The Experiment
The goal of experiments, according to the optimistic, empirical definition, is to reveal rules, if not also laws. In the way that experiments are arranged, they define $x$ conditions, under which $y$ occurs. If $y$ occurs, it is inferred that in the arrangement $x$ there are generally applicable conditions for the appearance of $y$. The general applicability is temporally defined through repetition. Whenever $x$, then $y$. According to skeptics, however, since conditions are defined by the arrangements in the experiment, the experiment turns into experimentation, that is, it is itself already a hypothetical action that interferes in the field that it is meant to research by induction. Gaston Bachelard summarizes this in a bon mot: “Un fait est un fait” (a fact is a fact). And Hans-Jörg Rheinberger proposed the nifty German translation that draws attention to the relation between the being-done of the fact and the action, the doing: “Eine Tatsache ist eine Tatsache.”¹ The experiment thus once again comes out of the fantasmatic realm of pure empiricism and into the contaminated zone where human beings and nature overlap. The experiment, the empiricism of which is itself made relative in the experiment’s quality as artifact and as something done, becomes a paradox. This originates in the experiment’s two interwoven natures, the physical one crisscrosses the human one. The anthropological explanation of the human being as a natural being, eccentrically situated in relation to its own physicality, as Helmut Plessner has put it, allows us to draw further conclusions that call into question whether hypotheses, condemned by experimental philosophy as a humanoid relapse of empiricism into metaphysics, can be abolished, or whether it is better to take on the fact that the human is a being that creates hypotheses.²

A popular television comedian from Cologne, Willy Millowitsch, puts it succinctly: “What you yourself don’t know, you have to explain to
yourself.” Since we are constantly running up against the limits of our tacit knowledge (Michael Polanyi), which constantly shifts the horizon of our previous understanding (Hans-Georg Gadamer), we are also constantly forced to shift the horizon of our nonknowledge further, to form new hypotheses, while those that hold up in the current situation are expanded into a theory. The beginning of expanding such theories, and this includes routine theories, scientific theories, absurd theories, and any others as well, is thus marked by an experience of lack, of a need, a need for explanation. To form a theory is to react to the experience of reaching a limit of understanding and wanting to get beyond it. Presumably, we construct theories where our curiosity runs up against something that escapes the empirical descriptive capabilities of our ordinary consciousness. This is why theories are at their cores nonempirical and speculative, even if theories refer to concrete empirical objects and incidents. At the same time, however, theories are driven by a longing for the real. It is not by chance that this brief polemic against theory originates from Ludwig Wittgenstein, who succinctly states: “Philosophy must not interfere in any way with the actual use of language.” And, he says, “we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. All explanation must disappear, and description alone must take its place.” These descriptions, however, “must not interfere in any way with the actual use of language.” In a critique of this apodictic thesis, which it is only almost correct to dismiss, Herbert Marcuse raises the thought-provoking objection that thinking here is “pressed into the straitjacket of common usage,” and it is assumed that common-language use is always already all right—that is, in a certain sense it lies outside the experimental. “What,” asks Marcuse, “remains of philosophy? What remains of thinking, intelligence, without anything hypothetical, without any explanation?”

The motif of forming theories, which is a precursor to any experiment, is similar to that of forming fictions in another area, namely aesthetics. Not only can we aesthetically relate to theories, as we can to any other objects, phenomena, and ideas, but I would go so far as to say that there is an isomorphism in the affective priming of both variations to confront the impenetrability of the physical world and the contingency of the social world. When a circumstance can no longer be ascertained in the usual way and can be integrated into the operative consciousness of a possible space of action, the spheres of fantasy, imagination, and fiction begin. At this point, a need emerges to convert the imaginary, which envelops the real, into a form that we, following Wolfgang Iser, could call
fiction. Even if Iser explicitly seeks to delimit his model of the acts of fictionalizing from theories of theoretical fiction, his argument is nonetheless grounded on the affective basis of the behavior of the physical body, which makes it of vital interest to see one’s own corporal frontality, and in which we go into the world, as a process of continually unlocking and opening new horizons. This is a process that does not remain bound by the limits of the physically visible but is directed at relationality: in space by assumptions about what lies far away, close by, and off to the side, and in time by the constant links between modes of time made by memory and recognition, as needing to be recognized, forgotten, and so on, in the future. The stream of consciousness permanently interweaves experiences, perceptual impressions by the senses, with linguistic and visual ideas that constitute an imaginary that pushes us onward to performatory formation. Theories, hypotheses, images, and experiments in thought have a common reservoir in the real, which has to be materialized and substantiated as fact in the very act of fictionalizing.

From this store of imaginary ideas, both linguistic and visual, we form the theoretical network with which we attempt to capture the real as a kind of grid by which we perceive and orient our actions. For this reason, theories are not possible outside of visual and affective ideas and circumstances. Martin Saar, in his reconstruction of the Nietzschean model of genealogy, raises exactly this point to emphasize that theories emerge in a crisis as a critique of existing models of explanation and interpretation. The fact that these theories have any bite as criticism at all is due to their temporal arrangement—that is, that they always emerge when something new turns up that we need to know more about. The mistrust of theory is much larger than that of dogmas, which have already established themselves as incontrovertible and can gather believers around them who no longer need to be convinced. Theories, on the other hand, are trophies that have to be passed on, since the horizons of our world can have no fixed limits.

The skeptical demand to mitigate the question of why (the explanation) with that of how (the description) is countered, however, by the fact that our need for explanation has an affective basis, which cannot be fobbed off onto any call for empirical modesty. When Sigmund Freud presents a biologically based affect theory of knowledge by assuming a “drive to knowledge,” this brings a new angle to the question of how the biological materialization of thinking is connected to human corporeality.

I take the experiment to be a kind of dispositif, in which the relation
between physical nature and physical bodies must always be defined and redefined in reference to the human body and its physical and mental capacities. In this context, the experiment is also always an experiment on human beings as much as it is an experiment by human beings. The anthropocentric dimension of the experiment, as an artificial, humanly conceived trap, in which nature is meant to show itself to us and speak to us, turns into the experimental investigation of the boundaries of the human itself. In the experiment, if an untouched nature is supposed to be animated into one that speaks to us, the human being itself soon becomes positioned in the experiment as a mystery. At the beginning of the experiment is the question of the nature of nature, and at the end the question of the nature of the human being within the experiment. The fascination that the experiment has held as a technologically grounded cultural technique of desiring desire against any and all skepticism is above all emphasized where the experimental arrangement directly targets human perception, that is, the impact of an experiment, which is supposed to be new and take place in the interplay between the reception of the senses and the reception of affect. If the boundaries between the disciplines become fluid there, this should come as no surprise. Philosophy becomes psychology, psychology becomes aesthetics, and experimental aesthetics sets out once again to revise experimental philosophy.

In a review of Kurthian music psychology, Theodor W. Adorno points to comparable developments in music theory in the transition from the nineteenth to the twentieth century. He refers to the subjectifying power of music, which works directly against the experimental-exact models of examination:

It is much more characteristic of [Hugo] Riemann’s teachings than of the most effective of recent work that they believe they can banish the element of subjective tension in a static-objective, mathematizing schema, which was incompatible with the dynamic of the phenomena and which collapsed in the end. — Static, systematic, but always essentially didactic “music theory” figured as a supplement to a “psychology of sound,” which hoped to overcome the subjective side of musical phenomena in the psychological experiment by using the measuring methods of psychophysics. It saw its central problem as the relation between basic appeal and the strength of sensation, also already essentially getting beyond the mere analysis of elements in Carl Stumpf’s examinations, which were extensive and oriented to material, but still remaining for-
eign to spontaneous subjectivity, even in its themes, in the forms of musical cohesion as such.¹²

I am not so much interested in historically reconstructing the shift between philosophy, psychology, and aesthetics as I am in attempting to break down the inherent model of animation for the production of communicative expressivity as an aesthetics proper to the experiment in film. I take animation in film to be a process of bringing to life in a double sense: (1) through the technological setting-into-motion of individual pictures, the film itself is animated in a general sense, which exceeds the strict definition of the genre “animation film” and constitutes animation as a moving image that suggests the quality of vitality, and (2) the spectator is animated by the animation and displaced in a specific way into the state of vitality.

Materialist theories of film, which originate in the materializing film effects in the perceptual events of the recipient, tend to draw on the transformed vocabulary of experimental philosophy. This begins with the work of Gustav Theodor Fechner, whose psychophysics was strongly critiqued and rejected as a one-sided relation of causality, but whose terminology has meandered through the disciplines and the centuries ever since in a wide variety of ways. Both Freud and Friedrich Nietzsche, in the ideas they formulated, showed themselves to be open to a direct connection between the physiological and the psychological—and in individual cases it is not at all easy to detect where the terms came from in these authors. Max Weber, in his study “Zur Psychophysik der industriellen Arbeit” (On the psychophysics of industrial work), was extensively concerned with the works of labor psychology, which he sought to link to sociology’s new questions and methods. Here he already cites studies on typewriter writing that resemble Siegfried Kracauer’s descriptions of disciplining employees with metronomes that set the pace. Weber’s study cited concerns about the so-called loss of practice, which occurs when an established routine is interrupted by a break and has to be practiced anew:

An (American) test in typewriting showed, for instance, that the level of proficiency attained after 50 days when first learning to type was later achieved, after a break of more than two years during which the test subject had completely broken off any contact to typing, after only 13 days. In this shortening of the necessary practice time to around a fourth, we can see the “practice balance.” On the other hand, it seems to be demonstrable, in experimental review of familiar everyday experi-
ences, that no level of proficiency, no matter how high, provides an immunity to “loss of practice,” but that every interruption, even of the most proficient worker (typesetter, bookkeeper, piano virtuoso) makes its presence known at once in the continuing practice—which is of practically considerable significance for the question of diversifying work.\textsuperscript{13}

Weber remains notably skeptical of psychophysics in connection with Fechner, Wilhelm Wundt, and Emil Kraepelin, emphasizing the discrepancy that exists between the simple assumption that it is physical appeal that triggers a parallel emotion, and the complex construction of emotions in social structures of activity, which themselves can become further triggers. Kracauer speaks of “psychophysical correspondences,” which securely found their way into his \textit{Theory of Film}, by referring back not to Fechner but to Freud and to the French psychologist Henri Wallon, who was one of the founding figures of French \textit{filmologie} and who had been examining film from a psychological perspective since the forties. Kracauer cites Wallon in the spectator chapter, including his essay “De quelques problèmes psycho-physiologiques que pose le cinéma” (On some psycho-physiological problems posed by cinema).\textsuperscript{14} This critique of positivism and its opposition of man and nature is taken from Wallon:

\begin{quote}
Between it [the object] and the observer, there is no impenetrable interval as is postulated by positivism, nor all the old doctrines that go along with it, for which the universe and humanity come to be juxtaposed like two more or less distinct entities. Pushed to a sufficient degree of minuitia, the measure of physics shows that observation modifies the fact observed, since there is no such thing as observation disembodied from all physical action, nor is there intelligence without an organ nor a man without a body.\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}

Kracauer refers to Wallon’s film studies in order to document his own theory of cinema, which affects the spectator “with skin and hair.” The center of these reflections is occupied by movement itself: “Movement is the alpha and omega of the medium. Now the sight of it seems to have a ‘resonance effect,’ provoking in the spectator such kinesthetic responses as muscular reflexes, motor impulses, or the like. In any case, objective movement acts as a psychological stimulus. . . . The effect itself appears to be well-established: representations of movement do cause a stir in deep bodily layers. It is our sense organs which are called into play.”\textsuperscript{16} The spectator involuntarily adapts to rhythms and movements well before any meanings arise between the shots in the montage or nar-
rative dramaturgies— and herein lies the analogy to music that Kracauer underscores: “Aside from its meaning in each case, music has a direct effect on the senses; its rhythms directly stimulate the senses. The material phenomena represented in film and their movements fundamentally produce the same effect—indeed, film images are thus doubly allotted to this effect because without it they sink back lifelessly into the surface.” To sink back, “lifelessly into the surface,” would spell the aesthetic end of film—it would have lost its power to bring to life. The fact that this bringing to life becomes the telos of film aesthetics in Kracauer is omnipresent in the spectator chapter.

“Life” is nature animated, and film is the experiment that exposes this. “Whitehead for one,” writes Kracauer, “was deeply aware that scientific knowledge is much less inclusive than aesthetic insight, and that the world we master technologically is only part of the reality accessible to the senses.” He continues, “The concept of life may also designate this reality which transcends the anemic space-time world of science.” The reality that Kracauer finds rescued in film aesthetics is exactly this nature, experimentally produced, brought to life, animated in our gaze. The experiment of film, however, also differs from scientific experiments in another respect. While the scientific experiment is aimed at identical reproducibility, which is basic to its claim to legitimacy, the aesthetic experiment lives from the fact that it is temporally open and its repeated reception is precisely not aimed at identical reproduction but at the incompleteness of a process, a process in which signs are found in relation to one another in a movement that is not fixed by any identity of meaning. Adorno shifts the focus to the open temporal horizon of the aesthetic experiment when he describes its dialectic as targeted at “realizing the demand that is recognized without forgetting the nature that conditions the demand. For neither of them ever come into accord within the existing, but merely in what is to come: dialectically. Experiments are the genuinely dialectical moments in the life of the artwork.”

The nature that speaks to the camera is different from the nature of the squeaking laboratory rat; what the scalpel (Benjamin’s camera) cuts free are points of view and not facts. These points of view are the result of alternating standpoints, which—and this is the insight of Nietzsche’s perspectivism—do not only stand open to principal alterability and ecstatic cross fading but can also be anticipated. As such, the film experiment goes after the subjectivity of reception without fixing it into a subject-object schema. In the experiment of film, therefore, it is not only the identity of the object that comes into question but also the
identity of the subject. In the open temporal horizon of what will be, subjectivity and objectivity are experimentally interwoven with each other. The life of the artworks and the life of their recipients are ecstatically intertwined in the moment of bringing to life, which occurs in separate temporal windows. This is the criterion for the success of the aesthetic experiment, the twisting of the externality of the test arrangement with the interiority of the sensations of the senses.

Sergei Eisenstein also sees this duality as dialectically dynamic:

The dialectic of a work of art is constructed upon a most interesting “dyad.” The effect of a work of art is built upon the fact that two processes are taking place within it simultaneously. There is a determined progressive ascent towards ideas at the highest peaks of consciousness and at the same time there is a dual process: an impetuous progressive rise along the lines of the highest conceptual steps of consciousness and at the same time there is a penetration through the structure of the form into the deepest layers of emotional thinking. The polarity between these two creates the remarkable tension of the unity of form and content that distinguishes genuine works. All genuine works possess it.20

Eisenstein, who was fascinated by psychological experiments, never forgot that the form does not only penetrate the inner storyline of the film; the form also penetrates the spectator. “Emotional thinking” is connected to the ecstatic states of the spectators, which it exemplifies with recourse to the concept of life. And it does so in film objects, which still undermine the materialistic concept of the nature of our physical surroundings—this seems to be fundamental for Benjamin and Kracauer.

In his euphoric commentary on Walt Disney’s early animated films, Eisenstein developed a poetics of film and life with the goal of connecting the permanent re-forming of the drawn line into new forms with a motif of plasmaticness. Animated films are, as he writes, “mocking at their own form.”21 The infinite life of the endlessly metamorphizing characters becomes an ecstatic celebration of a life that is continually created anew, free of the production of meaning and responsibility: “Disney is simply ‘beyond good and evil.’ Like the sun, like trees, like birds, like the ducks and mice, deer and pigeons that run across his screen. . . . Disney’s films, while not exposing sunspots, themselves act like reflections of sunrays and spots across the screen of the earth. They flash by, burn briefly and are gone.”22 The Nietzschean citation, set in single quotes, is not the only allusion to the Dionysian celebration of
merging with drives, with nature, or with whatever else will be called on as a generic primeval ground to picnic with plasma. The Apollonian trump card, which refers to the Dionysian ecstasy of borders, is nothing more than time itself:

And if most of them did not flash by us so quickly . . . we could be made angry by the moral uselessness of their existence on the screen.

But because of the fleeting ephemerality of their existence, you cannot reproach them for their mindlessness.

Even the string of a bow cannot be strained forever.

The same for the nerves.

And instants of this “releasing” . . . are just as prophylactically necessary as the daily dose of carefree laughter in the well-known American saying: “A laugh a day keeps the doctor away.”

The energetic model of tension and release used here by Eisenstein is that of nerve stimulation; at a different point he relates it to another element that has an effect on the nerves by means of light and warmth, that of fire. The love of fire, and here he is following a study of pyromania by the psychiatrist Paul Näcke, is based on the following reasons: “Foremost phototropism, characteristic of all living matter—that is, the attracting power of bright light, the sun, or fire . . . thermotropism—that is, the magnetic power of warmth on the cells of an organism.” Eisenstein emphasizes “the magnetic power of . . . movement.” The synaesthetic model of a connection between visual, haptic, and tactile qualities in perception is a model for film perception: it gets on our nerves. Film is an experience that we sense synaesthetically, which is subcutaneously brought into a rhythmic shaping of time through light and movement. This is the poetic plasmaticness that the material of film presents and that protects us from “ossification.” There is “a rejection” at work, “of once-and-forever allotted form, freedom from ossification, the ability to assume dynamically any form. An ability that I would call ‘plasmaticness.’”

Eisenstein finds these poetics in Japanese woodcut prints; in Maxim Gorky’s description of fire in alternating images of animals, whose forms assume the shape of flames; in the snake people who share a world with Lewis Carroll’s Alice, who can become quite small and quite large in Wonderland; and more. Movement becomes a media-anthropological tertium comparationis, and it is movement that has an effect as the animation of drawing. The pneuma of the film, we might add, lies in the rhythm of the montage’s cuts, the temporality of the twenty-four
frames per second, the vibration of the flicker that is obstructed as inner agitation in the very film being screened. The film is thus similar to the attractiveness of fire, which—and here Eisenstein cites Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy—“is physical time, absolute unrest, absolute disintegration of existence, the passing away of the ‘other,’ but also of itself.”26 Film goes by in physical time, but over and over again it takes on form; it burns up and is animated once again in the apparatus.27

If Eisenstein had simply remained with the celebration of biological life, we would probably attribute to him today a life-sciences paradigm that had quite abandoned the obstinacy of an aesthetic concept of form, jumping back once again into psychophysics. This is an option that Eisenstein rejected expressis verbis. Eisenstein has bigger plans for Disney. The comedic quality of the film cannot simply be explained through biological regression to plasmatic merging. The matter that becomes the material of the film cannot be plasma.

In terms of their material, Disney’s pictures are pure ecstasy—all the traits of ecstasy (the immersion of self in nature and animals etc.)

Their comicality lies in the fact that the process of ecstasy is represented as an object: literalised, formalised.

That is, Disney is an example (within the general formula of the comical) of a case of formal ecstasy!!! (Great!) (Producing an effect of the same degree of intensity as ecstasy!).28

The comedic as a form is based on a shift of the metaphor of metonymy, a procedure that Eisenstein also sees in effect without the shift to the comedic in the following line that he cites in German from Friedrich Hölderlin’s Der Wanderer (The wanderer, 1797):

Fernhin schlich das hagere Gebirge, wie ein wandelnd Gerippe,
Streckt das Dörfllein vergnügt über die Wiesen sich aus.

[Far away crept the haggard mountains, like a mutating carcass,
The village merrily stretches out past the meadow.]29

The fact that it is the village itself that “stretches” fascinates Eisenstein: “This kind of motor metaphor . . . is the very earliest, most ancient type of metaphor—directly motory. . . . Not objectively visible, even less ‘a comparison of something with something’ . . . but rather a motor-subjectively sensed metaphor, par excellence.”30

This is what fascinates him so much in the elongated necks of the Disney bestiary, in the legs that get longer as they run, for example: that
the contours become independent and form themselves into a second object, which exists alongside the first and which does not simply metaphorically replace it. “And only after the contour of the neck elongates beyond the possible limits of the neck—does it become a comical embodiment of that which occurs as a sensuous process in the cited metaphors.”31 Referring to Walt Disney’s *The Karnival Kid* (1929), Eisenstein at one point notes—without mentioning the title of the film—that “there are the hotdogs whose skins are pulled down and are spanked.”32 The anarchistic shifts of metaphors into metonymies are clearly shown in the film. Mickey plays a hot-dog seller, running his mobile business out of a small wagon at a fair. This is one of the first sound films in which Mickey speaks, and he intones a staccato “hoot doggs, hoot doggs,” each time sticking a fork into one of the sausages, which then responds with a bark. As the film goes on, the hot dogs undergo different kinds of transformations, for example, from sausage to a dog that bites, to a boy that gets his behind paddled. The hot dogs that bark are not metaphors for dogs. Rather, their proper name is used metonymically: the hot dogs become dogs, the bites become biters, the sausage casing becomes a textile covering, and so on. The comedic arises at the level of a motory-sensual knowledge about how it feels to be in motion, and of the object-like representation of its intention, such as getting away quickly, or its mood, such as feeling agitated.

Eisenstein is fascinated by Émile Zola’s formula: “Une réalité vu à travers un tempérament” (a reality seen through a temperament).33 The world is seen through a temperament, or, one could add, following Heidegger, through a mood. Moods are ways of perceiving the world. They are not simply bad filters or distorting mirrors; they are our own membranes, which connect us to the world as we perceive it. Films, and particularly those of Disney, create this membrane, which is required for us to experience the world as one in which will and representation can appear side by side. And precisely because of this these films allow the will and the wish to come forth to color our representation of the world and provide it with its plasticity by distributing light and shadow.

The poetics of film that Eisenstein develops with Disney’s animated films is thus based on a threefold conception of life:

1. Biological life as matter or plasma, which precedes any implementation of individual life as substance.
2. The artwork as an experiment of animation, which grants itself a life.
3. The artwork as an experiment of animation, which arouses the spectator to life and allows the spectator to experience himself or herself as living.

By mediating the three layers, film becomes an aesthetic experiment in which, as I proposed in the definition of the experiment, something is to be given voice in its nature. In his astute study Ästhetik der Lebendigkeit: Kant’s dreite Kritik (Aesthetics of vitality: Kant’s third critique), Jan Völker has derived a principle of difference from Kant’s concept of life and nature: “If we return once again to the third Critique, then Kant’s definition of the human animal—as that animal that is an organic being and at the same time a being that can express its difference in nature—can be read differently. The specificity of the human being lies in its nonnatural life.”34 The experiment of animated film gives voice to exactly this aspect. The “ecstasy of form” is not the dull celebration of the organic around the plasmatic melting pot; it is the enhanced experience of an animated nature, a fictitious nature, which is the effect of a human act, an action that it has manufactured: “This is Kant’s solution to the question of spirit. The spirit is the human faculty of negating the order of nature, and therein lies the paradoxical nature of the human being. It is its nature to negate nature.”35

Whether it be barking sausages, talking mice, or czars drawn out in their shadows, in the film experiment of animation, the open quality of natural definition can be experienced as a permanent metonymic shift. If we define the experiment as a dispositif, it can be deployed, as Eisenstein has shown, as a basic building block of cinema aesthetics.

Notes

All translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

1. The standard German translation for “fact” is Tatsache, which is made up of the parts Tat (act, action) and Sache (thing, matter). Rheinberger, “Wissensräume und experimentelle Praxis,” 368.
2. Plessner, Conditio humana; and Plessner, Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch.
5. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, section 109, 52e.
8. See, for example, Iser, The Fictive and the Imaginary.
9. See, for example, Saar, *Genealogie als Kritik*.


11. See, for example, the writings of Robert Hooke, the curator in charge of experiments at the Royal Society: “Such Experiments therefore, wherein Nature is as ‘twere put to Shifts and for’cd to confess, either directly or indirectly the Truth of what we inquire, are the best if they could be met with.” Cited in Nelle, “Im Rausch der Dinge,” 145.


14. Wallon, “De quelques problèmes psycho-physiologiques que pose le cinéma,” 15. Translation into German is mine, into English from German by Daniel Hendrickson.


20. This is from Eisenstein’s speech to Soviet filmmakers on January 8, 1935; quoted in Eisenstein, *The Eisenstein Collection*, 80 (in Naum Kleiman’s “Introduction” to the chapter “On Disney”).


27. See, for example, Lyotard’s position on film aesthetics as explosion in *L’acinéma*. Lyotard, *L’acinéma*.


33. Eisenstein, *The Eisenstein Collection*, 158. Zola, however, does not speak of “reality” but of “a corner of creation”: “J’exprimerai toute ma pensée en disant qu’une oeuvre d’art est un coin de la création vu à travers un tempérament” (I will express the entirety of my thought in saying that a work of art is a corner of creation seen through a temperament). Zola, *Mes haines*, 234.

34. Völker, *Ästhetik der Lebendigkeit*, 263. Translation is mine.