PART IV — High Colonial
THE POWER OF CULTURE AND ITS LIMITS
Taiwanese Merchants’ Asian Commodity Flows, 1895–1945

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Since the 1990s, newspapers and journals have been using terms such as “Greater China Economic Zone” and “Global Chinese Network” to describe how Chinese cultural ties facilitate economic relations. Scholars such as Leo Suryadinata, Wang Gungwu, and others depict Chinese oscillation between the affirmation of their specific ethnic identity and assimilation into other cultures. Other scholars, such as Marie-Sybille de Vienne, stress that the total gross domestic product (GDP) owned by the ethnic Chinese population around 2004 is barely the GDP of Germany, and the diasporic rate of Chinese is only 3 percent of the Chinese population, while the Greeks have more than half.

In this chapter I take up the question of the effect of cultural ties on establishing economic relations by looking at Taiwanese merchants’ Asian commodity flows during the period of Japanese colonial rule over Taiwan (1895–1945). By “cultural ties” I refer specifically to ethnicity, customs, languages, and personal relations, and in the phrase “commodity flows” I include goods and capital traded. Taiwanese merchants’ East Asian commodity flows denote their trade with and investment in South China, Manchukuo, and Southeast Asia. The data for this study derive from archives or libraries in Taiwan, Japan, the United States, Singapore, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and consist of Japanese Foreign Affairs archives, investigations published by the Taiwanese general government and the Bank of Taiwan, and newspapers in overseas Chinese communities, in Manchukuo, and in Taiwan.
Culture and Immigration

Following Shibaoka Hisashi, who defined overseas Chinese as settlers rather than sojourners who merely stayed abroad for less than three months, immigration here refers to settlers rather than to sojourners. Immigration is a prerequisite for direct investment. Statistics on overseas immigration of Taiwanese during the period of Japanese rule are scattered. One 1926 document offers a basis for understanding the distribution of Taiwanese who moved abroad. Like other sources for immigration statistics, this document sometimes excludes nonregistered people or dependents and thus provides numbers that are lower than the real numbers. Nonetheless, this document does effectively illustrate the geographical distribution of Taiwanese immigration: South China had the greatest number (4,118), followed by Southeast Asia (522), other areas of China (118), Guandongzhou (19), Qingdao (4), Australia (3), and Chile (1) (see map 1). In contrast to Japanese immigrants, who moved out of East Asia and Southeast Asia in greater numbers than moved within this area from 1904 to 1935, Taiwanese migration was mainly restricted to East Asia and Southeast Asia (see map 1, fig. 1).

Taiwanese immigration remained largely within South China, especially within south Fujian, as well as within the overseas Chinese communities from this region across Southeast Asia. According to the registered number published by the Taiwan general government, the total number of Taiwanese in China was approximately 335 in 1907, and 12,900 by 1936. If we include the estimated 7,000–8,000 who did not register, the number of Taiwanese in China in fact reached nearly 21,000 in 1936. Of this number, around 20,000 resided in Fujian Province alone; the distribution within Fujian put 18,000 of these in Xiamen, 2,000 in Fuzhou, and several hundred within the Zhangzhou and Quanzhou regions. An estimated 80 to 90 percent of the ancestors of the Taiwanese had arrived within the previous three hundred years from Xiamen, Quanzhou, and Zhangzhou, and they often retained family, property, and friends in their ancestral homes. Guangdong was somewhat further from Taiwan than south Fujian was, and the dialects spoken there were quite different from Fujianese. But their dialects were similar to the Hakka Taiwanese, whose population is about one-fifth of the Fujianese in Taiwan in 1928. While the number of Taiwanese in Guangdong increased in the later period of Japanese rule in Taiwan, overall their numbers were far less than those in Xiamen.

In the early twentieth century, Taiwanese made up the greatest proportion of Japanese nationals in South China, especially in Xiamen, Fuzhou, and
Shantou. Immigrants from Japan proper began to expand into South China only in the late Meiji period (1868–1912), comprising but a tiny proportion by the beginning of the twentieth century. There were virtually no Koreans in South China in this period. By 1936, when 12,900 Taiwanese were registered in South China, only 2,783 migrants had come from Japan proper.\textsuperscript{12} According to a survey from 1 April 1937, of the 2,100 Japanese nationals in Fuzhou, 1,700 were Taiwanese; of the 10,678 Japanese nationals in Xiamen, 10,000 were Taiwanese.\textsuperscript{13} Based on the results of a Japanese consular survey from 1 January 1942, the number of Japanese nationals in China indicates that Japanese and Koreans clearly outnumbered Taiwanese in north and central China, but the opposite was true in South China (see figs. 2, 3, 4, and 5). This data corroborates the trend of Taiwanese immigrants settling more in South China than in other parts of China.

According to article 4 of the 1896 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between China and Japan, Japanese nationals were only allowed to rent or purchase houses, and rent or lease land for residence, doing business, or engag-

Figure 2: The distribution of Taiwanese in China, 1942. Source: Chart derived from the table in Komukura Jirō, Manshū, Shina: Sekai chili seiji taikei [Manchuria and China: The great series of world geography and politics] (Tokyo: Hakuyōsha, 1944), 392. I am grateful to Xu Xueji for kindly providing me with this material.

Figure 3: The distribution of Japanese nationals in North China, 1942. Source: Chart made from the table in Komukura Jirō, Manshū, Shina, 392.
ing in industry at the international concessions or settlements of the treaty ports. Article 4 stipulated that they could also carry Japanese passports with Chinese officials’ agreement, which were valid for thirteen months, to travel among the treaty ports. If travel extended beyond the treaty ports, it had to remain within 100 Chinese li (189,412 ft) from the treaty ports, and it could not extend for a period of more than five days (article 6). The distance between Xiamen and Zhangzhou is 45 kilometers. As one kilometer is 3,280.83 ft, and one Chinese li is 1,894.12 ft, 45 kilometers is 78 Chinese li. The distance between Xiamen and Quanzhou is 100 kilometers, which is 173.12 Chinese li. However, several hundred Taiwanese had inhabited or done business in Zhangzhou and Quanzhou. As Japanese nationals, the Taiwanese could live with the local Chinese. They were not required to live with Japanese from Japan proper in the treaty ports. As China did not have a
well-established household-registration system, the Taiwanese could claim
themselves as local people in order to do business or attend school.18 Some
Taiwanese went so far as to sign contracts with local governments to culti-
vate opium, leveraging familial relations in inland areas. In the years around
1920, the Taiwanese merchant Li Zhongyi, for example, could send money
to a relative in Xiamen to purchase a farm of several thousand mou (0.1647
acres) and over 400 head of plow-oxen; and set up the Zhannan Company,
which, in addition to farming livestock, grew lychees, longans, mangos, and
chestnuts.19 Taiwanese merchants could use their relatives to deeply pene-
trate into Fujianese society.20

At the same time, because China’s Nationality Law, issued in 1909 (re-
mainling effective with revisions through 1957), was based on the bloodline
principle and insisted that any revocation of Chinese nationality required the
state’s consent, even for people living on territories ceded to other countries,
the Taiwanese were able to claim legally to be Chinese. Like other Chinese
with other nationalities in the early twentieth century, the Taiwanese with
Japanese nationality were able to retain their Chinese nationality and enjoy
its considerable economic benefits.21 They were not restricted in employ-
ment or excluded from landowning rights as foreigners in China.22

Taiwanese migrating to Southeast Asia also had the advantage of sharing
a subculture with overseas Chinese already there. In Japanese colonial Tai-
wan, classes for Taiwanese to learn Southeast Asian languages were avail-
able. The Chengyuan School in Taipei began teaching Malay in September
1913.23 Yet, when Taiwanese arrived at their Southeast Asian destinations,
they rarely had problems communicating; whether in Singapore or Bang-
kok, they were able to call for a cab in the Taiwanese dialect to get to hotels
and restaurants, and local residents could employ overseas Chinese to serve
as translators in dealing with Taiwanese.24 In 1941, a Taiwanese merchant in
Indonesia said, “It is common here to hear radio broadcasts from Taiwan,
and since eighty percent of the overseas Chinese here are from Fujian, Min-
nan dialect is used in radio broadcasts.”25 In 1936, when a trade-oriented
special program was opened to Taiwanese students in Taipei Commercial
College, Taiwanese who could not speak Minnan dialect had to take related
courses.26 In this school, Malay, Thai, Filipino, Burmese, Vietnamese, Can-
tonese, Fuzhou dialect, Minnan dialect, Santou dialect, spoken and written
Chinese, Dutch, French, German, and English were offered at a minimum
of two choices in one semester with two hours a week.27

By the end of Japanese colonial rule, approximately 3,000 Taiwanese had
migrated to Southeast Asia. This suggests that cultural affinity could explain why the number of Taiwanese in Southeast Asia was second only to the number of Taiwanese in South China.

The Taiwanese situation in Manchuria was different. Unlike in South China, where Taiwanese immigrants far outnumbered Japanese, in Manchukuo it was not until 1938 that the Taiwanese approached one thousandth of the immigrants from Japan proper and one thirty-fifth of the number of Taiwanese in South China. According to the Shengjing Shibao, the largest newspaper in Manchukuo, the number of Taiwanese in Manchuria rose from about 60 in 1911, to 500 in 1932 at the establishment of Manchukuo, to 600 by 1938. Furthermore, according to Liang Jinlan, a Taiwanese whose father operated a medical practice in Manchukuo, about 1,000 Taiwanese lived in Manchukuo on the eve of 1945. The number of Japanese immigrants in Manchuria was already 100,000 in 1911, 270,000 by 1932, and 600,000 by 1938 (excluding military personnel and their dependents).

Before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the passport application procedure for Taiwanese traveling to Southeast Asia or to the Republic of China was not as simple as going to Manchukuo, since the latter was under greater Japanese influence than the former. Still, far fewer Taiwanese migrated to Manchukuo than South China or Southeast Asia. One reason was the rather high linguistic barrier in Manchuria. According to a 1919 article in the Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpo,

People from Jiayi (in south-central Taiwan) who have traveled to Fuzhou, Xiamen, and all over Southeast Asia have had no difficulties in travel, but as their prospects would be constricted by not being well versed in Mandarin Chinese, young people in this town thought deeply about the problem and formed the Tu’nan [Breaking through the South] Institute to study the spoken and written Mandarin.

In 1917, the Dongyang Association’s Taiwan Commercial and Industrial School also began teaching Mandarin to facilitate trade across the Taiwan Strait. In 1938, the Jiayi Commercial School in Tainan Prefecture, complying with Japan’s national policy, began actively cultivating merchant talents to expand business in China, Southeast Asia, and Taiwan. By the fifth academic year, students had to study written Chinese every Wednesday, and it was hoped they would all take up spoken Chinese courses. From these examples, it is clear that moving outside of South China or Southeast Asia required surmounting the linguistic barrier of Mandarin, even in Manchukuo.
It was, of course, possible for Taiwanese to speak Japanese in Manchukuo. As Liang Jinlan recalled, “In Manchukuo, I mostly spoke Japanese, and after being away from Taiwan for some time, I was not able to speak Taiwanese.” However, Japanese people were the only people who could not communicate with the Mandarin-speaking people in Manchuria.

Taiwanese immigration was 22,935 in South China, 7,045 in Central China, 1,442 in North China, 1,000 in Manchuko, and 3,000 in Southeast Asia on the eve of 1945. Cultural ties certainly provide an explanation for this clear trend in migration.

Culture and Investment

Most Taiwanese immigrants during the period of Japanese rule were merchants who made large and important investments in South China. Southeast Asia and Manchuria ranked next in sequence.

According to the Tongji nianjian [the statistics almanac] published by the Fujian provincial government’s statistics office in 1937, 81.18 percent of the Taiwanese in Xiamen were merchants, 4.51 percent were doctors, and 7.85 percent were prostitutes. In Fuzhou, 68.18 percent were merchants, 8.36 percent were doctors, 7.48 percent were government employees, and 5.28 percent were teachers. According to a 1926 article in the Taiwan Nichi-nichi Shinpo, “Some Taiwanese merchants and doctors are moving to Manchuria.” In 1941, the Taiwan Association in Thailand had 76 members (including 8 Japanese), and if we include 10 others who had not become members and 65 family members, the total number of Taiwanese there was 150; of these, only 3 were not engaged in commercial activities.

Even doctors often made investments as a side business. Dr Huang Shunji from central Taiwan’s Zhanghua county moved to Manchukuo and made purchases in real estate and farmland. Cai Shixing from Lugang of central Taiwan, who with his uncle’s help was able to attend medical school, graduated and worked for the Sanwu [J. Sango] Company as a doctor. After ten years in Xiamen, by managing with small capital, he was able to rent pastureland to sell milk, his family was involved in the sugar business, and he was fast gaining respect. Wang Jingqiu, who spent twenty-two years in Thailand, engaged in several enterprises in addition to running a successful medical practice.

In addition to their work as company and store employees, these Taiwanese merchants’ commercial activities extended to investments ranging from individual stores to large-scale industries such as factories, farms, mines, and banks.
Categories of Taiwanese Investment

In 1929, Taiwanese in South China engaged in a wide range of commercial activities. They opened businesses that dealt in foodstuffs (rice, tobacco, tea, wine, ginseng, fruit, candy, and seafood); clothing (cloth, dyes, leather, rubber shoes, jewelry, and lace); everyday products (coal, medicine, timber, antiques, incense, writing implements, printing, toys, porcelain, and furniture); modern products (clocks, fertilizer, machinery, chemicals, drugs, glasses, cement, alcohol, bicycle parts, medical implements, ship repair items, ship materials, and dry-cell batteries); factories (incense, wine, staples, ice, drugs, soda, gas refining, batteries, and mining); and services (hotels, restaurants, real estate, and finance). In September 1926, the occupations of Taiwanese in Xiamen included the operation of opium dens, grocery stores, restaurants, hospitals, pharmacies, and distilleries. In 1941, service trades dominated their business.

From 1935 to 1940, Taiwanese in Southeast Asia had food-related stores for bread, coffee, tea, vegetables, rice, tobacco, and seafood; and for general products including western medicine, ship sail fabric, mosquito nets, exercise equipment, and porcelain. They also invested in factories that produced canned fruit, ice, drinking water, iron, lime, and hats; or in factories for machine repair. In addition, they had plantations, fishing, and husbandry. In the service sector they had investments in finance, hotels, and real-estate agencies. In addition, Taiwanese in Southeast Asia included a fair number of doctors and actors. Taiwanese in Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam tended to work in Japanese companies or to own grocery stores, hardware stores, pharmacies, and tea stores. In Indonesia, more Taiwanese owned production industries, including weaving, dying, charcoal, iron, soy sauce, candy, canvas, and cold beverages. They also had more extensive financial power and a longer and closer relationship with the local overseas Chinese than Taiwanese did in other Southeast Asian countries. Taiwanese in Malaya and Singapore, being mostly of the laboring classes and weak in economic power, formed a great contrast with those in Indonesia.

The scale of the factories of Taiwanese merchants in South China and Southeast Asia was comparable. From 1935 to 1940, the businesses operated by Taiwanese in Southeast Asia had mostly ten or fewer employees, but there was also a factory employing over 600 workers. In terms of capital and operating expenses, the range was from 200 guilders to 280,000 guilders. Factory employees included Chinese, Japanese, and locals. One Taiwanese business in Xiamen had ten or fewer employees in July 1941.
In the field of manufacturing, a Taiwanese merchant in Fuzhou in about 1914 operated a shoe factory with 32 employees, capital expenses of 45,000 yen, and an annual profit of 26,000 yen. In Xiamen, a Taiwanese merchant opened the Guangjian Leather Factory with a local Chinese in 1920 on the Gulangyu international settlement with 62,500 yen as capital. In May 1928, another merchant opened the Huang Chengyuan Ice Factory with 22 employees, and a daily production average of 5 tons of ice. The Jiaji Yanghang Distillery had 80 employees and an annual gross profit of 110,000 yen, capital of 650,000 yen, and a net profit of 50,000 yen. Xinji Yanghang Crystal Sugar Factory, using sugar from Java and selling to Tianjin and Shanghai, was established in about 1917 with capital of 10,000 yen. With 60 employees and 12,000 crates of crystal sugar produced per year, the factory netted a profit of 120,000 yen.

Taiwanese Investment in Public Works

The largest investments were made by the prominent Lin family of Banqiao, Taiwan. Lin Erjia (the son of Lin Weiyuan, who helped Governor Liu Ming-chuan in Taiwan to build the wall of Taipei in the 1880s) established the Xiamen Telephone Company. In 1907, Lin Erjia assisted the Xiamen Guild to establish the Common Electrical Appliance Company and install street lamps. Over half of the Xiamen-based Electric Lamp Company’s capital of 120,000 yuan was provided by Lin Erjia. In 1909, Lin Erjia answered the call of his relative through marriage, Chen Baochen (the teacher of Puyi, the last Qing emperor), to begin planning a railroad for Fujian province. In 1918, when the Xiamen Merchant Affairs Bureau was established, Lin Erjia was asked to repair the road from Anhai to Quanzhou. Lin Erjia also contributed to the development of the Quanzhou Electric Company. In 1913, Sun Yat-sen called for the development of modern industry, and the Quanzhou region began planning for electrification, but the 10,000 yuan of capital collected by nine well-known locals was insufficient. Since the Lins of Banqiao were related by marriage to the Gong family of Quanzhou, the Lin family entered into the investment, contributing over 80,000 yuan, with an 85 percent share of the total investment. It was only through this arrangement that it was possible to purchase generators to provide light for Quanzhou in 1916. Throughout 1913 to 1921, a relative of the Lin family managed the Quanzhou Electric Company. Furthermore, Lin Erjia’s nephew, Xiongzheng, and his uncle, Cai Faping, a merchant in Fuzhou, each contributed 500,000 yen to establish the Ri-Hua Joint Stock Company to mine in Anxi. In 1935, the manager of the Lin family of Banqiao, Xu Bing, carried out three surveys of
Tieshan Mountain in Anxi, Fujian province. Lin Xiongxiang (the grandson of Lin Weirang, Lin Weiyuan’s brother) ran a lumber business in Fuzhou and set up the Fuma People’s Car Company.

In soliciting investments to establish a sewer system in Fuzhou, Fujian’s construction bureau hoped to raise 500,000 yuan from overseas Chinese and 1,000,000 yuan from the provincial government. The bureau guaranteed a return of 5 percent interest every year for three years, and they allowed Taiwanese and foreigners to join in; they solicited a loan from Lin Xiongxiang. In order to pay off old loans and encourage industry and commerce, the bureau borrowed 2,000,000 yuan, and the Fujian finance bureau also sought a loan from Lin of 300,000 yuan to consolidate the province’s finances and to encourage industry and commerce. Lin Xiongxiang’s loans to the Fujian provincial government for public works in Fujian in 1921–1922 totaled 2,600,000 yen, 120,000 yuan of Fuzhou money, and 410,000 of the Taiwan Bank’s yen. They took place about every three weeks.

Another prominent family, the Lins of Wufeng in central Taiwan, made extensive investments in public works as well. Lin Jishang, the son of Lin Chaodong (a general merchant who had helped Liu Mingchuan to defeat the French in Taiwan and who monopolized Taiwan’s camphor industry), operated a canal from Longyan to Huating in Zhangzhou, Fujian, establishing it with a capital of 150,000 yen and jointly operating it with Lin Ruiteng, Jishang’s brother. In 1911, Lin Jishang’s firm received permission from the Chinese government to extend the canal by 80 li. Lin Ruiteng and Lin Jishang set up three steam-powered pumps in Changle County, irrigating 2,000 jia of land. They invested about 30,000 yen in Zhangpu, Zhangzhou, to reclaim over 980 jia of farmland, and they also owned 1,500 jia of forested land in the mountains. Zhangzhou’s merchants once asked Lin Jishang to purchase a steamship that could service Zhangzhou and Xiamen. Lin Jishang and Lin Ruiteng also jointly ran a light rail between Quanzhou and Anhai. They also started the Jingkou Cultivation and Herding Company, in 1909, with a capital of 50,000 yen, purchased about 500 jia of land, then an additional 100 jia of farmland and 200 jia of dry farmland, which they reclaimed and used to raise cattle and grow fruit. Lin Jishang, Lin Ruiteng, and Lin Erjia started the Fujian Mining Company in Longyan of Zhangzhou with a capital of 400,000 yen. In 1913, Lin Jishang obtained the Chinese government’s permission to mine and sell smokeless charcoal; they produced about 10,000 tons of coal per year, an amount that rose during times of war with increased demand.

By contrast with the previous two Lin families, whose ancestors both came from Fujian and invested heavily in Fujian, the Xiao family, whose an-
cestors were Hakka from Guangdong, invested in Guangdong. Xiao Xingdong from Pingdong, in southern Taiwan, went to Shantou, in 1916, to begin a joint venture with a local merchant; they established the Yonghe foreign firm on 80,000 yen of capital, with Xiao and his cousin Xiao Enxiang providing 20,000 yen. Xiao’s younger brother Xiao Ranzhao moved to Shantou to serve as consultant to the firm. The firm purchased a mine in the Longfeng region of Guangdong province and began digging. Xiao also provided capital for the Shanzhang Light Rail Company, which purchased ten li of track produced in Osaka from Mitsui Company. The ten-li light-rail line they built connected Shantou and Chenghai.

The extent to which Taiwanese merchants invested in public works ranging from telephone, electricity, and rail to canals, automobiles, steam-powered pumps, and mining in South China was simply not found in Southeast Asia or Manchukuo. Other than the big families, Taiwanese in general played a decisive role in Xiamen and Fuzhou relative to Shantou and Guangzhou in South China.

The Role of Taiwanese Merchants in South China

According to the Maritime Customs Annual Report from Xiamen in 1903, “They [the Taiwanese with Japanese nationality] have larger shop signs, and by being able to use the title of ‘foreign firm,’ they are able to thrive off Chinese merchants and contend for the business [of] other foreign firms. . . . In the same year, Xiamen had 254 foreign firms, 230 of which were owned by Chinese with foreign nationality, and 150 of whom were Taiwanese.” A survey by the Taiwan general government in 1929 also reveals that Taiwanese merchants in Xiamen were very influential in political and financial circles; financially, they owned altogether 7,000,000 yen of real estate, and 12,000,000 yen in liquid assets. Twenty of the Taiwanese merchants collectively owned over 100,000 yen, far more than any local Chinese. In 1941, during the Japanese occupation of Xiamen, the major companies and trading firms were run by Taiwanese. Among these major firms, 76 were Taiwanese, while 29 were Japanese, 4 were Fujianese, 2 were Korean, and 2 were non-Fujianese Chinese. In terms of the number of employees, Taiwanese firms had the most; three Japanese firms had over 8 employees, two had 8, and one had 17. Five Taiwanese firms had over 8 employees (10, 11, 12, 22, and 29 employees, respectively). Thus, in terms of scale, Taiwanese firms were larger than Japanese firms.

In Fuzhou, the Taiwanese were fairly powerful in Fuzhou’s politics and economy from 1918 to 1921, but their power decreased markedly after 1933.
as Chinese overseas students grew more powerful and after the 18 September Incident (also known as the Mukden Incident, which gave Japan the pretext to invade and occupy Manchuria) sparked anti-Japanese sentiment. In Shantou, fourteen Taiwanese firms owned over 10,000 yen in capital in 1934. In Guangzhou, quite a few of the Taiwanese in Guangzhou were laborers, servants, miners, and factory workers; transport workers were particularly common. While prostitution was common, fewer Taiwanese than Japanese joined this trade. Likewise, fewer Taiwanese than Japanese were company employees or workers involved in finance. In addition, quite a few Taiwanese were professionals such as doctors, artists, and reporters. Lastly, some Taiwanese were in the field of industry and commerce, in sundries, foodstuffs, clothing, printing, transport, and trade.

Modest Taiwanese Investment Activities in Manchukuo

Japan wanted to develop Manchukuo on the model of Taiwan, and Taiwan’s capital had flowed to Manchukuo. Yet most of it came from the Taiwan general government or from merchants from Japan based in Taiwan. When Taiwan’s Lin family of Banqiao visited Manchuria in 1910 and 1932, they were cautious in investing here. This was very different from the situation in Xiamen, where Taiwanese merchants including the Lins of Banqiao made major investments. In 1935, the native banking industry in Fujian, dominated by Taiwanese capital, provided about 70 percent of capital for trade between Fujian and Taiwan, leading even the Bank of Taiwan. This was also the opposite of the situation in Manchukuo, where Japanese capital led Taiwanese resources.

Not only did linguistic and cultural similarities cause Taiwanese to migrate and invest more in South China, but trade between the two countries was also quite developed.

Cultural Networks and Trade

Quite a few Taiwanese merchants were engaged in trade between Taiwan and South China. For example, in 1924 Gu Xianrong operated a 161-ton Japanese-registered ship, the Jinzhou Hao, between Fuzhou and Quanzhou. Jian Shiyuan, who was born in 1898 and lived in the Taiping street area in Taipei, built Guangshengtang in Xiamen in 1932; he was elected six times as president of the Taiwanese Association in Xiamen. He set up a branch of his company in Guangdong, dealing in medicine and trade. Shi Tianshou, born in Tainan city in 1892, set up the Heyu Shipping Company in 1910, went to Xiamen to work for the postal service in 1920, and in 1927 set up the Yiquan
Yanghang, a trading firm. In addition, he served as head of the Xiamen Export Union’s fourth section, the director of the Xiamen Import and Export Union’s Federation, a member of the Xiamen residents’ association’s assembly, a director of the Xiamen finance union, and a council member of the Xiamen trade hall.74

With trade networks like this, the value of Taiwan’s trade with south Fujian actually comprised an average of 72.72 percent of all of Taiwan’s trade value with China between 1902 and 1912. After 1913, the percentage gradually dropped: by 1931 the average was 51.3 percent, and between 1932 and 1937 the average was 50.6 percent.75 Taiwan’s volume of trade with South China was twice that with Southeast Asia in 1922 and eight times that in 1935.76 This somewhat describes the effect of cultural relations on trade, because Taiwan’s cultural relations with South China were closer than those with Southeast Asia. However, in Taiwan’s case, we see the influence of Japanese policy and power manifesting itself in increased immigration to, investment in, and trade with South China.

Japanese Policy and Power

When Taiwanese engaged in economic activities out of Taiwan, legally, they had to apply for the Japanese passport. This passport allowed Japanese people to enjoy extraterritorial rights while they were in China or some Southeast Asian countries, and it also gave them closer access to Manchukuo.

**Passport System**

Article 2 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed between Qing China and Japan in 1895, reads: “China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty, the following territories together with all fortifications, arsenals, and public property thereon.” The “following territories” denote the island of Formosa and the Pescadores. Article 5 of the same treaty conveys, “The inhabitants of the territories ceded to Japan, who wish to take up their residence outside the ceded districts, should be at liberty to sell their property and retire. For this purpose a period of two years from the date of the exchange of the present Act [5 May 1895] shall be granted. At the expiration of that period those of the inhabitants who shall not have left such territories shall, at the option of Japan, be deemed to be the Japanese subjects.”77

As Japanese subjects, the Japanese from Japan proper (naichijin 内地人) were not required to carry Japanese passports when they entered China. Article 4 of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between China and Japan had allowed Japanese nationals to move and reside freely in China’s
treaty ports. As the passport was aimed at ensuring that Japanese subjects in China could gain protection from their consuls in the destination country, no passport was needed unless going inland. However, Taiwanese with Japanese nationality, hontojin 本島人, had to apply for a passport to enter China. Since Taiwan had been China’s territory before its cession to Japan, the movement of people across the Taiwan Straits had been controlled after cession.

For the general population to travel from China to Taiwan for business or personal matters, a certificate from the government on the China side was required as regulated in September 1895. Before 1898, to prevent anti-Japan violence from being fanned, laborers from China were prohibited. Between 1898 and 1905, desperately needed tea workers from China were allowed in. From 1905 to 1937, all laborers from China were required to come with the agency of a Japanese-run Nanguo gongsi (Nankoku kaisha), which provided certificates allowing them to enter Taiwan or return to China. Between 1937 and 1945, people from China were generally not allowed to enter Taiwan.78

People moving from Taiwan to China had to go through a more thorough passport system. In 1878, the Japanese government issued its Passport Act. In April 1897, as the deadline for the Taiwanese to decide whether to stay as Japanese nationals or to leave drew near, the Taiwan governor-general ordered that those who stayed and registered in each district and prefecture could follow the 1878 Passport Act when traveling to China or other countries. However, those going to China still required special investigation. Before 1907, the attachment of photographs to certificates was encouraged, but not enforced, because many Taiwanese still feared to have their photograph taken due to the belief that their soul would thereby be stolen. The submission of certificates for household registration was also flexible, as the system was not established until 1907. From 1907, certificates were required. In Japan, photographs were not required until 1918, while in Taiwan the requirement was introduced in 1907. In special cases, a guarantee from a local notable was required. Japanese nationals from Japan or Korea could also apply for a passport in Taiwan via a similar process, but applicants who were financially better-off could proceed faster. After Japanese nationals arrived at their destination, they had to register with the Japanese consul there. The passport application had to be made at the prefecture. The passport application section of the local government had moved from the general affairs section to the police section in 1901. On the application form, applicants had to provide information on their name, native place, birth date, current residential address, profession, title, travel destination, and purpose of travel.
Taiwanese who went directly to China from Japan without applying for a passport could be fined, depending on the circumstances: a Taiwanese in Japan who made an urgent visit to his dying father in China without applying for a Taiwanese passport in Japan could be pardoned; but an anti-Japan Taiwanese on the same route would be fined.79 The discretionary nature of the fine opened loopholes for smuggling criminals or anti-Japanese Taiwanese into China.80 Of the sixty to seventy Taiwanese who sneaked into China from the ports of Japan through Shanghai to Fujian, fewer than 10 percent used the cross−Taiwan Strait junks, and 30−40 percent bribed sailors of Osaka Steamship Company to hide them in cabins while passing through the Taiwan Strait.81

The Japanese passport illustrated in figure 6 lists the holder as belonging to the category of merchant (merchant category no. 6776). The passport notes his Taiwan address (17, Chome 2, St North Gate, Taipei, Taipei district), age (42), business (antiques), and the port (Tamsui) and date of departure (29 April 1900). A photo of Li Zhishan, wearing a mandarin robe, is attached. “Passport of the Japanese empire” was stamped by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The main text asks protection for the bearer of the passport. The bearer filled out the destination of his travel (Xiamen and Fuzhou of the Qing empire and Hong Kong under the British rule). On the left fold of the passport, there are Chinese, English, and French translations of the main elements on the right fold. In addition, a handwritten addendum given by the Taipei prefect claimed that this passport could be renewed when it expired three years after issuance.

The Japanese passport, though troublesome to obtain, provided Taiwanese in China with the advantage of not having to pay local taxes or be molested by local bullies as the Japanese consuls protected them. Like overseas Chinese from Southeast Asian countries who had taken up French, British, Dutch, or Spanish nationalities, the Taiwanese could now hold a foreign passport to open “foreign firms” (yanghang 洋行) in China.82 Even the local notables in South China attempted to obtain this kind of passport in order to be one of Taiwan’s registered people.83

Japan took Fujian as its sphere of power after 1898, just as France had taken Southwest China; England, the Yangtze Valley; Germany, Shandong; and Russia, Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria. Taiwanese or Fujianese notables could serve as intermediaries for the penetration of the Japanese empire into South China. By contrast with the Chinese immigrants in Japanese colonial Taiwan, who were poorer than Taiwan’s notables, the Taiwanese in Fujian were better off than the locals.84 In Xiamen, Japanese nationality
was preferred over that of the European countries as the latter would have involved military conscription and the inheritance taxes exempted by the Japanese nationality. The Dutch assimilation law issued in 1907 required a familiarity with spoken Dutch, the possession of wealth, the obligation of military service, and the equal division of property among sons and daughters in accord with Western, and not Oriental, ideas of justice. By contrast, Japanese naturalization in the early twentieth century required no racial or geographical condition of birth. Those who had lived in Japan for more than five years, were more than twenty years of age, of good morals, possessing property or the ability for self-maintenance, and had no other nationality could be naturalized. Marriage and adoption were two other routes to becoming a Japanese national. The Taiwanese in the Dutch East Indies paid fewer taxes than the Chinese there, and overseas Chinese often tried to gain Japanese nationality. For the latter, doing business in Taiwan was one avenue to achieving Japanese nationality. As Japan's southern advance policy took the alliance of Taiwan and South China as the basis for the further alliance with Southeast Asia, the Japanese government generally welcomed the naturalization of these overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. The overseas Chinese from Southeast Asia received more advanced technology for investment from their association with the Taiwanese. For example, when overseas
Chinese from Java, Penang, and Hong Kong invested in the railway construction in Shantou, they obtained Japanese technology through the introduction of a co-investor from Taiwan.91 This period witnessed a series of boycotts against the Japanese goods, as these movements often drove up the prices of the Japanese goods sought after by the market and eventually earned the Taiwan-Japanese profit.92 The power or policy of the Japanese government also made South China lose out relative to Manchuria as Taiwan’s main trading partner after Manchukuo was set up, in 1932. The Sino-Japanese War put the Taiwanese in opposition to the Chinese under the rule of Chiang Kai-shek.

Politics-Economics Trumped Culture

Before 1932, the entire Chinese mainland was governed by the Republic of China. Between 1932 and 1944, Manchuria fell out of China’s de facto control. During the period between 1902 and 1932, the value of Taiwan’s trade with Fujian made up the greatest portion of the value of Taiwan’s trade with the Republic of China.93 Between 1925 and 1927, the value of Taiwan’s trade with South China was greater than its trade value with Manchuria, but from 1928 to 1939, the value of trade with Manchuria quickly surpassed the value of trade with South China. Although there was more smuggling between Taiwan and South China than between Taiwan and Manchukuo, the value of Taiwan’s legal trade with Manchuria increased rapidly between 1932 and 1939 and made up 67.6 percent of Taiwan’s total value of trade with the Chinese mainland, while during the same period, that with South China only comprised 11 percent on average.94 During this period, the value of Taiwan’s trade with Manchukuo was six times that of Taiwan with Fujian and eight times that of Taiwan with Southeast Asia (see fig. 7). Taiwan’s trade with Manchuria generally fluctuated around the level between that of 1938 and 1939 until 1941, and then declined after 1943 when Japan increasingly lost control of Manchuria with the increasing threat from Russia and the Chinese communists.95

Taiwanese who participated in the Taiwan-Manchuria trade include notables such as Liu Xinshui, born in 1897 in Luliaokeng, Qionglin Village, Zhudong County, Xinzhu Prefecture, who worked to expand the marketing network for Taiwanese citrus fruits in Manchukuo, Korea, and Tianjin; and Liu Zongmiao, born in 1880 in Sanxia Town, Haishan County, who became a tea master (who graded the quality of tea) for the Mitsui Tea Company in 1927, and set up the Nanxing Yanghang in 1932 to export tea. In 1941,
Liu Zongmiao began serving as a council member in the Taiwan Tea Export Union for Manchukuo and China.96

An important factor for the more dominant Taiwan-Manchuria trade was Manchukuo’s advantage over South China and Southeast Asia of being compatible with Taiwan in terms of a regional division of labor. In agricultural production, both Taiwan and Southeast Asia were at the development stage: Taiwan produced sugar, rice, and tea, the major products of Southeast Asia, and besides several fruits that could not be grown in China due to the climate, Taiwan’s products were also grown in China in large amounts.97 Other industries, such as fishing, timber, or mining, were “identical” with resources on the Chinese mainland; very few products were unique enough to find a profitable niche.98 Thus, the economies of South China, Southeast Asia, and Taiwan did not share complementary functions. In contrast, there was a great demand for Taiwan’s abundant fruits and vegetables in the cold climate of Manchukuo, and Manchukuo’s bean-cakes could be used as fertilizer in Taiwan. Thus, even though Taiwan’s distance from Dalian was far greater than the distance between Dalian and mainland China, it came to be

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**Figure 7** Changes in the value of trade between Taiwan and various regions of mainland China, and Southeast Asia, 1925–1939. Source: Calculated and combined from the following trade records: for 1925–1926, Taiwan sótokufu kanbō chōsaka, Shina no jikyoku to Shina bōeki no shōchō, 170; for 1927–1936, Taiwan sótokufu kanbō gaijika, Taiwan to Minami Shina (bōeki), 43; for 1937–1939, Taiwan Sōtokufu zaimukyoku zeimuka, Taiwan tai nan-Shi nan’yō bōekihyō (tsuki chū-Shi, hoku-Shi, Manshūkoku, Kantōshū), 1.
that the tonnage of freight transported between Taiwan and Dalian was second only to that of Dalian freight with Japan, far outweighing the tonnage of freight between Dalian and any other place in China.  

Relations between Taiwan and Manchukuo were also encouraged by the Japanese government, as evidenced by the establishment of a branch of the Bank of Taiwan and the increase in shipping. After the 18 September 1931 Incident, the surge in anti-Japanese sentiment in South China and Southeast Asia harmed Taiwan’s trade position there.  

The 18 September Incident led to the establishment of Manchukuo, and the 7 July Incident of 1937 put Manchukuo under even greater influence from Japan. These two incidents led Taiwan to replace China as the major provider of tea to Manchukuo, especially after Taiwan’s tea market in Southeast Asia dried up due to anti-Japanese sentiment. These two incidents, in which Japan invaded China and earned the enmity of the Chinese people, actually received a positive appraisal in Taiwan. Chen Rongsen, of the Dadaocheng-based Rongxing Tea Company, was quoted in the Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpo, during his 1933 inspection tour of Manchukuo, as having said, “As tea sales have slumped, the tea farmers who grew tea for me deem the addition of the Manchukuo market as a lucky star.”  

When Japan invaded China, in 1937, prominent tea merchant Chen Qingpo was deeply moved by the “valiance” of the “imperial army,” calling it a “holy war” (sheng zhan). When Chen visited Mongolia to work on developing the market for Taiwanese tea, he said, “The untrustworthiness of Chinese merchants has earned the hatred of the Mongolians.” Further, he said, “Now, the Japanese empire is leading these peoples to establish a great East Asian union.”  

In 1938, when the Japanese army occupied South China, the power of Taiwanese merchants in South China expanded greatly. They provided running water, electricity, banks, hospitals, newspapers, food cans, marine products, garments, ships, intelligence, and even opium for the Japanese army. In the process of the Sino-Japanese War, the Chongqing government planned to take Xiamen as “a base from which airfields could be used to bomb Japan and Taiwan.” When Japan started to invade China after 1937, many local students acquiring a Japanese education at a Japanese-sponsored school in Xiamen withdrew, while several Taiwanese students at the school celebrated the victory of the imperial army. Even though both Taiwanese and the Fujianese shared the same culture, they now belonged to two nation-states in conflict.
Conclusion

In view of the overseas migration of Taiwanese merchants during the period of Japanese rule, the Taiwanese diasporic rate is less than 1 percent, even including those who had migrated to Japan.\textsuperscript{106} It is less than the 16 percent of Japanese from Japan in 1935.\textsuperscript{107} However, the size of Taiwanese immigration and investment was still big when compared with other internationals. Yang Duanliu’s and Hou Houpei’s *Statistics of China’s Foreign Trade during the Last Sixty-five Years* has listed the annual number of people from various countries in China between 1872 and 1928. The peak years for each nationality in China were as follows: Russia had 148,170 nationals in China in 1919; the United States had 9,356 in 1923; England had 15,247 in 1925; and Japan had 239,180 in 1928.\textsuperscript{108} The presence of around 20,000 Taiwanese in China in the 1930s and 1940s was more than the number of American or British people in the 1920s. Yang also had statistics of international firms in China. Using the 150 Taiwanese firms in Xiamen in 1903 as a basis for comparison, the various internationals had the following firm numbers in China in the same year: England had 420; Japan had 361; the United States had 114; Portugal had 45; Spain had 29; Russia had 24; and Norway had 7.\textsuperscript{109} The Taiwanese had 171 firms in 1938 in Xiamen.\textsuperscript{110} In 1941, Taiwanese commercial power in Xiamen was stronger than that of the Japanese from Japan in terms of firm number and employment rate. Japanese foreign-affairs records indicate that there were approximately 171 Taiwanese firms in Southeast Asia from 1935 to 1940.\textsuperscript{111}

These Taiwanese firms were involved in various trades, from salty fish to cameras. In general, their scale was small, but they could be involved with big enterprises such as factories, plantations, mining, banks, and even public works such as telephones, electric power, canals, and railroads. When the American robber barons such as Leland Stanford, Cornelius Vanderbilt, Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller, and J. P. Morgan invested in railroads, mines, telephones, telegrams, and finance and industry at home and abroad, including China between the 1880s and 1930s, the Taiwanese joined this investment fever in South China.\textsuperscript{112} Overseas Chinese from Southeast Asia also invested in Fujian’s urbanization. An example was Huang Yizhu (1868–1945), a Fujian-born merchant in Indonesia who was the most important real-estate investor among the overseas Chinese in Fujian from 1927 to 1935, and who was described as the biggest investor among the overseas Chinese merchants in modern China by Lin Jinzhi, an overseas Chinese his-
torian in the PRC. Huang was vice chairman of Xiamen’s chamber of commerce in 1920, while the Taiwanese Lin Erjia was its chairman.\textsuperscript{113}

By contrast with other internationals, the Taiwanese had the advantage of speaking the same dialect with some people in Fujian and Guangdong Provinces. They could also rely on the bloodline-based Chinese nationality law to acquire Chinese nationality. Relatives and friends could help them to find work and invest in the interior area, which legally excluded foreigners, including Japanese, and to which the Taiwanese now legally belonged. In Southeast Asia, the Taiwanese also shared the same dialects or ethnic traits with the overseas Chinese communities there, whereas the Mandarin used in Manchuria was a foreign language to the Taiwanese under Japanese colonial rule. The cultural affinity certainly explains the greater immigration and investment of the Taiwanese in South China and Southeast Asia as compared with that in Manchuria.

On the other hand, the Taiwanese, considered Japanese subjects according to the Treaty of Shimonoseki, carried the status of foreigner in China. In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth, many Chinese people tried to obtain foreign nationality in the treaty ports of China so as to avoid lijin and other political harassment from the unstable Chinese government.\textsuperscript{114} Even in Southeast Asia, some overseas Chinese coveted Japanese nationality.\textsuperscript{115} The legal identity of Taiwanese cast them as intermediaries for the Japanese southern advance policy in South China and Southeast Asia, demonstrating the cross-fertilization of the cultural affinity of the Taiwanese and Japanese policy and power.

Yet, when Japan set up Manchukuo, in 1932, Taiwan traded more with the latter than with South China or Southeast Asia, due to its Japanese infrastructure and the comparative advantage that Taiwan gained through selling tropical agriculture products in exchange for Manchurian soybean, coals, and fertilizer. In particular, when Japan was at war with China, the Taiwanese found that their status as Japanese subjects overrode their cultural affinity with the Chinese.

Unlike the Chinese in Malaya under British rule, whose rice trade was replaced by the British, as described by Wu Xiaoan, Taiwanese indigenous capital under Japanese colonial rule had the chance to develop overseas.\textsuperscript{116} Through the passport system, the Japanese government had actually screened Taiwanese merchants abroad through the legal process.

As with the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, the Taiwanese merchants had legal investments as well as investments in opium or other illegal businesses. Carl Trocki describes the relationship between Southeast Asian
opium development and the European imperialist powers, particularly the British Empire.\textsuperscript{117} John Jennings had depicted the Japanese government’s opium policy in Japan proper and in its colonies without mentioning its relationship to the Taiwanese merchants’ overseas opium trade.\textsuperscript{118} In Taiwanese investment in Manchukuo, even the Lins of Banqiao, the Lins of Wufeng, and the Lius of Liuying had cooperated with Manchurian people in setting up an opium factory in Manchukuo.\textsuperscript{119} In Thailand and South China, the Taiwanese used their extraterritorial privileges to sell opium or to engage in terrorist activities, and they left a terrible impression on locals.\textsuperscript{120} Liang Huahuang had pointed out the Japanese consul’s guidance of Taiwanese opium cultivation and marketing to cooperate with local warlords.\textsuperscript{121} Zhong Shumin provided evidence of the Japanese consul’s tolerance, elimination, and encouragement of the sale of Taiwanese opium.\textsuperscript{122} Wu Lingjun’s study reveals an institutional background to the link between extraterritorial rights and crime. It was not because the foreign powers intended to nurture crime in the treaty ports, but because the foreign powers tended to lack the manpower to police and enforce laws overseas. Wu’s study is based on an American case in the 1850s–1860s, when the American consuls’ prisons in China’s treaty ports had been so full that they were forced to borrow the British consuls’ prisons, from which some criminals escaped.\textsuperscript{123}

The Taiwanese selling opium in Thailand in 1919, for example, had little contact with the Japanese consuls, and were reluctant to make known their Japanese nationality.\textsuperscript{124} However, that the Taiwanese tea traders had declared of “Holy War” because Japan had opened a bigger market for them through the Mukden and Marco Polo Bridge incidents fully reveals the Taiwanese identification with Japan. With Japan having ruled over Taiwan for about fifty years, the governmentality and subjectivity had become deeply entrenched. The process of Taiwanese “becoming Japanese” was a process that put both the Taiwanese and the Japanese government in the same boat. The Taiwanese were not only ready to die for the Japanese emperor, as Leo T. S. Ching notes, but were also seeking their own benefit while staying with the Japanese empire.\textsuperscript{125}

In PRC scholar Lin Jingzhi’s history of overseas Chinese investment in China, the chairman of the chamber of commerce and a leading Taiwanese in South China, Lin Erjia, was described as a “Taiwan compatriot,” while the vice-chairman, Huang Yizhu, was categorized as overseas Chinese because he was from the Dutch East Indies.\textsuperscript{126} In fact, however, all of Lin Erjia’s sons carried Japanese nationality, and Lin’s family endorsed many businesses in Xiamen promoted by the Japanese government.\textsuperscript{127} Lin Erjia’s family, which
carried multiple nationalities, including French, British, Japanese, and Chinese, was similar to the overseas Chinese merchant Guo Chunyang, who was from the Dutch East Indies but adopted Dutch, British, Japanese, and Chinese nationalities. Neglecting the fact that the Taiwanese, under Japanese colonial rule, were in fact also overseas Chinese prevents greater reflection on the concepts of the “Greater China Economic Zone” and the “Global Chinese Network.” The ways in which the Japanese government utilized Taiwanese cultural traits to promote its southern advance policy and Japan’s war with China illustrate the extreme power of culture, as well as its limits.

Notes

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1. Leo Suryadinata, ed., Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997); Leo Suryadinata, Chinese Adaptation and Diversity: Essays on Society and Literature in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1993); Wang Gungwu, Community and Nation: China, Southeast Asia and Australia (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, Asia Studies Association of Australia, Southeast Asia Publications series, 1992).


3. The trade statistics for Manchukuo in this period sometimes include Guandongzhou, which was leased territory (租借地) in Dalian and Lushun transferred to Japan from Russia after the Russo-Japan War. Leased territory denotes areas in the treaty ports leased to foreign powers for their absolute military, judicial, and administrative rule. The leasing countries set military commanders there, and even the passage of the Chinese army through this territory required the permission of the leasing country. Chinese nationals or subjects of the leasing country and other internationals in this territory were subject to the judicial rule of the leasing country rather than Chinese judges or consuls of related countries, as in concessions or settlements (租界). In the concessions or settlements, the government or private foreigners had to pay rent or taxes for the land they rented. The leased territory in some sense meant territory ceded temporarily. Russia’s leased territory in Lushun and Dalian was obtained from Qing China in 1898 with a lease of twenty-five years. Russia set a governor-general there as the highest official and named this area Guangdong Province, in 1899. After taking the province, in 1905, Japan set the commander-in-chief office of its Guangdong army there, where it remained until 1945, and changed the name to Guandongzhou. Fei Chengkang, Zhongguo zujieshi [A history of China’s concessions or settlements] (Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 1991), 312–18, 432.
4. Shibaoka Hisashi, Saishin nanpō tokō an’nai [Information on recent immigration to the south] (Taipei: Sanseidō, 1943), 20.

5. In this essay, I use “investment” to mean direct investment, not absentee security or bond investment.

6. Ihara Suekiti, Seikatsu yō yori miraru Taiwan no jissai [Taiwan as seen from its daily life] (Taipei: Shinkōto, 1926), 77–78.

7. Taiwan sōtokuku kanbō gaijika, Taiwan to Minami Shina (bōeki) [Taiwan and southern China (trade)] Minami Shina oyobi nan’yō chōsa, dai 236 shū (Taipei: Taiwan sōtokuku, 1937), 13.

8. Lin Zhen, “Kangzhan shiqi Fujian de Taiwan jimin wenti” [The problem of registered Taiwanese in Fujian during the war of resistance], Taiwan yanjiu jikan [Bulletin for Taiwan Study] 2.44 (February 1994): 71.


10. Taiwan sōtokuku kanbō chosaka, Taiwan zaiseki kan minzoku gyokanbietsu chosa [An investigation of the native place distribution of the Han people registered in Taiwan] (Taipei: Taiwan sōtokuku kanbō chosaka, 1928). This source lists 586,900 Hakka and 3,000,900 Fujianese.


12. Calculated from Taiwan sōtokuku kanbō gaijika, Taiwan to Minami Shina, 13.


14. Cheng Meixiang, “A Comparative Study of the Foreign Settlements at Tamsui of Taiwan and Inchon of Korea (1858–1913)” (in Chinese), master’s thesis, department of architecture, Zhongyuan University, 2002, 8–9, cited the Taiwan general government’s archive to point out the difference between concessions and settlements in the treaty ports. The former rented whole pieces of land to the foreign government, which leased or sold part of that land to its own subjects. The latter allowed foreigners to rent land piece by piece from private owners in the zone of treaty ports.


17. In the treaty ports in Fujian such as Fuzhou and Xiamen, no particular concession or settlement for the Japanese nationals was set up. Fei Chengkang, Zhongguo zujieshi, 431.

18. Bian Fengkui, Zhongcun xiaozhi jiaoshou lunwenji, 150.

19. Fujiansheng dang’anguan and Xiamensi dang’anguan, eds., Min-Tai guanxi dang’an

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ziliao [Archival materials on Fujian-Taiwan relations] (Xiamen: Lujiang chubanshe, 1992), 11–12, 635.
20. Taiwan sótōfuku kanbō gaijika, Taiwan to Minami Shina, 18–19.
22. Taiwan sótōfuku kanbō gaijika, Taiwan to Minami Shina, 18–19. Fujiansheng dang’an guan and Xiamenshi dang’an ziliao, 18–20.
23. Tōi Nichinichi Shinpo (abbreviated as Nichi hereafter), Taishō (abbreviated as Thereafter) 2.8.26. The nightly courses were taught by an instructor who had lived in Java and Singapore for many years, and who was fluent in the languages spoken and well-versed in the local situations in each location. Regular and rapid-pace courses were offered, each six months in duration.
24. Ōta Shūkichi, ‘Taiwan sekimin no nan’yō ni okeru katsudō jōkyō’ [The activities of Taiwan registered people in Southeast Asia], Taiwan keizai nenpō [Annual report of Taiwan economics] (Tokyo: Taiwan keizai nenpō kankōkai, August 1942), 671–94.
25. Nichi, Showa (abbreviated as S hereafter) 16.10.7.
27. Ibid., 29, 33, 43.
29. Shengjing Shibao (abbreviated as Sheng hereafter), S13.8.9.
32. Taiwan Jihō Hakkōjo, “Nanshi nan’yō ni okeru Hontōjin” [Taiwanese in South China and Southeast Asia], Taiwan jijō (Taipei: Taiwan Jihō Hakkōjo, 1944), 164–68.
33. Nichi, T8.3.22.
34. Nichi, T6.1.21.
35. Nichi, S13.3.17.
38. Lin Zhen, “Kangzhan shiqi Fujian de Taiwan jimin wenti,” 72.
39. Teki shusei, “ZaiKō Taiwan jin no kinkō” [The recent situation of the Taiwanese in Shanghai], Tōi jihō (Taipei: Taiwan jihō hakkōsho, May 1938), 159.
40. Nichi-Japanese version (abbreviated as J hereafter; not specifying Nichi as Japanese version means it is the Chinese version), T13.7.6.
41. Nichi, S16.6.5 and Nichi, S17.7.4 show that most of the two hundred Taiwanese living in Bangkok were in business.
42. Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, Koushu lishi, 206.
43. Yoshikawa Hiroshi, Minami Shina kenkyūshi, 376.
44. Nichi, S16.6.5.
46. As the original documents reproduced show, in Fujiansheng dang’anguan and Xia- menshi dang’anguan, Min-Tai guanxi dang’ an ziliao, 8–9, 31–34, 640–46.
47. Nihon Gaimushō (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan), Kaigai zailiu honbojin chosa [Investigation of the Japanese nationals], Showa 10, Showa 11, Showa 15.
48. Ibid.
49. Fujiansheng dang’anguan and Xiamenshi dang’anguan, Min-Tai guanxi dang’an ziliao, 640–46.
50. Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō chōsaka, Taiwan, Nanshi nan’yō, dai ni bu: Nanyō [Taiwan, southern China, and Southeast Asia, 2d part: Southeast Asia] (Taipei: Taiwan sōtokufu, 1935), 16. The monetary unit this paper uses will follow the sources cited. The exchange rate between the British pound and the currencies of the United States, France, Germany, India, Japan, Russia, and Mexican silver dollars between 1868 and 1928 refers to Yang Duanliu and Hou Houpei, Liushiwu nian lai Zhongguo guoji maoyi tongji [Statistics of China’s foreign trade during the last sixty-five years] (National Research Institute of Social Sciences, Academia Sinica, 1931), 151. One Japanese yen equals 1.2 yuan (silver dollars) in 1927. Also, by 1927 one yuan (silver dollar) was about 0.50 US$ and it was 0.30 US$ after 1927. See Lin Jinzhi, Jindai huaqiao touzi guonei qiye gailun [A sketch of the overseas Chinese investment in China in the modern period] (Xiamen, Fujian: Xiamen daxue chubanshe, 1988), 56n1.
51. One crate equals forty catties (units of weight used in Southeast Asia equal to 500 grams, approximately 1.1 pounds).
54. Lin Benyuan jisi gongye, Banqiao Linbenyuan jiazhuan, 55.
57. Nakamura Takashi, Nihon no nanpō kanyō to Taiwān [Japan’s southern involvement and Taiwan] (Nara: Tenrikyū dōyūsha, 1988), 264.
58. Nihon Gaimushō, Gaimushō kirōku: From General Consul Usomi to Prime Minister Hirota Kōki about Taiwanese investment in Fujian heading by Lin Xiongxiang (24 January 1935).

59. As Mr. Lin Hengdao recalled.

60. Nihon Gaimushō, Gaimushō kirōku: From General Consul Usomi to Prime Minister Hirota Kōki about Taiwanese investment in Fujian heading by Lin Xiongxiang (24 January 1935).

61. Nichi, M37.10.9; Nichi, T6.1.7.

62. The Xiao family from Pindong of Taiwan are Hakka from Chaozhou of Guangdong.

63. Yoshikawa Hiroshi, Minami Shina kenkyūshi, 399; Yoshikawa Seima, Sen-go Nanshi nan'yō to Taiwan [Postwar Taiwan, southern China, and Southeast Asia] (Taipei: Taiwan jitsugyō sha, 1925), 45.


65. Taiwan sōtofuku kanbō gaijika, Taiwan to Minami Shina, 21–22.


67. Taiwan sōtofuku kanbō gaijika, Taiwan to Minami Shina, 24–25.

68. Tanaka sen, “Minamishina (Kanton) to Taiwan renkei no hōto” [Approaches for the liaison between southern China (including Guangdong province) and Taiwan], Taiwan jihō (Taipei: Taiwan jihō hakkōsho, December 1943), 49–50.


70. Sheng, M43.5.24; Nichi, S7.7.26.

71. Ide Kiwata, “Tai Shi bōeki no fushin to Taiwan bōeki no shinkōsaku” [The slump in trade with China and the policy to promote Taiwan’s trade], Taiwan Jihō (Taipei: Taiwan jihō hakkōsho, October 1931), 52.


73. Kōnan Shimbunsha, ed., Taiwan Jingzhi kan [Almanac of Taiwan’s notables] (Taipei: Shinnan Shimbunsha, 1943), 103.

74. Ibid., 181.


76. Tamiya Ryōsaku, “Minamishina to Taiwan” [Southern China and Taiwan], Taiwan
jihō (Taipei: Taiwan jihō hakkōsho, March 1938), 10. It cites Taiwan bōki yonju’nen hyō, 1896–1935 [40 years of tables on Taiwan’s trade, 1896–1935] (Taipei: Taiwan sōtokufu, 1936) and mentions that Taiwan’s volume of exports to major cities in South China was 11,083,000 yen in 1922, and 16,687,000 yen in 1935; in comparison, Taiwan’s volume of exports to Southeast Asia was 5,034,000 yen in 1922 and 2,861,000 yen in 1935.

77. Gaimusho joyakukyuku, Nihonkoku oyobi kaku kuku aida no joyaku, 20–21.


79. Liang Huahuang, Taiwan zongdufu de “duian” zhengce yanjū: Riju shidai TaiMin guanxi shi [The cross–Taiwan Strait policy of the Taiwan governor-general: The Taiwan-Fujian relation in the period when Taiwan was occupied by Japan] (Taipei: Daoxiang, 2001), 131–82.


81. Bian Fengkui, Zhongcun xiaozhi jiaoshou lunwenji, 94.

82. Ibid., 75.

83. Liang Huahuang, Taiwan zongdufu de “duian” zhengce yanjū, 184–90.

84. Ibid., 51–58, 184–90; Man-houng Lin, “The Taiwanese Merchants’ Taiwan-China Economic Ties, 1895–1937.”


86. MacNair, The Chinese Abroad, 107.

87. Ibid., 127.

88. Detailed in Man-houng Lin, “The Multiple Nationality of Overseas Chinese Merchants,” 985–1010. Also, see Bian Fengkui, Zhongcun xiaozhi jiaoshou lunwenji, 89.


90. Liang Huahuang, Taiwan zongdufu de “duian” zhengce yanjū, 40.


93. Taiwansheng wenxian weiyuanhui, Taiwansheng tongzhi [A comprehensive history of Taiwan province], jingjizhi (economy), shangye pian (chapter on commerce) (Taipei: Taiwansheng zhengfu yinshua chang, 1971), 4:174.


95. Taiwan sōtokufu, Taiwansheng tongzhi kan [Quarterly of the Bank of Taiwan], 1st issue (Taipei: Nantian shuju, 1997), 459–60.

96. Shimbunsha, Taiwan Jingzhi kan, 444.

97. Danan, “Taiwan jingji yu nanyang.” [Taiwan’s economy and the Southeast Asia], Taiwan yinhang jikan [Quarterly of the Bank of Taiwan], 1st issue (Taipei: Taiwan yinhang jingji yanjusho, June 1947), 155.

98. Ye Lizhong, “Taiwan jingji zai Zhongguo” [Taiwan economy in China], Taiwan yinhang jikan [Quarterly of the Bank of Taiwan], 1st issue (Taipei: Taiwan yinhang jingji yanjusho, June 1947), 132.
103. Detailed in Man-houng Lin, “‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.’”
104. Disan zhanqu JinXia hanjian anjian chuli weiuyuanhui, Mintai hanjian zuixing jishi [An account of the criminal actions of the Fujian and Taiwan traitors] (Xiamen: XiamenjiangSheng wenhua chubanshe, 1947), 14.
105. Liang Huahuang, Taiwan zongdufu de “duian” zengge yanjiu, 192–94.
106. The nonsoldier Taiwanese emigration was about 60,000 by 1945 (see Man-houng Lin, “‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’ ”); the population of Taiwan in this year was six million (see Chen Shaoxing, Taiwan de renkou bianqian yu shehui bianqian [Taiwan’s population change and social change] [Taipei: Lianjing chubanshe, 1979], 18).
107. The number of immigrants from Japan in 1935 (1,151,462) is obtained from Gaimushō chōsabu, Kaigai kakutei zairyū honpōjin jinkōhyō. [The population of Japan in 1935] (69.254.148) is obtained from http://www.stat.go.jp/data/kokusei/2000/kako/danjo/ zuhyou/da02.xls by the instruction of Hori Kazuo.
111. Nihon Gaimushō, Kaigai zaibatsu honbojin chosa, Showa 10, Showa 11, Showa 15.
113. Lin Jingzhi, Jindai huaxiao touzi guonei qiye gailun, 80.
114. MacNair, The Chinese Abroad, 112–120.
116. See Wu Xiao An’s essay in this volume.
117. See Carl A. Trocki’s essay in this volume.
119. Nichi, S8.3.10; Nichi, S8.11.7.
120. Oda Shūkichi, “Taiwan sekimin no Nanyō ni okeru seidō jōkyō,” Taiwan keizai nenpō (Tokyo: Taiwan keizai nenpō Kankōkai, 1942), 682.
121. Liang Huahuang, Taiwan zongdufu de “duian” zengge yanjiu, 110, 114, 116, 117, 220–22.
122. Zhong Shumin, “Taiwan zongdufu de duian zengge yu yapian wenti” [Taiwan...
general government’s opium policy in South China], Taiwansheng wenxianweiyuanhui, Taiwan wenxian shilou zhengli yanjiu xueshu yantaohui lunwenji [Conference proceedings on Taiwan historical materials and its arrangements] (Nantou Taiwansheng wenxian weiyuanhui, 2000), 223–54, 229, 248–51.

123. Wu Lingjun, “Tiaoyue guanxi yu Qingmo Meiguo zaihua shangwu: Yi lingshi bude jian shangren yu tongshang kouan she gongchang liangan wei li” [Treaty relations and American business in China: To take consuls not being supposed to do business and setting factories at treaty ports as examples], Guoli zhengzhi daxue lishi xuebao [Historical journal of National University of Political Science], no. 26 (November 2006): 29–64, 40.

124. Nihon Gaimushō Kiroku 3–8–6–34 (kō [public] no. 130): A document sent from acting Japanese consul at Xiamen, Ishikawa Noboruya, written on 5 May 1919 to Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Baron Uchida Kōsai, received on 13 May 1919, regarding the situation of Koreans and Taiwanese in Bangkok.


126. Lin Jingzhi, Jindai huaqiao touzi guonei qiye gailun, 80, 209.

127. Liang Huahuang, Taiwan zongdufu de “duian” zhengce yanjiu, 188n12.