NOTES

Introduction


2 Martta Heikkilä, At the Limits of Presentation (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2008), 103.
8 See Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, trans. S. Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 23–44.
12 Deleuze, *The Fold*, 76, 78.
13 See my (In)fusion Approach: Theory, Contestation, Limits (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2006).
19 Serres, *Genesis*, 3.
Introduction Continued


3 Rens Bod, A New History of the Humanities: The Search for Principles and Patterns from Antiquity to the Present (Oxford University Press, 2014).


6 Google “fake scientific papers” for a long list of websites on this topic, for example, an essay in Nature entitled “Publishers withdraw more than 120 gibberish papers” (http://www.nature.com/news/publishers-withdraw-more-than-120-gibberish-papers-1.14763, accessed June 3, 1015). Other fake papers claim to be based on scientifically conducted research that never occurred, for example, a recent, notorious one claiming with fake evidence that just talking to people will cure them in a few minutes of their opposition to gay marriage.

7 My Chinese correspondent cited the two sentences I have quoted here from the preface in Chinese to the Chinese translation of my Fiction and Repetition. They come originally from my “The Critic as Host,” in Deconstruction and Criticism, ed. Harold Bloom (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 251. The short paragraph from which these two sentences are drawn begins with an unequivocal assertion that “the word ‘deconstruction’ has misleading overtones or implications” (251). Any careful reader should see that my figure of the dismantled watch is an ironic parody of what many people mistakenly think deconstruction is.

8 See Wikipedia’s entry for “pun” for a valuable entry on the different forms of pun along with a brief history of examples. Paronomasia, as the pun is called in Greek, itself contains a multiple pun on antithetical meanings, since the prefix “para,” sometimes, as in this case, shortened to “par,” means “beside; next to, near, from; against, contrary to.” (Wikipedia, s.v. “Pun,” accessed June 6, 2015, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pun.)

9 An immense number of editions of the Alice books exist. I cite the one I read as a child and still have in my library. It is much battered and worn from having been read by generations of children. It has the Tenniel illustrations, which were, and are, essential to my “rhetorical reading” of the two Alice books: Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass (New York: A. L. Burt, n.d.), 12.

10 Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass, 30–32.

11 “Then you should say what you mean,’ the March Hare went on.
‘I do,’ Alice hastily replied; ‘at least—at least I mean what I say—that’s the same thing, you know.’

‘Not the same thing a bit!’ said the Hatter. ‘You might just as well say that “I see what I eat” is the same thing as “I eat what I see”!’

‘You might just as well say,’ added the March Hare, ‘that “I like what I get” is the same thing as “I get what I like”!’

‘You might just as well say,’ added the Dormouse, who seemed to be talking in his sleep, ‘that “I breathe when I sleep” is the same thing as “I sleep when I breathe”!’

(Carroll, *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass*, 82).


Chapter 1: Making Sahitya Matter


3 Raghavan, “Sahitya,” in *An Introduction to Indian Poetics*, ed. V. Raghavan and Nagendra (Bombay: Macmillan, 1970), 82.


9 Chaudhury, *Tagore on Literature and Aesthetics*, 13. Tagore writes in “Sahityer Swarup”: “There is no need in art to settle a problem, its business is to perfect its form. To untie the knot of a problem is an achievement of the intellect but to give perfection to some form is the work of creative imagination. Art dwells in this realm of imagination and not in the realm of logic” (45). I hope I have been able to problematize literary judgment as elucidation and the analysis of literature.
12 For further elaboration, see Tagore’s “Sahityer Pathe,” in *Rabindra Rachanabali*, vol. 10, 435–561.
14 Tagore, *Personality*, 17.
37 This approximates Annie Dillard’s “Teaching a Stone to Talk,” wherein Larry makes meaning by teaching a small stone to talk. The apparent absurdity of the proposition is denied when we come to understand Dillard’s suggestions that talking is about attending to the silence that a stone has. See Dillard, “Teaching a Stone to Talk,” in *Teaching a Stone to Talk* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1992), 87.
Chapter 2: Literature Matters Today


18 Tennyson, “Tears, Idle Tears.”


Chapter 3: The Story of a Poem


3 Gioia, “Disappearing Ink: Poetry at the End of Print Culture,” 49.
4 Clausen, “Poetry in a Discouraging Time,” 708.
8 Berry, “The Specialization of Poetry,” 27.
10 *Rasa* (Sanskrit: “essence,” “taste,” or “flavor,” literally “sap” or “juice”) is the “Indian concept of aesthetic flavour, an essential element of any work of visual, literary, or performing art that can only be suggested, not described. It is a kind of contemplative abstraction in which the inwardness of human feelings suffuses the surrounding world of embodied forms. The theory of rasa is attributed to Bharata, a sage-priest who may have lived sometime between the 1st century BCE and the 3rd century CE. It was developed by the rhetorician and philosopher Abhinavagupta (c. 1000), who applied it to all varieties of theater and poetry. The principal human feelings, according to Bharata, are delight, laughter, sorrow, anger, energy, fear, disgust, heroism, and astonishment, all of which may be recast in contemplative form as the various rasas: erotic, comic, pathetic, furious, heroic, terrible, odious, marvelous, and quietistic. These rasas comprise the components of aesthetic experience. The power to taste rasa is a reward for merit in some previous existence.” Rasa, Indian Aesthetic Theory, accessed October 1, 2015, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/491635/rasa.

“It may be pointed out here,” writes Sushil Kumar De, “that [the] subtle conception of *Rasa* makes it difficult to express the notion properly in Western critical terminology. The word has been translated etymologically by the terms ‘flavour,’ ‘relish,’ ‘gustation,’ ‘taste,’ ‘Geschmack,’ or ‘saveur’; but none of these renderings seems to be adequate. The simpler word ‘mood,’ or the term ‘Stimmung’ used by Jacobi may be the nearest approach to it, but the concept has hardly any analogy in European critical theory.” See *History of Sanskrit Poetics*, 2nd ed. (Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1960), 2:135.
22 Keping, *Spirit of Chinese Poetics*, 76. Jiang Kui writes: “A poem depends entirely on the last line; this is like stopping a galloping horse. When both the meaning and the words come to an end, it is like ‘overlooking the water to see off someone going home’; when the meaning comes to an end but the words do not, it is like ‘spiralling with a whirlwind’; when the words come to an end but the meaning does not, it is like the returning boat on the Shan stream; when both words and the meaning have no ending, it is like [meeting] Wenbo Xuezi” (73).
43 Aristotle writes: “The greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learnt from others; and it is also a sign of genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilar.” See Aristotle, *Poetics* (New York: Modern Library, 1954), 1459a, 255.
46 Michelle Yeh, “Metaphor and Bi: Western and Chinese Poetics,” *Comparative Literature* 39, no. 3 (summer 1987): 245.
47 Yeh, “Metaphor and Bi,” 246.
51 For more on this subject, see my “The Figure that Robert Frost’s Poetics Make: Singularity and Sanskrit Poetic Theory,” in *Singularity and Transnational Poetics*, ed. Birgit Kaiser (London: Routledge, 2015), 134–54.
54 Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 238.
68 Ming Dong Gu, *Chinese Theories of Reading and Writing: A Route to Hermeneutics and Open Poetics* (Albany: State University of New York, 2005), 47.
69 Liu, *Language-Paradox-Poetics*, 84.
74 Liu, *Language-Paradox-Poetics*, 81.

Chapter 4: Western Theories of Poetry


12 Stevens, Opus Posthumous, 179.


14 See Aristotle, The Poetics, 1457b, 14–15, 81–83: “Sometimes there is no word for some of the terms of the analogy but the metaphor can be used all the same. For instance, to scatter seed is to sow, but there is no word for the action of the sun in scattering its fire. Yet this has to the sunshine the same relation as sowing has to the seed, and so you have the phrase ‘sowing the god-created fire.’” Theology appears here once more, in this case in Aristotle’s example of what is called, though Aristotle does not use the word here, a catachresis. Jacques Derrida, in his magisterial “La mythologie blanche” (white mythology), by far the greatest twentieth-century essay on metaphor, makes much of this passage in Aristotle and of the general role in theories of metaphor of the diurnal rising and setting of the sun. See Jacques Derrida, “La mythologie blanche: La métaphore dans le texte philosophique,” Marges de la philosophie (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1972), 247–324; Jacques Derrida, “White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy,” in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 207–71. It is tempting to make a detour into a reading of Derrida’s wonderful essay, but that would add a great many more pages, perhaps a hundred or so, to this essay, and I have sworn to keep my eye on Stevens’s poem.

15 Stevens, The Collected Poems, 165, 373. The full sentence that contains the phrase about metaphor as evasion is a self-exhortation that says the reverse of what is said about (and done with) metaphor in “The Motive for Metaphor”: “Let’s see the very thing and nothing else, / Let’s see it with the hottest fire of sight. / Burn everything not part of it to ash. / Trace the gold sun about the whitened sky / Without evasion by a single metaphor.” The hot fire of the sun is here transferred by metaphor to the poet’s eyesight, his ability to see what is really there, without evasion, by a lambent refinement like the purifying of metal in a forge. The figure of a forge appears in “The Motive
for Metaphor,” though not explicitly in “Credences of Summer.” In the latter poem, the sky is whitened not just because a bright, sunny day does that, but because the sun purifies the sky of the blue of imagination, source of metaphorical evasions. Stevens’s locutions match the example in Aristotle about sun “sowing the god-created fire.” The sun, it might be said, is, in the Western tradition from Aristotle on, the closest thing you can have to a visible sign of that fatal, dominant X named at the end of “The Motive for Metaphor.” The reader will note that just as Aristotle imports a catachresis, sowing, to name what has no proper name, that is, “the actions of the sun in scattering its fire,” so Stevens evades the nameless brightness of the sun by calling it gold. Gold is the most precious of metals and the measure of all other values, as in “gold standard.” An exploration of these connections would take me far and would repay the doing, but would, once again (as have Aristotle, de Man, Derrida, and Stevens in his prose tempted me to let happen), divert me by way of attractive displacements and evasions from trying to see “The Motive for Metaphor” with the hottest fire of sight. So I desist, with difficulty.

16 A steel, by the way, is a small, cylindrical object made of serrated steel you hold in your hand as a tool to sharpen knives.

Chapter 5: More than Global


4 Karen Barad, “Diffracting Diffraction: Cutting Together-Apart,” Parallax 20, no. 3 (2014): 168. Also see Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quan-


7 See Jean-Paul Martinon, “Im-Mundus or Nancy’s Globalizing-World-Formation,” in Nancy and the Political, ed. Sanja Dejanovic (Edinburgh University Press, 2015). I thank Professor Martinon for sharing this chapter with me.


10 Nancy, Being Singular Plural, xvi.

11 Nancy, Being Singular Plural, 3.


16 Serres, The Five Senses, 262.

17 Serres, The Five Senses, 264.


Fernando Cabo Aseguinolaza, “Dead, or a Picture of Good Health?: Comparatism, Europe, and World Literature,” *Comparative Literature* 58, no. 4 (fall 2006): 419.


The concern is about resurrecting literature from the fuss and fizz of world literature. I want to see it freed from the uncritical comparative modes of doing literature, from Franco Moretti’s sweeping categorizations, and from the seeming authority of acknowledged universals of “global literature.” Anders Pettersson’s observations come very close to my concerns here: “Not only do I think that Moretti fails to analyze the concept of world literature, and that he fails, a fortiori, to derive a method for the study of world literature from the analysis, but I already regard it as a mistake to pose the question of what world literature ‘is’ as a factual question.” “Transcultural Literary History: Beyond Constricting Notions of World Literature,” *New Literary History* 39, no. 3 (2008): 473.


Steven G. Yao, “The Unheimlich Maneuver; or the Gap, the Gradient, and the Spaces of Comparison,” *Comparative Literature* 57, no. 3 (summer 2005): 252.


37 Nancy, The Birth to Presence, 4.
40 Raimundo Pannikar, “What Is Comparative Philosophy Comparing?” In Interpreting Across Boundaries: New Essays in Comparative Philosophy, ed. Gerald J. Larson and Eliot Deutsch (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 116–36. He writes: “Diatopical hermeneutics is an art as much as a science, a praxis as much as a theory. It is a creative encounter, and there is no blueprint for creativity” (133). The more than global does not have any blueprint either.
Chapter 6: Globalization and World Literature


2 Claire Colebrook, in an essay entitled “A Globe of One’s Own: In Praise of the Flat Earth,” which I have seen in manuscript, sent me back to Satan’s space-travel in Milton. Her essay has been provocative for me in other ways, too, as have recent manuscript essays on “Critical Climate Change” by Tom Cohen.


8 King Lear, 4.6.16.

9 Paul de Man, “Genesis and Genealogy (Nietzsche),” in Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust (New Haven, CT: Yale


13 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 111.


15 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 143.

16 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 143.

17 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 143.


19 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 143.

20 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 143.


23 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 130.

24 Warminski, in “Reading for Example,” discusses cataphresis in his reading of a metaphor in The Birth of Tragedy (liii–lxi).

Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 110–11.


Here appears again the figure of the tame shore as against the dangerous ocean of universal knowledge, or, in this case, the icy current of existence. “Knowledge” and “existence” are by no means the same, however. The import of the metaphor is reversed in the second example, as happens with so much else in the language of The Birth of Tragedy. In the first citation, universal Socratic knowledge is seen as bad, debilitating. In the second citation, man is seen as too timid to entrust himself, as he should do, to the icy waters of existence.

Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 113.

Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 144.

Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 144.

George Eliot, Middlemarch (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1974), 229. The Cabeiri were a group of Samothracian fertility gods, the note in the Penguin Middlemarch tells me, with Casaubon-like learning.

Eliot, Middlemarch, 96.

Chapter 7: Reinventing the Teaching Machine


2 Garber, Academic Instincts, 60.


4 Garber, “Good to Think With,” 13.


7 Also see Ranjan Ghosh, ed. In Dialogue with Godot: Waiting and Other Thoughts (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013), where I have provided a new reading of Waiting for Godot (“Waiting upon Each Other: Work and Play in Waiting for Godot”) from an (in)fusionist perspective, keeping Hindu philosophy as the pervasive paradigm of intervention.
19 Samuel Beckett, Proust (New York: Grove Press, 1931), 48. The problem is that there is no Russellian spirit as evidenced in “Free Man’s Worship,” or the spirit that Camus tries to foreground that suggests the effort to face agony, absurdity, vacuity, and “unpleasure” with stolid boldness. All references to the play are from Endgame (London: Faber, 1970).
22 Rabindranath Tagore, Sadhana (Madras: Macmillan, 1979), 40.
26 See Karen Horney, Neurosis and Human Growth (New York: W. W. Norton, 1950). She clarifies the responsibility of consciousness where the “real self” forms the central inner core and becomes the deep source of growth. The question arises as to the extent to which Hamm and Clov have realized the significance of a generative center of being. A growth that combines both the vertical and the horizontal axes points to a harmonious development and unfolds itself sufficiently on the road of a self-enriching dharma of existence. For more pertinent references to Gita, see S. Radhakrishnan, The Bhagavad Gita (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2011), especially sections 14, 16, and 18.


Tagore, *Sadhana*, 57.


For Beckett, any perception of the “core” is problematic and very difficult to define. The “essence” of a thing remains elusive and defies formalization. Instances of this order are plentifully available in *The Unnamable* (1953). The sense of a fundamental unity is sorely lacking, which means that the metaphysical experiences of several of his protagonists are devoid of stability, permanence, and a transcendental joy. There is, thus, a relishing of passivity, an aspiration to revel in the freedom from the cardinal compulsion to cogit, “the great classical paralysis” (Molloy in *Three Novels* by Samuel Beckett [London: John Calder, 1956], 140). The inability to define the nature of reality and the virtual inexpressibility of the core of reality are the two issues that have primarily troubled me here; this means that the two characters cannot have the strength of the intellect to thrash out a significant view of the world. It is the “ordering” of the experiences and formalization of the chaos within that cry sorely for attention; despite the dim prospect of its eventual realization, the dharma of existence demands this inner reconstruction, which is what I ascribe to the inner emigration.


In the English translation, the boy is feared as “a potential procreator.” There is a fearful possibility of his living on as the boy pushes at the horizons of a refigured dharma of existence where the possibility of a new order of life, a new cycle, and a new earth come to the fore, threatening to obviate the hith-
erto adharmic, existential coils. I believe that the significance of the “small boy” is more emphatically expressed in the French version.


47 Jody Norton, “Guerrilla Pedagogy: Conflicting Authority and Interpretation in the Classroom,” *College Literature* 21, no. 3 (October 1994): 141.


Chapter 8: Should We Read or Teach Literature Now?


6 See Sam Frank’s fascinating essay about one facet of the digital revolution, the springing up of visionary prophets predicting, among other things, a dangerous robotic future powered by computers. It is dangerous because the computers may begin thinking for themselves and turn against their human creators: “Come with Us If You Want to Live: Among the Apocalyptic Libertarians of Silicon Valley,” Harper’s, January 2015, 26–36.
7 A recent report, published April 2015, by a committee of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, The State of the Humanities: Higher Education 2015 (available online at http://www.humanitiesindicators.org/binaries/pdf/HigherEd2015.pdf) takes a somewhat more cheerful view, emphasizing, for example, that there has been no increase in the percentage of adjuncts and part-time faculty in the humanities (it is already over 70 percent), the increased number of students who do humanities as a second major, and an increase in course credits in the humanities even as the humanities’ share of undergraduate degrees has been shrinking. The report is primarily based on statistical surveys, however. It would be interesting, for example, to know just what the content of those courses typically is. How many are in English composition, which is what most adjuncts in English departments primarily teach?
10 “What, me worry?” is the motto of that iconic nonworrier, Alfred E. Neuman, in Mad Magazine. See the Wikipedia entry for Mad Magazine.


Chapter 9: The Ethics of Reading Sahitya


3 Elizabeth Grosz, Chaos, Territory, Art, 9.


6 Andrade and Bary, “Cannibalist Manifesto,” 38, 39.

7 Andrade and Bary, “Cannibalist Manifesto,” 38.


10 For some interesting documentation of Arnold’s engagement with the Orient, see Martin William and R. Jarrett-Kerr, “Arnold Versus the Orient: Some Footnotes to a Disenchantment,” Comparative Literature Studies 12, no. 2 (June 1975): 129–46.


20 Machosky, “Fasting at the Feast of Literature,” 304.
28 Barad, “Posthumanist Performativity,” 815.
29 Barad, “Posthumanist Performativity,” 815.
30 Barad, “Posthumanist Performativity,” 817.
31 Barad, “Posthumanist Performativity,” 817.
33 Baird, *Thing Knowledge*, 146.
36 The connections between Harman’s object-oriented ontology and that ethics of sahitya as explicated in this chapter need further elaboration, which I hope to bring out someday. Some interesting recent additions to this line of scholarship dealing with humanities and OOO come from Richard Grusin,


Chapter 10: Literature and Ethics


2 This essay is available as chapter 6 of J. Hillis Miller, *An Innocent Abroad: Lectures in China* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2015).


10 Trollope, *An Autobiography*, 95. The whole paragraph about *Framley Parsonage* in *An Autobiography*, 94–95, gives Trollope’s mature judgment of that novel. It will be discussed later in this chapter.

11 Trollope, *Framley Parsonage*, 514.

12 Trollope, *Framley Parsonage*, 293.


17 This, by the way, is an example of Trollope’s constant, covert use of unidentified citation or allusion. It echoes a passage many Victorian readers would perhaps have recognized, that is, what Sydney Carton says in Dickens’s *A Tale of Two Cities* (published in 1859, a year before *Framley Parsonage* began to appear in periodical form), book 2, chapter 4: “I care for no man on earth and
no man on earth cares for me.” Both Dickens and Trollope, however, may be echoing some folksong, popular song, or common saying. *Framley Parsonage* also contains, in my judgment, many covert echoes of Sir Walter Scott’s *The Bride of Lammermoor*. Many of Trollope’s readers would have known Scott’s novel. Lucy Robarts is not called Lucy for nothing, since that is the name of Scott’s heroine. Many parallels exist between the plots of the two stories. Lucy Robarts may be referring ironically to Scott’s Lucy when, in a response to Fanny Robarts’s question about how Lucy can joke about Lady Lufton’s opposition to her marriage to Lord Lufton, she says: “I ought to be pale, ought I not? And very thin, and to go mad by degrees? I have not the least intention of doing anything of the kind” (Trollope, *Framley Parsonage*, 385). Or perhaps Trollope is satirically echoing Donizetti’s opera, *Lucia di Lammermoor* (1835), based on Scott’s novel, with its famous aria sung by Lucia in her madness.

18 Trollope, *Framley Parsonage*, 229.
19 Trollope, *Framley Parsonage*, 145.
21 Trollope, *Framley Parsonage*, 283
22 Trollope, *Framley Parsonage*, 286.
23 Trollope, *Framley Parsonage*, 447.
28 Trollope, *Framley Parsonage*, 483.
29 Trollope, *Framley Parsonage*, 268.
31 Trollope, *Framley Parsonage*, 229.
34 Trollope, *Framley Parsonage*, 339.
36 Trollope, *Framley Parsonage*, 343.
37 The Wikipedia entry for “The King and the Beggar-Maid” mentions *Framley Parsonage* as one place among a great many in Western literature where the beggar-maid story appears.
38 Trollope, *Framley Parsonage*, 288–89.
39 See “conjure” in the *Oxford English Dictionary*. 