New Countries

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I have taken only those measures that have been necessary for the support, protection, tranquility, and conservation of the Spanish criollos, of the mestizos, zambos and Indians. For all of them [are] countrymen and compatriots born in our land. —JOSÉ GABRIEL TÚPAC AMARU, 1780

Bolivia and southern Peru are homogeneous.... My goal is to do well and raise these two portions of territory, if I am able, to the height of civilization and common welfare. —ANDRÉS DE SANTA CRUZ, 1837

At first glance, Andean history illustrates well the theme of divergence in the era of New World independence. In 1500, the Inkas exerted influence over the most expansive American empire from Cusco; before the end of that century the new Spanish metropolis of Potosí became a nerve center of the global economy. But silver production declined after 1650, and in the early nineteenth
century the region broke into multiple countries governed by weak states and lacking cohesive national identities.¹ That outcome was not inevitable. This chapter explores the forces of convergence and divergence within the Andean heartland—core highlands ranging from the regions around the once Inka capital at Cusco to the later mining metropolis at Potosí and its hinterlands—to understand how peoples with a long history of interactions came to separate into two nations: Peru and Bolivia.²

Inka roads, armies, and exchanges integrated the heartland in the fifteenth century. Spanish rule linked the region to the global silver economy in the sixteenth century, but preserved strong indigenous leadership, ways of production, and cultural customs at the local level. Although the heartland was split between two viceroyalties in 1776, economic, social, and cultural integrations persisted as evidenced by the uprisings of the 1780s, famously led by Túpac Amaru. Although political rivalries during the wars of independence led to the establishment of separate nations, the foundation of Peru and Bolivia as new countries was contingent—a historical process in need of explanation.

The heartland was the core of what had been a larger Andean zone of resource exchange and empire building. Beginning almost four thousand years ago, Andean peoples began to develop settled agricultural communities and systems of exchange that distributed products such as corn, tubers, wool, and coca among highly diversified ecological zones from the coast to the high altitude plains. From the shores of Lake Titicaca, Tiwanaku expanded its influence over much of the southern Andes between 550 and 950, while the Wari held sway over the central zone (much of contemporary Peru). Over the course of the fifteenth century the Inka built an empire—Tawantinsuyu or the Land of Four Quarters—that expanded even beyond the former Tiwanaku and Wari territories. Some of those recently conquered Andean peoples helped Spanish invaders defeat the Inka in the sixteenth century, and under this new empire the silver extracted by indigenous laborers from the rich mountain of Potosí flowed across both the Atlantic and Pacific, much of it to meet high demand in China.³ Wealthy Spanish miners, in turn, could import luxurious silks and wines to make life in the harsh environment more tolerable. Silver also stimulated commerce throughout the Andes to meet the needs of workers and provide supplies for mining: woolens arrived from far-off Quito, while mules raised to the south near Tucumán met demand for power and transportation.⁴

Spanish colonialism dramatically affected Andean society by pulling native peoples into a commercial economy and siphoning labor power from agricultural communities to the mines. Nonetheless, unlike the case of mining centers
in Spanish North America, as analyzed by Alfredo Ávila and John Tutino, these forces did not make “a new world.” Rather, native Andeans in the heartland resiliently adapted their cultural traditions and social relations to changing conditions and demands. Although Potosí itself was a new metropolis—with a population in 1600 of about one hundred thousand at an elevation of thirteen thousand feet—it grew within a long-settled region. Despite dramatic demographic decline, the indigenous population of the Andean heartland provided labor for the mines, about half of it from a forced draft (the mitá). In addition to taxes on silver and trade, a separate tax on the indigenous population was critical to colonial (and later national) revenue. Traditional authorities (kurakas in Quechua, caciques in Spanish) and many commoners viewed this tribute as guaranteeing a degree of self-rule, access to communal landholdings, and an exemption from sales taxes when they sold their products in markets. Native Andeans without land or herds, on the other hand, often resisted payment. From 1630 to 1730, silver production in Potosí declined, but agriculturalists and herders in the heartland—many of them members of indigenous communities—continued to exchange goods through regional trade networks. When silver began a modest recovery in the eighteenth century, the south-central highlands along with their connected tropical valleys (yungas) were able to meet the demand for supplies: sugar, cocoa, wine and brandy, woolen textiles and hides, meat, grains and tubers. While much reduced from the Inka realm of Tawantinsuyu, this region included much of its former core (Cusco and the heartlands of the southeastern quarter named Kollasuyu).

The integration created by cultural ties, trade networks, and labor migration, however, was repeatedly ignored when political authorities drew and redrawed borders in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In 1776, the Spanish Bourbons removed the provinces of Upper Peru, including Puno, from the authority of Lima and joined them to the newly created Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata, with its capital in the Atlantic port of Buenos Aires. The break, however, was anything but clean. Although silver from Potosí was henceforth exported through Buenos Aires, communities on both sides of the new administrative border continued to provide labor and supplies. With the establishment of a Cusco Audiencia (High Court) in 1788, three provinces of Puno were put under its jurisdiction, while the rest continued to report to the Audiencia of Charcas in Chuquisaca until the entire Intendancy of Puno was returned to Peru in 1796. An 1801 proposal to create a new viceroyalty encompassing heartland provinces of Cusco, Puno, and Charcas made sense, but did not come to fruition. In 1825, Simón Bolívar sanctioned the creation of a nation, named in his honor, independent of either Peru or the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata.
Plata (which included the future Paraguay and Uruguay as well as Argentina). He still hoped to build a grand Andean federation that never materialized. Finally, in the wake of the War of the Pacific (1879–1883), Bolivia lost its Pacific port and Peru its rich nitrate fields to the expanding nation of Chile.

Despite cultural diversity and economic differentiation within the Andean heartland, one does not need to resort to counterfactuals to find political attempts to reintegrate the region. The great Andean rebellions of 1780 to 1782 encompassed this entire zone, and when the capture of Fernando VII created an imperial crisis in 1808, Viceroy José Fernando de Abascal reclaimed Upper Peru in a bid to weaken the rebels of Buenos Aires. The last Spanish viceroy of Peru, José de la Serna, retreated to the highlands, making Cusco the effective capital and allowing members of its cabildo and Audiencia to imagine a Hispanic reincarnation of the Inka empire. Independence-era leaders did not view the division of the region into separate nations a foregone conclusion. Even after a congress in “Upper Peru” declared its independence as Bolivia in 1825, various schemes imagined reuniting the two “Perus.” Andrés de Santa Cruz led the most promising attempt; he saw himself as a citizen of both nations and joined them in confederation from 1836 to 1839.
Although the attempts at independence-era political integration of the Andean heartland failed, owing to internal rivalries as well as external opposition, they challenge us to consider alternatives to the separate nations of Peru and Bolivia. As in Central America, drawing national boundaries after independence was a complicated and contingent process. There, as Jordana Dym traces, Guatemala emerged from processes of both fragmentation (separation from the larger federation) and integration (strengthening the economic and political ties among three distinct regions). In the Andes, inhabitants of a territory that had been cohesive for centuries were unable to overcome administrative divisions introduced by the Bourbons and reaffirmed out of political expediency after the defeat of the royal army.

Given the contingency of their separation, we should not lose sight of the commonalities between northern Bolivia and southern Peru. This region shared a resilient indigenous peasantry who was neither passive nor isolated and at least some elites and intellectuals who envisioned polities that would incorporate, rather than exclude and dispossess, such communities. Both before and after independence from Spain, the term “patria” was invoked to convey common membership in a polity, allowing Spanish concepts of vecinos as rights-bearing residents of a corporate community to overlap and interpenetrate both indigenous understandings of communal membership and evolving notions of citizenship in broader republics. Belonging to a patria asserted a degree of shared identity without negating internal diversity. Finally, the borders of a homeland represented by the patria were flexible, rooted in but reaching beyond the local community. This chapter draws on the rich historiography of both Peru and Bolivia, as well as sources from the early nineteenth century, to reassemble those elements into an alternative view of a patria, if not a fully realized nation, integrated through culture and trade routes as well as political imaginings. Along the way, this counternarrative will cross several periods whose chronological boundaries are as imprecise as those geographic borders.

**Economic Resilience and Movements for Home Rule (ca. 1750–1805)**

The history of Peru is often told as a story of decline. Before the arrival of the Spaniards, native Andeans had developed technologies of agriculture, storage, and transport that supported dense populations, laying the foundations for the expansive Inka empire. In the first century of colonialism, Spaniards harnessed these human and material resources to an expanding global market. Peruvian silver funded the rise of Spain as a world power and stimulated trade from Europe to China. So famous in Europe was the remote Andean metropolis that
the term “Potosi” became synonymous with striking it rich. Then silver production entered a long decline and the territory named Peru gradually shrank from encompassing all Spanish claims in South America to a medium-sized nation of uncertain prosperity by the end of the nineteenth century.

If we reconsider the Andean heartland during the eighteenth century from the vantage point of the altiplano rather than Lima, alternative narratives emerge to challenge expectations of dependency theory that extractive enterprises oriented toward the global market would create enclaves of dynamism within larger zones of underdevelopment. The forced labor draft (mitá) did constitute a double exploitation of indigenous communities, by siphoning off local resources (wool, foodstuffs, llamas) along with their labor power. Nonetheless, native Andeans (women as well as men) responded to these pressures with resilience, continuing traditional exchanges of products among ecological zones and even selling surpluses in the new markets. As silver production declined and the population of Potosí shrank in the later seventeenth century, the peasant economy did not collapse. Some of the reduction in officially registered silver, moreover, reflected both tax evasion by large refiners and informal production by groups of skilled indigenous wage laborers. Finally, after 1730, both the indigenous population and the production of silver began to recover from their long decline.

Although Peru’s value to the Spanish empire could not rival New Spain’s in the eighteenth century, the Bourbon monarchs did not ignore its potential as they promoted economic revival and increased revenue collection throughout the eighteenth century. To stimulate mining, Madrid reduced the tax on silver, made mercury for processing more readily available, and provided technical help for upgrading excavations and water pumping. Equally important for the profits of silver entrepreneurs in Potosi, Spanish officials continued to enforce the mitá despite growing calls for its abolition and looked the other way as increasing quotas lengthened the shifts of forced laborers. Throughout the century, Andean silver production increased at an average annual rate of 1.2 percent, although it regained its earlier peak only briefly in the 1780s. In the midst of the recovery, Bourbon reformers opened more ports to trade and reorganized colonial administration to increase oversight and tax collection. Travel from the altiplano to either coast was difficult, but shipping silver from Buenos Aires eliminated the overland Panama route, avoided Caribbean attacks by imperial rivals, and reduced silver exported directly across the Pacific. Moreover, authorities in Buenos Aires could increase vigilance against the contraband silver that had flowed through Brazil since the seventeenth century. Despite the shifts in export patterns, however, Andean products
continued to move freely across the new boundary between the viceroyalties of Peru and Río de la Plata.

Demand from the reviving mining centers and expanding cities no longer drew trade from as widespread an area, in large part because producers in the Andean heartland met regional needs. Native Andeans were exempt from the sales tax (alcabala), an exception some nonindigenous traders and colonial officials viewed as an unfair competitive edge; thus it is difficult to measure and track commodities produced by indigenous peasants. Sources from 1793, when that exemption was briefly abolished, suggest that native provisioning accounted for a significant proportion of goods consumed in mining areas. Although the vast majority of European goods entering Potosí that year (80 percent) were imported through Buenos Aires, almost three-quarters of commodities (as measured by value) were produced in the Andean heartland, including brandy from Tacna and Arequipa, cloth from Cusco, and coca from La Paz. Notably, much of the coca was produced and transported by native Andeans. Although large coca haciendas also expanded in response to demand from mining centers, indigenous communities often found markets for their cheaper coca during periods of silver contraction. Indigenous peasants and other small farmers in the regions north of Potosí and in Cochabamba similarly provisioned both the mining areas and the city of La Paz with wheat and corn, and native Andeans flocked to major trade centers in the region of Oruro. Although brandy and cloth were produced on larger enterprises and traded by Hispanic merchants, the abundance of these commodities in the markets and shops of Potosí demonstrate that the transfer of Upper Peru to the jurisdiction of Río de la Plata did not discourage trade across the new border.

While Potosí remained the single most productive mining center in the Andean heartland, silver production rose throughout Upper and Lower Peru. Moreover, growing populations in cities like Arequipa also created demand for foodstuffs and other locally produced goods in addition to European imports. Cusco, where producers specialized in sugar, textiles, coca, and hot peppers (aji), experienced greater economic stagnation than Arequipa; on the other hand, the obstacles to making quick profits limited encroachment by non-Indians onto communal lands around Cusco. The major trade routes passed through the altiplano region around Lake Titicaca, where as much as two-thirds of the livestock was in indigenous hands and many worked transporting goods on packs of camelids and mules throughout the south-central Andes. Residents of the high plains sent the products of herding (wool, hides, meat) as well as crafts (leather goods and pottery) in both directions: to Arequipa and Cusco as well as to Oruro and Potosí. Although indigenous labor and commodities
both received low compensation, the flexibility of peasant household production allowed for subsistence survival in hard times and modest surpluses when markets improved. In contrast to Mexico and Haiti, where popular rebellions destroyed export economies to establish familial subsistence production, external and internal trade and commercial and family production continued to converge in the Andean heartland.

Although regional trade offered opportunities to some, demographic and administrative changes in the eighteenth century also resulted in economic hardship. The recovery of the indigenous population, after the last great epidemic of the 1720s, placed pressure on the land base of communities. Moreover, Bourbon measures to increase colonial revenues resulted in more efficient collection of “tribute,” the indigenous head tax, in part by ending exemptions for forasteros (“migrants” who may have been residents of a given community for generations). In 1751, Madrid also legalized the customary practice undertaken by governors (corregidores) to require communities to buy goods, often at inflated prices. Cusco elites forged economic and marital alliances with authorities in Upper Peru, for example, that allowed them to market their textiles through such repartos. Finally, in the 1770s, colonial authorities raised the sales tax from 2 to 4 and then 6 percent, and increased the range of commodities subject to taxation. Although indigenous traders selling products from community plots or herds were exempt from taxation, they were liable for tax on “Castilian” goods that they marketed. Given this loophole, many indigenous traders feared that more of their cargos would be taxed than had been customary, especially when the sales tax was extended to coca and grains in 1779 and 1780.

Colonial subjects in the Andean heartland responded in various ways to these increasing economic and fiscal pressures. As they had since the conquest, indigenous communities filed petitions and lawsuits aimed at staking claims to land, lessening the burden of their tax and labor obligations, and protesting abuses by both colonial authorities and some kurakas. When Bourbon officials proved less open to negotiation than their predecessors, however, many peasants and traders turned to open revolt. Crowds attacked customhouses newly established across this economic zone to collect the expanded sales tax, first in Cochabamba (1774), then La Paz (1777 and 1780) and Arequipa (1780), and finally there were plans to protest a proposed aduana in Cusco (1780). Evidence suggests that participation was widespread across classes and ethnic groups, and the opposition to an expanded alcabala reflected the potential links between economic circuits and potential polities. Although uprisings might respond to a trigger event, they drew from historical memory of alternative forms of rule and envisioned new arrangements of power. And trade networks,
especially the circuits plied by muleteers and trajinantes (who used llamas as pack animals), were an important means of coordinating actions throughout a wider region. 27

As such a trader, José Gabriel Condorcanqui (1738–1781) had built up a network of contacts that cut across various ethnic and socioeconomic categories. 28 He was educated in the Jesuit college in Cusco established for the children of the indigenous nobility, and later in Lima met intellectuals associated with the University of San Marcos, where professors evaded censorship to discuss enlightenment texts. He was on good terms with many of the regional elite, and his network widened with marriage to mestiza Micaela Bastidas, who played a key role in their joint economic and political endeavors. 29 Despite his education and commercial success, he too ran up against colonial, specifically Bourbon, forms of exploitation. His uncle Marcos Thupa Amaro, kuraka of Surimana, was “bankrupted by the seizure of a train of mules and a hundred pesos’ worth of goods because his mitá quota was one man short.” 30 Condorcanqui, in turn, had to pay increased taxes on his trade goods in 1777 and disputed the reparto with several corregidores, one of whom jailed him for debts. 31 Like other indigenous elites, he repeatedly went to court to establish his claim as hereditary kuraka of Tinta in the region of Cusco and his royal descent from Inka ruler Túpac Amaru, executed in 1572 by Viceroy Francisco de Toledo. It sent a powerful
message when the kuraka, taking the name of Túpac Amaru, launched his movement by executing Corregidor Antonio de Arriaga in 1780.

Historians have long debated the causes and goals of the great Andean rebellion. Túpac Amaru claimed to be acting with orders from the Spanish monarch, but the language and content of his proclamations and letters were clearly anticolonial. Issuing orders authoritatively as an Inka, he called for the reduction of tribute and sales tax rates and the abolition of the mitá. He participated in and drew from an eighteenth-century revival of Inka history that included the circulation of Garcilaso de la Vega’s *Royal Commentaries of the Incas*, the composition and legal use of Inka genealogies, and portraiture of kurakas and their wives in Inka dress. But Túpac Amaru was also reinventing what it meant to be an Inka; he declared his Christian faith, prohibiting harm to priests or desecration of churches, and in his efforts to recruit allies, he implied that the Andean patria over which he claimed authority could be embedded within the larger empire of the Catholic sovereigns of Castile. Túpac Amaru appealed to all fellow countrymen born in “Peru” (referring to the full Andean region rather than the recently reduced viceroyalty)—American Spaniards, mestizos, and zambos (mulattos) as well as Indians—to unite as compatriots in opposition to the corrupt and exploitative officials who came from Spain. Even before securing Cusco, he led his troops toward Lake Titicaca; rebels in that region continued fighting until 1783. In the heartland of Tawantinsuyu, where stories of a returning or regenerated Inka (Inkarri) had and would continue to circulate, some non-Indians as well as native Andeans could imagine their place within a polity governed by an Inka.

Certainly, these coalitions were fragile. Some hereditary nobles chose not to recognize Túpac Amaru’s overarching authority, but they did not necessarily reject the larger vision of a reinvigorated authority for their class. Similarly, indigenous peasants had their own interpretations of who were and were not their fellow countrymen, often ignoring orders not to kill locals of Spanish or mixed descent, thus scaring off some of the allies Túpac Amaru sought. Although Charles Walker rejects Peruvian nationalist narratives that claim Túpac Amaru as a precursor to the independence movements of 1810 to 1825, he does argue that the movement and its ideology constituted a militant “protonationalism.” Although the rebellion did not succeed in establishing a new polity, its leaders spoke in the name of a patria, indicating “the existence of a unique body of people and the attempt to attain political gains for this body or nation.”

Even before Túpac Amaru’s execution of Arriaga, another anticolonial movement was taking shape from the bottom up among the Aymara-speaking communities around La Paz and Potosí. In this region, the legitimacy of hereditary
ethnic leaders had eroded to a greater degree than around Cusco, and local community authorities (often elected to the colonial office of village alcaldes) took the initiative in protesting the abusive practices of corregidores in forced sales and collection of tribute.\textsuperscript{40} Such local efforts were not new, but an illiterate peasant from the community of Macha came to spearhead a wider collective strategy. Interestingly, Tomás Katari and his allies initially sought the support of new Bourbon officials against the entrenched local elite. Katari promised that in return for being allowed to determine among themselves how to apportion tribute payments, communal authorities could in fact increase revenue by cutting out corrupt middlemen. When Corregidor Joaquín Alós refused to recognize his authority, Katari traveled over two thousand miles to Buenos Aires, where he obtained a viceregal order to the Audiencia of Charcas to investigate the community claims and enact a just settlement. Instead the Audiencia ordered Katari’s arrest, and its troops subsequently killed the captive. This act triggered open revolt by Katari’s followers. Although Katari’s leadership was distinct from that of Túpac Amaru, his movement also expressed a vision of indigenous authority at the local level that grew out of “a long-term process of cultural and political empowerment of the Andean peoples.”\textsuperscript{41}

The Amaru (Quechua) movement formed a tenuous alliance with the community-led (Aymara) revolt under a new leader from the Sicasica province near La Paz. Julián Apasa earned his living selling coca and woolens within the south-central Andean trade circuit, an occupation that allowed him to spread anticolonial plans and forge a political network. Taking the name Tupaj Katari (“Resplendent Serpent”) and embodying physical and spiritual characteristics associated with Aymara warriors, Apasa effectively mobilized his peasant troops, twice setting siege to La Paz for 109 and 75 days, respectively.\textsuperscript{42} Although Tupaj Katari was in communication with Diego Cristóbal Túpac Amaru, who was trying to maintain a multiethnic alliance from Cuzco, the Aymara soldiers often took retribution on all who gained in colonial exploitation, rather than distinguishing those born in America from those who arrived from Europe.\textsuperscript{43} Tupaj Katari rose to prominence at the height of anticolonial protest, but had emerged out of longer-term strategies aimed at reinforcing local authority. Smaller revolts in the region of La Paz during the preceding decades had demonstrated an emerging “democracy” in action in which leaders consulted communal assemblies and Aymara peasants experimented with incorporating Spaniards and mestizos on indigenous terms into visions of a new polity.\textsuperscript{44}

Visions of the polity that might result from Andean rebellion in the 1780s ranged from Túpac Amaru’s multiethnic patria under Inka rule to Tupaj Katari’s bottom-up federation of mostly Aymara communities. Revolts in which
Quechua and Aymara leaders alike experimented with practices and rituals that might incorporate non-Indians (albeit in ways those American Spaniards and mestizos might not welcome) suggest that native Andeans did not necessarily reject all outsiders from their idea of patria. As later in Haiti, where all citizens were declared “black,” as Carolyn Fick shows, all members of an Andean patria might be imagined as indigenous. Andrés Túpac Amaru, for example, ordered non-Indians in the town of Sorata “to dress in Indian garb, chew coca, go barefoot, and call themselves Qollas” (a reference to the Inka territory of Kollasuyu); in the mining center of Oruro Hispanic rebels voluntarily donned Inka tunics. Such initiatives provide evidence to support Sinclair Thomson’s claim that “race war,” rather than inevitable, “was a result of political and military processes from among an array of different possibilities.” Although none of these revolts prevailed, nor easily conform to Western notions of nationhood, such movements can be seen as alternative projects to establish home rule of the patria, some more inclusive but authoritarian, others more exclusive but potentially more democratic.

Several decades would pass after the suppression of the rebellions of the early 1780s before major political and military movements again shook the Andes. From their role as critical intermediaries who controlled access to Andean labor and resources for Spanish conquerors, kurakas had seen the gradual erosion of their influence in the face of regime pressures. The defeat of Túpac Amaru brought an intensification of that trend. In addition to executing or deposing kurakas who had supported Túpac Amaru, colonial officials prohibited displays of Inka heritage; they even took from many loyal kurakas the authority to collect tribute. Viceroy of Peru Teodoro de Croix (1784–1790) also led reforms to create a more centralized and disciplined military force that could respond to uprisings more effectively than the local militias who had performed poorly in 1780.

It would be a mistake, however, to see a period after 1782 as one of complete quiescence. Provincial elites (Hispanic by reputation but often of mixed ancestry) pursued strategies of negotiation and evasion to limit the negative impacts of the Bourbon reforms, and indigenous communities returned primarily to the courts in the ongoing effort to protect their resources and limit outside exploitation. One sign of the ongoing appeal of an alternative polity—for diverse inhabitants of the region—was a conspiracy in 1805. Despite memories of indigenous violence in 1780, two Hispanic provincials searched for a descendant of the Inkas to legitimate a plan to topple Spanish rule. Juan Manuel Ubalde was born in Arequipa, studied in Cusco, practiced law in Lima, and was appointed as a substitute member of the recently established Audiencia of Cusco in 1805.
His coconspirator, mineralogist Gabriel Aguilar, was born farther north in Huánuco, but had traveled widely through the trading circuits of the south-central Andes. Their peregrinations traced possible boundaries of an Andean patria. Although their plans were discovered before they could be carried out, less than a decade later creoles and kurakas from Cusco jointly launched a rebellion, seizing territory from Arequipa to La Paz.

*Imperial and Separatist Visions of an Andean Patria (ca. 1809–1825)*

Because histories of Spanish American independence focus their studies on the nations that emerged and work their way back in time, many artificially separate Bolivian and Peruvian separatist movements. In most accounts, Peruvians are identified as the “reluctant rebels”; in these interpretations, elites remembered Túpac Amaru and feared provoking another race war, while native Andeans took no interest in the disputes between Spaniards, whether American or European. Although Lima elites did remain largely royalist, many in the highlands led or joined revolts. “Bolivians” (the term did not yet exist) have a somewhat more rebellious reputation, but are noted for their formation of small *republiquetas* rather than a united front. In both cases, of course, Spanish forces were defeated only with the assistance of troops arriving from the more autonomist regions of Greater Colombia and Río de la Plata. Although some Andeans (like their counterparts across Spanish America) initially remained loyal to the Spanish Crown and others opted earlier for independence, most shared a vision of a patria that encompassed territory on both shores of Lake Titicaca. And leaders in diverse political factions saw the importance of incorporating the majority indigenous population into their plans.

Urban elites throughout the Spanish empire responded to Napoleon’s capture of Fernando VII by forming assemblies (*juntas*) to govern locally in his name, but their goals varied: some regarded their actions as a temporary measure until monarchism could be restored, others hoped to create a space for greater home rule within a reformed imperial structure, and a few envisioned a movement toward full autonomy. Lima, where both officials and merchants dreamed of reconstituting its former glory as the viceregal capital and exclusive port for Spanish South America, was notably absent from this trend. Cities in the Andean heartland, however, were among the first to establish juntas: gatherings in Chuquisaca and La Paz in 1809 preceded the formation the following year of the more famous assemblies in Caracas and Buenos Aires, and Cochabamba, Oruro, and Tacna quickly followed in 1810 and 1811.

328—Sarah Chambers
Although members of the Hispanic elite initiated the junta in La Paz, they invited indigenous communities to send representatives. Supporters from below, moreover, pressured for measures such as the abolition of the mita, the temporary suspension of tribute and sales taxes, and the election of local leaders. Strikingly reminiscent of earlier attempts to identify all members of an Andean patria as indigenous, rebels occasionally used the term indio to refer to all those born locally, grouping together “white, almost white (or having white skin), and real Indians.” In addition to attempting to forge an inclusive alliance within the region around La Paz, leaders planned to extend their movement throughout the Andean heartland. Their initial declaration was addressed to the “courageous inhabitants of La Paz and of the entire empire of Peru.” They quickly gained adherents as far south as Potosí and Chuquisaca and sent troops toward Lower Peru and the port of Arica. Although they could not hold the city of La Paz, many continued to fight for their “patria” as guerrillas in the República of Ayopaya, a territory that included landless Aymara, indigenous communities, and mestizo and Hispanic smallholders. Notably, rebel authorities adopted many of the tactics used decades earlier in the area by the Kataristas, and financed their operations in part by marketing coca.

The revolts in Upper Peru envisioned an Andean patria that straddled the boundary between Peru and Río de la Plata, while authorities in Lima and Buenos Aires also vied for control over altiplano territory. Juan José Castelli, who led the first expedition to extend the power of the porteño junta, proclaimed that the movement aimed to liberate the indigenous population along with everyone else. As far away as Huánuco, where American Spaniards were trying to recruit support among the surrounding villages for a revolt, rumors circulated that the “Inka King Castelli” would arrive to liberate the communities and that members should prepare to greet him with traditional dances. From the other direction, Viceroy José de Abascal in Lima seized upon the crisis as an opportunity to reunite Lower and Upper Peru, sending troops that scored victories over both local juntas and porteño forces. Abascal had intensified military reform, increasing the size and effectiveness of the Peruvian royal army. In an effort to reinforce loyalty to the Crown, he recruited a diverse leadership to command the largely indigenous and mestizo troops. Among royal officers were loyal kurakas from Puno and Cusco, notably Mateo García Pumacahua, earlier decorated for his role in defeating Túpac Amaru. In 1812 Pumacahua was promoted to brigadier and interim president of the Cusco Audiencia, but then passed over by the permanent appointment of peninsular Manuel Pardo. American Spaniards from Arequipa, including Pío Tristan and José Manuel de
Goyeneche, returned from military service in Spain to take command of the army of Upper Peru. Mestizos such as Agustín Gamarra (Cusco) and Andrés de Santa Cruz (La Paz) also rose through the ranks.  

Just as Abascal was rewarding loyalty through military commissions, the convocation of the Cortes in Cádiz further altered political possibilities in the empire. In a reversal of earlier rebel attempts to Andeanize Spaniards and mestizos, the 1812 Constitution extended “Spanish” nationality to indigenous inhabitants, declaring them citizens eligible to vote and abolishing the tribute they had been assessed since conquest. The exclusion of people of African descent from citizenship would affect many along both the Pacific and Atlantic Coasts, but few in the Andean highlands. Many from various classes enthusiastically embraced the constitution during the brief periods it was in force (1812–1814 and 1820–1823). Presumably they shared its vision of a new national polity in which Spaniards included all “free men who were born and reside anywhere in Spanish dominions, as well as their children” (article 5, section 1). The nation, thus defined, was far vaster than the Andean heartland, much less the later nations of Peru and Bolivia. But the constitution did grant significant authority to locally elected bodies. A pyramid of municipalities and provinces within a constitutional monarchy was not so different from what Tristan Platt suggests was the indigenous vision of “cantons and provinces, departments and nations as simply the ascending levels of a segmentary system whose smallest units were to be found within the kinship and residential group.”

Defense of the constitution was one trigger of a major autonomist movement that began in Cusco. As in the aborted conspiracy of 1805, this rebellion was initiated by American Spaniards who sought indigenous allies; unlike the messianic dreams of Aguilar and Ubalde, its vision grew out of a new political context and its plans were more realizable. In late 1812, a lawyer circulated a letter signed by thirty-seven local notables protesting the delay in calling elections for the town council (cabildo). The Audiencia tried to restore calm by arresting some more vocal agitators, but these measures had the opposite effect of mobilizing a protest under José Angulo. When Abascal ordered a hard line against the protestors, Pumacahua, perhaps smarting from not being confirmed in his Audiencia post, joined the rebellion. Although he was cautious about his use of Inka symbolism, his descent from Huayna Capac likely bolstered his legitimacy among some, indigenous and nonindigenous alike. In 1814, autonomist forces fanned out, north to Huamanga and Huancavelica and south to Arequipa, Puno, and La Paz, where they were more successful. Many soldiers and officers, like Pumacahua, had just served in the suppression of the revolts in Upper Peru, but were now mobilized for a new cause. Although the rebels were
defeated by royal troops in 1815—after the restored King Fernando’s abrogation of the constitution—it revealed again the potential for political alliances that crossed class and ethnic categories, and the border that had divided the two Perus in 1776. As rebels in the province of Aymaraes expressed it in 1818, “We are now all of the same body, españoles and tribute-paying Indians.”

By 1820—when the Cádiz Constitution was reinstated and peninsular troops prepared to sail to South America—the royal army still controlled much Andean territory. The leaders of the increasingly successful moves toward independence elsewhere in South America recognized that they must end Spanish rule in the Andes to consolidate their own autonomy. José de San Martín landed near Lima in 1820 with soldiers from Chile and the Río de la Plata; Simón Bolívar came with Colombian troops (from regions now Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador) and took over patriot command in 1822. The new viceroy of Peru, José de la Serna, moved his administration from Lima to Cusco, which he called “the ancient capital of Peru,” opening a last opportunity between 1821 and 1824 to construct an Andean patria within the framework of the Spanish Constitution. A local newspaper published a poem that envisioned an empire stretching across the Andes from the Pacific to the Atlantic, led by La Serna from Cusco.

Despite the last stand by La Serna, local guerrillas who favored independence slowly extended their control of territory across the altiplano, while forces commanded by Bolívar and Antonio José de Sucre advanced from the north. As the balance of power tipped, American-born officers in the royal army one by one shifted allegiance to the cause of independence. The biographies of two reveal common roots in the provincial elite of the Andean heartland and the ongoing ties between Lower and Upper Peru. Agustín Gamarra was born in 1785 in Cusco, where he learned Quechua before studying Latin. He joined the king’s army in 1809 to fight insurgency in Upper Peru and later the followers of Pumacahua, and by 1818 he was promoted to colonel. Then he switched sides in early 1821, volunteering to serve under San Martín. Gamarra’s enemies insinuated that his mother was an Indian; the mixed heritage of his future rival Andrés de Santa Cruz is undisputed. The father of Santa Cruz, originally from Huamanga, was a career military officer and midlevel royal bureaucrat, serving the viceroyalties of Peru and Río de la Plata. In the 1780s he was in La Paz to suppress the Katarista rebellion, and he later married a woman of the indigenous elite whose family remained loyal to Spain. Andrés was born in La Paz but educated in Cusco, where he courted the daughter of an Audiencia judge whom he later married in Arequipa. He pursued a career similar to Gamarra, joining the royal army in 1809 and rising to the rank of lieutenant colonel in
1817, when he was taken prisoner of war. Escaping to rejoining the royal army in Peru, he fell captive once again—and changed sides.

In addition to adapting to the fortunes of war, American-born officers saw that their chances of promotion in the Spanish army were limited. In the independence forces, by contrast, Santa Cruz rose quickly to become Bolívar’s chief of staff for the Peruvian division. The gambits of Santa Cruz and Gamarra paid off in 1824 with the definitive patriot victories at Junín (where Santa Cruz fought) and Ayacucho (where Gamarra participated). Although Bolivar favored a union of the two Perus, he followed Sucre’s advice to convene a congress in 1825 that founded a separate Bolivia.

An Andean Nation Briefly Realized:
Trade Circuits and Confederation (ca. 1825–1839)

Before picking up the story of the intertwined political trajectories of Gamarra and Santa Cruz and their roles in promoting an Andean patria from bases in Peru and Bolivia respectively, let us revisit the regional economy during the first half of the nineteenth century. The prolonged fighting between separatist and royalist forces between 1809 and 1825 took a serious toll on production across the region. Peasants and workers were pressed into service, armies requisitioned supplies from communities, and mining came almost to a halt. Nonetheless, the production of silver and other minerals resumed more quickly than often assumed, albeit with regional variations. Moderate levels of silver extraction continued in Potosí, much of it by indigenous and mestizo small-scale producers, as the mitá draft was abolished at independence. Puno also remained an important mining center integrated into both regional trade circuits and the global market. Exports from and imports to Bolivia went through both the new country’s only port at Cobija on the Pacific, as well as the established trading center of Arica, which remained part of Peru until 1883. With production below pre-1810 levels, however, much Bolivian silver was minted and used to buy supplies from the regions of Cusco and Arequipa rather than reaching any port.

Jurist José María Dalence, a native of Oruro educated in Chuquisaca, published an overview on the geography, demography, and economy of Bolivia in 1851 that reveals continuities from late colonial times. La Paz remained the most populous department, and the most indigenous; along with parts of Potosí and Oruro, it still produced large quantities of coca and herds of camelids. Dalence noted that while most of the nation’s borders were secure, the boundary between La Paz and Puno down to Arica remained porous. In addition to Bolivia’s large
imbalance in global trade, the nation imported more wine, liquor, and sugar from Cusco, Puno, and Arequipa, than the value of its exports to Peru.\textsuperscript{71} Strikingly, much of this transborder trade was transacted with small-denomination coins (known as the \textit{peso feble}) minted in Bolivia with lower silver content than either the colonial peso or the postindependence Peruvian currency. For the most part, European merchants refused to accept this new currency, as did the Chilean government, which was trying to gain control of new import trades through its port of Valparaiso. Authorities in Lima periodically protested the devalued coins, but they continued to circulate within southern Peru. Informally, the Andean heartland had its own currency that crossed national boundaries.\textsuperscript{72}

Although the regional economy experienced much continuity, new export products also emerged in response to demands of an industrializing Europe. Southern Peru became an important source of wool for British textile mills. Trading houses in Arequipa sent mestizo middlemen up into the altiplano to buy both sheep and alpaca wool, which was shipped out through the port of Islay; until at least the middle of the nineteenth century, producers also directly marketed wool at regional fairs in the highlands.\textsuperscript{73} Although both old and new exports were important to the postindependence economy of the south-central Andes, volumes were small compared to the colonial period or the later nineteenth century. With low revenue from customs duties, the new governments of Peru and Bolivia continued to collect head taxes (renamed from “tribute” to “contribution”) from the substantial indigenous populations of the highland regions. This taxation policy had contradictory effects. On the one hand,
it distinguished Indians from other Peruvians and Bolivians, setting them up
for second-class citizenship. On the other hand, paying tribute protected com-
munities from privatization and dispossession of their land base. As Erick
Langer details, the decades after independence allowed indigenous people in
the Andes and elsewhere to gain greater control over their livelihoods.

Native Andeans constituted a majority in this region, and there were liber-
als on both sides of the new border who were relatively optimistic about the
possibilities of integrating them into their vision for a new patria. José Domingo
Choquehuanca, a subprefect and elected representative from Azángaro (near
Lake Titicaca), provides an interesting example. Through his father, a priest, he
was descended from Inka Huayna Capac, but his grandfather, cacique Diego
Chukiwanka, had opposed Túpac Amaru, provoking local rebels to sack his
properties in revenge. Choquehuanca, by contrast, joined with other stu-
dents at the university in Chuquisaca to support independence, and he tied
their struggle to earlier indigenous rebellions. He praised the brave fight of in-
digenous rebels for independence since 1780, emphasizing that Azángaro war-
riors had rallied to rebellion in 1814, joined in expeditions to both Arequipa
and La Paz, and continued to fight even after the rebellion’s leaders saw their
cause as lost.

As he compiled a report on the province’s population and economy cover-
ing the five years after independence, Choquehuanca envisioned indigenous
citizens as key participants. According to his figures, the citizens on the civic
registries varied from 20 to 40 percent of the adult male population of each
district, proportions including native Andeans. He estimated that as many as
two-thirds of indigenous property owners along with some mestizos belonged
to the middle class (what he called the acomodados). District by district, he
provided estimates of agricultural and textile production, tracking export of
textiles and animal products to Arequipa, Cusco, and La Paz and imports of
coca, liquor, and grains from these regions. According to his estimates, about
64 percent of the province’s wool-producing sheep and 71 percent of cattle
were in indigenous hands. Choquehuanca criticized landowners and officials
who called Indians lazy and mistreated them, pointing out that the indigenous
population had learned from colonialism that any outward sign of economic
success was an invitation to expropriation and coerced labor. “Pay them accord-
ing to the law,” he asserted, “and there would be more than enough workers for all
manner of labor.” Although he acknowledged the difficulties of educating a
population who were not raised to speak Spanish, he claimed that the middling
indigenous population already sent their children to Arequipa to learn Span-
ish in order to expand their trading networks. Choquehuanca supported the
political reunification of the Andean heartland, and was later accused by his political opponents of not being a true citizen of Peru due to his 1789 birth in Chuquisaca. In spirit, he was a citizen of an Andean patria still held together by a regional economy in which mineral production stimulated agriculture and small-scale manufacturing.

While trade circuits continued to integrate southern Peru and Bolivia, despite the new national border, economic development in central and northern Peru followed a distinct path. The greatest mining revival in Peru occurred to the northeast of Lima at Cerro de Pasco, where copper would eventually replace silver as the primary export. Demand for manufactures and foodstuffs was largely met in its immediate hinterland. Sugar and cotton plantations expanded along the northern coast, but only later would be integrated into the world market. During the 1820s and 1830s, protectionist, politically conservative elites in Lima and the North faced off against free traders and liberals in the South, especially Arequipa. After 1840, world demand for fertilizers triggered the infamous guano boom, which for several decades provided the central government in Lima with critical revenues and enriched the capital's merchant elite—but did little to transform the country's interior highlands, especially in the South.

Given economic interests distinct from Lima and northern Peru, elites in southern Peru and Bolivia, including Gamarra and Santa Cruz, kept alive political plans to reunite the Andean heartland after its partition at independence. The choices before the congress that convened in La Paz in 1825 were to join Peru, to join the United Provinces (the former viceroyalty of Río de la Plata) or to declare autonomy. Either of the first two options could have thrown off the delicate balance of power among emerging republics; local elites were wary of submitting to authorities in either Lima or Buenos Aires. The congress voted to establish an entirely new country, named Bolivia in honor of the “Liberator.” (In 1839 the capital’s name was changed from Chuquisaca to Sucre, honoring the country’s first president.) Santa Cruz, who agreed to be a representative despite his concern that it would harm his political future in Peru, wrote to a friend that an important minority, notably delegates from La Paz (who were underrepresented relative to the department’s population), favored union with Peru. Although the independence of Bolivia was an expedient political compromise in 1825, the constitution proposed by Bolívar and approved the following year left open the possibility of federation with Peru and even Colombia.

Despite the creation of two nations, the constitutions of both Peru and Bolivia granted citizenship to all who had fought in the patriot army. Therefore, Santa Cruz was able to serve as interim chief executive of Peru in 1827 and
as elected president of Bolivia the next year. Gamarra began by establishing his power base as prefect of Cusco, from where he crossed the border into Bolivia in 1828 to overthrow the “foreigner” Sucre before launching his own presidency of Peru in 1829. The two caudillos became rivals, each eyeing the territory governed by the other. As conservative Gamarra fought Peruvian liberals over trade policies and constitutions, Santa Cruz seized an opportunity to ally with southern liberals to reunite Bolivia and Peru. From 1836 to 1839 he forged a Peru-Bolivian confederation of three states: Northern Peru, Southern Peru, and Bolivia.

Several models influenced the polity Santa Cruz aimed to construct. He shared Bolívar’s belief that a strong military guaranteed political stability while providing upward mobility for capable soldiers (uniformed in fine cloth from Cusco). His promulgation of new civil and criminal codes drew heavily from Napoleonic laws, adapted to an Andean society that was corporatist and hierarchical rather than composed of theoretically equal individuals. Santa Cruz’s continuation of paternalist policies that protected separate jurisdictions for indigenous communities allowed local Aymara and Quechua authorities to exercise a degree of sovereignty at the local level. It was no coincidence that he chose Puno as the site to issue a lengthy decree detailing rights and protections for indigenous citizens, including exemption from all taxes other than the “direct contribution” (i.e., tribute).87 In May and June 1836, Santa Cruz visited Arequipa, Cusco, and Puno, dispensing orders and promoting state institutions that would appeal to his supporters in Southern Peru: schools and law faculties (reserving places for descendants of the Inkas in Cusco) and compensation for property losses at the hands of the confederation’s enemies in the “heroic” city of Arequipa. Most important, he abolished trade barriers. The continuous movement of Santa Cruz, in his role as “protector” of the confederation, throughout southern Peru and Bolivia prevented one city in the heartland from claiming preeminence over the others—but did nothing to allay fears in Lima and northern Peru that their state had a subordinate status.

We will never know what forms of governance might eventually have emerged within the Andean federation. The union of Peru and Bolivia was seen as a threat by neighboring Chile, whose leaders allied with Gamarra to defeat Santa Cruz’s army in 1839. The confederation also faced internal tensions. Although support for union was strong in La Paz, elites in Chuquisaca feared that Peruvians would dominate. In Peru, southern free traders were enthusiastic about the abolition of internal borders, but northerners had little to gain from those markets. The Lima aristocracy feared losing power to competitors in indigenous highlands, and Felipe Pardo y Aliaga relentlessly lampooned the confederation

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and Santa Cruz in satiric verses that ridiculed the notion of indigenous citizenship and leadership. Hispanic elites in Lima would neither relinquish their claim to southern Peru nor accept a broader union where the political center of gravity could shift from the coast to the Andean heartland.

Conclusions

The economic and political integration of an Andean patria centered on Lake Titicaca reached its apogee under the Peru-Bolivian Confederation, but it did not collapse in 1839. While subsequent governments in Peru and Bolivia con-
tinually renegotiated commercial treaties, merchants in La Paz and southern Peru continued to advocate reunification into the 1840s. After midcentury, however, divergence predominated. Distinct export booms of silver in Bolivia and wool in southern Peru pulled trade circuits toward these nodes within the global market and away from trans-Andean commerce. As revenue from exports increased, moreover, national states relied less on the taxes paid by indigenous populations and the regional currency, the *peso feble*, depreciated. Later, with the construction of railroads to get newly valuable commodities to ports, opportunities declined for indigenous traders with mule or llama trains. These economic shifts were accompanied by policies to privatize communal land, laying the groundwork for the expansion of commercial haciendas in the second half of the century.

Some provincial elites and intellectuals continued to imagine regional integration, but their visions were increasingly disconnected from the economic activities and movements of the heartland’s majority. As late as 1868, Bolivian artist Melchor María Mercado, who was born in Chuquisaca and traveled throughout Bolivia and southern Peru, painted a series of landscapes linking the mountains around La Paz down to the coastal cities of Tacna and Arica. And as the War of the Pacific heated up in 1880, Peruvian commander-in-chief Nicolás de Piérola proposed a federation with Bolivia similar to that tried under Santa Cruz, which his father had supported. Invoking a shared history of struggle against Spain from 1780 to 1825, Piérola declared that when citizens of the renewed federation were asked about their nationality, they would respond, “I am Inca.” Inka, but presumably not indigenous, as the speeches and draft treaties mentioned “Indians” merely six times. Native Andeans for their part continued to resist threats to their livelihoods; but increasingly their movements and alliances were contained within the national borders of Peru and Bolivia and targeted officials in their respective capitals.

Advocates of an Andean patria centered in the altiplano did not succeed in building an enduring nation-state, but not because such plans lacked support or a material basis between the middle of the eighteenth and the middle of the nineteenth centuries. Boundaries and polities throughout the Americas were in flux in this period, as detailed by the essays in this volume. Although we tend to associate nations with republics, we have American examples of successful constitutional monarchies in Cuba and Brazil—and several experiments in Mexico from 1821 to 1867. The early Andean heartland movements that looked to an Inka sovereign or a Spanish monarch, were not radically distinct from the Peru-Bolivia Confederation, with its powerful military caudillo. All these imagined communities, moreover, were rooted in corporatist politics that rec-
ognized a degree of local authority in communities—Hispanic cabildos or indigenous councils. The imagined and contested patrias linked communities in spaces continuously being constructed rather than rigidly bounded.

As drivers of mules and llamas plied their trade along highland routes throughout the Andean heartland, they carried with them more than wool, coca, and wheat. News of tax policy, of war and rebellion, of the rise of new Inkas, and of grievances against Spaniards traversed these same routes. Such reports were not received and interpreted in identical ways in different provinces or by distinct social groups. Nevertheless, broad coalitions repeatedly converged to challenge not just orders from Madrid, but from Lima and Buenos Aires. Ethnic conflict was always possible, but at key times Spanish liberals declared Indians to be “Spanish,” and rebels called Spanish Americans “indios.” They failed, it is true, to establish alternative polities for more than a few years at a time, facing overwhelming military force from outside, whether Lima or Santiago, as well as ongoing internal tensions. But the nations that were established struggled with their own challenges: to develop strong economic foundations and promote a common identity, and to resist foreign invasions that further reduced their borders by the end of the nineteenth century. To observers in Cusco in 1780, La Paz in 1809, or Arequipa in 1836, such boundaries—on maps as well as in political belonging—were by no means foreordained.

Notes

Conversations with the contributors to this volume helped to shape my thinking. I would particularly like to thank John Tutino, Erick Langer, and Sinclair Thomson for their constructive feedback on written drafts. The first epigraph is from Ward Stavig and Ella Schmidt, eds. and trans., The Tupac Amaru and Catarista Rebellions: An Anthology of Sources (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 2008), 73; the second is Santa Cruz as quoted from Juan Gualberto Valdivia in Alfonso Crespo, Santa Cruz: El cóndor indio (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1944), 206.


2 It is difficult (and indeed contrary to the spirit of this essay) to draw precise boundaries for this region. It could include part of modern-day Ayacucho in Peru, but likely excludes the eastern and far southern regions of Bolivia (i.e., Santa Cruz and Tarija). Much of the literature refers to this region as the southern Andes (sur andino), but to clearly distinguish it from either southern Peru or areas even farther south, I will use the term Andean heartland or south-central Andes. For good overviews of the historical constitution of this region, see Brooke Larson, “Andean Communities, Political Cultures, and Markets: The Changing Contours of a Field,” in Ethnicity, Markets, and Migration in the Andes: At the Crossroads of History and


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10 Assadourian, El sistema de la economía colonial.


12 Although demand from China drove up silver prices between 1700 and 1750, Potosí’s recovery did not begin until 1730 and peaked in 1780; Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giraldez, “Cycles of Silver: Global Economic Unity through the Mid-Eighteenth Century,” Journal of World History 13:2 (2002), 391–427. Profitability also varied with the price of mercury and ultimately rested on the subsidy provided by the mita labor draft; Tandeter, Coercion and Market, esp. 1–51, 115.


14 Enrique Tandeter, Vilma Milletich, María Matilde Ollier, and Beatriz Ruibal, “Indians in Late Colonial Markets: Sources and Numbers,” in Larson and Harris, Ethnicity, Markets, and Migration in the Andes, 196–223.

15 Herbert S. Klein, Haciendas and Ayllus: Rural Society in the Bolivian Andes in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,

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Officials in Lima similarly noted that indigenous communities competed effectively with haciendas in Peru; Hünefeldt, *Lucha por la tierra y protesta indígena*, 137–138.


21 Barragán, “Españoles patricios y españoles europeos,” 117; and Sala i Vila, *Y se armó el tole tole*, 39.


25 Drawing the boundaries of eighteenth-century rebellion is complicated. Scarlett O’Phelan has proposed that the economic zone centered on providing Potosí with supplies (and, one could add, labor) and running through the highlands to Lima, gave rise to a zone of political consciousness and rebellion; Scarlett O’Phelan, *Rebellions and Revolts in Eighteenth-Century Peru and Upper Peru* (Köln: Böhlau, 1985). Steve J. Stern has argued for including the central highlands of Peru as an area of anticolonial resistance; Steven J. Stern, “The Age of Andean Insurrection, 1742–1782: A Reappraisal,” in *Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World: 18th to 20th Centuries*, ed. Stern (Madison: University
of Wisconsin Press, 1987), 34–93. In a spatial analysis of rebellion limited to the region of Cuzco, Magnus Mörner and Efraín Trelles find a correlation between the attitudes of kurakas and communities toward Túpac Amaru based upon the old Inca divisions of Chinchasuyo (largely loyalist in 1780) and Kollasuyo (largely rebel in 1780); Magnus Mörner and Efraín Trelles, “A Test of Causal Interpretations of the Túpac Amaru Rebellion,” in Stern, Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness, 94–109, especially 100–109.


27 For the role of traders in various revolts, see O’Phelan, Revolutions and Revolts in Eighteenth-Century Peru and Upper Peru. For traders generally, see Luis Miguel Glave, Trajinantes: Caminos indígenas en la sociedad colonial, siglos XVI/XVII (Lima: Instituto de Apoyo Agrario, 1989).


31 Stavig, The World of Túpac Amaru, 215, 221; and Cahill, From Rebellion to Independence in the Andes, 97.


33 Documents about the rebellion were transcribed and published in Comisión Nacional del Sesquicentenario de la Independencia del Perú, Colección documental de la independencia del Perú, Vol. 2, La Rebelión de Túpac Amaru (Lima, 1971).


35 See, for example, Túpac Amaru’s “Edict to the Province of Chichas,” in Stavig and Schmidt, *The Tupac Amaru and Catarista Rebellions*, 73–74.


45 Carolyn Fick, “From Slave Colony to Black Nation: Haiti’s Revolutionary Inversion,” in this volume.


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Arnade, *The Emergence of the Republic of Bolivia*; René Danilo Arze Aguirre, *Participación popular en la independencia de Bolivia* (La Paz: Bolivia: Organización de los Estados Americanos, 1979); and Marion, “Indios blancos.” For a primary source narrative in which a midlevel patriot leader occasionally acknowledges the heroism of indigenous combatants, see José Santos Vargas, *Diario de un comandante de la independencia americana, 1814–1825* (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno, 1982).


Rafael Garófano and Juan Ramón de Páramo, *La constitución gaditana de 1812*, 2nd ed. (Cádiz: Diputación de Cádiz, 1987); for a translation of these articles into English, see Sarah C. Chambers and John Charles Chasteen, *Latin American Independence: An Anthology of Sources* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2010), 97.

Studies 25 (1993), 159–185. Víctor Peralta Ruiz and Marta Irurozqui Victoriano, Por la concordia, la fusión y el unitarismo: Estado y caudillismo en Bolivia, 1825–1880 (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2000), 139–248, discuss the ways in which Spanish concepts of local belonging (vecindad) continued to shape understandings of citizenship (ciudadanía) into the nineteenth century. Langer, citing Platt, notes that for elites as well as Indians, notions of being American remained strong as compared to specific national identities; Erick D. Langer, “Bajo la sombra del Cerro Rico; Redes comerciales y el fracaso del nacionalismo económico en el Potosí del siglo XIX,” Revista Andina 37 (2003), 77–91, here 84. For an argument that indigenous peasants in villages around Cusco and Puno no longer envisioned an Inka restoration, see Cahill and O’Phelan, “Forging Their Own History.”

On this rebellion, see Hünefeldt, Lucha por la tierra y protesta indígena, 41–53; and Walker, Smoldering Ashes, 97–105.

Walker, Smoldering Ashes, 111.


Walker, Smoldering Ashes, 121–123. One of Peru’s leading historians and a native of Tacna mused that had the 1814 rebellion succeeded, the Peruvian nation would have had a “mestizo, indigenous, creole and provincial” identity; Jorge Basadre, El azar en la historia y sus límites (Lima: Ediciones PLV, 1973), 146.


Mitre, “El monedero de los Andes.”


75 Erick D. Langer, “Indigenous Independence in Spanish South America,” in this volume.


77 José Domingo Choquehuanca, Ensayo de estadística completa de los varios económico-políticos de la provincia de Azángaro en el Departamento de Puno de la República Peruana, del quinquenio contado desde 1825 hasta 1829 inclusive (Lima: Imprenta de Manuel Corral, 1833), 29, 58–59.

78 For other cases from this region in which local elites imagined or even treated the indigenous population as citizens, see Cecilia Méndez, The Plebeian Republic: The Huanta Rebellion and the Making of the Peruvian State, 1820–1850 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005); Chambers, From Subjects to Citizens; and Peralta Ruiz and Irrozqui Victoriano, Por la concordia, la fusión y el unitarismo.

79 Choquehuanca, Ensayo de estadística, 60.

80 Choquehuanca, Ensayo de estadística, 70. For a work that expresses more of a classical vision of liberalism with less local color, see José Domingo Choquehuanca, Complemento al régimen representativo (1845; reprint, Lima: Crédito Editorial, 1949). An anonymous contemporary of Choquehuanca from Bolivia similarly proposed development of the internal economy, but was more cautious in his assessment of the place of native Andeans in the nation; see Lema and Barragán, Bosquejo del estado.

81 Choquehuanca, Ensayo de estadística, 67.


84 Paul Gootenberg persuasively argues against an earlier dependency interpretation of guano, but it still left the South untouched; Gootenberg, Imagining Development: Economic Ideas in Peru’s “Fictitious Prosperity” of Guano, 1840–1880 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993).

85 For the text of the independence declaration, see Peru, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Colección de los tratados, convenciones capitulaciones, armisticios, y otros actos diplomáticos y políticos celebrados desde la independencia hasta el día, precedida de
una introducción que comprende la época colonial, vol. 2 (Lima: Imprenta del Estado, 1890), 154–158.

86 On the declaration of an independent Bolivia, see Sobrevilla Perea, The Caudillo of the Andes, 93; Arnaud, The Emergence of the Republic of Bolivia, 195–198; and José Luís Roca, Ni con Lima, ni con Buenos Aires: La formación de un estado nacional en Charcas (La Paz: Plural Editores; and Lima: IFEA, 2007). On the underrepresentation of La Paz, with its large indigenous population, see Rossana Barragán, “Los elegidos: En torno a la representación territorial y la re-unión de los poderes en Bolivia entre 1825 y 1840,” in La mirada esquiva: Reflexiones históricas sobre la interacción del estado y la ciudadanía en los Andes (Bolivia, Ecuador y Perú), siglo xix, ed. Marta Irurozqui Victoriano (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2005), 93–123.


89 Rossana Barragán, Espacio urbano y dinámica étnica: La Paz en el siglo XIX (La Paz: HISBOL, 1990), 41–47; for treaties, see Bolivia and José Rosendo Gutiérrez, Colección de los tratado y convenciones celebrados por la República de Bolivia con los estados extranjeros (Santiago: El Independiente, 1869).


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92 Melchor María Mercado, *Album de paisajes, tipos humanos y costumbres de Bolivia (1841–1869)* (Sucre: Archivo y Biblioteca Nacional de Bolivia, 1991), esp. plates on 160–177 and 185–188.

