In this chapter the load that I wish to give to the term “cosmopolitan” is the complex blending of the global and the particular in ways that do not replicate Western perspectives and that do not construct the local as a product of the global. In the same way that Appiah (2006a: xiii) moves away from “globalization” and “multiculturalism,” both problematic terms that have become very extended in meaning, I wish to use the term “cosmopolitan” as part of an attempt to move away from global/local dichotomies. So in this chapter I will use the term to refer to the complex alliances that are set up between groups and individuals that crosscut the global, national, and local categories.

Several writers have discussed the principles, ethical and otherwise, on which cosmopolitan dialogue should be based. Appiah (2006a: 78) talks of “taking an interest in” other peoples and places, even if agreement cannot be reached. Benhabib (2002) describes a deliberative democratic process. Both Appiah and Benhabib, in different ways, are concerned with individual rights. Both therefore minimize the rights of individuals with respect to their membership of cultural groups. Appiah (2006a: 131) argues that “the mere fact that something you own is important to the descendants of people who gave it away does not generally give them an entitlement to it.”

Benhabib (2002: 33) rightly makes the point that cultures are fluid and constructed. She notes that most people today “are members of more than one community, one linguistic group, one ethnos.” She thus promotes perspectives on public policy regarding cultural preservation that empower “the members of cultural groups to appropriate, enrich, and even subvert the terms of their own cultures as they may decide” (2002: 66). She prefers a deliberative democratic process based on respect and egalitarian reciprocity (2002: 37), but she admits that her approach does not address the cultural heritages of indigenous peoples (2002: 185). These groups often cling to their cultural identities in the face of long histories of exploitation, conquest, policing, and subjugation. For such groups, an open dialogue and an egalitarian reciprocity that do not acknowledge preferential restitution seem inadequate and
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disempowering. Respect for pluralism and diversity seems inadequate as the sole basis for ensuring group rights.

In contrast to these perspectives, the processes that led to NAGPRA in the United States, to the Burra Charter in Australia, and to the code of ethics of the World Archaeological Congress firmly link indigenous rights to the recognition of cultural affiliation. Certainly in some instances cultural affiliation is the basis for claims of recognition and restitution. I agree that international human rights issues should not assume a Western tone, and in particular we should not assume a priori that individual rights should trump group rights. Group rights are key in heritage contexts and in claims to restitution by historically savaged groups.

But the problem with both NAGPRA and with writers such as Appiah and Benhabib is that they assume a priori positions about whether rights to cultural heritage are primary. In practice, in different contexts, sometimes cultural heritage rights are the basis for claims to other rights (recognition, economic welfare, freedom of expression, and so forth), while in other contexts, cultural categorization may in fact subvert or deny individual rights (when, for example, cultural groups exclude those who claim membership).

It seems important, therefore, to recognize that in a cosmopolitan world of complex and shifting alliances, cultural heritage claims should be linked strategically to the specifics of the cosmopolitan mix. While accepting and championing group rights we should not also deny individual rights. Rather than imposing overall strictures (group or individual rights, for example) we should trust to a process of deliberation and negotiation. There seems wide recognition that claims to heritage should as far as possible be resolved through processes of dialogue, respect, recognition, and restitution in an open democratic process. Rather than starting these processes on the basis of a priori strictures about whether human and cultural heritage rights should be based on the individual or the group, we should focus on dealing with the conditions that make a democratic dialogue possible. In such a process, I argue, it will often be necessary to empower local groups or individual voices through complex cosmopolitan alliances that cut across individual, local group, regional and national group, and global scales. In this chapter I wish to explore some examples that purport to show how individual and local group rights can be enhanced through complex cosmopolitan interactions, alliances, and dialogues.
During the summer of 2006, an exhibit about Çatalhöyük, a Neolithic site in central Turkey, was opened in Istanbul. It lasted for four months and was funded by the major Turkish bank Yapı Kredi. Held in the Yapı Kredi Gallery on one of the busiest streets in Istanbul—Istiklal Caddesi—the exhibit was prepared and mounted by a culture and arts section within Yapı Kredi, in close liaison with the public relations department of the bank.

The Çatalhöyük Research Project, which I direct, is multinational, involving teams from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Poland, as well as three teams from Turkey (Hodder 2000). The project was closely involved in the planning and implementation of the exhibit, and some of the video material developed by the project was chosen for use in the exhibit, including a video used in the on-site visitor center where people are introduced to the site. Since the project aims to have close links with the local communities close to the site, Mavili Tokyağsun, a woman from the local village, provided the voice for the Turkish version of the video. Mavili has worked for the project in the dig house, in the kitchen, and in some collaborative research. She has two children and has been divorced, about which there is some stigma in the village, but she is now remarried. The video using her voice is played daily to visitors to the site, most of whom are Turkish speakers, and it has been received very well.

A few days before the exhibit opened I was told that the public relations department at the bank had decided to replace Mavili’s voice on the version of the video to be used in the exhibit in Istanbul. It was explained to me that her accent made understanding her words difficult, although we had not encountered this problem at the site. The new voice-over was made by someone from Istanbul. Despite protests from me about how this erasing of Mavili’s voice would harm our relationships with the village and would set back our attempts to build close ties and “ownership” of the site in the village, the exhibit went ahead with a nonlocal voice on the introductory video. While I was initially assured that there would be a section in the exhibit that described the involvement of the local community in the project, this too disappeared in the final version of the exhibit displays.
In this case a regional dialect and a local contribution were silenced. It would be possible to read the reaction of the educated Istanbul Turks as being about class. Indeed, there may have been some snobbery about lower-class uneducated provincials in the decision to remove Mavili’s voice. But if there were any reasons beyond the desire to have the words easily understandable, a wider context is provided by the debate within Turkey between secularists and Islamists. In 1928, five years after the founding of the Turkish republic, a clause retaining Islam as the state religion was removed from the constitution. Secularism was a central strut of the republicanism envisaged by Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey. Mavili’s voice came from the Konya region, that part of the country associated most clearly with a newly powerful Islamist perspective in Turkey, one feared by the urban elites that had benefited the most from the Kemalist position, which had been dominant since the early days of the republic.

The long interaction between secularists and Islamists in Turkey and the social context of the debate have been chronicled by many authors (Abu-Rabi 2006; Zubaida 1996). The Islamist movement emerged soon after the founding of the secular republic in 1923 (Narli 1999). It failed to gain wide support in the 1920s to the 1940s. From the 1950s onward, there was a major expansion of Turkey’s modernization. Many felt excluded from the new wealth and higher levels of education, and it was particularly in the provincial areas and among upwardly mobile classes that the environment was created for the growth of Islamic parties. Islamist groups provided social welfare for the new aspiring university students, professionals, shopkeepers, merchants, or workers. Financial assistance was provided by a newly formed Islamist business elite. The newly educated and financed groups moved increasingly into urban contexts, including Ankara and Istanbul.

Narli (1999) argues that several types of relationships were embroiled in the Islamist-secularist conflict: center-periphery, class, regional cleavages, and sectarian antagonism (such as Sunnis versus Alevi). Thus, through time, a series of socioeconomic and regional groups in the periphery have backed a succession of Islamist parties in order to voice their grievances: the National Order, National Salvation, Welfare, and Virtue parties. More recent pro-Islamist parties include Saadet or Happiness Party and the present governing AK (Justice and Development) Party. The current AK Party, led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is a complex
and ever shifting attempt to attract support from across the divide. While undoubtedly rooted in the Turkish Islamist tradition, it has sought to pursue Turkey’s membership in the Europe Union and supports some liberal reforms (for example, in 2004 the state-run TV broadcast the first Kurdish-language program). Konya, one of the heartlands of its provincial success, is a complex mix of restraints on alcohol but burgeoning capitalist and internationalist economic programs.

Thus, there is a lot going on when the urban elites in Istanbul say that it is inappropriate to air Mavili’s voice in the exhibit in Istiklal Caddesi. At one level, there may be simply a desire to make the words easily understandable. But at other levels, the use of a local Konya voice is tied up in the debates within Turkey that deal with tensions between urban and provincial, upper and lower classes, old and new money, center and periphery, secularists and Islamists, West and East.

My second example also refers to the secularist-Islamist tensions in Turkey, though more directly. In the summer of 2007, the Çatalhöyük project received the results of some radiocarbon determinations on human bone that had been excavated from graves across the site. We had thought the graves were late Byzantine in date, but the radiocarbon results in the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries AD suggested that the burials could, after all, be early Islamic. Team members identified parallels in the grave construction techniques and in the layout of the skeletons that confirmed an Islamic attribution. During the Selçuk period in the Konya region there was a very mixed multiculturalism, and many religious affiliations, but it seemed clear that around sixty-four of the graves that we had excavated over the previous fifteen years at Çatalhöyük were in fact Islamic.

We immediately consulted with the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and with local officials such as the regional governor or kaymakam. We also had meetings with the village head or muhtar. As a result of these and broader discussions in the community and among project members, it was decided to rebury the skeletons in a designated part of the local village cemetery. The requisite letters for permission were written to the local, regional, and national authorities, including the village imams. As well as the request to rebury, the letters stated that the project would try to avoid uncovering Islamic burials wherever possible in future excavation strategy. The letters also asked for permission to study the skeletal remains of any Islamic burials that were uncovered before the remains were reburied.
Again, there is a lot going on in these consultations and discussions. The events took place in the run-up to the national elections in Turkey on July 22, 2007. These elections were dominated by the debates between secularists and Islamists in Turkey. The reburial issue at the site played out these larger issues in microcosm. Many of the Turks consulted felt that the bones should be reburied in the village cemetery. This was the immediate and clear view of the village muhtar and elders, and of the local community. But many on the project felt it was wrong to accede to the interests of the local community. It was felt that such a move would play into the hands of the Islamists.

My third example derives from the fact that the Çatalhöyük project is now a close institutional partner of Selcuk University in Konya, in central Turkey. Konya is one of the largest cities in Turkey and is usually seen as very traditional. Its university has over eighty thousand students. Within the highly centralized education system in Turkey, the administration of the university follows the Kemalist and government policy that none of its students should wear the “turban” head scarf, worn to fit closely over the hair and forehead, on campus. This policy is particularly stark in the Konya region, where religious strictures are followed in many areas of life (for example, alcohol is not available in most restaurants). The female students from Selcuk University who participate in the Çatalhöyük project are not allowed to wear the turban, even though most female visitors to the site, including their friends and families, are covered. The project is thus complicit in the ban on an expression of religious diversity.

Should the project allow the students from Selcuk to wear the turban? In practice local and national state officials turn a blind eye to the fact that the local female workers on the project do wear turbans. The turban is even worn in local government offices in the Çatalhöyük area. But what should the project do about the students from Selcuk University? The wider debate about wearing the turban in Turkey (Kılıcbay and Binark 2002) should not be seen simply as an example of the divide between secularists and Islamists. There are many religious, political, social, and personal layers of meaning that are involved and a great diversity of perspectives and opinions ( Göçek 1999). The established meanings of veiling include adherence to the Islamic notion of concealing the female body from the male gaze, and the veil as a sign of “political Islam.” But today the articulation of Islamic faith into consumption culture has opened up a greater diversity of shifting...
meanings. While many in Turkey today see the turban as Islamist, anti-secular, and political, for many others wearing the turban is about personal choice and individual rights in a global consumer market.

 Atatürk banned religious dress in public places and argued against veiling women, but it was left to a government in 1979 to make wearing the turban illegal. For many women, the injunction against wearing the turban or head scarf in universities, government offices, and many professions is against their values, against human rights, and an insult. For others, wearing the turban is a threat to secularism and freedom of thought and expression. In rural Konya, women may have little choice but to wear the turban if they are to remain within village society and culture. And yet a young woman from the village who has started working on the project and who wishes to go to university and become an athlete is uncovered, unlike her age-mates. Should the project actively encourage such employees, in line with university and government policy? Or, in its links with Selcuk University, does the project undermine the rights of those who wish to wear the turban, and in so doing does it restrain a multicultural heritage?

Global Heritage and Multiculturalism

Most discourse on heritage deriving from the United States, and increasingly from the United Kingdom, takes for granted the rights of indigenous groups to have a say in controlling their own past, even if that means that those groups rebury their heritage or secrete it away in traditional locales (e.g., Swidler et al. 1997). “We,” as archaeologists and heritage managers in Western developed countries have come to celebrate identity difference and cultural diversity in relation to heritage. There has been a massive increase in international charters for the management of archaeological sites over recent decades, and many of these have turned their attention to the processes of collaboration with local communities around sites and monuments. For example, in 1987, the General Assembly of ICOMOS adopted the Charter for the Conservation of Historic Towns and Urban Areas, which includes guidelines for the participation of residents. The Charter for Sustainable Tourism that emerged from the World Conference on Sustainable Tourism in 1995 stated that tourism must be “ethically and socially equitable for local communities.” The Australian chapter of ICOMOS (the International Council on Monuments and Sites) has produced the Burra
Charter, which moves away from defining sites and monuments in objectivist terms and toward the description of cultural landscapes as understood and perceived by indigenous peoples (Australia ICOMOS 1981). The Corinth Workshop on Archaeological Site Management in May 2000, organized by the Getty Conservation Institute, refers to the importance of collaboration with local community members. Indeed, the Getty Conservation Institute has modified and developed the planning framework outlined in the Burra Charter (Avrami et al. 2000; see also de la Torre 1997). Specific examples of collaborative work include that at the Nevada test site (Stoffle et al. 2001) and at the Barunga rock art site in Australia (Smith et al. 1995; see also Smith and Ward 2000). The Code of Ethics of the World Archaeological Congress (WAC) seeks to ensure the primacy of indigenous perspectives in relation to ethical principles.

At times this type of focus on heritage rights suggests a multiculturalism in which a diversity of perspectives is celebrated and in which multiple stakeholders are identified as having a voice around the heritage management table. Much heritage management embraces this focus on multiple voices around the table. But many of the authors in this volume would decry this position as politically weak, and would in fact join the larger critique of multiculturalism and pluralism as a whole. The critique aims to replace multiculturalism with a more grounded concern with diversity and with historical inequalities and exploitation. In many contexts it argues that those who have suffered the most should gain the most at the heritage stakeholder table (Meskell and Pels 2005). It argues that complex alliances other than those centered on the West can be formed in the protection of individual and local heritage rights. Rather than a global approach centered in the West, we can identify complex decentered global and local heritage alliances and “multiple cosmopolitanisms partly rooted in local cultures, partly positioned in global networks” (Anderson 1998: 273; see also Appiah 2006a).

This focus on cosmopolitan heritage rights reacts against the general assumption made worldwide that cultural heritage is the property of the nation-state. The rise of archaeology, antiquities management, and museums is closely tied to the rise of the nation-state (Kohl and Fawcett 1995), and the ultimate rights of the nation-state in relation to heritage are enshrined in UNESCO’s documents regarding World Heritage Sites. It should be noted, however, that the protection of Native American rights under NAGPRA was obtained through state intervention and the
provision of a legal apparatus by central government (Watkins 2000). Within the nation-state it seems that a focus on multiculturalism and diversity does not of itself produce the protection of heritage rights. Rather, public coalitions and activism allied with state intervention are at times needed to create and enforce individual and local rights of cultural difference.

The sovereignty of the nation-state in its relation to heritage is being eroded by perspectives that would enforce some form of “universal” access over and above diverse and minority interests. In the developed world this view is associated with the several UNESCO charters that refer to the universal outstanding value of World Heritage Sites and that see a value of heritage sites and antiquities for all humanity (Cleere 1989). Such global prescriptions are typically the result of a Western sensitivity (Byrne 1991). A universalist position is also associated with the scientific claim for unrestricted access to knowledge. Thus many archaeologists and biological anthropologists in the United States and Europe argue that human remains should be available for all to study, and not reburied (for an insight into the debate, see Kane 2003; Zimmerman 1989). A universalist position is also argued by those that seek a deregulated trade in licit antiquities (Merryman 2005).

International agencies, from UNESCO to NGOs such as the Global Heritage Fund, increasingly work with, between, and across national governments in their desire to protect sites, develop tourism through heritage, build museums, and restore the monuments of displaced peoples. Their international and global character is often accompanied by a Western perspective (see the chapter by Lydon, this volume). Cosmopolitan alliances of local groups and national and international agencies can work to further the interests of minority groups and revive local economies. “What the new archives, geographies, and practices of different historical cosmopolitanisms might reveal is precisely a cultural illogic for modernity that makes perfectly good nonmodern sense. They might help us see that cosmopolitanism is not a circle created by culture diffused from a center, but instead, that centers are everywhere and circumferences nowhere. This ultimately suggests that we already are and have always been cosmopolitan, though we may not always have known it” (Breckenridge et al. 2002: 12). These cosmopolitan alliances are not just decentered open networks. In order effectively to champion and protect individual and local rights, there is the need to
create partnerships that are practical and effective. When decisions are made about competing claims, and when the historical rights of indigenous groups are decided upon, there is a need to move beyond an ethical multiculturalism and embrace a grounded cosmopolitanism.

It could be argued that “we were there first” or “we were always there” are the arguments that should underpin all heritage rights issues. According to this view, archaeology and cultural heritage should be used in origins debates to demonstrate the rights of displaced minorities and indigenous groups. But archaeologists have long been critical of origins debates (e.g., Conkey with Williams 1991), and given the lack of congruence between material culture, language, genes, and aspects of identity it is difficult for archaeologists to adjudicate on questions of origins. Origins debates have typically led to claim and counterclaim in an escalating cycle that can lead to extreme conflict. Most local groups are mixed, and they are as capable as national and colonial states, or as any group of people, of mistreatment of those around and within them.

The notion that contemporary identities are complex, fluid, and hybrid threatens the ability of local and displaced groups to make claims asserting rights. In many instances national or international bodies need to be involved in dealing with cultural heritage and cultural difference in order to protect the rights of others. A focus on open and unfettered dialogue around the heritage management table, whether the dialogue be local, regional, national, or international, or some complex mixture, does not of itself protect individual or local heritage rights. “A metropolitan cultural politics that espouses a hands off approach to a museumized cultural other leaves the neocolonial staging of that other—fundamentalism, ethnicism, patriarchal nationalism—untouched” (Cheah 1998: 290). At the level of the nation state, deregulation does not seem to guarantee basic rights to heritage. At the international level too, neither open access nor universalist strictures can protect individual, indigenous, or local rights to heritage in and of themselves.

I would like now to return to the three cases in Turkey with which I began to explore them more closely in relation to this general discussion. Can we see here evidence of what is needed to guarantee individual and local rights to heritage? Are there dangers in an open deregulated negotiation of rights?
Returning to the Three Cases in Turkey

In the case of whether Mavili’s voice should be retained on the video in Istanbul, multiculturalist intellectuals in elite academic circles in Istanbul argued that the project should support the retention of her voice and should resist the attempts by a large private bank to silence the local contribution to the exhibit.

In Mavili’s local village, Küçükköy, about one kilometer from Çatalhöyük, the villagers are suffering as a result of changes in agricultural policy, which are themselves part of the attempt by Turkey to gain membership in the European Union and to comply with the EU’s agricultural policies. Some government subsidies have been withdrawn. Life in the village is also hard because large state irrigation schemes have made it difficult for villagers to get access to water for their homes and fields. Mavili’s particular life is difficult in a traditional society that limits the roles of women. In such a context of long-term marginalization of women I have thought it right that the project insists on employing and paying women (initially against the wishes of some elders in the village). The project has also attempted to contribute to local economic growth, through attracting tourists to the site and through providing direct employment.

In this case it seemed correct to argue against the silencing of the local voice, but it is important to point out that here “the local” is thoroughly divided between an Islamist perspective and those parts of the village that seek change and greater choice. As we have seen, the nation of Turkey too is divided between those who wish a greater Islamic presence in public life and those (such as in the judiciary) who adhere to a strong secular agenda and a Kemalist perspective. There are also intellectual elites calling for a form of multiculturalism and a degree of toleration of religious and cultural difference in public life.

So it is not a matter of supporting the local against the national or global. The situation is too complex and multi-stranded for that. The situation may quickly change, but at this particular historical moment the project’s support of those in the village such as Mavili, and the attempt to empower the villagers through identification with “their own” cultural heritage, with employment, and with a voice in exhibits, offers a concrete opportunity, in a real sense, to transcend the situation in which they find themselves. The project has been involved in educational schemes in the villages, and has supported the quest by the
villagers and local town to change their names to Çatalhöyük. It has provided space in the visitor center for exhibits by the local community and has involved them in the interpretation and publication of the site. The villagers are by no means passive in this process, but it has to be recognized that the whole project of local engagement is born out of an interventionist agenda. The international archaeological project has embedded itself close to the village, with international funding and with the support of the Turkish state. There is an undoubted paternalist intervention in the attempts made to educate and involve and engage the local community in the cultural heritage schemes. As already noted, the villagers are not passive in this process, but as well meaning as the attempts at engagement are, this multiculturalism has been partly promoted by global and national processes.

As a result of James Mellaart’s excavations in the 1960s (Mellaart 1967), for both the nation and the world Çatalhöyük means something. Initially it meant very little to the local community. Today the village and the local town vie with each other to take on the name of Çatalhöyük. That Mavili’s voice has the potential to be heard is the result of the intersection of local, national, and global interests in many dimensions. The local senses of cultural heritage and identity have here been constructed through interventionist policies. Neoliberal market economies have played their role. It is through them that the bank is able to achieve economic gain through marketing sponsorship and its exhibit. It is through private and corporate sponsorship that the project can function. But Mavili’s voice is weakly heard. It is all too easily quashed, as this example shows. Any hope of freedom or equality for Mavili and other villagers through heritage depends on a cosmopolitan fraternity—her voice in relation to “her” heritage depends on being promoted and pursued by international bodies and by national interests over the long term.

In fact few such interests exist to assist Mavili. There is no requirement by most of the numerous institutional funders and sponsors of Çatalhöyük for support of Mavili and other educational and empowerment programs. It still seems to me remarkable and unethical that bodies such as the National Science Foundation in the United States do not make consideration of local impact a requirement for funding. There are shifts occurring. For example, the project has been able to apply to the U.S. State Department’s Ambassadors Fund and to the British Academy (British Institute of Archaeology at Ankara) for outreach
funding. But many governmental, research, and scientific foundations remain uninterested in outreach issues. Most funds for such activities at Çatalhöyük have come from NGOs and private and corporate sponsors wishing to make charitable donations. We have wonderful educational programs funded by Shell, Thames Water, Boeing, and Yapı Kredi. But we have seen how these interests may by themselves allow the erasure of regional, local, and minority interests. Neoliberal economics may provide a mechanism for Mavili’s voice to be heard, but some regulation and intervention by the state or by global communities acting through or across the state seem also to be needed.

I wish to add a further example with a superficially different outcome. This is the case of Sadrettin’s voice. Sadrettin also lives in Küçükköy. He left school at the age of twelve and after a series of jobs became one of the guards at Çatalhöyük during the early years of the project in the 1990s. Since as a guard his job was also to show people around the site, I and others on the project taught him as much as we could about the site and about the Neolithic in the region. One day he announced that he wanted to write a book about the site and the project. Because I had seen so many pictures of the huge “local workforces” that had excavated the great archaeological sites in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world, and yet had never read a word written by these people who made archaeology possible, it seemed to me important to encourage and help him in his venture. Members of the project helped him in the translation and editing of his text (translated by Duygu Camurcuoğlu Cleere), and finally the book was published in English by Left Coast Press in the United States, thanks to the vision and support of Mitch Allen (Dural 2007). It talks of his social encounters, his economic deals, his memories of his childhood, and of his response to the archaeologists. “Once tourists came here and asked me what I thought about foreigners and Turks working together, and in the past I felt that they would not be able to work together. But now I do not feel it matters who does the digging” (Dural 2007: 145–46).

Sadrettin’s book is not a success story. It does not chart the successful education and empowerment of one of those many who have for so long been overlooked at the edges, but are actually at the center, of archaeology. His story is tragic and unending. “I realize how tired I am. The tiredness has nothing to do with writing this book, but with seeing my life not going the way I wanted” (Dural 2007: 130). But those
reading his book can hardly fail to be moved by Sadrettin’s point of view, and archaeologists can hardly avoid the implications of his words and his plight, hardly remain unimpressed by the silences that we have created round him. There is much to learn from his book about how Çatalhöyük might be managed and interpreted, and about how archaeologists might work with local communities.

In an interview with Sadrettin published at the end of the book, I asked him several times how and why he felt empowered to write a book. I asked him why he, rather than any one of the countless number of site workers and guards who had remained silent on archaeological sites, should feel able to write, and why he thought anyone would listen. What made him feel able to write and interpret in the face of so much specialism and high-level science? Given all that, and all the teaching he had been given, did he think he could have an independent voice? His answer was clear. “It is possible for me to have opinions independently from what I learned from the archaeologists. I still produce ideas” (Dural 2007: 147). But yet his book is a very cosmopolitan hybrid, infused with the education he has been given and made possible by a postcolonial sensitivity to difference and otherness that is more at home in a Californian publisher’s office than it is in central Turkey. For Sadrettin himself, as he makes clear in his book, his story is a sad one that has not ended well. His time as a guard at Çatalhöyük and in writing the book has not produced the life that he would have liked. He has been able to “write back,” but this privilege has been hard won and it has not benefited him materially or in his life’s dreams. Multiculturalism and diversity, even economic empowerment through cosmopolitan alliances, have not made life better for Sadrettin. There are many reasons for this, but at least part of the answer is that “finding a voice” does not necessarily lead to real and sustained partnerships, with economic and social benefit. In the West we may be fascinated by otherness, but it is difficult to turn such “play” into long-term change (see also the chapter by González-Ruibal, this volume).

A similar conclusion about multiculturalism and cosmopolitan alliances can be made in relation to the issue of the reburial of Islamic remains from Çatalhöyük in the village cemetery. Many of the local government officials accepted the view that the remains should be reburied. As noted elsewhere in this chapter, the Konya region is generally seen as a center for Islamist perspectives. The wealth in the region
is new, and it is built from small, medium, and large businesses. The region is seen as a strong base of support for the AK Party and Tayyip Erdoğan.

Several members of the project, especially the more educated Turks from Istanbul, argued against the reburial. For them, to reburry the remains was to play into the hands of the Islamists. A secularist position for them involved treating the remains as scientific instruments of study. The skeletons should be kept in the laboratory for long-term analysis, for future generations of researchers. After all, they argued, if the Islamic skeletons were reburied, surely we should reburry all the Byzantine burials in a Christian cemetery, and so on. Maybe it was even wrong to excavate the Neolithic burials at Çatalhöyük.

There were other cross-cutting concerns. It seemed that on many sites in Turkey and the Middle East, scant attention had at times been paid to later burials. Some authorities raised the specter of possible “chaos” if the Çatalhöyük project raised awareness of this issue. Perhaps excavation on many sites would become difficult. It was agreed that in any reburial ceremony in Küçüköy the press coverage should be kept at a minimum.

Indeed, the debate about the Çatalhöyük skeletal remains, while apparently local, regional, and national, also seemed inflected by a wider, more global set of concerns. Most of the foreign members of the project were of the clear view that the bones should be reburied. This view was informed by the way that even early Christian burials have to be treated in Britain (informing the police and reburial in sanctified ground). But it was also very much inflected by the reburial debate in the United States and Australia (for example), where it has come to be accepted that the remains of indigenous people should be returned by museums to affiliated groups for appropriate burial.

In fact it was the project itself that raised the issue of the Islamic burials on the site and put forward the solution of reburial. The initial sensitivities derived from a global and postcolonial experience. Certainly the issue then became taken up within the domains of local, regional, and national politics, but the desire and decision to reburry were inflected by complex and very cosmopolitan intersections. At the core of these concerns were the villagers who felt most closely affiliated with the remains. In fact, in discussions with the villagers they immediately referred to the belief that present-day Küçüköy had migrated from an earlier village located immediately by Çatalhöyük. Indeed,
they argued that the skeletons recovered were perhaps the remains of those who had lived in the old village and who had used the mound as a graveyard. This local concern resonated with national politics and the debate between secularists and Islamists, but it also resonated with global sensitivities about indigenous rights and the reburial of ancestral remains. In this strange cosmopolitan mix of alliances, the small local voice was made louder, and was heard, because of its intersection with larger scales of influence.

But the foreign members of the project remained slightly surprised and disappointed at the relative lack of interest shown by the various Turkish groups—local, regional, and national—in the whole topic. It did not seem to be a major area of concern after all. A global discourse about reburial and indigenous rights just did not seem to have the same impact in this context where the term “indigenous” has little clear meaning. So here a global discourse of rights meets a set of local concerns (about secularism and Islam) that resonate with but do not duplicate the international perspective. The different perspectives make use of each other, but they do not coincide. The end result is a cosmopolitan mélange that has little ability to transform lives.

In the third case, it would perhaps be thought ethical for the Çatalhöyük project to refuse to collaborate with a university that does not allow its female students to wear the turban. After all, the project does not seek to ban the many women wearing the turban who visit and work at the site. The decision to collaborate with the university is not here a matter of supporting the local against the global. The predominant local practice is for the turban to be worn. Rather, the project has to position itself in relation to the larger debate within Turkey as a whole regarding the secular state established by Kemal Atatürk.

As an example of this debate and how it impinges on archaeology, the *Turkish Daily News* for October 20, 2006, described the plight of a ninety-two-year-old Turkish archaeologist who was to go on trial for inciting religious hatred. She had written a paper saying that the use of head scarves by women dated back to pre-Islamic sexual rites. Muazzzez Ilmiye Çig is a specialist in the Sumerians and she argued that head scarves had been worn by Sumerian priestesses initiating young people into sex, although they did not prostitute themselves. The prosecutor charged both her and her publisher with “inciting hatred based on religious differences.” Çig’s aim was to argue against the wearing of head scarves, at least in the arena of the state.
The high-level administration at Selcuk University is very liberal. One of the vice rectors plays Van Morrison and Pink Floyd as we drive around in his chauffeur-driven BMW. The administration believes strongly in using international collaboration as a mechanism for raising standards. The rectors are receptive to Western ideals and values. Yet the administration’s leaders argue forcefully for the need to ban the turban, which is seen as a threat to the secular world they have inherited and wish to reproduce. They fear Islamic fundamentalism and they decry as naïve the Istanbul multiculturalist intellectuals who think that loosening the secular ideal does not lead to a full move to Sharia law.

In America and Britain there is much acceptance of a multiculturalist agenda and thus much criticism of the decision by the French government to ban the head scarf in its schools. But in the Konya region it is understandable that the state, in however paternalistic a way, protects the common good of access to knowledge. The implications of a shift to fundamentalist religious teaching in the Konya region are clear. The Çatalhöyük project was the lead partner in a TEMPER Project funded by the European Union that developed heritage educational schemes for primary and middle schools in Turkey. In preparing and producing educational books about prehistory for local schools in the Konya region, members of the project were told that the teachers would not use the books if they told of evolution rather than following the Koran. Some archaeology students from Selcuk University working on the Çatalhöyük project have said they were surprised to be told about prehistory. There is a real fear, then, that some versions of a religious fundamentalist agenda would restrict access to knowledge about prehistory and might restrict the rights of people to engage in the distant human past. In the Konya region the common good is served by understanding and respecting the decisions by the Selcuk University rectors to ban the turban. It seems that in this specific context, openness, transparency, and multiple engagement are best achieved by taking a restrictive, statist, course. It remains possible, at the same time however, to argue against the terms of the opposition between secularists and Islamists. It remains possible to argue that wearing the turban might not, of itself, imply a wholesale adoption of religious beliefs in all areas of life. One might wear the turban and also teach or be taught evolution.
In 2006 Elif Shafak went on trial in Turkey, having been accused of affronting Turkishness in her novel The Bastard of Istanbul. In the novel there is a description of the mass deaths of Ottoman Armenians in 1915 as genocide. Her trial recalls the attempt by the nationalist lawyer Kemal Kerinçsiz to prosecute Orhan Pamuk. In 2005 Turkish state prosecutors dropped the charge that the Nobel Prize-winning author had “insulted Turkishness” by referring to the mass killings of Kurds and Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. Authors such as Elif Shafak refuse to accept that one has to be either a Muslim fundamentalist or a secular European. As she says, “My ideal is cosmopolitanism, refusing to belong to either side in this polarized world. Ambiguity, synthesis: these are the things that compose Turkish society, and that is not something to be ashamed of” (interview with the Guardian, September 21, 2006).

As discussed earlier, the rights of groups in relation to heritage cannot be based on fixed categories and boundaries. The various forms of multiculturalism that have increasingly held sway in discussions about heritage rights seem closely linked to an agenda that minimizes state and international regulation and intervention. There are those on “the left” in global cultural heritage in the Anglo-American world who would go so far as to argue that local customs should always be accepted and not interfered with, however repugnant they might seem to outsiders. This view seems to me an abrogation of our responsibilities to each other—of fraternity. There are many problems with this liberal view, not least of which is the point that cultural difference is always generated within global interactions and dependencies. Like it or not we are co-dependent at the global scale, and our “localness” is produced in relation to and within global processes. It seems difficult to stand by and watch injustice under the banner of “respecting cultural difference,” if we have been complicit in producing difference and inequality as a result of processes of colonialism and globalization (see also the discussion by González-Ruibal of the Žižek critique, this volume).

In practice, access by minorities and the disadvantaged to economic and social benefits through heritage often hinges on the membership of historically and culturally defined groups. It is through recognition of past injustices to identified groups that reconciliation and restitution...
are often sought. Like it or not, archaeology is embroiled in claims of origins and can in the process contribute to an amelioration of access to economic and social goods. But it is inadequate to leave decisions about group membership, histories, reconciliation, and restitution to an open set of negotiations. Certainly debate around the cultural heritage table should involve multiple stakeholders, but in this chapter I have been critical of the links between a notion of open and equal dialogue and a pluralistic multiculturalism.

In the three examples I have explored in relation to the cultural heritage of Turkey, the rights of disadvantaged minorities can only be promoted by cosmopolitan alliances between local groups and individuals and state or global interventions. At present, there is little in the way of an international legal framework that protects minority rights in relation to cultural heritage. There are many charters and ethical guidelines at the global scale (UNESCO, ICOMOS, WAC), but historically these have largely abrogated responsibility to the nation-state, and more recently increasingly to stakeholder negotiations at the local scale.

It seems that a sea change is needed at all levels—legal, financial, ethical—to promote a stronger global framework that protects rights at whatever scale they may be threatened. Pluralistic multiculturalism often seems to celebrate diversity, the local, and the indigenous without providing a framework that can in practice protect rights. There is a need for an agenda that is concerned with historical inequalities and includes a commitment to global and interventionist principles that can protect the rights of individuals, minorities, and the disadvantaged. What is needed is careful discussion between national and global structures leading to a viable set of legal frameworks, even an international court, that protects minority rights in relation to heritage.

A related position has been put forward by Jürgen Habermas (2000), who “advocates a model of cosmopolitan law which would supersede international law, confer actionable legal rights directly on individuals, and mandate the creation of supranational political agencies and institutions to ensure the implementation of human rights on a global scale. While nation-states would retain limited sovereignty, their citizens would be able to appeal to the coercive legal authority of regional or global agencies, against their own governments if necessary” (Crönin and De Greiff 1998: xx–xxi).

It seems to me that what is not needed is archaeologists deciding alone on the moral, social, and political issues surrounding cultural heritage.
rights. It should not, for example, be for archaeologists to determine whether universal rights to heritage should trump local, national rights in general or particular. There is often a complex mix of stakeholder interests and multiple scales of formal and informal cosmopolitan alliances into which the archaeologist or heritage manager is inserted. “The neologism cosmopolitics is also intended to underline the need to introduce intellectual order and accountability into this newly dynamic space of gushingly unrestrained sentiments, pieties, and urgencies for which no adequately discriminating lexicon has had time to develop” (Robbins 1998: 9). Archaeologists should certainly be part of the debate and raise awareness of the complex claims and rights that are involved. But in the end the right to cultural heritage needs to be ordered intellectually, ethically, and legally. Perhaps the best way forward is to situate heritage rights within a larger cosmopolitan framework of human rights legislation. The process that leads us there needs to be decentered and cosmopolitan, while at the same time providing a structured framework of protective rights for the individual or minority voice.

I have tried to leave open the question of whether heritage rights should be conferred on individuals or groups. Rather than a universalist answer to this question, I would prefer to avoid absolute strictures and trust in the processes of heritage dialogue themselves. My focus on the need for a framework to protect minority rights is aimed at the process of heritage itself. The important point seems to be that both minority and individual rights need to be protected through cosmopolitan alliances that recognize the historical contexts of heritage claims. These alliances may need to draw on structures of power and authority at national and international levels. Whether it is best to protect Mavili’s or Sadrettin’s rights to heritage through links to human rights concerning the individual, or whether it is best to refer to the heritage of the group depends very much on the specific historical context.

But what does seem clear from the examples given here is that minority rights to heritage depend on cosmopolitan alliances that also work within and between states or other institutions. It is the institutional frameworks that can provide the long-term commitment to change that is needed when voices are weakly heard. Hearing Mavili’s voice depends to some degree on regulation and intervention by the state or by global communities acting through or across the state. Sadrettin’s voice has been more widely heard in that he has published a book.
And yet this success has yet to be translated into personal betterment and fulfillment. We may in the West buy his book and be fascinated by the otherness and the empowerment that it might appear to exude. But we do not take long-term responsibility for his life or for those of his children. Our Western sensitivities too may encourage reburial of skeletal remains at Çatalhöyük, but “giving this heritage back” may do little to alleviate the social and economic problems within which the local communities exist. Alleviating such problems would involve longer and more institutionalized engagements of the type that can be provided by states and international agencies. In the example of the restriction on wearing the turban or head scarf by students at Selcuk University, the dissemination of knowledge about heritage seems to depend on taking a statist, interventionist line. It is by working with the university’s and the government’s secularist position that an open dialogue about prehistory remains possible. One might argue against the institutions of the state and say that a woman wearing the turban might also teach or be taught evolution. This is the sort of cosmopolitan compromise that is sought by Elif Shafak. But the fact remains that for a hybrid cosmopolitanism to be a successful basis for open teaching about prehistory in the Konya region, some intervention and protection by state institutions seem necessary. In all these examples from Turkey, cosmopolitan heritage needs grounding in political, legal, economic, and social institutions at national and global scales.