"All We Are Breaking Are Stones"

In March of 2001, the world’s major transnational media centers turned their collective gaze toward the Bamiyan Valley in Afghanistan, awaiting the obliteration of two giant and ancient statues of the Buddha (figure 1). In the now infamous global crisis—flames fanned by protests in India and China, pleas from the United Nations, encouragement from Muslim quarters in Chechnya and Sarajevo, and vociferous Internet chatter—Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban elected to destroy the Bamiyan Buddhas, as well as many of the country’s other statuary relics, purportedly because the icons were an affront to their version of Islam. “These idols have been gods of the infidels, who worshipped them and these are respected even now and perhaps may be turned into gods again. The real God is only Allah and all other false gods should be removed,” the Taliban’s Mulla Mohammad Omar explained in a decree, supported by a fatwa and a ruling by the Afghan Supreme Court (Colwell-Chanthaphonh 2003b: 76). “If people say these are not our beliefs but only part of the history of Afghanistan, then all we are breaking are stones.”

Little doubt remains that the Taliban used the threat of harming the Bamiyan Buddhas as a political ploy—to assert their authority in the global public sphere, to demonstrate their commitment to the most austere interpretation of Islam, and to reveal the West’s hypocrisy of a putative humanitarianism moved more swiftly by inert objects than by the daily suffering of Afghanistan’s poor and hungry. The destruction of the giant statues, however, is not without precedent, as previous moments of iconoclasm can be found in Islamic history (Martin 1978).
1 Taliban fighters destroyed this colossal statue of the Buddha in Afghanistan’s Bamiyan Valley in 2001. *Photograph by John C. Huntington, courtesy of the Huntington Archive.*
These previous episodes too, undeniably, were suffused with political machinations, and yet it is not easy to deny the consistent Islamic religious and moral justifications used to support such iconoclasm; Islam clearly does not make iconoclasm requisite, but within certain strands, it is reasoned. The Bamiyan Buddhas did seem to constitute a site of “negative heritage” for fundamentalist believers and the Taliban, “a site of negative memory, one that necessitated jettisoning from the nation’s construction of contemporary identity” (Meskell 2002: 561). Thus, as we reflect on the crisis of 2001, we can at least take seriously the Taliban’s general claim—if not for this particular event—that the physical destruction of godly icons may have been a religious imperative, necessary for the spiritual well-being of Afghanistan’s citizens, a populace made up almost entirely of practicing Muslims. Suppose if it were true that nearly every citizen of Afghanistan genuinely believed that “the real God is only Allah and all other false gods should be removed,” then could the destruction of these “false gods” by the nation-state’s government be justified? Can the destruction of heritage ever be ethically justified? If so, by what principle, why, and under what conditions?

Framed in these terms, the debate over the fate of the Bamiyan Buddhas is not entirely atypical from others surrounding the preservation of cultural heritage. The debate I am pointing to is not so much the one commonly argued about “right”—whether a government, de facto or otherwise, has the right to ownership, to decide how to care for the cultural property within its borders. Instead, I am pointing to a predicament that might be called the “preservation paradox” because at its core is the way in which one group’s preservation of heritage is another group’s destruction of heritage. The underlying argument to the Taliban’s iconoclasm is that the preservation of Afghanistan’s living Muslim heritage required the destruction of Afghanistan’s historical heritage, its corporeal heritage of Buddhism. The preservation paradox is not uncommon elsewhere, and indeed I want to argue that it may lie at the heart of multiple conflicts between archaeologists and Native Americans, and even between different Native American communities.

In this chapter, my aim is to explore the preservation paradox, especially as it has effected conflicts over heritage in Native North America. In particular, I highlight two case studies. The first concerns the Zuni Ahayu:da to illustrate how anthropological modes of preservation re-
sult in destruction from the perspective of Zuni religious practitioners. The second case study addresses rock art in the American Southwest, which Hopis seek to protect physically as monuments to their ancestors, but that some Navajo medicine men physically damage during curing ceremonies. Following these cases, I argue that resolution to the preservation paradox may lie in notions of cosmopolitanism, a way to express global concerns for heritage while at the same time orienting resolutions toward local actors. Although some scholars might posit that cosmopolitanism is largely descriptive, my reading of it—principally following from Martha C. Nussbaum and Kwame Anthony Appiah—is prescriptive, a political philosophy with profound normative implications. Cosmopolitanism makes claims about our moral and ethical lives.

The Preservation Paradox

In a world without conflict or contradiction, everyone’s notion of “preservation” would be identical. Native communities, museums, governments, and international organizations alike could then cooperate in sync to ensure that heritage objects were preserved for the good of communities, nations, humanity. But in actuality preservation is neither a universal concept nor unanimously defined. From the contemporary Australian Aborigines who repaint over ancient images on stone, to the Haisla who leave sacred memorial totem poles to decay, to members of the Six Nations who choose not to relocate burials that are naturally eroding from riverbanks, numerous examples illustrate that the concept of preservation is itself culturally conceived (Groarke and Warrick 2006: 173). These differences profoundly challenge the aims and methods of the modern cultural heritage preservation movement, provoking archaeologists to articulate more clearly what preservation means when its meanings are contested (see the chapters by Byrne, Lydon, and Meskell, this volume). Such cases ultimately evoke what we may term the preservation paradox, because they point to how one group’s notion of cultural preservation can be another group’s notion of cultural destruction.

The Zuni Ahayu:da  In recent years scholars have chronicled the colonialist threads interwoven into the histories of museums around
the globe (for example, Barringer and Flynn 1998; D. Cole 1985). The modern anthropology museum began as part and parcel of colonialist projects of the late nineteenth century and involved a desire to collect and control the material manifestations of newly dominated peoples. Even where such culpable motives were not so evident, seemingly few early museum professionals paused to reflect on how the collection of cultural objects for museum making adversely effected local (usually indigenous) communities, already yoked by colonial rule. Most museum curators and collectors of the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth genuinely believed in opposite terms that their work was an ethical duty. As Amalia Rosenblum (1996: 61) has written, the collection of anthropological specimens from cultures on the brink of destruction became “a moral obligation, wholly consistent with the discipline’s concern for its subject peoples. And with the rhetorical circle now complete, it was supposed that future generations of Native peoples themselves stood to benefit from anthropological far-sightedness.” And yet during this age in which colonial expansion transformed societies around the world, anthropology museums did in fact obtain countless cultural objects that otherwise would have been lost to time. In the immediate aftermath of colonialism, it very well did seem that the physical preservation of material heritages functioned as a surrogate for the preservation of vanishing cultures.

These strains of the salvaging principle were certainly at work when anthropologists began collecting objects from the Pueblo of Zuni in northwestern New Mexico in the late 1800s (Hinsley 1992: 18–19). In a five-year period alone, between 1879 and 1884, cultural artifacts were taken at a rate of five objects for every occupant of the Pueblo, many under the cover of dark (Parezo 1985, 1987). One object in particular caught the attention of collectors, the Ahayu:da or War Gods, and over the years scores were stolen from the Zuni (figure 2). All Ahayu:da in the possession of museums or collectors were stolen because these sacred objects are owned by the community and are inalienable: they cannot be bought, sold, or traded by any individual for any purpose (Merrill et al. 1993: 532, 536). The Ahayu:da are twin deities first “created in time immemorial by the Sun Father, the ultimate giver of life, to lead the Zunis and help them overcome obstacles in their migration to the Middle Place at Zuni Pueblo” (Merrill et al. 1993: 524). The deities protect the Zuni people and look after their welfare, intervene
to bring rain and good crops, give courage during war, and cure individual ailments and illnesses that infect the whole tribe (T. J. Ferguson 1990: 8–9; Ferguson and Hart 1985: 57). The Ahayu:da are thus not only associated with war as their English name would suggest, but have a complex role in Zuni society. Sculptural images of the Ahayu:da are made during the winter solstice and other ceremonies connected with the Bow Priesthood, which makes Uuyymi, the elder brother War God, with the cooperation of the Deer Clan, and Ma’a’sewi, the younger brother War God, with the help of the Bear Clan; Bow Priests are delegated to install the two cylindrical wood sculptures in shrines that surround the Pueblo of Zuni (Ferguson et al. 1996: 251–52; Stevenson 1898). When the newly fashioned Ahayu:da are placed in a shrine, the previous ones are “retired,” reverently laid on a nearby pile with other Ahayu:da. “These retired Ahayu:da retain an important role in
Zuni ritual,” Ferguson and his co-authors (1996: 252) emphasize. “All Ahayu:da are to remain at their shrines exposed to natural elements until they disintegrate and return to the earth.”

Although some early collectors certainly understood the Zuni estimation of the Ahayu:da (Parezo 1985: 771)—for it was in large part their great value to the Zunis that made such objects of great value to anthropologists—it is not necessarily a contradiction to recognize that collectors were also troubled by witnessing these precious objects deteriorating from sun, wind, and rain. This is the core of the salvage ethic, the urge to “preserve” objects by physically protecting them. But for the Zunis, such acts that aspired to cultural preservation were in fact acts of cultural destruction. As cultural objects, the Ahayu:da are vital to the Zuni people’s ongoing traditions, physical health, and spiritual well-being. The deities are sanctified in the complex of Zuni customs and cultural practices; they must be left in place to serve their purposes.

During the efforts of the Zuni tribe to have stolen deities returned, some museum professionals were concerned that repatriated Ahayu:da would be returned to shrines and left in the open to deteriorate (Ferguson et al. 1996: 264). Aside from pointing out that the museums illegally held the Ahayu:da, the Zunis involved emphasized that museums cannot really “preserve” these cultural objects, because for them to be cultural objects—for them to be Ahayu:da—they must be allowed to wear away naturally (Merrill et al. 1993: 546). “That is the natural course of things and the Zunis do not think humans should intervene in the process,” Ferguson and his co-authors (1996: 264) wrote. “As the Zunis say, ‘All things will eat themselves up.’” In other words, from the Zuni view, when Ahayu:da are put into museums, taken from their sacred shrines, and indefinitely protected from natural decay, they are in part destroyed and injure the Zuni people. It is when the Ahayu:da are allowed to deteriorate physically in their sacred places that they are preserved as meaningful heritage and as religious objects.

**Ancestral Pueblo Glyphs** The Diné, the Navajo people, are deeply rooted to the Diné Bikéyah, the country of their ancestors, in the four corners region of the American Southwest (Valkenburgh 1999). The towering mountains, spectacular rock formations, rare rivers and springs, unique plants and animals, and open desert sky form the cultural landscape of the Navajo people’s lived experience (Kelley and Francis 1994). An
essential feature of this sacred landscape is the many ruins that testify to the lives of the ancients (Kelley and Francis 1993: 155). Navajos call those people that made and left the fallen pueblos the *anaasazi*, or ancient enemy (H. Holt 1983: 595). The Navajo express a deep affinity for these places and ancient people.

Most scholars maintain that Navajos entered northern New Mexico around 1500 AD, generations after the major Ancestral Puebloan villages, like those in Chaco Canyon, were occupied (Towner and Dean 1996: 8). And yet as Robert S. McPherson (1992: 81–85) has detailed in his singular book *Sacred Land, Sacred View*, Navajos believe that their relationship with the ancient Puebloans stretches back to when humans lived in the underworld. Traditional Navajo stories recount that the ancient pueblo world collapsed in the midst of environmental chaos and social anarchy. McPherson (1992: 3) has written: “The Anasazi serve as a good example of what happens when those roots [of connection to the earth] become weakened. The Anasazi culture shriveled and died because the people transgressed the laws of the holy beings and of nature as they sought ease through power which they abused. Their example and the visible remains left behind serve as a reminder of death and destruction in the midst of life.”

Of the various kinds of ancient sites that remain today, among the most visible are those with glyphs—pictographs and petroglyphs. Navajos have long taken these images on stone to be wordless transcripts of the Ancestral Puebloans, descriptions of their trials and tribulations before they were destroyed or moved on (McPherson 1992: 76). As glyphs are born from human evils, they, like ruins more broadly, are dangerous and cause disease, blindness, and confusion. Sites where there has been any ceremoniial activity “carry a ritual power that is enduring and not to be violated without potentially threatening the welfare of the families involved” (Doyel 1982: 637). Other Navajos believe that glyphs are associated with witching. Handprints on the walls are those of the dead searching for a person to haunt and placing one’s hand in the imprints of like images can cause sickness, pain, and aches in the jaw, head, and arm. Some Navajo believe “a painting left in a ruin was made for a reason, a thought behind it continues to permeate its existence”—the ghost carried by the wind can haunt the living (McPherson 1992: 121). To heal those inflicted, curing ceremonies must be held.
Ruins and glyphs are powerful and consequently dangerous, but power does not always result in evil. The power imbued in ancient places can be harnessed for healing (H. Holt 1983: 596). The Navajo cosmology holds the universe to be ordered by natural laws—this order in part comes from the animation of everything, even fixed objects, which may be appealed to for aid. When a Navajo is ill, it is presumed that “the natural order of things has been disrupted, in some cases by patients’ improper conduct or contact with impure things” (Schneider and DeHaven 2003: 422). In this view, evil and good are indivisible: “A site or prayer that is used for positive effect can also be used for negative results by just reversing that which is good” (McPherson 1992: 73). The power in ancient sites can thus be used for healing when shrines are placed in ruins, ceremonies conducted there, or artifacts collected for ritual use.

Although most of these uses would seem to have little impact on archaeological sites, one ceremony does not leave the ancient detritus unscathed. The ceremony is little reported in the anthropological literature, but McPherson (1992: 118) briefly describes the ritual, which requires the intentional defacement of ancient glyphs. In some cases, it is believed that glyphs inflict harm and thus must be ritually “killed” by destroying the image, a scattering of the evil contained within it and that is causing some impairment. Thus, at times glyphs are intentionally destroyed, but to ensure the physical and spiritual well-being of those who have fallen ill. But the ritual destruction of rock art is not done for the sake of destruction. For Navajos preserving the material past is not a foreign concept (Begay 2001; Spain 1982). These ceremonies, it would seem, are performed in the genuine belief that they will exorcise evil, and thus “allow for the restoration of harmony on both an individual and a community-wide level” (Schneider and DeHaven 2003: 420).

The Navajo ritual destruction of glyphs is thus no simple case of iconoclasm. Yet, as troubling as this case might be for archaeologists, it remains even more so for the contemporary ancestors of the people who made these ancient images in stone. The Hopi in particular believe that ancient ruins survive into our modern age not by chance but through the designs of their ancestors. Hopi traditions recount that the people of long ago, the Hisatsinom, emerged onto this world and made a covenant with the spirit-being Màasaw to act as stewards of the land. Seeking the Earth Center, the Hopi Mesas, the Hisatsinom
sojourned across the land for generations, establishing one village and then another—a migration over centuries that is well attested to in the archaeological record (Bernardini 2005a). Along their migration routes, Màasaw instructed the clans to leave *kuktota*, their “footprints” on the earth, by setting down ritual springs, trails, shrines, and glyphs (Kuwanwisiwma and Ferguson 2004).

Traditional Hopi knowledge holds that petroglyphs were etched to record myriad events, social practices, and topographic features, including plants, animals, migration routes, clan membership, religious societies, ceremonies, astronomic observances, and landforms (Colwell-Chanthaphonh 2005). But Hopis believe that underlying all of these representations is the fact that glyphs made by the Hisatsinom are monuments to Hopi history, proof of ancestral homelands and clan migrations. The importance and sacredness of *tutuveni*, as rock art is known to the Hopi, is signified by glyphs being etched directly onto the bedrock of the Hopi Mesas (Fewkes 1892). Hopis use glyphs adjacent to shrines, and petroglyphs in part demarcate boundaries of Hopi lands (Eggan 1994: 15; Fewkes 1906: 362–64). The creation of glyphs is not long past: into the twentieth century Hopis have been recorded leaving clan symbols on cliffs during pilgrimages (figure 3) (Bernardini 2007; Michaelis 1981).

For the Hopis, then, glyphs not only chronicle Hopi history but also buttress Hopi identity; glyphs confirm the traditions related by Hopi elders and affirm their enduring commitment to land stewardship. Sites with glyphs, as is the case with all ancestral sites, are living monuments that connect Hopis today to their ancestors of long ago (Dongoske et al. 1993; Ferguson et al. 2001). Glyphs are unquestionably sacred for the Hopi. They believe the physical integrity of glyphs is vital to remembering the past and ensuring the survival of the Hopi people into the future.

Thus, the Navajo practice of ritually destroying some glyphs to ensure the well-being of ailing Navajos threatens the well-being of the Hopi people. Navajos may see the ritual destruction as a form of preservation—preserving the health of the Navajo people, Navajo medicine, and traditional ties to the land. But from the Hopi viewpoint, such ritual destruction, as thoughtless vandalism, is not only a physical destruction but a cultural one as well because it is their history that is being erased. With each clan symbol that is wiped out, another Hopi monument is gone.

**THE ARCHAEOLOGIST AS A WORLD CITIZEN** 149
How ought these conflicts be resolved? The preservation paradox illuminates a core contradiction for archaeologists who are rightly concerned for the objects that constitute the focus of their labors, but who are also rightly concerned about the well-being of communities who give these objects their cultural meanings. In the cases of the Bamiyan Buddhas and Zuni Ahayu:da, the conflict is between broader “universal” norms of the physical preservation of heritage objects and the more localized norms of communities that declare that the physical destruction of heritage objects is needed for preserving the vitality of the community itself. In the case of the Ancestral Pueblo glyphs, the basic conflict is not between putative international and national norms,
or between the nation and a local community, but between two local communities that differentially interpret the history, social value, and spiritual function of ancient glyphs.

Undeniably, concrete resolution to such conflicts will entail legal and political considerations that may supercede moral ones. Because any Ahayu:da collectors hold are unavoidably stolen property, they should be returned to the Zuni tribe on these grounds alone, irrespective of how the Zunis care for the deities. Navajos, if caught destroying archaeological sites on federal land, may very well face the consequences of prosecution under the Archaeological Resources Protection Act. The Taliban may not have comprised the legitimate government of Afghanistan. However, while political and legal solutions are needed to fully address these conflicts, ethical questions remain. Setting aside whether museums possess stolen property, or Navajos are violating ARPA, or the Taliban was a legal government, I am trying to clarify the archaeological position on such conflicts. Quite simply, I am asking, from the perspective of archaeological ethics: what is the right thing to do?

More than twenty years ago, John H. Merryman (1986) argued that there are two ways of thinking about cultural property, that objects of cultural patrimony rightfully belong to nations or that they exist independently of national borders and so belong to humanity. More recently, Joe Watkins (2005) has emphasized how enclaves within nations, particularly indigenous communities, provide a third pole, that of the intranationalists. Although these positions are indispensable to clarify legal and political arguments of right and ownership, they contribute far less to discussions about cultural property in terms of lived experiences and moral obligations. Consider: the ancient ruins of Chaco Canyon in New Mexico are at once a Hopi ancestral site, a locus of Navajo spiritual power, a ritual space for New Agers, an archaeological and scientific resource, a National Historical Park of the United States, and a UNESCO World Heritage Site (Finn 1997; Noble 2004). Clearly, in anthropological as much as ethical terms, such a complex convergence of people, communities, and institutions cannot be reduced to just intra-nationalist, nationalist, or internationalist claims. The key ethical problem, then, is not so much categorizing rights but trying to illuminate their interrelationships.

This in essence will mean finding equitable solutions to conflicts over heritage that do not unjustly encumber one group to the advantage
of another. But how can stewardship be realized when one place is valued in such different ways? As shown above, there is no “universal” preservation ethic, because preservation is itself a cultural construct. (International organizations and treaties that aver to preserve heritage for the “good of humankind” do not claim that this is a universal ethic, but that this ethic should be universalized.) Nevertheless, this is not to say that preservation is nonsensical, injurious, or necessarily imperialist, but that instead we must develop a sophisticated understanding of how heritage works from the individual level, to the community, to the nation, and beyond it. Because this is the social reality we find ourselves in, a just solution cannot simply pick out the rights of one group but must instead interweave these multiple values. It is this need for a more complex approach to heritage stewardship that leads us to cosmopolitanism.

The Argument of Proximity  When thinking about possible resolutions to these problems, we may intuitively think about various claims to heritage objects as a set of nested relationships. This framework would situate, for example, a range of individuals and communities in relation to each other and the object in question. Following Amartya Sen (2002: 115), broadly stated, we can think of these nested relationships consisting of four sets of identity: kinship, locality, nationality, and humanity. Such a nested, multi-scale structure is akin to what has been codified in the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), which orders priority of ownership along a key alignment of affiliation, beginning with lineal descendants and then moving outward to tribal cultural affiliations (Echo-Hawk 2000: 268). The issues of affiliation in NAGPRA are heated not only because the law can turn on how it is determined (T. J. Ferguson 2004), but also because in a moral sense we feel claims of right are proportional to the degree of cultural affinity.

This ordering of right can be termed the “argument of proximity” because it is based on the notion that those individuals and communities most socially or culturally proximate to the cultural object and its creator(s) have the greatest rights to it. Indeed, ample anecdotal and sociological evidence makes clear that often people do have more intense emotional experiences with heritage objects that are perceived to be culturally proximate. A Zuni elder seeing an Ahayu:da on display in
a museum feels great sadness and senses the deity’s own sentiments—clearly a different experience from, say, an Anglo museum visitor who is encountering the Zuni Indians for the first time (T. J. Ferguson 1990: 10). But that same Anglo, say, whose great-grandfather died fighting for the Union Army, will likely have a more evocative experience than the Zuni elder at Gettysburg National Park (Gatewood and Cameron 2004). The argument of proximity is compelling because it captures the essence of cultural heritage—the things we feel deeply connected to, that give us a sense of history, our future, and ourselves. This argument is powerful because it is not abstract and it respects the autonomy of individuals. It recognizes that those who feel closest to heritage objects are perhaps in the best position to determine how the integrity of those objects can be maintained and honored.

However, a generalizable principle of stewardship derived from the argument of proximity—roughly stated, preservation should be decided by those closest to the heritage object in question—is not without problems. One shortcoming with the argument of proximity is that it confuses an is with an ought. A hierarchy of relations may accurately describe how individuals feel—assuredly based on social structures or cultural worldview—more connected to cultural objects, but this social reality does not necessarily imply that they ought to have more rights to it. The bare fact of social proximity does not make a moral imperative, in other words.

We can think of many cases in which someone may feel particularly proximate to an object but not have particular claims to it based only on these feelings of affinity. I would argue that descendants of Betsy Ross could not legitimately claim ownership of the first American flag only because of these descendants’ social proximity. The descendants may feel closer to the object—perhaps more pride and adoration for the flag than the average American, recognizing as they might that one of their very kin made it—but that fact alone does not give them more right to it. In not dissimilar terms, Zunis would say that the carver who made an Ahayu:da does not own it by virtue of his proximity; no one individual can alienate the wooden image because the entire community owns it as an inalienable cultural object. The carver and the carver’s family might feel honored that one of their own made the idol, but these feelings alone do not bestow upon them any special rights of control.
The Argument of Inclusivity  Another problem with using a set of nested identities to order a set of moral rights is that the lines between each category can be strangely arbitrary. Few, if any, anthropologists today think of “culture” as a neatly bounded bundle of customs and practices, but instead they emphasize the ways in which culture and the social identities born from it are fluid and flexible phenomena (see the chapter by Hodder, this volume). A Zuni tribal member, after all, not only has kins and religious affiliations but is also a citizen of the United States. So, can cultural identities be so easily parsed and ordered? Can we presume that one identity takes moral precedence over another, particularly if we admit that myriad identities are constituted in the individual? Given that each person has multiple—intersecting and overlapping—identities why begin with the most particular identity before proceeding outward (if concentric circles) or upward (if a hierarchy)?

Indeed, some political philosophers recommend that we must begin such deliberations not at the most particular and local, but at the most general and universal. Martha C. Nussbaum (2002a), in a forum with twenty-nine scholars, argued for just this view as a critique of unfettered patriotism. Rather than a first loyalty to the nation, Nussbaum argued that our first duty should be to humanity. “Whatever else we are bound by and pursue,” Nussbaum (2002b: 133) asserts, “we should recognize, at whatever personal or social cost, that each human being is human and counts as the moral equal of every other.” The Stoics of ancient Greece were perhaps the first in Western philosophy to suggest that every individual is a kosmou politês, a world citizen who “dwells, in effect in two communities—the local community of the birth and the community of human argument and aspiration” (Nussbaum 2002a: 7). As Marcus Aurelius, a firm Stoic, wrote, “My city and country, so far as I am Antonius, is Rome, but so far as I am a man, it is the world” (Russell 1979: 272). The Stoics, it is clear then, were not arguing to merely espy humans beyond our horizons or to abolish state governments. “Their point was even more radical,” Nussbaum (2002a: 7) writes, “that we should give our first allegiance to no mere form of government, no temporal power, but to the moral community made up by the humanity of all human beings.”

The kosmou politês is committed to a moral sphere that begins with humanity rather than ends with it for three basic reasons, according to Nussbaum. The first is egocentric in that the more one understands
of the world the more one understands oneself: the study of humanity is thus not only a mirror but also a lens for self-contemplation. The second is that with a genuinely cosmopolitan view, communities can better solve their problems. Factionalism and partisan politics are avoidable if one’s commitments are wholly inclusive. The third is that this view is inherently gainful because it “recognizes in people what is especially fundamental about them, most worthy of respect and acknowledgment: their aspirations to justice and goodness and their capacities for reasoning in this connection” (Nussbaum 2002a: 8).

This philosophy of cosmopolitanism is not far from the view of “internationalism,” codified in multiple charters and laws, which define cultural property as “components of a common human culture, whatever their places of origin or present location, independent of property rights or national jurisdiction” (Merryman 1986: 831). Excepting the common gendered language in these charters of mankind, this view is compelling precisely because it aspires to be so inclusive and nondiscriminatory. A cosmopolitan perspective affirms that some cultural objects transcend state boundaries and national imaginings. It addresses the realities of contemporary and historical globalization, that people today as for centuries are fundamentally connected—traveling, exchanging, communicating. The kosmou politês seeks to recognize our common humanity, even as the differences that render possible unique contributions to world heritage are honored.

A cosmopolitan principle of stewardship would therefore state that we should maximize the preservation of cultural heritage objects for the good of the greatest number of people. Here “preservation” would entail the physical conservation of objects so far as possible because if objects were physically destroyed then they could not be appreciated by all of humanity—or at least the portion of humanity that could visit or view the objects in question. The physical preservation of cherished heritage objects might infract the creed of a few, but is justified by their wider appreciation.

However, a principle so formulated is problematical chiefly because it disregards the very reasons that we value heritage objects in such broad terms. We value heritage objects not for their abstract qualities per se, but for the particular experiences they evoke. The cosmopolitan cherishes an Uuyuyemi sculptural image not merely because it was made by humans, but because it was made by members of the Bow Priesthood
and Deer Clan living at the Pueblo of Zuni in the belief that the deity secures their community’s physical and spiritual well-being. Thus, while the principle of preservation from the argument of proximity fails because it is not universal enough, the principle of preservation from the argument of inclusivity fails because it is not particular enough. What is needed is an approach that locates the middle ground where the local and the global meet.

An Argument for Rooted Cosmopolitanism  Some critics have disparaged Nussbaum for missing what is right in front of her when looking so far beyond the horizon—the social connections and ethical duties humans feel toward their family, friends, and intimates. “Above all,” Gertrude Himmelfarb (2002: 77) has passionately written, “what cosmopolitanism obscures, even denies, are the givens of life: parents, ancestors, family, race, religion, heritage, history, culture, tradition, community—and nationality. These are not ‘accidental’ attributes of the individual. They are essential attributes.” Sissela Bok (2002: 39) similarly believes that cosmopolitanism unreasonably requires us to ignore our social ties. Suppose, she writes, two people are drowning and one is your intimate while the other is a stranger. Does it really make no difference to you which person is saved first?

But even the Stoics emphasized that the obligations of world citizenship should not replace local affinities, which are distinguished as “a source of great richness in life” (Nussbaum 2002a: 9). As Sen (2002: 112) has written in Nussbaum’s defense, “The demands of fundamental allegiance need not be identical to those of exclusive allegiance.” A cosmopolitan ethic hardly requires that we surrender our identities of family, religion, or community, but in fact can easily accommodate special attention to those in our most immediate social circle. Nussbaum believes that this is the most practical way of ensuring human flourishing. As an example, Nussbaum explains that she gives her own daughter exceptional attention because it is better to give one child her full care than only a little care to the world’s children. “But,” Nussbaum (2002b: 136) ends, “that should not mean that we believe our own country or family is really worth more than the children or families of other people—all are still equally human, of equal moral worth.”

The political philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah (2005, 2006a) has led a spirited defense of cosmopolitanism, but has argued that our
commitments to our intimates and kin are not merely practical, but also deeply ethical. Firmly grounded in the tradition of liberalism, Appiah claims that we need to cultivate ethical systems that are simultaneously cosmopolitan and rooted. Appiah’s justification for this view is extended and complex, and so cannot be related in toto. Nonetheless, as Appiah’s reasoning ultimately buttresses my own, it is important here to examine at length some of Appiah’s central arguments for a rooted cosmopolitanism, most persuasively articulated in his book *The Ethics of Identity* (2005).

Appiah begins his story with his own father, Joseph Appiah. He is described as a cosmopolitan patriot, a man who deeply loved his family and his Asante roots, was willing to die for his nation of Ghana, and yet admonished his children, “Remember that you are citizens of the world” (Appiah 2005: 213). Joseph loved Ghana. He risked his life for it and was imprisoned for it because he opposed the country’s tyrannical government. To explain Joseph’s outlook, it is important to consider that while he was born and reared in the Asante region of Ghana, Joseph was also a subject of the British Empire, married a British woman, and had children who came to live in America, Namibia, Nigeria, and Ghana. Indeed, Appiah reminds us that throughout human history, throughout the world—from Alexander the Great’s reach in India, to the spread of Bantu ironworks over Africa, to Islam connecting Mecca to Jakarta, to Chinese silk shaping European fashions, and on and on—human communities have journeyed and interacted.

Even as the nature, form, and frequency of our interconnectedness may be shifting in the twenty-first century, Appiah argues that the world has never been nor will ever be a “global village.” A village implies a close relationship, but it is impossible to be intimate with the billions of people that populate the earth. But this is a limitation not only of a global outlook. Can a citizen of the United States really know 300 million fellow Americans? Whether speaking of humanity, the nation, or the *ethnie*, we are therefore often speaking of “political strangers.” Cosmopolitanism nonetheless acknowledges that not everyone is a stranger; it is not a philosophy that advocates, in Susan Wolf’s (1992: 244) term, an “extreme impartialism” in which one is morally required to treat a stranger exactly as one treats a friend. “A tenable cosmopolitanism,” Appiah (2005: 223) consequently argues, “in the first instance, must take seriously the value of human life, and the value of particular human
lives, the lives people have made for themselves, with the communities that help lend significance to those lives. This prescription captures the challenge. A cosmopolitanism with prospects must reconcile a kind of universalism with the legitimacy of at least some forms of partiality.”

A cosmopolitan philosophy must justify the nature and limits of ethical partiality. The concern with “special obligations” is that they seem to undermine three core liberal values, which cosmopolitanism also seeks to uphold: “those of autonomy (that is, some core concern for liberty), loyalty (that is, associational life, in all its richness and responsibility), and moral equality (that is, the notion that persons are of equal worth, or anyway, due equal respect)” (Appiah 2005: 224). Appiah’s response is twofold. He first argues that obligations can be both special and universal. The general idea here is that ethical partiality involves “particularist goods.” Consider for example, friends and wealth, which can both be intrinsically good, but goods of different kinds: “You may not mind whether you have this million dollars or that million dollars; but you value your friend not as a token of the type friend but as this particular person with whom you have a highly particularized relationship” (Appiah 2005: 227). His second argument comes down to the point that we do not demand the same sense of equality from states and individuals. Although we want state governments to be impartial when selecting their policies and running their programs (so as not to unfairly disadvantage, say, women or African Americans or the poor) we deem that partiality at the individual level is not only fair but also often expected. In this way, Appiah (2005: 230) asserts, “Impartiality is a strictly position-dependent obligation. What is a virtue in a referee is not a virtue in a prize-fighter’s wife.”

Appiah goes on to say that our sense of ethics unfolds from the personal paths each of us seeks in our lives, our “ground projects.” These pursuits are shaped by two kinds of relationships, “thick relations” (interactions among those with a shared worldview and a rich collective history) and “thin relations” (the associations we have with political strangers). These relations in turn correspond with two kinds of obligations. The first are “ethical obligations,” which involve leading a life that is good or bad, while the second, “moral obligations,” are narrower and concern the principles of how to treat others. Thus, thick relations involve ethical obligations and thin relations involve moral obligations. “Ethical concerns and constraints arise from my individuality; moral ones arise from my personhood,” Appiah (2005: 232)
writes. From this framework, we can begin to see how Appiah’s rooted cosmopolitanism uniquely negotiates between the tasks of partiality and impartiality. We are bound by both thick and thin relations, by both ethical and moral obligations.

And so, unlike Nussbaum, Appiah (2005: 241) is arguing that the cosmopolitan’s commitment to the local should not just be instrumental, not just “a coolly cerebral decision, an impartial calculation as to how one would best make the world a better place.” Indeed, the imaginings of a nation are real to those who imagine them. The happenstance of one’s sex does not somehow make one’s gender inauthentic. In the end, nationalities matter ethically “for the same reason that football and opera matter: as things cared about by autonomous agents, whose autonomous desires we ought to acknowledge and take account of even if we cannot always accede to them” (Appiah 2005: 245). Thus, rooted cosmopolitanism is not a contradiction in terms, but instead goes to the heart of a life committed to one’s kin and community as much as the dignity of every human being.

Appiah presents a kind of universalism that appreciates that human practices and behaviors are historically and socially contingent. But we do not need to obtain perfect theoretical harmony to discover shared practices. Appiah argues that we can and often do agree on moments of moral and ethical judgment. We cannot always agree on the universal, but we can often agree on the particular. The missionary nurse and mother who come to the aid of a sick child come for different reasons, but both come to help this ailing child. Appiah suggests that such shared moments are clearly realized when we hear stories in which we come to see the world through the eyes of another (see the chapters by Lilley and Scham, this volume). The anti-universalist, Appiah (2005: 257) concludes, “supposes that the rationalist is bound to think that ‘we’ are right and ‘they’ are wrong: but if there is one world only, then it is also possible that they might be right. We can learn from each other’s stories only if we share both human capacity and a single world: relativism about either is a reason not to converse but to fall silent.”

The Principle of Complex Stewardship

The principles of stewardship derived from proximity or inclusivity are what we might consider to be notions of “simple stewardship” because they see preservation as either infinitely variable (depending exclusively
on local definitions) or wholly fixed (depending exclusively on a single, universal definition). A perspective of rooted cosmopolitanism leads us, in turn, to “complex stewardship” because it stipulates that archaeologists must comprehend the ways in which preservation can be both locally enacted and universally sought. This tenet is offered not as a universal principle, but as a means to universalize a stewardship ethic derived from rooted cosmopolitanism. In other words, it is a way for archaeologists to frame predicaments of stewardship—as so clearly raised in the preservation paradox. This principle could thus be stated: We should maximize the integrity of heritage objects for the good of the greatest number of people, but not absolutely.

Maximize the integrity of heritage objects. In this principle, “integrity” is conceived as the soundness of a cultural object that includes but is not limited to physical welfare. As we saw in the case of the Ahayu:da, a wooden deity’s integrity is derived primarily not from its perpetual physical conservation, but rather from its active participation in the life of Zuni community members, which includes the physical deterioration of the object. Concepts of integrity should not be imposed externally, but ought to be derived from the viewpoints of stakeholders. The scientific archaeologist, as one stakeholder, can make the argument for the physical preservation of an object, but this is just one view that must be negotiated given the local context. This concept of integrity provides the archaeologist with a firm foundation to explain why—from a scientific view—ancient Ancestral Pueblo glyphs should not be destroyed, but that other archaeological artifacts can be destroyed (e.g., carbon samples, sherds for petrographic analyses, and so forth). That is, the argument from the archaeological viewpoint is that the scientific integrity of some objects entails their physical destruction while in other cases their physical conservation.

For the good. As a notion of integrity, “the good” is not a ready-made object that can be imposed from above. I think that archaeologists need a minimum concept of the good, which can be found in the notion of universal human dignity. From this flow basic values that archaeologists can reasonably defend: equality, justice, liberty. Archaeologists ought to be committed to human flourishing, but this does not give them license to enjoin their own ideas of “the good” upon others, particularly on impoverished or politically weak communities. Indeed, the basic recognition of human dignity would demand that archaeologists respect how individuals and communities conceive of the good, so
long as those individuals and communities do not themselves contravene the basic human dignity of others.

*Of the greatest number.* Following from a view of rooted cosmopolitanism, our first (but not only) allegiance is to humanity. Beginning at the outermost ring of our nested relationships means a first recognition of our shared identity as human beings, of our entwined histories and collective experiences. Specifically in terms of “heritage,” it seems empirically true that most communities deeply value the objects that contribute to their identities, and many communities deeply value the objects of other communities. Since cultural heritage (although variously defined and expressed) seems to be prized across a spectrum of communities, it is not only right but also a practical matter to err toward humanity. In other words, if multiple communities are likely to esteem the Rosetta Stone, why start discussions of value with Greeks or Egyptians or archaeologists? Does it not make the most sense, *as a beginning point*, to imagine the values it holds for humanity?

*But not absolutely.* But since we know that cultural objects are valued precisely because they come from particular human communities—and not humanity in general—we must take into account not just the “greatest number” but also individuals who made objects or experience profound affinities because the objects come from their ancestors or community. Archaeologists could also argue that the scientific merits of some particularly special object outweigh the benefits of sharing an object with other stakeholders. This stipulation, then, seeks to be sensitive to the local contexts in which heritage objects are created, used, conveyed, and retired. In Appiah’s terms, the phrase “not absolutely” sanctions our thick relations and ethical obligations while “maximiz[ing] the integrity” concerns our thin relations and moral obligations.

It should be clear from this discussion that I am not promoting an absolute rule, but rather a frame archaeologists can use to begin deliberations on ethical predicaments. Although I am using the term “stewardship,” this discussion moves away from how “stewardship” is typically conceived by archaeologists and their professional societies (e.g., Groarke and Warrick 2006). Even as ethical archaeologists should seek to engage in dialogues with stakeholders, this principle does not require archaeologists to be arbitrators; however, it does require archaeologists to be anthropologists because they must be aware of how different stakeholders conceive of and enact such key concepts.
as heritage, preservation, integrity, and the good. They must be aware of how and why heritage objects persist in particular communities, including their own archaeological one. While I have sought to clarify a justifiable and reasonable moral stance for archaeologists, this principle by itself does not provide a clear mechanism for negotiation or resolution of conflicts. Real negotiations must involve legal and political considerations, and not just ethical principles.

The principle of complex stewardship can nonetheless clarify how archaeologists qua archaeologists can approach the preservation paradox. In the case of the Zuni Ahayu:da, it is clear that these wooden images are exceedingly rare, even priceless contributions to the record of humanity. However, a general contribution to humanity is not enough. In this case, the key issue revolves around integrity. Museum professionals and Zuni tribal members approach the images in fundamentally different ways, but it is the Zuni perspective that is most compelling since it is from this community that the objects were made and are still used. The museum world after all marvels at these objects because of how the Zunis conceptualize the War Gods. Thus, even the museums should acquiesce to the deep particular meanings the images hold for Zunis.

With the case of the Ancestral Pueblo glyphs we again see conflicting ideas of integrity: for Hopis, the integrity of the objects entails their physical conservation as monuments to Hopi history; for Navajos, the integrity of glyphs depends on their use in the healing of ill Navajos and the maintenance of the Navajo cultural landscape. Although most evidence suggests that Navajos did not arrive in the Southwest until after many of these ancient glyphs were made, this consideration must be balanced by the fact that the Navajos do have some traditions that relate connections with the *anaasazi* (Begay 2003). The most persuasive argument of integrity from the Navajo perspective might be if it could be demonstrated that it was ancient Navajos who made the glyphs that were being damaged in Navajo ceremonies. But unless the issue of integrity between the two primary stakeholders can be clarified, we need to consider the broader values of other Pueblo groups, archaeologists, tourists, and residents of the Southwest and the United States. When these glyphs are destroyed, the absent objects potentially affect the well-being of all these communities as well. For these reasons, and unless additional claims are made or information is offered, archaeolo-
gists should have serious ethical reservations about the Navajo practice of damaging ancient Ancestral Pueblo glyphs.

Although the Taliban ostensibly destroyed the Bamiyan Buddhas because of political machinations (Meskell 2002: 563), if their claims of destruction for religious preservation were taken seriously, could archaeologists accept (on ethical grounds) the destruction of the statues? The far-reaching estimation of the Bamiyan Buddhas as a record of humanity is indicated by the archaeological expeditions that Italian, French, Indian, Japanese, and Afghan scholars have undertaken since the 1920s, the substantial investments made by UNESCO since 2001, and the inscription of the Bamiyan Buddhas as a World Heritage Site in 2003 (ICOMOS 2003). Nearly two millennia old, and among the largest standing Buddhist sculptures, the Bamiyan Buddhas were rare cultural objects to be sure. At the same time, a close look at the issue shows that the Bamiyan Buddhas had been threatened many times before and the world had hardly taken notice; indeed, the discourses surrounding the crisis suggest that for many people throughout the world, the prestige of the Bamiyan Buddhas as objects of world heritage actually came after—not before—their destruction (Colwell-Chanthaphonh 2003b: 76, 93). An argument based exclusively on notions of inclusivity may not be entirely convincing. The integrity of the Bamiyan Buddhas is twofold. First, although few if any practicing Buddhists live in Afghanistan, when the crisis began, protests in Sri Lanka and China would indicate that Buddhists in those places continue to revere the statues for their religious meanings. Second, the Bamiyan Buddhas’ integrity involves their status as heritage objects for Afghans, a status upheld by previous Afghan governments and even initially the Taliban in 1999 (Harding 2001). Because the integrity of the Bamiyan Buddhas—as religious objects beyond Afghanistan, and as heritage objects within Afghanistan—would be fundamentally undermined by their destruction, the strongest ethical redoubt for the Taliban would be a convincing argument about “the good.” This argument would have to entail a compelling explanation about how people in the Bamiyan Valley, or in Afghanistan, as adherents of one strain of Islamic fundamentalism, needed to remove these sacrilegious objects in order for society to flourish. In addition to the difficulties of making such a case, defenders of the Taliban would have to explain how such destruction would not contravene a baseline standard of human dignity, as it seems that
such naked desolation (dynamiting the statues) menaces contemporary Buddhist adherents. It is difficult to see how archaeologists could be ethically neutral or more in this instance of heritage destruction.

Cosmopolitan Education

When children enter this world, do they begin learning of it first from the particular or the general? Sissela Bok (2002) offers the intuitive argument that humans build their identities from “part to whole,” naturally assembling their world from one’s kin to one’s community to one’s nation to our world.

Martha C. Nussbaum’s provocative response to this question is that these rings of association do shape how we see the world—and that children do naturally move from these rings of identity—but they begin with humanity. Nussbaum (2002b: 142) writes of how all babies begin their lives first as human beings: “Infants respond, innately, to the sight of a human face. A smile from a human being elicits a reactive smile, and there is reason to think this is an innate capacity of recognition.” It is only as the child grows that she begins to learn of particularities, that this person is her mother, that this land is her country, that this lexicon is her language. “All circles develop simultaneously, in a complex and interlacing movement,” Nussbaum (2002b: 143) posits. “But surely the outer circle is not the last to form. Long before children have any acquaintance with the idea of nation, or even of one specific religion, they know hunger and loneliness. Long before they encounter patriotism, they have probably encountered death. Long before ideology interferes, they know something of humanity.”

If it is true that humans know of humanity from their earliest experiences, then the field of archaeology has the potential to expand and deepen these understandings. As David Hansen (2007) suggests, a “cosmopolitan education” is one that inspires people to learn from every human contact they make and to not withdraw from what is merely different. This approach to pedagogy can lead to human solidarity and the understanding of how we are all each other’s relations. Critical explorations in human history and the explication of the relationship between material culture and humans in all times and places are ideal means of learning about similarities and difference among human societies. This realization should encourage cosmopolitan educators and philosophers to incorporate archaeological inquiry more fully into
their projects. And in turn, it should compel archaeologists to engage with their local communities as well as far beyond them. Archaeologists ought to remember that they are not only members of a profession and inhabitants of cities and countries; they are also citizens of the world.

Note

I undertook the writing of this chapter while I was a visiting scholar at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 2005–6; I gratefully acknowledge the support of the academy and the Harvard Humanities Center. I am also greatly indebted to Lynn Meskell for the invitation to participate in this volume and her continual encouragement of my research, as well as to several anonymous reviewers and my fellow visiting scholar, Sarah Song.