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Chapter 8

Enlightenment unrefined: Bentham’s realism and the analysis of beauty

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Introduction

Jeremy Bentham was born at a time when civil discourse on aesthetics and taste in Britain had begun to shift from the idea of beauty as a harmonious order that is perceived by an ‘inner sense’ of taste towards a more practical aesthetics appropriate to commercial society. This practical aesthetics exchanged fixed rules of art and taste for an analytical power that was attributed to the ‘verdicts of sentiment’ of critics of taste. Definitions of beauty began to focus on the possibility of achieving an unbiased and objective analysis of pleasurable sentiments.¹ Bentham’s challenge to aesthetics, which was aligned with his utilitarian ethics, was to reject both rules of taste and the powers of judgment accorded to the person of taste, and replace them with a predilection or disposition towards pleasure. For Bentham, pleasure is what explains human behaviour, not what needs to be explained. This approach took no account of critical judgments on what was ugly and what was beautiful, of the kind that could be used to construct general ‘agreements on the agreeable’. This makes Bentham difficult to include in narratives of British aesthetics – in Timothy M. Costelloe’s survey of British aesthetics ‘from Shaftesbury to Wittgenstein’, Bentham only rates a couple of mentions as the background to a discussion of the aesthetics of John Stuart Mill.² We are more familiar, however, with attacks on Bentham’s hedonic utilitarianism as a form of cultural barbarism, ranging from criticism by Thomas
Macaulay, Karl Marx and Matthew Arnold in the nineteenth century, to Roger Scruton in more recent times. In this chapter, I will argue that we should not rest content with Marx’s assertion that ‘the arch-philistine, Jeremy Bentham’ was the ‘heavy-footed oracle of the “common sense” of the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie’. Instead, I will define Bentham as someone who saw that a typically bourgeois, practical, empirical and experimental approach to the analysis of beauty would become mired in contradictions if it attempted to impose social norms that could separate the beautiful from the ugly.

In Bentham’s view, there was no reason whatsoever why a predilection towards pleasure would be guided by distinctions between the ugly and the beautiful. Moreover, he also favoured a social order that could make use of socially beneficial predilections and proclivities, which had always been regarded as inimical to impartial judgments of taste. Bentham took up the cudgels for empiricism by defining the social norms imposed by taste as a form of harmful blindness. As I have argued elsewhere, Bentham’s theory of language indicates that the turn towards the refined judgments of the critic of taste was not an embrace of empiricism but a rejection of it. In this chapter, I will show how Bentham’s *The Rationale of Reward* offers a counter-strategy that returns us to the empirical by allowing us to choose between refinement and utility, while also offering the chance for an enlightened exit from aristocratic modes of social life.

In what follows, I will begin by defining what my title refers to as ‘Bentham’s Realism’ as a means to establish his contribution to debates on aesthetics. I will show how Bentham’s criticisms of Claude Adrien Helvétius, Joseph Addison and David Hume, along with the analysis of taste and predilection in his manuscripts on sexuality, offer a thorough critique of those forms of practical aesthetics that advocated realism about the connections between beauty and human desire and emphasized the cultural power of the ordinary observer. I will then discuss Bentham’s own definition of cultural barbarism, through an analysis of his comments on what I define as the ‘centrally managed’ practical aesthetics of Helvétius. This is followed by an account of Bentham’s attack on Joseph Addison’s proposals for ‘self-management’ through the practice of taste. I will then turn to the question of how the emphasis on cultural observation in practical aesthetics placed the artist in a subordinate position to the spectator and the critic. In this regard, I will suggest that Bentham’s praise for William Hogarth opens up the possibility for a distinction between the ‘Addisonian’ Hogarth that is presented in his treatise on *The Analysis of Beauty* (1753) and
the ‘Benthamite’ Hogarth of the prints *Beer Street* and *Gin Lane* (1751) (Figures 8.1, 8.2).

**Figure 8.1:** William Hogarth (1697–1764), *Beer Street*, 1751.
Wiki/ Commons.

**Figure 8.2:** William Hogarth (1697–1764), *Gin Lane*, 1751.
Wiki/ Commons.
In these two prints, Hogarth anticipates Bentham’s position on aesthetics by ‘doubling down’ on realism, presenting a practical ethics that takes account of taste as inclination and predilection rather than self-management. In conclusion, I will comment on the display of Bentham’s auto-icon in the exhibition ‘Like Life’ at the Met Breuer Museum in New York in 2018, in order to suggest some lessons that the unrefined enlightenment of Bentham might have to offer for contemporary practices of cultural management and self-management.

Bentham’s realism

An otherwise favourable review of Jeremy Bentham’s book The Rationale of Reward in the Political Examiner of 30 May 1825 noted that the book had caused ‘a havock … in our predilections’ with its assertion that ‘Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music and poetry.’ In that same year, the journalist John Neal referred to the received opinion that Bentham’s followers were ‘a body of youthful conspirators against government, order and morality, the fine arts, and all the charities and sympathies and elegancies of life.’ The Rationale of Reward is the text most often cited by those who have accused Bentham of cultural barbarism, philistinism and a rejection of the finer things in life. It is, therefore, worth noting that The Rationale of Reward contains its own criticisms of utilitarian cultural barbarism. Bentham directs this criticism at Claude Adrien Helvétius’s assumptions concerning a form of utilitarian legislation in which beauty is offered as a reward for service to the state and through which the legislator is given power over the social distribution of pleasure. Bentham’s criticism of Helvétius is entirely consistent with his comments on push-pin and poetry in The Rationale of Reward, as well as his criticisms elsewhere in this text of the promotion of refinement of taste by Joseph Addison and David Hume. Bentham’s answer to Helvétius, Addison and Hume does not advocate a return to fixed rules of taste, but instead emphasizes a greater degree of realism, specifically the kind of realism about sexuality that Bentham sets out in detail in his manuscripts on ‘Sexual Irregularities’ of 1814–17. In these manuscripts, Bentham rejects any natural or assumed link between sexual pleasure and reproductive activity. Refusing to define sexuality by referring to a normal set of behaviours, aims and objects, means that Bentham at once includes sexual behaviour within a variety of human tastes and propensities and rejects the association of taste with refinement, claiming that ‘Taste for any object is an aptitude
or disposition to derive pleasure [from] that object." In a note added to this sentence in the manuscripts, Bentham added: 'Here give illustrations from other objects of taste – ex. gr. subjects of the fine arts.'

The ‘havock … in our predilections’ brought about by Bentham’s rejection of favoured objects of culture in his comments on push-pin and poetry should, therefore, be understood in relation to the realism about sexuality that is offered in ‘Of Sexual Irregularities’. In addition, Bentham’s views on sexuality and culture must be seen in relation to his condemnation of the potential for cultural barbarism in aesthetic realism. In The Rationale of Reward, this potential for barbarism is located in socially normative definitions of beauty, which are ‘centrally managed’ by Helvétius’s utilitarian legislator and ‘self-managed’ in the cultural choices of the refined spectator favoured by Addison and Hume. For Bentham, the central management of beauty described by Helvétius would be barbaric because it assumes that there can be state control over the allocation and social distribution of individual pleasure. The self-management of beauty advocated by Addison was also barbaric, because it asserted the authority of the person of refined taste to dismiss what was extravagant or absurd in the arts and to crush a variety of propensities and inclinations towards pleasure ‘under the strokes of his club’.

The connection that Bentham makes in ‘Of Sexual Irregularities’ between sexuality and taste also indicates why the need for the management of beauty arises within aesthetic realism. Once fixed rules of taste are abandoned in favour of the position of the ordinary observer, it is hubristic to assume that this observer will be the ideal conduit for a socially normative definition of beauty and the general ‘agreements on the agreeable’ that can provide the basis of a legislative science of taste. The potential for cultural barbarism that is inherent in the idea of the favoured observer of a socially normative idea of beauty finds its opposition in the idea of sexuality as a ‘sixth sense’ in ‘Of Sexual Irregularities’, where Bentham notes that, ‘Till of late years, the number of senses had by usage been fixt at five: of late years, a sense corresponding to and put in exercise by the act of sexuality has been added to the number.’ Bentham’s assertion that there is ‘a sense corresponding to and put in exercise by the act of sexuality’ implies that the gratification of sexual desire relies for its fulfilment on a specific type of observation that receives and responds to information about possible sources of sexual pleasure. The sociologist Niklas Luhmann has reminded us that we have forgotten the importance of sexuality as a form of social observation, through which the body ‘makes its own distinctions and decides whether or not to be sexually attracted. Observing this observer
leads us to ask whether or not it dutifully follows cultural imperatives, or whether there is unavoidable akrasia (lack of self-control), as the Greeks would have said, a lack of potestas in se ipsum (self-control) in humans and social systems. The argument that Luhmann makes here about sexual desire as an unruly observer of cultural imperatives was anticipated by Bentham’s inclusion of both ‘subjects of the fine arts’ and sexual acts under the general heading of taste as disposition and inclination. Bentham went further and argued that this ‘unruly’ observer of culture could, nonetheless, counteract the blindness of prejudices of taste and provide insights into social problems. An example of this is provided in ‘Of Sexual Irregularities’, when Bentham suggests that a suppressed aspect of Thomas Robert Malthus’s reasoning proves the propriety and ethical value of homosexuality as a check on over-population, ‘though his situation, in the double character of a Clergyman of the Established Church and an instructor of youth, does not admit of his proposing it, or directly advocating it’. When read together, The Rationale of Reward and ‘Of Sexual Irregularities’ disclose the fallibility of the idea that the analysis of pleasurable sentiments can be used to propose socially normative definitions of beauty. Rather than imposing a practical aesthetics based on reproductive sexuality, The Rationale of Reward and ‘Of Sexual Irregularities’ advocate utilitarian social practices that embrace a multitude of dispositions to derive pleasure.

Bentham on Helvétius

The Rationale of Reward emerged from manuscripts written between 1786 and 1787 when Bentham was staying with his brother Samuel in Russia. Bentham described it in a letter to George Wilson in 1787 as a work that ‘touches upon all the possible applications of the matter of reward, ordinary and extraordinary’. These manuscripts were later edited and published in French by Étienne Dumont in 1811 and translated into English by Richard Smith in 1825. Nonetheless, as Ross Harrison has pointed out, the long genesis of The Rationale of Reward gives it the character of a message from the eighteenth-century enlightenment that is received in the Britain of the Industrial Revolution. Part of this message is about barbarism, and is directed at Helvétius’s assumptions about the possibilities for utilitarian legislation. Bentham’s statement is worth quoting at length:
One word on the last article of reward – Pleasures. Punishment may be applied in all shapes to all persons. Pleasure, however, in the hands of the legislator, is not equally manageable: pleasure can be given only by giving the means by which it is purchased: that is to say, the matter of wealth which every one may employ in his own way. Among certain barbarous or half civilized nations, the services of their warriors have been rewarded by the favours of women. Helvétius appears to smile with approbation at this mode of exciting bravery. It was perhaps Montesquieù that led him into this error. In speaking of the Samnites, among whom the young man declared the most worthy selected whomsoever he pleased for his wife, he adds that this custom was calculated to produce most beneficial effects. Philosophers distinguished for their humanity; both of them good husbands and good fathers, both of them eloquent against slavery, how could they speak in praise of a law which supposes the slavery of the best half of the human species? How could they have forgotten that favours not preceded by an uncontrolled choice, and which the heart perhaps repelled with disgust, afforded the spectacle rather of the degradation of woman than the rewarding a hero? The warrior surrounded by palms of honour, could he descend to act the part of a ravisher? And if he disdained this barbarous right, was not his generosity a satire on the law?

Miriam Williford has argued that this passage shows that ‘Bentham in his enthusiasm for women’s rights even goes so far as to reprimand his mentor, Helvétius, and the customs Helvétius supported.’ While Bentham’s support for equality between the sexes is beyond doubt, what should be emphasized is that Bentham is also arguing against Helvétius’s idea of a utilitarian state, in which, for example, there could be a science of public taste that could be used to discover ‘the particular knowledge of what pleases the public in a certain nation’. The passage in Helvétius’s De l’esprit to which Bentham refers claims that, in general, virtues attended by the promise of sensual pleasure are those that are the most sought after. Helvétius offers martial virtue rewarded by female beauty as an example of this, using Montesquieu’s reference, in his De l’esprit des lois, to the ‘excellent’ custom of the Samnites, who begin by choosing a young man who embodies the fine qualities and services rendered to his country. This young man ‘took for his wife the daughter he desired … Love, beauty, chastity, virtue, birth, even wealth, all this was, so to speak, the dowry of virtue.’ There is debate as to whether Helvétius agreed with Montesquieu in this instance, but what is certain is that Helvétius’s
version of a practical aesthetics of state-managed taste depends on a social science of beauty. This science of beauty is not based on the rules of art, or even on the powers of the critic of taste, but on the efficacy of a manager/observer whose power is never revealed, but who can define what will be sought after in a particular cultural situation. What Helvétius’s utilitarianism cannot relinquish is the possibility of gaining access to knowledge concerning a normative definition of the beautiful. Bentham’s interest, in contrast, is in why the possibility of defining social standards of beauty vanishes when we examine our predilections. His response to Helvétius is to argue that pleasure, in the hands of the legislator, is not manageable and depends on an ‘uncontrolled choice’ in which what is desired is not determined by social identities and cultural mores but instead by stubborn dispositions and propensities to derive pleasure from a variety of objects and activities. In Bentham’s view, the assumption that reproductive sexuality can underpin cultural definitions of beauty and social mechanisms of reward is not tenable. The practical aesthetics of Helvétius gives power to a manager/observer who can discern the ways in which social standards of beauty determine norms of behaviour. As I have said, Bentham rejects the idea of such a privileged observer and puts a predilection or disposition in its place. Accordingly, Bentham’s idea of social observation, as it is expressed in the panopticon, links human predilections to an architectural mechanism, one in which power over others can only be established by using an apparatus for monitoring empirical differences. In his manuscripts on the panopticon, Bentham contrasts his inspection house with the Sicilian prison of ‘The Ear of Dionysus’, a cave whose structure, it was said, allowed the warder to hear what the prisoners were saying to each other and ‘pry into the secret recesses of the heart’. The structure of the panopticon prison, on the other hand, is designed solely for the monitoring of overt acts, a task that can be performed by anyone who has a predilection for it. Bentham asserts that the panopticon ‘will supply … the place of that great and constant fund of entertainment to the sedentary and vacant in towns – the looking out of the window’. Putting curiosity to use within the social apparatus of the panopticon is a very different matter from assuming that a normative idea of beauty can be used as a mechanism of social coercion. In fact, Bentham opposed a utilitarian ethics of social observation to normative ideas of beauty. In a discussion of the personal taste of legislators in his manuscripts on ‘On the Influence of Time and Place in Matters of Legislation’, Bentham introduces the anecdote of a surgeon who cuts off the one remaining healthy finger on a patient’s damaged hand for aesthetic reasons, ‘because it would have looked
ridiculous'. In this example, aesthetics is used as the means to exert power over others but proves to be a very poor guide to ethical action. The utilitarian alternative is to be found in the panopticon hospital, where the surgeons ‘might with the least trouble possible watch as much as they chose to watch, the progress of the disease, and the influence of the remedy’. The apparatus of the panopticon hospital locates social power within the activity of inspection, but only insofar as this contributes to utility. This is why Michel Foucault’s description of the panopticon as a disciplinary mechanism is tendentious: it makes Bentham’s hedonic utilitarianism identical with the disciplining of bodies, an assumption that is contradicted by Bentham’s comments on warriors rewarded by the favours of women. The panopticon is not built around the power of an individual subject to classify what it observes, as Foucault suggests. Instead, the structure of this ‘simple idea in Architecture’ means that the actions of both the observing subject and the subject who is being observed are subsumed within a particular social task of inspection (penal, medical, pedagogic, etc.) that can contribute to general utility. A present-day equivalent of the actual distribution of social power in the structure of the panopticon hospital can be found in the detection of eye diseases, where monitoring by artificial intelligence is now superior to the scrutiny of human specialists. If we can understand how, in principle, the apparatus of the panopticon hospital might correct the point of view of the surgeon who cut off the healthy finger and thus alter his conception of ‘the good’, we can also understand why Bentham used a demand for utility to raise the stakes to the point where the possibility of cultural barbarism is revealed.

**Bentham on Addison**

In his manuscripts on the panopticon, Bentham recommends his inspection house to Joseph Addison as a means for monitoring the virginity of young ladies and to Claude Adrien Helvétius as a means of testing his theory that ‘anybody may be taught anything, one person as well as another’. Bentham’s intention is partly satirical and partly serious. It is satirical because these offers to Addison and Helvétius are among several suggested applications of the panopticon apparatus that also include a solution to a fictional situation that is encountered in Cervantes’ *Don Quixote*. His intention is also serious, because the purpose of Bentham’s satire is to point out the precision and ‘sharpness’ of the panopticon as an apparatus for monitoring overt behaviour.
Bentham’s offer of his inspection-house to ‘the grave and moral Addison’ relates to Bentham’s half-remembered reference to ‘a contrivance for trying virginity by means of lions’ that was discussed by Addison in *The Spectator.* The important distinction here is between Addison’s idea of morality and Bentham’s. As I have mentioned, where Helvétius offers a utilitarian, ‘centrally managed’ practical aesthetics, Addison proposes a means for ‘self-management’ through the practice of taste. In Bentham’s view, both Helvétius and Addison are at fault for promoting socially normative definitions of the beautiful that cause harm to others. This was not how Addison saw it; for him, the power of being able to discover one’s own reasons for finding something pleasing or beautiful carried moral force, because it meant that the subjects of commercial society became the guarantors of their own happiness, rather than locating this happiness within the seductions of the external world. In Addison’s writing on taste in *The Spectator* between 1711 and 1714, we can see the articulation of a specific ethical problem – how is a person with weak social connections to make their way in the world without losing their integrity by doing so? Addison’s practical aesthetic solution was to exchange the contingent and therefore dangerous pleasures of the world for the structured and controlled pleasures of good taste and good judgment. What is distinctive about this solution is that, on the one hand, it unites all mankind on the ground of ordinary perception and, on the other, it divides mankind into those who can learn to rely on the pleasures of taste and those who are content with the pleasures of the world. It also gives a very specific social role to the arts. For Addison, his new conception of taste could be used to oppose sectarian rules of art; in his words, ‘A man of an ordinary Ear is a judge whether a Passion is express’d in Proper sounds, and whether the Melody of those Sounds be more or less pleasing.’ This sets up an opposition between the true social standard of judgment offered by a ‘man of an ordinary Ear’ and the false social standard offered by the public appetite for certain kinds of music. It also offered a means to distinguish bad taste from good taste. Bad taste was demonstrated in the cultural choices of those who, for example, were not actively developing their ‘ordinary Ear’ to judge ‘whether a Passion is express’d in Proper sounds’ and who were therefore passively content with all that was extravagant, childish and absurd in the performing arts. In this way, the connoisseur who trains himself to recognize the particular qualities of an object of art is challenged by the Addisonian person of taste who uses objects of art to train his own perception. Good taste would triumph, Addison thought, if public taste stopped bowing to the arbitrary rules of art and art started
accommodating itself to the rationale provided by ‘the general Sense and 
Taste of Mankind’:

Musick, Architecture, and Painting, as well as Poetry, and Oratory, 
are to deduce their Laws and Rules from the general Sense and Taste 
of Mankind, and not from the Principles of those Arts themselves; 
or, in other Words, the Taste is not to conform to the Art, but the Art 
to the Taste.²⁷

In opposing Addison, Bentham’s focus was on the social consequences 
that followed from the employment of an evaluation of pleasurable 
sentiments as the preferred means to distinguish good taste from bad 
taste. For Bentham, this way of establishing standards of taste meant that 
something that was previously an object of amusement and enjoyment 
for oneself or someone else could become an object of ridicule and 
contempt. While Addison’s version of enlightenment seems to open up a 
new horizon of liberty that places the sensibility of the ordinary spectator 
at the centre of events within the chaos of commercial society, Bentham 
shows how this reproduces the arbitrary violence of aristocratic privilege 
in new ways. Bentham’s alternative, which proceeds through utility, 
offers an unrefined enlightenment through which the social violence of 
refinement can be overcome. In The Rationale of Reward, Bentham first 
isolates the problems of Addison’s refined enlightenment in a discussion 
of the relationship of the fine arts to refined taste. He then frames the 
alternative of an unrefined enlightenment, by separating Addison’s 
aesthetic solution from his ethical problem and offering the possibility 
of a choice between Addisonian refinement and Benthamite utility. 
Bentham’s unrefined enlightenment does not follow Addison’s logic of 
rejecting the rules of art and replacing them with a refined sensibility. 
Instead, it seeks a point of refuge from that same refined sensibility, a 
position from which we can examine how the cultural value of refinement 
determines the social role of the arts. The problem is, to use Bentham’s 
words, how can we choose ‘A pure and simple amusement’? When ‘to be 
hard to please, and to have our happiness dependant on what is costly 
and complicated, shall be found to be advantageous’²⁸ The difficulty 
that Bentham faces in his endeavour to establish the terms of a utilitarian 
choice for a simple amusement, is that Addison’s elevation of a refined 
sensibility as the basis of the standard of taste claims to annex the very 
possibility of choice and judgment to itself. This ‘checkmate’ on alter-
natives to refinement is re-affirmed in Mill’s criticisms of Bentham’s 
apparent blindness to the opportunities of reading moral character
through judgments of taste, and Mill’s famous remarks on Socrates and the satisfied fool in his essay on ‘Utilitarianism’ of 1861, in which Socrates is given the power to evaluate whatever it is that the fool is satisfied with, while the fool is not accorded the same privilege.\textsuperscript{39}

Bentham’s solution to the ‘checkmate’ of good taste in The Rationale of Reward begins with his analysis of the relationship of the practice of art to the practice of taste. Bentham begins by describing an inseparable connection between ‘science’ which is defined as the knowledge of how to achieve certain goals within a field of human endeavour and ‘art’ which is defined as the process of acquiring this knowledge. Utility, then, enters the picture as the basis on which to divide the arts and sciences according to how they contribute to the happiness of society. One half of the divide is occupied by the arts and sciences of utility, such as medicine and legislation, and the other half by the arts and sciences of amusement and curiosity. Here we need to focus on the manner in which an initial alignment of theory with practice is followed by a division of the arts and sciences according to how they contribute to the happiness of society. Bentham assembles the fine arts under a single category of ‘arts and sciences of amusement’ in which he includes music, poetry, painting, sculpture, architecture, and ornamental gardening. He also draws attention to a paradox by pointing out that the fine arts are sources of amusement which also have the potential to deprive others of the sources of their amusement. He argues that on the terms set by critics of taste such as Joseph Addison and David Hume, the fine arts please only those refined individuals who are difficult to please and who can only obtain their pleasure through cultivating antipathy towards the pleasures of others, thus effecting a social separation between the pleasures of taste and the pleasures of the world.

Bentham then shows us an exit from the horizon of judgment set by Addison’s ‘general Sense and Taste of mankind’. To do this, Bentham has to demonstrate that we can make an enlightened, empirical choice between refinement and utility that steers clear of social and cultural norms, in the face of Addison’s claim that ‘the general Sense and Taste of Mankind’ is the best foundation for a valid judgment. Addison’s view is that good taste can protect us from bad choices, but Bentham argues instead that what may look like a ‘bad choice’ can protect us from social mischief. To achieve this goal, Bentham alters the relationship between ethics and aesthetics within an Addisonian idea of cultural value. He begins by isolating a social problem of choice, by observing that, insofar as the fine arts have become the vehicles of a refined sensibility, they please those that are hard to please. Bentham then shows us how we can
mark out the route to an enlightened choice between refinement and utility, in the face of the claim that refinement is the only route to a valid judgment. He achieves this by reframing a choice between a ‘high status’ pleasure (The Iliad) and a ‘low status’ pleasure (solitaire) as a choice between refinement and utility. Bentham begins by outlining a utilitarian position on whether a statesman should play solitaire or play cards in company. He notes that while the statesman can play cards in company all night, playing solitaire is frowned upon, even though, as Bentham says, ‘how incomparably superior is this solitary game to many social games, so often anti-social in their consequences!’ Having identified an immediate problem of social isolation that accompanies the choice of a pure and simple amusement, he then introduces a further difficulty by saying, ‘How much better was this minister occupied, [at solitaire] than if, with the Iliad in his hand, he had stirred up within his heart the seeds of those ferocious passions which can only be gratified with tears and blood.’ What makes the choice of a pure or simple amusement so difficult to make is not just the stigma of social isolation, but the gratification afforded by the use of culture as a means of self-aggrandizement and self-justification. To surmount this difficulty, Bentham supplements this aesthetically determined choice between ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture (the Iliad or solitaire), with the third option of playing cards in company, which transforms it into a decision about utility versus refinement. When this third element is in place, it becomes clear that for the statesman to choose solitaire is simultaneously to choose the best option from the point of view of utility and the worst option from the point of view of a refined sensibility. For him to choose the Iliad is to occupy the opposite position; here we might refer to David Hume’s explanation, in his essay ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ of 1757, of how the Iliad can be used to demonstrate the niceties of a refined sensibility. It is one thing to claim, as Bentham frequently did, that we should accept that no form of gratification is placed higher than any other; it is quite another to dismantle the Addisonian distinction between the pleasures of taste and the pleasures of the world, which is what Bentham sets out to do in The Rationale of Reward. To achieve this goal, Bentham’s task is not to tell us to prefer push-pin to poetry, because that would simply replace one person’s privilege with another’s. Instead, he must first show us why choosing poetry over push-pin gives us access to the social power conferred by distinctions between good taste and bad taste, and then show us why employing these distinctions, within which gratification is present but disguised as refinement, is likely to be contrary to public utility. To challenge aesthetics, the very form of criticism had to
change, as is evident in Bentham’s comment that David Hume, despite ‘his proud and independent philosophy’, yielded to literary prejudice on the grounds of taste when he praised the Duke of Buckingham for satirizing the popular theatrical entertainments of his day. Bentham’s new utilitarian form of criticism would have to disturb the privileges of the observer on which practical aesthetics depended. It would be able to identify Addisonian aesthetics as a means of self-gratification that was not justified by its claims on analytical power or moral autonomy, but rather should be condemned for the manner in which it negated the simple pleasures of others.

The concept of an unrefined enlightenment relates to a key question that emerges in The Rationale of Reward, namely, how ‘without violence or injustice, hereditary nobility … [could be] … deprived of the greater part of its injurious prerogatives’. This sentence is part of a discussion of Catherine the Great’s use of meritocracy as a way to reform the Russian Civil Service. It is not a reference to the possibility of a violent overthrow of the nobility, but rather to the possibility of creating a meritocracy that does not reproduce the injurious prerogative of claiming to have been born to rule. The nearly forty-year gap between the origins of the text in Bentham’s visit to Russia and its English publication meant that Bentham had learnt something in the interim, as is demonstrated in his self-enlightening ‘Remarks by Mr Bentham’ in the preface to the 1825 edition, in which he qualifies his earlier favourable comments on Catherine the Great in the light of his new commitment to representative democracy. Nonetheless, the key question at stake is not the question of nobility itself but how to think about social value in an enlightened way. The opposition between refinement and utility in The Rationale of Reward describes an enlightenment project whose exit from aristocratic prerogatives could be accomplished either by the refined enlightenment of Addison, with its emphasis on culture and taste, or the unrefined enlightenment of Bentham, with its emphasis on utility as a means to identify a variety of routes to pleasure. From Addison’s point of view, on the other hand, there is only one exit – good taste is what allows us to separate the esteem we give someone because of their refined sensibility from the deference that might be due to a hereditary title.

**Bentham on Hogarth**

Bentham’s direct attack on Addison in The Rationale of Reward takes place on the terms set by an Addisonian worldview, in which the arts have
been co-opted to a project of refinement; however, I have also suggested that the manner in which Bentham frames a choice between refinement and utility showed that it was possible to develop a counter-strategy. In this part of the chapter, I will suggest what this counter-strategy implied for artists, by referring to Bentham’s praise for William Hogarth, whose illustrations to Samuel Butler’s *Hudibras* were displayed on the walls of Bentham’s home.44 Michael Quinn has noted that Bentham identifies Hogarth as someone who could promote healthy alternatives to socially mischievous desires that might otherwise warrant prohibition and punishment.45 Bentham wrote that, in Hogarth’s print *Beer Street* of 1751, everything has the aspect of health and jollity, while its companion print *Gin Lane* showed misery and disease, concluding, ‘That admirable artist was one of the best of moralists.’46 Bentham’s suggestion that Hogarth was on a par with the best of moralists suggests a very different social role for the arts than the one he outlines in *The Rationale of Reward*. It is worth noting, however, that David Bindman has argued that, ‘It seems beyond argument that Hogarth’s enterprise was Addisonian, in that his moral series implicitly advocate a middle way between vice and excessive virtue.’47 Other Hogarth scholars such as Ronald Paulson and David Solkin have given support to this idea of Hogarth as an Addisonian artist. Addison’s *Spectator* actually makes an appearance at the centre of one of Hogarth’s paintings, *The Edwards Hamilton Family of 1734* (Figure 8.3).

![The Edwards Hamilton Family on a Terrace, 1734](image)

**Figure 8.3:** William Hogarth (1697–1764), *The Edwards Hamilton Family on a Terrace*, 1734. Private collection, printed by kind permission of Patrick Goetelen.
At the request of his patron Mary Edwards, Hogarth painted her holding *The Spectator*, no. 580 of 13 August 1714, in which Addison discusses the omnipresence of the deity. *The Spectator*, no. 22 of 26 March 1711, which condemns ‘the false Taste of the Town’, may also have been one of the sources for Hogarth’s early print *The Bad Taste of the Town* of 1723 (Figure 8.4).

![Image of The Bad Taste of the Town](image_url)

**Figure 8.4:** William Hogarth (1697–1764), *The Bad Taste of the Town*, 1723–4.

Wiki/Commons

This print features an imaginary ‘Accademy of Art’ which is modelled on Burlington House, Piccadilly, the home of Richard Boyle, third earl of Burlington. This fantasy academy, whose doors are firmly shut, is shown to be failing to stem the general decay of public taste that is illustrated in the foreground, in the form of crowds being led towards the facile and shallow amusements of masquerades and Italian operas. In the middle of the image, plays written by Addison and other English dramatists such as Shakespeare, Congreve and Dryden, are being carted off in a wheelbarrow to be sold as wastepaper. Here Hogarth stays true to Addison’s injunction that ‘Taste is not to conform to the Art, but the Art to the Taste’ and the viewpoint of ‘Mr Spectator’ that separates the true pleasures of refined taste from the false pleasures of popular entertainment. Hogarth’s Addisonianism is carried to its furthest extent in his treatise *The Analysis of Beauty*, published in 1753, where Hogarth attempts a rational, impartial analysis of the truth of beauty, in order to assist the ordinary observer and defeat the artificial rules of art promoted
by connoisseurs of art. In this text, Hogarth followed Addison’s emphasis on the power of being able to discover one’s own reasons for finding something pleasing, as well as a concomitant rejection of arbitrary rules of art and a subsequent embrace of ‘the general Sense and Taste of mankind’. Hogarth’s wish to lend the privileges of the Addisonian critic of taste to anyone who would like to have them founders because his ‘Analysis of Beauty’ does not establish a universal definition of beauty so much as rehearse the social and cultural privileges associated with reproductive sexuality that British men already enjoyed. Hogarth tells us that, ‘if I have acquired anything in my way it has been wholy obtain’d by Observation’, which counteracts a ‘perversion of the sight’ in which ‘the eye may be subdued and forced into forming and disposing of objects even quite contrary to what it would naturally see them’. This allows him to declare that the elegant curved lines in the body of a living woman are more beautiful than a statue of Venus, and that the form of a woman’s body surpasses that of a man. The art historian Ronald Paulson saw Hogarth as pursuing a radical project in *The Analysis of Beauty*:

Hogarth is attempting to create an aesthetics that acknowledges that if we place a beautiful woman on a pedestal we will inevitably and appropriately desire her and may discover, moreover, that she is not strictly virtuous. This is an anti-aesthetics, or a practical aesthetics, in relation to the theoretically pure aesthetics of Shaftesbury, where the human body can only be beautiful if divorced from function, fitness and utility.

It can also be argued, however, that Hogarth’s attempt to ‘fix the fluctuating ideas of Taste’ by means of direct observation works against his own ambition for a rational and formal analysis. This is because it installs a preferred definition of beauty based on reproductive sexuality at the heart of that analysis. The effect of this is coercive – as Jenny Uglow has argued, Hogarth’s ‘real mistake … was to defy the tyranny of rules by inventing a new rule himself, and insisting that it was an absolute truth’. It can also be argued that Hogarth’s mistake in this instance is actually Addison’s mistake, insofar as the persuasive and liberal notion of the general sense and taste of mankind leads Hogarth to adopt not so much an anti-aesthetic but rather an anti-artistic position in *Analysis of Beauty*, which begins, somewhat paradoxically, by arguing vehemently against the notion that ‘painters and connoisseurs are the only competent judges’. Adam Komisaruk has argued that ‘Hogarth replaces one fetish (the classical simulacrum) with another (the living woman)’ while
emphasizing ‘how risky a strategy this inflated masculinism can be’. We can go further, and say how risky a strategy empiricism can be – the ambition for clear and unprejudiced vision leads from the classical statue to the living woman, but, in Bentham’s terms, a definition of beauty based on reproductive sexuality was not tenable, because sexuality was an inclination without a fixed object that ignored the distinction between the beautiful and the ugly.

In *Beer Street* and *Gin Lane*, on the other hand, we see Hogarth approaching empiricism in a different way, by outlining the harms that result from a predilection for gin, and the benefits that derive from substituting this predilection for the consumption of beer. The knowledge that is made available by comparing these two images does not require an analysis of beauty. The distinction between *Gin Lane* and *Beer Street* is not guided by a difference between the ugly and the beautiful, but rather by the difference between the pleasure of a predilection and the social harm it causes. Bentham also reminds us that a fixation on a specific object of desire is a work of the imagination, which must be understood in its particularity as an inclination towards pleasure, rather than reasoned out through an analysis of beauty:

A value of affection is rarely appreciated by third persons; it requires highly enlightened benevolence, a philosophy quite out of the common, to sympathize with tastes that we do not share. The Dutch florist, who exchanges a tulip bulb for its weight in gold, scoffs at the antiquary who gives a great price for a rusty lamp.

In his writing ‘Of Sexual Irregularities’, Bentham also makes the following observation:

In the case of the fine arts, when the object is of a complex nature, by being made to observe this or that circumstance that he had not observed before – this or that feature of defect or excellence which till now had passed unobserved – a man may now and then be made to change his taste. But in the field of appetite – of physical appetite – so simple is the object, no place can be found for any such discovery. The man to whom habit has rendered the use of tobacco a source of gratification, whether in the way of snuffing, smoking or mastication, by nothing that any one can say to him will he be convinced that that taste of his is a bad taste. Let him see that by taking it he inflicts annoyance on those in whose presence he is taking it, you may make him abstain from it, but never can you make him in his own mind acknowledge it to be a bad taste.
Hogarth’s *The Analysis of Beauty* asserts that it is the artificial rules of art and the verbiage of the connoisseur that prevents the ordinary spectator from seeing something ‘he had not observed before’, namely that the living woman is more beautiful than the statue. Bentham argues that this way of seeing things as they really are is self-defeating, because it narrows the field of vision to what we are ‘made to observe’ by the person of taste. The field of vision described by a search for things as they actually are can instead be occupied by any object that is a source of gratification, whether that is a tulip bulb, a rusty lamp or a tobacco pouch. In *Gin Lane* and *Beer Street*, Hogarth made these kinds of objects the subject of his art. The distinction between the Addisonian and the Benthamite Hogarth that I have made in this chapter also shows us how we can begin to map out a conceptual distance between the role of art in affirming the social power of normative judgments on the beautiful, and a contrasting aim to define the social power of art by marking out its position in the world. Bentham does the latter when he defines Hogarth as an admirable artist who was also ‘one of the best of moralists’.

**Conclusion: An unrefined enlightenment**

If enlightenment, broadly speaking, means freedom from tutelage, from being told what to think or how to behave by someone else and gaining freedom from prejudice and superstition, what is an ‘unrefined’ enlightenment? It is enlightenment won in a battle against refinement, a battle that Jeremy Bentham conducted throughout his life. In this chapter, I have argued that, taken together, *The Rationale of Reward* and ‘Of Sexual Irregularities’ show us that, once we have embraced an empirical attitude to aesthetics, the agreements on the agreeable that are required by refined taste are unstable. We have to name what is actually barbaric, such as rewarding warriors with women, rather than concerning ourselves with a dubious bid for civilization by naming what is in ‘bad taste’. I have also given an account of the enlightened exit from aristocratic forms of social life that Bentham describes in *The Rationale of Reward*, and contrasted Bentham’s approach with the practical aesthetics of Addison and Hume, who see the esteem we give someone because of their refined sensibility as the enlightened alternative to the deference that might be due to a hereditary title. The time that has elapsed from the end of the ‘long eighteenth century’ to the beginning of the twenty-first century has sidelined Bentham’s challenge to aesthetics, while retaining an Addisonian emphasis on the privileges accorded to the ordinary
observer of culture, as well as versions of Helvétius’s ambition to obtain a controlling interest in socially normative definitions of the beautiful. When the award of the Nobel Prize in Literature to Bob Dylan in 2016 challenged elitist cultural distinctions of the kind that would separate Bob Dylan from John Keats, it thereby affirmed the cultural status of the ordinary observer within judgements of taste, over and above the interests of literary cliques. However, as was the case with Hogarth’s The Analysis of Beauty, the cultural status accorded to the ordinary observer could be more precisely defined as the restatement of existing privileges accorded to a particular social group. As one journalist put it, giving the Nobel Prize to Bob Dylan was actually an indication of ‘prevailing educated taste among Swedish Baby Boomers’. It is also worth noting that when cultural institutions do question the logic of taste, they do this on the ground Joseph Addison chose for his new conception of the social role of the arts, namely the importance of everyday experience to the definition of cultural value. To give an example, Alistair Hudson, during his tenure as director of Middlesbrough Institute of Modern Art (2014–17), declared it his intention to make the museum the sum of the activity of all of its users. However, this attempt to substitute community values and civic value for aesthetic value is not what Jeremy Bentham was concerned with. He was not interested in the question of what counts as cultural value, but rather in the more fundamental question of whether culture has any value at all to a project of enlightenment. For Bentham, the answer to this question turned on the issue of a change in the social meaning of taste from enjoyment to refinement. He opposed this turn from enjoyment to refinement by showing that the ambition to obtain knowledge about the beautiful becomes irrelevant when we examine our predilections.

An opportunity to observe a contrast between Bentham’s unrefined enlightenment and current relationships between the ‘central management’ and ‘self-management’ of culture was provided by the display of Bentham’s auto-icon in a major art exhibition Like Life: Sculpture, Color and the Body (1300–Now), curated by Luke Syson and Sheena Wagstaff, which ran from 21 March to 22 July 2018 at the Met Breuer museum in New York. While Bentham’s auto-icon has been the subject of artworks by Marcel Broodthaers and Luc Tuymans, in this exhibition it was being used as part of an exercise in practical aesthetics that defined realism in sculpture, using objects from different eras that were more or less ‘Like Life’, ranging from Duane Hanson’s sculpture ‘Housepainter I’ (1984) that might easily be mistaken for a living person, to Charles Ray’s ‘Aluminum Girl’ (2003), an all-white three-quarters
sized female nude that juxtaposes extreme representational detail with classical conventions of sculpture. Comments on the auto-icon in the exhibition catalogue placed it in the cross-hairs of a debate on the relationship between art and verisimilitude, noting that the wax head of Bentham (by Jacques Talrich, a French military surgeon, later anatomical wax modeller for the Faculté de Médecine in Paris) ‘combines the conventions of portraiture and the acute realism available through wax modelling’.61

In her essay in the catalogue for ‘Like Life’, the exhibition’s co-curator Sheena Wagstaff referred to the ‘aesthetic shock’ that was brought about by the discovery of the polychrome characteristics of classical sculpture, which signalled the literal presence of the body in the realm of art. If the intention of the curators of ‘Like Life’ had been to challenge our understanding of sculpture by including Bentham’s auto-icon alongside Duane Hanson, Charles Ray and a copy of Philippe Curtius’s mechanical waxwork Sleeping Beauty (1765, remade 1989) loaned from Madame Tussauds, it seems to have worked. In The New York Review of Books, James Fenton argued that the exhibition had succeeded in drawing our attention to ‘a kind of perceptual trick played on us by the history of taste’62 in which any sculpture that is coloured is perceived to have lower cultural value. This did not, however, make everyone entirely comfortable with what was on display – in a review for The New Yorker, Peter Schjeldahl said that he was ‘torn between praising it [the exhibition] as visionary … and reporting it as a mugging to the taste police’.63 Another review by Ben Davis on Artnet went so far as to suggest that the exhibition was courting a new kind of taste based on a much older model of the ‘Wunderkammer’ or cabinet of curiosities: “The sensibility proposed by “Like Life” is a taste for the Curious – or whatever you call the thrill you get from seeing philosopher Jeremy Bentham’s preserved corpse, propped up in a glass box.”64 ‘This last comment on the ‘Like Life’ exhibition indicates the necessity of more clearly identifying Bentham’s challenge to aesthetics, the nature of his commitment to realism and his opposition to distinctions of taste. This challenge is not about broadening our cultural outlook, so that the thrill of seeing Bentham propped up in a glass box can bring us from the specialized aesthetic realms of the terror of the sublime or the refined sensibility of taste to arrive at mere goggle-eyed curiosity. We have to go one step further and put curiosity in the service of utility. Within the panopticon, as Bentham remarks, curiosity can be put to good use, because the structure of the apparatus means that an inclination towards looking out of the window is necessarily transformed into the business of inspection. Outside the panopticon, however, if you are feeling curious
about Bentham’s preserved corpse in an exhibition, what you are seeing is Bentham as he appears within your personal cultural itinerary. Within this self-managed cultural itinerary, your commitment to the value of seeing things in your own way is very clear, and, moreover, is supported by the central management and the curatorial agency of an exhibition such as ‘Like Life’. Your relationship to utility, however, is obscure. Staring at Bentham’s auto-icon in an exhibition would tell you very little about Bentham’s challenge to the arts. On the other hand, noticing how, in *Gin Lane* and *Beer Street*, Hogarth makes predilection both the subject of his art and an anchor for the social role of art in general tells you what this challenge is all about.

**Notes**

1 One place from which to chart this shift of emphasis in British aesthetics is through the influence of the Abbé Dubos, whose *Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et sur la peinture*, first published in 1719, was acknowledged by David Hume. See Jones, 1982, 97, where Jones argues for the debt Hume’s essays on taste owe to Dubos: ‘[for Dubos] the role of reason is to justify the verdict of sentiment by determining the causes of our pleasure; tasks that are properly undertaken by critics who engage in discussion and analysis’.


3 See Thomas Babington Macaulay’s comments on the dangers of cultural ‘levelling’ from Benthamism in his article ‘Mill’s Essay on Government: Utilitarian Logic and Politics’, (Macaulay, 1829, 159–89, 183) ‘The civilized part of the world has now nothing to fear from the hostility of savage nations. … But is it possible that institutions may be established which, without the help of earthquake, of famine, of pestilence, or of the foreign sword, may undo the work of so many ages of wisdom and glory, and gradually sweep away taste, literature, science, commerce, manufactures, everything but the rude arts necessary to the support of animal life?’

4 See Arnold, 1869, 28–9: ‘So, after hearing Bentham cried loudly up as the renovator of modern society, and Bentham’s mind and ideas proposed as the rulers of our future, I open the *Deontology*. There I read: “While Xenophon was writing his history and Euclid teaching geometry, Socrates and Plato were talking nonsense under pretence of talking wisdom and morality. This morality of theirs consisted in words; this wisdom of theirs was the denial of matters known to every man’s experience.” From the moment of reading that, I am delivered from the bondage of Bentham! the fanaticism of his adherents can touch me no longer; I feel the inadequacy of his mind and ideas for being the rule of human society, for perfection.’


7 Malcolm Quinn, 2017.

8 Anon, 1825, 335–6, 336.

9 John Neal, 1830, 44. For an assessment of Neal as a fellow traveller of the Benthamites, see King, 1966, 47–65.

10 Bentham, ed. Schofield et al., 2014.


12 Bentham, ed. Schofield et al., 2014, 4n.

13 Bentham, 1825, 209.

Ibid. See also n. 1, 51, where it is suggested that the idea of sexual attraction as a sixth sense may have arisen with the Comte de Buffon’s description of sexuality as a sense that, although intermittent, commands the others senses when it acts.


Bentham, ed. Schofield et al., 2014, 142.


Harrison, 1983, 5.

Bentham, 1825, 17–18.


Helvétius, 1825, 413.

Montesquieu, 1771, 141.

See Montesquieu, 1795, Vol. 2, Book 7, Chapter 16, 167–8: ‘Les Samnites avaient une coutume, qui, dans une petite république, et sur-tout dans la situation où étoit la leur, devoit produire d’admirables effets. On assembloit tous les jeunes gens, et on les jugeoit. Celui qui étoit déclaré le meilleur de tous, prenoit pour sa femme la fille qu’il vouloit ; celui qui avoit les suffrages après lui choisissoit encore ; et ainsi de suite. Il étoit admirable de ne regarder entre les biens des garçons que les belles qualités & les services rendus à la patrie. Celui qui étoit le plus riche de ces sortes de biens choisissoit une fille dans toute la nation. L’amour, la beauté, la chasteté, la vertu, la naissance, les richesses même, tout cela étoit, pour ainsi dire, la dot de la vertu. Il seroit difficile d’imaginer une récompense plus noble, plus grande, moins à charge à un petit état, plus capable d’agir sur l’un & l’autre sexe.’ Helvétius’s ostensible note on this passage (n. 1, 167) is ‘Are women a flock without liberty and inclination?’ which has led David Wootton to argue that ‘If this is indeed Helvetius, then D. W. Smith (the doyen of Helvetius scholarship) is mistaken to follow Diderot in thinking Helvetius’s ‘sexual ethics were advocated entirely from the male point of view’, although De l’esprit and De l’homme are open to this interpretation.’ Wootton, 2000, 307–36, 314.

Helvétius argues that, while taste can be defined as what merits the esteem of mankind, there is no universal taste common to all ages and countries. He proposes that taste as ‘the more particular knowledge of what pleases the public in a certain nation’ can be understood in two ways – as an informal daily practice that enables anyone to judge the merits of a particular work such as a theatrical production, and as a rational taste, grounded in ‘long study both of the public taste, and of the art or science in which a person pretends to the title of a man of taste’. Helvétius, 1825, 413.


Bowring, 1843, 181.


See Foucault, trans. Sheridan, 1975, 199–200: ‘All the mechanisms of power which, even today, are disposed around the abnormal individual, to brand him and to alter him, are composed of those two forms [the binary division of a population and the differential distribution of individuals] from which they distantly derive. Bentham’s Panopticon is the architectural figure of this composition.’

Foucault, trans. Sheridan, 1975, 203. Foucault compares Bentham’s panopticon with the centralized structure of Louis Le Vau’s (1612–70) menagerie at Versailles, an octagonal central pavilion with a viewing balcony, surrounded by seven enclosures: ‘one finds in the programme of the Panopticon a similar concern with individualizing observation, with characterisation and classification, with the analytical arrangement of space.’


Today Online, 2018.


Bentham, ed. Božović, 1995, 90. Bentham notes that he has forgotten whether this reference occurs in The Spectator or the Tatler. The reference is to ‘the received Opinion, that a Lion will not hurt a Virgin’ in The Spectator, no. 13, 15 March 1711.

Addison, The Spectator, no. 29, 3 April 1711.

Addison, The Spectator, no. 29, 3 April 1711.


Mill, 1863, 14.

41 Bentham, 1825.
42 Bentham, 1825, 209.
43 Bentham, 1825, 9.
44 See Wheatley, ed. Grint, 2015, 10: ‘My bed room is a small oblong chamber; the bed such a one as we used to call a crib, at school. One side of this my room is filled up with bundles of printed papers. On the walls are hung portraits of Shakespear, Milton, Dryden, Gower, Cowley, Ben Jonson, and Waller, also the plates of Hogarth’s Hudibras.’
45 Michael Quinn, 2017, 1, 11–33, 28.
46 UC lxxxvii. 66.
47 Bindman, 1997.
56 See Fry, 1934, 41–2: ‘one cannot help wishing that he [Hogarth] had paid more attention to cultivating his own very genuine gifts as a painter and less to improving other people. For I think his influence on British art has been bad upon the whole. It has tended to sanction a disparagement of painting as a pure art – has tended to make artists think that they must justify themselves by conveying valuable, or important, or moral ideas. … It has obscured the truth that art has its own specific function, that it conveys experiences that are sui generis, not to be defined or valued by anything outside – experiences which have immense, but quite inexplicable, value to those who are sensitive to them.’
58 Bentham, ed Schofield et al., 2014, 77.
61 Kumar, ed. Syson et al., 2018, 100–7, 105.
63 Schjeldahl, 2018.
64 Davis, 2018.
65 In his foreword to the catalogue, D.H. Weiss, President and CEO of The Metropolitan Museum of Art says ‘Like Life: Sculpture, Color, and The Body focuses on sculptures from the fourteenth century to the present, juxtaposing objects from different eras to test our preconceptions about the human form, the canon of Western art, and our understanding of ourselves.’ (Kumar, 2018, p. vi.)

References

Addison, J. The Spectator, no. 13, 15 March 1711.
Addison, J. The Spectator, no. 29, 3 April 1711.


