Chapter 1

The Epicurean universe of Jeremy Bentham: Taste, beauty and reality

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1. *Fountain* and the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England

The French artist Marcel Duchamp (1887–1968) is credited with creating the first ‘ready-made’, that is a manufactured, mass-produced object, with or without some degree of modification, presented as an artwork. An early example was *Fountain*, an upturned, pseudonymously signed urinal that he submitted for exhibition in New York in 1917, and which is one of the best known and most controversial artworks of the twentieth century.¹ According to the French philosopher Michel Onfray, for instance, *Fountain* ‘demolished Kant’s *Critique of Practical Reason* and thus Platonism in art and elsewhere. More than twenty centuries of classical theory about Beauty went up in smoke in the blink of an eye.’² In an interview given in or around 1961, Duchamp distinguished ready-mades from *objets trouvés* or ‘found objects’, such as pebbles or feathers. He stated that ‘the so-called “found object” is completely directed by personal taste’ that ‘decides that this is a beautiful object and is unique’, whereas his own ready-mades could be and often were ‘duplicated, thus avoiding the cult of uniqueness, of art with a capital “A.”’ He continued: ‘I consider taste – bad or good – the greatest enemy of art. In the case of the ready-mades, I tried to remain aloof from personal taste and to be fully conscious of the problem.’ He had produced his ready-mades in small numbers, since to produce a large number ‘would
immediately produce a personal taste’, while he had added ‘as little as possible’ to them in order to ‘try to keep them pure’. Duchamp, however, was aware that he had not necessarily provided a satisfactory solution to the problem of taste, ‘because many people can prove I’m wrong by merely pointing out that I choose one object rather than another and thus impose something of my own personal taste’.³

Michel Onfray, as we have seen, argues that Duchamp’s *Fountain* represents the point at which the Platonic ideal of beauty was shown to be a sham, though Duchamp himself was less confident that he had delivered the fatal blow against the notion of taste that he had hoped to deliver. It might be argued, however, that Duchamp’s aim had been accomplished a century and a half earlier by Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), whose objection to the notion of taste can be traced back to his reluctance, at the age of 16 in 1764, to subscribe to the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England in order to take his Bachelor of Arts degree at the University of Oxford. Fifty years later in *Church-of-Englandism* he admitted that he still felt ‘shame’ at ‘the sin of [his] boyhood’, and that confessing his disbelief was an ‘expiation; an atonement for that early sin’.⁴ Bentham explained that he had his doubts about the truth of the Articles. He was sent, together with some other students, to a Fellow of his College whose role was to assuage such doubts, and who told them that it was not for ‘uninformed youths … to presume to set up [their] private judgments against a public one, formed by some of the holiest, as well as best and wisest men that ever lived’. In the end, Bentham subscribed because he did not want to disappoint his father Jeremiah, who had earmarked him for a career in the law in the hope that he would rise to its very eminence as Lord Chancellor of England.⁵ It is remarkable, given his background, that Bentham had any doubts at all. Both of his grandmothers’ fathers had been Church-of-England clergymen.⁶ His father Jeremiah, himself a staunch Church-of-England man, was a lawyer in the City of London who had acquired an extensive property portfolio and had bought a house in Queen’s Square Place, Westminster with an enormous garden, adjacent to St James’s Park, which Jeremy eventually inherited in 1792. Aged seven, Jeremy was sent to Westminster School, where he wrote devotional Latin verses on Christ’s passion.⁷ Aged 12, he was sent to the Tory University of Oxford, where he dutifully attended his classes and translated Cicero’s *Tusculan Disputations* at the command of his father.⁸ He was, therefore, immersed into the culture of a politically conservative, religiously orthodox, financially privileged, upper-middle class and by all expectations upwardly mobile metropolitan family (his step-brother did eventually become a peer of the realm).⁹ How could he, by the age
of 16, have become sceptical about religion, and resent for the rest of his life being forced to subscribe to the Thirty-nine Articles? There is a hint in young Jeremy’s translation of the *Tusculan Disputations* that not everything was as it should be. To the passage that he had translated as, ‘for tho’ Plato were to give no reason for his Assertions (see what deference I pay him) he would even bear me down by his Authority’, Bentham added a footnote for his father:

N.B. a very poor reason, truly! That Tully should believe any thing that Plato said, merely because he said it, is, in my Opinion, as absurd as if I were to believe the Soul was mortal, merely because you said it … .

One wonders whether the comment raised concerns in Jeremiah’s mind about his son’s orthodoxy.

Bentham is, of course, noted for his utilitarianism, but, according to his own account, he did not formulate his version of the principle of utility until 1769 – hence his unwillingness to subscribe to the Thirty-nine Articles could not have been based upon any explicitly utilitarian consideration. His unwillingness arose from doubts about the truth of the Articles, and his resentment concerned the compromise, as he saw it, of his intellectual integrity – that is, being forced to lie. Bentham emphasized the point when he explained that, while attending William Blackstone’s lectures in 1764, he had been concerned about the fictions – in other words, the lies, the untruths – that he had detected in Blackstone’s account of English law.

The question, therefore, turns on the young Bentham’s understanding of truth. While he gives us no contemporary account, there are plausible grounds for reading back his view of truth from his later writings on ontology and epistemology in order to appreciate the nature of his doubts about the Thirty-nine Articles. Having said that, we need not read back too far. Although his most detailed writings on these subjects date from the mid-1810s, he had formulated his central ideas by the early to mid-1770s. In short, he argued that the only thing that had any real existence was the ‘substance’ that formed the physical universe, that any proposition that made any claim grounded ultimately on a non-physical entity was nonsensical, and that any claim that misrepresented events or states of affairs in the physical world was untrue. He presumably held this view, or had more than an inkling of it, by the time that he subscribed to the Thirty-nine Articles.
It seems plausible to assume that, at some point during his studies at Oxford, he had discovered Epicurus. He may have been attracted to Epicureanism through the account, albeit not a sympathetic one, that he had found in Cicero’s *Tusculan Disputations*. It is worth remembering that he had always been a voracious reader, and so he may have gone on to study more recent and contemporary writers who belonged to the Epicurean tradition. Given what Bentham says later about his formative influences, one of these Epicurean writers, and perhaps the most important, was the French materialist philosopher Claude Adrien Helvétius. There is no evidence, however, that Bentham had read Helvétius’s *De l’esprit* before subscribing to the Thirty-nine Articles: according to Bentham’s later reminiscences (not always totally reliable), a copy ‘fell into [his] hands’ when he was aged 20. At some point he read Lucretius’s *On the Nature of Things* (*De Rerum Natura*), which contains the most detailed surviving account of Epicurus’s philosophy. One might speculate that it was his profound fear of ghosts, instilled into him at a young age by mischievous servants, that made a materialist account of the universe attractive to him – if all that existed was the physical world, there were no spirits and hence no ghosts of which to be afraid.

There is no doubt that Bentham explicitly allied himself with the Epicurean tradition in opposition to the nonsense that he regarded as emanating from Plato and the Stoics. In an early manuscript from the mid-1770s, Bentham noted that he ‘had [the principle of utility] from Epicurus, from Carneades, from Horace, from Helvetius, from Beccaria’. In 1818 Bentham gave the title ‘The Epicureans the only philosophers deserving of the name’ to a proposed section of *Not Paul, but Jesus*, Vol. III. He began the section as follows:

From the days of their founder to the present, Epicurus and those who have discoursed and acted as he is said to have acted, constitute a standing but[t] to the invectives of hypocrisy and imbecillity, whether cloathed in the mantle of philosophy or that of religion.

They have, in a word, been so many utilitarians, or rather non-ascetics: no where have they looked for happiness but where it was to be found …

Where they looked for it, of course, was in pleasure. In a similar vein, in a note at the head of a manuscript written for the same essay, he wrote: ‘Limitations [to the pursuit of pleasure] are those dictated by 1. prudence. 2. probity. 3. benevolence. *Conceditur* this Epicureanism:
but Stoicism is either folly or hypocrisy. In *Deontology*, his extensive work on ethics dating from the mid-1810s, at the start of a chapter discussing the *summum bonum* of the ancient philosophers, Bentham noted: ‘*Summum bonum* consummate nonsense’ and ‘Anti-Epicureans quarrellers with their bread & butter.’ The problem was that neither Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, nor any of their disciples, nor the Stoics, having rejected pleasure, could agree what the *summum bonum* consisted in or even say anything intelligible about it. Going on to condemn Socrates and Plato for ‘talking nonsense, on pretence of teaching morality and wisdom’, he described how the people in general, ‘who were content with reaping pleasures under the guidance of common sense’, were for that very reason ‘considered [by them] as ignorant and as composing the vulgar herd’. If the Platonists and Stoics were wrong, ‘how must it have been’, asked Bentham ironically, ‘with those sensualists, with those hogs, the Epicureans?’ According to the account in *Ethices Compendium in usum juventutis academicae*, the elementary textbook on moral philosophy used by undergraduates at Oxford and which Bentham himself had studied, the Epicureans, he noted, ‘Hogs as they were’, had looked for the *summum bonum* in bodily pleasure. Bentham doubted, however, whether the Epicureans had looked for a *summum bonum* at all, whether they believed in the existence of such a thing, and whether ‘in their account of pleasure, pleasure in every shape that was not bodily should have been omitted’. The Epicureans, he continued, could not have been unaware, since everyone knew it, that some pleasures had their ‘seat’ in the mind, while others had their ‘seat’ in the body. The author of *Ethices Compendium* had gone on to criticize the bodily pleasures on the grounds that they were ‘ignoble’, ‘short’, and ‘unsavoury’, and in this latter case gave rise to ‘blushes’. Bentham pointed out that the term ‘ignoble’ meant nothing, and in any case it was the mind that felt pleasure, whatever its ‘seat’, and not the body. If a pleasure was indeed of short duration, he asked, what did that matter? And finally, if the recollection of a pleasure taken in an ‘improper manner’ led to an ‘unsavoury’ recollection, what did that matter for a pleasure taken in a ‘proper manner’?

### 2. Bentham versus Kant

Whether Bentham was inspired by Epicurus or by some other sceptical writer, the moment when his scruples as a 16-year-old boy were brushed aside by the combined might of the University of Oxford and
the Church of England, seconded by the considerable weight of paternal authority, was arguably not only a seminal moment in his own life, but also a seminal moment in the history of Western philosophy and in the history of aesthetics. Recent works by Michel Onfray and Cathy Gere illustrate what is at stake. In *A Hedonist Manifesto*, Onfray characterizes the overwhelmingly dominant philosophical tradition in Western civilization as Platonic, Christian and Kantian. This tradition, accepted by the majority of contemporary philosophers, is characterized by the acceptance and celebration of a non-materialist universe that is superior to the physical universe that our bodies inhabit. Onfray points out that Plato has his forms, Christianity has its God and Kant has his ideals. A dualism is posited between the material and the ideal, the body and the spirit, phenomena and noumena, the descriptive and the prescriptive, with the latter elevated over the former. In short, Platonism, Christianity and Kantianism all posit a metaphysics that ascribes superiority to the ideal domain over the physical, to the other-worldly over the this-worldly, to the spirit over the body. Those Epicurean philosophers who have opposed the dominant tradition, including Bentham and John Stuart Mill, are branded as pigs. Yet their concern, states Onfray, was to deconstruct myths, to get rid of gods, to provide solutions for the actual world, and to value pleasure and the common good.

In relation to art and aesthetics, Onfray argues, as we have seen, that Marcel Duchamp’s *Fountain*, intended for exhibition in New York in 1917, was the point at which the dominant approach was exposed as nonsense. Having rejected the dominant Kantian world view, Onfray advocates ‘The Revolutionary Transformation of Individuals’, based to a significant extent on Benthamite utilitarianism. While generally admiring Karl Marx and Michel Foucault, Onfray criticizes them for doing much damage to Anglo-Saxon Utilitarianism. First, they harmed it for reasons surrounding the intellectual and political power struggles of their time. Second, they harmed it by promoting excessive specialization: Foucault’s sole focus on the panopticon, without concern for the project’s totality, inspired him to write foolish things about Bentham. Hedonist utilitarianism is much more than a grocer’s philosophy or the invention of modern totalitarianism! … It’s a funny kind of grocer who pushes for the decriminalization of homosexuality (*Essay on Pederasty*, 1785!), the rights of minorities (women and children), a dignified status for animals who were cruelly tortured as if by executioners, and a humanization of the conditions of incarceration in *Panopticon*
(1791). The supposed inventor of totalitarianism also wrote a catalog of the crimes committed by religion (*The Influence of Natural Religion Upon the Temporal Happiness of Mankind*, 1822), and called out the hypocrisy of politicians (*Book of Fallacies*, 1824). In *Deontology*, he subordinated politics to ethics; all hedonist politics is concerned with the greatest good for the greatest number. The goal remains valid.29

While some of the detail in this passage might be revised, and indeed a great deal added, Onfray has appreciated the radical challenge that Benthamism entails to the dominant Kantian world-view.

While Onfray praises Bentham for his Epicureanism, a far different assessment is offered by Cathy Gere in *Pain, Pleasure, and the Greater Good*. In her history of medical ethics, she allies herself with Onfray’s dominant tradition and contrasts Benthamite utilitarianism, with its Epicurean foundations in materialism and the sensations of pain and pleasure, with the notions of autonomy, transcendent human dignity, self-determination and free consent, which she associates with Kant and Christian humanitarianism. According to Gere, in *A Table of the Springs of Action* Bentham ‘established the framework that would unite medicine, utilitarianism and politics’ for 150 years,30 until ‘the decisive victory’ of patient autonomy over ‘medical utility’ at Robert Kennedy’s American Senate hearings into health care and human experimentation in 1973.31 ‘In place of tradition, sentiment and rights,’ notes Gere, ‘Bentham insisted on the brute physicality of pain and pleasure’ and thereby invented, without noticing it, a whole new discipline of ‘moral physiology’.32 The manipulation of human subjects by the application of pain and pleasure formed the basis of his proposed system of pauper panopticons. Taking particular exception to Bentham’s use of the treadmill (or the walking wheel, as she terms it), Gere contends that ‘the poor were to be manipulated in the spirit of training non-human animals’ – a project that was eventually realized in the laboratories of the twentieth-century behavioural psychologists, where oppressed classes, who were ‘deemed to have least to lose’, were sacrificed for the sake of the greater good.33 Hence, she draws a lineage from the utilitarianism of Bentham, through the deterministic and associationist psychological theories of James Mill and Edward Bain, to the twentieth-century behaviourists Edward Thorndike and B.F. Skinner. Echoing those who have linked utilitarianism with totalitarianism, she sees no essential moral distinction between fascist human experimentation in Hitler’s Germany
and American utilitarian medicine as practised in the years after the Second World War.34

Gere’s contempt for utilitarianism appears to be all the more bitter since, as she confesses, she had once been ‘a zealot of utility’, but had eventually abandoned it, describing it as a ‘delinquent … path’, after finding an ‘alternative, based on respect for others and self-respect’.35 She tells us that ‘utilitarianism can send scientists down the proverbial well-paved road to hell’, that utilitarianism constitutes ‘flagrant moral elitism’, that Bentham had ‘exposed the vein of moral nihilism in utilitarianism’, that Skinner was ‘[e]very bit as bumptious’ as Bentham, speaks of the ‘totalitarian/utilitarian error’, and refers to utilitarianism as being ‘like a greased pig’,36 thus invoking the traditional characterization of Epicureanism by its opponents. ‘The “concept of man” that stepped into the breach’ was ‘the vision of autonomy, dignity and freedom’ found in Kant’s moral philosophy. ‘The activists and reformers of the 1960s found that their disgust with the utilitarian calculus of human experimentation resonated precisely with [Kant’s] injunction that no rational being should be used as a means to an end.’ Kantianism encapsulated ‘the spirit of informed consent and the sanctity of autonomous decision making’.37 But the victory over medical utilitarianism in the 1970s did not prove to be the end of the problem, according to Gere. In the 1980s two new disciplines emerged – neuroeconomics and behavioural economics – both explicitly indebted to Bentham: ‘Unchained from the walking wheel of Bentham’s Panopticon, Epicurus has been set to work greasing the machinery of global capitalism.’38 There is, therefore, more work to be done, in Gere’s view, to oppose the re-emergence and resurgence of utilitarianism.

Gere relies on emotive language and on literary fiction (Mr Gradgrind et al.)39 as the basis for her condemnation of utilitarianism. A difficulty with her account is that she conflates the moral injunctions of the principle of utility with the psychological claim that sentient creatures are motivated by a desire for pleasure and an aversion to pain. Her assumption is that where there is experimentation that involves the investigation of pain and pleasure as stimuli to action, there also is utilitarianism. She states, for instance, that David Ferrier ‘turned … psychology into an experimental science, driving utilitarianism deep into the emergent discipline of neurology’, and that ‘Skinner’s mechanistic psychology more or less entailed extreme utilitarian ethics’.40 She admits, moreover, that most of the scientists who gave evidence at the Kennedy hearing in 1973 did not defend their practices on the grounds of utilitarianism,41 and even states that the physicians and researchers
who she condemns considered themselves as having ‘inalienable rights’ to promote the greater good, which is a Kantian and not a utilitarian justification, and which she might have acknowledged given that she is aware that Bentham branded notions of inalienable rights as nonsense.42

Gere does at least appreciate that animal experimentation would have ‘troubled’ Bentham,43 but points out that the logic of treating humans as animals was that, once animal experimentation had become acceptable, it was a short step to make human experimentation acceptable.44 One such experiment that Gere finds particularly obnoxious was Robert Heath’s anti-homosexual therapies, which were eventually discredited and replaced by an ‘ethic of choice and self-determination’.45 It need scarcely be said that Gere seems to be unaware of Bentham’s writings on sexual morality, containing his arguments in favour of sexual liberty and in particular the decriminalization of male same-sex relationships.46 There is, moreover, no antithesis between Bentham’s utilitarianism and the notion of consent.47 Bentham would, however, have objected to Kantian notions of ‘inalienable dignity’ and ‘autonomy’, and that every person had to be treated as an end in themselves and not as a means to an end,48 as being either nonsensical or trivial. In The Book of Fallacies, for instance, Bentham referred to the claim that ‘the end justifies the means’ as the ‘Atrocity-justifier’s argument’. His criticism had been sparked by a report in a newspaper that the Peterloo Massacre of 16 August 1819 (the means) had been justified by the need to rescue the country from seditious meetings (the end). The danger and absurdity lay in treating some objective as an end and thereby justifying the obtainment of that end at any cost. The end might, for instance, be the acquisition of a penny loaf. The goodness of the end was ‘indisputable’, but that did not mean that one was justified either in giving a pound for it or in getting it for nothing by cutting the baker’s throat. For Bentham, the good and evil associated with both the means and the end needed to be weighed against each other in order to decide whether an action was justified.49 Finally it seems to be without irony that Gere, in her ‘Afterword’, places some hope for the future of humanity in her own delight at encouraging a threatened species of butterfly to thrive in her Californian garden50 – Epicurus would have approved! Bentham, for his part, was not content merely to tend his own garden – though he did do that assiduously at Queen’s Square Place – but had a much broader ambition of tending everyone’s garden – of being, as his Guatemalan admirer José del Valle put it, the ‘legislator of the world’.51
3. Bentham’s critique of metaphysics

I have suggested above that Bentham found Epicureanism attractive because of its materialism and the associated rejection of any form of metaphysics. It is important, then, to explore how Bentham presented his own views in order to appreciate why he would have rejected any claim concerning the existence of a metaphysics of beauty, whatever form that metaphysics took, whether as a mathematical proportion and symmetry, a set of ideal forms or an inherent sense of the sublime and the beautiful akin to the notion of the moral sense. This brings us back to Bentham’s ontology and epistemology. A difficulty in addressing this topic is that, since the revival of Bentham scholarship in the 1960s, it has suffered from two related problems. The first is that insufficient attention has been given to Bentham’s ontology as the basis for his utilitarianism, and the second is that, where attention has been paid to it, fictions have often been confounded with fictitious entities. The confusion stems from Charles Kay Ogden’s edition of Bentham’s Theory of Fictions, published in 1932. The title seems to have been Ogden’s invention, while the content is arranged under main headings that Ogden also devised. Ogden’s text is not one that Bentham himself organized, but consists in a compilation containing the whole of ‘A Fragment on Ontology’ and extracts from ‘Rationale of Judicial Evidence’, ‘Essay on Language’, ‘Essay on Logic’, ‘Chrestomathia’, and ‘A Fragment on Government’. All this material is taken from the Bowring edition of Bentham’s Works, and, with the exception of the extracts from ‘Rationale of Judicial Evidence’ and ‘Fragment on Government’, was edited by Bentham’s physician Thomas Southwood Smith. The Bowring/Smith versions of ‘Ontology’, ‘Language’ and ‘Logic’ are themselves a mish-mash taken from Bentham’s unpublished manuscripts. Ogden, therefore, created his own mish-mash out of the Bowring/Smith mish-mash and called it Bentham’s ‘Theory of Fictions’. Ogden did not recognize any important distinction between a fiction and a fictitious entity – to the text of Theory of Fictions he appended both a discussion of legal fictions from Bentham’s Rationale of Judicial Evidence and an extract from Bentham’s nephew George’s An Outline of a New System of Logic, under the heading ‘The Classification of Fictions’, in which he provided succinct expositions of the various ‘entities’, including fictitious entities, that his uncle referred to. Ogden’s confounding of fictions and fictitious entities has been unreflectingly followed in much of the succeeding scholarship. It is necessary, therefore, to disambiguate fictions and fictitious entities,
and show the relation of the latter to real entities, in order to understand
the philosophical basis of Bentham’s materialism. The expositions of
all these terms involve, in one way or another, the notions of truth and
utility.\(^{57}\)

We have seen above how the youthful Bentham reacted against
what he viewed as the falsehood in the Thirty-nine Articles and the
fictions relied on by Blackstone in his lectures on English law. In *A
Fragment on Government*, published in 1776, his critique of a short
passage in Blackstone’s ‘Introduction’ to *Commentaries on the Laws of
England*, Bentham remarked that English law was characterized by
‘Fiction, tautology, technicality, circuity, irregularity, [and] inconsistency
…. But above all the pestilential breath of Fiction poisons the sense of
every instrument it comes near.’\(^{58}\) In ‘Constitutional Code Rationale’,
written in 1822, he noted: ‘By fiction, in the sense in which it is used
by lawyers, understand a false assertion which, though acknowledged
to be false, is at the same time argued from, and acted upon, as if true.’
He went on to argue that fiction served the sinister interest of lawyers
and other officials on the particular occasions on which it was used,
but more generally it served their interest and that of rulers together
by producing ‘demoralization’ in the community as a whole. The ‘object
and effect’ of demoralization was to cause men to regard with indiffer-
ence, or even with approval, both ‘the perpetration of injustice’ and the
employment of ‘falshood – wilful, deliberate and self-conscious falshood
— in a word mendacity’ as a means of producing that injustice.\(^{59}\) In the
passage on fictions reproduced by Ogden, and taken from *Rationale of
Judicial Evidence*, Bentham condemned fictions on the grounds that they
consisted in falsehood and that their effect was mischievous: ‘Fiction of
any use to justice? Exactly as swindling is to trade?’ Bentham went on to
give examples of fictions in English law, including the common recovery
whereby entails were ‘barred’, the addition of an *ac etiam* clause to writs
whereby actions could be tried in the central common law courts that
were not otherwise entitled to try them, and the action of ejectment for
the trial of freehold title.\(^{60}\) Throughout this passage lies, falsehoods and
fictions are equated.\(^{61}\) A fiction, therefore, was a proposition that was
known to be false in fact. A fictitious entity, on the other hand, was not
a proposition, but a term. In order to understand Bentham’s notion of a
fictitious entity, we need first to turn to the notion of a real entity.

In ‘Essay on Logic’, Bentham explained that the ‘source of perception’
— and, it might be added, the only source – was ‘an individual portion of
matter’, ‘a real, corporeal entity’, ‘a body’, by which an ‘impression’ was
made on ‘sense’. Strictly speaking, these impressions were the immediate
source of perception, and the body itself but the ‘secondary and comparatively remote’ source. The existence of the object of perception was, therefore, ‘a subject of inference [rather] than of perception’, and such inference was frequently found to be erroneous – we heard a sound, for instance, and assumed it was raining, but when we looked out of the window we saw that it was the wind rustling the leaves in a tree. Hence, Bentham described a two-stage process by which the mind, or more specifically the perceptive faculty, experienced the physical universe – at the first stage, the physical object gave rise to an impression in the organs of perception, and at the second stage, the impression was recognized by the perceptive faculty in the mind. Knowledge of the physical world was inferential, because what we perceived were impressions and not the objects themselves. There were, therefore, two different, but related notions that Bentham termed perceptible real entities. The first were our own perceptions, whether impressions produced ‘by the application of sensible objects to the organs of sense’ or ideas ‘brought to view by the recollection of these same objects’. The second group were ‘bodies of all sorts’. Again, he explained that these (he presumably meant impressions and ideas) were in fact the sole perceptible entities, while corporeal substances were inferential. He went on, however, to make a second distinction that also involved inference, namely a distinction within real entities between perceptible and inferential entities, the former being those of whose existence we were persuaded directly through perception, and the latter those of whose existence we were persuaded by a process of reasoning or reflection. With reference only to substances, the term perceptible real entities applied to corporeal substances, and inferential to incorporeal ones, that is to such inferential, because imperceptible, entities as the human soul, God, angels and devils. The soundness of the inference from perceptions to the existence of the corporeal body of which it was a perception was far stronger, Bentham noted, than that from the existence of corporeal to that of incorporeal substances:

Suppose the non-existence of corporeal substances – of any hard corporeal substance that stands opposite to you – make this supposition and as soon as you have made it, act upon it, pain, the perception of pain, will at once bear witness against you, and be your punishment, your condign punishment. Suppose the non-existence of the above-mentioned inferential incorporeal substances, of any of them, or all of them, and the supposition made, act upon it accordingly – be the supposition conformable or not conformable to the truth of the case, at any rate no such
immediate counter-evidence, no such immediate punishment, will follow.  

Inferential real entities, such as the human soul and God had never been perceived, and their reality ‘can not, therefore, be considered otherwise than as a matter of inference’. If one were not persuaded of the inference, that is that the human soul or God were real entities, it was likely that one would assign the former to the class of fictitious entities, consisting of the aggregate of such ‘psychical entities’ as were said to compose the mind, and the latter to the class of non-entities. To summarize, there were two inferences: the first, from perceptions to substances; the second, from substances perceived to substances unperceived. For Bentham, to assume the physical non-existence of entities that revealed themselves to us through sense perception would tend to produce evil consequences. Such evil consequences would not follow were we to assume the physical non-existence of entities that had not been perceived and were possibly not perceivable. The individual bodies that we did perceive and could be assumed to have physical existence were real entities.

Bentham did not only refer to real and fictitious entities, but to fabulous entities and also, as we have seen, to non-entities. The basic distinction, to which all others had to be referred, was that between real and fictitious entities: ‘Real entities – fictitious entities – under one or other of these denominations may be comprehended every object that ever was or can be present to any faculty of the human frame – to perception, memory, or imagination.’ Bentham recognized that the term ‘fictitious entity’ seemed to involve a contradiction in that the term ‘entity’ suggested that the thing represented had existence, while the term ‘fictitious’ suggested that it did not. Why not, then, use the term ‘non-entity’? Bentham answered that the ‘root’ of the contradiction lay in language, ‘that instrument without which, though of itself it is nothing, nothing can be said, and scarce any thing can be done’. Hence, while fictitious entities did not exist, the names of fictitious entities did exist (sounds and written words are, after all, perceptible): ‘To language then – to language alone – it is that fictitious entities owe their existence – their impossible, yet indispensable existence.’ Every name that existed in a language (Bentham presumably meant every name that would potentially make sense when placed in a proposition) was either the name of a real entity or the name of a fictitious entity.

What will moreover be seen is, that the fiction – the mode of representation by which the fictitious entities thus created, in so far
as fictitious entities can be created, are dressed up in the garb, and
placed upon the level, of real ones – is a contrivance but for which
language – or at any rate language in any form superior to that of
the language of the brute creation – could not have existence.\textsuperscript{68}

It is important to note that Bentham refers to the fiction involved in
the creation of fictitious entities, and not that fictitious entities were
fictions. The fiction was the apparent predication of real existence to the
subject represented by the name of a fictitious entity.\textsuperscript{69} In other words,
to claim that the subject so represented had physical existence would
be a falsehood, but unless we spoke as though it did have existence,
our language would not rise above that of animals, and since thought
was dependent on language, our thought would not rise above that
of animals. Bentham explained that names were first applied to real
entities, and thereby an association formed between the name and the
reality of the object to which it was assigned. There had then arisen ‘a
very natural propensity’ to ascribe reality to every object given a name,
including fictitious entities.\textsuperscript{70}

Bentham warned against confusing fictitious entities with fabulous
entities, which were ‘either fabulous persons or fabulous things’. They
were ‘supposed material objects of which the separate existence is
capable of becoming a subject of belief: and of which accordingly the
same sort of picture is capable of being drawn in the mind as of any
really existent object’.\textsuperscript{71} Fabulous entities were, therefore, created by the
imagination, and consisted of a combination of entities that had not been
perceived, but if the fabulous entity did exist, it would be perceivable:
for instance a golden mountain, a diamond billiard ball, Hamlet, and
so forth. Fictitious entities, on the other hand, although represented by
noun substantives, did not, unlike fabulous entities, ‘raise up in the mind
any correspondent image’.\textsuperscript{72} Bentham explained the notion of non-exis-
tence in terms of the annihilation of physical substance or body:

Of body … the annihilation is conceivable without difficulty. Why?
because in whatsoever place, that is within whatsoever portion of
space, within whatsoever receptacle composed of mere space, any
body is at any given time conceived to be, it may thenceforward be
conceived to be removed from that place, and so successively from
any and every other portion of space.\textsuperscript{73}

It was through the idea of absence that ‘the transcendent and awful
idea of non-existence’ was ‘attained’. Take a body existing in a particular
place, and suppose it non-existing in that place, 'you suppose its absence, its relative non-existence: expel it in like manner from every place, you suppose its absolute non-existence'. An entity was either in existence or not in existence: there was no other possible state for an entity to be in. A fabulous entity, then, was, in strictness, a non-entity, which, in turn, was the absence of any real entity.

How, then, did Bentham make sense of fictitious entities with their necessary, but merely linguistic existence? As he pointed out, in law – which was, of course, his main philosophical and practical concern – many of the leading terms, such as right, duty, obligation and power, did not correspond to any physical thing. Similarly, the words ‘matter’, ‘form’, ‘quantity’, ‘quality’, ‘relation’, ‘place’, ‘time’, ‘motion’ and ‘action’, together with their related ideas, all designated fictitious entities. They were like terms in algebra, which were used as shorthand to represent more complex entities. Such terms, the names of fictitious entities, made sense insofar as they could be expounded by showing their connection with real entities, objects that existed in the physical world. One took a proposition that contained the name of a fictitious entity and reformulated it in a proposition that had the same meaning but contained the names only of real entities, or were closer to real entities (one might say, for instance, that a person enjoyed liberty when he had the capacity to move his limbs without impediment, wherein motion or movement was a step closer to the physical world than liberty). Bentham gave the name ‘paraphrasis’ to this process of demonstrating the relationship of the names of fictitious entities or abstract terms to real entities or objects that had physical existence. Insofar as this operation could be successfully carried out, the proposition containing the abstract term made sense; insofar as there existed no physical ‘root’ for the abstract term, the proposition in which it was contained made no sense. Hence, it made sense to talk about a legal right, where it was possible to identify the legislator who had commanded its creation and enforcement, whereas it made no sense to talk about a natural right, because there was no such legislator.

In short, the name of a fictitious entity did not represent an object that had physical existence, but it facilitated discourse to speak of it as though it did exist. It made sense to say that a certain person lay under an obligation to another person, or enjoyed a right, but no one had ever seen, heard, touched, tasted, smelled or, assuming a sixth sense, had sex with an obligation or a right. A proposition including the term ‘obligation’ or the term ‘right’ would make sense if it could be expounded by paraphrasis, that is if it could be translated into another proposition.
with the same import but which contained only real entities. According to Bentham, the only source of knowledge was sense-perception. The only source from which sense-perception could be derived was the physical substance of the universe. There were no innate ideas. To the objection, made by Platonists and Kantians, that we must have the innate idea of a perfect circle in order to recognize that a particular geometric shape is a circle, Bentham would have responded that there is no such thing in the physical universe as a perfect circle, that the only place that a perfect circle exists is in the imagination, and that the idea is created by the mind’s power of abstraction, based on all the imperfect circles that we have encountered in the physical world. Similarly, the proposition $1 + 1 = 2$ would in itself be meaningless for Bentham – there is no innate mathematics in the mind. The sum $1 + 1 = 2$ is an abstraction, derived, for example, from the experience of taking an apple, and then taking another apple, placing them next to each other, and calling the resulting situation ‘two’ apples. The proposition makes sense only when it is related to objects in the physical world. When, in his account of paraphrasis, Bentham referred to the ‘fictitious proposition’ that ‘An obligation is incumbent on a man’, he did not mean that this proposition was a legal fiction or any other sort of fiction. It might, of course, have been false to state that, in a certain situation, a certain person lay under a legal obligation, but equally it might have been true. A fiction was a lie, but a proposition containing a fictitious entity or several fictitious entities might be true: a true fiction was a contradiction in terms.

4. Aesthetics as sympathy and antipathy

We can now see why, for Bentham, talk about any notion of the sublime or the beautiful that was based on some form of metaphysics, in other words appealed to some non-physical quality, was so much nonsense. If the proposition that some entity was beautiful were to make sense, the notion of ‘beautiful’ had to be expounded by the process of paraphrasis, and thus be shown to have its root in real entities. In the end, for me to say that something was beautiful was to say nothing more than that I liked that thing, and to say that I liked that thing was to say that it gave me pleasure. Conversely, for me to say that something was ugly made sense only if it meant that the thing in question gave me pain. The point was that, for Bentham, feelings of pleasure and pain were real entities. It was this assumption that underlay his threefold division of moral theories into the principle of utility, the principle of asceticism and the
principle of sympathy and antipathy or of caprice. An adherent of the principle of utility, noted Bentham, ‘approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question’, where happiness was understood as a balance of pleasure over pain. To talk about the principle of utility made sense because it was founded on the real entities of pleasure and pain. All rival theories, which were necessarily wrong if the principle of utility were right, fell into two groups. The first group, which consisted in variants of the principle of asceticism, was ‘constantly opposed’ to the principle of utility; while the second, which consisted in variants of the principle of sympathy and antipathy, was ‘sometimes opposed to it, and sometimes not’. The adherent of the principle of asceticism ‘approves or disapproves of any action, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question; but in an inverse manner [to the principle of utility]: approving of actions in as far as they tend to diminish his happiness; disapproving of them in as far as they tend to augment it’. An adherent of this principle was ‘any one who reprobates any the least particle of pleasure, as such, from whatever source derived’. The principle had been adopted by ‘a set of religionists’, who had done so in the hope of avoiding punishment in an afterlife, and by ‘a set of moralists’, namely the Stoics, who had condemned what they had considered to be the ‘gross’ pleasures of the body in order to pursue whatever was ‘refined’, which they had called ‘the honourable, the glorious, the reputable, the becoming, the honestum, the decorum’, in fact any thing but pleasure. Both branches of ascetics had come together ‘upon various occasions against the common enemy, the partisan of the principle of utility, whom they joined in branding with the odious name of Epicurean’. The adherent of the principle of sympathy and antipathy approved or disapproved of actions, neither on account of their tendency to increase, nor on account of their tendency to decrease, the happiness of the persons affected by them, ‘but merely because a man finds himself disposed to approve or disapprove of them: holding up that approbation or disapprobation as a sufficient reason for itself, and disclaiming the necessity of looking out for any extrinsic ground’. The amount of punishment that the adherent of the principle of sympathy and antipathy attached to any action was measured by the degree of his dislike: ‘if you hate much, punish much; if you hate little, punish little: punish as you hate. If you hate not at all, punish not at all: the fine feelings of the soul are not to be overborne by the harsh and rugged dictates of political
utility. All so-called standards of right and wrong, apart from the principles of utility and asceticism, were in fact reducible to the principle of sympathy and antipathy. By dressing up his own opinions or sentiments in the garb of some fictional standard, whether termed the moral sense, common sense, the law of nature, right reason, or repugnancy to nature, the adherent of the principle of sympathy and antipathy attempted both to avoid ‘the obligation of appealing to any external standard’ and to persuade others to take his own sentiments as authoritative. The notion of ‘repugnancy to nature’ was a particular aspect of the principle of sympathy and antipathy that Bentham criticized in his later writings on sexual morality, but he had made the same point, as he noted, in *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*. Bentham there explained that acts, such as the exposing of children by the Greeks and Romans, were often condemned, ‘upon the principle of antipathy’, for being ‘unnatural’, but all that unnatural meant, if it meant anything, was ‘unfrequent’. However, the usual complaint was that the act was all too frequent. The term ‘unnatural’ expressed nothing but ‘the disposition of the person who is talking of it: the disposition he is in to be angry at the thoughts of it’. The person who claimed that an act was unnatural was in fact saying that he did not like to practise it and, therefore, it should not be practised by others. There was no ‘difference in taste’ and no ‘difference in opinion’ from which the adherent of the principle of sympathy and antipathy might not ‘extract a ground of punishment’.

Hence, to say, I like this, or, I like that, and so ought you (or so must you), was to be an adherent of the principle of sympathy and antipathy. Taste was capricious, and herein lay Bentham’s opposition to the notion of taste. Insofar as those who referred to taste were appealing, or pretending to appeal, to some metaphysical standard, they were talking nonsense; but what they were in fact doing was making a claim that their own opinion was to be the standard for others. This was as much as to say that their pleasure was more important than any other person’s pleasure, or perhaps that the pleasure of persons of their social class – persons who shared a similar place in ‘the conjoint scales of power, opulence and factitious dignity’ – were more important than those of another social class. This was the claim made by the highest class, the aristocracy, and they had the advantage that their wealth and power made the claim appear plausible, and even be accepted, by their inferiors in power, wealth and titles. Bentham remarked that, ‘The Democratical [section of the community] refers or soon will refer every thing to the standard of Utility … the Aristocratical, to as great an extent and as long as possible, to the standard of taste: itself being the arbiter of taste’.
The adherent of the principle of utility had no basis for claiming that the pleasure of one person was worth more than the equal pleasure of any other person, and hence ruled out all claims based on superiority of taste. It might be objected that the ‘person of taste’, when thinking of an object or action of which he disapproved, experienced pain as a result, and that such pain should be taken into account by the adherent of the principle of utility. Moreover, if the pain was sufficiently intense, or experienced by a sufficiently large number of people, then the adherent of the principle of utility should condemn the object or action in question. Bentham’s response would be that the problem did not lie in the object or action complained about, but in the attitude, often founded in prejudice, of the complainant.

An explanation of this point requires a brief discussion of sanctions. For Bentham, a sanction was a source of pain and pleasure. In *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* he identified four sanctions: the physical sanction arose ‘from the ordinary course of nature’; the political sanction from an official acting under the authority of the state; the moral or popular sanction from members of the community in general; and the religious sanction from a supernatural being. In his later writings, Bentham added the sympathetic and antipathetic sanctions, which were imposed by specific or ‘assignable’ individuals, as opposed to the moral sanction where there were no assignable persons as such. An instance of the operation of the sympathetic sanction occurred when an individual imposed some pain on a person who had harmed his friend, while an instance of the operation of the antipathetic sanction occurred when an individual imposed some pain on a person who had benefited his enemy. The sympathetic and antipathetic sanctions arose, therefore, from pre-existing feelings of sympathy and antipathy, which themselves might be based on prejudices of various kinds. Hence, a person who today we would term ‘homophobic’ would be so-called because of his inclination to punish two males who he believes or imagines are experiencing pleasure from having sex with each other. The males in question consent and undertake the action because it gives them or they expect it to give them pleasure. The observer condemns it because the thought of it causes him pain. That pain arises from the antipathetic sanction, that is from his own internal beliefs, and not from the action itself. Addressing the adherent of the principle of sympathy and antipathy, Bentham stated: ‘it is for you to get the better of your antipathy, not for him [the actor of a non-mischievous action] to truckle to it’. The point is that, if the action is prevented, the pain is not experienced, but neither is the pleasure of the actors. If the prejudice is removed, the pain
is not experienced, but the pleasure of the actors remains. Hence, the latter course is that which is approved by the adherent of the principle of utility.

In summary, there was no independent value of beauty to which the ‘person of taste’ could claim privileged access; all that taste reflected was the pleasure that one gained from a particular object or state of affairs. Once this was recognized, since no one person’s pleasure was more important than that of another person’s equal pleasure, no one person’s ‘taste’ could be regarded as superior to that of any other person’s. It took Bentham many years and many projects to work through the implications of the materialist, Epicurean world-view that he had adopted, and which incorporated a radical scepticism towards the metaphysics that had hitherto been the dominant tradition in the history of ideas, but as he did so, established institutions and practices in law, religion, politics and economics became the subject of ferocious criticism, and the systems of thought on which they rested were attacked. Bentham’s utilitarianism brought the radical Epicurean tradition into the mainstream, but only briefly. John Stuart Mill, who was Bentham’s most influential successor in the utilitarian tradition, while not rejecting his Epicurean legacy, began the retreat from outright materialism back towards metaphysics through his condemnation of Bentham’s critique of taste and with his distinction between higher and lower pleasures and his associated claim that it was ‘better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied’. Mill would have disapproved of Duchamp’s *Fountain*, but Bentham would have been greatly amused by it.

Notes

1 Hick, 2017, 17–19.
2 Onfray, 2015, 39.
5 Bentham, ed. Crimmins and Fuller, 2011, 35–6.
7 Stone, 2016.
9 Charles Abbot (1757–1829), after distinguishing himself as speaker of the House of Commons 1802–17, was created Baron Colchester.
10 The phrase ‘Every thing is now as it should be’ had been used by William Blackstone in Blackstone, 1765–9, iv. 49. Bentham took it to be characteristic of Blackstone’s conservatism. For Bentham on Blackstone see Schofield, 2018, 23–40.
11 BL Add. MS 33,537, fo. 99. (Thanks to Chris Riley for this reference.)
12 Bentham, ed. Bowring, 1843 [hereafter Bowring], x. 54.
13 Bentham, ed. Goldworth, 1983, 293; Bowring, 1843, x. 45.
15 While Epicureanism was often the subject of disdain in the early modern period, there were many influential writers who were attracted to the doctrine: see Wilson, 2009, 266–86.
16 Bowring, 1843, x. 27.
17 There are citations to Lucretius at UC xxvii. 1 (not dated, but probably written in the early to mid-1770s) and xcvi. 220 (not dated, but again probably written in the early to mid-1770s). Four lines from De rerum natura (Book v, lines 1011–14) are reproduced in ‘Principles of the Civil Code’, at Bowring, 1843, i. 349. Bentham mistakenly attributes a quotation to Lucretius at BL Add. MS 29,809, fo. 180 (24 February 1819) that actually occurs in Publius Papinius Statius, Thebaid, iii. 66.
19 See UC c. 11. (Thanks to Rex Mixon for this reference and general advice on Bentham's relationship to Epicurus.) See further Hoesch, 2018; Schofield, 2019. Bentham's citation of Horace is briefly discussed in Rosen, 2003, 15–16, a work that explores more generally the link between Epicureanism and utilitarianism with particular reference to the notion of justice.
21 UC clxi. 227 (19 December 1817).
22 See UC xiv. 57 (9 September 1814). The text of this folio is reproduced at Bentham, ed. Goldworth, 1983, 135, but these notes, and several others, at the top of the folio are not recorded.
25 Anon, 1745, 9: ‘Harum praeterea sensus est brevis, praeteritarumque in suavis saepe recordatio, et erubescenda.’
27 For the ancient origins of this insult see Warren, 2002, 129–49.
28 Onfray, 2015, 7–11.
29 Onfray, 2015, 137–8. The points about grocers and totalitarianism reflect the criticisms of utilitarianism made by Marx and Foucault respectively.
30 Gere, 2017, 114. For Table of the Springs of Action, first published in 1817, see Goldworth, 1983, 79–115 (where unfortunately, no doubt due to typesetting and production constraints, it does not appear in the form of the table originally conceived by Bentham).
32 Gere, 2017, 92.
33 Gere, 2017, 96–7, 129.
34 Gere, 2017, 44.
35 Gere, 2017, 24, 221.
37 Gere, 2017, 189.
39 For a reassessment of the relationship between utilitarianism and literature in the nineteenth century see Blake, 2009.
40 Gere, 2017, 143, 172.
41 Gere, 2017, 58.
42 Gere, 2017, 43, 93.
43 Bentham is well known for a statement at Bentham, ed. Burns and Hart, 1970, 282–3 n., that what mattered was not whether animals could reason but whether they could suffer. An important statement of his position in relation to animal welfare appears in a letter dated 4 March 1825 published in the Morning Chronicle, 9 March 1825, and reproduced in Bowring, 1843, X. 549–50.

Bentham, ed. Schofield, 2015, 327–8. For Bentham’s view that dignity presented an ‘idea’ that was ‘not altogether a very determinate one’, namely the quality in a person by which respect towards him was produced in others, see Bentham, ed. Schofield, 1989, 48, and his criticism of dignity as a ‘pretence for ‘depredation’ on the part of rulers see Bentham, ed. Schofield, 2015, 320.


Bentham envisaged that the material that Smith presented in these three essays – namely ‘Ontology’, ‘Logic’, and ‘Language’ – would appear in a single work under the title of ‘Essay on Logic’.

Bentham does not refer to this material as ‘Theory of Fictions’ – moreover, there is (as yet) no evidence that he ever used this phrase. The most suggestive passage that I have found for Ogden’s phrase ‘theory of fictions’ is at BL Add. MS 33,550, fo. 4: ‘It was for want of a clear conception of this distinction [i.e. between names of real entities and names of fictitious entities] that many an empty name is considered as representative of a correspondent reality: in a word, that mere fictions are in abundance regarded as realities.’ Bentham’s point here was that the distinction had led him to see that such terms were not capable of being defined per genus et differentiam, but only through paraphrasis.

In his essay on Bentham’s theory of probability (though it is in large measure concerned with Bentham’s ontology), G.J. Postema, for instance, refers indiscriminately to fictions and fictitious entities: see Postema, 1983, 37–64. Following Postema’s account of Bentham’s ontology, Michael Quinn, 2013, purportedly compares Bentham and Fuller on legal fictions, but, having argued that Bentham viewed any proposition involving a fictitious entity as a fiction, spends much of the article comparing Bentham on fictitious entities with Fuller on legal fictions. Quinn also mistakenly equates fallacies with fictions (474). A further error made by some commentators, and which seems to originate with Mack, 1962, 180–4, is that Bentham’s logic of the will is concerned with fictions.

Bentham considered these subject-matters under the general heading of ‘logic’. ‘By Logic taken at large’, he explained, ‘may be understood the art of applying to best advantage to the purpose of discourse the faculty of discourse’, and referred to it as ‘this all-comprehensive art and science’. See Bentham, ed. Schofield, 2015, 408 n. The notion of ‘best advantage’ links Bentham’s exposition to the principle of utility. Alternatively, Bentham defined logic as ‘the art, which has for its object or end in view, the giving to the best advantage, direction to the human mind and thence to the whole human frame, in its pursuit of any object or purpose, to the attainment of which it is capable of being applied.’ UC ci. 92 (3 August 1814). He went on to state that, ‘Of the art and science of logic the prime, and that the most immediate, use is the establishment of clear and determinate ideas’ and that this objective would be achieved through such operations as methodization, distinction, definition, division and exposition. See UC ci. 103 (5 August 1814). Given that the pursuit of well-being was ‘the end of every action’, logic had the same end. See UC ci. 107 (25 September 1815).


See Baker, 1998, 54–6, 319–21, and 341–3, for explanations of the ac etiam clause, the common recovery and the action of ejectment respectively.


UC ci. 118 (25 July 1814).

In distinguishing between impressions and ideas, Bentham was following David Hume: see Hume, ed. Norton and Norton, 2007, i. 7.

UC cii. 13–14 (26–7 September 1814).

UC cii. 15 (25 September 1814).

UC cii. 9–11 (27 September 1814).

UC cii. 21 (23 September 1814).

UC cii. 23 (23 September 1814).
See UC cii. 25 (23 September 1814): ‘Of fictitious entities, whatsoever is predicated is not, consistently with strict truth, predicated … of any thing but their respective names.’

UC cii. 24 (23 September 1814). See UC ci. 340 (7 August 1814): ‘Words, viz. words employed to serve as names, being the only instruments by which, in the absence of things, viz. the substances, themselves, the ideas of them can be presented to the mind, hence, wheresoever a word is seen which to appearance is employed in the character of a name, a natural and abundantly extensive consequence is – a disposition and propensity to suppose the existence, the real existence, of a correspondent object – of a correspondent thing – of a thing to which it ministers in the character of a name.’

UC ci. 342 (7 August 1814).

UC ci. 322 (7 August 1814).

UC cii. 38 (26 September 1814).

UC cii. 74–5 (2–3 October 1814).

See UC cii. 35–50 (25–9 September 1814).

This was the thrust of Bentham’s critique of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man in ‘Nonsense upon Stilts’: see Bentham, ed. Schofield et al., 2002, 317–401.


UC ci. 25 (23 September 1814).

UC ci. 222 (23 August 1814).

See further Schofield, 2015.

For a full account see Schofield, ed. Zhai and Quinn, 2014, 90–118.


See Bentham, ed. Schofield et al., 2014, 6–8, 132.


Bentham, ed. Schofield, 1989, 144.


References


