The preceding chapter examined the background to the setting up of London government under Mayor Ken Livingstone, the structure of its various agencies and the establishment of the Architecture and Urbanism Unit (A+UU) under Richard Rogers. It also looked at the early work and approach of the A+UU as well as its successes and weaknesses. This chapter examines the reasons for the formation of Design for London (DfL), which replaced the A+UU, and considers its methodology and operational approach.

The first decade of the twenty-first century was a heady time for the UK and London. The Labour government under Tony Blair was in its second term, the economy was growing rapidly and London was emerging as one of the most powerful cities in the global economy. There was every sign that this would continue well into the future. Any clouds on the horizon were those arising from London’s rapid growth, with shortages in affordable housing and the market distortions caused by property speculation for short-term returns.

Perhaps the high point was in July 2005 when London was awarded the 2012 Olympic Games. Mayor Livingstone was now back in the Labour Party and the London bid had been fully supported by the national government. The bid centred on the regeneration of Stratford, one of the poorer areas of London, and presented the opportunity to realise the strategy to push development eastwards into the Thames Gateway at a scale that would create long-term momentum for change. The way was open for London to emerge as the pre-eminent city in the world.
The institutions of London government

Ken Livingstone had been re-elected in 2004 without any serious challenge and the mechanisms of London government were maturing. The creative chaos of the early days of the Greater London Authority (GLA) was being replaced with more formalised structures. Critically, the two main agencies outside the GLA, Transport for London (TfL) and the London Development Agency (LDA), were now under a degree of political direction from the mayor’s office. TfL in particular was under a new transport commissioner, Peter Hendy, and was continuing to transform into a transport agency. Capital funds were shifting from highways to buses and the underground. Walking and cycling were considered as legitimate transport modes in their own right and, despite still being low in the pecking order, were now receiving resources. These new programmes were largely uncommitted and offered opportunities for new public space projects.

The LDA was still finding its feet. Created as part of a national network of regional development agencies, its remit was to intervene in areas of market failure in order to stimulate regional economic growth. However, in London the market failures did not stem from industrial decline but were due to rapid growth and an overheating economy that had left behind areas of social and geographical deprivation. In these circumstances the measures in the traditional armoury of a regional development agency – land acquisition and decontamination, training and support for enterprise and incentives for inward investment – were not easily applicable.

The LDA’s land portfolio, inherited from English Partnerships, was a ragbag of difficult sites and the agency soon became bogged down in a series of cumbersome development initiatives that were both costly and ineffective. In an overheated economy, the LDA was just getting in the way. Other programmes such as training and support for enterprise were also yielding mixed results and the agency was constantly firefighting to rescue poorly conceived initiatives that had been pursued for overtly political objectives. In the absence of well-developed management and performance structures, the LDA was operating well below its potential. It did, however, play one particular role with alacrity. It picked up specific projects that the mayor wanted to pursue but for which no other budgets were available. While TfL had a strong internal management structure that could act as a counterweight to the mayor, the LDA was malleable and compliant.
Background to the creation of Design for London

Ken Livingstone’s re-election provided the opportunity for more ambitious long-term strategies and a chance to consolidate inter-agency working. Public interest in architecture and urban design had been stimulated by a series of lottery-funded projects, in particular the new Tate Modern, housed in the former Bankside power station originally designed by Sir Giles Gilbert Scott and converted into a gallery by the architects Herzog & de Meuron. Design was suddenly newsworthy, and architects were media stars. Following in the footsteps of the Pompidou Centre in Paris and the Guggenheim in Bilbao, the creation of Tate Modern brought about a significant transformation of London’s South Bank. Exhibitions in the newly refurbished Turbine Hall created an important visitor attraction, and the building also completed the link along the South Bank between the Royal Festival Hall, Southwark Cathedral, Borough Market and Tower Bridge.

The development of Tate Modern had been accompanied by wider design thinking driven by Fred Manson, who had been Director of Regeneration and Environment at the London Borough of Southwark in the 1990s. Following its subsequent comprehensive upgrade, the Southbank Centre (Allies and Morrison, 2005–7) was connected to the Embankment and Covent Garden by the new Hungerford Bridge foot crossings (Lifschutz Davidson, 2002), while Norman Foster’s Millennium Bridge provided a new link to St Paul’s Cathedral. The partial pedestrianisation of Trafalgar Square (Norman Foster, 2003) under the Mayor’s World Spaces for All programme had also proved instantly popular. These projects had not been part of a grand design by a centralised authority – they were a triumph for pragmatic incremental urbanism driven by individual architects and agencies. There was widespread public recognition that such interventions, particularly around public spaces, represented a significant improvement. London was at last catching up with other cities.

Another force promoting good design was the Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment (CABE). Founded in 1999 as a response to recommendations in the Urban Task Force, it replaced the Royal Fine Arts Commission’s role in design review. It also commissioned numerous best practice papers. It was a highly influential, if sometimes controversial, voice in support of contemporary architecture and design. CABE’s role in raising the profile of the design debate in England (there were separate bodies for Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland) was
significant. It had responded to the government’s agenda and had captured the public mood, acting as an important counterweight to the more conservative approach of English Heritage.

**Purpose and structure of Design for London**

Some in the GLA viewed the A+UU as maverick and difficult to control – more of a problem than an asset. Its fraught relationship with the GLA planning team was causing problems and its direct channel to the mayor through Richard Rogers represented another cause for mistrust. The idea of a new and more powerful design agency for London was first mooted in early 2005 by Deputy Mayor Nicky Gavron, Richard Rogers and senior managers in the GLA. The rationale was to strengthen the role of design within London government and at the same time to exercise greater control over projects in TfL and the LDA. The intention was also to regularise the position and managerial structure of the A+UU.

The A+UU had established good working relationships with project officers in the LDA and TfL, and the GLA hoped that an integrated design team would be able to extend inter-agency working and access to capital budgets for mayoral projects. Architecture and design were still part of the mayor’s agenda and the creation of a single team represented an opportunity to establish a degree of common purpose between the GLA, the LDA and TfL, especially in the context of the rapid growth of the London economy and the forthcoming Olympics. The consolidation of design resources into a single unit would also increase the mayor’s design capacity without the need to find additional funding.

With the agreement of Ken Livingstone and Richard Rogers, David Lunts, Director of Regeneration at the GLA, brokered an agreement with TfL and the LDA to pool their resources into a new pan-London design unit. The jealousy with which the agencies defended their independence meant that this new unit could not be located in the GLA, but the GLA did not want to lose control of it to either of the other agencies. The compromise was that it would be outside the existing structure of London government and would have a degree of managerial and operational independence. While the LDA would provide ‘pay and rations’, it would have no managerial control over the new organisation. Instead, it would report to a board chaired by Lunts that would include a senior representative from TfL and from the LDA. Richard Rogers would also be on the board. The new agency would have access to the mayor through the board. Whether this was a deliberate attempt to reduce
Richard Rogers’ influence is unclear, but on paper at least the new agency would be managerially accountable for its activities. The new organisation was to be called Design for London (DfL), Richard Rogers would take a more strategic role in directing its work and a new director would be appointed to lead the integrated team. The arrangements were signed off by the mayor in the summer of 2006.

There was considerable media interest in the new agency, due partly to Richard Rogers’ involvement and the high profile of design in London. Media interest had already been sparked by controversy around CABE, which was facing accusations of conflicts of interest. These were possibly due to perceptions that it had become overly powerful. There was also friction between CABE and English Heritage, and criticism from some within the architectural profession that CABE was promoting a ‘modernist’ as opposed to a ‘traditionalist’ agenda. Either way, design agencies were fruitful news stories for the architectural press. Another reason for the press interest was the name: Design for London represented a powerful brand image. It implied the power to shape and change London, as well as the independence to carry through projects. This was in keeping with the zeitgeist of the period. It also implied the prospect of conflict with CABE and English Heritage, and a potentially endless series of news stories. It brought in a period of intense speculation over who would be appointed as the new Director of Design for London.

The job was advertised in summer 2006 and a number of well-known architects were rumoured to be applying. The advertisement also caught the eye of Peter Bishop, then working as Planning Director at Camden Council. Bishop had worked as a planning director in central London for 25 years, at Tower Hamlets, Haringey, and Hammersmith and Fulham, and recognised that ‘this looked like the best job in the world’. An informal ‘interview’ – a lunch with Richard Rogers, Renzo Piano and others at the Venice Architecture Biennale – was followed by a formal interview with Rogers and senior officials from the LDA, TfL and the GLA. ‘I didn’t think I’d get the job,’ says Bishop, ‘but it became clear to me they were actually looking for a manager with experience in operating at the political interface. I knew London, I had been involved in urban design, but critically I also understood and could work within the systems of London government.’ Bishop was appointed, and Design for London was launched to some fanfare from the design press, in October 2006.

Peter Murray, director of New London Architecture, commented:

We are very glad Peter Bishop has won this very important appointment. He has always been a great supporter of quality
architecture as shown by the work he did while at Hammersmith and at Camden. He is someone who can provide the link between the GLA and the Boroughs which will be so important for the successful implementation of the London Plan. We look forward to working with Peter Bishop in the future to encourage the best of design for the capital.5

The appointment of a director who was not from an architectural background surprised many people, as did the fact that the new director was from local government. Possibly there was no room for two big-name architects in London government. The appointment made a clear statement that DfL was to be an agency of government and was expected to move the propositional work of the A+UU onwards to achieve more delivered projects on the ground. The director was also expected to manage the A+UU and evolve the design team by amalgamating design staff from TfL and the LDA. To do this the director needed to understand the processes of government and be able to work within the politics of City Hall.

**Approach and methodology of Design for London**

DfL inherited the staff and work programmes of the A+UU together with the design teams at the LDA and TfL. The staff came with their existing work programmes, time commitments and approaches, but only the A+UU had a clear working methodology based on sound theoretical frameworks. Few staff from the LDA and TfL had design skills, but they did bring project implementation skills and a knowledge of organisational procedures – both of which had been areas of weakness of the A+UU. The A+UU’s tight-knit, energetic and talented team formed the core of the new organisation and its previous work provided a firm basis from which to build new momentum. Richard Rogers retained his close working relationship with the team and usually spent one day a week working in their offices, critiquing projects and discussing new policy ideas.6

Bishop shared the A+UU’s recognition that London was never going to be shaped by *grands projets*. The limited power of the mayor and the shortage of capital budgets for London in any case precluded major intervention. Bishop brought to the team his experience of working on
major development projects, a knowledge of the development industry, the skills needed to access public funding and a pragmatic approach to steering urban change through tortuous political processes. He was also more comfortable working in a political environment than the A+UU had been and understood the power of intercorporate working and networks.

As a planner Bishop had always been interested in the social and economic impacts of urban change and viewed urban design as an essential tool of the planning profession. He had been involved in major development projects and saw planning as a means to drive social improvement in the form of affordable housing, public space and the creation of economic opportunities for local communities. For Bishop, planning was a flexible and creative discipline that could be used to achieve urban change – planning process was of interest only inasmuch as it achieved tangible (and desirable) results. That said, Bishop understood process and understood politics and this combination had enabled him to drive through transformative change in the parts of London that he had worked in. He had been trained in urban design and was scathing of planning’s inability to be involved in the wider design debate. From the outset, he viewed DfL as a planning agency, but one that was able to use architectural approaches to shape the city.

Bishop had been particularly influenced by the methodology of everyday or incremental urbanism, as developed by Margaret Crawford and Stephen Marshall, a theory of the city based on a degree of tolerated disorder. This approach is critical of ‘[b]anal suburbs, shiny but empty downtowns, formal office parks and abandoned districts [that] result from policies that neither recognise the everyday nor allow it to assert and reassert itself’. The everyday urbanism proposed by Crawford favours interventions that reinforce the heterogeneous qualities of small, temporary, not-intended, undistinguished though well-used spaces. It takes ordinary places, ‘the nooks and crannies of existing urban environments’, thinks about them in new ways and makes small changes that may accumulate to have a transformative effect on the wider locality. It aims to reconnect urban design with ordinary human and social meanings and thus strengthen ‘the connective tissue that binds daily lives together’. Inherent in this approach is an appreciation of the fine grain of the city.

Bishop’s thinking was very close to that of Mark Brearley and the A+UU team, whose way of working he easily embraced. This approach sat comfortably with the pragmatism required to orchestrate urban
change from the position of organisational weakness that DfL had inherited. To be effective, DfL had to be able to play a weak hand well. It had no power or money, but these could be considerable assets. In the absence of power there was no requirement to comply with the stifling conformity of government. If it could deploy the soft power of its access to the mayor, then other agencies would willingly work with it and could be influenced by its approach. If other agencies carried out the project work then DfL would be free of all of the responsibilities of dealing with public money and could be a strategic design agency. The ambiguity of its position in the structure of London government was to be its greatest asset.

From the outset DfL adopted much of the A+UU’s methodology, projects and programmes and fully embraced the approach of urban narratives rather than urban plans. Its more powerful position in London government, high public profile and ability to work more adeptly in a political environment allowed it to extend its influence further in the following ways:

– **Partnership with stakeholders who controlled budgets.** DfL set out to be collaborative and not didactic. The A+UU had been effective at finding allies within the boroughs, the LDA and TfL, and DfL was able to build on these networks. In particular it could now access a greater number of senior decision-makers. At the same time, it continued to ‘infiltrate’ key agencies of London government to persuade them to take a wider design perspective. This ‘soft power’ approach allowed DfL to build wider and deeper networks. To back up these networks, DfL worked hard to identify available resources within government budgets and programmes. By knowing where the money was and working with those who controlled resources, the team could assemble complex funding packages to implement its own project priorities. This ability to harness the power of funding set the new agency apart from the A+UU and enabled it to make an early impact.

– **Influencing procurement and supporting the client role.** The mantra ‘good architects can design good buildings, bad architects never will’ is explored in more detail in Chapter 7. Influencing the procurement of architects was seen as one of the most effective ways of improving project design. Support from the mayor (real or perceived) gave the team access to stronger influence over the procurement of architects and designers. Over time DfL advised clients on development briefs and took on a pivotal role in
setting up new framework agreements. DfL deliberately used procurement to promote a new generation of practices – smaller, younger and more experimental – that had often been excluded by traditional procurement processes. It recognised the potential of such practices to move the design agenda forward with new ideas and approaches.

– *Campaigning and publicity.* DfL made the decision to exploit the high profile generated by its formation. This was a departure from the A+UU’s policy of keeping a low profile. There was a major press launch for the new agency, frequent contact with the architectural press, events and exhibitions. All were aimed at creating continuous media (and public) interest. In its publications, DfL deliberately eschewed any recognised public-sector house style. The graphics, covers, photos and plans were a deliberate departure from public-sector norms. They were part of the branding of the team. This is covered in more detail in Chapter 7.

– *International profile.* European influences were evident in the methodology and early projects of the A+UU and it had built a good network with other cities and practitioners. Under DfL connections with German and Dutch practices were refreshed. Dutch masterplanning in particular was considered to be ahead of current thinking in the UK, as were German ideas around landscape. Consequently, links were strengthened with a range of practices such as KCAP, Maxwan, Vogt, and Latz+Partner. DfL became a significant conduit for new ideas for London. It also became an advocate for emerging UK and international practices to gain commissions in London.

At the heart of DfL’s approach was a detailed knowledge of London and an understanding of its uniqueness. London’s urban morphology is not as formal as that of other European cities and has an ingrained flexibility of form. Outside the areas of historical importance, the city has a wide range of diverse places that offered opportunities for experimentation. The team did consider whether there might indeed be a specific London ‘style’ but concluded that it was the approach to urban thinking that defined the city (Figure 2.1). *Grands projets,* certainly before the Olympics, were to be left to private-sector developers with the land and money to execute them. The strategic design team aimed to develop ideas and projects that could sit within the everyday fabric of the city. These could then be implemented by other agencies as the opportunities permitted.

DfL’s first priority was to bring all the staff together while there was still momentum. This was achieved in less than two months. The second priority was an early and high-profile launch where major figures in London architecture and the press would be present. This took place in March 2007. Presentations by Richard Rogers and Ken Livingstone reinforced the impression that the new organisation had high-level support and would be a force to be reckoned with. Its inherited body of work gave DfL a head start and the first projects in the 100 Public Spaces programme were nearing completion. Although Gillett Square in Hackney (Figure 2.2) was officially opened in November 2006, two months before the new agency actually came into existence, it was badged as a DfL scheme and an instant sense of momentum was established. Similarly, the *East London Green Grid Primer* was published in 2006 and DfL was credited with the project. Richard Rogers’ association with DfL provided both national and international kudos, and he dedicated much time to boosting the team’s public influence.
Soon after DfL’s establishment, a new advisory panel was set up. This was recruited through open competition and provided more positive press coverage. DfL’s profile allowed it to attract some of the best practitioners from the UK and abroad (see Chapter 7). The panel deliberately included names that were unexpected, as well as representatives from development, landscape, engineering and environmental disciplines. It met quarterly and its role was flexible. It rarely advised on the design of specific projects. Its main purpose was to connect DfL to the world of practice (and to be seen to do so). Outside the formal meetings, a number of the panel members put in time to advise and mentor on projects. The panel was also an important conduit of new ideas and provided a powerful set of friends and advocates for the new team (Figure 2.3).

The creation of a new agency provided a good opportunity to reappraise projects that had been inherited from the A+UU, the LDA and TfL. The core programmes of town centre renewal, public spaces and the East London Green Grid were continued (Figure 2.4) and are covered in more detail in Chapters 3 and 5. Other initiatives, such as an ambitious idea for a cross-river park in east London, were dropped (when Mayor Johnson abandoned the Beckton river crossing in 2008). City East was not pursued as a project (it had achieved its purpose), but it did provide a strong foundation for later plans for the regeneration of east London and the Royal Docks.

The most significant change was one of traction. DfL had the profile and power to gain momentum for its projects. Complex funding...
Figure 2.3  Richard Rogers (centre, in a characteristic coloured shirt) at the Design for London Advisory Panel. Source: Design for London Archive, DfL/GLA.

Figure 2.4  Influencing through policy documents. Source: Design for London Archive, DfL/GLA.
arrangements were knitted together from various agencies to progress projects, in particular for the 100 Public Spaces programme. Direct involvement in procurement allowed the team to influence some LDA and TfL projects and the team expanded its involvement in writing briefs, setting up competitions and selecting design teams on behalf of London government and boroughs. The development and architectural sectors began to respond with better designs. Town centre projects were brought forward, most notably in Dalston and Barking, and the growing maturity of the team was apparent in its ability to extend its networks and work with local politicians. The style was cooperative, gentle, persuasive. Mayoral agencies had expected DfL to throw its weight about. The very name ‘Design for London’ suggested a body that would direct and impose its views and there was understandable suspicion, especially as the organisation reported directly to the mayor. From the start DfL recognised the danger of taking a high-handed position and sought to collaborate with agencies within London government. They were surprised and became more comfortable in cooperating with the team. In practice there was little friction in working relationships.

Perhaps DfL’s most influential work was in the field of policy. The GLA had responsibility for producing the London Plan – a task that they executed effectively. However, there are limitations to what can be achieved through planning policy and DfL was able to move into these openings. The London Housing Design Guide project (covered in Chapter 4) is an example of how a policy debate that was considered too controversial and politically sensitive for a statutory planning team to engage with could be moved forward. Ken Livingstone had concerns about any policy framework that would impose higher design requirements that might stifle private-sector development and increase already high land values. Initially it was agreed that the Design Guide could be produced as long as it only applied to a small handful of LDA-owned sites. However, eventually it was incorporated in the London Plan and became the basis for national housing policy. In a similar way, the team was able to float big conceptual ideas and spatial strategies without any requirement to justify them within the restrictions of the UK planning system. Thus, City East was developed into the Green Enterprise Zone and a strategy for the Royal Docks that led to the London cable car, the Siemens Crystal and the new business district at Albert Dock (commenced in 2017 by the Chinese company ABP). These are all covered in more detail in Chapter 6.

DfL’s other area of work was the London Olympics (see Chapter 6). The award of the Olympic Games to London in 2005 had completely
transformed the regeneration agenda for east London. The A+UU had been ahead of the game with City East and planning work in the Lower Lea Valley, but had not had the political strength to be involved more directly in the Games bid. Once the Games had been awarded, the Olympics project went into implementation mode and questions about architecture and design were sidelined. In fairness, there were significant concerns about the UK’s ability to deliver the Games on time and within budget, and agencies promoting design strategies were not welcome at the table. The Olympic Development Authority (ODA) was tasked with delivering the Games while the LDA took on the role of land acquisition and the relocation of existing businesses. Delivery of the Games’ legacy was also allocated to the LDA but, for the time being, was politely put to one side. There followed a long period of working behind the scenes to influence the ODA, first through the (eventual) establishment of design review panels and then through commenting on and altering the most inflexible parts of the Games plans. When the Games’ legacy was finally brought forward, DfL was fully involved in the appointment of a masterplanning team, the Dutch practice KCAP. DfL also produced various Olympic Fringe masterplans that aimed to spread the benefits of the Games into the wider community. Several DfL team members eventually joined the London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC).

DfL’s relationship with CABE was generally good, even if the two agencies had very different philosophical approaches. CABE saw itself as an influencer (very much top-down) and employed design review, design policy and best practice as its principal workstreams. DfL viewed this approach as one of detachment rather than involvement. DfL was not overly interested in questions of aesthetics and saw design agency more as a matter for proactive involvement and the political empowerment of local communities. The difference was illustrated when CABE offered to pass design review in London over to DfL, an offer that was turned down. DfL considered that design review was a distraction that failed to address the central issues of why parts of London were deprived and of poor quality. The design review process would also have been administratively onerous, a distraction from the team’s core business and likely to create more enemies in the profession than friends.

Although the two organisations were largely promoting the same values, DfL was critical of CABE where it was seen to be ‘improving’ poor projects rather than intervening to change them. English Heritage, on the other hand, was often perceived as being at loggerheads with CABE. Some members of the architectural press and the profession made the rather artificial distinction that CABE was a supporter of ‘modernism’
and English Heritage of more traditional approaches to design. DfL attempted to distance itself from this debate and saw such definitions as irrelevant to its work. There was certainly a perception from some in the industry that CABE was a creation of the Blair government and this association may have contributed to its ultimate demise under the Conservative administration of David Cameron in 2011. Political changes were to impact on DfL as well.

**First challenge: the transition to a new mayor, 2008**

Within 18 months DfL was maturing as an organisation. Its work programme was delivering results and it was strengthening its influence on the agencies that made up London government. It had chosen to concentrate on working with amenable boroughs and not to bother with those that were not. Its unique governance model provided independence. It might report to a board, but this only met quarterly. Richard Rogers continued to put in one day a week with the team and was their figurehead and champion. DfL relished its ambiguous relationship within London government and enjoyed access to support from the mayor. It was skilled at deploying its soft power and was viewed as an organisation to work with rather than against. Its Achilles heel was that its power rested on its political patronage and this was about to change.

The 2008 London mayoral election initially seemed one-sided. Ken Livingstone was generally popular and initially the Conservative challenger, Boris Johnson, was not taken seriously. Two factors changed that. The first was a campaign in the *London Evening Standard* that was critical of Livingstone. The second, and more important, was the mobilisation by the Tories of the outer London vote. In a campaign that was to have shades of the later Brexit referendum, Livingstone was portrayed as elitist and out of touch with ‘ordinary Londoners’. His achievements were painted as having benefited inner (and Labour-controlled) boroughs. What had he achieved for the suburbs?

Johnson’s election in May 2008 caught many by surprise, including DfL. London government had not experienced a change in political leadership and had no way of ensuring a smooth transition. Mayoral advisors were cleared out overnight and replaced by a new team. Some key appointments had apparently been made directly by Conservative Central Office. Simon Milton, who had been Leader of Conservative-run Westminster City Council, was appointed as Johnson’s special
advisor on planning. Peter Hendy retained his position as TfL Transport Commissioner, but the chief executive and board of the LDA were replaced.

DfL mistakenly assumed that it was too small to be caught up in this shake-up and was in any case so obviously a force for good that it would retain its special relationship with the mayor. It was only a matter of keeping its head down and waiting for the right moment to impress. What was not clear at the time was that Milton had no love for DfL and that tensions within the GLA, dating back to the days of the A+UU, would resurface. DfL’s public profile – one of its strengths – suddenly became a weakness. It was too visible a target to escape notice. DfL’s re-emergence had been planned to coincide with the new mayor opening a major exhibition as part of the London Festival of Architecture at Somerset House. Curated by Isabel Allen and Morag Myerscough together with the team, it was intentionally quirky and thought-provoking. However, it soon became abundantly clear that DfL was peripheral to the mayor’s interests (see Chapter 7). Richard Rogers stepped down from his role as advisor, and DfL was left exposed and without support.

As members of its board focused on their own survival, there was a real possibility that DfL would be wound up. Peter Rogers was appointed as the new Chief Executive of the LDA with a remit to reform the agency. Rogers’ motives for retaining the team are unclear, but it is possible that he could see a role for it within an agency where new ideas were needed. Although it was notionally within the LDA, DfL had scrupulously avoided association with it. It was fortunate that Peter Rogers had known Peter Bishop when he worked in Camden (and had tried to recruit him to Westminster). Bishop was offered the role of Deputy Chief Executive of the LDA, a position he accepted reluctantly and on condition that DfL came with him and remained intact.

DfL survived the transfer of power but no longer had the independent position that it had enjoyed under Livingstone. It was now part of the LDA and had to report through line management structures to a board. However, DfL did have some advantages. First, it was a new organisation that had not been part of the traditional institutions of government. Second, it had a portfolio of projects that were ready to be implemented if the funding was available, and the decimation of LDA projects from the previous mayor meant that it was. Third, it was sufficiently agile to read and respond to the political changes. In return for its loss of independence, DfL gained direct access to LDA funding and took control of its land portfolio and environmental programmes. It had to undergo a rapid and painful process of growing up but could now
deliver its programmes. It had traded soft power for tangible power. Now, with Mark Brearley pushed forward as Head of Design for London and the close collaboration with Bishop sustained, the team changed its mode of operation in a number of ways:

– With the fresh closeness to those who controlled the LDA’s land portfolio, it developed new ways of using land as leverage to implement big spatial strategies and town centre regeneration.
– It shed design staff back to TfL since it could no longer exert significant influence over transport programmes.
– It developed expertise in the LDA’s Byzantine processes of internal project management.
– It rebadged core programmes. The Mayor’s 100 Public Spaces programme was replaced with London’s Great Outdoors. It covered the same set of schemes but was more flexible and included Better Streets and London’s Water Spaces. The East London Green Grid was reworked as the All London Green Grid, and the town centre projects evolved in response to the new understanding gained from the team’s research work on high streets, and after the 2011 riots, DfL was able to re-present these as ‘oven-ready’ projects that could become a core element of the Outer London Fund.
– It moved staff out into other agencies. Peter Rogers had given away the LDA’s lead role in delivering the Olympic legacy and a new development corporation had been set up – the Olympic Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC). The new chief executive of the agency, Andy Altman, was an American architect and a friend of Richard Rogers and Peter Bishop. He was a natural ally and took two staff from DfL, thus allowing a degree of direct influence over the Olympics that had previously been absent.
– It found new friends. The Advisory Board was now effectively defunct, so a new London Design Advisory Board was recruited. Its role was less clearly defined under Johnson, but it demonstrated to the press and professions that the mayor was maintaining continuity in design policy and that DfL was still alive. Johnson appointed Daniel Moylan, a councillor from Kensington and Chelsea, as his advisor on public realm. Moylan was also the chair of the TfL board and had pioneered a series of public realm projects in Kensington. He was also a friend of Richard Rogers and a supporter of public space programmes. This gave an important degree of continuity and Moylan was to prove an important supporter of, and collaborator with, the team.

If working for Ken Livingstone was like being in the court of the Medicis (cf. Chapter 1), the period under Boris Johnson was more like the Sublime Porte of the Ottomans: the courtiers were replaced with a group of powerful advisors whose role was to ensure that no one was allowed access to the ‘sultan’. Contact with the new mayor was closely controlled by his chief of staff, Simon Milton. Meetings were formal and agendas were agreed in advance. Simon Milton, who also controlled planning, viewed DfL with deep mistrust.

In such an environment DfL was forced to rethink its mode of operation and develop new strategies. It focused on the art of the possible and dropped some of the more ambitious schemes that would have required political commitment from the mayor. The highest-profile of these was the second of the World Squares for All projects, the partial closure to traffic and re-landscaping of Parliament Square (Chapter 5). It was clear that under the new mayor the project, designed by the Swiss landscape architect Günther Vogt, would never be realised. English Heritage and Westminster Council opposed it and the mayor could see no reason to change the existing layout. Other schemes, however, could be rebranded more easily.

On the positive side, the Johnson administration was far more conciliatory to the boroughs than Livingstone’s had been and there was a view, probably stemming from Milton’s own background in Westminster Council, that the boroughs should largely be left alone. Money was reallocated to the outer London boroughs to honour election pledges and this opened up opportunities for new partnerships. Otherwise, DfL’s work with boroughs was largely unaffected and indeed some new opportunities for collaboration opened up. A degree of refocusing took place and greater emphasis was placed on suburban town centres and high streets across London. This suited the design philosophy of the team. Projects such as Making Space in Dalston, typical of this period, are covered in Chapter 3. In addition, the London’s Great Outdoors programme identified new opportunities and, with access to LDA budgets and the political support of Daniel Moylan, the programme gained real traction. As a result, a flurry of new projects were completed, for example in Brixton (Windrush Square), Kensington (Exhibition Road) and Tower Hamlets (Aldgate Roundabout).

The team also dropped its campaigning profile and worked more deeply within the machinery of government. While it had been forced to become part of the institution of government, this did not prevent it from
subverting that machine. As Deputy CEO of the LDA, Bishop saw his role as shielding the team and allowing it to function without being drawn into the LDA’s difficult working environment. Brearley and his by now highly experienced team were familiar, from their A+UU days, with a subsurface way of working, so they readily adjusted, exercising influence while pushing credit to the mayor and others.

Bishop could also access new sources of funding through an investment subcommittee that was largely made up of business and financial consultants. The secret to working with this group was to use drawings and plans, which were an entirely new concept to many on the committee. They might challenge the business cases presented by other sections of the LDA, but found plans and drawings intoxicating.

Public space improvements were also real and material. Although the projects might lack any output indicators or metrics, they were the subject of well-worked-through inter-agency funding packages where LDA money was leveraged to good effect. The committee members were also open to a good narrative. The idea of storytelling and narratives had been developed by the A+UU and perfected by DfL, and Bishop had employed the concept extensively in his work with politicians in his previous positions in London boroughs.

Access to the mayor was restricted. Through his role as Deputy CEO of the LDA, Bishop (and therefore DfL) had weekly meetings with the mayor, but these were carefully controlled and monitored by his advisors. Individual meetings were discouraged. The formal meetings covered the range of business of the LDA and the mayor rarely showed any interest in design. The trick was to find a way of engaging and holding his attention. Obscure historical references (especially classical ones) usually worked, as did unusual turns of phrase.

Nevertheless, this was the working environment and DfL did adapt. In some ways the mayor’s working style was conducive to the team’s approach of ‘big ideas – small moves’. Livingstone was interested in detail; fail on this and he would dismiss the initiative. Johnson was capable of engaging with a big idea and was largely content to allow the team to get on with it as long as his advisors ensured there was no adverse political fallout.

DfL was sufficiently agile to work in this way and could package ideas and narratives quickly to suit the prevailing climate. A specific example was the creation of the Green Enterprise Zone (Figure 2.5). At the end of 2008, Bishop had a rare meeting with Johnson on his own. The conversation ranged from the economic slump and the risk of London being too heavily reliant on the financial industries sector to the lack of a
credible Olympic legacy strategy and the pressure that the mayor was under to find a convincing environmental strategy. The response to ‘Can you do something?’ was the Green Enterprise Zone. The idea was simple: brand a large area of east London that included the Lower Lea Valley, the Royal Docks, Beckton and Barking as a zone for the emerging green economy. The zone would include district energy grids, research and development establishments, and state-of-the-art ‘green’ manufacturing. The strategy was written up in a morning and a plan was produced. It was presented to the mayor a week later and he liked it. It had not been anticipated that two weeks later he would show it to the prime minister, Gordon Brown, who liked it too. There followed a frantic post hoc justification of the project. Management consultants Ernst & Young were brought in to verify the concept and put numbers behind it, but the concept stood. It was then taken to the Shanghai Expo as part of the London pavilion curated by DfL (see Chapter 7). Later that year Siemens invested in the Green Enterprise District, a move that triggered a new DfL workstream around regeneration of the Royal Docks (Chapter 6).

Johnson was always affable and enjoyable to work with and was undoubtedly popular with his staff and many Londoners. The key was to find a time when he was not being chaperoned by his advisors. The mayor cycled in and out of City Hall and it was often possible for Bishop, also a cyclist, to intercept him on his way home to Islington. A number of

Figure 2.5  The Green Enterprise Zone: a conceptual plan for the regeneration of east London. Source: DfL/GLA.
projects were discussed and ideas planted in this way. The London cable car (Emirates Air Line), for example, was mooted one evening at the traffic lights on Pentonville Road.

The period from 2008 to 2010 was a productive one for DfL. The LDA was used as a funding vehicle for projects, and the integration of design work with Bishop’s control of property assets and environmental programmes opened up new possibilities for area-based design strategies. Town centre regeneration projects were being developed in new locations. The Royal Docks were beginning to attract investment interest and the doors were opening for greater involvement with the Olympic legacy work.

The Olympic Fringe masterplans (Chapter 6) were a response to agitation from the five ‘host boroughs’ for tangible investment in their communities. Central government and the mayor did not have answers, but DfL did. Indeed, many of its new projects were a response to problems that existed at the interface of the GLA, TfL, the boroughs and central government. Such power interfaces represent real problems for formal institutions of government but are fertile areas for creative design thinking. Consequently, DfL developed new strategies around the wider integration of land development, housing and environmental programmes. These were launched at the annual property conference at MIPIM in March 2010 as the New Urban Agenda. Other initiatives were developed around town centre regeneration on the back of the impact of Crossrail. LDA land had dropped so sharply in value after the 2009 crash that it could no longer be considered as a significant asset. This triggered a period of intense policy development around how it could be used to support area-based regeneration programmes. This moved the policy emphasis away from financial returns towards design-based interventions which could achieve social and economic benefits.

But once again there were problems on the horizon. In May 2010, the newly elected Conservative government was determined to reduce public spending and slim down the agencies of government, especially the quangos (quasi non-governmental organisations). CABE’s funding was removed and the regional development agencies were abolished. This included the LDA and once again DfL was both homeless and under threat.

An unwanted child: 2011–2013

Following the spending cuts in the 2010 autumn budget, the LDA began the process of winding down its organisation in preparation for its
abolition. All programmes and projects that were not party to a binding contract (and some that were) were immediately suspended. Staff redundancies commenced, with a view to terminating the LDA by early 2012. DfL was caught up in this storm and initially no one in the mayor’s administration showed interest in preventing its abolition. With disaster looming, Brearley worked behind the scenes, helped by Richard Rogers and several members of the London Design Advisory Board, to get a survival campaign going. In response the team received a huge amount of support from the professions and press. Ellis Woodman described it as ‘an agency to be cherished’ and Merlin Fulcher wrote a piece in the *Architects’ Journal* entitled ‘Save Design for London’. Letters were written to the mayor from the presidents of the Royal Institute of British Architects, the Landscape Institute and the Architecture Foundation. *Building Design* published an open letter from international architects including Renzo Piano, Zara Hadid, Rafael Viñoly and Frank Gehry urging the mayor to retain the team. DfL had moved from the fringe to the mainstream! After an intense period of internal lobbying, a small core of staff of five architects from DfL were moved to the GLA, with other staff going to TfL and the Olympic Legacy Development Corporation.

In March 2011 Peter Bishop left the LDA to join the architects Allies and Morrison. Mark Brearley moved back to the GLA with a greatly reduced team to face an uncertain future. One of the conditions of survival for the design team was that it would be absorbed within the planning and regeneration group at City Hall and the name Design for London would be dropped. Brearley’s team was almost back down to the size of the A+UU in 2006, but this time it had no obvious champion at either political or managerial level. The team took the decision to ignore abandonment of the name, judging that perhaps no one would challenge continuity. No one did, so the DfL name continued, and the team flourished for another two years, regrouping and adapting its strategy once again. The team focused on progressing its existing workload rather than becoming too distracted by events, but as it happens a number of external events presented unexpected new opportunities.

First, the unexpected death of Johnson’s principal advisor, Simon Milton, led to Daniel Moylan taking over the mayor’s responsibilities on the built environment and separating these from planning. This gave DfL both a committed champion and a clearer niche in London government. While he was a councillor at Kensington and Chelsea, Moylan had been responsible for streetscape improvements in Kensington High Street. These had set new benchmarks for design quality and Moylan was both interested in and knowledgeable about architectural design. He supported
a number of DfL projects that might have otherwise been abandoned. In addition, he agreed to continue with the London Design Advisory Group, changing its membership to include Terry Farrell, Nick Serota (Director of the Tate), developer Roger Madelin and experienced civil servant Joyce Bridges. The mayor’s occasional attendance, encouraged by Moylan, provided an opportunity to engage him in a design debate and float ideas that would otherwise never reach him. It was through these sessions that, for example, interest in high streets was nurtured and enthusiasm for the Great Outdoors programme was strengthened.

Many small projects that had been developed with the boroughs could still proceed, often with the explicit support of the mayor. With Moylan now keen to make use of DfL’s skills, it became possible to dovetail with TfL projects and with borough projects funded by them. Moylan established a design review process for TfL-supported projects and he pushed the team’s nimblest critics to the fore. The Green Grid work was promoted by the mayor after a pitch to him that it offered a big impact for a low cost and his advisors noticed that these projects also afforded several photo opportunities. The team’s approach was low-key and opportunistic. Although in theory DfL had been wound up, the team’s continuity and distinct status was validated by Daniel Moylan and he coached Brearley in the art of politics and survival. It was a matter of staying in the game and waiting for an opportunity to rebuild.

The second relevant external factor was the need to provide a tangible response to outer London, a political payback that was required in response to Johnson’s 2008 election victory. Elections were coming up again in 2012, and the mayor’s Outer London Commission was struggling to find meaningful responses to the suburbs. The riots in August 2011 (a year before the Olympics were due to open) concentrated minds. The DfL team had a series of projects on town centres and high streets that had been prepared earlier in response to the economic downturn and demise of the high street. These were ready to be implemented (see Chapter 3). They had the advantage of being tangible and local, and were not funded from borough budgets. The resulting projects, initiated by DfL working with boroughs, were rolled forward through what became the Outer London Fund. This bold programme was acknowledged by Johnson as an important contribution to his re-election in 2012 (indeed, in May 2012 he spotted Brearley in the City Hall cafe and marched over to ask that he thank the team).

The third factor was the mayor’s relationship with the boroughs. This was less confrontational than under Livingstone since the political assumption of the administration was that decisions, wherever possible,
should be taken at local level. This was very much in keeping with the Cameron government’s policy of localism. This gave the DfL team access to new political clients. As long as its work was well grounded and in boroughs that actively sought its involvement, it was seen in a relatively positive light within the GLA. In the weeks before his departure from the LDA, Peter Rogers had arranged for Brearley to present to the mayor a proposal to focus regeneration efforts on a scatter of smaller projects across London, in places identified as ‘Good to grow and ready to go’. This approach was recognised as able to deliver much with small budgets, while enthusing boroughs and being welcomed by the public. Before long new initiatives and a flurry of projects had been tailored to respond to opportunities as they arose. The team thrived again, making rapid and substantial achievements. But this was to be short-lived.

Following Johnson’s re-election in 2012, there was another reshuffle in City Hall and the design team was again left without any political or managerial support. Daniel Moylan was moved to another job outside City Hall and lost his key role at TfL. New advisors were appointed and the planning lead passed to Edward Lister, formerly leader of Wandsworth. The emphasis of policy moved to raising the density of new housing. With a new round of budget cuts on the horizon, time had run out for DfL and the team was abruptly disbanded. No reasons were given nor announcements made. This time there was to be no survival campaign as it was clear that it would be futile. Mark Brearley departed with several of his colleagues, and the remaining team members were incorporated within the GLA regeneration team as project managers, to see out existing commitments. This effectively marked the end of the design experiment that had started 12 years earlier with the A+UU.

**Designing for London: the legacy**

While the Design for London brand name came to an end, it was not the end of the work of the team. The final element to this story is the diaspora of the team. Some members (Peter Bishop, Lara Kinneir and Richa Mukhia) have gone into academia; others (Tobi Goevert and Adam Towle) moved to city government, while some (Eleanor Fawcett, Esther Everett and Steve Tomlinson) worked for Mayoral Development Corporations. Mark Brearley is a professor of urbanism and has taken over a manufacturing enterprise in south-east London. Eva Herr, Charlotte Kokken and Fenna Wagenaar are all senior planners and
designers, in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands respectively. Some have advisory roles to other cities (Mark Brearley: Brussels; Peter Bishop: Zhuhai, Goyang and Riyadh). Through this diaspora the promotion of good design within city government continues.

It was always envisaged that the team would operate through the networks that it built in London government and it has been successful in advocating the importance of good design within London government. There are today many individuals within the GLA and TfL who understand the importance of good design and who make efforts to promote it in their everyday work.

Ten staff remained in the GLA as part of a Regeneration Team within a larger department. The loss of the brand name proved to be liberating. It removed the profile that had made DfL such a target and allowed the team to be assimilated into the structure of government. There they were seen to be under management supervision and had ‘proper jobs’. The team continued a number of projects with mayoral support on high streets, public space, town centre regeneration and the Green Grid.

When Sadiq Khan (Labour) was elected as mayor in 2016, there was no debate about re-establishing a design agency to replace DfL, but the process of transition was easier and there were no major upheavals. The remnants of the DfL team were by then well embedded in the GLA and had matured into a design-led regeneration team with sound relationships across London government. Khan’s agenda is broad and ambitious in certain areas but does not place design and urbanism at its centre. The main threads of the team’s design work – open space, landscape, town centres and high streets – all continue, as does work on housing standards and London Plan policy. The team continues to work in a refreshingly collaborative manner and has developed further strategies to support other parts of the GLA and TfL and the boroughs. There is political support for the team and its work. The team has learnt to play by the rules and is now an established voice for the promotion of good design in London.

Good Growth by Design, a programme of London’s current mayor, Sadiq Khan, aims to promote quality and inclusion in the built environment. It recognises the role of design in improving development and delivering quality of life in an ever-denser city. It has six pillars of activity:

- **Setting standards.** This involves design-related research to provide evidence and information to inform policy, investments and
decision-making, including a refresh of the Housing Design Supplementary Planning Guidance, guidance to promote the reuse and recycling of materials across a building’s life cycle, and guidance on making London child-friendly.

– Applying standards. This involves mechanisms to provide scrutiny of London’s development, such as the London Review Panel (City Hall’s design review panel), which has undertaken more than a hundred reviews since its launch.

– Building capacity. This concerns building and supporting local authority place-shaping capacity.

– Supporting diversity. The Supporting Diversity Handbook, launched in July 2019, addresses the barriers at each stage of career progression, from school age through to leadership.

– Commissioning quality. The programme recognises the role of good procurement and accessing the best design practitioners. Work includes the Design Quality Management Protocol – a framework for ensuring design quality, including design review and procurement. The Architecture Design and Urbanism Panel (ADUP) is a pre-approved panel of built environment consultants that can be used by public-sector bodies.

– Championing good growth. Advocacy work continues to be undertaken by Mayor’s Design Advocates and Advocate Organisations engaging on behalf of the mayor across London, nationally and internationally. This includes events, conferences and design awards.

Conclusions: an agency to be cherished?

The Introduction to this book compared forms of city government in the UK and other countries. It would be a generalisation to say that UK politicians are more sceptical about professional advice than their European counterparts, but the generalisation is borne out by how few examples there are of architectural advice reaching the heart of city government in the UK. The period in which the A+UU and DfL operated was both exceptional and volatile. The team and its work survived a change of mayor, but ultimately could not survive both that and a change of national government. It was not alone here, since CABE and other agencies were also axed. It was particularly unfortunate to have been incorporated into the LDA, where it ultimately suffered from the agency’s own demise.
There is always the need for champions at the political and operational level. When these existed in Ken Livingstone, Richard Rogers and Daniel Moylan, the team flourished; when they were absent, the team struggled. A design team will always be a fragile entity within city government. To be effective, DfL had to deploy a high public profile with an operational ability to influence and subvert. This worked when it was located close to the centre of political power, but it can make for an interesting but short operational life. Operating effectively within the heart of government inevitably makes enemies. Urbanism and design are approaches to shaping government programmes rather than core statutory requirements and therefore are always potentially expendable.

DfL was politically savvy and able to adapt and constantly reinvent itself. The approach of ‘big ideas – small moves’ (incremental urbanism) was robust enough even when architectural design was no longer at the centre of mayoral priorities. Programmes that deal with public space, climate change, town centre regeneration and streets are universal and should be able to cut across political boundaries. Some of DfL’s most effective work was in the field of policy development. DfL did not take a detached and technocratic approach to this work. Policy was abstracted from an understanding of its likely design impacts and this in turn was derived from extensive and careful research. The team understood where power and money were located in government and was adept at accessing these to support its projects. It learnt to build allies in different government agencies and to find new clients, budgets and workstreams. During this volatile period, it repackaged its programmes and ‘sold’ the ideas to different politicians and organisations. In the final analysis DfL was tenacious, resilient and agile and did not become institutionalised. Some of its work around the Olympics, high streets, public space, street design and urban landscapes has achieved a lasting impact. Perhaps its greatest achievement was the way it changed the culture of design thinking in government and the organisations within it. It supported those who were working to improve design quality and helped to build common methodologies as well as an evidence base that demonstrated the benefits of well-crafted and thoughtful design-led interventions.

DfL sought to plan London strategically as a whole by transcending boundaries and making relationships beyond sites and masterplans and between boroughs. It recognised that a city is a live and changing entity and worked to bring convergence between the disciplines of planning, architecture and landscape through its multidisciplinary, multi-scaled approach. Its approach was simple: to collaborate with others as part of the design process; to value and present the existing city with clarity; to
support its work with fresh research; to help improve the quality of design through influence; and, most crucially, to bring the designs of others together in one place, thus enabling a coordinated dialogue.

DfL was the kind of creative influence that London needed at the time (and still does). Its approach was loose. It could not shape the city through formal powers or the control of capital budgets. Instead it relied on its ability to influence and used the support of the mayor for this purpose. The approach to urbanism was to develop big ideas and implement them in small steps. DfL’s effectiveness lay in its ability to forge alliances, to influence public agencies and private developers, and to improve design quality through better design procurement and constructive design critique. Its ad hoc and opportunistic approach can be seen to have lent itself successfully to the naturally piecemeal patterns and behaviours of city regeneration, particularly in the London context. Its form of practice was in response to this very London condition.

This brings us to the underlying questions of how cities can be shaped by design strategies, what methodologies are the most effective and how these can be implemented within the structures of government. Possible answers to these questions include the following:

- Political leadership is essential. City politicians need to recognise that architecture and design are not abstract concepts. Well-thought-through and carefully applied design strategies can transform a city for the better (and benefit all of its inhabitants).
- A tactical approach, utilising big ideas and then bringing them to realisation through small projects, is an effective methodology.
- Long-term commitment and design continuity are essential. Many of DfL’s ideas and projects are still coming to fruition.
- A small design team that is unrestricted by city bureaucracy can act as a conscience, as a catalyst and as a conduit for new ideas. A design team needs to be given political licence to ‘think about the city’.
- Partnership and cross-agency working are very effective ways of channelling resources for change.
- Strengthening client roles in procuring and managing design work is essential.
- Public engagement – winning hearts and minds both at the city scale and through public involvement in local schemes – is vital.
- Drawings, phrases and narratives are important mechanisms for framing ideas and engaging partners.
– Research and intelligence gathering are essential to make the case for design interventions.
– Finally, achieving better design outcomes is difficult. It requires tenacity and stubbornness.

Kees Christiaanse described the methodology of DfL as ‘a negotiated approach, an urbanism of brokerage’, and Kieran Long commented, ‘Design for London is using guerrilla tactics to become the most influential city architect’s office in the country’. This legacy can be seen in many of the projects that have been delivered and in the continuing work of those who still work in London government. DfL and the A+UU might not have changed London, but they certainly shaped it, and in most cases for the better. At its height, from 2006 to 2011, DfL employed 25 people – the most concentrated group of city designers in the history of London government. The impacts of its projects and programmes are considered in more detail in later chapters.

Notes

1 The programme originally planned the partial pedestrianisation of Trafalgar Square, Leicester Square and Parliament Square. Plans for Leicester Square were implemented by Westminster City Council and the GLA in 2012. Those for Parliament Square were abandoned in 2008 when Boris Johnson became mayor (Chapter 5).
2 Interview with Richard Brown, writer and Senior Policy Officer at the Centre for London, May 2019.
3 Interview with Richard Brown, writer and Senior Policy Officer at the Centre for London, May 2019.
4 Building 2006.
6 Richard’s contribution and generosity deserves wider recognition. Not only did he give one day a week of his time without any payment; he was also available at any time to offer advice as well as to use his personal reputation and contacts to support the work of the team. He asked for no public recognition for this work.
7 Bishop and Williams 2016.
12 Crawford 2008b, p. 25.
13 The mayor’s team intervened to insist that KCAP were partnered with Allies and Morrison.
14 An Outer London Commission was set up to look at ways to do this, chaired by William McKee and advised by Terry Farrell. In reality little significant funding was diverted from existing programmes but recommendations did feed into the London Plan.
15 Siemens built the Crystal at Victoria Dock, opened in 2011.
16 The east-to-west cross-London railway, recently renamed as the Elizabeth line.
17 Woodman 2010.
18 Fulcher 2010.
19 Warmann 2011.
20 Set up to devise ways to move investment, the Outer London Commission (OLC) was established in 2008 by the Mayor of London. Chaired by William McKee CBE, it included
representatives of business, the boroughs, the development industry and the voluntary sector. The OLC published its Third Report in July 2014.

21 Summary of the Good Growth by Design programme provided by Jamie Dean and Sarah Considine, GLA (March 2020).


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