The language policy of the European Union (EU) represents an intriguing paradox. In order to preserve the ideal of linguistic democracy, multilingual language production is governed by the principle of ‘multiple authenticity’. This means that all parallel languages of official documents are equally valid as original policy tools. At the same time, the Language Charter and treaties actively avoid the word ‘translation’; all texts are said to be drafted on an equal footing. However, in reality the institutions of the EU currently produce documents in twenty-four different languages increasingly using English as the original drafting language. As a result, most versions are the product of hybrid translational procedures in which there can be several interim source and target texts before final versions are settled. The phenomenon of hybridity is therefore particularly relevant to Dutch language production as, in the EU discourse context, this is a language that is always translated into from another or other languages. The purpose of this chapter is to problematise the notions of multiple authenticity and hybridity, as well as conceptual relationships between Dutch and English, French and German in a discourse narrative on security. The chapter will analyse a number of parallel examples to explore whether Dutch is a mimic or a maverick, producing consensus or discord, in relation to these other languages; it will also describe the consequences this has for discourse content and the stability of institutional voice at the multilingual interface of discourse.
Introduction

Multilingual text production within the European Union institutions is a complex process. It involves currently the production of official documentation in twenty-four languages serving the needs of European public servants, members of the European Parliament, national politicians, European interest groups and lobbies and the wider lay audience of the Union, the ordinary European citizen. A great number of institutional actors take part in the process, which can be described as both political and linguistic. This is because the content of texts is drafted in two phases: first to convey the European policies of the Union (political), usually in English first or concurrently in English and French; and then to convey this same policy content in all the other remaining languages (linguistic).

The process of transforming policy documentation into this series of twenty-four multilingual versions is governed by the European Commission’s principle of multiple authenticity, which means that all language versions share equal authenticity or are considered equally valid as originals. This also implies that any single language version of an official text can be used as a policy tool either in isolation from or in tandem with any other language version. In other words, all parallel text content, regardless of the specific language selected, is equal in status to that of any other. This view is backed up by the European Union’s Language Charter, which does not make any mention of official texts being ‘translated’ from one language to another; rather all texts are ‘drafted’. The distinction between translation and drafting is significant as translation invariably implies the subordination of the source text to the demands of a target text (although, admittedly, the relative merits or legitimacy of target versus source text dominance have also been much debated within translation studies). However, the insistence of EU language policy specifically on the notion of parallel drafting and not translation suggests that translational effects on texts in their different language versions are somehow obviated; or at the very least the linguistic transfer procedure (whether this be source-or target-text-dominant) is not considered to be an issue which may influence the overall content of policy documentation. There is thus a collective institutional denial of the very activity of translation per se.

However, in reality the EU’s multilingual language production machine does function to a large extent with the aid of extensive translational procedures. The Commission’s Directorate-General for
Translation (DGT), as well as the other institutions, do in fact actively engage in enormous amounts of translation work. What is more, statistically most ‘translations’ increasingly find their genesis as original drafts in English; French is now used considerably less and German very sporadically. Hence, the remaining twenty-one language versions (of which Dutch is one) are without exception the result of translational transfers only. This has prompted the Orwellian view that some languages are ‘more equal’ than others.

It is thus primarily the way in which these translation activities are carried out that presents an intriguing paradox when considering the effects of language transfer procedures on the interpretation of policy content. Since – officially – there are no source or target texts (all texts are parallel drafts and therefore multiply authentic), no traditional source-to-target relationships between languages are either visible or traceable. The manner in which cross-lingual relationships are then constructed has created a phenomenon referred to by translation studies scholars as hybridity. A hybrid translation situation within the EU arena means that one-source to one-target language transfer (i.e. English into French or French into German) does not necessarily take place, and translational procedures may be based on more than one or even several language versions acting as interim source texts; these are also referred to as ‘pivot’ or ‘bridging’ languages because they mediate between original drafting language and final destination target language, passing through possibly up to ten so-called source texts. As a consequence, cross-contamination or pollution occur between ‘privileged EU working language’ versions and those versions that are not among the ‘chosen few’; as we have said, the precise effects of this are then understandably not traceable using source-to-target methods of analysis.

As an illustration, let us consider the following scenario. When certain segments of a draft in English are adjusted prior to the final version being released for publication, it then follows that other language versions must also be adjusted. For instance, the French version may be based on the English version and the German version on the French; the French text is then used as a ‘pivot’ or ‘bridging’ language between English and German. To complicate the matter further, another language, Dutch for example, may then be adjusted on separate occasions and by different translators using two (or even more) languages as source texts (i.e. English and German and perhaps also French). Thus, translational phenomena across language versions at the multilingual interface become hybrid.
In 2008 the former Director-General of the DGT commented that the Union's multilingual mandate was ‘too politically sensitive’ to be ‘dramatically reformed’ and was thus ‘here to stay’. In other words, the main principle of linguistic democracy enshrined in the policy of multiple authenticity was untouchable; the Union would therefore just have to cope with the incremental pressures of continued linguistic enlargement. However, more recently, in 2012 the current Director-General, Rytis Martikonis, emphasised during the CIUTI annual Forum that in the current climate translation can be very much a challenging political issue. This suggests that the political tide could be changing; there may indeed now be more room for debate around the issue of democratic legitimacy as to this somewhat fictional ideal of multiple authenticity, a concept designed to eliminate the political dominance, subordination or indeed individuality of any language in relation to others. As Tosi has remarked:

> when translations do not say the same as the original, then the law is not equal for all European citizens; and the language of the original and its translation are equally accessible to all Europeans, then the citizens are not equal before the law.

If we then problematise the notions of both multiple authenticity (the principle of linguistic democracy) and hybridity (the means by which the EU purports to achieve such linguistic democracy), we can ascertain whether these two notions add up to some kind of multilingual equivalence. If this is not the case (i.e. language versions do not say the same thing), then Tosi's further remark becomes all the more salient:

> In an arena where Europe champions equality for all, one would expect to find a more critical appreciation of the language issues that concern communication and affect democratic participation, as this can challenge the unity and solidarity of Europe.

The purpose of this chapter is to explore multiple authenticity and hybridity through the prism of the EU’s multilingual discourse chain in general; and in particular the behaviour of the Dutch language within this chain in relation to the three official working languages of the European Commission (English, French and German). As we have already said, Dutch is an EU ‘minority’ language (among the other twenty!) as it is never an original drafting language and is therefore always subject to hybrid translational procedures involving possibly an
incremental number of other languages as interim source texts. While these languages can of course be any of the other twenty-three available official EU languages, in this chapter we confine the analysis to only three others, English, French and German. The cross-lingual comparisons drawn will be between Dutch and these three languages only; the analysis will use a limited number of examples of parallel text excerpts from a citizenship narrative\[^{13}\] between the European Commission and the European Council to explore the following questions: Is Dutch a mimic or a maverick? Does it base itself on other language versions (thus achieving a form of equivalence) and if so which ones and in what way? Or, does it attain a level of linguistic independence (and thus non-equivalence) at various junctures in relation to these other languages? If so, how does it achieve this and what is the effect on the discursive content of what is being said as a result?

**The multilingual chain of discourse: intergovernmental and supranational**

One of the central notions underpinning the arguments in this chapter is that multilingualism as an EU ideology is defining for the way in which discourse is produced in parallel language versions – i.e. the phenomena of hybrid text production and hybrid ‘translation’ discussed in the preceding section. However, to fully appreciate the ideological parameters at work within this process, it is important to understand that the discourse narrative is a dialogue between two different institutional voices (Commission and Council); the Commission is a *supranational* institution (it represents the views of the EU as a whole) and the Council is an *intergovernmental* institution (it represents the views of the individual member states as a whole). Thus, the analysis must be able to identify translational shifts across two separate dimensions: (1) within the same institutional document or discourse stage (*intra-textual hybridity*) and (2) across different documents or discourse stages (*inter-textual hybridity*). Within this, language versions may or may not convey predictable patterns of supranational or intergovernmental ideology. In this respect, we will of course highlight in particular the behaviour of Dutch in comparison to the other languages. For example, mimicking or veering away from the meanings expressed in other languages could be of significance at the Council (intergovernmental) stage; this is because this is the stage where – either intentionally or unintentionally – member states (i.e. the Netherlands and Flemish-speaking Belgium) may be able to achieve
some form of individual voice in their own language. However, should this be the case, it would also be a point of contention as all language versions are deemed to be equally authentic as policy tools; they should therefore not lay themselves open to alternative interpretations on a close reading compared to other parallel versions.

It is therefore also important to consider parallel discourse segments from each document in terms of their chronology. In other words, the dialogue between the Commission and the Council unfolds dynamically as a *chain of discourse*. The chain is initiated by the Commission Proposal (COM 262), which is then converted into an adopted Programme by the Council (C 115); this in turn is then responded to in the form of an Action Plan for implementation, again drafted by the Commission (COM 171). The discourse narrative is thus a continuum, with the second document (or stage) developing (and modifying) what has been set out in the first, and the third replying to (and modifying) what has been set out in the second. Any analysis of the discourse will then firstly need to describe how the discourse chain develops over the three documents as a whole. This is of particular interest as, within the context of the EU’s principle of multiple authenticity, each of these documents can be considered as a single authentic narrative stage in any one language version.

Figure 10.1 illustrates how the chain proceeds from the Commission to the Council and then back to the Commission. As we have said, translational shifts can occur on two dimensions, within the same stage of the discourse chain and/or across different stages of the chain. This means that at one stage Dutch may mimic certain language versions but behave independently of others (intra-textual hybridity); at the next stage it may also mimic some language versions and not others but – crucially – not necessarily those same languages or indeed in the same ways. The result can be then that different constellations of languages

![Fig. 10.1 The institutional chain of discourse](image-url)
are in agreement or not at different stages, and the role of Dutch varies within each of these stages. The following section will briefly describe the methodology used to explore and compare cross-lingual expressions of conceptual equivalence among language versions.

Methodology

The way in which language is used to express a particular perception of reality (referred to by cognitive linguists\textsuperscript{14} as \textit{construal}) can reveal cross-lingual differences in the conceptualisation of narrative features; this has also been referred to as the construction of a subjective linguistic scene or ‘viewing arrangement’.\textsuperscript{15} The idea of linguistic subjectivity or ‘subjectification’ developed by Langacker can be applied as a specific tool for exploring spatial relationships within a discourse narrative. The Discourse Space Theory (DST) suggested by Chilton\textsuperscript{16} offers a framework for illustrating these relationships as functions of proximity and distance from one another. Thus, shifts in lexico-grammatical features of language (words and structures) can influence the interpretation and content of policy voices embedded in a political discourse context.

Chilton’s theory is essentially a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) approach, which means that it attempts to link micro-linguistic discourse features to the expression of ideology (the macro discourse); discourse spaces are categorised as both ‘ideational and ideological constructions in which people, objects, events, processes and states of affairs in the text world are conceptualised’ along the three axes of ‘space, time and modality’.\textsuperscript{17} The ‘ideational’ is how the speaker linguistically and/or discourse conceptually conceptualises the world; the ‘ideological’ is the political and/or economic beliefs or principles that underlie this conceptualisation of the world.

More specifically, spatial expressions operate on a scale of proximity and remoteness, where expressions such as ‘here’ and the personal pronouns ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘our’ are located at the deictic centre (the closest in proximity possible to the ‘self’). Conversely, expressions like ‘there’, and the personal pronouns ‘they’, ‘them’ and ‘their’ are found at the remotest end of the scale, the furthest from the deictic ‘self’. In political discourse, deictic centre is not necessarily interpreted as ‘geographical distance’ but more as ‘geopolitical or cultural “distance”’.\textsuperscript{18}

The data analysis in this chapter applies these notions to explore the extent of conceptual equivalence between cross-lingual versions
from the European Council’s Stockholm Programme 2009–14 on an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, with particular emphasis on the role of Dutch (NL). The analysis of data is organised as follows. A number of parallel excerpts in English (EN), French (FR), German (DE) and Dutch (NL) are presented as tables depicting one or more stages of the multilingual discourse chain (Examples 1 to 6); the Dutch version is then successively cross-compared to any or all of these versions as and when specifically relevant. Back translations in English are either wholly or partially given in the tables, depending on whether there is a need to highlight all or only some of the discourse content. Following on from the discussions of separate cross-lingual data examples, the language constellations that best represent the behaviour of Dutch compared to the other languages will be illustrated as diagrams (Figures 10.2 to 10.5).

The next section is the data analysis, which contains tabulated Examples 1 to 6. All these examples deal specifically with the overarching theme of security; they also consider in more detail the role of NL not only across languages but also across stages of the discourse chain (Commission and Council) in terms of the supranational and intergovernmental voices projected.

**Data analysis**

The first example is taken from one stage only of the discourse chain (stage A – the Commission supranational stage) and concerns the manner in which people – citizens or inhabitants – should be protected from threats that breach European borders.

**Example 1: A Europe that Protects – Epistemic Difference**

**STAGE A Commission Proposal COM 262**

**Supranational**

*Action at European level is key* to protecting its people against threats which do not stop at borders.

*L’Europe offre un cadre indispensable* (offers an essential framework) *pour protéger ses habitants contre les menaces qui ignorent les frontières.*
Stage A of the NL version here presents a first discourse segment which is strikingly different in content from all the other versions. The other versions state that in order to protect people/inhabitants/citizens of the EU from cross-border threats that do not stop at/disregard borders, the following scenarios are the case: (1) Action at European level is ‘key’ (EN); and (2) Europe either ‘offers an indispensable framework’ (FR) or ‘provides the necessary framework conditions’ (DE). In other words, the main message of these three language versions is that (the action of) Europe plays a crucial (‘key’), indispensable or necessary role in protecting citizens (people/inhabitants). However, here in the NL version the narrative has actually changed and states that: ‘bewoners in de EU beschermen tegen bedreigingen die geen grenzen kennen is alleen mogelijk binnen het Europese kader.’ Literally back-translated this segment equates to: ‘Protecting inhabitants in the EU against threats which know no borders is only possible within the European framework.’ This discursive shift signals that the NL speaker wishes to make it unequivocally clear that the only solution to cross-border threats is for member states to work within the European framework. This is very different from stating that Europe’s action is ‘key’ (crucial) or that the framework it provides is indispensable or necessary, as these positions do not rule out any alternative scenarios; the NL version rules out all other possibilities by stating that protection is ‘only possible’ under the conditions of the European framework it describes.

In this context, we in fact also see that the other versions mutually produce subtle differences in deontic modality in terms of judging degrees of necessity for Europe’s action or framework (conditions) to be provided. In the EN version, for example, deonticity is very close to the speaker’s self on the modal axis as the term ‘key’ expresses a necessity of crucial importance; something which is key is normally associated with being the one element needed to make a certain condition workable. The FR version is also very close to this degree of necessity given that something that is indispensable is needed to enable a particular
situation to function (i.e. the situation would definitely not come about in its absence). Finally, the DE version is further away from the speaker’s self on the deontic axis, as framework conditions which are merely ‘necessary’ are not such an urgent requirement as ‘indispensable’. When something is indispensable, this means that it cannot be feasibly or usefully replaced by anything else if the same result is desirable. In the DE version, however, ‘necessary’ framework conditions do not rule out similar conditions perhaps being achieved by other means (other than by Europe). The language versions of EN, FR and DE therefore all express subtly varying degrees of deonticity (necessity for Europe to provide protection for citizens). However, in the NL version, it is an epistemic type of modality that is being suggested; it is not the degree of necessity for European action in protecting citizens that is being emphasised here but the degree of possibility. The NL version closes off all other possible world views of protecting citizens from cross-border threats other than that provided within the European framework.

The distribution of these hybrid language representations is illustrated in Figure 10.2. We see that, despite being a ‘minority’ language that is always translated into (never acting as an original drafting language), NL attains here a degree of linguistic independence; that is to say its conceptual interpretation cannot feasibly be linked to any one of the possible ‘original drafting’ languages as a source text for translation. It can then be said to have become not hybrid within the process (i.e. if it had been based on one or more of the other languages) but hybrid within itself. Its interpretation of this particular segment has created a new independent hybrid construal not traceable to the other languages.

The next table (Example 2) also deals with one stage only of the discourse chain (this time stage B – the Council intergovernmental stage). The main focus of the excerpt is addressing threats said to be

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**Fig. 10.2** Hybrid language representations
Example 2: External Access to Europe

STAGE B Council Programme C 115

Intergovernmental

Addressing threats, even far away from our continent, is essential to protecting Europe and its citizens.

Pour protéger l’Europe et ses citoyens, il est essentiel de faire face aux menaces, même lorsqu’elles se manifestent loin de notre continent.

Back translation:

To protect Europe and its citizens, it is essential to face the threats, even when they manifest themselves far from our continent.


Back translation:

Defence from threats, also far away from our continent, is decisive for the protection of Europe and its citizens.

De bescherming van Europa en zijn burgers staat of valt met het beperken van bedreigingen, zelfs als zij van ver buiten ons continent komen.

Back translation:

The protection of Europe and its citizens stands or falls with (depends entirely on/is decisive for) the limiting of threats, even when/if they come from far outside our continent.

far from the European continent in order to protect the EU’s external borders and its citizens.

This segment discusses the protection of Europe and its citizens from threats that lie beyond Europe (our continent). The NL version of this is particularly interesting; the reason for its salience is that it includes the dynamic verb ‘komen’ (come), which plays a decisive deictic role in determining the rhetorical stance of the speaker. The NL version of this segment and its back translation read as follows:

‘De bescherming van Europa en zijn burgers staat of valt met het beperken van bedreigingen, zelfs als zij van ver buiten ons continent komen.’
‘The protection of Europe and its citizens stands or falls with (depends entirely on) the limiting of threats, even when/if they come from far outside our continent.’

There are a number of discourse features in the above segment that suggest a subjective reproduction of a source text for translation into NL. The first and most overriding of these is, as already indicated, the use of the dynamic verb ‘komen’; this makes it clear that, despite these threats being conceptually positioned ‘far outside’ our continent, they are – in the perspective of the speaker – moving, do (regularly) move or are likely to move into our continent (Europe).

In all the other language versions, the distal position of the threats is described as ‘far (away)’, which of course indicates a considerable distance from the deictic ‘here’ coordinate of the speaker; however, this does not conceptualise in any way whether the threats are or should be excluded from the conceptual space of the speaker. This brings us to the second point of difference between this NL version and the other versions: the use of the locational preposition ‘buiten’ (outside), which categorically positions the threats beyond the borders of Europe (‘our continent’). Therefore, these threats are strongly associated with a sense of ‘otherness’ from a space beyond Europe from which those within Europe are separated; the ‘us’ and ‘them’ discourse of inclusion (equals safe and protected) and exclusion (equals dangerous and threatening) is thus constructed in an indirect way.

The third particularly striking point of difference with all the other versions is the speaker’s discursive positioning that the protection of Europe’s citizens depends categorically (stands or falls) on the limiting of these threats. Even though the other versions state that addressing/facing these threats is ‘essential’ (EN and FR) or ‘decisive’ (DE: entscheidend) for protecting Europe and its citizens, they in no way imply, as the NL version does, that ‘limiting’ these threats will determine the ultimate success or failure of protecting citizens within Europe.

Figure 10.3 shows the distribution of languages according to similarity of conceptual representation in this segment. As we can see, the EN and FR versions are very close collaborators in this respect, with the DE version offering a variation (not discussed here). However, crucially, the NL version is dissimilar conceptually to all three other versions in the constellation. We therefore conclude that it has achieved an independent voice not directly traceable to a possible source text provided by the other parallels here – and can thus be qualified as maverick in this instance.
Examples 1 and 2 each concerned only one stage or document (the intra-textual) of the discourse chain and its parallel multilingual versions. Nevertheless we have already seen that even within these two intra-textually hybrid scenarios, the NL version achieved an independent voice, whether this was the institutional voice of the Commission (stage A – Example 1) or that of the Council (stage B – Example 2). This means that the institutional voices of Commission and Council (supranational and intergovernmental, respectively) were equally unstable in NL compared to the other languages. This is highly relevant from a CDA perspective; this is because in both cases the protection of citizens within the EU framework (stage A) and from threats external to Europe’s borders (stage B) were emphasised more strongly in the NL version and the particular construals used could not be directly traced back to other languages as source texts. Given that NL is always translated into, we note that the version generated was not conceptually equivalent either from a translational or a conceptual viewpoint. The NL voice was linguistically independent of other language voices despite being said to be multiply authentic with all other EU parallel versions.

The next table contains Examples 3 and 4, which now compare not only intra-textually (cross-lingual comparison within stages) but also inter-textually (across two stages of the discourse chain – stages A and B).

Here in the NL version, like the FR and DE versions, the semantic description ‘internal’ is maintained across stages A and B to describe the security strategy that should be developed: ‘een strategie voor interne veiligheid’ (a strategy for internal security). In addition, at stage A, like the DE version, the title of this section characterises Europe as an entity which offers protection (‘een Europa dat bescherming biedt’) rather than ‘that protects’, which is the title maintained in the EN and FR versions. However, at stage B in this NL version, the text neither reverts nor homogenises to stage B in EN and FR (a Europe that protects); this is indeed the case in the DE version, where the text equates to ‘a Europe that offers protection’ at stage A only. The NL in fact introduces at stage B a new
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example 3</th>
<th>STAGE A</th>
<th>Commission Proposal COM 262 Supranational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protecting citizens – a Europe that protects:</td>
<td>A domestic security strategy should be developed in order further to improve security in the Union and thus to protect the life and safety of European citizens.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protéger les citoyens – une Europe qui protège (that protects):</td>
<td>une stratégie de sécurité intérieure (internal) devrait être développée pour améliorer encore la sécurité au sein de l’Union et protéger ainsi la vie et l’intégrité des citoyens européens.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schutz der Bürger – ein Europa, das Schutz bietet (that offers protection):</td>
<td>Es sollte eine Strategie der inneren (internal) Sicherheit entwickelt werden, um die Sicherheitslage innerhalb der Union zu verbessern und damit das Leben und die Unversehrtheit der europäischen Bürger zu schützen.</td>
<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example 4</th>
<th>STAGE B</th>
<th>Council Programme C 115 – Intergovernmental</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Europe that protects:</td>
<td>An internal security strategy should be developed in order to further improve security in the Union and thus protect the lives and safety of citizens of the union and to tackle organised crime, terrorism and other threats.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Une Europe qui protège (that protects):</td>
<td>une stratégie de sécurité intérieure (internal) devrait être développée afin d’améliorer encore la sécurité au sein de l’Union et, ainsi, protéger la vie des citoyens de l’Union et assurer leur sécurité, et en vue de lutter contre (fight against) la criminalité organisée, le terrorisme et d’autres menaces.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ein Europa, das schützt (that protects):</td>
<td>Es sollte eine Strategie der inneren (internal) Sicherheit entwickelt werden, um die Sicherheitslage innerhalb der Union weiter zu verbessern und damit das Leben und die Sicherheit der Unionsbürger zu schützen und um gegen (against) organisierte Kriminalität, Terrorismus und sonstige Bedrohungen vorzugehen (act).</td>
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De burger beschermen – een Europa dat bescherming biedt (that offers protection): er moet een strategie voor interne (internal) veiligheid worden ontwikkeld om de veiligheid binnen de Unie verder te verhogen en zo het leven en de integriteit van de Europese burgers te beschermen.

Een beschermend (protective) Europa: Een strategie voor interne (internal) veiligheid moet worden ontwikkeld om de veiligheid binnen de Unie verder te verhogen en zo het leven en de integriteit van de burgers van de Unie te beschermen, en om georganiseerde misdaad, terrorisme en andere dreigingen het hoofd te bieden (offer ‘the head’ – resistance).

construal equating to ‘a protective Europe’ (een beschermend Europa). Thus, Europe is cast in the role of a ‘protective’ parent as it were; the adjectival description ‘protective’ endows Europe with the quality of being protective – or of protector – rather than simply describing action taken in a particular instance (i.e. A Europe that protects).

Nevertheless, there is still a subtle grammatical difference between NL ‘beschermend’ (literally ‘protecting’) and an alternative adjectival form ‘protective’. The NL version is a present participle (but functions here as an adjective); this means that ‘a protecting Europe’ could also easily be defined in the relative clause form used in EN, FR and DE: ‘a Europe that protects’ (in NL: een Europa dat beschermt). We are also bound to note that the adjective ‘protective’ is not possible lexically in NL, so the present participle must be used. Notwithstanding, the NL still opts for an adjectival description of Europe as ‘protecting’ rather than taking action to protect. As we have already said, ‘a Europe that protects’ is not grammatically ruled out in NL. Coupled with the fact that this structure is also not used at stage A – in favour of a Europe that only ‘offers’ protection (i.e. there is no guarantee that this protection will be forthcoming), we conclude that this slightly weakens the role of Europe as the agent of protection in the NL version only.

Returning to stage A, the need to enhance security within the Union is expressed differently to the other language versions in two respects. The first of these is the way in which the desired further enhancement of Union security is lexically described using a verb equating to the semantic domain of ‘increase’; this is in contrast to all three of the
other languages, which state that security should be further ‘improved’. Thus, in the NL version the desired aim is ‘de veiligheid binnen de Unie verder te verhogen’ (to further increase security within the Union). While both lexical choices equating to ‘improve’ and ‘increase’ are included in the semantic domain of ‘enhancement’, from a conceptual viewpoint there is a subtle difference between the two. This is because the notion of improving security is open to the interpretation of the speaker (or hearer) as to the precise quality and/or quantity of action required to achieve this improvement. However, the notion of ‘increasing’ security is far less open to such interpretation in the sense that ‘increase’ suggests the stepping up and actual quantitative multiplication of resources for security measures. This difference in lexical construal is also carried over to Council stage B and is not homogenised to other language versions.

Another salient element of this NL discourse strand concerns the lexical alternatives of protecting either the ‘integrity’ (FR, DE and NL at stage A) or the ‘safety’ (EN version only at stage A) of citizens. Initially, and in parallel with the FR and DE versions, the NL deviates here at stage A from the EN lexical choice of ‘safety’; it therefore also suggests that citizens are whole and that this wholeness may be disintegrated if sufficient protection is not achieved: ‘en zo het leven en de integriteit van de Europese burgers te beschermen’ (and in this way protect the life and the integrity of the European citizens). However, this discourse strand also remains the same (using the lexeme ‘integrity’ – integriteit) at stage B (Council); this means that it is not modified to equate lexically to safety and thus homogenise to the other three language versions. The NL version thus deviates from the EN version with the other two languages at stage A (Commission); but it then retains this deviation even when the remaining parallel versions then modify lexically to harmonise with the EN ‘original drafting language’ at stage B (Council).

One final point of interest in this same discourse strand relates specifically to the text at stage B, where the need to confront threats to security is expressed. Here a metaphorical conceptualisation is used in that a second positive outcome of increased security will be ‘om georganiseerde misdaad, terrorisme en andere dreigingen het hoofd te bieden’ (in order to offer resistance – literally: ‘to offer the head’, based on the movements of a bull or stag confronting an opponent – to organised crime, terrorism and other threats). It is worth noting here that this expression is perhaps more adversarial – by virtue of its metaphorical imagery – than other less metaphorical expressions of offering resistance, such as the FR ‘lutter contre’ (fight against) and the DE ‘vorgehen gegen’ (act against).
The cross-lingual hybrid relationships described above and the role of NL within these are depicted in Figure 10.4. We can clearly see from this diagrammatical representation that, at the supranational stage A of the discourse chain, NL allies itself with (thus mimics) the DE version. In contrast, at stage B, the intergovernmental stage, the NL ‘parallel’ achieves a degree of independent construal (acting as a maverick) in relation to the three other languages; these all form one homogeneous cluster in their similar interpretation of the protection of Europe and the life and safety of citizens. This also means that NL appears to attain its independence more at the intergovernmental stage, where it is rather the voice (and interests) of individual member states (i.e. its own language users) and not that of the European Union as a whole (the Commission) that is being expressed.

The next two examples (5 and 6) also deal with the inter-textual dimension but this time we examine stages B to C (Council intergovernmental stage to Commission supranational stage) rather than the reverse scenario of stages A to B dealt with in the last two data analysis examples. Our focus here is the distribution of lexical choice among languages between ‘citizens, people and Europeans’; we discuss in particular the relative conceptual representations of these terms as they relate to notions of protection and security and the specific role of NL within this.

The purpose of these two examples is not so much to examine the discourse surrounding the approach to security but to see how the lexical item ‘European citizen’ may be utilised differently across different stages of the discourse chain (Council intergovernmental stage B and Commission supranational stage C). At these two stages, the notion of the European citizen is also being mentioned in two different discursive
scenarios. Stage B concerns the need to develop an internal security strategy to further improve security and protect the lives and safety/integrity of citizens. This is seen as an imperative in the light of what is mentioned in the second part of the segment (to tackle/fight/act...
against/resist organised crime, terrorism and other threats). We see then at this intergovernmental stage that all language versions (including NL) are in agreement that the collective voice of the European citizen should be utilised; the threat to member states and the security of their citizens (who are denoted here specifically as European citizens) is very real and overtly categorised: organised crime and terrorism, which is presumably pan-European and requiring a pan-European response. The inference then here is that a collective European voice should deal with such threats. However, at stage C, no specific security threats are spelt out and the discourse is relatively generalised, alluding to the fact that the Lisbon Treaty will enable greater ambition in responding to everyday concerns and aspirations of ‘people in Europe’ (EN version). What is interesting to note here is that two language versions (FR and DE) retain the sense of European/Union citizenship, respectively, whereas both EN and NL do not. These latter two versions then seem to suggest that there is no need to specify this European ‘citizenship-ness’ here as the discourse no longer concerns overt threats to security requiring a collective intergovernmental ‘member states together’ reaction. Even so, the NL version does not mimic the alternative EN lexical choice (people in Europe); it has yet another alternative, which is not equivalent to any other version. The lexical choice of ‘Europeans’ generalises beyond European citizens but does not go as far as the EN version’s ‘people in Europe’; the latter could mean any persons physically in Europe, thus even those who could never qualify as belonging to any state or political entity that is European (e.g. an American). However, the NL version ‘Europeans’ does designate those referred to as at least having a legitimate affiliation with Europe, even if they are in a state outside the EU and are thus not European citizens. NL then achieves here an independence in lexical choice – and indeed conceptualisation of European citizenship – that does not follow FR or DE but, crucially, does not either follow EN (the likely original drafting language).

Figure 10.5 shows the constellation of languages and their relationships to one another across intergovernmental stage B and supranational stage C. As we have indicated, NL is a mimic to all the other languages at stage B and a maverick (even to EN, which is already significantly distinguishable from FR and DE) at stage C. The NL version then also exhibits not only translational hybridity by virtue of its independence even from EN at stage C. What is particularly salient is that it also exhibits conceptual instability of institutional voice (Council and Commission) across discourse stages: it was equivalent to the other language versions at stage B in its translational representation of ‘European
citizens’ but not at stage C (even though this equivalent was still available in FR and DE).

The verdict: mimic or maverick?

From the examples, we have seen that Dutch oscillates between mimicking any combination or configuration of the three other languages analysed at varying points (or stages) of the discourse. However, we have also noted that it displays maverick tendencies (or indeed precisely not!) in places where security issues involve perceived threat or danger; this is particularly the case when ‘us’ and ‘them’ internal/external EU border polarities are at stake.

A more systematic comparative analysis of a larger corpus of data would of course be needed to explore the mimic/maverick behaviour of Dutch more fully. Nevertheless, important conceptual differences were identified within and between the two institutional voices of the Commission (stages A and C) and Council (stage B). This is significant as the Commission is a supranational body and is expected to retain a stable narrative voice in support of the interests of the EU as a whole; neither should it portray any evidence of alternative stance-taking in any one particular language and/or in the interests of any one national or language community. Its narrative is therefore said to be multiply authentic and neutral in all languages and in respect of all national politics. On the other hand, the Council is an intergovernmental body and, as such,
represents the views of the heads of state and government of the individual member states. In this capacity, its institutional narrative may then be anticipated to be more susceptible to conveying subjectivity at particular discursive junctures. Notwithstanding, regardless of the possibility (or even expectation) of linguistically representing intergovernmental interests, the narrative in each language version should also be multiply authentic; moreover, it should in principle remain stable in the conceptual representations it portrays within each parallel text segment. We can then at least conclude that the mimic and maverick tendencies of a so-called ‘non-drafting’ minority language such as Dutch can – via hybrid translational mechanisms – still considerably affect the conceptual stability of the Commission and Council’s institutional voices.