Britain, France and the Decolonization of Africa

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Notes

Introduction

1 This volume focuses primarily on a comparison between British and French decolonization in Africa, but we are conscious that the Portuguese empire did not decolonize until the 1970s. See Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and António Costa Pinto (eds.), ‘International dimensions of Portuguese late colonialism and decolonization’, special issue of Portuguese Studies, 29:2 (2013).


5 For a comparative analysis of the political context of European decolonization, see Martin Thomas, Bob Moore and Larry J. Butler, Crises of empire: decolonization and Europe’s imperial states, 1918–1975, 2nd edn (London: Bloomsbury, 2015).


13 Ibid.


15 Shipway, Decolonization and its impact, 8.
16 John Darwin, ‘What was the late colonial state?’, Itinerario, 23:3/4 (1999), 73–82. See also Miguel Bandeira Jerônimo and António Costa Pinto (eds.), The ends of European colonial empires: cases and comparisons (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).


18 Martin Thomas, Fight or flight: Britain, France, and their roads from empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), x. For an insight into the ways in which British and French colonial administrators deployed similar solutions after the Second World War, despite differing mentalities, see Véronique Dimier, Le gouvernement des colonies, regards croisés franco-britanniques (Brussels: Éditions de l'université de Bruxelles, 2004).


24 Buettner, Europe after empire, 5–8.


27 Cooper, ‘Reconstructing empire’, 196.


30 Hunter, Political thought and the public sphere, 66.


35 Frederick Cooper, Africa since 1940: the past of the present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 20–37.


37 Senghor, 'La décolonisation'.


42 Cooper, Citizenship, passim.

43 Rohland Schuknecht, British colonial development policy after the Second World War: the case of Sukumaland, Tanganyika (Munster: LIT Verlag, 2010), 23–32.

44 In particular, this can be seen in the ‘Eurafrican’ project explored by the French government as a means of reconciling its African presence with European integration. See Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson, EurAfrica: the untold history of European integration and colonialism (London: Bloomsbury, 2014); and Adekeye Adebajo and Kaye Whiteman (eds.), The EU and Africa: from Eurafrique to Afro-Europa (London: Hurst, 2012).


47 This is very well explored in Butler and Stockwell, The wind of change. Todd Shepard in particular has highlighted the way in which this battle took place in popular discourse, in The invention of decolonization, and illustrated the process taking place in the document series he authored, Voices of decolonization: a brief history with documents (Boston, MA: Bedford/St Martins, 2015). On the British side, Ronald Hyam discusses the official mind in Britain and its attempts

48 Shipway, Decolonization and its impact, 2.
54 This is true also of the story of activists told by Kristin Ross, in which revisions altered the memory of the events of 1968: May ’68 and its afterlives (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002).
56 See, for example, the discussions around the establishment of the Mali Federation in Alexander Keese, ‘French officials and the insecurities of change in sub-Saharan Africa: Dakar, 19th August 1960 revisited’, in Tony Chafer and Alexander Keese (eds.), Francophone Africa at fifty (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 44–57.
58 This is a key theme in the edited collection Francophone Africa at fifty, and is well outlined in the ‘Introduction’ (Tony Chafer and Alexander Keese, 1–12) and in the chapters in part III of the volume, ‘Continuities and connections’. See also Ashley Jackson, ‘Empire and beyond: the pursuit of overseas national interests in the late twentieth century’, English Historical Review, 123:499 (2007), 1350–66.
59 Robert J. C. Young, Empire, colony, postcolony (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2015).
61 Shepard, The invention of decolonisation, 10–15.
66 Potter and Saha, ‘Global history’. 
Chapter 1


2 In the British case, such perspectives connect work stretching from John Robert Seeley’s The expansion of England: two courses of lectures (London: Macmillan, 1883) through to the eight volume Cambridge history of the British empire (1929–61) and beyond to the post-war work of historians such as Nicholas Mansergh. The first volume of The Cambridge history speaks of a ‘long story of colonization and imperial policy, of the rise and growth of new nations and the assumption of vast responsibilities, a story varied in its scene, but finding its unity in the activities of a maritime and commercial people’: John Holland Rose, Arthur Percival Newton and Ernest Alfred Benians, The Cambridge history of the British empire, vol. I, The old empire from the beginnings to 1783 (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1929), v.


4 The confidence of the authors of the Cambridge history, for example, is manifest in their belief that the ‘time has not yet come when that story can be finally written’, because the ‘British Empire is still in the long process of its growth’: Rose et al., The Cambridge history, vol. I, v.


6 William Keith Hancock, Argument of empire (London: Penguin Books, 1943), 12. As William Roger Louis has commented, ‘Historians of the interwar years, with varying degrees of scepticism, continued to affirm the Whig idea of progress’: William Roger Louis, ‘Introduction’, in Robin W. Winks (ed.), The Oxford history of the British empire, vol. V, Historiography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 1–42, 27. Louis adds that it ‘would do them an injustice to measure them against the Zeitgeist of a later age’. In an important sense he is right. Even though by the 1950s there was a growing political and academic awareness that British control of the development of its empire/commonwealth was increasingly impractical, in Africa specifically, both British and French officials still believed – as discussed below – that they were in charge of the continent’s direction after 1945.


Useful assessments of British politics during this period include David Goldsworthy, Colonial issues in British politics, 1945–1961: from ‘colonial development’ to the ‘wind of change’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971); and Murphy, Party politics and decolonization.


The ‘transfer of power’ had cross-party appeal, particularly in early attempts to explain post-war decolonization written by those involved in the process themselves. Harold Macmillan’s memoirs, especially his Pointing the way, 1959–61 (London: Macmillan, 1972), can be seen as a last breath for the idea that decolonization was an intended affair, leading to a mutually beneficial postcolonial relationship within the Commonwealth. Although it had been shared at an earlier stage, this kind of sentimentalism had been severely eroded among Labour politicians by their experience of Commonwealth relations in the later 1960s, particularly by the Rhodesian and Biafran crises.


A stimulating discussion of the long intellectual history of Britain’s civilizing mission can be found in Ali Parchami, Hegemonic peace and empire: the Pax Romana, Britannica, and Americana (London: Routledge, 2009). See also Julian Go, Patterns of empire: the British and American empires, 1688 to the present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).


25 This has been explored in the forceful polemic by Emmanuel Todd, Who is Charlie? Xenophobia and the new middle class (Cambridge: Polity, 2015), in which the author questions the racial dimensions of the Republic’s allegedly inconsistent commitment to equality. For a cogently argued and circumspect history of the changes undergone by the republican model in the wake
of decolonization, see Emile Chabal, A divided republic: nation, state and citizenship in contemporary France (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), especially ch. 3.


28 Niall Ferguson is generally seen as the leading voice in the ‘for’ camp, extolling the overall positive effect of British imperialism in making the ‘modern world’. See his Empire: how Britain made the modern world (London: Penguin Books, 2003). A sympathetic hearing (with accompanying TV series) was produced by the notable British broadcaster Jeremy Paxman under the title Empire: what ruling the world did to the British (London: Viking, 2012). A more critical account, but still in line with Ferguson and Paxman’s Eurocentric perspectives, is given by Kwasi Kwarteng, Ghosts of empire: Britain’s legacies in the modern world (London: Bloomsbury, 2012). Richard Gott’s Britain’s empire: resistance, repression and revolt (London: Verso, 2011) meticulously catalogues colonial violence, as well as the many stories of its victims and those who stood up to colonial rule. In this sense it offers a welcome shift of emphasis away from Britain as the centre of its narrative, but overall its approach and tone add to the arguably over-simplified dichotomy of good empire, bad empire. Another popular history of empire’s decline, Piers Brendon’s The decline and fall of the British empire, 1781–1997 (London: Jonathan Cape, 2007), is a ‘warts and all’ version but, as one reviewer pointed out, by portraying ‘a glittering panoply of decadence, folly, farce and devastation’ it leaves the reader wondering ‘how Britain ever managed to have an empire at all’: Maya Jasanoﬀ, ‘Last post for the oddball empire’, The Guardian, 20 October 2007, www.theguardian.com/books/2007/oct/20/featuresreviews.guardianreview2 (accessed 14 January 2016).

29 A July 2014 YouGov opinion poll in the United Kingdom found that 49 per cent of respondents believed that countries formerly colonized by Britain were ‘better off for it’. A January 2016 YouGov poll found that 44 per cent of British people believed that they should be ‘proud of British colonialism’: Will Dahlgreen, ‘Rhodes must not fall’, YouGov, 18 January 2016, https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/01/18/rhodes-must-not-fall (accessed 21 January 2016).


31 For an unambiguous statement on the importance of the official archive, see Flint, ‘Planned decolonization and its failure in British Africa’, 389: ‘My sources will be, almost entirely, the Colonial Office files for the period after 1938. I make no apologies for this, because the dynamic for change, before 1946 at the earliest, lay there, and not in Africa.’

32 As Darwin has put it, ‘the ideas and arguments found there [in ‘The imperialism of free trade’] bear almost constant re-reading’: John Darwin, The empire project: the rise and fall of the British world-system 1830–1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 793.
2015 saw not one but two detailed examinations of Darwin’s work in the scholarly journals. The first was a surprisingly personal, interrogative analysis of Darwin’s attitudes to the study of the imperial past through the wider corpus of Darwin’s work and his intellectual influences by Bill Schwarz: ‘Unsentimental education: John Darwin’s empire’, *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 43:1 (2015), 125–44. The second was a roundtable on Darwin’s major book *The Empire Project* entitled ‘Imperial history by the book: a roundtable on John Darwin’s *The Empire Project*’ and coordinated by Antoinette Burton for the *Journal of British Studies*, 54:4 (2015), 971–97, which contained pointed remarks about Darwin’s style of scholarship, not to mention the size of his books, from Burton. Not to be displaced as the main object of the postcolonial historians’ wrath, Bernard Porter has issued a new provocation in the form of *British imperial: what the empire wasn’t* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2016). It is hard to imagine it will attract the same level of interest as that generated by his *Absent-minded imperialists: empire, society and culture in Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), since the better parts of the new book appear to be a more concise reiteration of the previous one.


‘Singapore’s fall was the brutal proof that the Eurasian revolution of the 1930s and 1940s had reached its climax. The global preconditions in which the British world-system had been continuously viable since the 1830s and 1840s, had all but disappeared in the storms of war. The European balance, precariously restored after 1918, had been comprehensively wrecked… “Passive” East Asia had become an uncontrollable vortex of anti-Western imperialism.’ Darwin, *The empire project*, 513.


*The empire project* is built on an immense amount of archival work in the United Kingdom, the Irish Republic, South Africa, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States, but includes no original primary source work in African archives other than South Africa, and relatively little material narrating perspectives from colonized peoples, excluding even nationalist elites.

For a broad discussion, see Richard Drayton, ‘Where does the world historian write from? Objectivity, moral conscience and the past and present of imperialism’, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 46:3 (2011), 671–85. In fundamental ways these ideas constitute the nexus between history and present politics. For an excellent review of this, see Dane Kennedy, ‘The imperial history wars’, *Journal of British Studies*, 54:1 (2015), 5–22.

When the Indian National Congress was formed in Mumbai in 1885, its purpose was not to fulfil nationalist ideology – for every nation, its own state – but broadly to petition the imperial power to give more consideration to the interest of Indians and India as a political and economic entity. See, for example, Dadabhai Naoroji, *Poverty and un-British rule in India* (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1901).

This came alongside a turn to area studies within social science and humanities departments in many European and North American universities that also threatened the status of imperial history. See David K. Fieldhouse, ‘Can Humpty-Dumpty be put together again? Imperial history in the 1980s’, *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 12:2 (1984), 9–23.

It is worth noting that there were histories written at a much earlier time that could be deemed as Africanist, or that sought to define the shape of an African ‘nation’. Apolo Kagya, the Buganda Katikkiro (prime minister) from 1890 to 1926 (first under Mwanga II and later Daudi Chwa), travelled to England with his secretary Ham Mukasa in 1902 for the coronation of Edward VII. He did much to promote the distinctive history of Buganda (which would impact upon subsequent colonial politics in the Uganda Protectorate) through his ethnography of Buganda and the publication of *Basekabaka be Buganda* in English as *The Kings of Buganda* (London: Macmillan, 1901).

House, 1968). Dike’s influence can be seen in the work of eminent African historians writing today; see, for example, Toyin Falola, *The history of Nigeria* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999).

### Notes


48 Henri Grimal, *Decolonization: the British, French, Dutch and Belgian empires, 1919–1963* (London: Routledge, 1978). Similar ideas underpin the later work of John Gallagher, who extended his analysis of peripheral politics and collaboration in *Decline, revival and fall of the British empire*, edited by Anil Seal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), in which he argues the terms of collaboration began to shift during the interwar period and renewed attempts at imperial control and development of the empire after 1945 served to provoke nationalist resistance and thereby raise the cost of collaboration yet further.

A leading proponent of the European and ideational roots of nationalism was Elie Kedourie in his *Nationalism* (London: Hutchinson, 1960), in which he states on page 1 that “nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century… Not the least triumph of this doctrine is that such propositions have become accepted and are thought to be self-evident… These ideas have become firmly naturalized in the political rhetoric of the West which has been taken over for the use of the whole world.” For an emphasis on the socio-economic dimension, but definitively the thorough-going European and modern nature of nationalism, see Ernest Gellner, *Nations and nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983). The modernist perspective that held sway tended to tie in with the broader parameters of modernization theory and assume, from an almost entirely theoretical perspective, that African nations would develop greater degrees of unity and cohesion as they developed economically and socially. For an early proponent, see Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and social communication: an enquiry into the foundations of nationality* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1953). In an entirely different critical postcolonial context, but strongly articulating the idea that nationalism originated in Europe and was thus essentially a foreign import, see Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist thought and the colonial world: a derivative discourse?* (London: Zed Books, 1986).


*Ibid.*, 147. Fanon became the standard-bearer for a particular type of emancipatory violence, endorsed by radical Europeans such as Jean-Paul Sartre, across the African continent from the mid- to late 1960s.


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Albeit within an Algerian rather than a sub-Saharan African context, this argument was originally made in a very persuasive form by Shepard in his *Invention of decolonization*.

Cooper posits at least three options for African nationalist leaders: ‘[D]id the “nation” lie in the numerous and diverse units of African society, and the territorial boundaries imposed by colonization less than a century previously, in larger units of cooperation and potential solidarity, such as French West Africa, in a pan-African vision of solidarity, or in a French nationality and citizenship, purged of invidious inequality?’ Cooper, ‘Alternatives to nationalism’, 110.


In fact, with Europeans pushing for federal alternatives to the nation state in Europe itself, the Dutch also experimenting with federal options during decolonization and the British pushing federations in the West Indies, South Arabia and Malaya, it has been suggested that federal thinking after 1945 constituted a broad moment of doubt about the viability and desirability of nation states in the post-war period. See Collins, ‘Decolonization and the “federal moment”’.


Hunter, *Political thought and the public sphere*.


Ibid.


Ibid.


See Alamin M. Mazrui, ‘Decaying parts of Africa need “benign” colonization’, in Alamin M. Mazrui and Willy Mutunga (eds.), Governance and leadership: debating the African condition (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2003), 339–41. The most startling ad hominem attack on Mazrui was Archie Mafeje, ‘“Benign” colonialism and malignant minds in the service of imperialism’, in Mazrui and Mutunga, Governance and leadership, 342–9, where he asserts that ‘Ali Mazrui’s discourse on “benign colonialism” is intellectually bankrupt, analytically superficial, sensational, and downright dishonest’ (346). This prompted a stinging reply from Mazrui: Alamin M. Mazrui, ‘Self-colonization and the search for pax-Africana: a rejoinder’, in Mazrui and Mutunga, Governance and leadership, 350–5.


As Dülffer and Frey suggest in their introduction to their edited volume on Elites and decolonization in the twentieth century, the ‘key to understanding the transition from the colonial to the post-colonial is agency’. In other words, ‘individuals and social groups shaped decolonization’, through actors struggling and fighting for independence, while ‘others tried to retard or suppress it, while still others simply try to accommodate the fundamental changes in the political, economic, social, cultural rounds as best as possible’: Dülffer and Frey, ‘Introduction’, 2.


Frederick Cooper, Africa since 1940: the past of the present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 5.

Ibid., 5–6.

Low and Lonsdale, ‘Introduction: towards the new order’, 12. On the nexus between metropolitan planning, colony-specific institutions and the international or ‘global’ sphere, the authors suggest that, ‘although the scale of British economic planning was not global, the institutional sinews of development remained firmly embedded in each territory [and] the close interrelationship between economic and political development was now the topic of empire’.

For a detailed discussion of the evolving historiography on the late colonial state, see Darwin, ‘What was the late colonial state?’.


For a sophisticated account of the export of metropolitan welfare and social engineering projects to a colonial setting, and of the complex African response, see Lewis, Empire state-building.


A fascinating collection of essays looking at the French angle is to be found in Martin Thomas (ed.), The French colonial mind, vol. II, Violence, military encounters, and colonialism (Lincoln, NE: Nebraska University Press, 2011).

This is testament to the ongoing utility of Ronald Robinson’s concept, developed through his work with Jack Gallagher but elucidated most fully in his essay ‘Non-European foundations of European imperialism: sketch for a theory of collaboration’, in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (eds.), Studies in the theory of imperialism (London: Longmans, 1972), 117–42. See, for example, Benjamin N. Lawrance, Emily Lynn Osborn and Richard L. Roberts,


Ann Laura Stoler, Capitalism and confrontation in Sumatra’s plantation belt, 1870–1979 (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1995). This reminds us too of Fred Cooper’s Decolonization and African society, in which he suggests that much labour and trade union activity was wrongly conflated with nationalist agitation. The blurring of the lines by colonial authorities between labour disputes, nationalist activities and criminality added to this tendency.


On surveillance and intelligence gathering in the French empire, see Martin Thomas, ‘Colonial states as intelligence states: security policing and the limits of colonial rule in France’s Muslim territories, 1921–40, Journal of Strategic Studies, 28:6 (2005), 1033–60; A broader piece by the same author covering both British and French sub-Saharan Africa is Martin Thomas, ‘Intelligence providers and the fabric of the late colonial state’, in Dülffer and Frey, Elites and decolonization, 11–35.

Thomas, Violence and colonial order, 19.

David Scott has neatly summarized the nationalist and postcolonial moments as representing different historical ‘problem spaces’. Crucially, for postcolonialists, the conceptual paradigms and political projects defined in relation to Marxism and nationalism seemed ‘no longer adequate to the tasks of the present’. The ‘“problem-space” of the anti-colonial project had…been defined by the demands of political decolonization, the demand for the overthrow of colonial power. Its goal was the achievement of political sovereignty.’ What was not theorized was ‘the whole question of the decolonization of representation itself’. Hence the postcolonial perspective recognized the illusory nature of decolonization as ‘flag independence’ and the derivative nature of nationalism. What was now required was ‘the decolonization of representation, the decolonization of the West’s theory of the non-West’. This of course constituted both a critique of actually existing decolonization as at best partial and a new conceptual and hence historiographical opening, once again bringing the European imperial states and the newly independent states – now the ‘colonizer’ and the ‘colonized’, in postcolonial terminology – into contact once again. See David Scott, Refashioning futures: criticism after postcoloniality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 10–13. Richard Drayton uses the term ‘secondary decolonization’ in a similar way: see Richard Drayton, ‘Secondary decolonization: the black power moment in Barbados, c. 1970’, in Kate Quinn (ed.), Black power in the Caribbean (Gainsville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2014), 117–35. Although the epistemological dimensions of postcolonialism were formulated in new ways, the dangers of a derivative nationalism as the pathway out of colonialism had been debated vigorously and extensively at a much earlier decolonizing moment, between the Indian poet-philosopher Rabindranath Tagore and the (reluctant) nationalist Mohandas K. Gandhi. For a fuller discussion, see Michael Collins, Empire, nationalism and the postcolonial world: Rabindranath Tagore’s writings on politics, history and society (London: Routledge, 2012).

For an early exploration of the potential significance of Foucault for the study of imperial history and decolonization, see David Scott, ‘Colonial governmentality’, Social Text, 43:2 (1995), 191–220.


The ‘network’ may be an overused category of historical analysis, but it does provide new ways to think about the history and longevity of empire in wider, ‘global’ settings. For a cautionary tale, see David A. Bell, ‘This is what happens when historians overuse the idea of the network’, New Republic, 26 October 2014, https://newrepublic.com/article/114709/world-connecting-reviewed-historians-overuse-network-metaphor (accessed 22 October 2015).

If looking beyond national frameworks suggests the importance of international, transnational, supranational and subnational loyalties in both destabilizing and reinforcing the nation state as an organizing category of twentieth-century world history, there are further options and alternative historiographies for thinking beyond the nation state. The history of African cities may well be a revealing area of future study for understanding both Africa’s past and future: see Bill Freund, The African city: a history (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

Chapter 2


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(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 306–28, 327: ‘Paradoxically, the ultimate cost of defending the British empire during the Second World War was the empire itself’; and Nicholas J. White, ‘Reconstructing Europe through rejuvenating empire: the British, French, and Dutch experiences compared’, *Past and Present*, supplement 6 (2011), 211–36, 236.


4 Such as James Midgley and David Piachaud’s *Colonialism and welfare: social policy and the British imperial legacy* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011); Mark Duffield and Vernon Hewitt’s *Empire, development and colonialism: the past in the present* (Woodbridge: James Currey, 2009); and Helen Gilbert and Chris Tiffin’s *Burden or benefit? Imperial benevolece and its legacies* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008).


7 Hodge, *Triumph of the expert*, 265.


15 Ibid.

16 Ibid., 2–3.

17 Ibid., 3.

18 Ibid.


20 Ibid., 3.


23 Tidrick, *Empire and the English character*, 256.

24 See, for example, Stephen Howe, *Anti-colonialism in British politics: the left and the end of empire* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), in which Howe focuses on areas of Labour ideology and practice that fit into a broader narrative of left-wing anti-imperial thinking.


26 Patricia Pugh, *Educate, agitate, organise: 100 years of Fabian socialism* (London: Methuen, 1984), 189.


28 Pugh, *Educate, agitate, organise*, 198.

29 Memorandum no. 205 by Norman Leys on ‘Labour’s colonial policy’, Labour Party advisory committee on imperial questions, with an appendix – February 1939, Box 16 file 2 ff. 23–30, Bodl. RH, Creech Jones MSS, MS Brit. Emp. s. 332.


32 Ibid.


34 Jones, ‘A visit to West Africa’.

35 Buxton, ‘Note on Colonial Office vote’.


38 Hinden, ‘Socialism and the colonial world’, 14.

39 Ibid.


42 Memorandum by Arthur Creech Jones of colonial policy of Labour administration, c. 1947, Box 4, File 4, f.2–5, Bodl. RH, Creech Jones MSS, MS Brit. Emp. s. 332.

43 Arthur Creech Jones, ‘Circular despatch to the officer administering the government of (all colonies, protectorates and mandates)’, 10 July 1947, CO 537/2002.


45 By 1951 the OFC had collapsed under the strain of the failed Groundnuts Scheme, but the CDC remained a force for state-sponsored development after decolonization, working mainly – but not exclusively – in former colonial nations. It was renamed the Commonwealth Development Corporation in 1963, and was eventually rebranded as the CDC Group PLC. There is a (heavily edited) history of the CDC on its website, [www.cdcgroup.com/company-history](http://www.cdcgroup.com/company-history).

46 For a more in-depth discussion of these interdepartmental tensions and how they shaped colonial rule, see Charlotte Lydia Riley, ‘“Tropical allsorts”: the transnational flavour of British development policies in Africa’, *Journal of World History*, 26:4 (2015), 839–64.


49 This continuation was also a transnational phenomenon. Joseph Morgan Hodge has demonstrated how British colonial expertise at the end of empire was not dissolved but was instead co-opted into new organizations, such as the World Bank, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and the Food and Agriculture Organization. Joseph Morgan Hodge, ‘British colonial expertise, postcolonial careering and the early history of international development’, *Journal of Modern European History*, 8:1 (2010), 24–46.

50 Barbara Castle, ‘Barbara Castle says: this way to peace!’, 1955, Election addresses, Special collections, University of Bristol.


52 Ibid.


54 Ibid.
Chapter 3


2 For an account of the ideological evolution of the FLN and how it envisaged its role in international affairs, see Jeffrey Byrne, Mecca of revolution: Algeria, decolonization, and the Third World order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).


5 Petroleum Press Service, April 1956.


7 Ibid.

8 The North Sea fields were not discovered until the 1970s.


11 Delavesne, L’Industrie du pétrole.


13 Durand, La politique pétrolière internationale.


15 Ibid. For an insight into how the Cold War framework shaped the interaction of Europe and ‘Third-Worldism’, see also Giuliano Garavini, After empires: European integration, decolonisation, and the challenge from the global South (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).


17 Paul Frankel, Mattei: Oil and power politics (London: Faber, 1968).

18 Ibid.

19 See Penrose, The large international firm in developing countries; and J. Ernest Hartshorn, Oil companies and governments: an account of the international oil industry and its political environment (New York, NY: Perseus, 1969).

20 Frankel, Mattei.


22 Frankel, Mattei, 102.

23 Frankel, Mattei.
24 Durand, La politique pétrolière internationale.
25 ENI Archives, Corrispondenza sulle ricerche nel Sahara. For CFP, see Maugeri, L'era del petrolio; and Daniele Pozzi, Dai gatti selvaggi al cane a sei zampe (1926–1967) (Venice: Marsilio, 2009).
28 Historical archives of the European Union, Uwe Kitzinger and Noël Salter Documentation, Investimenti paesi Europei nell’industria petrolifera al 1° gennaio 1962; Historical archives of the European Union, Report by the energy commission.
31 Cornet, Sahara: terre de demain.
34 Kouzmine, Le Sahara algérien, 21.
36 Cornet, Sahara: terre de demain, 240.
37 Ibid. (translation by the author).
39 See ibid.; and Cornet, Sahara: terre de demain.
41 Cornet, Sahara: terre de demain.
42 Cantoni, Oily deals.

48 Bagnato, L'Italia e la guerra d'Algeria, 309 et seq.
49 Cantoni, Oily deals.
54 Cantoni, Oily deals.
55 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 AN, b. 19900317/8, fd. 2, Algérie 1957/64, secret, Note SDECE, Le F.L.N. et le pétrole du Sahara, 16 April 1958 (FOIA no. 111,382). In Cantoni, Oily deals.
72 See Bagnato, L'Italia e la guerra d'Algeria; and Mario Pirani, Poteva andare peggio: mezzo secolo di ragionevoli illusioni (Milan: Mondadori, 2012).
74 See Cantoni, Oily deals.
75 Pirani, Poteva andare peggio.
77 Total Archives, Direction Générale et Directions Centrales; Accords et Contrats – Pays: Algérie, Déclaration des principes relative à la coopération économique et financière, 1962.
80 Cattan, The law of oil concessions.
81 Alain Beltran, A comparative history of national oil companies (Brussels: PIE Peter Lang, 2010).
82 Pirani, Poteva andare peggio.
Chapter 4


4 See, for example, the discussion of ‘inscription’ governing the social logic of textual sources in Gabrielle M. Spiegel, *Historicism, and the social logic of the text in the Middle Ages*, *Speculum*, 65:1 (1990), 59–86.


7 As Theodor Adorno argued, the rationality of positive forms (here referring to the historical present), is the ‘quintessence of all the negations it contains’: Theodor W. Adorno, *Lectures on negative dialectics* (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), 12–21.


9 Stoler, *Along the archival grain*, 3.

10 In thinking about the inclusion of these research stories, I was strongly influenced by Arlette Farge’s reflection on *The allure of the archives* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013) and Lisa Jardine’s discussion in *Temptation in the archives: essays in golden age Dutch culture* (London: UCL Press, 2015), as well as Burton’s *Archive stories*.


12 This necessarily invites comparison to Gayatri Spivak’s influential piece ‘Can the subaltern speak?’, in Peter Simon (ed.), *Norton anthology of theory and criticism* (New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 2001), 2197–2207, 2207. Spivak famously stresses that ‘it is important to acknowledge our complicity in the muting’, and Richard Drayton has more recently echoed this by counselling contemporary historians to speak ‘to and for those outside the tribe’: Richard Drayton, ‘Where does the world historian write from? Objectivity, moral conscience and the past and present of imperialism’, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 46:3 (2011), 671–85. Acknowledging these subaltern voices, and granting them the space to speak, is at times a task of acknowledging where the structures and assumptions of our enquiry have seen them silenced or marginalized. Importantly, this work cannot claim a grand representative measure. The voices it recovers are male and largely bound into the structures of colonial elites, whether obviously, in the accounts of an eminent philologist and a colonial official, or more subtly, in recovering the silenced voices of disgruntled students in the colonial education system. By collating these documents on conditionality, one of the first casualties is comprehensive coverage.


Christopher E. Goscha, “‘So what did you learn from war?’ Violent decolonization and Paul Mus’s search for humanity’, *South East Asia Research*, 20:4 (2012), 569–93.


Drayton, ‘Where does the world historian write from?’, 672.


It is worth noting that Cartier didn’t coin the famous phrase ‘the Corrèze before the Zambèze’ but, rather, it was Jean Montalat (deputy for the Corrèze) who cited Cartier and used the phrase in a discussion in the National Assembly in June 1964. He cited it as one that had been popularized elsewhere: ‘As we are discussing the aid which France gives to underdeveloped countries and certain neighbouring states, the temptation is great for me as Mayor of Tulle, according to a short and sweet slogan from the streets, to think about “the Corrèze before the Zambèze”, and remind you of some old arguments. I won’t do it. But allow me say today, and to my eyes the articles of Mr Raymond Cartier in *Paris-Match* put it best, that we need to remind the French people that in many areas – alas! – France is itself an underdeveloped country.’ *Journal Officiel, débats parlementaires Assemblée nationale*, session of 10 June 1964, 1777.


Ibid., 142.

Ibid., 145.

Goscha, ‘So what did you learn from war?’, 571.
40 Mus, Le destin de l’Union française, 229.
41 Wilder, Freedom time, 166.
43 Ibid.
44 Wilder, The French imperial nation-state, 8.
45 A useful example here is in the uncertain memory of Mus in Vietnam, as one who sought to hold back President Hồ Chí Minh, and not as an engaged scholar. Bayly, ‘Conceptualizing resistance and revolution in Vietnam’, 205.
48 I didn’t.
49 Shepard, The invention of decolonization, 217.
50 Ibid., 100, 271–2.
56 Note from directeur général de la jeunesse et des sports, Gaston Roux, 8 April 1955, Archives nationales [hereafter AN] 19870441/42.
57 La Pensée: revue du rationalisme moderne, no. 74 (1957), 118.
59 ‘Extraits des devoirs scolaires’, nd., AN 19870441/42.
60 ‘Extraits des devoirs scolaires’, nd., Archives nationales d’outre-mer [hereafter ANOM] 112 APOM 27.
61 The name is today popular in Cameroon, though the files themselves come from within the federation of AEF.
62 ‘Extraits des devoirs scolaires’, nd., ANOM 112 APOM 27.
63 Ibid.
66 Anthony D. Smith, Ethno-symbolism and nationalism: a cultural approach (London: Routledge, 2009), 64. This thesis is more broadly discussed in Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London: Hutchinson, 1960), especially in the introduction.
67 Smith, Ethno-symbolism and nationalism, 55.
68 The last note in square brackets is quoted from the text, and is not my observation: ‘Extraits des devoirs scolaires’, nd., ANOM 112 APOM 27.
71 Chauvet had actually succeeded Bernard Cornut-Gentille, the author of the third source in this chapter.
72 M’Bokolo, ‘Forces sociales et idéologies’, 399.

Ibid., 38.

Thomas et al., Crises of empire, 139.

Shipway, Decolonization and its impact, 89.

Martin Thomas, Fight or flight: Britain, France and their roads from empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 88.

Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in colonial Africa (London: Frederick Muller, 1956), 10.


After Cornut-Gentille’s time as Governor General of AOF ended, he would remain close to the Gaullist government until the end of the Algerian War, when he broke with Gaullism at the same time as Jacques Soustelle (who had also been Governor General) in 1960.


‘Note pour le ministre’, Direction des Affaires Politiques, 11 February 1957, ANOM, AFFFPO-3512.


‘Note pour le ministre’, Direction des Affaires Politiques, 11 February 1957, ANOM, AFFFPO-3512.


Léopold Senghor, ‘Pour une solution fédéraliste’, La Nef (June 1955), 148–61, quoted in Wilder, Freedom time, 156.

Indeed, Cornut-Gentille went on to become a deputy allied to the Gaullists, until he split with them over the Algerian War.


See also the various contributions to the ‘AHR roundtable: the archives of decolonization’, American Historical Review, 120:3 (2015), 844–950.

Shepard, The invention of decolonization, 5.

Chapter 5


6 Moyn, The last utopia, 118–19.


Trevor Huddleston to John Collins, 20 February 1953, Collins Papers, Ms 3300, Lambeth Palace Library.


UN General Assembly Resolution 1881, 11 October 1963.


35 ‘Suggestions to be placed before the Special Committee on Apartheid by the World Campaign for the Release of South African Political Prisoners’, July 1967, Anti-Apartheid Movement Papers, Mss AAM 1779.


38 Ingrid Nifosi, *The UN special procedures in the field of human rights* (Holmes Beach, FL: Gaunt, 2005), 67.

39 Ibrahima Boye to Dennis Brutus, 15 April 1968, Anti-Apartheid Movement Papers, Mss AAM 1782.

40 Moyn, *The last utopia*, 126.

41 Joost de Blank, ‘Human Rights Year: preparing our programme’ (July 1967?), Movement for Colonial Freedom Papers, Box 22/AFF 10. Unfortunately, de Blank died in January 1968 and was unable to see the plans come to fruition.


46 Burke, *Decolonization*, 107.


52 Irwin, *Gordian knot*, 128.


56 Burke, ‘From individual rights’, 288–94.

57 ibid., 283–4. See also ‘Address delivered by His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah Aryamehr’, in UN, *Final act of the International Conference*, 34.

58 Burke, ‘From individual rights’, 296; see also Burke, *Decolonization*, 109–10.

Africa Digest, February 1968, 1.


Burke, Decolonization, 109.


Ibid., 6.

Ibid., 4.

Ibid., 17.

Moyn, The last utopia, 111.


Ibid., 38.


Ruth Addison to Anti-Apartheid Movement, 29 July 1970, Anti-Apartheid Movement Papers, Mss AAM 1436.

See Moyn, The last utopia, 195–201.

Burke, Decolonization, 149.

Chapter 6


38 Hyam, *Britain’s declining empire*, 11.
40 Clarke, *A technocratic imperial state?*, 454.
44 The reports for all cadets who undertook their training at Cambridge from 1946 to 1963, as well as some interview reports, are held in the CDEV/3 series, Cambridge University Archives. Conditions of access demand that all references are kept anonymous. Where I quote directly from a report or interview summary I give the year and folder, while more general points must be taken as reflective of overall tone.
47 Colonial Office circular on recruitment and publicity at schools,’ August 1956, CUA, CDEV/4/7.
48 Colonial Office, *Post-war training for the Colonial Service: report of a committee appointed by the Secretary of State for the colonies* (London: Stationery Office, 1945); Véronique Dimier,


J. Howard (Cambridge Devonshire course supervisor), January 1953, CUA, CDEV/1/4/5.


A. H. Gardner-Brown (Cambridge Devonshire course supervisor) to T. R. Henn (Fellow St Catharine’s, Cambridge), 21 April 1950, CUA, CDEV/1/4/5.

Colonial Office interview report, 3 May 1961, CUA, CDEV/3/29/A.

H. B. Shaw (headmaster Hulme Grammar School, Oldham), 31 March 61, CUA, CDEV/3/28/B.

Dr D. C. M. Yardley, 17 March 1960, CUA, CDEV/3/28/B.


McCleery to Revd D. P. Hardy, College Tutor, 24 October 1956, CUA, CDEV/4/7.

McCleery to A. D. Garson, 6 November 1959, CUA, CDEV/4/7.


Cambridge University Appointments Board annual report (1962), CUA, APTB/1/68.


Letter of resignation from serving DO in Kenya to Secretary of State for the colonies, 28 February 1961, CUA, CDEV/3/28.


For a thoughtful account of one 1950s grammar school recruit’s career in Tanganyika, see Donald Barton, *An affair with Africa: Tanganyika remembered* (Hertford: AuthorsOnline, 2004).
McCleery to establishment officer, Tanganyika, 13 July 1956, CUA, CDEV/4/7.


‘Headmaster of Wellington College, speech day (1956)’, *The Wellingtonian*, July 1956, 626.


For example, *The Wellingtonian*, March 1959, 604.

For example, ‘Jazz over classical music’ (Wellington, December 1956); ‘Without reform the public schools deserve to die’ (Charterhouse, June 1954; Wellington, March 1957; Westminster, April 1959); teenage culture (Wellington, March 1958); the power of the press (Charterhouse, June 1955; Charterhouse, March 1958); or the nuclear deterrent (Charterhouse, July 1958). All took precedence over the end of empire.


*The Haileyburian*, July 1957, 755:XXXI.


*The Sunday Times*, 26 April 1959, 10.


Mora Dickson (ed.), *Alec Dickson: a chance to serve* (London: Dennis Dobson, 1976), 19–90. Dickson covers her husband’s early life and career using his own articles to shape the text.


Alec Dickson quoted in Bird, *Never the same again*, 18.


Adams, *Voluntary Service Overseas*, 43.

Colonial Office minutes, the National Archives [hereafter TNA], CO/96/811.


*The Economist*, 21 April 1962.


G. L. Stephenson to W. J. Smith (Department of Technical Cooperation), 13 November 1961, TNA, OD/10/3.

On Chadwick, see Ben Page, “‘And the Oscar goes to... Daybreak in Udi’: understanding late colonial community development and its legacy through film’, Development and Change, 45:5 (2014), 838–68.

Gilbert L. Stephenson was born in 1913, and educated at Haileybury and Pembroke College, Cambridge, where he gained a 3rd in geography and a Boxing Blue. Appointed to the CAS in 1936, he rose to become admin officer, grade I, and retired in 1960. Bird describes him as ‘rumbustious’: Never the same again, 35.


Gilbert L. Stephenson, ‘Nigerian and other days’ (unpublished memoir, 1982), the Bodleian Library of Commonwealth and African Studies, Oxford, MSS.Afr.s.1833, 141–2. For a detailed description of the work and life of a volunteer, see Dickson, A world elsewhere, 50–204. These experiences ranged from assisting a local woman give birth on a bus to having to take over as headmaster of a school following the death of the incumbent.

Alec Dickson, ‘The year between’, The Sunday Times, 19 April 1959, 10; ‘A year in the Commonwealth for young volunteers: British colonies review 4th quarter’, The Times, 1 December 1959, 4; ‘Confidential reports on volunteers’, 1961, TNA, CO/85/1445.


Sir Alan Burns, ‘Call to the colonies’, The Times Literary Supplement, 4 May 1962, 306.


Overseas Service Pensioners Association Journal, 80 (October 2000), 11.

Chapter 7


3 Cited in ibid., 57, emphasis original.


6 ‘[É]troitement imbriquées les unes dans les autres’: ‘Mis en lumière l’importance stratégique et économique du Continent tout entier.’ Raymond Offroy [head of the Press and Information Service, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs] to French Consul, Accra, 14 June 1946, Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes [hereafter CADN, 6PO1/11/no.266.


9 ‘El Dorado, la Mecque de l’homme qui veut s’enrichir rapidement.’ R. Clap [administrator in charge of the colonies, Free French Mission, Gold Coast] to commissioner for the colonies, 28 October 1944, CADN/6PO1/5/34.

10 ‘Un véritable paradis terrestre, où il est possible de gagner de l’argent très vite, où surtout les marchandises affluent ne sont pas chères.’ Jean Rouch [temporary member of the French School of Africa; later became a researcher at the Musée de l’Homme] and Roger Rosfelder [member of the Griaule Mission], Rapport sur la tournée effectue en Gold Coast en Novembre–Décembre 1950, nd., CADN/6PO1/5.

11 Clap to commissioner for the colonies, 28 October 1944, CADN/6PO1/5/34.


14 Rouch and Rosfelder, Rapport sur la tournée effectue en Gold Coast.

15 Clap to commissioner for the colonies, 28 October 1944, CADN/6PO1/5/34.

16 Rouch and Rosfelder, Rapport sur la tournée effectue en Gold Coast.

17 Ibid.


20 Ibid., 40.

21 Ibid., 80.

22 Ibid., 88.

23 Ibid., 84, 88.

24 Rouch and Rosfelder, Rapport sur la tournée effectue en Gold Coast, nd., CADN/6PO1/5.

25 Clap to commissioner for the colonies, 28 October 1944, CADN/6PO1/5/34.

26 Jean Rouch, Migrations en Gold Coast, 1954, CADN/6PO1/5.


28 ‘[D]epuis les longues années, les indigènes de nos territoires, à la recherché d’un travail, viennent si volontiers et si nombreux en Gold Coast.’ Charles Renner to Governor General, 20 January 1955.


30 ‘Vous savez combien graves sont nos préoccupations quand nous constatons que les populations Mossi continuent d’abandonner leurs pays pour rendre en Gold Coast.’ R. Saller [commissioner for the colonies] to Clap, 31 August 1944, CADN/6PO1/5/5967.


32 Shipway, Decolonization and its impact, 13.


Ibid.


Ibid., 140–3, quote at 143.


Cooper, *Decolonisation and African society*, 177.


Ibid.

‘En résumé, il faut autant que possible, créer chez nous les conditions qui attirant les travailleurs chez les Anglais.’ Clap to commissioner for the colonies, 28 October 1944, CADN/6PO1/5/34.

‘[F]atiguant profondément nos populations.’ Clap to commissioner for the colonies, 28 October 1944.

Cited in Cooper, *Decolonization and African society*, 188.

Chafer, *The end of empire in French West Africa*, 55–79.

Keese, *Living with ambiguity*, 61, 64.

Minister of the colonies [hereafter MOC] to MFA, 1 March 1945, AMAE/AL/PB/34/fo.12–13.

Guy Monod [embassy secretary, military and administrative transit post, Lagos], 27 March 1946, AMAE/AL/PB/27/fo.6–9.

The Free French established missions in Lagos, Accra, Freetown (Sierra Leone) and Bathurst (The Gambia) in 1940, with a central office in Accra. The Freetown and Bathurst branches were closed in 1943, while the Lagos office was turned into a military and administrative transit post. The Accra office was closed on 26 March 1945, with a view to its replacement by a consulate, though this new set-up was not fully established until October 1946. See Belliard [liaison officer, Accra], *Note relative à la mission française de Lagos*, 24 December 1945, AMAE/AL/PB/27/fo.10–11.

Monod, 27 March 1946; Belliard, *Note relative à la mission française de Lagos*.

Monod, 27 March 1946.


‘[I]ndispensable que la France ce soit représentée et bien représentée dans les colonies britanniques de la Côte Occidentale d’Afrique.’ Henri Laurentie to Clap, 17 February 1945, AMAE/AL/PB/34/fo.10–11.


Renner to MFA, 26 July 1950, AMAE/AL/PB/fo.141.

Georges Tourot [vice consul, Lagos] to MFA, 4 October 1946, AMAE/AL/PB/27/fo.43.

MOC to MFA, 1 March 1945, AMAE/AL/PB/34/fo.12–13.

‘[U]ne collaboration plus étroite possible entre les colonies françaises et britanniques de l’Afrique Occidentale.’ Balfour to Clap, 4 February 1945, AMAE/AL/PB/34/fo.6; Clap to MOC, 8 February 1945, AMAE/AL/PB/34/fo.5.

MOC to MFA, 1 March 1945.


MFA to MOF, 18 January 1947, AMAE/AL/PB/34/fo.85.


‘[L]es réalisations sociales, économiques et politiques dont bénéficié nos territoires, sur le dévouement et l’œuvre d’un grand nombre de nos médecins, de nos instituteurs, de nos missionnaires, de nos administrateurs.’ French consulate, Accra, *Rapport de M. Bequey*.


NOTES
Conclusion

1. As described in the introduction: see pp. 10–11.
Afterword


2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., vol. IV, part IV, ch. 11, 1228.

4 Ibid.


10 ‘Our preoccupation with this question of futile intransigence gradually abandoned…’: Thomas and Thompson, ‘Empire and globalisation’, 17.

11 As I have mentioned John Darwin, I should pay tribute also to my subsequent supervisor, the late Vincent Wright, who took me over when John went on a year’s sabbatical leave. I could have asked for no more inspiring and authoritative guide to the French official mind.


14 The finding is recorded somewhere in my card index files; given limited and expensive photocopy quotas, in an era well before digital photography, I have no other trace.


17 Pierre Messmer, interview with the author and Philippe Oulmont, Paris, 12 March 2007. Messmer was reflecting on his own experience (parachuted into Vietnam in 1945, captured by the Viet Minh, escaped), but he also cited the authority of Laurentie and Paul Mus.


19 John Darwin, ‘What was the late colonial state?’ Itinerario, 23:3/4 (1999), 73–82.


22 ‘[B]oth the way the leaders of empire-states thought and the forms in which political contestation took place reflect “thinking like an empire”. […] Far from being anachronistic political form in the “modern era”, this imperial perspective applies to France, Britain, and other important states of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.’ Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in question: theory, knowledge, history (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), 154.

23 Wilder, Freedom time, 4.

24 Darwin, The empire project, xi.
27 Wilder, Freedom time, 43–4.
28 Shipway, Decolonization and its impact, 8.
32 Darwin, ‘What was the late colonial state?’.
33 Véronique Dimier, Le gouvernement des colonies, regards croisés franco-britanniques (Brussels: Éditions de l’université de Bruxelles, 2004).