Conclusion

I opened this book with a reflection on the events of October 2020 and the following months, which appeared to have put Kyrgyzstan back into a state of authoritarian ordering and populist politics. The momentary and spectacular nature of this political development was taken as a departure point to inquire how the recent deepening of authoritarian ordering can be seen as an intensification and culmination of tendencies and developments in governing, policy making and social ordering that have occurred over recent years. In this light, I have questioned how we can productively describe and capture the kind of political system and wider forms of ordering that have emerged in Kyrgyzstan after the ‘Osh events’ in 2010 in line with comprehensive efforts to promote democracy, the rule of law, human rights standards and participatory decision making both before and especially after this tragic conflict. I have argued that the most appropriate way to understand the forms of governance and order-making that have emerged at this intersection of international assistance and domestic ordering dynamics is a post-liberal form of social order and of statebuilding in particular.

After further demonstrating the need to think about the post-liberal nature of contemporary political and social ordering in Kyrgyzstan, Central Asia and globally, I developed a conceptual mechanism through which to better capture the processes of contestation, interpretation and (re-)appropriation that are at play in the production of post-liberal orders, which other scholarship has continuously tried to situate within or between ‘democratic’ and ‘liberal’ frames of analysis on the one hand, and ‘illiberal’ and ‘authoritarian’ ones, on the other. As a way forward from these approaches and the analytical and political impasse they imply, I emphasized the need to capture the heteroglossia of social life, namely, the coexistence and interaction of multiple understandings of order and of human existence – indeed multiple ontologies – that figure in and thus inevitably affect the social ordering process. To better capture this heteroglossia, I adopted the concept of ‘social imaginary’, understood as a mental construct through which people make sense of the world and their existence and conduct within it, as an analytical
vehicle that links imaginary and discursive formations with materialities and practices in ‘real life’. This framework offered a productive way to capture the various understandings and normative positionings of social order in Kyrgyzstan and, in particular, the ways in which they are not only enacted, but also reproduced in practices of community and peacebuilding and the more macro-level forms of post-liberal order they foreground. Analysing imaginaries of social order and their constitutive discourses has also helped me to capture the contested condition of capitalist development and the legacies of transformation, exploitation and coercion it is built on, which in turn foregrounds decolonial perspectives on contemporary order.

In concluding this work, I proceed in three steps that develop the contributions of the monograph from the conceptual advances and empirical observations offered in the previous chapters. First, I recapitulate the key findings on how practices, discourses and imaginaries of social order in Kyrgyzstan co-produce post-liberal forms of statebuilding as they leave unchallenged the hyper-neoliberal redirecting of responsibility toward community-level and non-state actors while state-centric notions of authority and ideas of national and cultural order remain in place. In a second step, I relate these findings back to the contribution of this work to decolonial approaches to studying social order, and to the conceptual and methodological advances it offers in the Central Asian and global contexts.

**Practices, discourses and imaginaries of social order in Kyrgyzstan**

While covering a wide and indeed complex range of actors, practices and processes, the empirical analysis offered decisive insights into how local government, civil society, community-level institutions such as neighbourhood committees or courts of elders, and the population at large help produce, challenge and reshape post-liberal forms of statebuilding. Given the micro-level and practice-based focus of the analysis of community-level activities, this trajectory is not always obvious and its contours only take shape once the various practices, discourses and ideas the actors draw on are situated within the imaginaries of statebuilding and the post-liberal formations of order that their combination foregrounds. The empirical analyses and wider reflection can be captured in five key tendencies that manifest the post-liberal trajectory of statebuilding in Kyrgyzstan.

These include first, the increasing responsibilization of community-level and non-state actors to provide security, order and services, which has encouraged and often necessitated a selective withdrawal or even absence of state institutions. On the other hand, various actors and agencies from the state have maintained claims to the power of interpretation of particular events by state authorities (as captured in the invocations of the ‘politics of
souvereignty’ imaginary), which also imply or explicitly feature the rejection of external interference and commentary. This maintenance of a minimal and selective level of state authority foregrounds a second distinctive feature of the emerging post-liberal form of statebuilding, which could be termed as selective delegation, by which state authorities have limited the scope of the communal and other non-state actors to whom they delegated key ordering and service functions both in territorial and temporal terms. Third and relatedly, the analyses pointed to a strategy favouring ad hoc solutions over institutionalization, as state authorities appeared to reduce the institutional status of newly created entities to the absolute minimum necessary to ensure operations, while further reducing or de facto ending the institutional mandate of bodies deemed less or not necessary, as in the case of the downsizing of Territorial Youth Councils (TYCs) in Osh. These forms of ad-hocism and the lack of systematic approaches to policy on the macro level and other disagreeable features in the authorities’ conduct foreground a fourth feature of post-liberal ordering, namely the articulation of different forms and degrees of alignment and cooperation of community and non-state actors with executive and government authorities, and, in contrast to these, contestations and challenges that some actors, especially the Civic Union ‘For Reforms and Result’ have put forward. These four key tendencies of responsibilization, selective delegation, ad-hocism and cooperation versus contestation run throughout the empirical findings from Chapters 5 to 7.

To enable an in-depth and historicized understanding of the ways in which community security and peacebuilding are done in semi-urban and rural Kyrgyzstan, I began Chapter 5 by analysing socioeconomic and political changes that have taken place since Kyrgyzstan’s independence in 1991, and paid particular attention to the emerging moral economy of survival and translocal livelihoods and the insecurity and conflict potential they created. Against this background, I situated LCPCs as the prime body created to coordinate the work of other community- and neighbourhood-level institutions in preventing and solving conflict, legal violations and higher-level disagreements. This preliminary insight already pointed to the legal and institutional alignment of LCPCs with local government and Internal Affairs bodies who have ultimate authority over the operative and strategic orientation of LCPCs, which already suggests path dependencies and certain selective priorities of some entities over those of some groups in the community or the population at large. The analysis of LCPC work based on the ‘success stories’ (Saferworld, 2016) has illustrated how these bodies can successfully mobilize local residents and state institutions to solve problems pertaining to infrastructural issues or societal issues such as early marriages. I advocated caution about the narrow numeric indicators and short-term time horizons of these ‘successes’, whose underlying causes seemed too entrenched and complex to be addressed by LCPCs. This
performative, constructed and temporary nature of successful LCPC work was also apparent in their attempts to rebuild interethnic peace and trust according to the Soviet-era idea of ‘peoples’ friendship’ (*druzhba narodov*) in the aftermath of the 2010 conflict. As the local LCPC representatives admitted, their attempts to instil peaceful coexistence could only reach a selective part of the population and perhaps, as an artwork at the local school indicated, had most potential when promoted to affect younger people’s way of relating to one another. However, it also became clear that a lot of work remained to be done if the historically entrenched divisions between different mono-ethnic communities of the city were to be overcome.

Furthermore, I argued that the promotion of friendship and tolerance alongside human rights and other Western ‘liberal peace’ discourses was overshadowed by the fact that many residents in the analysed town had suffered violence and abuse not only from civilians who were still at large but also from law enforcement and other state actors. With this injustice and ongoing grievances not addressed, the kind of order emerging in the town can certainly not be seen as a liberal, inclusive one. Rather, as invocations of ‘liberal peace’ and ‘peoples’ friendship’ ideas of multicultural coexistence figured in an uncomfortable co-presence with opinions and discourses and the authorities’ judicial conduct in the ‘politics of sovereignty’, which remained effectively unchallenged, the order observed in this case and many analogous ones needs to be called post-liberal at best, when considering the coercive and violent elements which must have made some consider it outright authoritarian.

In Chapter 6, I analysed processes of conflict prevention, peace- and tolerance-building among young people by looking at the establishment and present activities of TYCs and embedding them in a more macro-level perspective on youth policy and participation. The themes of responsibilization and selective delegation which already emerged in the previous chapter came to the fore here too, even more clearly in some respects. Thus, the overall insights from the long-term perspectives on the TYCs’ establishment, institutionalization and downsizing is that the Mayor’s Office of the city of Osh, into whose Committee for Youth Affairs the TYCs were integrated, generated the maximum impact on peace- and tolerance-building and ordering among the youth, while investing minimal resources. This was possible thanks to the OSCE’s and NGO Iret’s immense efforts to build up and activate TYCs in successive capacity-building projects between 2011 and 2016, and, perhaps more importantly, through the TYCs’ functioning as a conduit that mobilized young people to take on leadership positions and implement events and measures directed toward the goals mentioned above. This responsibilization and delegation of functions had many positive aspects, not only as it enabled young people to participate and actively shape peace and order in their communities, but it also created
pressure, especially on TYC leaders, to deliver the planned activities while trying to secure their livelihoods and future career paths.

The under-resourced but highly important status of TYCs and analogous youth structures in other cities foregrounded a dynamic interaction with various ideas and motivation situated in the different discourses and imaginaries of statebuilding. The TYC activists’ key goal was not only to build peace and tolerance, but also to contribute to the development of the city and the country at large; a connection that was made both in neutral terms and in invocations of national ideology and dignity that clearly resonated with the ‘politics of sovereignty’ imaginary. Both on city- and national-level holiday celebrations and at more small-scale events, affirmation of the Kyrgyzstani nation and its legends and cultural heritage coexisted with expressions and performance genres such as breakdancing and singer-songwriter music, which can be situated in liberal multicultural ideas and the Western ‘liberal peace’ imaginary more broadly. More than in these expressions and performances, the post-liberal combination of state-centric and individualistic ways of being was apparent in the TYCs’ efforts to build solidarity and support networks for the urban poor and especially children in need on the one hand, while promoting ideas of self-help, self-development and entrepreneurial ways of life as a way toward success and well-being on the other. The deeply entrenched nature of poverty and precarity as well as other problems such as racketeering and gender-based violence pointed to the need for more systematic and institutionalized ways of fostering young people’s development. However, as my analysis of national-level youth policy and participation has indicated, this area has still been characterized by a post-liberal logic in which selective delegation to non-state and international actors and ad hoc solutions have so far prevailed.

I further substantiated this multi-level picture of post-liberal statebuilding in the analysis of the NGO network Civic Union ‘For Reforms and Result’ and its attempts to bring about substantive and people-centred law enforcement reform through both national-level advocacy and community-level project implementation (Chapter 7). Contrary to LCPCs’ and TYCs’ dependent and hence strongly aligned position vis-à-vis authorities, this case demonstrates the important, even if difficult, role of actors who confront the state and cooperate only when actual change and progress are in sight. Having mobilized activists and popular support for its ‘Alternative conception for police reform’, the network seemed to successfully wield influence on national-level decisions, only to realize that many of their demands remained ignored or rejected and they were side-lined for a purported lack of expertise and experience in questions of public security. The network’s efforts to gather and prove their expertise through community-level projects and various research and commentary activities, which I have analysed as part of their role of knowledge production, eventually served to consolidate and strengthen their position.
as a key civil society actor in the police reform process. On the other hand, I have indicated how the increasing authoritarian and closed approach of state authorities served to again limit the CU’s influence on the reform process, which was only retained in concrete collaborations on the new Road Patrol Service and parliamentary oversight. While especially the latter have shown that it is possible to overcome the ad-hocism discussed above and bring about institutional changes, the overall logic of selective delegation and responsibilization of the CU and other civil society actors have prevailed, as the latter have made tremendous efforts to inform reform policies and legislation and pilot projects while having had a limited stake in decision making and being completely dependent on international funding. It is here that the logic of post-liberal statebuilding is most obvious, as international money often, quite literally, builds up or refurbishes local police stations, car pools and technical equipment, while the conceptual and practical changes put forward by donors and their civil society counterparts are adopted in selective and temporary ways which, as recent developments have shown, can quickly morph into top-down and repressive ordering.

These higher-level dynamics should not distract from the fact that hierarchical, identity-based and potentially exclusionary forms of ordering are a feature of many areas of life in Kyrgyzstan. As my analysis based on participation in community-level project implementation events indicated, the CU’s ‘Co-Security’ approach, indeed, seemed effective in fostering cooperation and debate between law enforcement, local administration, neighbourhood leaders and the wider population and thus enabled the design of more appropriate measures for crime prevention and security provision. However, further critical reflection also pointed to the limited abilities or willingness of local security working groups to capture the complexity of security issues and include all residents’ points of view. Thus, in the constructing of newly arrived residents (priezhye) or religious missionaries as a source of problems, or in the more or less wilful ignoring of these groups’ or young people’s viewpoints, the local groups seemed to embrace at times paternalistic and at other times objectifying, exclusionary and potentially overzealous approaches toward tackling issues of public disorder, violent extremism and juvenile delinquency. While the CU were aware and trying to address these shortcomings in their work with the local groups, the insights on the differing levels of buy-in and activity of the community groups also indicate the network’s dependence on the latter to help demonstrate the suitability of the ‘Co-Security’ approach. The activists tried to secure this support by giving group members the space to problematize the loss of virtues and ideals that had once been upheld by Soviet modernity and civilization – a stance that must have seemed anachronistic to young people – and, more explicitly, by pointing out the significance of the project work as an attempt at ‘building a normal country’. In this way, the CU situated its own reform
agenda, which revolved primarily around ideas of transparency, accountability and anti-corruption from the Western ‘liberal peace’ imaginary, in a productive tension with local working group members’ concerns about the dignity of the country and its population that were situated in the ‘politics of sovereignty’ imaginary. In sum, the three case studies examined in this work illustrate the varying and sometimes contradictory positioning of peace and security actors within the imaginaries of statebuilding and the shaping of post-liberal forms of order via the mechanisms of responsibilization, selective delegation, ad-hocism and cooperation.

Governmentality and decolonial horizons in post-liberal statebuilding

The empirical insight and conceptual as well as methodological advances of this study foreground the three contributions that I have already discussed in the Introduction. In revisiting these, I focus on the insights that add to the decolonial perspective to then point out how the conceptual and methodological contributions are woven into it. In Chapter 2, I developed the decolonial approach to studying statebuilding and social ordering out of debates on post-liberal peace and the way in which it, as argued by Chandler, constitutes and serves to legitimize forms of governmentality as apparent potentials and realities of emancipation are overridden by processes of domination, subjugation and exclusion. I further traced this governmentality – understood broadly as a condition of contemporary post-liberal societies and not limited only to governmental technologies – through the various critiques of liberal political thought and of the illiberal nature of contemporary liberalism. Effectively, the book’s engagement with the various literature strands and empirical realities in Kyrgyzstan has thus demonstrated how forms of governmentality are paramount throughout global space and time – as community security practices exhibited problematic exclusionary and essentializing tendencies in their application in Anglo-America, which have played out in strikingly similar ways in Kyrgyzstan, and as historical modes and logics of social ordering and corresponding habitualization and normalization of violence and injustice still appear to be at play in contemporary Kyrgyzstan and beyond.

In furthering decolonial perspectives on the former Soviet space (see Tlostanova, 2010), my analysis demonstrated how in Kyrgyzstan the reproduction of internally established forms of hierarchy, exclusion and inequality is especially apparent in relation to the legacy of Soviet modernity. As Chapters 5 and 7 have shown, the Soviet ethos of voluntary engagement as a civic duty still informs present-day community volunteers’ activities and contributions to the solution of problems and is seen as a high value but also a moral obligation and expectation toward elderly and well-off people. One
local representative’s explanation that “If I only work for myself, what would this be, then I’m an animal or what?” especially stressed the normalization of this ethos with its humanist and Enlightenment ideas. Meanwhile, voluntary communal workers also find themselves in a position of arbiter between the population and local or higher-level authorities, law enforcement and security organs. Especially in cases when potentially problematic residents or groups of residents are hard to access, or when decisions are hard to take and contested, voluntary local groups and societal bodies in fact become representatives and defenders of the authorities’ decisions and policies, unless they challenge the latter themselves. The community-level actors examined in Chapters 5 to 7 thus become decisive players in the new governmentalization of the community, which is astutely captured in Rose’s description: “Community, rather than the ‘social’ is the new territorialisation of political thought, the new way in which conduct is collectivised … in a double movement of autonomisation and responsibilisation. Once responsibilised and entrepreneurialised, they would govern themselves within a state-secured framework of law and order” (1999, p 475).

The decisive aspect facilitating this autonomization, responsibilization and thus governmentalization is the work of imaginaries of statebuilding, through which the promotion and implementation of local and national governmental agendas is secured in non-obvious ways and not rarely presented as something which is, by all measures of appropriateness, the right thing to do. This way, promoting tolerance through the ‘peoples’ friendship’ idea, despite deep chasms between mono-ethnic communities, tackling racketeering and devising restrictive measures against religious radicalism, and the re-establishment of platforms and practices which introduce local youth to past achievements and civilizational virtues all seemed to be perfectly reasonable solutions to community security problems. At the same time, however, they also served, even if unwittingly, to reproduce the current order, stabilize existing hierarchies and distract from ways to deal with the more fundamental causes of insecurity, crime and violence.

This situating of post-liberal ordering in Kyrgyzstan as part of a wider trajectory of global governmentality resonates more or less obviously with decolonial perspectives in peace, conflict and intervention studies and beyond. Even if many approaches with a decolonial angle would reject this association because of justified concerns with the Euro- and Western-centric perspective that Foucault himself embodied (see Mignolo, 2011, p 133), this work is interested in exploring the common ground between decolonial analyses of the ‘colonial matrix of power’ or ‘coloniality of power’ and what (post-)Foucauldians call forms of governmentality and biopolitics (see Mignolo, 2011, p 14). In pursuing this line of thinking in the present study, I have used decolonial thought as a plane of critical reflection on the contemporary manifestations and historical legacies of the colonial nature
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of modern capitalism in Kyrgyzstan. Concrete forms of being, acting and knowing which seek to overcome such coloniality have been most apparent in the ‘tradition and culture’ imaginary, where the ecosophic worldview and corresponding discourses on traditional knowledge as a source of well-being and human connections with nature and the spiritual domain suggest parallels with other modes of existence that aim to heal the ‘colonial wound’ as they, in Shilliam’s words, ‘bind back together peoples, lands, pasts, ancestors and spirits’ (Shilliam, 2015, p 13). As already indicated in discussing other discourses in the tradition and culture imaginary, such forms of ‘deep relation’ (Shilliam, 2015) do not appear significant in Kyrgyzstan’s society as a whole, especially given the prevalent role of modernistic understandings of culture and tradition which, as suggested in Hobsbawa and Ranger’s (1983) argument on the ‘invention of tradition’, are strongly connected to understandings of the Kyrgyz as a nation.

Correspondingly, when it comes to the empirical analysis, I did not come across anything resembling a decolonial ‘political project’ or forms of decolonial political ‘subjecthood’, but mostly encountered decoloniality as diffuse and amorphous forms of being, acting and knowing with a faint presence in the narratives and practices observable in people’s lifeworlds. Conceived of in a broad sense and in association with momentary empowerment and emancipation, it could be argued that decolonial thinking was reflected in attempts to bring back together people from different ethnic communities analysed in Chapter 5, or in the TYCs’ efforts to bring together the youth from across town and from the countryside, and perhaps more so in their attempts to mobilize help and solidarity for those in need (Chapter 6). These attempts at forging peaceful coexistence and conviviality between people of diverse origins and backgrounds can perhaps best be understood with the concept of dakhlez, which Nurulla-Khodjaeva (2016) proposes as a decolonial way of being that defies Eurocentric forms of rationality, modernity and civilizational hierarchy (see Chapter 4). Furthermore, and in further emphasizing the aspect of mutual help and solidarity that is less reflected in dakhlez, the CU’s efforts to help people from rural localities across Kyrgyzstan to organize more people-centred ways to provide security can be seen as inspired by a decolonial sentiment. Ultimately, however, it has to be acknowledged that all these initiatives are situated within the institutions, practices and knowledges associated with the Kyrgyzstani nation state and the capitalist order in which it is embedded, and are thus liable to reproduce colonial tendencies of ordering, hierarchizing, stratification and subjugation, even if indirectly and unintentionally.

Why is decoloniality strictly defined absent from the different community security and peacebuilding practices examined? Why not use a broader definition of decoloniality as an extension of the ‘emancipatory’ or ‘empowering’ trajectories that other scholars in peace, conflict and
intervention studies have tried to uncover in recent years? The point of this analytical strategy, of defining decoloniality as an extreme, radical vantage point to analyse social ordering and statebuilding is to acknowledge and enunciate the ‘coloniality of being’ as it pervades life in the current late capitalist period, alongside the historical processes of the production of this coloniality. In the context of Central Asia, this means to acknowledge the historical forms of oppression and governing of people by way of creating hierarchies and divisions between them while providing frameworks that communicate an equality among supposed equals and common future goals, as well as the contemporary materializations of the epistemic frameworks underlying these governing approaches (Tlostanova, 2010).

Much in the same way as critical criminology and governmentality scholars have examined community safety and crime prevention debates in Western Europe and North America (see Chapter 2), the point of my analysis was to show how community-level security and peacebuilding initiatives need not be more inclusive or emancipatory than their supposedly more top-down, state-sanctioned equivalent. Rather, I have tried to demonstrate that even people who take the responsibility and invest efforts to define and deal with security concerns in their community are liable to develop constrained and exclusionary perspectives and corresponding security and peacebuilding measures. Once again, the point is not to suggest that people are unaware of these shortcomings. It is to show how, given the limited possibilities available to build peaceful and secure communities, people choose to engage in these potentially exclusionary and not quite perfect ways of doing something, rather than doing nothing. While this is understandable within the parameters of the cases examined, it is equally important to point out how the aggregation of the examined initiatives, and of the numerous other processes they represent, can lead to such levels of exclusion and marginalization that the overall trajectory this feeds into is one of conflict management and governmentality, rather than peacebuilding and security provision. While decolonial ways of being, acting and knowing might exist in the interstices of the capitalist-colonial nation state system in which the examined initiatives operate, it seems that more large-scale, visible forms of decoloniality are only possible in localities that are to an extent ‘de-linked’ from this system and thus sufficiently independent of its imperatives and modes of operation (Mignolo, 2011, pp 118ff). While such fundamental challenges to the current system appear remote, the above-mentioned discourses in the ‘tradition and culture’ imaginary, as well as the anti-colonial discourse in that of ‘politics of sovereignty’, present potentials that deserve further examination. Furthermore, the immense efforts of civil society bodies and wider societal actors in challenging authorities and working to ensure minimal levels of security, order and public services in their communities deserve more systematic attention as to whether and how
they already present forms of autonomy, solidarity and resilience that can be meaningful from a perhaps more pragmatic decolonial angle.

As indicated at the outset of this section, the other contributions that this monograph makes are more or less directly linked to the key concern of advancing debates on decolonial approaches to studying peace, conflict and intervention. Thus, both the conceptual and methodological move proposed in this work have their grounding in decolonial thought and the related concern to develop a more critical and grounded inquiry. My conceptual proposal was that research needs to start to appreciate and try to capture the heteroglossia of social ordering processes, which I have done by conceptualizing social imaginaries as a way of understanding the relation between concrete practices and materialities of peace- and statebuilding on the one hand, and the ideas, discourses and underlying worldviews and ontologies on the other, and the nexus of combination and hybridization unfolding between them. Even if some of the outcomes of this analysis have been reached in other approaches as well, the decisive added value of this framework is that factors of social ordering that are not apparent in textual representations, speech acts and practices of internationalized ordering projects are given more analytical attention and can thus be better appreciated in terms of the roles they play in the adaptation, reinterpretation and inversion of internationally promoted concepts and practices.

In direct relation to the latter concern, my methodological move was to introduce a cooperative and practice-based approach to doing research. Based on previous debates in practice theory and collaborative approaches to knowledge production, the idea is thus already known, but was situated in a wider concern of overcoming the division between researchers and research participants as well as communities in order to avoid the usually prevalent one-sided and extractive logics of knowledge production in favour of a more dialogical process. As I have elaborated in Chapter 3 and demonstrated throughout the empirical analysis, this approach has helped me get more in-depth and comprehensive insights than most more standard ways of doing fieldwork would have done. In particular, it helped me navigate issues of personal safety concerning both myself and research participants and partners which have been under-appreciated in earlier research. Although this has also implied a level of self-censorship in selecting the communities and actors whom I analysed in more detail, and despite the further limitations incurred by the diverging priorities of community and civil society actors which turned out to be hard to satisfy, this cooperative approach was continued and led into long-term collaborations and friendships with my partners in Kyrgyzstan. My evolving positionality as a researcher in continuous conversation and in a relation of mutual support with local partners thus presents an important contribution to the idea of ‘decolonizing methodology’ and transcending the neoliberal scientific episteme. Even if decolonial
thought does not directly feature in these conversations and appears remote, the common concern to expose, undermine and dismantle the institutions and wider social forces maintaining present injustice foregrounds a decolonial sensibility in a wide, but tangible sense.

On a final note, it needs to be acknowledged that this monograph has left a number of aspects still to be addressed in future work, especially concerning the specificities of post-liberal ordering in Central Asia and beyond. As the discussion of the imaginaries of social orders in Chapter 4 and various parts of the following analysis have indicated, amid all variation with the more authoritarian regimes of Kyrgyzstan’s neighbouring countries, the post-liberal approach appears valuable to capture the forms of liberalism and democratic ordering in other Central Asian states as well. Further, and more importantly, as the critical review of various approaches to liberalism and accounts of its failures and transmutations has demonstrated, the latter exhibit striking similarities across global regions, including Western Europe and wider industrialized parts of the world. In this light, a critical approach to studying peace, security and development, and especially decolonial versions of it, need to further unpack the forms of peace, order and security created in the name of liberal democracy to capture the extent, effects and implications of global post-liberal order.