Resembling the Opponent: Nationalist and Colonialist Historiographies in Modern Korea

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In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, modern historians played a vital role in structuring discourses about Korean nationhood. These new narratives were not created in isolation but interwoven with the international environment in which different forces co-created representations of Korea. This article attempts to reconsider the formation of modern Korean historiography by examining how Korean nationalist and Japanese colonialist scholars overlapped with each other in their practice of writing national history. It shows that Korean and Japanese historical accounts, despite their differences, were both premised on three major categorical concepts derived from the West: the essentialist understanding of the nation, the linear perception of time, and history’s subjective control over territorial space. I will conduct a textual analysis of writings by two Korean historians—Sin Ch’aeho and Pak Ŭnsik—and compare them to publications by several Japanese scholars who worked under the sponsorship of the Government General from the 1910s to the 1930s. My goal is to show that these two types of historical interpretation reified themselves for political ends within regimes of Western epistemological paradigms.

**Keywords:** modern historiography, nationalism, colonialism, Sin Ch’aeho, Pak Ŭnsik

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Since the late nineteenth century, the universalizing trend of modernity has manifested itself through the rise of nation-states as the “natural” unit of politics. In the midst of this transformation, a handful of Korean intellectuals viewed history as a key discursive platform through which to explain, in spatial and temporal terms, the location of their minjok (J. minzoku, ethnic nation) and claim its allegedly unbroken genealogy in the larger framework of civilization. They structured discourses about Korean nationhood that supplanted earlier dynastic annals or patrilineal records of noble families. These new narratives were not created in isolation but engaged with a global environment in which the production of knowledge was open to multiple agents whose interpretations co-existed, collaborated, and competed.

In this vein, this article attempts to reconsider the formation of modern Korean historiography by delving into how the practice of national history writing at the turn of the twentieth century “simultaneously reject[ed] and accept[ed] the dominance, both epistemic and moral, of an alien culture, [that is Japanese colonialism].” I will carry out a textual analysis of writings by two Korean elites—Sin Ch’aeho (1880–1936) and Pak Ŭnsik (1859–1925), both of whom were journalists, independence activists, and founders of modern Korean historiography—and compare their writings to publications by several Japanese scholars who worked under the sponsorship of the Government General of Korea (GGK) from the 1910s to the 1930s. My intention is to show that Korean and Japanese historical discourses, despite their differences, were both premised on three concepts found in Western epistemology: an essentialist understanding of the nation; a progressive representation of time; and the notion that history can exert subjective control over territorial space.

The age of imperial expansion saw numerous cases where historical accounts with very different purposes—one invoking a nation’s glorious evolution and another justifying colonial invasion—became nearly inseparable, due to the respective authors’ desires to control the story they told about a nation’s past. By embedding the minjok into history writing as its main subject and propagating their own versions of master narratives, I argue, these two seemingly opposite camps, nationalist and colonialist historiographies, served as mirror images to each other in objectifying history and making it into a politically legitimate entity that could incorporate a wide array of identities and spatio-temporal attributes.

In the past few decades, scholars have written extensively on modern Korean historiography and the focus of their research has varied over time. Traditional studies were...
interested in identifying Sin and Pak’s pioneering contribution to the nascent development of Korea’s national history. More recent works have taken a revisionist stance towards nationalist thought, presenting it as a possible conceptual framework for comprehending social changes and the potential re-unification of the two Koreas. Meanwhile, other studies examine little known aspects of these two early historians by focusing on Sin’s turn to anarchism in his later career or on Pak’s cosmopolitan egalitarianism and religious views. Other historians, mostly based in Euro-American academia, highlight Japanese influence on Korean nationalist thinking and its similarity with colonialism in logic and vocabulary.

This article aligns with that last trend but expands on what Gi-Wook Shin calls an “elective affinity” between nationalist and colonialist accounts of Korean history by looking at specific ways in which they shared narrative schemes and conceptual orientations. Several scholars have used a textual comparison to demonstrate ways in which these historiographies simultaneously opposed and resembled each other. My goal is not to place every Korean historian of the early modern era into a particular ideological framework and ignore their diverse scholarly perspectives on history, or to suggest that nationalism and colonialism carried equal sociopolitical weight. Rather, I intend to elucidate how these two types of historical interpretation reified themselves for certain political ends and how their overlapping perspectives were couched in Western epistemological paradigms.

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3 The selected works are as follows: Cho Tong-gŏl, Han’guk minjokchuŭi ĭi paldŏn kwa tongnip undongja yŏn’gyu [A study of the development of the Korean nationalism and independence movement] (Seoul: Chisik sanŏpsa, 1993); Kim Yong-sŏp, Urinara kŏndae yŏksahak ĭi sŏngnip [The establishment of modern Korean history] (Seoul: Sin’gu munhwasa, 1970); Sin Ich’ŏl, Sin Ch’aeho ĭi yŏksa sasang yŏn’gyu [A study of Sin Ch’ae-ho’s thoughts on history] (Seoul: Koryŏ Taehakkyo Ch’ulp’anbu, 1981); Sin Yong-ha, Han’guk kŏndae minjokchuŭi ľi hyŏngsŏng kwa chŏnp’’ga [The formation and development of modern Korean nationalism] (Seoul: Taegwang munhwasa, 1989); Song Kŏn-ho, Minjok chisŏng ĭi t’amu [An inquiry into the national intellect] (Seoul: Ch’angjak kwa pip’yŏngsa, 1975).


The Paradox within Modern Historiographies

By the time Japan annexed Korea, colonial bureaucrats believed it was essential to create a historical narrative for their imperialist agendas because it could legitimize Japan’s latest conquests abroad. Just as the three-hundred-year relationship between Japanese traders and tribal residents of Taiwan was considered reason enough to invalidate China’s suzerainty of the island, the historical roots that the Korean and Japanese peoples allegedly shared were thought to underpin their racial and cultural affinity. In 1910, Kita Sadakichi (1871–1939), a colonial scholar employed by the Education Ministry, asserted that “annexation represents a return to the ancient relationship between Japan and Korea.” He continued, “Korea is truly a weak ‘branch family’ (bunke), [whereas] Japan is a rich and strong ‘main family’ (honke).”

Aoyagi Tsunatarō (1877–1932), who founded the Keijō nippō (Seoul Daily) in 1906, made a similar argument that “the Japanese-Korean minzoku had lived like one family . . . but for geographical reasons . . . they were now politically separated and formed distinct societies. Therefore, it is unquestionably right to restore our ancient ties through annexation.”

Soon after Japan colonized Korea in 1910, the Bureau of Investigation (ch’wijoguk) was launched as an affiliate of the GGK and was tasked with making a thorough survey of Korean culture and customs. In the Bureau’s inaugural ceremony, the first Governor General, Terauchi Masatake (1852–1919), commanded that “the study of Korean history and national identity be part of the assimilation effort and the basis of colonial policy in order to merge the spirits of Yamato and Chōsen into one minzoku and to alleviate Korean antagonism.” The Bureau underwent structural reshaping after the March First Movement in 1919, which was decisive in shifting the GGK’s governance from military rule to cultural oversight. As a result of that restructuring, the Committee to Compile Korean History (Chōsenshi henshūkai) was established in 1922 with a ten-year-long plan of writing Chōsenshi (The History of Korea). Prominent Japanese historians of the time, such as Inaba Iwakichi (1876–1940), Matsui Hitoshi (1877–1937), and Imanishi Ryu (1875–1932), were members of this committee. A few Korean elites, including Yi Wanyong (1858–1926), Yi Pyŏngdo (1896–1989), and Ch’oe Namsŏn (1890–1957), also joined this committee in advisory or investigatory positions.

What resonates throughout colonialist historical narratives, as expressed in a number of texts, was the idea that the ethnic nation had continued to exist as a transhistorical body in both Japan and Korea since ancient times. This essentialist understanding of the past considers the minjok to be the epicenter of historical change that made these two peoples’ existence possible and determined their kinship ties. This concept of minjok underpinned an interpretation of history in which the Japanese believed that they had once ruled Koreans and

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9 Kita Sadakichi, Kankoku no heigō to kokushi [The annexation of Korea and national history] (Tokyo: Sanseidō, 1910), 77.
11 Ibid, 262–263.
shared common ancestral origins with them. One of the GGK’s early projects on premodern Korea, the Chōsenhantoshi (The history of the Korean peninsula), illustrates this point:

The Han minjok and the Japanese minjok had formed one single minjok and dwelled together in the same region. But as a result of massive migration, one group had settled down in the peninsula while the other arrived at the archipelago . . . Scholars in both the East and the West agree that the two minjok belong to the same ethnic line . . . These three ethnic groups [Mahan, Jinhan, and Pyŏnhan] formed the Chosŏn minjok of today. If so, the Samhan is the geographical term that connotes the Korean peninsula. Although [the Samhan] has often meant the three Han’gŭk, it refers more generally to the Chosŏn minjok . . . If Japan had not been strong enough to protect Korea from intimidation by Koguryŏ, the Chosŏn minjok would not exist now.\(^{12}\)

Although the term minjok is not specifically defined in this passage, the authors perceived it as an objective entity that had lasted throughout history in Korea. The minjok, in their minds, was a fluid and organic unit that could be split apart or merged back together over time, while still maintaining its unbroken continuity. The Chōsenhantoshi claimed that the Han minjok and the Japanese minjok had formed one single unity and that, in ancient times, Japan had protected the Samhan from threats emanating from Koguryŏ. In so doing, it legitimatized the idea that Japan’s recent annexation of Korea was a return to the original state of affairs and that Korea could not develop properly without Japanese guidance. However, these Japanese scholars ignored perspectives that might call their view of history into question: whether or not a shared ethnic lineage between the two peoples could be verified, internal/external factors, and the possibility of historical rupture and dissent.

If colonialist historians established narratives of the Korean minjok to uphold imperial policy, their Korean counterparts rethought history in national terms to create an autonomous historiography that might refute colonial scholarship. Sin Ch’aeho wrote new accounts that “equated Korean history (kuksa) with the history of the Korean nation (minjuksa).”\(^{13}\) He broke from earlier dynastic annals written in a Confucian style and crafted a narrative that was based in resurrecting memories of a nation-centered past, even if most Koreans were barely aware of such memories. A new historiography, based on a dimly-remembered collective memory of the minjok, would become the focus of Korean history to counter Japan’s vision of itself as bringing civilization and enlightenment to the peninsula.\(^{14}\)

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\(^{12}\) The Chōsenhantoshi was a multi-year project conducted by the Government General in the 1910s that preceded the establishment of the Chōsenshi benshûkai. The Chōsenhantoshi was not officially published, but it became a key part of the Chōsenshi. The passage is quoted from Taet’ongnyŏng sosok ch’innil pan minjok haengwi chinsang kyumyŏng wiwŏnhoe, ed., Ch’innil pan minjok haengwi kwan’gye saryojip: Ilche ŭi Chosŏnsa p’yŏnch’an saŏp [Collection of documents of the pro-Japanese and anti-national activities: imperial Japan’s compilation of Korean history] (Seoul: Sŏnin, 2009), vol. 5, 145 (hereafter cited as CDPAA).

\(^{13}\) Em, 339.

\(^{14}\) Sin, Sin Ch’aeho ŭi yŏksa sasang yŏn’gyu, 224–232.
To validate the autonomous nature of Korean history, Sin highlighted Tan’gun—a mythical figure who is believed to have been born between the son of God (Hwanung) and a woman (Ungnyŏ) incarnated from a bear, and who established the first dynasty in the Korean peninsula, Old Chosŏn (2333 B.C.–108 B.C.). By tracking vague clues and combining fragmentary pieces from several old texts such as the Samguk yusa (Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms), Chewang ŭngi (Songs of emperors and kings), and Tongguk tonggam (A comprehensive mirror of the Eastern Kingdom), Sin endeavored to restore Tan’gun to his rightful place within the collective memory of Koreans. In his article Toksa sillon (A new reading of history), serialized in 1908, Sin asked, “Isn’t Tan’gun the forefather who established our Eastern Kingdom? . . . Does the era of Tan’gun simply belong to the age of mysterious, remote antiquity?” He continued, “I believe that the sacred activities of Tan’gun must have been recorded in the remains and documents of Koguryŏ.”

As many have pointed out, however, it was not until the late thirteenth century that a reference to Tan’gun first appeared in a written text—the Samguk yusa compiled by the Buddhist monk Iryŏn (1206–1289). In his collection of myths and folktales, Iryŏn recounted a story about Tan’gun even though more than three thousand years had passed since the purported date of that legendary figure’s first appearance. Around the same time, Yi Sŭnghyu (1224–1300) depicted Tan’gun’s creation of Old Chosŏn in his mid-Koryŏ-dynasty work Chewang ŭngi. These narratives about Tan’gun were then succeeded by the Tongguk tonggam—a chronicle of early Korean history completed in 1485 by Confucian scholars such as Sŏ Kö-jong (1420–1488). Undaunted by scant sources that could prove the legend of Tan’gun, Sin transformed minjok from being just an abstract idea into a concrete reality by claiming that all Koreans could trace their origins to the bloodline of Tan’gun.

Pak Ŭnsik also rewrote the past from a nationalistic perspective to lend credence to the idea that Tan’gun had built Old Chosŏn and that the entire history of the Korean minjok was derived from him. In the introduction to Taedong kodaesaron (Ancient history of the Great East), published during his exile in Manchuria in 1911, Pak claimed, “We, the people of the Great East, have a four-thousand-year-old history” and “the god-like man, [Tan’gun], who came down from Heaven and landed under a sandalwood tree on Mount Paektu is the founder of our minjok.” Pak continued, “[All] Koreans share the same bloodline and are the holy descendants of Tan’gun.” In elevating Tan’gun as the ancestral head of the minjok, Pak

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15 Sin Ch’ae-ho, “Toksa sillon” [A new reading of history], in Tanjae Sin Ch’ae-ho chŏnjip p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe, [The complete works of Sin Ch’aeho], vol. 3 (Seoul: Hyŏngsŏl ch’ulp’ansa, 1997), 314.


18 Ibid.
crafted an uninterrupted trajectory for Korean history, which refused to concede that Korea’s mythical past had been forgotten in the mists of time or negated in recent decades.

Although Japanese colonialist and Korean nationalist historiographies at the turn of the twentieth century appropriated the concept of minjok to different ends, both their perceptions of the nation reflected notions of ethnicity rooted in German Romanticism.

In Meiji Japan, there were competing ideas about what “nation” meant until the 1890s. The political scientist Katō Hiroyuki (1836–1916) first used minzoku as an equivalent term for the German word Volk (“folk” or “people”) in his translation of Johann K. Bluntschli (1808–1881)’s *The Theory of the State (Allgemeines Staatsrecht)* during the early 1870s. A decade later, another writer Miyazaki Muryū (1855–1889) translated the French “Assemblée Nationale” into “minzoku kaigi.”

As Riva Kastoryano says, these French and German understandings of the nation were contrasting: while the former represented “an inclusive perception of citizenship” based on political “rights and duty,” the latter referred to “an ethnic affiliation that excludes all cultural differences.” The German interpretation gradually overtook the French one in Japanese public discourse due to multiple sociopolitical events, including the German-inspired Meiji Constitution of 1889 and a series of wars against foreign powers. Another important reason was that Japanese scholars increasingly expressed their “xenophobic and exclusionist sentiments” when the Meiji government negotiated an end to separate residential districts for Westerners and allowed them to live alongside local Japanese inhabitants.

Korean historians like Sin and Pak also adopted theories of ethnic nationality and claimed that the essence of the Korean minjok was unique. For them, the crisis of sovereignty that Korea faced was so dire that it was imperative to establish a new narrative distinguishing its cultural tradition. Whether in their imagined restoration of ancient unity or their assertion of Korean uniqueness, both colonialist and nationalist historians relied on a Western perspective of national history. That reliance created the paradox that lies at the heart of these two modern historiographies: they present opposing viewpoints that nonetheless coincide because they reinforce a vision of ethnic homogeneity within the parameters of Western epistemology and reproduce knowledge that subsumes other forms of identities such as class, gender, or region.

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19 German Romanticism refers to an intellectual movement that occurred in German-speaking countries during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Its leading philosophers were Karl L. Reinhold (1757–1823), Johann G. Fichte (1762–1814), and Friedrich Schelling (1775–1854) among others. In reaction to the radical political ideas and changes caused by the French Revolution, these thinkers conceptualized the Volk as an ethnic unit that completes the natural and organic evolution of social structures. For further discussion on German Romanticism, see Azade Seyhan, “What is Romanticism, and where did it come from?” in Nicholas Saul, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to German Romanticism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009): 1–20.


Ordering History within Linear Temporality

A remarkable feature found in nationalist historiographies, albeit each espousing quite different philosophical, political, and methodological positions, is that time is described as flowing in a forward direction to form a nation-state, a necessary stage in the realization of modernity. Within a minjok-based history, time had two narrative characteristics—linear and teleological—insofar as that history should prove an unbroken lineage that spanned countless generations and show the nation’s historical progress. For nationalist writers, tracing the fortunes of the minjok and its domination over ethnic minorities became a vital task because it was believed to help identify their nation’s historical continuity and sovereignty. To verify these claims, they “celebrated their [nation’s] hoariness, not astonishing youth,” while arguing for its ability to advance along with modernity by adopting political rationality.24

A disconnect within nationalist discourse—“one of the most persistent splits . . . between the atavism of the nation and its telos of modernity,” in Prasenjit Duara’s phrase—originated from historians’ anachronistic attempts to interpret the remote past through the lens of modern ideas.25 For instance, Partha Chatterjee has shown that leading Indian elites under British rule replicated that contradiction in how they perceived nationalism: they embraced “the bourgeois-rationalist conception of knowledge, established in the post-Enlightenment period of European intellectual history, as the moral and epistemic foundation for a supposedly universal framework of thought.”26 Yet they “also assert[ed] the autonomous identity of a national culture” by highlighting its archaic symbols and spiritual greatness.27

To maintain their unique Indian identity under colonial rule while simultaneously embracing the genuine benefits of modernity, these Indian elites bifurcated the domain of culture into two spheres—the material and the spiritual—and claimed their superiority in the latter realm.

Korean nationalist writers, in a similar vein, took a dualist approach to conceptualizing Korean history in their struggle against colonialist discourse.28 Pak Ŭn-sik used the concept of the national soul (kukhon) to define the nation as a spiritual entity that transcends the ephemeral existence of dynasties.29 Sin Ch’aeho distinguished a national essence (kuksu) from

26 Chatterjee, 11.
27 Ibid.
28 As a chief editor of the TaeHan maeil sinbo (Korea Daily News), Sin Ch’aeho wrote about kuksu (national essence) a number of times. For Sin, kuksu was a spiritual concept that encompassed customs, habits, laws, and institutions, which he believed to be historically inherited by the people in a country. If Pak Ŭn-sik, who also worked for the same newspaper, emphasized kukhon (national soul) and inspired readers not to lose it, Sin focused on kuksu and argued for its “maintenance” (pojŏn) against Japanese colonialism. Although Sin and Pak used different terms, both of them understood that the nation is constituted by the spiritual and the material. By employing these dualist approaches to the nation, Sin and Pak sought to highlight the possibility for national salvation. For kukhon, see TaeHan maeil sinbo June 14, 1908; August 8, 1909; November 2, 1909; and November 9, 1909; for kuksu, see TaeHan maeil sinbo, October 25, 1905; February 13, 1908; November 9, 1909; and January 13, 1910.
29 Pak Ŭn-sik, “Han’guk t’ôngsa” [An agonizing history of Korea], in Paegam Pak Ŭn-sik sŏnsaeng chŏnip
a national body (kukch’e), asserting that the soul of Korea would be preserved even if its body perished in the political crisis facing the minjok at that time. He focused on the hwarangdo, the mindset of an elite group of warrior youth (hwarang) who were trained to serve their country in the Kingdom of Silla. He saw that although Korea’s political autonomy was violated due to its colonization, its national identity, in its purest sense, was still inscribed in the hwarangdo. Sin was convinced that the hwarangdo was indigenous to Korea and that its strong ideology supported a vibrant national history. “The hwarang party has always advocated independence . . . in polity,” he claimed, “[and] the hwarangdo has evolved into a unique facet of Chosŏn . . . [whose] history of [bravely] defending sovereignty is contrary to the toadyism (sadaejun) of Confucian scholars.” For Sin, the hwarangdo was a conceptual space where he could envision an ancient spirituality that had been present throughout the history of the Korean minjok. He believed that the national identity embedded in the hwarang remained unadulterated by the demise of the state or its loss of sovereignty. “The vicissitudes of the minjok,” Sin said, “hinges on the variable course that its spirit takes.”

Sin and Pak engaged with contemporaneous global intellectual trends and adopted social Darwinism. Sin argued that “it is an inviolate law of human society in which “I” (a) can survive, prevail, and become a triumphant man only by subjugating the “non-I (pi-a),” but if conquered, [“I” (a)] would be marked as a loser in history.” According to this view, the Korean minjok could not avoid external and internal competition such as disputes with its neighbors and struggles for supremacy between different factions of its own population. Sin observed that such ethnic strife had marked ancient Korean history: “The Puyŏ minjok descended directly from Tan’gun and absorbed the other five rivals (the Xianbi, Chinese, Malgal, Jurchen, and local tribes).” Describing how the ethnic minorities had been subsumed by Puyŏ, Sin declared that the fortunes of his nation could be traced through a singular chronology starting with Tan’gun and continuing through Old Chosŏn, Puyŏ, Koguryŏ, Parhae, and the Koryŏ and Chosŏn dynasties. Pak also espoused the principle of “the struggle for survival” (saengjon kyŏngjaeng) and took for granted that the strong conquer the weak. For him, Tan’gun’s assimilation of territories belonging to Kija—a nobleman from China who founded a state on the peninsula in 1120 B.C. and, thus, became a rival to Tan’gun—

p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe, ed., Paegam Pak Ūn-sik chŏnjip [The complete works of Pak Únsik], vol. 1 (Seoul: Tongbang midiŏ, 2002), 1080–1081.
30 Sin Ch’aeho, “Chosŏnsa yŏn’guch’o” [A draft of the studies on Korean history], in Tanjae Sin Ch’aeho chŏnjip p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe, ed., Tanjae Sin Ch’aeho chŏnjip [The complete works of Sin Ch’ae-ho], vol. 2 (Seoul: Hyŏngsŏl Ch’ulp’ansa, 1997), 398.
31 Sin, 395.
32 Sin Ch’aeho, “Chosŏn sanggosa” [Ancient history of Korea], in Tanjae Sin Ch’aeho chŏnjip p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe, ed., Tanjae Sin Ch’aeho chŏnjip [The complete works of Sin Ch’ae-ho], vol. 1 (Seoul: Hyŏngsŏl Ch’ulp’ansa, 1997), 32.
33 Sin, “Toksa Sillon,” 311.
34 Sin, 312–323.
35 Pak, “Kyoyuk i purhŭng imyŏn saengjon i pudŭk” [No survival without education], in Paegam Pak Ūn-sik sŏnsaeng chŏnjip p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe, ed., Paegam Pak Ūn-sik chŏnjip [The complete works of Pak Únsik], vol. 5 (Seoul: Tongbang Midiŏ, 2002), 328.
exemplified how “the host group” (chujok) dominated “the guest group” (kaekchok) in Korean history. Pak claimed, “Descendants of Kija have intermixed with those of Tan’gun for the last thousand years. Therefore, it is impossible to see them as separate. But Tan’gun is first [in the lineage] and Kija is second [because Tan’gun’s descendants assimilated those of Kija].” Pak demoted Kija from being a potential progenitor of the Korean people to merely being an early settler, which showed that the Korean minjok had outcompeted its neighbors and eventually become a unified nation.

Pak described the historical progression of the minjok, from its initial formation to its ultimate survival, in terms of a linear and teleological temporality. He incorporated that same temporality into his invention of the Taehwangjo kangse kiwŏn, or calendar of the Great Emperor’s descent from Heaven. Pak considered Tan’gun to be the Great Emperor, and he created this calendar to indicate precisely when the minjok had begun. Pak declared 2457 B.C., the date that Pak believed Tan’gun had descended from heaven, as the starting point of Korean history and calculated the dates of his own publications in accordance with it. For instance, in the colophon to two of his works, Myŏngnim Tappu chŏn (Tale of Myŏngnim Tappu) and Ch’ŏn Kaesomun chŏn (Tale of Yŏn’gaesomun)—both of which recount the exploits of heroes who lived in the kingdom of Koguryŏ (37 B.C.–A.D. 668)—he wrote, “The author [Pak Únsik] writes in September of the year of 4368 according to the calendar of the Great Emperor’s descent from Heaven.” In Taejonggyo chunggwang yuksimnyŏnsa (Sixty years of Taejonggyo history), he asserted, “Hanbaegŏm [Tan’gun] descended onto Mount Paektu . . . on October 3, the Year of the Rat (the first year of the Chinese sexagenary cycle) [2457 B.C.] . . . after two sexagenary cycles had passed, he then ascended the throne on October 3, the Year of the Dragon (the fifth year of the Chinese sexagenary cycle) [2333 B.C.].” These examples show that Pak gave up both the traditional Confucian dating system, which had reckoned time according to the reigns of monarchs, and the Western solar calendar in favor of his Taehwangjo kangse kiwŏn.

However, the paucity of empirical evidence available to Pak and Sin, prevented them from agreeing on which year should be considered the very first year of Korean history. While Pak stressed Tan’gun’s arrival (2457 B.C.), Sin maintained that the founding of Old Chosŏn (2333 B.C.) should be marked as the beginning of Korea as a nation. Nonetheless,

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37 Ibid.
40 Taejonggyo chonggyŏng chongsa p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe, “Hanbaegŏm sinang ŭi yurae” [The origins of the Hanbaegŏm religion], in Taejonggyo chunggwang yuksimnyŏnsa (Seoul: Taejonggyo ch‘ongbonsa, 1971), 27.
as devoted followers of Taejonggyo, the Tan’gun-worshiping religion founded in 1909 by Na Chŏl (1863–1916), both Sin and Pak honored Tan’gun by commemorating the third day of every October of the lunar calendar—what is now known as the Day Heaven Opened (Kaech’onzol)—and believed that Tan’gun should be the focus in the national calendar.

While Sin and Pak celebrated the inexorable forward movement of their ethnic nation, colonialist scholars depicted the nature of Korean history “as stagnant, incapable of regeneration from within, and therefore in need of Japan’s protection and guidance.”

This paternalistic view situated Korea within the teleological framework of progress and characterized the colony as lagging behind the metropole. A political economist, Shikata Hiroshi (1900–1973), claimed that Korea had exhibited precious little material development over its past five hundred years. Shikata contended, “When the Chosŏn kingdom opened its ports to the outer world, there existed neither the primitive accumulation of capital, nor groups of entrepreneurs, nor machinery for mass production.”

According to Shikata, Korea had stagnated economically for centuries, so “it had no choice but to rely on foreign aid and technology for capitalist development.” Other colonialist historians, like Inaba Iwakichi and Kita Sadakichi, agreed with Shikata’s outlook. Comparing Korea’s situation in the 1920s to the Kamakura period (1185–1333) in Japanese history, Inaba maintained that Korea was six hundred years behind Japan in terms of modernization. Kita also equated contemporaneous Korean history with a moment in Japan’s own past, but one that was even further back in time. He argued that the current standard of living and cultural practices in Korea were similar to those found in Japan in the early Heian era (794–1185), which meant that contemporary Korea remained on a par with life in Japan during the eighth century.

Perceiving Korea as such a primitive and backward nation offered Japan a rationale for its imperialist domination of Korea. This notion that Japan was far more advanced than Korea was originally devised by early Meiji thinkers such as Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835–1901). In his work, Bunmeiron no Gairyaku (An outline of a theory of civilization) that was published in 1875, Fukuzawa translated the word civilization as bunmei in Japanese and described it as the tendency toward successive improvement of human interaction for the better. In his view, Koreans were “lagging 100 years behind” the Japanese; they were “ignorant of how the world was going around,” “uninterested in enlightening themselves,” and “reluctant to import the

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43 Shikata Hiroshi, “Chŏsen ni okeru kindai shihonshugi no seiritsu katei” [The Formation of Modern Capitalism in Korea], in Chōsen shakai keizaishi kenkyū [Studies in the social and economic history of Korea] (Keijō: Daigaku Hōbun Gakkai, 1933).

44 Ibid.


46 Kita Sadakichi, “Koushin senman ryōko nisshi” [Travel to Korea and Manchuria in the Year of Koushin], Minzoku to rekishi [Nation and History], vol. 6, no. 1 (1921): 247–376.

elements of Western civilization.” In his newspaper editorial, widely known as the Datsu-A ron (Dissociating from Asia), Fukuzawa asserted that because China and Korea “still had not been enlightened to move toward the path of progress” but were “obsessed with antiquated views” and “governed by autocracy without proper legislation,” Japan “should treat these countries in the same [paternalistic] manner as Westerners.” A new academic discipline called Toyoshi (Oriental history) was a more institutionalized attempt to redefine Japan’s position vis-à-vis the West and the rest of Asia. By recasting the Orientalist gaze of the West onto China and Korea through the mechanism of transposing difference into temporal hierarchies of civilization, Toyoshi helped establish “modern Japan’s equivalence—as the most advanced nation of Asia—with Europe, and also [its] . . . cultural, intellectual, and structural superiority over” its two neighbors. Like Fukuzawa and the Toyoshi scholars, colonialist historians envisioned Japan as a modern nation par excellence that had fashioned a vibrant forward-looking civilization. Because Korea suffered in a backward state, they claimed, Japan had intervened to bring it out of its dark past into the light-filled present. That paternalistic narrative justified Japan’s subjugation of Korea and other “backward” nations.

The progressive vision of history, which upheld the transition from tradition to modernity as a universal good, was closely linked to the conceptualization of time as inexorably moving forward. This temporal perception was reinforced by the work of state-sponsored Japanese writers who defined Korean history according to dynastic divisions. Narrating Korean history within such a strict chronological order allowed them not only to make a coherent account that unfavorably compared Korea’s present to Japan’s past, but also to explain the origins of the Korean people in a very different way from that of Sin and Pak. For example, in the Chōsenhantoshi, Imanishi Ryu and Kuroita Kazumi (1874–1946), challenged Sin’s view that all history streamed from the Puyŏ minjok with Tan’gun as its true progenitor, and contended, instead, that the continual line of descent initiated with the peoples of the Samhan (or “Three Hans”)—Mahan, Chinhan, and Pyŏnhan—in southern Korea. They dismissed both Tan’gun and Kija as purely fictitious figures and concluded that, even if they had existed, there was still no empirical record of ancestral inheritance after their decline in power. Imanishi and Kuroita maintained that the primitive indigenous peoples belonging to the Samhan should be identified as the first residents on the peninsula from whom all subsequent epochs—Han Chinese colonial rule, the formative years of the Three Kingdoms, the Japanese Protectorate, the Three Kingdoms, a subjugated Silla under the dominion of Tang China, and then the

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50 Stefan Tanaka, Japan’s Orient: Rendering Pasts into History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 12.

51 CDPAA, vol 5, 155–162. Unlike Imanishi and Kuroita, Miura Hiroyuki (1871–1931), a history professor at Keijō Imperial University, acknowledged the existence of Tan’gun and placed the Tan’gun era at the very start of Korean history. He asserted that Tan’gun’s reputation had inexplicably spread throughout the peninsula during subsequent generations. For further discussion, see To Myŏn-hŭi, “Chosŏn ch’ŏngdol’pu ū munhwa chŏng’ae kwa Han’guksa kusŏng ch’egye” [Cultural policies of the Government General and the structure of Korean historiography], Yŏksa bakpo 6 (2014): 77.
Koryŏ and Chosŏn dynasties—were derived. The Chōsenhantoshi also placed details of Korean royal genealogy within a chronological sequence. Regarding the pedigrees of each dynasty, it contained specific information, including the posthumous names of kings, their years on the throne, kinship and family relationships, places of origin, and the location of their tombs. If Sin stressed the eternal nature of national identity that flows through the ages, the colonialist writers suggested that Korea had lost its earlier prosperity and undergone a historical degeneration.

Regardless of their different goals in recounting Korean dynastic succession—one championing the independent lineage of the Korean minjok, while the other demeaned contemporaneous Korea as backward, Korean nationalist historians and their colonialist counterparts were both grounded in the same linear conception of time derived from the West. Among various historical factors that led to the creation of such temporal awareness was the advent of the Enlightenment. As a modern philosophical revolution par excellence, the Enlightenment introduced the idea that human beings possess the ability to measure the flux of time and to create their own destiny without dependence on divine revelation. The Enlightenment’s secular faith in human rationality and technological innovation laid the groundwork for a “scientific” notion of time, which is objective and quantifiable, and for the ideology of progress, which posits that the world moves forward “to dispel myths, to overthrow fantasy with knowledge.” Evoking the self-realization of “Spirit” (Geist) through his exquisite allegory of a blind man’s emergence from darkness into light, G. W. F. Hegel, one of the Enlightenment’s foremost thinkers, construed “the history of the world [as] none other than the progress of the consciousness of freedom.” Early modern historians of Korea strengthened the logic of their own arguments by adopting that new vision of history. Similarly, they were aligned in marginalizing other modes of temporality such as cyclical or eschatological time in favor of a “smooth and untroubled linear trajectory of a singular national time.” Both historical camps believed so firmly in the fixed notion of modern temporality that they overlooked moments of uncertainty and rupture in history.

53 For example, see the section of the Three Kingdoms Period in the Chōsenhantoshi. CDPAA, vol. 5, 162–214.
54 The Chōsenhantoshi defines the first half of the Chosŏn dynasty as the prosperous era and delineates its decline in politics and economy afterward. See CDPAA, vol. 5, 325–426.
The Politics of Memory and Space: Controversy over the Ownership of History

In Europe the idea of a homogeneous national space emerged with the rise of the Westphalian system of nation-states during the seventeenth century. As the Holy Roman Empire—governed simultaneously by a pope and an emperor—declined after the Thirty Year's War of 1618–1648 and lost control over its kingdoms, Europe morphed into a community of nation-states that claimed exclusive right to exercise sovereignty over their territories. “By the nineteenth century, in the heyday of imperialism . . . formally equal status in the so-called family of nations,” as Partha Chatterjee notes, was “restricted to certain states of Europe and the Americas.” Yet, as the Westphalian notion of an integrated nation-state spread beyond the West and became widely adopted, it offered both colonizing and colonized societies in East Asia a rationale for leaving a regional order centering on China.

For Korean nationalist and Japanese colonialist historians alike, imagining a stable integrated national space was a concrete way to clarify the geographical ambiguity that characterized the minjok. National space implies governance over specific lands, so these historians appropriated the Western concept of sovereignty, each for their own ends. During Japanese colonial rule, nationalist writers evoked the idea of sovereignty to defend Korea’s right to control its own territories and concessions. Meanwhile, the Japanese employed this same notion offensively to justify Japan’s efforts to broaden its territories and sphere of influence. In March 1890, Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo (1838–1922) underscored that point in his “Memorandum on Foreign Policy” (Gaikō seiryakuron) in which he argued that Japan should “not [be] satisfied to defend only the line of sovereignty” (mainland Japan) but “step forward and protect the line of interest” (Korea) “to maintain the nation’s independence and to rank among the great powers.”

Korean historians believed that Korea’s national essence, its minjok, had been preserved for centuries in spite of historical alterations to that nation’s borders, so they focused on the illustrious past of the minjok which, they asserted, extended well beyond the peninsula to inspire Koreans with a new sense of national space. Colonialist scholars also thought that a nation’s power resides in having a large territory and long history. They dismissed nationalist claims and curtailed the geographical boundaries of past Korean activities and their historical time frame.

Nationalist historians like Pak and Sin countered with a more expansive view of Korea: they insisted that its entire history not be limited to what had occurred on the Korean peninsula. This argument is found in Pak’s Parhae t’aejo kǒn’gukchi (The founding history of

60 Em, The Great Enterprise, 42–47.
61 TaeHan maeil sinbo [Korea Daily News], June 19, 1910.
Parhae), published in 1911, in which he revealed his nostalgic yearning for Manchuria, the northeastern region of China. Pak defined Manchuria as the true birthplace of the Korean minjok because it was initially settled by Tan’gun and his early descendants. That well-spring of Korean identity was now brutally separated from the peninsula because it had been unlawfully handed over to China by imperial Japan. In Pak’s view, the loss of Manchuria was not just due to Japan’s geopolitical machinations, but Korean historians were also to blame for they had been blind to Manchuria’s vital importance in Korean history. Pak implored, “Lift up your eyes and look to the north. To whom had the vast lands once belonged? . . . All of them were our ancestors’ old residence.” “But, for the last one thousand years,” he continued, “none of our minjok has ruled over or thought of Manchuria . . . How can one count the numerous sins of historians for not recording it?”

Pak’s strong pleas were echoed by Sin who believed that a national soul could exist beyond the boundaries of its nation-state. Even though Manchuria was no longer part of Korea’s legal territory, Sin advocated that it should take center stage when creating a new nation-centered discourse. So, he highlighted the territorial expansions achieved by Korea’s legendary figures and incorporated Manchuria into the ancient history of Korea. According to Sin, sociopolitical conditions on the peninsula had been shaped by Korea’s role in and authority over Manchuria. “How intimate is the connection between Korea and Manchuria?” he asked and then replied, “When the Korean minjok presides over Manchuria, the Korean minjok is strong and prosperous. When another minjok controls Manchuria, the Korean minjok is inferior and recedes.” For Sin, Manchuria represented the origin where the fate of the Korean minjok had been determined ever since Tan’gun’s birth. To find a way out of the present predicament of Japanese colonialism, Sin promoted the recovery of Korea’s deep ties to Manchuria through a reclamation of its territorial sovereignty over that region.

What is important to note is that Sin’s irredentist aspirations were rooted in an epistemological structure similar to t’ayulsŏng-ron (theory of heteronomy), a common theme in colonialist narratives, which foregrounds the influence of external forces on the historical vicissitudes of Korea. If Sin emphasized Korea’s long-lost sovereignty over Manchuria in order to claim national independence, colonialist scholars invoked that same historical connection between Korea and Manchuria to invalidate that claim. As explained by Kang Chin-wŏn, t’ayulsŏng-ron maintained that Korea’s historical development lacked subjectivity.

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63 Pak Ŭn-sik, “Parhae t’aejo kŏn’gukchi” [The founding history of Parhae], in Paegam Pak Ŭn-sik sŏnsaeng chŏnjip p’yŏnhoe, ed., Paegam Pak Ŭn-sik chŏnjip [The complete works of Pak Ŭn-sik], vol. 4 (Seoul: Tongbang midiŏ, 2002), 468–469.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Sin, Toksa sillon, 321–325.
67 TaeHan maeil sinbo [Korea Daily News], July 25, 1908.
68 Kang Chin-wŏn, “Singminjuŭi yŏksahak kwa ‘un’ an ūi t’ayulsŏng-ron” [Colonialist historiography and the theory of heteronomy], Yŏksa pip’yŏng 115 (2016): 213. Yi Ki-baek, a foremost Korean historian in the 1960s, is the first scholar who identified four characteristics underlying Japanese colonialist historiography: t’ayulsŏng-ron (Korean history had been determined by its neighbors); chŏngch’esŏng-ron (Korea had no capability to develop into a modern economy); tangp’asŏng-ron (Korean political history had been predominated by internal factionalism);
Colonialist scholars created a historical narrative in which Korea’s past was only a minor footnote to Manchuria’s illustrious history, which meant that Korea had no legitimate right to territorial sovereignty in Manchuria. Even worse, these historians maintained that Koreans had been subordinate to China and their independent spirit had perished after the collapse of the previously self-reliant Three Kingdoms.69

For about four hundred years after the establishment of Korea in the first century, there were the ups and downs of power. Yet it is an undeniable fact that Chinese counties and prefectures continued to exist in the Korean peninsula. When it comes to talking about regions, the peninsula—or at least the site of those Chinese counties and prefectures—saw the flowering of cultural enlightenment due to the influx of Chinese (Han, Wei, and Qin) civilization. But that enlightenment was limited to those regions [and did not spread to the peninsula as a whole], and even most of that cultural advancement was lost with the fall of those counties and prefectures.70

Japanese historians asserted that Koreans were no more than passive recipients of foreign culture and that Chinese commanderies in northern Korea were instrumental in introducing civilizing elements to the peninsula. In their efforts to undermine the nationalist thesis that Korea could lay claim to a glorious past in Manchuria, colonialist scholars had to equivocate on where and when Old Chosŏn was founded and limit Korean history exclusively to what had occurred within the bounds of the peninsula. Believing that the “ideology of serving the great” (sadaejun) had become central to Korean collective identity (minjoksŏng), colonialist writers elided any reference to ancient Manchuria and focused, instead, on Korea’s submission to China as a tributary state, which they claimed showed Korea’s servile deference to China and inability for self-rule or modernization.

Regardless of their split, these two modern historiographies were alike in transforming history into an object to be (dis)owned, whose primary function is to give legitimacy to the minjok. When they each began to view history as being directly linked to the ethnic nation, a debate inevitably arose over which minjok held claim to certain historical periods or regions. In their attempts to identify what constituted the past and its relation to the minjok, both nationalist and colonialist writers understood history as an inalienable object, which should be assigned to a specific ethnic group and which would determine the group’s identity. It was in this context that one historiographical faction expended much effort to prove a purely national uniqueness for Korea, while the other strove to discover how much Korea had been influenced and subjugated by foreign forces. Nevertheless, both factions agreed that the minjok should own its past, becoming the protagonist of its own historical narrative.

The disputes between them escalated over how to perceive the Koguryŏ dynasty that had

70 Chŏsen Sŏtokufu, Chōsenshi no shirube [A guide to Korean history] (Keiō: Chŏsen Sŏtokufu, 1936), 16–17.
once ruled in Manchuria. The main point of contention was whether or not the kingdom of Koguryŏ and its peoples should be seen as part of Korean history and as Korean forebears, even though the land of Manchuria was not acknowledged as being under Korean sovereignty. Sin was very adamant in arguing that the people of Koguryŏ could trace their lineage directly back to Tan’gun and that this illustrious dynasty had helped form the Korean nation through its interactions with other ancient states on the peninsula. He underscored the centrality of Koguryŏ in Korean history when he extolled its vital role in establishing the Puyŏ minjok:

While our Puyŏ minjok had begun to live in the Eastern Kingdom (Tongguk) from the early years of the Three Kingdoms, those who headed to the southwest to build Silla and others who established Paekche to the south of the Han River did not have any relationships with foreign powers because of their geographical isolation. They faced opposition only from powerless groups in their own provinces, the Malgal, or Japan. Therefore, none of the southern nations could brighten the glory of our history. It was Koguryŏ, albeit stuck between the great powers, which wielded its force with an unyielding spirit of outward expansion. In writing our ancient history, this is why I cannot help but consider Koguryŏ to be the protagonist of the Puyŏ minjok.71

Sin wanted to distinguish the kingdom of Koguryŏ from other ethnic or political entities, particularly the old Chinese empires, to solidify his claim that Korea had a direct historical link to Koguryŏ. He declared, “As I reflect upon our history of four thousand years, we competed most intensely with China during the Koguryŏ era.”72 The exploits of various leaders of Koguryŏ were cited to show how the dynasty had successfully repelled foreign aggressors and maintained its national integrity. In Chosŏn sanggosa (Ancient history of Korea), Sin illustrated this point by enumerating the brave deeds of ancient heroes during pivotal wars, including the subjugation of the Xianbi during the reigns of King Mich’ŏn (300–331) through King Kogugwŏn (331–371), the northern expedition by Kwanggaet’o the Great (375–415), and the victory of general Ŭlchi Mundŏk (590–618) against a massive invasion by Emperor Sui Yangdi (569–618).73 An entire volume of Toksa sillon (A new reading of history) was even devoted to the occupation of Manchuria by general Yŏn Kaesomun (603–666) after he repulsed Emperor Taizong (599–649) of the Tang dynasty (618–907). For Sin, these victories were so meaningful because they clearly showed Koguryŏ’s independence from China, which he believed was the key piece of historical evidence that validated Korea’s exclusive ownership of Koguryŏ’s history.

Colonialist scholars foiled Sin’s attempt to give Korea sole claim to that powerful historical narrative by producing their own interpretations of Koguryŏ. After the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, Japan’s colonial company, Mantetsu (South Manchurian Railway), led the expansion of Japan’s imperial sphere of influence in northeastern China. Japanese authorities

71 Sin, Toksa sillon, 329.
72 Sin, 331.
73 Sin, Chosŏn sanggosa, 259–327.
launched their own project to study Mansenshi (Manchurian-Korean history) and placed the Bureau of Historical and Geographical Studies on Manchuria and Korea (Mansen Rekishi Chiri Chōsabu) under the direction of Mantetsu in 1908. As promoted by the company’s first president, Gotō Shinpei (1857–1929), “rather than merely rely on arms,” Mantetsu sought to “take advantage of education, hygiene, and academics” under the banner of using “cultural forms for military preparedness” (bunsoteki bubi) to efficiently control Korea, Manchuria, and Mongolia. According to Louise Young, as the “brain trust” of Japanese imperial planning, Mantetsu aided researchers in the collection and compilation of data about these regions and helped publish reports about their histories and cultures. Matsui Hitoshi and Inaba Iwakichi along with other leading historians such as Shiratori Kurakichi (1865–1942), Yanai Watari (1875–1926), and Ikeuchi Hiroshi (1898–1952) collaborated as they conducted research and published two volumes of Manshū rekishi chiri [Historical geography of Manchuria] in 1913.

While creating the field of Mansenshi, these scholars provided narratives in which peninsular dynasties were described as having been merely adjunct to the fates of neighboring countries. Gaisetsu manshūshi [Introduction to Manchurian history], published in 1933, inherited this viewpoint and further argued that Japan—as the architect of the puppet state of Manchukuo—had suzerainty over the territories in northeastern China. The authors of this volume claimed that the kingdom of Koguryŏ, and then Parhae, were not truly independent as they had paid tribute to ancient Japan:

[Although] Manchuria had been ruled by the dynasty of Koguryŏ since antiquity, it is now under our [Japan’s] suzerainty. Parhae, which flourished after [the fall of] Koguryŏ, also paid tribute to Japan. Since that time, we [Japan], as the one that created Manchukuo, must bear the grave responsibility to instruct and develop [Manchuria].

Although Mansenshi historiography of the 1930s agreed with Sin’s earlier assertion that the Koguryŏ dynasty had been part of Korean history, it undermined his insistence on Koguryŏ’s autonomy. What is important to note is the rationale behind this stance: even if Manchuria belonged to the kingdom of Koguryŏ in an ancient time in Korean history, Japan still had the authority to rule Manchuria. Mansenshi authors proposed two reasons for Japan’s de facto hegemony: first, that Koguryŏ had served as a vassal state to Japan and remained under its sway; second, that Korea’s previous claim on Koguryŏ’s history had now been transferred to Japan, because Japan had colonized the peninsula and created the puppet state of Manchukuo.

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76 Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchukuo and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 44.
78 Oohara Toshitake, Gaisetsu manshūshi [Introduction to Manchurian history] (Keijo: Chikazawa Shoten, 1933), 10.
For these colonialist scholars, the Manchurian connection—Manchuria-Korea as a single historical unit—mattered only as one facet of history whose interpretation could easily be manipulated to bolster Japan’s current control over this region. In that sense, *Mansenshi* was devised to provide an ideological cover for the Manchurian expedition. Albeit very different in objective and function, *Mansenshi* historiography had the same premise as Sin’s historical narratives in that both maintained that a nation should evoke memories of its past during periods when it had been a dominant political force in order to demonstrate historical ownership and (re)claim a region. One notable difference between these two accounts is Japan’s advocacy for Pan-Asianism in which the assimilation ideology of *Naisen ittai* (Japan and Korea as one body) was extended to the discourse on *Mansen*. Colonialist scholarship envisaged having a powerful Japan-Korea-Manchuria bloc, united under Japanese imperial rule, by linking colonial Korea to the metropole first, and then to Manchuria.

It is important to keep in mind that Koguryŏ had not been considered part of Korean history in earlier colonialist studies, including the *Chōsenhantoshi*, executed under the auspices of the GGK prior to the establishment of Manchukuo in 1932. Older colonialist scholarship regarded the Samhan (Mahan, Jinhan, and Pyŏnhan) as the main ethnic groups in Korean history and concluded that Koguryŏ was an indigenous kingdom in Manchuria, which had nothing to do with the peninsula. While recounting that Koguryŏ had ancestral kinship with the Yemack, this scholarship argued that these ties were different from those of the Samhan, and that the peoples of Koguryŏ were neither related to the contemporary Korean minjok nor the Koreans but had been formed into the Tungus as part of the Manchurian nation. This interpretation is encapsulated in the following passage of the *Chōsenhantoshi*:

> Because Silla unified Chinhan, and Kaya and Mimana were the Pyŏnhan nation, they are the Korean *minjok*. But in the case of the Koguryŏ dynasty, it was built by the Puyŏ nation who was based on the [Chinese] continent [outside] the northern Korean peninsula. As the kingdom of Koguryŏ fell to ruin in the subsequent generation, most of its peoples were absorbed into Parhae and just a few of them migrated to Silla. Therefore, Koguryŏ does *not* constitute the history of the Korean *minjok*.

Why would Japanese historians working in the early 1930s decide to directly contradict colonial scholarship of the 1910s? What could have provoked such a significant interpretative shift in their understanding of the relationship between Koguryŏ and Korean history? Despite its claims to objectivity, the practice of modern historiography was never truly independent of its socio-political milieu and it has, to borrow Stefan Tanaka’s expression, “a materiality in the ideas and structures to which it gives meaning and form.” As Yun Hwi-t’ak points out, the Japanese imperial regime found it necessary, after it established Manchukuo, to reevaluate the territory’s past because it needed to promote mass migration of its colonial subjects.

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to Manchuria. Through a series of public-relations campaigns, the Japanese authorities actively encouraged Koreans to move to Japan’s newly acquired holdings in northeastern China. Agricultural settlement in Manchuria was seen as a viable solution to social conflicts and overpopulation in Korea and as a way to alleviate the influx of landless rural peasants into cities on the peninsula, or into Japan proper, which would have triggered high levels of unemployment. Fearing threats posed by Russia, the colonial government even sought to turn Korean (as well as Japanese) villages in Manchuria into a human buffer zone that would help protect the territory against aggression from the Soviet Union.

As these demands for the development of Manchuria increased from the late 1920s onward, the imperial administration construed this massive Korean emigration as the sacred reclamation of Manchuria by present-day Koreans. That masterstroke of propaganda tapped into Koran nostalgia for the northern lands where ancient Korean dynasties had built a grand and magnificent realm by occupying Manchuria. Colonial intellectuals idealized such irredentist dreams as the natural course of events which witnessed the return of Koreans to their ancestral home of Koguryŏ, Parhae, and Puyŏ. In so doing, they proclaimed that Japan should celebrate Korea’s recovery of its long-lost territory of Manchuria and even abandon the idea of delineating a clear border between Manchuria and the Korean peninsula.

There is a reason why I hereby attempt to undertake a historical investigation of the Manchurian-Korean indivisibility from national, historical, and economic perspectives. According to news reports, Korean migrants to Manchuria now number as many as three million and that number is increasing very fast. But I think that we should be fully prepared to protect them... We must believe that the blood of the peoples of Koguryŏ, Parhae, or the Jurchen runs in the veins of Koreans today. And we cannot help but imagine that Koreans perceive their migration to Manchuria as a return to the land of their origin. We, the naichijin [homeland Japanese], have to provide assistance and care for the accomplishment of this great national mission. First, we need to get rid of the border between Manchuria and Korea from our minds and wholeheartedly accept their inseparability.

This change in the account of Mansenshi involved much more than a mere discursive adjustment. As indicated in the passage above, it was a redrawing of the epistemological contours of Koguryŏ in relation to Korean history as a whole. Carefully avoiding any references to archaeological findings or contemporary documentary evidence that could undermine this new interpretation, colonialist scholars bowed to the politico-economic

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82 Ibid.
exigency of the empire and called for a complete shift in the previously accepted relationship between Manchuria and the Korean peninsula. They re-envisioned the history of Koguryŏ and its significance in Korea’s national past by re-constructing a collective ethnic memory that, ironically, had been deliberately negated in earlier decades. During the 1930s, the Japanese may have imagined Manchuria to be just an “empty, flat space”—a vast frontier awaiting agricultural settlement and industrial development—but Koreans perceived it to be a romantic, redeemable homeland on the mnemonic site of Mansenshi. In the midst of this radical re-invention of the past, rather than performing a critical intervention to expose this politically motivated scheme of memory-making, these colonialist historians were, willingly or unwillingly, put into the service of the Japanese government’s agenda.

Such manipulation of memory was nothing new, as we saw with the debates that had raged earlier between nationalist and colonialist historians. To be sure, both nationalist and colonialist scholars constructed different narratives of Koguryŏ to support their claims regarding its history in Manchuria. Sin and Pak considered it essential to devise a powerful nationalist account because possessing the history of Manchuria was believed to be a viable way to save their once potent minjok from its current impotence. They fostered an ennobling memory of their nation as ancient, spiritually vibrant, and extending far beyond the geographical confines of the peninsula to reach all the way to Manchuria. Their historical accounts would also help make the Japanese archipelago irrelevant to the longed-for resurgence of that mythical continent-peninsula unity. In reaction to these efforts, Mansenshi initially emphasized the alleged tributary relationship between Japan and Koguryŏ and limited Korean influence just to the peninsula by removing Koguryŏ from the ancient peninsular dynasties. From the early 1930s onward, however, a combination of economic and military factors facilitated a radical shift in colonialist scholarship, which now bound Koguryŏ to the Korean nation and perceived them as a single indivisible object of history.

Here, Teresa Brennan’s reflection on the Hegelian master-slave dialectic offers an apt metaphor for understanding the opposition between these two historiographic interpretations of national space. According to Brennan, the master-slave conflict for recognition has “social ramifications” whereby “the aggressive imperative of making the other into a slave, or object,” results in a struggle for the space of identification. The reason for this, Brennan argues, is that “the objectification of the other depends on establishing a spatial boundary by which the other and the self are fixed. But this fixing of the other leads to the fear that the other will retaliate, which in turn leads to a feeling of spatial constriction . . . These changes have physical effects on the psyche, which alter the psychical perception of the environment, and of one’s own boundaries.” This dialectic dynamic happened not only in Western imperialism but also in modern Korean historiographies. Both nationalist and colonialist scholarship wanted to appropriate Korea’s national past to refute conflicting views of Korean history and

85 Young, 15.
87 Ibid, 8–9.
88 Ibid.
better serve political interests. They employed history writing as a discursive vehicle through which to materialize their desire for defining the other as a fixed object and confining it within a limited geographical space. So, when one people expanded its territorial sphere of power, clear boundaries were drawn to stop the other from trespassing and to disavow its connection to the *minjok*’s past. Similarly, in the production of new knowledge about ancient Korea, the early founders of modern Korean historiography reified national space into a place of political contention to assert their exclusive ownership over its history.

**Conclusion: The Legacies of Nationalist/Colonialist Historiography**

The mobilization of history for the (re)production of national identity has been systematically practiced in postliberation Korea, particularly under the military dictatorship of the 1960s and 1970s. Though not every historian during that time acquiesced to political pressure exerted by the regime, the nationalist vision “more often than not was imbedded in a frame of reference” within contemporary scholarly arrangements.\(^89\) What characterizes the nationalist paradigm in postliberation history writing is that the legacies of modern historiographies—the *minjok* perceived as a homogenous entity, linear temporality, and national ownership of history—were interwoven with a postcolonial zeal to prove that Korea had successfully achieved modernization through its own initiative rather than due to any other outside influences. Nationalist scholars situated Korea within the framework of progress, which moved seamlessly from “ancient” to “medieval” to “modern.” In so doing, they sought to demonstrate “the origins of capitalist development as far back as possible in Korean history, and certainly before the impact of Western or Japanese imperialism.”\(^90\)

Corresponding examples can be found in other Asian countries that are still preoccupied with their own national aspirations as a way to fulfill the so-called unfinished task of modernization. Indian historians depart from the Orientalist depiction of eighteenth-century India as an era of disorder and call instead for a reappraisal of “the early modern” in the Indian context as a more appropriate alternative to the Eurocentric view of modernity. Sanjay Subrahmanyan’s discussion of nascent concepts of the “public” that existed in precolonial India places the Habermasian notion of the “public sphere” into doubt.\(^91\) Chinese scholars have also challenged historiographies that view Chinese history through a Eurocentric lens. They have displaced the older “impact-response” paradigm in the modern history of China with the *neibu fazhan lun* (inner development theory), foregrounding its agency in explaining what the driving forces of modernity were in that country. Wang Hui explores modernity

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in China through “the idea of an internal flow” and “elements of change inside Chinese society.”  

Moving beyond just searching for premodern China’s socio-economic development practices that are analogous to those found in preindustrial Europe, he announced that “modern China emerged before its encounter with the West.”  

Yet, these elaborate efforts to “giv[e] modernization a long and precolonial past,” in Dipesh Chakrabarty’s phrase, stemmed from, in a sense, “the moral preferences . . . share[d]” by historians, who conceive of modernity as encompassing such a laundry list of phenomena—the growth of a market economy, capitalist industrialization, centralized bureaucracy, and so forth. Looking retroactively for any trace, however faint, of historical conditions akin to those found in the West, they tend to “apply some kind of an ‘equal opportunity’ principle to historiography in order to create a ‘level playing field’ between histories of different regions and peoples.” That sentiment, albeit laudable, ironically shows the power and persistence of Western modernist discourses (and closely related Japanese colonialist discourses) even in a postwar/postcolonial setting.

One starting point for overcoming such structural limitations could be realizing that coloniality is deeply embedded in modernity and reciprocal reflexivity exists between nationalist and colonialist discourses. This perspective would enable contemporary historians to take a critical look at the expansive processes of modernity by arousing a postcolonial consciousness of the other. It opens a contentious space where the Western (or Japanese) self should address the constraints of its own complacency and the constructed self-referentiality of its knowledge and practice. This recognition also helps societies that experienced colonial rule to step aside from the hegemonic view of modernity as “a historical necessity or universal good,” and to challenge the collusion of nationalism and colonialism in the construction of modernity. A wholly reimagined criticism, based on a new understanding of polity, time, and space, holds potential for radical resistance to the master narratives that serve the reproduction of modernity within a shared reality of power and knowledge.

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96 Chakrabarty, 672.
98 Shin and Robinson, 11.
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