COMMENTARY
I

Gig. 1-5

Commentary on Gen 6:1: καὶ δὴ ἐγένετο, ἡνίκα ἤρξαντο οἱ ἀντρωποὶ πολλοὶ γίνεσθαι ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, καὶ δυνατέρες ἐγεννήθησαν αὐτῶν.

δὴ add. Philo; πολλοὶ γίνεσθαι LXX, cett.cod. Philonis, πληθύνεσθαι U.

A. General Comments

In Philo's great scheme, the pair of commentaries De Gigantibus—Quod Deus sit Immutabilis resume the exegesis of Genesis after a brief gap, occasioned by the rather intractable material, genealogical in nature, which comprises Genesis, chap. 5. The previous treatise, On the Posterity and Exile of Cain, took us to the end of chap. 4, the birth of Seth. The treatise On the Giants thus constitutes a new beginning to a rather greater extent than most of the treatises. Equally clearly, it is closely connected, structurally and thematically, to the treatise which follows it. Between them they constitute a commentary on that part of Genesis covering the period from the birth of the sons of Noah (and the multiplication of the human race) to the Flood (Gen 6:1-12).

Philo's exegesis of Gen 6:1 is at first sight surprising. Why should the growth of population and the birth of daughters in itself be a bad thing? This can partly be explained, perhaps, by the nature of the preceding chapter, "The Book of the Generations of Adam," where each of the patriarchs is described as producing both sons and daughters, culminating with Noah (v. 32), who engenders only sons (cf. BR 26.4, T-A 246); and partly also because the concepts of multiplicity and the female had definite negative connotations in contemporary Platonism (particularly in the Pythagorean wing of it) to which Philo was fully alive. The juxtaposition of the fewness and maleness of Noah's progeny, with the pullulating anonymous femininity of what follows him was something too striking for Philo to miss.
Overriding themes, therefore, in this pair of treatises, are the duality and tension between the spirit and the flesh, virtue and pleasure, self-abnegation (or God-centeredness) and self-centeredness; the nature of God's providential care for us, not governed by any passion, as a superficial reading of the inspired text might suggest, but purely by reason; and, as a corollary, our responsibility for our actions, our freedom of will, and the role within us of the Logos, acting as a conscience.

In this introductory passage, a comment on Gen 6:1 ("When men began to increase on earth and daughters were born to them . . ."), Philo begins by establishing a contrast between the rarity of excellence and the frequency of its opposite, such that the excellence concerned actually makes clear the existence and nature of its opposite (this notion takes on great importance in relation to the doctrine of Conscience, below, Deus 122 ff.). Ἑὐσκεῖα is thus contrasted with ἁμαρτία; the scarceness of excellence in arts and sciences with the ubiquity of its contrary manifestations; and, with the adducing of one of his favorite images (cf. F. N. Klein, Die Lichtterminologie bei Philon von Alexandrien und in den Hermetischen Schriften [Leiden 1962]), the singleness of the sun as opposed to the vast multiplicity of darkness. The fewness of Noah and his sons brings us to a consideration of the multitude of wicked men—opposites are best illustrated by the use of opposites. We may note here how Noah returns as a point of contrast in Deus 122-23, this time his virtue being contrasted with the wickedness of the majority of men, which it makes manifest, thereby bringing on the Flood.

Next, we are presented with a contrast between Male and Female, another of Philo's favorite images (cf. R. A. Baer, Philo's Use of the Categories Male and Female [Leiden 1970]). The wicked man does not generate anything "male" (virtuous) in his soul, but rather produces multitudinous "female" offspring (wicked), and this is the meaning of the statement that they produced daughters, but no son. Noah, by contrast, produced only male offspring (τέλειος τῆς σωτηρίας λόγος), thus revealing the wickedness of the Many—for opposites produce opposites.

It is instructive to consider how Philo treats this verse of Genesis in the corresponding section of his other great project of the commentary, the Questions and Answers on Genesis and Exodus (the sections parallel to De Gig. and Quod Deus as a whole are QG 1.89-100, i.e., the end of Book I). Section 89 raises the question, "Why, from the time when the great flood
drew near, is the human race said to have increased into a multitude?". A remarkable contrast is immediately apparent. For Philo in the *Quaestiones*, the *πολυανθρώπως*, like all abundance, is essentially a good thing. It simply in this case presages disaster:

Divine favours always precede His judgements, for His activity is first to do good, while punishment is secondary. It is then normal, when great evils are about to take place, that an abundance of great and numerous good things should come about first. In this same manner, when the seven years' barrenness was about to come, as the prophet says (Gen 41:25ff.), Egypt became fruitful for the same number of years in succession, through the beneficent and preserving power of the universe.

The second part of the section introduces a moral element:

In the same way as He does good, He teaches men to refrain and keep themselves from sins, lest they change the good into the opposite. Because of this now too cities grow to excellence through freedom of customs, so that if afterwards disaster arises, they may blame their own immeasurable and irremediable wrongdoing, and not make the Deity responsible, for He is innocent of evil and evil deeds, since His proper activity is to bestow only the good in a primary way.

Philo is presumably saying that men learn through their misuse of God's blessings to blame, not Him, but themselves, for such disasters as may follow. The reference to contemporary luxury seems to confirm this interpretation. (Cf. the comment on the prosperity of the Sodomites at Abr. 134 ff.) If so, it is easy to see that Philo's understanding of the meaning of "multiplying" and abundance in *De Gigantibus* is more sophisticated than that in the *Quaestiones*. Here it is a sign of decadence and inferiority in itself, not at all a blessing or benefit. The exegesis is enriched by the contrast between the oneness or simplicity of the Divine or the Good, and the variety and multifariousness of evil and of the human or earthly condition in general, a contrast characteristic of Greek philosophy, and of Platonism in particular.

B. Detailed Commentary

1 Ἄξιον ό διάμορφος. A common Philonic formula for introducing an aporia, cf. LA 1.85; Det. 57; Post. 33; Cong. 73. Closely analogous to the formulae of Neoplatonic exegesis, e.g. Procl. *In Tim.* 1.325.14 ff.: ἄμορφος δέ τινες; *In Parm.*
1184,9 ff., Cousin: ἵνα δ' ἀν τις ἀπορήσει... suggesting a common source, perhaps, in Stoic-influenced exegesis of Homer.

ἀλλ' γὰρ ἐπειδὰν τὸ σπάνιον φανεῖ. Doctrine of symmetrical contrast: "good/bad," "few/many." (Mss. reading τὸ σπάνιον; the conjecture of Cohn, τὶ σπάνιον, is unnecessary. For the rarity of the good, cf. LA 1.102; Ebr. 26; Mig. 59, 61, 63, 123; Mut. 34-56; Abr. 19; Prob. 63, 72; Agr. 180; Plato, Phaedo 90A; 491B; Rep. 6.503D; Arist. EN 2.1109a29; 7.1145a27, etc; Seneca, De Ira 2.6; De Const. 7.1; Ep. 105.3; SVP 3.658: σπανιότερον τοῦ φοι-νικος.

2 εὐφυΐα/ἀφυΐα. Contrasted also at Her. 212. εὐφυΐα is not a Platonic term, but Aristotelian (EN 3.1114b12); ἀφυΐα also (Arist. PA 659a29), but not contrasted. Cf. Fug. 27.

3 ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἥλιος. Contrast of ἥλιος/φῶς and σκότος very popular with Philo (see Leisegang's Index s.v. σκότος). Cf. e.g. Virt. 164: καθάπερ γὰρ ἀνατελλόντος ἥλιου τὸ μὲν σκότος ἀφανίζεται, φῶς ὅσον δὲ πληροῦται τὰ πάντα. The contrast between ἥλιος as εἶς and σκότος as μῦρος is not found elsewhere. n.b. Philo vacillates between σκότος, -ου m. and σκότος, -ους n. Always neuter in LXX. Philo always uses g. σκότους, but d. σκότῳ.

totals ποιεῖται. The principle that opposites are most easily recognized by opposites is perhaps a development of the principle τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτή ἐπιστήμη (Arist. Topics 1.105b25), but its immediate ancestry is not clear. Cf., however, Plato, Phaedo 70E (opposites generated by opposites); Ep. 7.344B (opposites must be learned simultaneously); Chrysippus ap. Gallius NA 7.1 (SVP 2.1169): opposites can only be known through opposites; Chrysippus ap. Plut. Stoic. Rep. 35.1050F: vice is not useless, for otherwise there could not be any good (there is a hint of this already in Plat. Theaet. 176A). Cf. discussion of Philo's views on origin of evil in M. Hadas-Lebel, De Providentia pp. 112-14; and Plot. 4.8.7.14-16.

This principle seems to be operative at Deus 122, where the point is that only at the appearance of a sense of good (or of conscience, τὸ συνειδός) does evil become recognizable. The imagery of light and darkness is used there too: γένεσις γὰρ τῶν καλῶν θάνατος αἰσχρῶν ἐπιληψευμάτων ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ καὶ σωτὸς ἐπιλάμβανος ἀφανίζεται τὸ σκότος. Cf. LA 1.46; 3.73; Ebr.
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186; (6th trope of Aenesidemus); *Fug. 27; Her. 213: "For the two opposites together form a single whole, by the division of which the opposites are known." (Philo attributes this principle to Heraclitus, but insists that Moses had already discovered it; cf. *QG* 3.5)

This figurative use of *δηλυγονέω* is unique, but the equation of the female with the lower parts of our nature, the passions or the irrational soul, is a basic Philonic image, e.g. *Sacr.* 103: *θηλυ* μὲν οὖν ἐγγονον ψυχής ἐστι κακία καὶ πάθος, οἷς καθ’ ἔκαστον τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐκήληλυμέθα, ἄροσε δὲ εὐπάθεια καὶ ἁρετή, ὅπ’ ὑπ’ ἐγειρόμεθα καὶ ὅμοιόμεθα. (It may be noted that Philo here ignores Ham, who in *QG* 1.88 [cf. 2.71] is designated as symbolizing evil.) *Θηλυτοκέω* is used in the same way in *Mig.* 206 (commenting on Num 27:3). Cf. also the description of Lot as ὃγατροποιός at *Ebr.* 135. For the male-female contrast, see R. Baer, *Philo's Use of the Categories Male and Female* (Leiden 1970).

*δένδρον ἁρετῆς.* This image takes its origin from the allegorization of the trees in the Garden of Eden, e.g. *LA* 1.56 (on Gen 2:9): ἀ φυτεύει ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ δένδρα ἁρετῆς, νῦν ὑπογράφει· ἐστι δὲ ταύτα αἱ τῇ κατὰ μέρος ἁρεταί καὶ αἱ κατ’ αὐτὰς ἐνέργειαι, καὶ τὰ καταράκματα, καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα παρὰ τοῖς ψυλοσφοροῦσι καθήκοντα· ταύτα ἐστὶ τοῖς παραδείσου τοῦ φυτᾶ. Cf. also *Op.* 153-54.


*ἐπεί γὰρ ὁ δίκαιος.* Note the use which Philo makes of the δίκαιος-ἄδικος contrast throughout §§3-5: ἡ τοῦ δικαίου Νῦν γένεσις—τοῦς ἄδικους; ἄδικος δὲ οὐδείς; ὁ δίκαιος Νῦν—ἄδικα.

*ἄρσενογονεῖ.* A biological term, used by Aristotle and Theophrastus. Philo's exegesis here takes account only of the masculinity of Noah's progeny, taking no account of the personalities of his sons. At *QG* 1.88, by contrast, we read: "who are the three sons of Noah—Shem, Ham and Japheth?" "These names are symbols of three things in nature—of the good, the evil and the indifferent. Shem is distinguished for good, Ham for evil, and Japheth for the indifferent."
Commentary on Gen 6:2: Ἱδόντες δὲ οἱ ἄγγελοι τοῦ θεοῦ τὰς θυγατέρας τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπερευθεῖν, εἰλαθον ἑαυτοῖς γυναικὰς ἀπὸ πασῶν, ὅν ἔξελέξαντο.

A. General Comments

For a fuller discussion of Philo's theory of angels/daemons, see the essay on the subject in the Intro. pp. 197-206. The present section shows both that the Middle Platonic theory of daemons was well developed by Philo's time, and that he was well acquainted with it. The analysis of the true relation between the terms "daemon," "angel" and "soul" is for Philo a matter of some importance. The relation is indeed obscure. Plato, in an influential passage of the Timaeus (90A), had identified the rational part of the soul as the daimon of each man, and later Platonism made no very clear distinction between daemons and angels (ἄνθρωπα μὲν διαφόρων, ἐν δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ὑποκείμενον). What "other philosophers" (the Greeks) call daemons, he says in sect. 6, Moses is accustomed to term "angels."

But does Moses in this passage refer to angels at all? This is one of Philo's more interesting departures from the LXX text as we have it (apart from a corrector of the Codex Alexandrinus). In place of οἱ γιοὶ τοῦ θεοῦ of Gen 6:2, Philo reads οἱ ἄγγελοι τοῦ θεοῦ. This must have been the tradition available to him. He makes the interesting remark at QG 1.92 that Moses "sometimes calls the angels 'sons of God,' because they are made incorporeal." Since here too he seems to read ἄγγελοι at Gen 6:2 and 4, the reference may be to some other passage, such as Deut 32:8, where, however, most manuscripts of our LXX text also have ἄγγελων θεοῦ, but one, 848, from the first century B.C.E., gives γιόν (see J. W. Wevers, Text History of the Greek Deuteronomy [Göttingen, 1978] 85). He is certainly not making his own translation from the Hebrew, which speaks also of "sons." It seems as if someone in the Alexandrian tradition was offended, as well he might be, by the idea of God having sons, and glossed "sons" by the less offensive term ἄγγελοι.
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The discussion of angels here starts from the argument that every element, every part of the universe, must contain forms of life proper to it (7). Therefore air too, contrary to appearances, must have its proper forms of life. These will be souls (cf. Plant. 14). Philo does not make the point, made later by Apuleius in a parallel argument in the De Deo Soeratis, ch. 8, that birds are not the proper inhabitants of air, being earthy. On the other hand he produces an argument not used by Apuleius, that the air is actually the element which gives life to the inhabitants of earth and water. Must it not, then, a fortiori support living beings itself? Further, when the air is corrupted, plagues of various sorts are liable to break out among earth-creatures, and clean air is eminently conducive to health (9-10).

Souls, then, are what we are talking about. "Angel" and "daemon" are simply terms for souls performing certain roles. Philo proceeds (12) to make a distinction between two classes of souls. The one class descend into bodies and become human souls (the reason for this he leaves aside for the moment); the other scorn all contact with the earthly realm, and remain above, to serve God as his agents for the supervision of mortals.

Among the former class, there are some who succeed in rising above the torrent of earthly existence (see note ad loc.) sufficiently to rise again, after one (?) incarnation, to whence they came. Others sink beneath the waves, becoming fascinated by bodily or external goods (15). It is not at all clear here how far Philo is subscribing to the Platonic theory of reincarnation on which this whole distinction is based. We are left in some uncertainty as to what happens to those who "sink." Certainly elsewhere he envisages reincarnation, e.g. Somn. 1.139.

Philo now feels he has cleared up the confusion in some quarters about souls, daemons and angels, and about the problem of good and evil daemons or angels. Evil angels (κακοί ἄγγελοι),
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so-called, are simply souls which have descended into corporeality, and have become fascinated by the pleasures associated with it (17-18). Whatever about his doctrine elsewhere (e.g. *QE* 1.23), Philo does not here seem to recognize any such thing as an evil daemon. θανόντες are souls which have become enamored of "the daughters of men," which he allegorizes here as the pleasures of the flesh, in contradistinction to "the daughters of right reason (ὀρθὸς λόγος)," the branches of scientific knowledge and the virtues, which are presumably the "brides" both of those souls who preserve a correct attitude to incarnation (i.e. οἱ ἀνόθως φιλοσοφοῦντες), and of those who do not descend at all.

B. Detailed Commentary

6 ψυχαλ...πετόμεναι. The other passage in which Philo sets out his daemonology (or angelology) is *Somm.* 1.135-43, in connection with the exegesis of Jacob's Ladder (Gen 28:12). The Ladder symbolizes the element of Air, which is the abode of souls. The argument there is parallel to this (see Intro. p. 199). *BR* 26.5, T-A 247 reflects a similar motivation to deny that the biblical passage is literally referring to fallen angels. R. Simeon b. Yoḥai says the reference is to the sons of judges, and curses those who insist that it refers to the sons of God. Cf. Justin, *Dial.* 79. "From allusions in the Talmud (BT *Yoma* 67b) it is clear that also in authoritative Jewish circles they were formerly of the opinion that it was actually to angels that the passage referred " (U. Cassuto, *Biblical and Oriental Studies* [Jerusalem 1973] 1.20).

7 μόθον. For Philo, a word of negative connotation, connected with Greek traditions, e.g. *Her.* 228: Stoic theory of ἐκπύρωσις and a void μηθευσμένη τερατολογία. At *Conf.* 2 ff., certain ill-intentioned persons (disloyal Jews, presumably) are said to assert that there are μόθοι in the Pentateuch, and compare the Tower of Babel story to that of the Aloeadae. At the outset of *Op.* Moses is praised for not tricking out his law-giving with μυθικά πλάσματα, such as obscure the truth. Cf. also *Op.* 157, 170; *Det.* 125; *Gig.* 58; and *Prov.* 2.109, where the Cyclopes are described as πλάσμα μόθοι; *LA* 2.19, 1.43; *Deus* 59; *Agr.* 96-97; *Sacr.* 13.
A parallel argument to this is given by Apuleius, *De Deo Soovatis*, ch. 8, showing it to be part of the Platonic tradition. Apuleius' source may well be Varro (*ap. Aug. CD* 7.6), whose source in turn might be Posidonius, though possibly also Antiochus of Ascalon. Cf. Plato, *Epín.* 984BC, Ar. Gen. An. 3.762al 8 ff.; Cic. ND 2.42; Sext. Math. 9.86; D. L. 8.32 (attributed to Pythagoras); Plotinus 3.2.3.26. See also J. Beaujeu in the commentary of his Budé ed. of Apuleius, ad loc.; Bréhier: 126-28; W. Bousset, *Jüdisch-christlicher Schulbetrieb in Alexandria und Rom* (Göttingen, 1915) 14-22; H. Leisegang, *Der heilige Geist* (Leipzig, 1919) 51 ff.

*ψυχοδοσια*. For the doctrine, cf. Plato, *Tim.* 40A and 41BC, where it is laid down that all varieties of living things must exist, in order that the cosmos may be complete. Philo states the doctrine clearly at *Prov.* 2.110: ἀναγκαίον μὲν γὰρ ἢν εἰς τὴν τοῦ δόλου συμπλήρωσιν, ἵνα γένηται κόσμος, ἐν ἐκάστῳ μέρει φῶναι ζώων ἱδέας ἀπάντας. Cf. *Conf.* 179; Plotinus 6.7.11. For the idea of the apportionment of living beings among the different elements, cf. *Det.* 151: τοῖς ζῷοις ἡ φύσις διαφέροντας καὶ οὐχὶ τοῖς ἀτόμοις τόπους πρὸς διαμομὴν ἐξωθομαντο, ὀκλαπαταὶ . . . γην. . . . For the actual verb ψυχοῦ Philo seems to be our earliest extant source. In fact he is not using it here in a fully Platonic sense, since δόλω δι’ δόλων τὸν κόσμον ἐφωνοδοθαί should mean that the cosmos is ensouled as a whole, whereas all that Philo means is that every part of it is full of souls.

*οἰκεῖα καὶ πρόσφορα*. Philo employs these two terms also at *Mut.* 230, as a seeming *variantio*: οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν τὰ πρόσφορα ἢν μηδ’ ὄλως νοσήσωμεν, τοὺς δὲ τὰ οἰκεῖα, ὡς πρὸς τὸ ὑγιειότερον μεταβάλωμεν. Cf. *Det.* 151: τὰς οἰκείους χώρας; same collocation in Epicurus, Fr. 250, Usener. The argument for air having its proper creatures is a development of Aristotle's argument, apparently in the lost Πείρα Ἐλκοσοφίας (Fr. 21 Ross), in support of fire or aether having their proper creatures. Who extended the argument to air is not clear. Aristotle must have said something about air, but it seems likely that he claimed birds, not souls, as its proper inhabitants. We may note that at *Plant.* 12, where Philo is following Aristotle's argument more faithfully, and is not concerned with proofs of the existence of angels, he accepts birds as the proper inhabitants of air (τὰ δὲ πτηνὰ ἄρει). This is presumably, then, the original form
of the argument. Just below, however, in 14, Philo amplifies it to include pure souls, declaring now that the air supports two classes of being. We seem here to catch the argument at an intermediate, and rather incoherent, stage. The affinity of various types of creatures for different elements was already taught by Empedocles, A.72, and adopted by Plato, Tim. 39E ff.; cf. Diod. 1.75.

 tà πυρίγονα. Cf. Aet. 45; QE 2.28. Philo is the first attested user of this word, but the "fire-born creatures" are introduced first by Aristotle, at HA 5.19, 552b. The connection with Macedonia, which Philo makes again at Plant. 12, is not derivable from Aristotle's account, which described the creatures as appearing in copper-smelting furnaces in Cyprus, and is of mysterious provenance. Cicero knows the argument (ND 1.103), but talks of the little animals as appearing in ardenti-bus fornacibus, which assumes A.'s account in the HA. It may be that Aristotle spoke of these creatures also in the Περὶ Φιλοσοφίας, which Cicero also knows (ND 1.33, 2.42; cf. BT Hulin 127a [the salamander lives in fire]). There is also the possibility of Posidonius as an intermediary. In ch. 13 of Achilles' Commentary on Aratus (p. 41,10 Maass), we have a context where Posidonius has just been quoted on the subject of the stars' being alive, and the statement is then made, 'καὶ διὰ τῶν πάντων τὰ στοιχεῖα ζωὴ ἔχει,' but it is not quite clear that Posidonius is still being quoted, or that, if he is, he understands the air as being inhabited by daemons, though this is probable. Cf. Cic. Divinat. 1.64; Aelian NA 2.2.

8 ψυχαὶ . . . ἄνερρατοι τε καὶ ὀνεῖα. For the doctrine of stars and planets as pure souls, see Intro, p. 200. It takes its origin from Timaeus 40A-D. Cf. also Op. 27, 73, 144; LA 2.10; Cher. 23; Deus 46; Somn. 1.135; Spec. 1.19; QG 4.157; Plant. 12. See Zeller, Stoics 206; Wolfson, Philo, 1.363 ff., 417 ff.

κινοῦνταί . . . κίνησιν. Cf. Tim. 34A: κίνησιν γὰρ ἀπένειμεν αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ οὐχιματος οἰκείαν τῶν ἐπτά τὴν περὶ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν μαλλιστὰ οὖσαν, and the discussion of Laws X 897C-898B, esp. 898A.

νοῦς . . . ἀκραιφυστάτος. ἀκραιφυσής not a Platonic word, nor found in Classical Attic prose, except Thuc. (1.19 and 52). Ps.-Plat. Azicohus uses it, however, at 366A. A popular word with Philo.
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9 φαντασμοθήναι. Philo is the first attested user of this
term, which is plainly, however, to judge from its use by Sextus
Empiricus (e.g. Math. 8.506) and Plutarch (Soll.An. 960D), a
technical term in later Greek philosophy.

έπει καὶ τί φήσομεν; . . . τί δέ; . . . τί δέ; For dis-
cussion of Philo’s use of rhetorical apostrophe, see Intro, p.
141.

10 οὖν Æρι καὶ πνεύματι. Cf. Diogenes of Apollonia B.4
and 5.

Æρος κακωδέντος. Cf. Prov. 2.24: καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἐν Æρι
γεγενήτοι λοιμωξ, πάντως οὐφελον νοσῆσαι; 1.18; 2.67, 102;
Prob. 76; Aet. 126. On the origins of the physical theory
envisaged here, cf. Leg. 125-26, and Smallwood’s commentary
ad loc. On the importance of the quality of the air, cf. Prov.
2.109; Cic. ND 2.17 and 42; Sextus Math. 9.79.86. Philistion,
Fr. 4, Wellmann (the air that is breathed is vital for the
entire body).

11 ζωοτοιχέω. In sense of "producing living things," this
verb seems peculiar to Philo, cf. ζωογονεῖν, Prov. 2.104, and
Somm. 1.136: καὶ μὴν εἰκός γε ἄερα γῆς μᾶλλον καὶ Æδατος ζωο-
trofoφεῖν.

12 τῶν οὖν ψυχῶν . . . Theory of pure souls, again,
Platonic. Their being consecrated to the service of the Demi-
urge is a development of Plato’s statements in Symp. 202E and
Polit. 271DE. Philo seems to be the first prose author to use
the word Æφεσρώ (isolated instance in Aesch. Eum. 451).

ὑπηρετίς καὶ διακόνοις. Collocation of διακονεῖν and
ὑπηρετεῖν at Plato, Rep. 5.466E. ὑπηρετίς and ὑποδιάκονος are
combined at Spec. 3.201.

13 ἀπερ ἐις πόταμον . . . Cf. Somm. 1.147. Plainly
borrowed from Tim. 43A: αἱ δὲ ἐις πόταμον ἐνεδειχχσαί; with
overtones of the Phaedrus myth (248A ff.), but with Philonic
elaborations. οὐρομός is not a Platonic word, nor even a Clas-
sical one, but one that Philo likes in nautical metaphors
referring to human affairs in general, or to human desires, cf.
Deus 177; Sacr. 61; Det. 144; Mut. 214-15; Spec. 3.1-6; 4.50;
Prob. 38 (the adjective ἀνεμώματιστος, which occurs frequently
in these passages, shows the influence also of *Theaet.* 144A). Δίνη is used by Plato once metaphorically, at *Crat.* 439C: εἰς τινα δίνην ἐμπεσόντες κυκώνται, but we may also recognize the influence of Stoic allegorical interpretation of Odysseus’ shipwreck in *Odyssey* V; ἀνενήγαντο in particular is reminiscent of the repeated use of νῆξειν in the passage. Cf. *Mut.* 107. There may also have been allegorization of the Scylla and Charybdis episode. ἀνέπησεν is, again, reminiscent of the *Phaedrus* myth (*Phaedr.* 249D). For various types of souls, see Plut. *De Gen.* Soc. 591D ff.

14 τῶν ἀνόδως φιλοσοφοῦσάντων. ἀνοθος/ἀνόδως is to all appearances a Philonic term, but there is a reference here to *Phaedrus* 249A: τοῦ φιλοσοφόσαντος ἀδόλως. Cf. *Prov.* 2.22: ἀνοθος φιλοσοφία.

μελετῶσαι ... Βίον. A ref. to *Phaedo* 67DE.

15 αἱ δὲ καταποντώθησαι ... καταποντιζομένων/δω in metaphorical usage is post-Classical. This is only semi-metaphorical, however, being part of the extended sea-imagery. Reminiscent of language of *Phaedrus* 248A: ὑποβρόχια συμπερισσέονται. Cf. *LA* 2.103-4.

Ἀστάτοις καὶ τυχροίς πράγμασιν. Philo likes ἄστατος, and associates it in various places with sea imagery. A good passage is *Post.* 22, with extended nautical imagery. Also *LA* 3.53.

τὸν σωματικὸν νεκρόν. A reference here, perhaps, to Aristotle’s story in the *Protrepticus* (Fr. 10b Ross), of Etruscan pirates tying living prisoners to corpses, used by him as an image of the linking of the soul to the body. Admittedly here the corpse is σωματικός. Cf. *LA* 3.69, 74; *Agr.* 25; *Migr.* 21; *Somn.* 2.237; *Plac.* 159.

τὰ ἄψυχητα τοῦτον. Distinction of three grades of good, in normal Middle Platonic manner.

τῶν μὴ τεθαμένον τὰ πρῶτα ἀλήθειαν καλά. *Phaedrus* myth again, 248BC.

ἀναπλάττεται καὶ ἑωραφεῖται. Similar collocution at *Plant.* 27, in ref. to Bezalel who, in contrast to Moses, τὰς σκλας πλάττει καθάπερ οἱ ἑωραφοῦσί τε, οἷς οὐ θέμις οὐδὲν
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16 δεισιδαιμονία. It is of some interest to work out what Philo means by this term. At Deus 164, it is seen as one of the (Aristotelian) vices—δοεβεία being the other—between which εύσβεια is set as a mean, but Aristotle does not include these at EN 2.6-7. The term first appears in a bad sense only in Theophrastus, Char. 16. Plutarch assumes this development of Aristotelian doctrine in his essay On Superstition, making it explicit in the very last sentence (171F): οὕτω γὰρ ἐν τηδείγοντες τὴν δεισιδαιμονίαν ἐμπίπτουσιν εἰς ἄθεττα τραχεῖαν καὶ ἀντίτυπον, ὑπερηψάντας ἐν μέσῳ κειμένην τὴν εὐσβείαν—though he uses ἄθεττας as the other extreme instead of δοεβεία. But this shows that it is part of the Platonic-Peripatetic tradition, rather than anything original to Philo. The same scheme appears at Spec. 4.147. At Sacr. 15 δεισιδαιμονία is a πάθος, fostered in children by nurses and paidagōgoi. An example is given at Plant. 107-8: thinking to escape blame for one's transgressions by sacrificing oxen and suchlike expensive things is δεισιδαιμονία. Cf. also the definition of δεισιδαιμονία at Prov. 2.81 as "metus malorum daemonum." At Cher. 42, δεισιδαιμονία is connected with the use of "the birdlime of verbiage and preten- tious clap-trap of ceremonial."

17 μαντυρεῖ δέ μου. Philo here quotes a passage of the Psalms (77:49), where bad angels surely are being referred to, but he enlists it, allegorically understood, to support his position that "bad angels" are no angels at all (cf. Conf. 17). Philo, it may be noted, very rarely moves outside the Pentateuch in his quotations. There are only 19 instances in his works preserved in Greek where he quotes the Psalms.

τὸ ἄγγέλων δύναμιν ὑποδύομενον. The verb υποδύομαι here does not imply any activity of disguise on the part of these souls. Philo is here thinking of Gorgias 464C ff., where Plato describes ἡ κολακευτικὴ as υποδύον ὑπὸ ἐκαστὸν τῶν μορίων (sc. of the virtues), and pretending to be that ὄπερ ὑπέδυε. 

τὰς μὲν ὀρθὰς λόγους γνωσίους. For Philo, ὀρθὸς λόγος is both a cosmic principle and an aspect of the human soul, cf. Op. 143, Jao. 31, etc., as against LA 3.106, Sacr. 51, etc. Contrast between immortal/mortal and γνώσιος/νόθος frequent in

άλλ᾽ εὖνοι ἐνίας ἐκ μυρίων. For an analogy to the notion of being controlled by one or another consuming passion, cf. Plato, *Rep.* 9.573AB. The worst condition of all is that of the "tyrannical" man, in whom a single desire is dominant.

18 πολικάλα γὰρ . . .. The variation of desires is curiously arranged, initially by senses, then by parts of the body, in degree of distance from the head, seat of the logos. The phrase τὰς μηχανὰς ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τελοντες ἐπιθυμίας calls for comment. There are textual difficulties here, addressed by Wendland, but they do not greatly affect the sense, which appears to be that some fallen souls extend themselves to the ultimate, stretching like the longest string in a lyre, for instance, in their pursuit of recherche and contradictory pleasures.

The whole of §18 is concerned with explaining the ἀνόμα ταιων of the lemma.

III

*Gig.* 19-57

Commentary on Gen 6:3: εἰπε λόρος ὁ θεός: οὐ κατα-

μενεῖ τὸ πνεῦμα μου ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα διὰ τὸ εἶναι

ἀὐτοῖς σάρκας, ἔσονται δὲ αἱ ἡμέραι αὐτῶν ἐκατὸν εἰκοσι ἐτη.

Textual variants: οὐ μὴ καταμείνῃ θ. οὐ μὴ καταμείνῃ

LXX. ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τούτοις LXX. Heb. γάδων obscure. Usu-

ally rendered "shall not abide in" or "strive with"; new JPS trans.: "shall not shield." Heb. לָאָבָגָם equally obscure. New JPS: "Since he is but flesh" (another translation: "by reason of their going astray they are flesh").

A. General Comments

We move now to an exegesis of Gen 6:3, closely linked by Philo to his preceding exposition by the introductory
The theme of this passage is the dealings of the spirit with the flesh, and the imperfections attendant thereon. Philo departs from the obvious meaning of the LXX here, in which πνεύμα means only "the breath of life," and the sense is simply that men will not live for ever. He takes up a position concordant with Stoicism and Stoicizing Platonism as against a more "broad-minded" Peripateticism. These positions were liable to be confused if one did not clearly grasp the contrasting psychological doctrines on which they were based. What the Aristotelians meant by moderation of the passions might in practice be little different from what the Stoics meant by their extirpation, so that Aristotelian metriopatheia might result in what the Stoics would accept as eupatheia, but the Peripatetic ideal did not theoretically demand complete elimination of irrational emotions, only their moderation and control. The moderated passion of the Peripatetic would thus not be properly equivalent to the Stoic eupatheia, which is a completely rational feeling from the very first, and requires no moderation. The soul for the Stoics is a unitary entity. The Stoic sage, guided by an infallible process of reasoning, engenders within his psyche only rational emotions, since they are the result of perfectly rational ideas as to what is best for the human organism in its drive to increase its power to persevere in its own existence. (See on this J. M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy, ch. 3, with the refs. there given.)

The Peripatetic, who recognized an irrational "part" of the soul, would thus presumably moderate his fear or his grief to the point where he could feel adequate self-control, whereas the Stoic wise man would never experience fear in the first place, but only a completely rational feeling of caution or wariness which requires no further moderation or modification. Grief, on the other hand, he would never be subject to at all, experiencing at the most a mental sting or minor soul contractions, which are morally neutral and betray not the slightest trace of irrationality. Their Peripatetic opponents undoubtedly argued that such a psychic state was an impossible ideal and untrue to the human condition, but, in any case, the chasm dividing the two schools was a deep one and due to substantive philosophical differences, cf. Cic. Fin. 3.41.

Philo in fact vacillates a good deal between these two positions (cf. Abr. 257). His predominant position, however, is
Stoicizing, reflecting the dominant trend in Alexandrian Platonism in his time (see on this Dillon, Middle Platonists, ch. 3).

In this passage Philo's position is relatively austere, although in §34 it becomes clear that what are to be avoided are τὰ περιττὰ, not τὰ ἐπιτήδευμα. This is reinforced by an allegorical misinterpretation of πᾶντα ὅκενον σαρκὸς αὐτὸς όμο τροφεύεται in Lev 18:6, the ὦ being taken closely with πᾶντα (see comment on text), which produces an injunction "not to approach all properties of one's flesh," and thus allows moderate use of the good things of life. This is Philo's basic position, as is evident from many other passages (e.g. Her. 285-86; Virt. 78-126; QG 3.16; Spee. 4.168).

We have in this passage a good example of his exegetical method. First, in 23 and 24, he brings in parallel texts from Exodus (31:2-3)—adduced also in the parallel passage QG 1.90—and Numbers (11:17) to support his allegorical interpretation of πνεῦμα in Gen 6:3 as ἡ ἀκήρυτος ἐπιστήμη. 25-27 expand on the exegesis of Num 11:17 on a point relevant to the main subject, to wit, that ἀκήρυτος of an intellectual quality like ἐπιστήμη entails no diminution of the original source—a commonplace of Platonic teaching. In 28 we return to the main point, that the divine πνεῦμα cannot remain permanently in the human soul, bound as it is to the flesh. Then in 32 a passage from Leviticus (18:6) is introduced which on its literal level prohibits incest, but which Philo takes as an exhortation against indiscriminate yielding to the desires of the flesh. From this point until 51 we are involved in a detailed exegesis of this supporting text, with a number of small digressions, only at 52 returning to Gen 6:3, with which we continue until 57.

At 40, Philo turns to comment on the last two words of Lev 18:6: ἐγὼ κύριος, which he seems to take first as meaning, not so much "I am the Lord," as "I am the real thing" or "I am in the truest sense," implying "I am the true ἄγαθὸν" (cf. sect. 45). He finds here an allusion to the great chasm dividing God from created being, a recurring theme in the Philonic corpus. Man must turn away from pleasure's lure and fix his gaze instead on the genuine beauty of virtue. It is the paradoxical nature of pleasure that she harms when she gives and benefits when she takes away. The words "I am the Lord," continues Philo (45 ff.), are especially addressed to those who need to be threatened by God's sovereign power of chastisement. The wise man, on the other hand, lives in unperturbed tranquillity by the side of
God. The worldly-wise vanity called Jethro, however, stands dumbfounded in amazement before this phenomenal serenity. Indeed, contemplative reason alone can attain the high spiritual state of perfect stability, since the two-fold nature of uttered speech robs it of constancy. Philo thus returns to one of his favorite themes (53 ff.), namely, that only the celestial type of soul which has abandoned the earthly regions and has disrobed itself of all concern with externals can enter into the "darkness" of divine being and become privy to its holy mysteries.

Ss. 55-57 contain a brief exegesis of the superficially troublesome remark at Gen 6:3:  ἐσούντα ἐτὲ αἱ ἡμέραι αὐτῶν ἱκανὸν ἐσωτ. ἐτι, which, as Philo notes, would make the god-forsaken of equal age with Moses himself (cf. Deut 34:7). Herein must surely lie some hidden meaning. In fact, however, Philo begs off explaining this for the present, simply taking refuge in the suggestion that the two 120's may be homonymous, and thus not strictly comparable (not having the same λόγος τῆς οὐσίας, Ar. Cat. 1al). He promises to discuss the problem in more detail elsewhere, in his examination of the προφητικὸς θεός as a whole (the prophetic life in general, or that of the Prophet [Moses] in particular?), a promise not, so far as we can see, fulfilled (see note ad loc.). In the parallel passage QG 1.91, we find an elaborate arithmological excursus on the virtues of the number 120 (on which see further K. Staehle, Die Zahlenmystik bei Philon von Alexandrea [Leipzig-Berlin 1931]), but no suggestion that there is any problem about the equality of age between Moses and the many.

B. Detailed Commentary

19 ἔκαλον ὀντάς. First attested in Philo, and used by him frequently (Plant. 93; Congr. 38; Mut. 209, etc.). Presumably provoked by ἐὰν τὸν ἀνόμον in the lemma.

20 τῇ γὰρ ὀντὶς ἄλογος ...; Cf. LA 1.33-35. Every being possessed of a human soul has some ἔννοια of the good at some time. This can be seen as an application of the Stoic concept of κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, which are imprinted on human reason. In the writings of Epictetus we find the Natural Law grounded in the προλήψεις or preconceptions which the Stoics believed were common to all men (1.22.1; 2.11; 4.1.41), cf. Arist. EN 6.114b5; Cic. Fin. 5.4.3. [virtutum quasi scintillas]; Tusc. 3.2 [semina innata virtutum]; Sen. Ben. 4.17.4: "Of all the benefits that
we have from Nature, this is the greatest, the fact that Virtue causes her light to penetrate into the minds of all; even those who do not follow her, see her”; 7.19.5; Ep. 108.8; Stob. 2.7.5b8; cf. LA 1.34-35, 38; Det. 86; Musonius, 2.14 Lutz: σπέρμα ἀρετῆς ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἐνείναι. We may also note Plato's doctrine in the Phaedrus (249b) that no soul that has never had a vision of the truth will rise from brutish into human shape. Conversely, then, any human soul must have seen something of truth at some time—in terms of Plato's myth, during the Heavenly Ride.

Πειπτοτάται. Poetical word—Aeschylean (Pers. 666, Eum. 378)—though Herodotus uses ἐπιπέταμαι, of a dream, at 7.15. Philo uses this verb also at LA 2.11, of the passions fluttering about over the mind like birds; and at Somn. 2.212.

21 ὀικητορᾶς. The image of visiting and leaving houses recurs in connection with conscience at Deus 131 ff., influenced by Lev 14:34-36.

ἐκείνητηπμένοις. ἐκείνητιάω with accusative is Hellenistic, cf. Dion. Hal. Ant. 5.74.

εἰ μὴ τοῦ διαλέγειν. Cf. LA 1:35: "One, then, into whom real life had not been breathed, but who was without experience of virtue, when punished for his transgressions, would have said that he is unjustly punished, for that it was through inexperience of good that he failed in respect of it, and that the blame lay with Him who had failed to breathe into him any conception of it."

22 λέγεται δὲ θεοῦ πνεῦμα . . . οὐ δέων ἀδικοῦ ἀπὸ γῆς. Cf. Ps.-Arist. De Mundo 394b8: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν οὗτος πλὴν ἀδικοῦ πλὸς καὶ θεὸς καὶ ἀδωδός. ὥστες ἄμα καὶ πνεῦμα λέγεται; QG 1.90; Det. 83: ἢ δὲ [sc. δόναμις] ἡ τῆς λογικῆς ἀποροεῖσα πηγής τοῦ πνεύμα, οὐκ ἄγα κινούμενον, ἀλλὰ τόπον τινά καὶ χαρακτῆρα δείας δυνάμεως; Emped. DK, B.100, 13-15; Plat. Crat. 410B; SVF 2.471; Doc. 374a,19; Heron, Pneum. 6.5. See O. Gilbert, Die meteorologischen Theorien des griechischen Altertums (Leipzig 1907) 512 ff.; H. Leisegang, Der heilige Geist (Leipzig-Berlin 1919) 15-75.

ἡ ἀκρατος ἐπιστήμη. Cf. QG 1.90: "For the divine spirit is not a movement of air, but intelligence and wisdom"; Det. 83-90; Plato, Phaedrus 247D: ἐπιστήμη ἀκρατῶς τροφομένη (θεοῦ διάνοια); Laws 735C; Congr. 25; Mut. 219; Jos. 146; Virt. 55. A completely different allegorical interpretation of Gen 1:2 is given by Numenius, Fr. 30 Des Places = Porph. Antr. 10.
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23 ἑπὶ τοῦ τῶν ἄγνων ἐργῶν δημιουργοῦ. For Bezalel, cf. LA 3.96-103; Plant. 27; BT Ber. 55a (cf. note on Gig. 15). No contrast is made here, however, between Bezalel and Moses in respect of the nature of their knowledge of God.


25 κατὰ ἀποκομηθὴν καὶ διάζευγέν. Platonic doctrine of the imparting of spiritual qualities, without loss to the source. Cf. Det. 90: τέμνεται γάρ οὔδὲν τοῦ θείου κατ’ ἀπόρτησιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐκτείνεται . . . ὅλως γὰρ δύναμις αὐτοῦ; Spec. 1.47; Wisd. 7:27: καὶ μένουσα ἐν αὐτῇ τὰ πάντα καινίζεται. For the concept, see Ennius, quoted by Cicero, Off. 1.51; Ps.-Ar. De Mundo 398b10 ff.; Sen. Ep. 41; M. Aurel. 8.57; 7.59; Numenius, Fr. 14 Des Places (a torch lighting another does not lose anything of its own light, nor is the teacher's learning diminished when he imparts it to his pupil [cf. Plot. 6.5.8; 4.9.5]). There is an analogy in Persian tradition, Ormuzd's creation of the Bounteous Immortals being compared to the lighting of a torch from a torch (Ayadgar I Jamaspīq, ed. G. Messina [Rome 1939] 3.3-7). In the Indian tradition, cf. The Questions of King Milinda, trans. T. W. Rhys Davids (Dover rep. N.Y., 1963) 1.111 [3.5.5]: "Suppose a man, O king, were to light a lamp from another lamp, can it be said that the one transmigrates from, or to, the other? 'Certainly not. 'Just so, great king, is rebirth without transmigration.'" Also, Shīr HaShīrim R. on Cant 3:10; BT Sanh. 39a; B. R. 68.9; Tanḥuma, ed. Buber, Beha'ałotkha 22 (torch image); Plot. 1.7.1; 5.3.12; 5.4.2; 3.8.10; Justin, Dial. 128 ad fin.; Tert. Apol. 21.10-13; Lactantius, Div. Inst. 4.29.4-5; Aug. Conf. 9.5.1.

ἀποκρινεῖν τὰς ἀπαντήμουμένας ἡγής. A piece of agricultural lore, to the effect that the more water one draws off from a spring, the sweeter it becomes. Clement uses this image also, at Strom. 1.12, but he may simply be borrowing from Philo.

26 μελέτην καὶ ἀνακόσια. A frequent collocution: Sacr. 85; Agr. 91; Conf. 110; Mig. 31; Mos. 2.27; Ebr. 21, etc.

27 τὸ ὀστεῖον. For Moses as ὀστεῖος, cf. Conf. 106.

28 ἔτο ὅη. We return to the main theme: the divine pneuma cannot remain permanently in the soul of man.
Two Treatises of Philo

Διπλωμένων καὶ πρὸς ἑκάτερα ταλαντεύοντων. Same notion emphasized in Somn. 1.153-56 (for this theme applied to nations, see Gen.Comm. on Deus 140-83, ad fin.). Cf. also LA 2.83; Post. 22, 100; Plant. 111, etc.

29 ἡ πρὸς σάφκα οἰκείωσις. Cf. Post. 157; Her. 154. For that oikeiosis by means of which we become well-disposed not just to ourselves but to other people, see Cic. Fin. 3.62-68, 5.65; and S. G. Pembroke, "Oikeiosis," in Problems in Stoicism, ed. A. A. Long (London 1971) 114-49. οἰκείωσις is probably an anticipatory reference to Lev 18:6, πρὸς πάντα οἰκεῖον σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ, which he turns to in §32.

γάμου καὶ παλαιστρούλα. The Stoic attitude towards the practical life was not unambiguous: cf. SVF 3.691, 693-94, 698 with 703, and Epict. 3.22, 67. (See E. Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics [repr. New York 1962] 321-26; J. M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy [Cambridge 1969] ch. 1; J. Gould, The Philosophy of Chrysippus [New York, 1970] 172-73; and the excellent discussion of Seneca's position on this matter in M. T. Griffin, Seneca, A Philosopher in Politics (Oxford, 1976) 315-66. Philo's attitude is similarly not free from ambiguity. Philo never loses track of the body's legitimate needs and functions, though he is keenly aware of its capacity to entrap and entice the higher self. He believes that most men must wean themselves from the physical aspect of things only very gradually, and with the expenditure of much effort and toil, though he is aware of the psychological contamination which may result from too extended an exposure to bodily concerns (cf. Cont. 18-20; Praem. 17-19; Spec. 2.44-46; QG 4.47). He is convinced, however, that some, though not many, may ultimately succeed in focussing their minds much of the time on the eternal realities, while yet going through the motions of somatic activity which will have finally faded into insignificance.

πρὶν . . . ἀνθήσαι, κατεμφάναν. Same image and phraseology in Plut. Mor. 804E: διὸ πολλοὶ πρὶν ἀνθήσαι περὶ τὸ βῆμα κατεμφάναν, so a common source is indicated. Cf. Prov. 2.21: πρὶν ἐπὶ μὴνιστὸν ἀνθήσαι . . . ἀμαιρώσας; Post. 112; Jos. 130: πρὶν ἀνθήσαι μαραίνομεν; Spec. 1.311 (μαραίνομεν . . . πρὶν ἀνθήσαι βεβαίως). κατεμφάναν is only found once in Philo.

30 καθάπερ τὸς θεμέλιος . . . ὑποδέβλεται, ὧ . . . ἐποικο- δομεῖται. Cf. Mut. 211; Char. 101; Somn. 2.8.
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31 ψυχαὶ . . . ἀσάρκοι καὶ ἀσώματοι. Cf. Fug. 58: ἐρωτι καὶ φιλίᾳ θεοῦ ἀσάρκῳ καὶ ἀσώματι κατεσχῆθαι; Ebr. 87. At Spec. 2.44-46, the wise are described as the closest observers of Nature, who, "while their bodies are firmly planted on the land provide their souls with wings, so that they may traverse the upper air and gain full contemplation of the powers which dwell there." Cf. also Deus 151; Mos. 1.190.

ἐν τῷ τοῦ παντὸς θεάτρῳ. The "theater of the universe" is a striking image, and one which was very influential in the Renaissance (see Frances Yates, The Art of Memory [1966] 129 ff., 149, 302, 330; and E. Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages [1953] 138 ff.). The soul, when freed from its fleshly envelope and worldly concerns, will be a spectator of the divine sights and sounds which are denied to mortal men; they will be able to see the world from above and observe the divine order of the universe directly, and they will be able to hear the music of the spheres. In Somnium Scipionis (Cic. Rep. 6.15), the universe as perceived from above is compared to a temple; Plato does not refer to the universe as either a temple or a theater, but the joy experienced by souls free to observe the symmetry of the world and the harmony of the stars and planets is a recurrent theme in the Phaedo, Phaedrus, Republic, and Timaeus. Plato usually uses θεωρία or θεάωμα (esp. Phaedo 109B-110E: θεωροῦμαι, 109E: εἰ τὶς δυνάμεν τὸ θέατρο, 110B). For Philo, cf. Op. 53-54, 77-78; Spec. 3.1-6. In Op. 77-78, the souls are invited as to a banquet or a spectacle (θεάτρον-θέαμα) where the entertainment is, again, Platonic.

ἀπληστοσ . . . ἐρωτι. ἀπληστος a good Attic word in Plato and the Orators. Usually refers to excessive or uncontrollable desires, especially greed. In Plato, Rep. 562B, ἀπληστία is desire for a good, but still excessive and dangerous.

μηδένος καλυπτεροχώντος. καλυπτεργέω a Hellenistic formation, first attested in Polybius (6.15.5).

tὸν σαρκῶν φόρτον ἄχθουσοροφεῖ. ἄχθουσορεῖ also first attested in Polybius (4.32.7).

βαρυνύθμεναι καὶ πιεζόμεναι. A frequent collocation in Philo, Deus 14; Det. 16; Ebr. 104, 214; cf. LA 3.152; Spec. 4.114. A reminiscence of Phaedo 81C: ψυχὴ βαρύνεται, cf. Wisd. 9:15: φθορόν γὰρ σώμα βαρύνει ψυχήν; Jos. Bar. 7.346. A fragment of the Pythagorean Onatas states that "the earthly mixture of the body defiles the purity of the soul: (Thesleff, p. 140,
9 f.) and Ecphantus taught that on earth man is "weighed down by a large portion of earth" (Thesleff, p. 79, 3 ff.; L. Delatte, Les traités de la royauté d'Ecpahnte, Diotogène, et Sténides [Liège 1942] 189). See also Plutarch, Isis and Osiris 353A: "But they want their bodies to be compact and light around their souls and not to oppress or weigh down the divine part with a mortal element"; Epict. 1.1.15; CH Assiçep. 1.9; Sen. Ep. 65, 16; Plot. 6.9.8, 16.

\[\text{δῶρ μὲν βλέπειν. Cf. Plant. 16-27; Det. 85; QG 4.46; Xen. Mem. 1.4.11; Plato, Tim. 90A-D; Cic. ND 2.140. See A. Wlosok, Laktanz u. die philosophische Gnosis (Heidelberg 1960) 8-69.}\]

\[\text{προσερρίζωνται. Verb first attested in Philo. Also at Det. 85, in a similar context.}\]

32 \[\text{ἐκνύμως καὶ ἐκθέσμως. Cf. Prasm. 126; Spec. II 50; Moe. II 198. ἐκνύμως an Aeschylean word (Eum. 92; adverb, Ag. 1473); ἐκθέσμως first attested in Philodemus, Sto. 339, 18.}\]


\[\text{ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπος... Philo recognizes the literal meaning of Lev 18:6, but his interest is in the allegorical meaning.}\]

33 \[\text{καίτοι ὁ ἄνθρωπος μόνον. Treatise from here until 51 now becomes an exegesis of Lev 18:6.}\]

\[\text{μαγίας. Possibly a vox Platonica for Philo (cf. Rep. 434D; Theaet. 157A; Tim. 49D).}\]

\[\text{ὁ πρὸς ἄλληλου ἄνθρωπος. Theme of the "real Man" very common in Philo and in Greek literature. See Her. 231; Fug. 71; Somn. 1.215, 124-25, 2.167; Det. 23; 83; Fug. 131; Jos. 71; Spec. 1.303; Congr. 97 (the man within the man; cf. Plato, Rep. 589B).}\]
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d'ęntος ἄνθρωπος; Hippi. Maj. 304D; Excerpta ex Theodoto 51.1); Plant. 42; Prob. 111; Arist. EN 1166a; Cíc. Somn. Scip. [Rep. 6] 26; Tusc. 1.52; Alcibiades I 130C (Plato, Phaedo 115C; Rep. 469D; Laws 959B). For a detailed discussion see Jean Pépin, Idées grecques sur l'Homme et sur Dieu (Paris 1971) 71-86. Cf. also Plot. 1.1.7.20.

Ἀλλοτρίωσις. Opposite of οἰκείωσις; cf. Plant. 25; Post. 135: ἢ πρὸς τὸ γενητὸν ἄλλοτρίωσις πρὸς θεὸν οἰκείωσιν εἰργάσατο; Chor. 41, 74; Conf. 82.

τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ ἀπαξ ἀλλὰ ἐὰς ἀναλ. Note Philo's indifference to the Hebraism here, as so often. Rabbinic exegesis, attuned to the slightest superfluity of expression in Scripture, derives an additional legal ruling (i.e., that Gentiles are included in the prohibition) from the ἐπαναδιπλωμασία or doubling of the word 'ἰς' (Sifra, Ἀχαρέ 9-13; BT Sank. 57b). Here the doubling simply indicates for Philo ὁ πρός ἄλλης ἄνθρωπος.


34 πρὸς πάντα οἰκείου. A strained interpretation of πάντα as distributive rather than inclusive. Since this interpretation really makes nonsense of the literal meaning of the passage, which forbids all intercourse with any member of one's family, it is plain that Philo's rules of allegory allow of this.

ἐνια γάρ προσετέου. Distinction between ἐπιθετία and περιττά. At Deus 162-65, Philo espouses the Aristotelian mean, identifying the μέσον ὁδὸς with the βασιλικὴ ὁδὸς leading to God, and at Spec. 4.101-2 he says that "Moses opened up a path midway between Spartan austerity and Sybarite luxury." Those who needlessly fast, or refuse the bath and oil, or are careless about their clothing and lodging, thinking that they are thereby practising self-control, are to be pitied for their error (Det. 19-21). Even the wise man will indulge in heavy drinking, although in the more moderate manner of the ancients rather than in the style of the moderns who drink "till body and soul are unstrung" (Plant. 167-68. In Cont. 73 and QG 2.67, however, Philo suggests that the use of wine is superfluous). Frequently, however, as here, he emphasizes the need to be content with little (ὀλι-γοθεία), for the less one needs the closer one is to God (Virt. 8-9). Cf. Xen. Mem. 1.6.10 ("to have no wants is divine; to have as few as possible comes next to the divine"); Praem. 99-100;
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Somm. 1.97; Virt. 6-7; Prob. 77, 84; Op. 164; Somm. 1.124-25, 2.195, 2.40, 64; Ebr. 58, 214-15; Mos. 2.185 ("But in very truth that most holy company, justice, temperance, courage, wisdom, follow in the train of the practisers and all who devote themselves to a life of austerity and hardship, that is to continence and self-restraint, together with simplicity and frugal contentment"); Cont. 37-39; Spec. 1.9 ("thus making circumcision the figure of the excision of excessive and superfluous pleasure"), 173-74, 2.159-60; QG 3.48; LA 2.17, 3.140-43, 147, 154, 236; Sacr. 59 (Jethro is the man of superfluity; cf. Gig. 50; Nut. 103); Det. 101; Xen. Mem. 1.3.5-6; Musonius (in Stob. 751, 526.16, 173). Wendland has pointed out the parallels between numerous passages in Philo and Musonius, and argues that they must have had a common origin in Cynic-Stoic diatribe. See P. Wendland, Philo und die Kynisch-Stoische Diatribe (Beiträge zur Gesch. d. griechischen Philosophie) (Berlin 1895); and D. R. Dudley, A History of Cynicism (London 1937) 186, 32, 67, 189-201.

Although the Epicurean distinction between necessary and unnecessary desires was already anticipated by Plato (Rep. 558D ff.; cf. Tim. 70E; Philob. 62E; Arist. EN 1147b24), Philo's contrast of the gifts of nature with those of κενή δόξα (Praem. 100; Virt. 7; QG 3.47; Somm. 1.255) in addition to his contrast between necessary and unnecessary desires points to his dependence on an Epicurean source. (See Usener, Epicurea 456. Schol. in Arist. EN: αἱ δὲ [sc. ἐπιθυμίαι] οὗτε ἀναγκαία οὗτε φυσικά ἄλλα κατὰ κενήν γενόμενα δόξαν; Cic. Tusq. 5.93: tertias, quod essent plane inanes neque necessitatem modo. Plut. Grylli 989B: τὸ δὲ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων μὴ ἐξελέγαν ἕξας ἐξελέγαν δόξης κενής. D.L. 10.149: αἱ δὲ ὧν ἄναγκαια ἄλλα παρὰ κενήν δόξαν γινόμενα; K.D. 30.) For other possible Epicurean echoes in Philo, see Bréhier 263-64.

σκορακιστέον. σκορακίζω rather a slang word, formed from "ἐς κόρακας" and found first in Philo, except once in Ps.-Demosthenes (11.11). σκορακισμός in LXX (Sir 41:19), so that may be the relevant influence. See Intro, p. 137 for discussion of Philo's vocabulary. Vulgar elements appearing in LXX had considerable effect on him, paralleled later by that of NT on Church Fathers. However, we know that vulgar diction was to be found in Comedy, and in some of the orators (Hyperides and the author of Dem. 17), so the word may have been more common than we would suppose in Classical Attic authors.
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For image of passions as a consuming fire, cf. Virt. 9: ἀπλήστου καὶ ἀκορέστου . . . ἐπιθυμίας, ἦν πυρὸς τρόπον ἀναρριψών καὶ ἀναφλέγων ἐπὶ πάντα μικρὰ τε αὖ καὶ μεγάλα τείνει.

35 ἡδοναὶ γὰρ ἀτίθασοι. Comparison of the passions to wild beasts very frequent in Philo: LA 1.69 (desire compared to a tiger, animal least capable of being tamed) (ἀτιθασοσότις ζῷω); ib. 2.9-11, 92; ib. 3.156; Sacr. 62; Plant. 43; Conf. 24, 110; Mīg. 219; Abr. 32; Spec. 1.148; 2.9; 4.94; Praem. 59, 88 (the wild beasts within the soul must be tamed); Cont. 74. The image is Platonic (Tim. 70E; Rep. 588C). Cf. Plot. 1.1.7.21. ἀτίθασος (aside from a dubious reading in Hdn. 5.6.9) found only in Philo, who uses it frequently.

(...)
part of a long list of similar virtues. For connection between ὀλιγόδεια and intelligence, cf. Prov. 2.110.)

36 ἄξιον ἀναπτύσσει. ἄναπτύσσει seems to be only poetical in this sense in Classical period. Cf. Agr. 136: τὰς διυλάδες καὶ ἀμφιβόλους λέξας ἀναπτύσσων; Cont. 78: τὰ μὲν σύμβολα διαπτύ- 

ξάς καὶ διακαλύψασα; Spec. 3.6; Porphyry, Antr. 4; Iambl. Protr. 21.

πολλάκις οὐ γενόμενοι τίνες πορισταὶ χρημάτων. The idea of the danger of having wealth, fame, and physical excellence thrust upon one Philo may, at least in the case of the first two, be applying to himself, although three different sets of people are mentioned.

37 ησαφρέσσαθαι. As Moses says (comm. ad loc. p. 38), Philo invests this word (taken from οὐ προσεχέσθαι of Lev 18:6) with much significance, making it a theme-word for his homily. It connotes here assent to the trio of "human goods," wealth, fame and health. It is taken up by ποσεφρόμενοι further down, and finally by the Homeric-Platonic phrase κατ’ ἵχνος βαίνειν (see below).

φιλάθλος. First attested in Philo. Used here to buttress ψιλογυμνασταίς and balance ψιλογύμναστας and ψιλοδόξους. (For the collocation of ψιλάθλος and ψιλογυμναστής, see Congr. 25 and Somn. 1.251.) Note his triadic construction, with the third colon of the triad suitably amplified. Cf. 27 above, and Longinus, Subl. 9.6, 10.3. A good parallel, which also involves a series of qualities, is Demosthenes 3.26. The amplification of the final clause is very common with three or more cola.

τὸ γὰρ ἀμέλιον. The theme of submitting soul, which should naturally rule, to the soulless, which should naturally be ruled (cf. Phaedr. 246B: ψυχῇ πᾶσα παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀμέλους), is trite enough. Cf. Decal. 76 μηδεῖς οὖν τῶν ἐχθρῶν ψυχὴν ἀμέλης τινὶ προσκυνεῖτω; LA 2.50; Cont. 9; Wisd 15:17.
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38 ὡς ἡγεμόνι τῷ υἱῷ. νοῦς as ἡγεμόνι is a popular turn of phrase with Philo, of obvious Stoic provenance, cf. Ebr. 60; Heres 186; Spec. 2.61, etc., but it is noteworthy that the actual phrase is nowhere in Old Stoic sources. It may be that Philo is being original here, giving a Platonist tone to the Stoic ἡγεμόνι.

ὡς καὶ δίκαια αὐτῶν. Definite rejection here of Peripatetic ethics. Happiness is independent of any material advantages. Cf. LA 2.16-18, a good exposition of Philo's views.

39 καὶ ἔκτος Βαίνειν. Echo here of Homeric phrase: ὡς ἔκτος μετ᾽ ἔκτος Βαίνει Θεόο (Od. 2.406; 3.30, of Telemachus following Athena in the guise of Mentor, and 5.193, of Odysseus following Calypso, allegorized as the initial leading of the soul forth to begin its journey through life). Cf. Mig. 128.

αὐθαράκτις ἀναπήλπηνοι δόξης φιλοσοφίαν. The translations of Colson ("with the baseness of men's opinion") and Mosēs ("d'une opinion déshonorante") are unsatisfactory, Colson "over-translating," Mosēs being indefinite. The meaning surely is "gives philosophy a bad name."

πωλούντων . . . καὶ ἐπεισωνιζόντων. Cf. Mos. 2.212; Cher. 123. Latter word Demosthenic (23.201). A Demosthenic echo, direct or indirect, is possible, but cf. also Plato, Prot. 313CD (Sophists as crooked market traders); Soph. 231D. Also Lucian, Bion Prasis (cut-rate sale of philosophies).

tοτέ μὲν μικροῦ λίμισματος. All these genitives presumably refer to the various pitches which the hawkers are making. Cf. Plato, Soph. 234A: πάνυ σμικρῷ νομίσματος ἀποβίδοται.

ἐὐπαραγόγου. A theme-word of Philo's (cf. 59 below; Agr. 16, 96; Ebr. 46; Fug. 22; Spec. 1.28, etc.). May be a vox Platonic, echo of Tim. 69D: ἐλπίδα δ' ἐὐπαράγωγον, though Philo uses it in the active sense here, as "seductive" (Philo uses ἐλπίσος just after this). The Platonic image of the sophist as huckster is elaborated in typical Philonic fashion.

40 ὅ γενναῖ. The homiletical formula employing direct address in a very personal manner, as here, is very frequent in Philo. Cf. LA 3.75; Det. 150; Agr. 86, 167; Her. 91; Mut. 177, 187; Somn. 1.93, 2.253; Decal. 73; Spec. 2.84; Prov. 2.31.

(Equally common is ὅ πυξί or ὅ διάνοια: Gig. 44; Cher. 29; Deus
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4, 114; LA 1.49; Somn. 2.68, 76; Saor. 20; Prov. 2.16; etc.)

See H. Thyen, Der Stil der jüdisch-hellenistischen Homilie (Göttingen 1955) 94-100. It is also common, as a slightly ironical address, in Plato’s dialogues, e.g. Alc. 1.135E; Hipp. Maj. 298A; Gorg. 521B.

пагκαλώς καὶ σφόδρα παίδευτικός. Same formula occurs at Spec. 4.39; cf. Mig. 14; Spec. 4.66 (σφόδρα π.); Virt. 165 (ἀγαν π.); Saor. 42 (δογματικός καὶ π.).

ὁ νοῦς τῶν διών, ὁ θεὸς. This Stoic formula (SVF 1.157: νοῦν κόσμου πύρινον) appears frequently in Philo: Mig. 4, 192-93; Op. 8; LA 3.29; Spec. 1.18; Fug. 46. Θεὸς here should properly refer to God’s logos, however, rather than to God himself.

41 ἐξαμιλλός γε καὶ ἀσύγκρισις σύγκρισις. Cf. Ebr. 43: ὅταν συγκρίνῃς τὰ ἀσύγκριτα; Somn. 2.284: συμφωνία ... ἀσύμφωνος. Some corruption seems to have crept in here. Wendland conjectured ἄσυγκρίτων σύγκρισις. Colson suggests the following reconstruction: οὖκ οὖν <εἶ> τὸ μὲν σαρκικὸν ἐστιν ἄλογον ἥδον, τὸ δὲ ψυχής καὶ τοῦ παντός ὁ νοῦς τῶν διών, ὁ θεὸς ἐξαμιλλός <εἶ> ἄ<σ>υγκρίτων ἦ σύγκρισις, εἰ μὴ ... i.e., "then if the first is ..., and the second is ..., the comparison is not an evenly balanced one or between two really comparables, unless we are prepared to admit . . .," etc. But Wendland’s emendation makes good enough sense, if we assume Philo to be speaking ironically, i.e., "the comparison of the (essentially) incomparable is, forsooth, a serious context, . . .". The reading of H, which omits μὴ after εἶ, seems to give a rather easier sense: "that is, if one is also prepared to say that" all opposites are really the same.

42 τὸ μὲν γέγονε τε καὶ πείσεται, ὁ δὲ ἐστὶν ἀγένητος τε καὶ πολὺν άξιόν. A development on Plato, Tim. 38AB, with a Stoic-influenced contrast between τὸ πολὺν and τὸ πάχους (SVF 1.85).

43 μὴ λιποτακήσῃ μὲν τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ τάξεως. Cf. Plato, Apol. 28E-29A: τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος . . . φιλοσοφοῦντα με δεῖν ζῆν . . . ἀσπομιν ἡν τὰξιν. Deue 34; Ebr. 145; Cher. 32; Det. 142; Aet. 65; Cont. 11: καὶ καθέστε τὴν τάξιν ταύτην λειπέτω; Decal. 104, 178; also Epict. 1.16-21; 1.9.16; 4 Macc 9:23.

καίνυτατ . . . ἡ φύσις. This remark on the paradoxical quality of pleasure, that its bestowals do good and its
deprivations harm, is a notable conceit, a development of the comparison with mad dogs at 35.

44 ἄδουνής φιλίτων. A frequent collocation in Philo. Post. 135; Deus 170; Agr. 98; Sobr. 23; Spec. 1.9; Cont. 69; Op. 165.

μετάθαλευ. First in Philo. Cf. Post. 100, 111; Deus 180; Conf. 129; Mig. 184 (generally refers to a shift away from an erroneous path).

ἀντιπεριάγονσα. Cf. Agr. 70 (where it refers to pulling the horse's neck around the other way). A reminiscence of Plato, Rep. 518B ff., where true education is spoken of as a περιαγωγή (518D) of the δύνας of the soul.

ἔμερος ἐν τακτική σολ. In earlier usage (Soph. El. 1311; Plato, Menex. 245D; Lucian, Peregr. 22) ἐντήκιω leans to a bad sense (cf. Post. 165). Philo, however, uses it mostly in a good sense: Ebr. 159; Mig. 157 (ο θεός ἐντακείς ἔμερος); Her. 310; Congr. 64; Mut. 174; Prob. 117; cf. Julian 130C: ἀντιπεριή μοι δεινὸς τοῦ θεοῦ πόθος.


47 πάντα γὰρ πεταλωχός ὁ θεὸς ἐγγὺς ἐστὶν, ὡστε ἐφορωντος. Cf. LA 3.4; Sacr. 67; Det. 153; Post. 14, 30; Deus 57; Conf. 136; Somm. 1.62, 2.221; Sen. Ep. 41.1-2, 83.2; Epict. 1.14; 2.8.9-14: "You are bearing God about with you, you poor wretch, and know it not . . . But when God himself is present within you, seeing and hearing everything. . . ."

κολαστηριώ νυνάμει. Philo explains God's designation as κύριος as a reference to his ἔξουσία or sovereignty, and his designation θεὸς as a reference to his ἀγαθότης or goodness.
To the former he applies the adjectives ἁρμονική, ἄρεττα, νομοθετική, and κοιλαστήριος, whereas for the latter he employs the adjectives πολιτική, εὐεργετική, χαριστική, ὁρετική, and ἠλεως. On the powers of God, see Wolfson, *Philo* I pp. 217-26.

οὖσα ἀρετής. ἄρετα c. part. or inf. in the sense of refraining from doing is apparently first attested in Philo (and only once at that). Cf. Lucian, *Jud. Voc. 4.*

tὸ σοφὸς πνεῦμα θείον. Σοφία is here identified with the πνεῦμα or λόγος of God pervading the universe, as a force both cosmological and ethical. For the relationship of σοφία to λόγος, see U. Früchtel, *Die kosmologischen Vorstellungen bei Philo von Alexandrien* (Leiden 1968) 172-83. Cf. esp. Fug. 97 and 109.

48 ὁ σοφὸς ἀκριβιστος ἀρετής. According to the Stoics, whom Philo is following, the Wise Man is no longer separated from virtue, whereas the προκόπτοντες are still liable to reverse course and slip back into their former habits. "For many, after beginning to practise virtue, have changed at the last: but on the man to whom God affords secure knowledge, he bestows both advantages, both that of tilling the virtues, and also that of never desisting from them" (LA 1.89). At *Agr.* 160, Philo is apparently reproducing Seneca's three-fold classification of the προκόπτοντες (Ep. 75). He speaks there of beginners, those making progress, and those who have reached perfection but are still unpractised in virtue. In describing the latter, he uses the Stoic expression διαλέληθος σοφοί (unwitting wise men). Seneca describes this group as men who have already laid aside all passions and vices, but whose assurance has not yet been tested. They have already arrived at a point from which there is no slipping back, though they are not yet aware of the fact (cf. *SVF* 3.539-42). Philo also seems to be referring to this stage at *Somm.* 2.270, where he says that the "destruction and removal of passion is a good, yet it is not a perfect good, but the discovery of wisdom is a thing of transcendent excellence." Although both Chrysippus and Philo agree that once a man achieves wisdom his actions acquire a firm consistency and he is no longer liable to slip back into vice (*SVF* 3.510), they nevertheless insist that the onset of a diseased physiological condition, such as melancholia, lethargy or various drug-induced stages, could temporarily interrupt the sage's virtue (D.L. 7.127-28; *Abr.* 207).
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οὗτοι λόγου βεβαιότητι ἰδρυμένοι. Cf. SVF 3.510: διαν αἰ μέσαι πράξεις αὐταὶ προσλάβωσι τὸ βέβαιον καὶ ἐκτικόν καὶ ἱδαν πῆξιν τινά λάβομαι. For πῆξιν cf. Agr. 160, where Philo employs the same image; LA 2.55; ἡ φιλόδεος ψυχή ἐκδοσά τὸ σῶμα . . . πῆξιν καὶ βεβαίωσιν καὶ ἱδρυσιν ἐν τοῖς τελείως ἄρετης δόγμασι λαμβάνει.

49 "σοὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ στήθι μετ' ἐμοῦ". (Deut 5:31) (v. 28 in Heb.) The rabbis deduced from this verse that Moses separated himself from his wife, and that God gave his approval to this act (BT Shab. 87a. cf. Mos. 2.68-69; Sifre on Num 12:1 [99], ed. H. S. Horovitz 98). The ideal of εὐσταθεία or inner calm and stability is a central theme running through Philo's writings. At Post. 23 Philo writes: "Proximity to a stable object (τῷ ἑστῶτι) produces a desire to be like it and a longing for quiescence (ἡσυχίας). Now that which is unwaveringly stable (ἄκλινος ἑστῶς) is God, and that which is subject to movement is creation. He therefore that draws nigh to God longs for stability . . ."; ib. 27: "Abraham the wise, being one who stands, draws near to God the standing One (τῷ ἑστῶτι Θεῷ), for it says, 'he was standing before the Lord' (Gen 18:22). For only a truly unchanging soul has access to the unchanging God (Ἀτρεπτὸν Θεόν) . . . But what shows in the clearest light the firm steadfastness of the man of worth is the oracle communicated to the all-wise Moses which runs thus: 'But as for thee stand thou here by Me' (Deut 5:31). This oracle proves two things, one that the Existent Being who moves and turns all else is Himself exempt from movement and turning; and secondly that he makes the worthy man sharer of his own nature, which is repose (ἡσυχίας);" ibid. 29: ὅτι θεός μὲν ἱδαν ἡσυχία καὶ στάσις. Cf. Cher. 19; Somn. 1.158, 2.219: "to be unswerving and stable belongs only to God and to such as are the friends of God" (for the last phrase see Plato, Tim. 53D: ὃς ἂν ἐκείνῳ φίλος ἦ); Virt. 32; Legat. 113; Conf. 130-32; Fug. 174; Abr. 27; Ebr. 100, 76; Saor. 8; Flac. 135. For the earliest application of the term εὐσταθεία to the human soul, see Democritus, D-K B. 191: αἰ δὲ ἐν μεγάλων διαστημάτων κινοῦμαι τῶν ψυχῶν οὔτε εὐσταθείς εἰσίν οὔτε εἴσθιμοι. Cf. also Epicurus, fr. 11 (Bailey); Epict. 1.29; SVF 3.280, 264; Muson. Ruf., fr. 38; Ps.-Aristeas 261 (ψυχής εὐσταθεία); Aristobulus, FPG 224; Wisd. 8:16: προσαναπάσχομαι αὐτῇ (sc. Sophia); Corp.Her. 13.20: θεολū τῇ σῇ ἀναπάσχομαι; Excerpt. ex Theod. 63.1; Gosp. of Philip 119.13-15;

στάσις. Stability or στάσις is one of the five categories (the μέγιστα γένη of the *Sophist*) applied by Plotinus to the Intellectual Principle. For ἀκλινής cf. Plato, *Phaed.* 109A; *Aet.* 116. The adv. ἀκλινῶς appears to be first attested in Philo. Stability, as opposed to regular, eternal motion, is the characteristic which Numenius discerns in his First God or Father, as opposed to the Second or Demiurge (fr. 15 Des Places).


50 ὁ περισσὸς τῷ φος, ἐπίκλησιν Ἰοθόρ. In two other places Philo explains the name Jethro, Ἰοθόρ in Greek, by περισσὸς: *Mut.* 103; *Agr.* 43. "Amir pointed out," writes Rokeah, "that in all other cases Philo uses the Attic form περιττός. Moreover in the same sentences, after using the form περισσὸς, he reverts to the Attic style and uses περιττός in his own syntactical construction. He does this also when he gives the meaning of the Hebrew without stating that it is a translation (*Saor.* 50). Amir argued that this interchange of dialects in a writer who took pains to write in a pure style can only be explained on the assumption that there was in front of Philo, in writing, the form περισσὸς as a translation of Ἰοθόρ, and that, as Philo wrote, he did not think himself privileged to change it. Amir added that he did not dare say whether this was a bare list of biblical names and their Greek equivalents, or a literary essay which contained etymological explanations. In any case, it is difficult to suppose that this document contained only the explanation of the name Jethro, and not also explanations of other names that Philo needed. Therefore, said Amir, whoever wishes to attribute to Philo a knowledge of the original language of the Bible will no longer be able to make use of Philo's explanations of Hebrew names as evidence. Amir omitted a third
example of translation of a sort by Philo, where he therefore had 'Ιοσθον-περισσος, i.e., our passage. Now three cases of περισσος as over against about seventy cases of πετιτος is very telling, even if there were no strict distinction between the Attic and the koine as argued by H. D. Mantel. Indeed, I cannot see any other satisfactory explanation of this phenomenon than the above suggested. In fact we have at our disposal part of this compilation in the Greek onomastica, the Oxyrhynchus papyrus, and Hieronymus' Onomasticum (Ox. AB 15 reads Ιεσθο περισσος). With their help we can solve almost all the problems that the Philonian etymologies pose." (David Rokeah, "A New Onomasticon Fragment from Oxyrhynchus and Philo's Etymologies," *JThS* N.S. 19 [1968] 76-77; Y. Amir, "Explanation of Hebrew Names in Philo," *Tarbiz* 31 [1962-63] 98-99 [Heb.]; Y. Kohen-Yashar, "Did Philo of Alexandria know Hebrew?", *Tarbiz* 34 [1964-65] 337-45. [Heb.])

There is no need, however, to say with Amir that Philo did not "think himself privileged" to change πετιτος into πετιτοτος. What is clear is that Philo did not bother to change it, and this is sufficient to establish Amir's basic point.

οἷν ὁρεσθη . . . καὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡς καρτοὺς ἔχουσαν προαίρεσιν. Cf. Deus 23; Conf. 30, 32; Mut. 87, 183; Somn. 2.220, 227; Abr. 170; Prob. 29. ὁρεσθης apparently first extant in Philo (also common in later Platonism). κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡς καρτοὺς ἔχουσαν is a basic Platonic phrase, e.g. Phaedo 78D. The use of προαίρεσιν to mean something like "character" is common in later Stoicism, particularly Epictetus (Diss. 1.8.16, 1.29.1, 2.10.25, etc.; cf. J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* 228-31), but can be discerned also in Philo, e.g. Leg. 230; Cont. 2; Deus 102, 114 (π. Βλου).

51 οἷν ἐν εἰρήνῃ συνεχὴ πόλεμον ἀνδρῶν. Cf. Conf. 46:

"For all the deeds of war are done in peace. Men plunder, rob, kidnap, spoil, sack, outrage, maltreat, violate, dishonor and commit murder sometimes by treachery, or if they be stronger without disguise." This war-in-peace antithesis was a common theme in the Cynic-Stoic diatribe literature of the first century C.E. Cf. Ps.-Heraclit. Ep. 7: "In peace you make war with words; in war you deliberate with iron . . . Give me an opportunity for laughter in peacetime, when you do not do battle in the lawcourts with weapons on your tongues, after committing frauds, seducing women, poisoning friends, spoiling temples,
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tòν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς... βαρύν χειμῶνα. For image of storm in soul, cf. Congr. 60 (βαρύν χειμῶνα).

52 ὁ ἄρχιερεὺς λόγος. The equation of the High Priest with the Logos is a common one in Philo (cf. Fug. 108 ff.; Mig. 102; Somn. 1.215), but here it plainly cannot be the Logos of God which only attains union with God once a year; it must refer simply to human reason, but it is a human reason which is able to function only rarely on a level of reflection without words (λόγος ἐνδιάθετος).


ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ἀδιαίρετον ἴσοτατα μονάδα. Cf. Deus 83-84: μονάδας μὲν οὖν ἄκρατος ὁ θεὸς λαλεῖ. Mention of the dyad, though ostensibly only referring to the duality of speaker and hearer produced by utterance, also has reference to the dyadic aspect of the Logos in the universe, and of Sophia. Some Neo-pythagorean influence is manifest here.

53 γυμνῆς τῇ διανοίᾳ. Cf. LA 2.59-60; Cher. 31; Sacr. 84; Ebr. 34; Mig. 90, 192; Mut. 199; Somn. 1.43; Abr. 236; Spec. 1.63, 4.71; Prob. 43. The image of stripping goes back to some extent to the myth of the Gorgias 523A ff. Cf. Plot. 1.6.7.5-7; Proclus, Comment. on Alcib. 138.16-18, p. 63, Westerink; Excerp. ex Theodoto 27; Emped. B.127: σαρκῶν ἄλλογνότι περιστέλλουσα χιτῶνι; Plato, Phaed. 87E. It is also common in Gnostic texts. In the Poimandres, for example, "the ascent of the knower's soul after death is described as a series of progressive subtractions which leave the 'naked' true self free to enter the divine realm
Commentary. Gig. 19-57

and to become one again with God (cf. Plot. 1.6.7). Similarly, the Mysteries of Mithras had for their initiates the ceremonial of passing through seven gates arranged in ascending steps representing the seven planets (the so-called κλίμαξ ἑπτάπυλος, Orig. C.Cels. 6.22); in those of Isis we find a successive putting on and off of seven (or twelve) garments or animal disguises" (H. Jonas, The Gnostic Religion [2nd ed. Boston 1963] 166. See also W. Bousset, Die Himmelreise der Seele [Darmstadt 1960]; Dodds, Proclus 307; Rist, Plotinus 188-91; P. Wendland, "Das Gewand der Eitelheit," Hermes 51 [1916] 481-85; Dodds, Pagan and Christian 94-95).

54 εἰς τὸν γυνώμον. A reference to Exodus 20:21; cf. Post. 14; Mut. 7; Mos. 1.158; εἰς τὸν γυνώμον . . . εἰσελθειν λέγε- 

tαι, τουτέστιν εἰς τὴν ἄξιοθ καὶ ἀδιατον καὶ ἀσώματον τῶν ὁλων 

παραδείγματικήν οὐσίαν. Clement borrows from Philo, e.g. Strom. 2.6.1. For the use of this image in Gregory of Nyssa, see J. Daniélou, "Mystique de la Ténèbre chez Grégoire de Nyssse," Dict. de la spiritualité, ed. M. Viller (Paris 1932 ff.) 1872-85.

55 Εἰρωφάντις ὑπόλιον. Philo uses this designation for 
Moses frequently. See LA 3. 173; Sacr. 94; Post. 16, 164, 173; 
Cher. 49 (of Jeremiah); Deus 156; etc. On the whole question of the correct evaluation of mystery imagery in Philo, see 

55 The rabbis had already connected this verse with Moses. 
BT Ἱλίν 139b: "Where is Moses indicated in the Torah (i.e., 
where is his coming foretold)? In the verse 'Beshagam hu basar' 
(the numerical value of 'beshagam' is equivalent to the name 
'Mosheh.' Moreover this verse adds, 'Therefore shall his days 
be 120 years, which corresponds with the years of the life of 
Moses')." Cf. BR 26.6, T-A 253; Midrash Tannaim, Deut. 34.7. 
Cf. 2 Baruch 17.1-4: "With the Most High account is not taken 
of much time nor of a few years. For which it profit Adam 
that he lived 930 years, and transgressed that which he was 
commanded . . . Or wherein did Moses suffer loss in that he lived 
only 120 years, and, inasmuch as he was subject to Him who 
formed him, brought the law to the seed of Jacob, and lighted 
a lamp for the nation of Israel?" A detailed arithmological 
discussion is given by Philo at QG 1.91.
56 τὰ ὀμόνυμα. See Arist. Cat. 1.11. Two things are homonymous, according to Aristotle, if the same name applies to both but not in the same sense. Thus, for example, both a man and a picture are animals (ζῷον had come to be used also of pictures or other artistic representations, whether of animals or not). Cf. Plant. 150 ff.; frag. from QE, R. Marcus' Supplement to Philo II (LCL) no. 5, p. 259.

διέμενον εἰς ὁμίλη. Cf. Praem. 63: ἄμα τῇ γενέσει κυο-φορεῖ διέμενα ἡ ψυχή, καίδον . . . καὶ ἀγαθὸν. Colson and Whittaker have suggested that we have here an echo of Socrates' remark concerning pleasure and pain to the effect that if a man "pursues the one and captures it, he is generally obliged to take the other also, as if the two were joined together in one head" (Plato, Phaed. 60B); cf. Heraclit. B.111. Moses suggests that Philo is here alluding to the births of Cain and Abel which are allegorized at the beginning of Sacr. There are two opposite views of life, says Philo, one which ascribes all things to man's own mind, the other which follows God. The first is figured by Cain, the other by Abel. "Now both these views lie in the womb of the single soul. But when they are brought to birth they must needs be separated." Neither of these analogies is persuasive. It is probable that Philo's point is a more general one.

57 τὸν ἐκ ἀφρωβὴ λόγον. This corresponds to nothing in Philo's existing Life of Moses, so that it seems to be a promise unfulfilled. If it refers to an intention connected with the Life of Moses, this would be interesting for the chronology of his writings.
Commentary. *Gig.* 58-67

### IV

*Gig.* 58-67

Commentary on Gen 6:4: οἱ δὲ γῆς ἀντές ἔπι τῆς γῆς ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις ἔκειναις.

### A. General Comments

This section is concerned with the contrast between the "giants" of Gen 6:4, denominated by Philo "the Men of Earth," and "the Men of God," a class of whom Moses is the paradigm case, but which includes "priests and prophets," and all those who have "risen above the whole universe of the senses and transferred themselves to the intelligible world" (61). The doctrine here is largely based on the Stoic theory of the Sage, though with the important difference that Philo's sage transcends the material world in the precise Platonic sense of partaking of a separate incorporeal and truly real realm of being, a process which is in contrast to the Stoic conception of the active rational divine nature as immanent within the physical universe, though logically transcending it.

We have also in this section a most interesting threefold distinction (60-61) between the Men of Earth, the Men of Heaven, and the Men of God. (There is no comparable distinction in the parallel passage of the Questions and Answers: *QG* 1.92.) It is the middle category here that requires comment, and the idea of a threefold distinction. A simple antithesis between the sensual and the godly is trite enough, derivable from, among other sources, Plato *Sophist* 246A ff. (where, however, the contrast is between physical rather than ethical doctrines), but the antecedents of this schema are obscure (see comment on 60).

Once again, we may note Philo's adducing of parallel passages. In 62, he brings in Abraham as the prime example of the mind which progresses from a "Chaldaean" or intracosmic state of mind to a higher, transcendent one. This leads him to quote Gen 17:1: ἔγὼ εἰμὶ ὁ θεὸς σου· εὑρέστηκα ἐναντίον ἐμοῦ, καὶ γῆν ἀμεμπτος, in connection with Abraham's change of name (63). In 65 he transfers his attention to the γῆς παῖδες, which leads him first to quote Gen 2:24: ἐγένετο γὰρ οἱ δύο οίς ἐς ὀδὸν μᾶν, and then to bring in Nimrod (Gen 10:8), as a prime example of a giant.
58 'οι άε γίγαντες . . .' According to BR 26.7, T-A 254, the "nefilim" were so called "because they caused the world to fall (Heb. nfl), and fell from the world, and filled the world with abortions through their sexual promiscuity."


Philosophical or real (φυσικός) meaning of the Torah, they should not "fall victim to mythological and human conceptions" (FPG 217, 22-27). Cf. Fug. 130; Mig. 128; Op. 144.

59 παρά . . . ἐξήλασεν. Moses, like Plato, is a stern censor of the arts. Philo is thinking of the Second Commandment (Exod 20:3). Cf. Ebr. 109; Decal. 66, 156; Spec. 1.28-29; Her. 169; Wisd. 14:18-21; Cic. ND 1.42: ipsa suavitate nocuerunt (of the poets); ib. 77 (these are Epicurean arguments); Sen. Ep. 88.18: "For I do not consent to admit painting into the list of liberal arts, any more than sculpture, marble-working and other helps toward luxury" (unlike Seneca, however, Philo condemns sculpture and painting as aids to myth-fabrication, not luxury); Clem. Alex. Protr. 4: "In Rome, the historian Varro says that in ancient times the xoanon of Mars--the idol by which he was worshiped--was a spear, artists not having yet applied themselves to this specious pernicious art; but when art flourished, error increased." See J. Gutmann, "The Second Commandment and the Image in Judaism," No Graven Images (New York 1971) 12-14: "Philo's strictures bore little relation to the Temple cult, which in its own day was known far and wide for its artistically wrought appurtenances, but were expressed in terms of how one might best attain the goals established by a philosophic system . . . His statements cannot be used to establish an antagonism toward images on the part of Judaism; nor do they indicate a strict enforcement of the second commandment during the Hellenistic period." There is an obvious parallel here to Plato's "driving out" of the poets in Republic III. The talk of Moses' πολιτεία is also significant.
60  οΥ τον ΓΗΣ... ΓΗΙΩΣ is taken etymologically as ΓΗΣΕΥΣ. This threefold division of classes is most interesting. There is a possible parallel to Philo's triadic distinction of Men of Earth, Men of Heaven and Men of God in Plato's enumeration of three classes of men at Rep. 9.581C: the philosopher or lover of wisdom, the lover of victory, and the lover of gain (cf. Phaedo 68BC); and in Aristotle's distinction of three types of life in the Nicomachean Ethics (1.3, 1095b17 ff.), the Life of Enjoyment, the Life of Action, and the Life of Contemplation. (Cf. EE 1215a25; GG 4.47; Fug. 36; Decal. 100-101. See Wolfson, Philo 2.262-66.) This doctrine of the three lives may even be seen as going back to Pythagoras, who is said to have compared human life to a festival celebrated with magnificent games, at which three classes of men appear: those who come to compete, those who come to buy and sell, and those who come to contemplate the spectacle (Cic. Tusq. 5.3.8; cf. Iambi. VP 58.). For a similar Stoic distinction of lives, see D.L. 7.130; Plut. Mor. 8A; Sen. De Otio 7.1. A detailed treatment of this theme may be found in R. Joly, "Le Thème philosophique des genres de vie dans l'antiquité classique," Académie Royale de Belgique, Mémoires, Classe des Lettres et des Sciences Morales et Politiques, 51 (Brussels, 1956).

On the other hand, this threefold distinction, in the particular form Philo gives it, seems to prefigure to some extent the later Christian and Gnostic distinction between σαρκικός (or χοικός) ψυχικός, and πνευματικός (see Iren. I.1.14; Eox. ex Theod. 54.1). The Men of Earth, as one would expect, are devoted to pleasure and material things. The Men of Heaven are very much like the ψυχικός of later systems, intellectuals (φιλοσόφοις) and skilled craftsmen, but lacking the light of higher wisdom (they are portrayed here, however, as acting not according to ψυχή but to νοῦς.) They are the masters of τα ἐνεκύκλια, developing their νοῦς and contemplating the νοῦτα—whatever Philo means by that in the present context.

τὸ γὰρ οὐράνιον τῶν ἑκμεν ὤ νοῦς. By itself this is a thoroughly Stoic remark.


γυμνάζων καὶ συγκροτών. Cf. Fug. 5; Mut. 85; Somn. 2.263. (Another frequent collocation is ἀλείφω καὶ συγκροτεῖω: Legat. 39, 178; Somn. 1.251.)
The actual phrase Philo may derive from LXX. Cf. Deut 33:1. Among the men of God Philo here classes priests and prophets, but plainly the class is larger, including, in Platonic terms, ol φιλοσοφοῦντες ὥρθως. These rise above purely human, or even cosmic, wisdom, and disdain even the ideal of becoming κοσμοποιητής (a dig here at the Stoics—cf. D.L. 7.87—we may note, however, that elsewhere κοσμοποιητής is a term of commendation for Philo, e.g., Op. 3, 142; Spec. 2.45).

φαίνεται δὲ αἰσθητῶν πάν ὑπερκύμνης. There is a conscious reminiscence here of the Phaedrus myth (esp. 249C: ἀναγνώσα ἔλις τὸ δὲ ὑντως). Philo also uses the term noētos kosmos, of which he is actually the first extant user (Op. 16, 25; Mos. 2.127; Deus 31; etc.), though the concept may be regarded as present in the noētos topos of the Phaedrus, as well as implied in the Paradigm of the Timaeus. The idea is further developed, by way of contrast with the Stoic concept, in the phrase ἀσθάρτων καὶ ἀσωμάτων ἱερῶν πολιτεία. For the realm of Ideas as the home of truly philosophic souls, cf. Her. 280.

For Philo, Abraham is a paradigm of conversion--specifically from the state of an οὐράνιος, a cosmos-bound intellectual, who (coming as he does from Chaldaea) is one of those who worship the heavenly bodies (τὰ μετέωρα) rather than their Creator—a reference here surely to the Stoics, and in particular to the heliolatrous tendencies developed a generation or so before Philo by Posidonius (F 17, 20, Kidd). (Cf. Sandbach, The Stoics [London 1975] 72-75.) For Abraham's practice of astrology, see G. Vermes, Scripture and Tradition in Judaism (Leiden 1973) 76-83.

μετάφορος is slightly post-Classical in prose (first in Theophrastus Ign. 3), but its technical use here, as opposed to αἰθέριος, to signify the intermediate realm of the upper air, is only found later, in Achilles In Aratium 32, probably deriving from Posidonius. That Philo knows this usage is made plain by his employment of it elsewhere (Plant. 3).

'Αβράμ γάρ ἐρυμνευθές πατὴρ ἐστὶ μετάφωρος. Hebrew: 'אֵּבְרָם "father," and רָּם = "lofty." Cf. Cher. 7; Mut. 66, 69-76; Abr. 81-84; LA 3.83-84, where "Abram" is given a favorable interpretation.
Commentary. Gig. 58-67

64 καλεῖται γὰρ πατὴρ ἐκλεκτός ἡγοῦσι. According to A. Hanson, this derivation is apparently from the three Hebrew words: ָב, בָּה, and הָד or הָד. In the LXX בָּה and בָּדּ are occasionally rendered by ἐκλεκτός, and ἡγεῖν is a frequent translation of הָד and הָד (JTS N.S. 18 [1967] 128-39). Another possibility is that it derives from ʼab and raʼam. See E. Stein, Exegese des Philo aus Alexandria (Giessen 1929) 58.

65 οὐ δὲ γῆς πᾶσες. The γῆς of 6:4 seem here to be interpreted in the light of the "earth-born" of Sophist 246A ff.

66 τὸ ἁμο. The ἁμο of Gig. is very frequent in LXX for Heb. ָב and ָד.
etc. Its remote origin, presumably lies in the story told of himself by Diogenes the Cynic, as to why he was expelled from his native city (D.L. 6.20).

The rabbis deduced from Gen 10:9 that Nimrod knew his Master and intentionally rebelled (marad) against him (Sifra, Beḥuqqotay 2.2). Cf. BT Pesah 94b (Nimrod caused the whole world to rebel [himrid] against God); Ps-Jonath., ad loc. The association of Nimrod with rebellion against God may be rooted in the fact that Gen 10:8 says of him "he was the first man of power (gibbor) on earth," which in the LXX is translated, "he began to be a giant (gigas) upon the earth." Since the rebellious nefilim were also designated as gibborim (translated as gigantes in LXX) (Gen 6:4), Nimrod was placed in their bad company. Ps-Eupolemus, who probably wrote in Palestine in the first half of the first century B.C.E., had already identified Nimrod with Bel and Kronos, considering him as the only one of the "giants" to have been rescued from the great Flood, after which he founded Babylon and built the famous Tower (according to BT A.2. 53b, he built the Tower for idol worship). (FGH 724, F 1 and 2. Ps-Eupolemus thus combined Gen 6:4 and 10:8, LXX with the account of Berossus about the foundation of Babylon by the creator God Bel and the myth of the revolt of the Titans in Hesiod. Philo, at Conf. 2, also assimilates the building of the Tower to the Greek legend of the Aloadae in Od. 3.310 ff. See Freudenthal, Hell.St. 35-82; Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism 1.89; Wacholder, Eupolemus 104-5; Ginzberg, Legends 1.177, 5.198-204.) In QG 2.82, Philo interprets Nimrod to mean "Ethiopian." Marcus says that he is confusing the etymology of Nimrod with that of his father Cush, but according to BR 41.4, T-A 408, Cush is only another name for Nimrod. Ginzberg suggests that Philo is connecting Nimrod with nmr "spotted." Moreover, Philo, following Jewish tradition, condemns Nimrod's hunting as something that is "as far removed as possible from the rational nature," for "he who is among beasts seeks to equal the bestial habits of animals through evil passions"; cf. Virt. 140. (The rabbis interpreted Gen 10:9, "he was a mighty hunter," to mean that Nimrod caught people through their own mouths [BR 37.2, T-A 345].)
Commentary. *Deus* 1-19

τῇ πανάθλῃ ψυχῇ. Πανάθλιος, a poetic word, is found in all the Attic Tragedians. Cf. *Det.* 109; *Post.* 53; *Congr.* 159.

μετάθεσις δὲ καλεῖται Βαβυλῶν. Gen 11:9 connects Babylon with Heb. *balal* "confound" (a play on *Babel*).

κατὰ τὸν ἱερώτατον Μωυσῆα δὲ ἡ μὲν φαῦλος . . . . Moses seems here to be adding to the usual Stoic paradoxes about the *phaulos* and the *spoudaios*.

τοσάοτα . . . εἰρημότες. Common formula of transition also in Neoplatonic commentaries. Here we see the essential unity, or continuity, of these two treatises.

67

Commentary on Gen 6:4: καὶ μετ’ ἐκεῖνο, ὡς ἄν εἰσεπρέποντο οἱ ἄγγελοι τοῦ θεοῦ πρὸς τὰς θυγατέρας τῶν ἄνθρωπων, καὶ ἐγέννων αὐτοῖς.

Textual variants: oἱ οὐοὶ τοῦ θεοῦ . . . καὶ ἐγέννωσαν αὐτοῖς, LXX; αὐτοῖς mss. Philon., exc. A. (Philo's ἐγέννων is a "correction," rather than a variant.) New JPS translation reads: "It was in those days, and later, that the Nephilim appeared on earth—after the divine beings had consorted with the daughters of man, who bore them sons." The Hebrew is ambiguous; *wayyāldū lahem* might mean either "they (the Giants) begot for themselves" or "they (the daughters of men) generated for them (the Giants)." It is quite possible that Philo's LXX text actually read αὐτοῖς, taking the latter interpretation, but it is clear that he understands αὐτοῖς, something that it would be quite easy for him to do, since the rough breathing was not operative by his time, and may not even have been written in the manuscript. It is also noteworthy that Philo is either ignorant of the last phrase of 6:4: ἐκεῖνοι ἦσαν . . . oἱ ὄνομαστοί, or deliberately ignores it. This is a troublesome statement for his interpretation, and would surely have deserved comment.
This whole first section (§§1-19) follows on directly from De Gigantibus, being still concerned with "the sons of god" and their commerce with "the daughters of men." The theme of God's immutability is not broached until §20, making it plain that for Philo there is no sharp break between the two treatises. It is, indeed, not quite clear why the break is made here.

The Hebrew of Gen 6:4 reads awkwardly. It is unclear whether the divine beings continued to consort with the daughters of men even afterwards, or whether the union with the daughters of men was a one-time occurrence, as a result of which were born the giants, who continued to beget after their own kind. The rabbis understood the vague phrase "and also afterward" to signify that "the latter did not learn from the former, the generation of the Flood did not learn a moral lesson from the generation of Enos, nor did the generation of the Tower (lit. "of Division") learn from the generation of the Flood" (BR 26.4, T-A 254). Philo, as is often the case, takes advantage of the lack of clarity in the verse and explains the phrase "and also afterward" as referring to the spiritual fact that it is only after the departure of the divine spirit from man, when the light of wisdom ceases to illumine the soul, that the forces of darkness and falsehood take over, and, mating with the emasculated passions, beget offspring not for God but for themselves, thus producing vices instead of virtues. The δύγγελοι are plainly here not evil spirits of any sort, but represent the irrational impulses, which "mate" with the passions to produce evil actions. (At QG 1.92, the angels are not treated as blameworthy, but the exegesis takes quite a different turn.)

"Begetting for oneself" is the central theme of the passage, interpreted as φιλαυτία, "self-love" (18). The principal axis of development is an opposition between "begetting for God," i.e. manifesting the virtues. Philo proceeds to introduce the perfect Abraham as the paradigm of those who beget for God, inasmuch as he had offered up Isaac, or self-learned wisdom, as a thank-offering to the deity, which signifies either that he had abandoned mortal concerns in his single-minded devotion to the divine, or that he wishes to give a firm basis to his knowledge of the sense-world. Here we are again confronted with one of Philo's central religious themes, namely, that it is due to God's singular gift of grace that man is bidden to render
Him what is His own, since it is in this way that man is enabled to purify his soul.

This leads Philo to an exegesis of 1 Samuel 1:11 (5-7) where we are presented with Hannah, who is interpreted as "the gift of divine wisdom." Hannah is a soul which receives the logos of God, and produces offspring which she dedicates to God, i.e., a virtuous disposition. Philo's interpretation of the LXX δίσωμί σοι αὐτὸν δοτόν, as "I give him (back) to you as something given (to me)," allows him, by adducing Num 28:2, to emphasise the point that the truly virtuous soul knows that all things are from God, and so on offering things to Him one is only returning to Him what is His own. Cf. Her. 124.

He next embarks on a digression, in diatribe style, contrasting men's concern with bodily purity when entering temples, with their indifference to spiritual impurity in the same circumstances (8-9). He then turns from this to an exegesis of Hannah's utterance, in the course of her psalm, at I Sam 2:5: "The barren has borne seven, but she who has many children has languished" in which he returns to one of his favorite numerical principles, the identity of the hebdomad with the monad, and so back to his starting-point, the rejection of those who are characterised by self-love and a self-centered cosmic perspective, and therefore beget only for themselves (16-19). Of these the type is Onan (Gen 38:9), who meets with (spiritual) death through recognising no loyalty except to himself. Onan, we may note, is depicted as sinning not only against piety, but against philanthropy, through neglecting his duties to his relations and to the community.

B. Detailed Commentary


ὀρώτατον ἄχος. See comment. on Gig. 31.

δύσεργος. First used in Plb. 28.8.3 in the sense of "hard to effect," "difficult."
37: "For a beam purer than ether and incorporeal suddenly shone upon him and revealed the conceptual world ruled by its charioteer." The phrase ἀυγὴ καθαρὰ derives from the striking passage, Phaedr. 250BC. Philo uses the phrase repeatedly. Cf. Deus 29 and note.

ψευδαγγελοῦντων. Only found here. (Ψευδάγγελος appears in Il. 15.159.)

περιμοραντήρων. Cf. Cher. 96: ἔξω περιμοραντήρων ἀπελαύνεται, βοῶσι ὑμῖν ἐόμενον προσαχθήναι. For Philo's use of temple and mystery imagery, see Intro. p. 150.

ἀμυδρόδεν. ἀμυδρόδεν is first attested in Philo (later in Proclus and Olympiodorus). Cf. Deus 78; Praem. 28. Reminiscence of ὅτι ἀμυδρόν ὄργανον in Phaedr. 250B.

οἱ τοῦ σκότους ἑταίροι. Analogous expressions at LA 3.22; Somn. 2.64, 205; Deus 143; etc.


ἐπικιλασθῇ. ἐπικιλάζω in the metaphorical sense of "conceal," "obscure," first attested in Philo. Cf. LA 2.30, 58, 3.7; Gig. 2; Deus 103; etc. Cf. συσκιάζεται, Deus 30.

κατεαγόμενοι καὶ τεθηλυμένοις. Cf. Gig. 4: καὶ κατεαγόμενοι καὶ τεθηλυμένοι.

4 ὀλόκληρον ἄρετα. ἄνάρμοστοι κακίαι. ὀλόκληρος is used at Phaedr. 250C. ἄναρμοστος is also a Platonic word associated with vice in the soul, Gorg. 482B; Phaedo 93C; cf. Phaedo 93B6: ἥ μὲν κακία ἀναρμοστία. Note that this whole sentence is a commentary, in chiastic form, on the previous clause, καὶ γεννώσαι εὐαυτοῖς, οὕτω θεῷ.

μάθε ὅτι. ὁ διάνοια. For Philo's use of rhetorical apostrophe, see Intro. p. 141. This is probably best understood, however, as directed, not to Philo's own mind, but to his audience.

tὸ ἄγαπητὸν καὶ μόνον. (Ἐγγονον). Cf. Ebr. 30; Abr. 196, 168; Mos. 1.13.
Commentary. Deus 1-19

αύτομαθὸς σοφίας. For Isaac as αύτομαθης, cf. Socr. 6; Det. 30; Post. 78; Plant. 168; Ebr. 60, 94; Sob. 65; Conf. 74, 81; Mig. 29 ff., 101, 125, 140, 166-67; Congr. 34-38, 111; Fug. 166; Mut. 1, 12, 88, 137, 255, 263; Somn. 1.68, 160, 168 ff., 194, 2.10; Praem. 27, 59.

συμποδίσιας. In fact, Abraham is here "binding his own feet" (Isaac being an aspect of himself), either, as Philo says, as an indication that he wishes to have no more to do with mortal things, or that he recognises the instability of the realm of generation. In the one case, presumably, he is "tying up" his συμποδίσιας σοφία; in the second case he is "tying it down."

παρόσων. παρόσων with indic. for ὅς with participle is post-Classical. Cf. Gig. 9 (where, however, δῆτι with indic. seems the more exact equivalent); and Sextus, Math. 7.419.

ἀνίδροτον. Classical, but not used metaphorically before Philo. Cf. Gig. 67; Ebr. 170; Congr. 58; Abru. 85; Mos. 1.196; Virt. 40; etc. For the collocation ἀνίδροτον καὶ ἀστατον, cf. Det. 12; Post. 22; Somn. 1.156. For ἄβδαις καὶ ἀνίδροτος, cf. Op. 156; Abru. 84; Spec. 1.29, 4.88, 139, 153. (Ἀστατος is a word favored by Epicureans, cf. Epicur. Ep. 3, p. 65 U.; Diog. Oen. 18.)


μαθητικης. Feminine form found only here. Use of terms μαθητικης καὶ διδαχοχος borrowed from terminology of succession in philosophical schools.

Ἀννα...χριστος αυτης. Ἱαννᾶ = ἠινήνᾶ. Cf. Ebr. 145 ff.; Mut. 143 ff.; Somn. 1.254. χριστος can have the sense of "free gift."

τελεσφόρος...ωδις. A development on 1 Sam 1:20: καὶ ἐγενήθη τῷ καιρῷ τῶν ἡμερῶν καὶ ἔτεκεν υἱόν. τελεσφόρος is used in later Greek for "bearing perfect offspring." Artem. 1.16; Dsc. Eup. 2.97, but Philo may also not be oblivious to the fact that τελεσφόρος (like καιρός) is a Pythagorean term for the number "seven" (cf. Op. 102), which as it turns out (11), Samuel represents. [Such an interpretation seems arbitrary, V.N.]

Ἐμουῦλ...τεταγμένος Θεῷ. Cf. Somn. 1.254; Mig. 196; Ebr. 144. Samuel is here derived from ὅμ, ὅμ = set, appoint + Ἐλ.
μὴ δὲν Ἰδοὺν εὐαγγελίου ἀγάπην. А basic motif in Philo. Cf. LA 3.209, 1.82; Her. 85, 103-8, 111; Ebr. 106-7; Det. 56: "To God men can bring nothing except a disposition full of love to their Master." Cf. Epict. 1.16.15-21. See Jean Laporte, La doctrine eucharistique chez Philon d'Alexandrie (Paris 1972). Laporte shows that Philo interpreted the whole liturgical practice of Judaism eucharistically. A parallel to the doctrine may be found in Plutarch, Consol. ad Apoll. 116AB: all good things are only loaned to us by the Gods, so that we should not take it ill when they ask for them back (Euripides, Phoen. 555-56 is quoted in this connection). As a biblical parallel cf. Job 1:21.

6 "δίδωμι σοι αὐτὸν δοτόν". Philo is following the LXX on I Sam 1:11, which may either be translating a Hebrew text different from ours, i.e., ἵνα τὴν λα'αδονοῦ mättānā (although mättānā is elsewhere rendered in the LXX as δῶμα, e.g., Ez 46:17), or else represents a slight expansion of the Hebrew text as we have it.

τὸν δεδομένον δίδωμι. Cf. I Chr 29:14: "For all things come from thee, and of thy own have we given thee." Cf. LAB 32:2: "Lo, now my son, I offer thee for a burnt offering and deliver thee unto his hands who gave thee unto me."

tὰ δόρα . . . δόματα . . . καρπώματα. Cf. LA 3. 196, and Cher. 84, where a distinction is in fact made between these three terms. Here they are taken as equivalents, since the idea is that one is offering back to God his own gifts.

7 Χρησίμος. In prose, only Hellenistic. Not attested before Philo in this sense. Cf. Deus 37.

7-8 εὐχαριστητικός. Adverb only here. The adjective εὐχαριστητικός is found thrice in Philo and nowhere else: Sacr. 74; Ebr. 94, 105. τιμητικός also, in this sense, only found in Philo. Adjective not before Jos. Ant. 19.8 and Plutarch Consol. ad Apoll. 120A.

καθαρυσμούς ἀνιμημάτων ἐκνευρισμοὺς τὰ καταραμπαίνοντα τὸν βίον . . . δικὸν μὴ πρότερον λοιπάμενος ψαλίδθηται τὸ σῶμα, εὕχεσθαι . . . ἐπιχειρεῖν ἐτί κεκαλλιδωμένη καὶ πεσωμένη διά-

νοίας. We have here a conceit and a family of words of which Philo is particularly fond. Cf. Her. 112-13: ὡς καθαρυσμόθεν εἰκνευρισμοὺς . . . τὰ καταραμπαίνοντα ἡμῶν τὸν βίον . . .
Commentary. Deus 1-19

Cher. 94-97: τὰ μὲν οὐκότα λουτροφὲς καὶ καθαροῖς ἀπορρύπτονται, τὰ δὲ ζωικὲς ἐκνιψασθαί πάθη, οἷς καταρρυπάνεται ὁ βίος, οὗτε βούλονται... ἀνελκώτως εἴσθητας ἀμελεχμένοι διάνοιαν δὲ κεκηλιδωμένην...; Fug. 41; Mut. 49, 124.

8 εἰς τὰ λεγόμενα ἡ ἔκχεινα βασιλεύειν. See Maim. M.T., Laws of Temple Entry, chs. 3-5. On the dialectical topos ἐκ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον, see Intro, p. 171.

κεκηλιδωμένη. Cf. Ecphebus, p. 80.17 Thesleff: καθὸ καὶ τῶς ἀνισιτῶς τόπως ἐκλίδωσάν τινες. (For ἀμελεχμένος, cf. Wisd. 4:9, 7:26; Apoc. Abr. 17, where "spotless" is one of God's attributes.)

ἀκάθαρτος ὄν. Cf. Spec. 1.283; Plant. 164; Her. 82; LA 1.62. Cf. Agr. 130, and the similar argumentation used by the rabbis in MBS, Epst-Mel.: 157; Tosef. B.Q. 7.6; Mek. Bakodesh 11, Lauterbach, 2.290. For an analogous use of the trope ἐκ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον, cf. Semajot 8.16, Higger: 165: "Similarly, it is written: Thou shalt build the altar of the Lord thy God of perfect stones (Deut. 27.6)—of stones that establish peace in the world. Let us reason a minori ad majus: If of stones that neither see, nor hear, nor speak, nor eat, nor drink, but because they establish peace between Israel and their Father in heaven, the Holy One, blessed be He, said, 'Let them be perfect before me'—in the case of students of Torah, who effect atonement for the world, how much more necessary is it that they be perfect before the Holy One, blessed be He." Cf. Spec. 1.89. See J. Neusner, A Life of Yohanan Ben Zakkai (Leiden 1970) 128-36; 24-42.


9 δωσκόλαμαρτος. First attested in Philo. Cf. Det. 144; Post. 75; Deus 183; Plant. 107; etc. Found, however, in a slightly different sense, in Soph. Ant. 1284, and Ar. Peace 1250.

ἐμπερικατοθύτα. Cf. LXX Lev 26:12; Det. 4; Post. 122.
Philosophical discussion of Hannah.

Commentary on I Sam 2:5: τεσσαρα ετεκεν επτα, ἡ δε πολλὴ ἐν τέκνων ἡσθένησε. (Textual variants: καὶ ἡ πολλὴ ἐν τέκνων ἡσθένησεν.)

Only here in Philo.

The identification of seven with both light and Logos was already made by Aristobulus: "God created the world and, because life is troublesome to all, gave us for rest the seventh day, which in reality (φωσιωδῆς) could also be called the prime source of light, in which all things are comprehended. The latter could also be transferred metaphorically to wisdom, for all light comes from her" (Fragm. Pseudepig. Graeca, ed. A. M. Denis [Leiden 1970] 224). See also N. Walter, Der Thoraausleger Aristobulos (Berlin 1964) 65 ff. For the rest of the soul in God, cf. Post. 28; Somm. 2.228; Fug. 174; LA 1.6; Philolaus, DK A.12.

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Commentary.  Deus 1-19

13 οὐκεῖπαν . . . οὐκεράν. Is this a piece of "creative etymology," or simply an instance of paronomasia? The former view gains support from the confusion that seems to have taken place, at least in later antiquity, between the two words, e.g. in mss of Eur. Andr. 711, where a scholiast on V notes that οὐκεῖπαν is "Attic" for οὐκεράς (meaning "barren," not "firm"). But cf. also οὐκεράς meaning "barren" in Arist. GA 773b27 ff.

For a similar exegesis in Philo based on this verbal connection, cf. Philo, LCL Supplement, II p. 273, line 9 (on Gen 26:32): *stabilitatem non sterilitatem*, presumably representing οὐκείπατος, oὐ οὐκεράτης. A passage in Plutarch's *Isis and Osiris* (366b) tends to confirm the possibility of such an etymological word-play. Here, Nephthys is described as being at first οὐκεῖρα after her marriage to Typhon. Plutarch wishes to interpret this as referring to τὸ παντελῶς τῆς γῆς ἀγωνόν καὶ ἀκατόν υπὸ οὐκερότητος, that is, the barrenness of the earth due to its sun-baked hardness. Wyttenbach's emendation οὐκερότητος is quite misguided. Admittedly, Plutarch is here using οὐκερότης to mean "hardness," whereas Philo, if our rendering is correct, is using it to mean "barrenness," but it is the connection between the two meanings that is the important factor. Philo elsewhere does recognise a "positive" meaning for οὐκεῖρος, in the sense of "barren, unreceptive, to vice." At Congr. 3, we find this stated as a startling paradox, yet true. Virtue (Sarah) is "barren" (ἔστείρωσα) as regards all that is bad, but shows herself a fruitful mother of the good (ἐστείρωσα). At Praem. 159, the soul is described as "many" (πολλῇ), full, that is, of passions and vices, which makes her feeble and sick. But when she has become "barren" (στειρωθέσαι), and ceases to produce these children, she is transformed into a pure virgin. Cf. also Mut. 143, where I Sam 2:5 is explicitly quoted, and explained in the same way as in the present passage. In none of these places, however, is any connection made between οὐκεῖρος and οὐκεράς. [For a persuasive argument against any etymological intention on Philo's part, however, see V. Nikiprowetzky, "Ἐπείρα, Επερά, Πολλῇ et l'exégèse de I Sam. 2:5 chez Philon d'Alexandrie," SILENO, Roma, 1979.]

Hannah is "barren" as regards the realm of Generation and particularly as regards Vice, but this involves firm establishment in the realm of Being and Virtue. For a similar contrast between sterility and fecundity, cf. Wisd. 3:13-15, where we are told that sterility, if pure, is redeemed by a spiritual
fertility; Sir. 16:3: "For better is one than a thousand, and to die childless than to have a presumptuous posterity." For other etymologizing by Philo, see Intro. p. 173.

14 τὴν δὲ πολλὴν ἁγθενεῖν ἐν τέκνοις. Cf. Praem. 159.
This word-order makes it plain that Philo has deliberately construed the LXX text to suit his allegorical purposes, by taking ἐν τέκνοις with ἡσαχήσει. While this makes no significant difference to the meaning, it is worth noting as another example of Philo's troubles in construing the "translatorese" of the LXX. It does, however, enable him to take πολλὴ by itself as meaning "multiple" or "multifarious," in a bad sense.

ἀφευδώς καὶ σφόδρα ἐναργῶς. One of Philo's favored ways of introducing an allegorical interpretation. Cf. σφόδρα ὀρθῶς καὶ προσημόθυτος, 16; Praem. 17: αἰνίττεται δὲ ἐναργῶς.

πολλά ὀσίνη τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀποσίας. Platonic-Pythagorean contrast of One and Many. The sensible and the flesh imply plurality. The soul diversifies itself into various potencies in the process of becoming linked to matter.

ἀμβλωθρίδια. In the sense of "abortive child" only in Philo (although frequent later in Patristic Greek). Cf. LA 1.76; Mig. 33: ἀμβλωθρίδια, ἠλιτώμηνα. Contrast here with τελεσφόρος ὀδίσι of 5, above.

βαρυνομενὴ καὶ πιεζομένη. See comment. to Gig. 31.


δοσι... ἐαυτοῖς... γεννῶσιν. Note how here, as well as with the ref. to Gen 38:9 in 16, αὐτῶν ἔνεκα in 17 and οἱ γεννῶντες αὐτοῖς in 19, Philo keeps recalling the lemma ἔγενσιν αὐτοῖς.

16 φιλαυτία. For bad sense, cf. UPZ 42.10 (II B.C.E.). Abraham's faith (πίστις) in God is paradigmatic for Philo of the "unswerving and firm assumption" that is attained when the mind has a vision of the First Cause, the truly Existent. The opposite of πίστις is called by Philo οἵτινς, τῶρος, κενή δόξα, ἀφφοσίμως, ἀλάζονεια, τὸ ὑπέραυνον, and φιλαυτία (Mut. 176; Spec. 1.10; Somm. 2.48-66, 162, 192; Her. 106; Mig. 147; Ebr. 111; Sob. 57). It consists in giving to the senses or to the thought
based on them that trust which should be bestowed on God alone. Cf. Sacr. 58; Post. 52, 180-81 (contains a long list of duties similar to the one in Deus 19); Her. 106-111; Congr. 130; Spec. 1.334-45, 4.131; Praem. 12.

ο ήγεμόν Αύναν. Cf. Post. 180, where Onan is similarly depicted as the type of φιλαυτία, with a very similar string of clauses.

17 μὴ γυνέων τιμής . . . ἐπιστρεφόμενοι. ἐπιστρεφόμενοι with genitive not in classical prose. Note the impressive sequence of eight parallel cola, one of them actually double (μὴ ἱόων μὴ κοινῶν).

ἐκφύλου. Late Greek prose. Cf. Strabo 4.4.5; Plut. Brut. 36; Caes. 69; Det. 61; Fug. 144; Abr. 137.

19 μὴ τὰ πάντα προσθήκην ἐαυτοῦ . . . νομίζοντα. Cf. Somn. 2.115-16; Prov. 2.84; M. Aurel. 9.39: "the part ought not to grumble at what is done in the interests of the whole"; 10.6: "as I am a part, I shall not be displeased with anything allotted me from the whole"; Epict. 2.5.25; Plato, Laws 903 BD; Plot. 2.9.9.75.

πατρί, μητρί . . . καὶ ἡγεμόν τῶν συμπάντων. A Middle Stoic concept which is found also in Antiochus. According to the latter, friendship is seen extending outwards from the family until it includes even the gods (Aug. CD 19.3). "This affection comes into being right from our birth, in that children are loved by their parents and the whole family is held together by the bond of marriage and parenthood. From there it gradually spreads beyond the home, first through ties of blood, then through marital relationships, then through friendships, later by association with neighbors, afterwards to fellow-citizens and to partners and friends in public life, and finally by embracing the whole human race" (Cic. Fin. 5.65). Cf. also Apuleius, De Plat. 2.2.222, for the doctrine in later Middle Platonism. For Philo's doctrine of φιλανθρωπία and its Stoic antecedents, see Winston, "Philo's Ethical Theory," forthcoming in ANRW.
VI A

Deus 20-32

Commentary on Gen 6:5-7: 'Ἰδὼν οὖν, φησὶ, κύριος ὁ θεὸς δὲ ὁ δὲ ὁ ἐπιληπτόνθησαν αἱ κακίαι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, καὶ πᾶς τῶν διανοεῖται ἐν τῷ καρδίᾳ ἐπιμελῶς τὰ πονηρὰ πάσας τὰς ἡμέρας, ἐνεθυμήθη ὁ θεὸς δὲ ἐποίησε τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, καὶ διενοήθη. καὶ ἔπεσεν ὁ θεὸς: Ἀπαλείψω τὸν ἄνθρωπον δὲ ἐποίησα ἀπὸ προσώπου τῆς γῆς.

Textual variants: Ἰδὼν δὲ κύριος . . . καὶ ἐνεθυμήθη.

Hebrew: By translating ἐνεθυμήθη and διενοήθη the LXX has expunged all reference to God's repenting and its attendant sadness which is found in the Hebrew text. It should be noted, however, that when the biblical context deals with God's love for man, and his compassion and forgiveness for those who repent or those who have been punished and are in need of his merciful love, the LXX translators do not deviate too sharply from the Hebrew text. Cf. Deut 32:36; Exod 32:12 and 14, where the Hebrew words wehinnahēm, wayyinnahēm, yitneham, are translated as if the verb meant in the nip'âl "have compassion," or in the hitpâ'el "be comforted." (See Gutman, 2.127-28.)

A. General Comments

The whole passage from 20-69 constitutes in fact a single commentary on Gen 6:5-7, but, following A. Moses, we have thought it best to divide it into three parts, for ease of exposition.

In the first passage Philo turns to the question which gives this treatise its name. He engages first in a well-wrought polemic in diatribe style against those who would base themselves on this passage of Genesis to argue that God is subject to change, even change of mind. His position here is based ultimately on Plato's "second canon of theology" in Republic II (380D-383B), that God suffers no change either from any external force or from his own volition (cf. Sen. Ben. 23.1). His first argument proceeds from a Stoic base; we assume that the true philosopher is superior to the changes of fortune (μὴ τοῖς πρόγυμοι συμμεταβάλλειν), and maintains an undeviating singleness of purpose. (Cic. Tusc. 5.81; Pro Murena 61; SVF 3.548; Sen. Ben. 4.34.3). Moses also holds this to be the ideal of the Sage; Deut 5:31 (a popular passage with Philo, who uses it for various purposes) is brought in to support this point (23).
This prompts Philo to celebrate the harmony of the soul, or at least of the well-tempered soul, which, if itself correctly tuned, can impose calm upon the storms suddenly whipped up by ἡμία. The train of thought is not difficult to follow. Deut 5:31 is interpreted as an exhortation to the sage to achieve ἡρεμία. In 26 we come back to the point that God (ὁ ἀληθινὸς καὶ μακάριος) can hardly be supposed to be less stable than the well-tempered human soul.

From 27-29 a contrast is then made between the uncertainties and inconsistencies of human life and the constancy of God's existence. This develops, in 30-32, into a contrast between the conditions of temporality and eternity, which owes much to the discussion of Time and Eternity in Timaeus 37C-39D. This passage is of particular interest, both for its importance in the debate about divine "foreknowledge," and as suggesting a possible link between Philo and Plotinus via Numenius. Note the ideas that God knows temporal events (a) in a timeless eternity, and (b) as their cause. Both ideas recur in Plotinus as regards the knowledge possessed by the World-Soul 4.4.12), and a fortiori by Nous (e.g., 6.7.1). That they are of Stoic inspiration is shown by Cicero, Div. 1.82 (divine causal knowledge) and 1.125-27 (simultaneous knowledge of events divided by time). Cicero's immediate source is stated in the passage to be Posidonius.

In 31-32, the notion of God as Father is developed remarkably; if God is father of the cosmos (Tim. 28C), then the cosmos is plainly his son: cf. Ebr. 30; Mos. 2.134; Spec. 1.96; Plut. Quaest. Plat. 1001B; Is. et Os. 373A (Horus, begotten by Isis, is the perceptible world, an image of what is spiritually intelligible); the idea of sonship of the cosmos is no doubt helped by the description in Rep. 6.509E, etc., of the Sun as ἔχοντος of the Good. But Time is the measure of the motion of the cosmos (Tim. 38B ff.), and is therefore produced by it, and is therefore its son; so Time will be the grandson of God. (Cf. Dante, Inferno 11.105, where Virgil describes human art as the "grandchild of God," since art is said to copy nature, and nature is the child of God.) Further, the intelligible cosmos is prior to the physical cosmos, so that this latter is the younger son of God as opposed to his elder son, the intelligible cosmos. The contrast between the elder son who stays at home with his father, and the younger son who wanders abroad, finds an interesting parallel in Plotinus 5.8.12-13 and 5.5.3 (originally

For Plotinus the sensible world is God's youngest son Zeus (5.8.13.1), who alone appears "without," whereas his elder brothers remain with their Father (Nous-Kronos), who "abides bound in identity" (5.8.13.1), and gives the sense-world to his son (now apparently regarded as the World-Soul) to rule. Note also in 5.8.13 and 5.5.3 the genealogical language used of the three Plotinian hypostases, of which the highest (the One) is the grandfather of the World-Soul (5.5.3.23). We may note also the possibly Hebraising phrase "King of Kings," ibid. 20, and the more mythological expression of the genealogical relation at 5.1.7.

Of course in Philo's less elaborate scheme, God is the grandfather of Time, not of the World-Soul. If there is any connection between Philo's language and that of Plotinus, it will almost certainly be an indirect one, through Numenius of Apamea. Numenius does use genealogical language about his three gods (Procl. In Tim. 1.303.27 ff. = Fr. 21, Des Places; cf. Dillon, Middle Platonists: 366-67).

B. Detailed Comments

20 τούτων μὲν δὴ ἄλλη. Compare other phrases of transition, e.g. Gig. 67; Deus 33, 51, 70.

τὰ δὲ ἄκολουθα. For Philo, ἄκολουθος implies not just "following next after," but "following logically upon" (cf. the use in Stoic logic of ἄκολουθος). We find it, throughout his works, in various usages:

(1) used absolutely: LA 3.150; Det. 81; Decal. 32 (συνυφαίνειν . . . τὰ ἄκολουθα); Agr. 124, etc.

(2) followed by a dative: Decal. 128; Agr. 32; Ebr. 206 (ἔπι τὰ ἄκολουθα τῷ λόγῳ τρεφώμεθα), etc.

(3) followed by a genitive: Gig. 67 (ἔπι τὰ ἄκολουθα τοῦ λόγου τρεφώμεθα). For the use of συνυφαίνω here, cf. Post. 14, Cher. 171 (τούτου δὲ προδιομολογηθέντος, ἄκολουθον ἄν εἰς συνυφαίνειν τὰ ἄρμόζοντα); Fug. 119. Since this verb can be construed both with a direct object only, and with an indirect object, also, in the dative, τῷ λόγῳ could be taken either with ἄκολουθα or with συνυφαίνωςεν. In the former case, it would refer to the text of Scripture; in the latter to Philo's own
discourse. For similar use of προσωπαίων, cf. Hor. 17, Congr. 122.

In fact there is a logical link between De Gig.-Deus 1-19, and the present section. After having described and commented upon the multiplication of evil on the earth, Philo embarks on the subject of the reaction of God to the spectacle of evil.

21 τινές τῶν ἀνεξετάστων. Compare with other phrases of referring to superficial or literalist critics and commentators. Cf. below, 52. These literalists are in this case not to be taken as literal-minded exegetes, but rather "the man in the street." The term ἀνεξετάστως is no doubt derived ultimately from Plato Apol. 38A. Cf. Spec. 2.244; Somn. 1.39, 102, 301; Cher. 42; Origen. C. Cels. 6.54; A. von Harnack, Marcion (rep. Darmstadt, 1960) 279*.

ἐπελαφρύζουσι καὶ ἐπικουφύζουσι. For collocation cf. Spec. 4.171; Legat. 27. ἐπελαφρύζω first recorded in Philo (ἐπελαφρύνω in Plut. Superst. 165F, Dio Chrys. 56C).

ἀδέσποτος. Parallels for ἀδέσποτης as a term for the holding of false views about God; Conf. 114; Decal. 90; Ebr. 110; Mos. 2.193; Aet. 10; Legat. 163.

22 τοὺς ἄδολως καὶ καθαρῶς φ. A reference to philosophers of the type of the Stoic sage, but couched in language reminiscent of Phaedrus 249A (τοῦ φιλοσοφήσαντος ἄδολως). Cf. Decal. 58, where this appellation serves to characterize the disciples of Moses.

τὸ μὴ τοῖς πράγμασι συμμεταβάλλειν. Cf. SVF 3.548, 23-24: ὁδὲ μεταβάλλεσθαι ἐκ καὶ οὔδένα τρόπον ὁδὲ μετατίθεσθαι οὔδὲ σφάλλεσθαι. συμμεταβάλλειν in this sense ("change along with") an Aristotelian term, e.g. EN I 10, 1100a28.

23 "οὐ δὲ αὐτῷ στήθι μετ' ἐμοῦ". Philo gets a good deal of value from this passage. See list of parallels in note on Gig. 49, where he uses it in connection with Moses' ἐωστάθεια and ἔρμις. To capture Philo's meaning, one must render the text "remain immobile here with me."

τὸ ἀκλίνης καὶ ἀρετῆς τῆς γυνῆς. Neither ἀρετῆς, nor ἀκλίνης in the sense of "steadfast, unwavering," is attested
before Philo. Ἀρρετής is used by Plutarch (Proc. Am. 1015A) as an epithet of Matter. Both adjectives are common in Philo, being used in a parallel context in Gig. 49-50, and Conf. 30: ἀκλίνητα καὶ ἀρρετεῖ; Mut. 87: ἀκλίνους καὶ ἀρρεποὺς; ib.183; Somn. 2.220, 227; Abr. 170; Prob. 29. The collocation is found also in Proclus, In Tim. 2.313.5: ἡ πρώτη πληρουμένη γνῶσις ἀπὸ τῶν νοητῶν, ἀκλίνης καὶ ἀρρετής καὶ ἀμετάπτωτος ὑπάρχουσα.

24 ὅπερ τινὰ λόγον. As usual, when Philo fixes upon a metaphor, he exploits it to the full. (For other uses of the metaphor cf. Sacr. 37 and Ebr. 116). Here the figure of the soul as a harmony is elaborated upon variously. The notion that it is harmonised by ἐπιστήμη τῶν ἐναντίων, playing the role of high and low notes, is peculiar. The Platonic theory that knowledge is of opposites is never elsewhere connected with the notion that knowledge harmonizes the soul. The image is continued with ἐπιτείνειει and ἀνέβαι, reflecting ultimately the precepts of Rep. III, esp. 412A, where the effects of a good blending of gymnastic and music are being summed up: διὸ διὸν ἄλλωσιν ἐνυψαλμόθεν ἐπιτείνειει καὶ ἀνεμένω μεσχρὶ τοῦ προσήκοντος; and then with κροτεῖν and ἐπιψάλλειν, the latter a rare word, found before Philo only in a fragment of Sophocles (fr. 60).

προσπεράβαλλοντα. Verb not found before Philo.

τῶν φύσει καλῶν. It is not quite clear to what this phrase refers. Mosè (trans. ad loc.) seems to take it as referring to natural good parts ("les merites naturels"); but it may just be a synonym for the virtues.

25 δραγανοῦ γὰρ τελεώτατον. The image is continued further with the description of the soul as a perfect instrument fashioned by Nature (cf. Sacr. 37; Stoic influence here, surely, overlaying that of the Timaeus) as an archetype of those (musical instruments) fashioned by human skill. Its perfect tuning consists in the ὁμολογία of all its actions with each other, the Stoic ideal. This is its τέλος. Perfect tuning is connected here with the notion of perfect stability, ἱσμέλα, with which we began in §23.


συμμορφώνιαν. Cf. SVF 1.179: καθ' ἐνα λόγον καὶ σύμμορφων ζῆν.
Commentary. \textit{Deus} 20-32 \hfill 289

26 τὸν πολὺν κλόωνα καὶ σάλον. His thought moves effortlessly now to another of his favourite images, the storm at sea. (Cf. \textit{LA} 2.90; \textit{Cher.} 12-13, 38; \textit{Sacr.} 13, 90, etc.) The sudden blasts of evil break upon the soul, rousing up a raging sea, which the well-tempered soul reduces to calm.

\begin{quotation}
\textit{γαληνιάκει.} The verb is found before Philo only in the Hippocratic corpus, \textit{Vict.} 2, though \textit{γαληνιάω} is used by Epicurus [Fr. 425 Usener], but \textit{γαληνη} in the metaphorical sense is to be found in Plato (\textit{Phaed.} 84A, \textit{Laws VII.}791A), as well as elsewhere in Philo (e.g., \textit{Sacr.} 16, 90; \textit{Somm.} 2.229).
\end{quotation}

\begin{quotation}
\textit{εἰτ' ἐνδολάκεις.} We arrive at the point to which all this has been building up. If the soul of the philosopher is so steadfast, how can we doubt that God himself, who is not subject to corruption, and is the origin of all the virtues and excellencies of the Sage, could be any less steadfast? The whole passage 24-26 constitutes a good example of Philo's rhetorical style (cf. Intro. p. 141).
\end{quotation}

\begin{quotation}
\textit{ἀνημένος τὸ κράτος.} Better to render this, with Colson, "who has taken as his own the sovereignty of the virtues," than with Moses, "qui a attaché sa puissance aux vertus."
\end{quotation}

27 \begin{quotation}
\textit{ἀνθρώποις μὲν ὅπως τὸ εὐμετάβολον.} Men have two sources of \textit{ἀβεβαιότης}, an internal and an external. On the first, Philo makes the interesting psychological observation that we sometimes change our friendships into indifference, or even enmity, for no very positive reason, showing in this a κοῦρος εὐχέρεια. The combination of \textit{εὐμετάβολον} and \textit{ἀβεβαιότης} may own something to a reminiscence of \textit{Rep. VI.}503C: τὸ βῆβαια αὖ ἥθη καὶ ὁμοίωτερόθηκα, where Plato is analysing the various types of character which must be possessed by candidates for guardianship.
\end{quotation}

28 \begin{quotation}
\textit{κραταῖος.} A poetic adjective. Adverb found before Philo only in LXX (Judges 8:1).
\end{quotation}

\begin{quotation}
\textit{ὁ δὲ δεδοκιμασθηκὼς.} Is a certain degree of sarcasm discernible in the use of this adjective? In the Platonic corpus, it is found only in the \textit{Axiochus} (369A), which Philo would have accepted as genuine, as an epithet of the δήλως. It is frequently used by Plutarch (\textit{Mor.} 7B, 20A, 93D, 752B, etc.), of greed and of the bad sort of democracy, and Dio Chrysostom, 33.369C (also of the bad sort of democracy).\end{quotation}
The second source of human variability is external, but here Philo specifies rather the inconstancy of other individuals (our partners, perhaps, in some enterprise), than inanimate causes. This may be because in fact it is easier for the wise man to remain constant in face of the vagaries of nature than of those of his associates.

A chief cause of our inconstancy is our inability to foresee the future, whereas to God all things are plain. This involves Philo indirectly in the problem of human free will (a problem that will recur later, §§47-48). God can see all things in a way that will recur later, §47-48). God can see all things and administer all things predestined and preordained. This means he allows nothing to happen outside of his omnipotence. The statement of such a variation of the 'naxiap xal TXOLξic of Tim, 28C, and the title of ἐπίτροπος arises naturally out of his relation to the world; Post. 68-69; Congr. 118: ὁ τῶν διῶν ἐπίτροπος.

The first two epithets of God are a variation of the ἐπίτροπος. The familial relationships here listed have been noted already in the General Comments. The definition of Time as the measure of the motion of the cosmos (Chrysippus' formalisation of Plato's doctrine in the Timaeus, SVF 2.509-16) is general in Middle Platonism, e.g.
Commentary on Gen 6:6: ἐνεδυμήθη ὁ θεός διὶ ἐποίησε τὸν ἀνθρώπον ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς καὶ διενοθή.

A. General Comments

After having dismissed, on grounds of general principle, the possibility that God can be subject to change of mind, Philo here returns to the solution of the problem raised by the expressions ἐνεδυμήθη ὁ θεός . . . καὶ διενοθή. To explain the meaning of the LXX rendering of Gen 6:6, Philo provides us with an analysis of the hierarchic structure of being and man's place in it, in accordance with Stoic theory. He begins with an attempt to distinguish between ἐννοια and διάνοια, corresponding to LXX ἐνεδυμήθη and διενοθή respectively. The former, he says, employing a Stoic usage, is "thought stored up" or quiescent (ἐναποκειμένη νόησις: SVF 2.89), whereas the latter is thought in its [all-traversing] course (νοησιαὶ διέξοδον) (cf. Det. 90;
Gig. 27; D.L. 7.138-39: "Reason [νοῦς] pervades every part of the cosmos just as does the soul in us. Only there is a difference in degree; in some parts there is more of it, in others less..." Philo's use of διάνοιας here instead of νοῦς is undoubtedly dictated by the διάνοια of his text, but it corresponds with Stoic usage. See Plut. Sol. An. 961D [referring to the Stoics]: ὁσπερ ἀμέλει τὰ περὶ τὰς νοῆσεις, ἀς ἐναποκειμένας μὲν "ἐννολάς" καλοῦν, κινομένας δὲ "διανοήσεις." As Philo explains in QG 2.54, only God employs διάνοια in the strict sense (κυρίως) of that term, since his firm and unvacillating thought "is extended (ἐκτείνεσθαι) and passes completely and effortlessly among all things." (He explains elsewhere that God's thinking is simultaneous with his acting or creating and there never was a time when he did not act. See Prov. 1.7; cf. Sacr. 65-68; LA 1.5; Mos. 1.283: "God cannot repent or fail to abide by what He has once said. He will utter nothing at all which shall not certainly be performed, for His word is His deed." Strictly speaking, then, God's έννοια is not distinct from his διάνοια. Only in man do they constitute two distinct phases.) For the analogy between the twofold Logos in God and the twofold logos in man, see Mos. 2.127-29; LA 2.23; cf. Deus 31. See M. Heinze, Die Lehre vom Logos in der heidnischen Philosophie (Oldenburg, 1872) 231-35. Scripture is thus emphasizing that it was part of the unchanging divine plan to deal with man in accordance with his essential nature, which involves the responsibility of choosing between good and evil. Hence God is constantly praising those who do not leave their posts in life, and punishing those who depart from it.

In order to explain man's exalted and unique position among earth creatures, Philo now proceeds with a detailed account of the scale of being, beginning with ξεῖς, or cohesion which holds the cosmos together and prevents its disintegration in the void (SVF 2.540, 552-53). This ξεῖς operates not only in inanimate objects, such as wood and stones, but also in parts of animals, such as the bones and sinews (SVF 2.634). It is identified by the Stoics with the active cause, the source of qualities, and is effected through pneumatic motion (SVF 2.449). In describing the next level, that of φύσις (growth or nature), exemplified by the plant world, Philo characteristically employs vivid imagery. His anthropomorphizing of nature is very effective for his purpose, which is presumably to contribute to the notion of the ζωομάθεια of all creation (cf. D.L. 2.140). He
then continues with the level of ψυχή (life), which is characterized by αισθήσεις (sensation), φαντασία (impression) and ὄρμη (impulse), all of which are lacking in plants (cf. Arist. De An. 2.2, 413b2; 3.3, 427b15-16; 3.10, 433b28-29). Finally he turns to a description of man's unique superiority over the animals, and provides us with a eulogistic account of the human intellect (νοῦς) that emphasizes its indestructibility and its freedom. (For the orderly progression in creation, cf. Op. 65-68). [For a detailed analysis of Philo's conception of human freedom, see Introduction p. 181.] It is man's unique freedom to choose between good and evil that constitutes him a moral agent who is responsible for his actions. Philo has thus arrived at his goal, which was to explain God's continuous and unchanging contemplation of man's nature, through which he holds him accountable for his various actions.

B. Detailed Commentary

33 "ἐνεσμηθήσαν". ἐνθυμοματι in the meaning of "be irritated" is already a Classical usage, e.g. Thuc. 7.18, Dem. 1.43. In the parallel passage of QG (1.93), Philo seems to be taking the verb in its more normal sense of "be concerned," "take thought for," and his exegesis is accordingly different.

34 ἐναποκειμένη. First attested in Philo, but only here in a technical sense. Cf. Plut. Aem. 14; Plot. 3.6.2.40; SVF 2.89 (ap. Galen): ἐπίνοια ἐστὶν ἐναποκείμενη νόσους.

διέξοδον. Cf. Det. 130; Post. 79; Agr. 145; Plant. 49; etc. Also Plot. 6.7.13.48: "Since it does not change, Nous ever pursues the same course (τὴν αὐτὴν διέξοδον) through things that are not the same."

μὴ λείποντα τὴν τάξιν. Cf. comment. on Gig. 43.

35 τὰ μὲν ἐνεσθάσατο ἔξει... ψῦκε... ψυχή... λογικὴ ψυχή. ἐνεσθάσατο should be taken as middle rather than passive, "he bound down." Possibly a reminiscence of Tim. 43A ἐνέσθη, though the verb there is active. The cosmic pneuma, according to the Stoics, has a fourfold function. In the form of ἔξις it provides unity and quality; in the form of ψυχή, nutrition and growth, in the form of ψυχή, sensation and movement; and in the form of νοῦς or λόγος, it provides rationality. Inanimate objects possess only ἔξις; plants possess, in addition,
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ϕόσις; irrational animals possess ψυχή; and man and the cosmos possess also reason (SVF 2.473, 460, 634, 714-16, 804, 1013; cf. LA 2.22-23; Her. 137; Aet. 75 [where there is a further elaboration: "mind and reason in men and the perfection of virtue in the good" (SVF 458-59)]). Whereas Cleanthes had followed Aristotle in distinguishing three psychic functions (θετικόν; αἰσθητικόν; διανοητικόν, λογιστικόν: Cic. ND 2.23-24; 30-31; Arist. De An. 2.2-3.8; EN 1097b33 ff.; GA. 736a32), Chrysippus added a fourth, ξίς, the distinctively Stoic contribution. See S. Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics (London 1959) 7-11; David E. Hahm, The Origins of Stoic Cosmology (Ohio State U.P. 1977) 136-74. The Stoic scale of beings is obviously indebted to Aristotle's scale, in which plants possess only the nutritive soul, animals also possess the perceptive soul, and man possesses mind in addition to the two lower forms of soul. For the background of Aristotle's scale, see F. Solmsen, "Antecedents of Aristotle's Psychology and Scale of Beings," AJP 76 (1955) 148-64, reprinted in his Kleine Schriften (Hildesheim 1968) 588-604. Cf. also J. Moreau, L'âme du monde de Platon aux Stoïciens (Paris 1939).

συμφωνεῖ. First found in Philo (though cognatio in Cic. ND 2.19 may be a translation) and used by him fairly frequently. Cf. Flacc. 71; Cont. 7. The pneuma makes the cosmos a living, organic whole, with each part grown together (συμφωνεῖ: SVF 2.550) in living sympathy with all the rest (SVF 2.473, 912). Plutarch uses the word in Mor. 923C, 1080F, 1112A-C.

πνεύμα ἀναστρέφων ἐν ἐκατό. Pneumatic motion has two phases, a movement into itself (πρὸς or εἰς ἐκατό) and a movement out of itself (ἐξ αὐτῷ), or movements back and forth (πρὸς ἐκ ὁπλίσω), either from the center of the cosmos to its extreme boundaries, or from the center of any given entity to its surface (SVF 2.442, 471, 551). The inward movement toward the center holds the body together and produces cohesion (συνέχεια), unity (ἐνωσις), and being (οὐσία); the outward movement causes dimensions and qualities (SVF 2.451-52, 551). According to some sources, tensional motion (τονίκη κίνησις) is a simultaneous motion in opposite directions (Alex. De Mitt. 10.224.25; Mant. 131.10, 16, 19-20). Both these texts are polemical "and the notion of simultaneous motion," writes Robert R. Todd, "may have been an accretion to the description that we find in the doxography. It is only reported elsewhere
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by Nemesius" (*SVF* 2.451) (Alexander of Aphrodisias on *Stoic Physics* [Leiden 1976] 37 n. 86). The exact nature of this motion is by no means clear. Hahm believes that "the image of compressed air gives, on the whole, the most satisfactory explanation of the pneumatic motion and its effects. Such pressure has no local motion and the fact that it acts simultaneously in opposite directions could have given rise to the notion that it comprises a simultaneous motion toward the center and toward the periphery" (*Origins* 167). Sambursky's interpretation of this motion as something akin to wave motion, according to Hahm, is an interesting thesis which goes beyond the texts. Cf. *Conf.* 136; *Plant.* 9; Mig. 181. It is odd that although δια πάντων διηνων is an almost formulaic description of pneuma's motion (*SVF* 2.416, 1035, 1021; Alex. *De Mixt.* 216.15; D.L. 7.139), Philo never uses the verb διηνω in this context. (It is used, however, by the author of Wisdom [7:24].) On the other hand, Philo does consistently use the verb τείνω to indicate the tensile character of pneumatic motion. (The Stoic concept of τόνος is first met with in the fragments of Cleanthes, who said that it was a "stroke of fire" [*πληγή πυρός*]: *SVF* 1.563. For the origin of the concept of τόνος, see Hahm, *Origins* 155.)

36 διαυλος. Philo is rather fond of this image. Cf. *Mut.* 117; *Spec.* 1.338; 2.246; *Plant.* 9, 76, 125; *Aet.* 58; *Op.* 44, 47. Aristotle (CA 741b21) compares nature to a runner covering a double course (διαυλοδρομούσης) and retracing her steps toward the starting-point whence she set out. Pausanias (5.17.6) uses this comparison to illustrate Boustrophedon writing. The main point of the comparison here is simply to emphasize that the motion is one that returns on itself and need not indicate that it is necessarily sequential. (According to F. H. Sandbach, Philo "must intend a continuous stream of which at any moment part is moving outward, part turning, part coming back": *The Stoics* [London 1975] 77-78.)

37 μεταβλητικης. This is the only occurrence of this word in Philo. Cf. Arist. *Met.* 1020a5.


αφηνημενα. Cf. Her. 137: αφηνημενω κινούμενα, in the course of a similar contrast between ἔξις and φόσις.
It is not surprising that Philo's imagery here is primarily of vines (cf. Mut. 162; Anim. 78) and that he seems well acquainted with them (for his acquaintance with the cultivation of vines and trees, cf. Bet. 107), for "one of the earliest steps taken by the Ptolemies to satisfy the ever-growing demand of the Greek inhabitants for wine was an extensive planting of vines of various kinds. There is evidence of this in many documents. Our fullest information relates to the Arsinoite nome. This nome in the time of Philadelphus was covered with vineyards large and small, some planted by the kings, but most by immi-grants, not by natives. Vines were planted with feverish activity on the doreai (gift-estates) of Apollonius the dioioetes. Many sorts of vine were tried. In 256 B.C.E. Apollonius sends messengers to a certain Lysimachus to get cuttings of vines and fruit trees from him. Nicias, Lysimachus' manager, replies to the message from Apollonius and attaches a list of cuttings. Eleven varieties of vine are named, among them Cilician, Mendean, Maronean, Phoenician, and Alexandrian, and some others, all famous for their quality. In one letter, Apollonius speaks of 10,000 vine plants (ψυτά ἄμπελινα) and 1,700 shoots (μοσχέο-ματα)" (M. Rostovtzeff, Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World [Oxford 1941] 1:353-54; cf. P. M. Fraser, Ptolemaic Alexandria [Oxford 1972] 1.166-67; 2.282, for further bibliography). In this regard we may also compare Seneca, who was a prosperous vine grower and who often resorts in his Letters to figures dealing with the vine. (Ep. 112.1; 104.6; 86.14 ff.; 12.2; 83.16; NQ 3.7.1). See M. T. Griffin, Seneca, A Philosopher in Politics (Oxford, 1976) 290; C. Magenta, "Riflessi di agronomia et economia agricola in Seneca Filosofo," RIL 73 (1940) 244 ff.

Αθλητική. Athletic imagery is extremely frequent in Philo. Cf. LA 1.98; 2.21; 3.14, 70, 72, 201; Cher. 80; Sacr.160; Det. 49; et al. See V. C. Pfitzner, Paul and the Agon Motif (Leiden 1967) 16-75; and H. A. Harris, Greek Athletics and the Jews, ed. I. A. Barton and A. J. Brothers (Cardiff 1976) 51-95.

περιαναστάσα. First found in Philo. Cf. LA 2.26; Cher. 62: ἐκ βαθῶς ὄνου περιαναστάσα; Somn. 2.106.

οἱ τοῖς ἐν γυναικί μαστοῖς ἀναλογοῦσι. Note how Philo keeps before our minds the unity of nature, by such analogies as this. The βαθῶς ὄνου image serves the same purpose.
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41 ἀδριμπτα, ἀφάνταστα, αἰσθησομένως ἀμέτοχα. All three negative adjectives found first in Philo (except for one doubtful use of ἀμέτοχος in Thuc. 1.39).

42 εἰθεσθείς. First found here and not used again by Philo. (See also Damasc. Dub. et Sol. 102 p. 265,11 Ruelle, opposed to ἀφαίρεσις). αἰσθησις/εἰθεσθείς is apparently an attempt to understand Plato's etymologizing at Tim. 43A5-6. Proclus and the Platonic tradition took this as a derivation from ἀδύσεις (In Tim. 332,5 ff.), but knowing Plato's powers at etymologizing, εἰθεσθείς is not too bad a suggestion as to what he might have intended. If it is Stoic, it may nevertheless derive ultimately from Tim. 43C. (Modern linguists prefer to derive αἰσθησις from ἀoulos, "hear, perceive," cf. Skt. ānih, "evidently," OCS aně, Lat. audio.)

ταμεῖον . . . ἐναποθησαυρίζεται. Cf. SVF 2.56: μνήμη, θησαυρισμός οὗσα φαντασίων; LA 3.36: τι γάρ τάς φαύλας δόξας . . . ταμεῖες καὶ θησαυρίζεις, ὁ διάνοια, ἐν σοφίᾳ; Post. 57; Plato, Phaedr. 276D. Also Cic. Acad.Pr. 30 (representing Antiochus' doctrine). For νοῦς as ταμεῖον, cf. Det. 68. For πανδεχές, cf. Tim. 51A, where Plato speaks of the Receptacle as πανδεχές (though Philo must here be thinking of a πανδεχέων). Cf. LA 1.61; Saor. 135; Det. 34. Cf. also Iamb. V.P. 29.162. Philo's preference for νοῦς over ἰγεμονικόν or διάνοια in reference to man's reason is a mark of his essential Platonism.

43 φαντασία δὲ ἡστι τύπωςις. Cf. LA 1.30. Philo is influenced by the Theaetetus account, as were later Platonists in general (Ar. Didymus, ap. Euseb. PE 11.23.36--; Plut. Is. et Os. 373B), but also by Stoic doctrine. Cf. SVF 2.55-56.

δισερ διακύλις τῆς οὐφαγίας. Cf. SVF 1.484.


κηρῷ δὲ ἐκλίμος ὁ νοῦς. This description of the process by which the mind acquires concepts is peculiar, in that it seems to revert to the more primitive doctrine of the Old Stoa (Zeno, Cleanthes), disregarding the more sophisticated model proposed by Chrysippus, according to which each new image introduces a
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"modification" (ἐπεροίωσις) into the ἡγεμονικῶν (Sext. Emp. Math. 7.227, 372 = SVF 2.56), rather than impressing anything upon it. Philo is perhaps influenced by what he (or some intermediate source?) takes to be the doctrine adumbrated in the Theaetetus. The manner in which θάνη "smoothes out" and "effaces" the imprints of memory is, also, far from clear. It is perhaps fair to say that Philo is not vitally interested in the technicalities of epistemological theory. Cf. Op. 166, where he accepts the same doctrine.

44 τοτε μὲν οίκείως τοτε δὲ ὡς ἐπεροίως διέθηκε τὴν ψυχήν. A reference to the Stoic doctrine of ὁμή (resulting in οἰκείωσις), and ἀφορμή (resulting in ἀλλοτρωσις), arising from the reaction of the Soul to the impressions it receives (SVF 3.169-77), though Philo here uses ὁμή for both types of impulse. The subject of ἐφασμάν in the next sentence is left vague by Philo, but since "they" define ὁμή as πρώτη ψυχῆς κίνησις, the subject is inevitably the Stoics.

45 σώματων τε ὁμοίως καὶ πράγματων. What contrast is intended here? Neither Moses nor Colson in their translations ("aussi bien les corps vivants que les choses," "both of all material objects and of things in general") seem quite adequate. The contrast σώματα-πράγματα is a very common one with Philo (see Leisegang's Index, s.v. πράγμα), and in many cases it seems to be simply between animate and inanimate objects (e.g. Op. 150, Det. 165, Conf. 21), though sometimes πράγματα could be taken as meaning intelligible objects (Post. 57; Ebr. 167). When Philo wants to make this latter contrast, he usually says so, Somn. 2.134: τοτε κατὰ ψυχῆν πράγμασιν; Mut. 56: τὴν τῶν ἀσωμάτων διὰν πραγμάτων; but at Her. 130 we find σώματα and πράγματα contrasted in a way which, as becomes clear in 131, involves their reference to sensibles and intelligibles respectively; and so it seems to be in the present passage. (Cf. also Somn. 2.101: πραγμάτων οὐ σωμάτων.) This curious usage must derive from the Stoic use of πράγμα to mean λεκτόν, as attested in SVF 2.173, and especially Diog. Laert. 7.59: προσφέρονται μὲν αἱ φιάναι, λέγεται δὲ τὰ πράγματα, αἱ δὲ καὶ λεκτά τυγχάνει. Also Sextus, Math. 8.11-12, cf. [Plut.] Plao. 1.6.13.

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EN 1.6.1096b28. In *Art of Rhetoric* 3.10.7, 1411b, Aristotle quotes from an unknown writer the following example of a metaphor: "reason is a light that God has kindled in the soul." Also, Cicero *ND* 1.19: *oculis animi*, in a reference to Plato.

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οὐκελαὶς περιλαμβάνεινς αὐγαῖς. Cf. *Spec.* 1.42; *Praem.* 45; *SVF* 2.54, 63.

βαθύς λόγος. Λόγος is a Homeric term and carries with it the connotation of the ἢσοράς which Hades has for his portion (*IL. 15.191*), though by Philo's time this connotation may not have much force. Cf., however, *Plut. Mor.* 48C. τὸν ἑντάς εὐρῶτα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ Λόγον is reminiscent of the ἢσοράς of Hades mentioned in *Hom. Hymn to Demeter* 488. Philo likes the word, cf. *Praem.* 82: διόπερ ἐκ Λόγου βαθέσι εἰς φῶς ἀναχλήτα αὐτής; *LA* 3.171, etc.

καθαρωτέρας δὲ καὶ ἄμεινονος ἑλαχε τῆς οὐσίας. The reference could be taken to be to Aristotle's *πνεῦμον οὐσία*. Cf. *Cic. Acad.* 25; *Her. 283; QG* 3.6. At *Plant.* 18, however, Philo seems to reject the αἰθήρ as the source of the mind, which he assigns instead to the divine pneuma, which is immaterial, and this seems to be rather his meaning here. Cf. *Det.* 86; *LA* 1. 37-38. Elsewhere Philo tells us that the mind is incapable of knowing itself (*LA* 1.91; *Somm.* 1.30-33, where he insists that the soul is incorporeal). Moreover, at *Somm.* 1.21, he shows himself agnostic as to whether αἰθήρ is "a fifth substance, circular in movement, with no part in the four elements," and concludes that "one may confidently take one's oath that the day will never come when any mortal shall be competent to arrive at a clear solution of these problems" (*ibid.* 24). Billings has suggested that Philo's materialistic language in regard to the rational soul is "merely metaphorical." (See T. Billings, *The Platonism of Philo Judaeus* [Chicago 1919] 53-59.) It might be more correct to say that Philo feels himself able to use materialistic terminology borrowed from the Aristotelians and Stoics with systematic ambiguity.

47 ἄφέτων εἶδος. The term ἄφετος seems to give a clue to Philo's conception of the mind's conditional freedom. This word is properly used of animals allowed to roam free (often in sacred enclosures, and sometimes preparatory to being sacrificed), instead of being bound in stalls and employed for specific tasks.
A characteristic Stoic notion. Cf. Epict. 1.1.10: "We have given thee a certain portion of ourself, this faculty of choice and refusal"; cf. 2.8.11.

μοίον, ἥν ἡδύνατο ἔξασθαι. Philo is clearly emphasizing the limited character of the freedom bestowed by God on man. Cf. Tim. 38B: [Time] was made after the pattern of the Eternal Nature, to the end that it might be as like thereto as possible (κατὰ δύναμιν); Theaet. 176B: ψυγή δὲ ὁμοίωσις δεῦρα κατὰ τὸ δύνατόν; Plot. 3.2.3.32-33; Philo, Abr. 203, where God bestows χαρά on Isaac only "in so far as the recipient’s capacity allows"; Virt. 203; Op. 23, where God confers benefits "in proportion to the capacities of the recipients"; Deis 48: Ὡς οἶον ἥν ἔλευθερωθείσα.

ἐγγαλινωθέντα. In its metaphorical sense, first used by Philo. Cf. Plut. Lys. 21; LA 3.155, 195; Cher. 19; Det. 53.

ἔθελουργος καὶ ἀυτοκέλευστος γνώμης. Philo seems deliberately to be avoiding Stoic terminology here, since neither ἔθελουργός nor ἀυτοκέλευστος appear to have been used by the latter. It may well be that in those passages where he is anxious to emphasize man’s freedom, relative though it be, he prefers to dissociate himself from the Stoic formulae which were under heavy attack by those who accused the Stoics of trying to camouflage their deterministic position by coating it with innocuous but meaningless phrases that suggested some sort of human freedom. (The Cynic Oenomaus called the lot accorded to man by Chrysippus "semi-slavery." Euseb. PE 6.7.2 and 14; cf. Nemes. De Nat. Hom. 35; and Plotinus 3.1.7.15.) On the other hand, when writing for the "initiated" and wishing to indicate the very limited nature of human freedom, he does employ the Aristotelian/Stoic formula ἔστιν ἡμῖν (fragment from the lost fourth book of the LA; Harris, Fragments 8). It is also interesting to note when ἔθελουργός and ἀυτοκέλευστος are first used. In both cases, by Xenophon (Eq. 10.17; Anab. 3.4.5 respectively), in the former case in the context of "animals" (horses) doing things willingly and spontaneously; in the latter of soldiers doing something without command from above. We may be relatively free, but we are still chattels of God. Moreover, ἔθελουργός καὶ ἀυτοκέλευστος is a very frequent collocation in Philo, and it is illuminating to examine the various contexts in which this phrase occurs. They all refer to that kind of human action that
Commentary.  *Deus* 33-50

is spontaneous and not the result of external compulsion, i.e., precisely what is ordinarily meant in Greek philosophy by the term ἐκοινωνία. At *Conf.* 59, for example, it refers to the Israelites' readiness to perform God's will even before learning and understanding its nature, whereas at *Mut.* 270, it refers to the relative independence of the pupil in the absence of his teacher's presence. Cf. *Det.* 11; *Mos.* 1.6.3; *Spec.* 1.57; 2.146; 3.127; *Prob.* 22. Cf. also *Anth.* *Pal.* 5.22: "Love gave me to thee, Boöpis, for a servant, yoking the steer that came himself to bend his neck to Desire, all of his own free will, at his own bidding, an abject slave (ταῦτα ὑποζεύξας εἰς πόδου αὐτόμοιον, ἐκοινωνία, αὐτόκελευστον) who will never ask for bitter freedom, never, my dear, till he grows grey and old."

εἰμίδρους ψόγον μὲν ἔσχεν. The prime motivation of Philo in this passage, to show that man is responsible for all his actions, is very similar to that of Plato in the *Timaeus* (42D) and *Republic* (10.614 ff.). The dominant motif is there sounded by the oft-quoted phrase: αἰτία ἐλοίμου, ὢδης ἀναίτις (*Rep.* 617E; cf. *Plot.* 3.2.7.20; *CH*, Nock-Festug., 1:52. According to Justin Martyr [*Ap.* 1.44.108], this dictum was taken by Plato directly from Moses.) The attribution of moral responsibility to man is fully justified, as far as Plato is concerned, as long as man's soul is not caught in the web of a fatality that would constrain its actions arbitrarily, and thus bypass its normal choice-process.

κακοπραγία. This may mean either (1) "misfortune" or "bad condition," in which sense it is applicable also to plants and animals, or (2) "evil deed," in which sense it is properly applicable to man. Philo's use of the word here amounts almost to a pun.

τὴν ὑπ' ἀπελευθέρων ἄχαριστων ... δίκην. These words constitute an implicit commentary on the last words of the lemma quoted in 20: ἀπαλείψα τὸν ἀνθρώπον ὁ θεοῦ ἐποίησε ἀπὸ προσώπου τῆς γῆς. The Roman law on the subject of the respect due by freedmen to their masters is better reported than the Greek. Ulpian, in *Digest* 47.10.7.2, advises judges not to admit actions for insult and the like from freedmen against their former masters.
49 ἡγίως καὶ Βεβαίως. For this collocation, cf. Cher. 83. There are also many passages where these two words occur in very close proximity: Cher. 26; Agr. 160; Plant. 84; Conf. 106; Deus 22. Philo is here concerned to emphasize that the use of the aorists in the lemma does not imply any temporal activity on the part of God.

50 "Ἰδον δέσῳκα... ἔκλεξα τὴν ζωὴν". This juxtaposition of Deut 30:15 and 19 occurs only here, and in a fragment of LA 4 (Fr. 8, Harris), though there is an interesting use of Deut 30:15 in Fug. 58, in a different connection.

λογισμὸν ἔχοντες ἐν ἑαυτοῖς. For Philo’s concept of conscience, and of the relation of our λογισμός to the ὀρθὸς λόγος in the universe, see Introduction, p. 207.

VI C

Deus 51-69

Commentary on Gen 6:7: ΄Απαλείψω τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὅν ἐποίησα ἀπὸ προσώπου τῆς γῆς, καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἔως κτήνους, καὶ ἐρπετῶν ἔως πετεινῶν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, διὰ ἐθυμώδην διὰ ἐποίησα αὐτὸν.

A. General Comments

Philo moves on now to the next sentence of Genesis, giving particular attention to the bothersome phrase "διὰ ἐθυμώδην διὰ ἐποίησα αὐτὸν." This apparently unequivocal attribution of θυμός to God provokes him to what becomes an important statement both of his theology and of his theory of exegesis.

Philo accepted the Platonic-Aristotelian concept of the deity, as an entity which could be subject to no passion, nor even change. The previous section, commenting on Gen 6:6, concerns God’s changelessness; we are here concerned with his freedom from passions. Contrary to the view of literal exegetes, God is totally free from any attributes which are proper to the irrational portion of the soul (52). Why, then, does Moses talk of his θυμός?
Commentary.  *Deus* 51-69

Philo’s answer is that he does this only for the purpose of εἰσαγωγή, the leading to the truth—or, at least, the keeping in order (νουθετήσω) of those who are not susceptible to any higher type of teaching. Philo takes as his key texts two passages which he also employs in the parallel passage *Somn.* 1.231-37 (cf. also *QG* 2.54, a comment on Gen 8:21, where the same discussion takes place, with the use of the same pair of texts), (1) Num 23:19: "God is not as Man," and (2) Deut 8:5: "Like a man, he will chastise his son." (54) This juxtaposition of apparently contradictory passages has the mark of a rabbinic aporia. For Philo it is the starting-point for a comprehensive theory of levels of exegesis, a theory much favored later by the Alexandrian school of Christian exegesis, in particular Clement and Origen (who in fact particularly valued this Philonic treatise). It is plain, after all, that only the former of these passages is literally true. Why, then, does Moses present us with the other?

The answer is, for the purpose of μαθῆσαι and νουθετῶσαι. Men, says Philo (55), are divided into two classes, the Friends of the Soul and the Friends of the Body. The friends of the soul, being familiar with the truths of the intelligible world, are not tempted to attribute to τὸ δύν (note the neuter here) any of the attributes proper to things of generation, but free it from all ποιότης, comprehending it as pure ὁμορφία, endowing it with no character or form at all (cf. also 62). This is a clear statement of the necessity of negative theology, at least to the extent of denying of God all attributes other than pure existence. At *Somn.* 1.231-37 we find also a comprehensive denial to God of anything but simple ὁμορφία, and an explanation of Moses’ attribution to him of physical characteristics more or less identical to what we have here.

The criticism of the friends of the body leads Philo into a tirade (56-59), in diatribe style, against the absurdities of anthropomorphism, which reproduces the criticism that Greek philosophers had been making against popular Greek religion from Xenophanes on, but which is also applicable to certain tendencies within the rabbinic tradition. Anthropomorphism is closely connected, for Philo, with superstitious fear, because of the tissue of myths to which it gives rise.

To explain why Moses uses such terminology in regard to God, Philo makes use of an elaborately worked-out medical comparison (65-68). This in itself, the setting up of an analogy between the care of the mind and the care of the body, the
Philosopher as Doctor of Souls, is trite enough, being a favorite of Plato's, and is used repeatedly elsewhere by Philo, but his use of the analogy here has a slightly unexpected twist—at first sight illogical, but in fact sound enough. The good doctor, he says, conceals the truth about the seriousness of the disease from his patient in order not to cause mental distress within him which would be fully as serious as the disease itself. Even thus, Moses conceals the truth about God's nature from the friends of the body, attributing to him human passions such as anger, in order to protect them from sinfulness and ruin, consequent on the recklessness they would give way to if they knew God to be incapable of such passions. The circumstance that the good doctor is minimizing the seriousness of the situation, while Moses, so to speak, is exaggerating it, is irrelevant to the point of the comparison. In each case what we have is a benevolent concealment of the truth. (Cf. Origen, C. Cels. 4.71.)

He ends the discussion (69) with the reflection that the two opposed sayings previously quoted may be associated with two attitudes to the deity, Love (ἀγάπη) and Fear (φόβος). Those who attach no anthropomorphic characteristics to God approach him with love; the others must approach him with fear.

B. Detailed Commentary

51 ἄρα ἐντῷ ἐντὰ τοῦτω, ἢ ἔμοι τὰς ἰδιότητες. Cf. formula of transition at end of Gig. (67): τοσοῦτον ἢ ἐντὰ τοῦ νομοῦ τοῦ ἱεροῦ τῆς ἱεροσολύμωνα. The connotation of τὰ ἔμοι, as opposed to τὰ ἰδιότητες, is presumably that of purely physical, as opposed to logical, sequence.


τὸ δὲ. Here, τὸ δὲ, as opposed to ὁ δὲ, seems to lay emphasis upon the abstractness of the divinity (cf. 55). A study of Philo's use of τὸ δὲ/ὁ δὲ in relation to God is much to be desired.
Commentary. Deus 51-69

κηραίνειν. A poetical verb in Classical times, first attested in prose with Philo. Also Plut. Mor. 886E. The verb seems to mean for Philo "be subject to passions" in general, rather than simply "be sick at heart, anxious" (LSJ). Presumably this is a result of πάσχειν having lost much of its force.

μέχρι τινὸς εἰσαγωγῆς. Εἰσαγωγή is the normal term for an introductory handbook, e.g. Albinus' Isagoge to the dialogues of Plato. Here the μέχρι is restrictive, "as a sort of introduction." Cf. Her. 102: ἀπὸ στοιχείων εἰσαγωγῆς.

53 τῶν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς προστάξεσι καὶ ἀπαγόρευσεν νόμων. See IA 1.93 for distinction between πρόσταξις, ἀπαγόρευσις, ἐντολή and παράλγεσις. Cf. Praem. 55; Congr. 120; Mos. 2.46.

"οὖν ὡς ἀνθρώπους ὁ θεὸς." "ὡς ἀνθρώπους παιδεύει τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ." These texts are used again in just the same way at Somm. 1.237. Cf. Sac. 94; Conf. 98; QE 2.54; Fragments, Harris, pp. 8, 15, 23. Note here that Philo's interpretation is only validated by the LXX. The Hebrew does not say "God is not as a man," but "God is not a man."

54 "παιδεύσει"—παιδεία. Use of παιδεύω in sense of "chastise" vulgar Greek, only in LXX and NT (e.g. Pontius Pilate's statement in Luke 23:16: παιδεύσας οὖν αὐτὸν ἄπολόσω). It is not quite clear that Philo understands the usage here, since he glosses παιδεία by νουθεσία, but both these words can have overtones of "punishment" in Classical Greek; cf. e.g. Plato, Prot. 325CD, Laws III 700C.


ἐνομισέω. Verb first attested in Philo. (Used in different sense by the Epicurean Polystratos [p. 32 Wilke], in third century B.C.E.)

ἐκβιβάζοντες αὐτὸ πάσης ποιήσης. See the comprehensive discussion of H. A. Wolfson, Philo 2.101-10, on the meaning of the denial of "quality" to God by Philo. Here Philo is simply denying any physical quality or accident of God. Cf. Intro, p. 217.

τὴν ὑπαρξίν καταλαμβάνεις. On the grasping of the simple existence of God, as opposed to any attributes, cf. Intro, p. 217.
56 ἀπαγωγάσασθαι τὸ σαρκῶν περίβλημα. Verb first found in prose, in Philo. The imagery presumably originates in the myth of the Gorgias (523A ff.), but is influenced also by Gen 3:21. Cf. Philo’s exegesis of “the garments of skin” at QG 1.53.

ἐκ πλειώνων συνόδου δυνάμεων. No reference here to the doctrine of Powers. The simplicity of the essence of God is a basic principle of Philo’s theology; cf. Intro. p. 217.


λόγῳ χρώμενος ὑπηρέτη δωρεῶν. At LA 3.177-78, however, we are told that God gives the principal boons in his own person, whereas the secondary ones, i.e., those involving riddance from ills, are bestowed by his Angels and Words; cf. also Fug. 67; Conf. 181. For the Logos as God’s δογανογός in creating the world, cf. LA 3.96; Mig. 6. Here, Philo is concerned primarily with freeing God from all direct activity upon the world, so such distinctions are not to his purpose.

58 φωτὶ χρώμενος ταυτῆ. A curious notion. God "sees," but not with eyes as instruments, and using as "light," in place of the sun, which is necessary for physical seeing, himself. Perhaps the Sun Simile of Rep. VI is an influence here. The Good there, the intelligible archetype of the sun, would, in the Middle Platonic tradition, as Philo would have known it, be identified with God himself.

59 ἄποναυεταί. Some mss. (MAHP) read ἄποναυετί, and this was accepted by Wendland. It is certainly more in accord with diatribe style, and is tempting, but (a) there is the following παυσάμενος, which sounds as if it picks up ἄποναυεταί, the simple form of the verb picking up the compound, a good stylistic flourish; and (b) the notion of excretion seems to be covered more tactfully by Philo with the phrase τάλα δος τούτοις.
Commentary. *Deus* 51-69

60 Ἐφησορόθυτα γὰρ <εἰσάγει> ὑποθέτε τρια. Ἐφησορέω first attested in Philo (though adj. Ἐφησόρων in Aeschylus and Euripides). (Wendland’s addition of εἰσάγει seems necessary.) Cf. Exod 15:3; Deut 32:23, 41-42; Gen 19:24; Ps 104:4-7; II Sam 22:13-16.

Φθοροποιῷ πυρί. Presumably a reference here to Sodom and Gomorrah. Φθοροποιός first attested in Philo, but also in [Plut.] *Plac.* 5.911A: Φθοροποιῶν γὰρ ἑκατέρου μοναχία, where the doctrine of Alcmaeon is being given.

καταγίδα καὶ κεραυνών. Interpreting accounts of divine warlike activity as descriptions of natural phenomena is a type of exegesis that goes back at least to the fifth century (e.g. Socrates’ explanation of Boreas’ rape of Oreithyia at the beginning of the *Phaedrus*), and was popular with Stoic commentators on Homer (cf. Heraclitus, *All. Hom.* 6-8, the explanation of Apollo’s sending of the plague on the Achaeans in *Iliad* I). Philo, however, is not here saying that Moses is indulging in the same sort of allegorizing; Moses is simply concerned, in using this sort of language, to produce a salutary effect in the minds of the duller-witted or corrupted hearers (cf. 63).


61 Πάντας ὃς ἄφθονος τοῦς ἐνυγχάνοντας. The notion that the aim of a good lawgiver should be to benefit all those who come in contact with his laws, by so framing them that they are comprehensible on some level by even the meanest intelligence, does not seem to occur elsewhere in so many words. This sentiment serves here as an introduction to the doctrine of various levels
of understanding of scripture, a doctrine also developed at Somn. 1.191.

εὐμοίρου φύσεως . . . καὶ ἀγωγῆς . . . ἀνυπαίτίου. A reference to at least the first two of the three components declared, in the Platonist-Aristotelian tradition, to be necessary to the attainment of perfect virtue, φύσις, ἀσκήσις and μάθησις. This goes back at least to Protagoras (80 B 3, DK: "φύσεως καὶ ἀσκήσεως διδασκαλία δείται"), is alluded to by Plato at the beginning of the Meno (70A), and is formalized by Aristotle (EN 10.9.1179b 20 ff.; Pol. 8.13.1332a 40; EE 1.1.1214a16 ff. Cf. Diog. Laert. 5.18); it turns up in the Pythagorica (e.g. "Archytas" De Educ. 3, p. 41, 20 ff. Theesleff), and is found in Albinus Did. ch. 28. Philo knows the formulation well, cf. Abr. 52-54.

The adjective ἀνυπαίτιος is not found before Philo.

ὅδσον τοῦ βίου λειψορον καὶ ζωτάς εὐρίσκοντες. The figure of life as a road is common in Philo. Cf. LA 3.253; Post. 31, 102, 154; Deus 143, 165, 182; etc. As usual, Philo elaborates his image. Truth becomes a fellow-traveller (συνοδόσιορος), in the form of a goddess, who initiates one into the mysteries of True Being. Mystery imagery thus obtrudes itself, for a judicious discussion of which see Nikiprowetzky, CEP pp. 17-28.

παρ᾽ ἣς μυηθάντες. Truth here performs the role of δρώοδχος, and of hierophant. Cf. Ebr. 168, where μαθεία plays the same role as ἀλήθεια does here. In Her. 311, it is God who is the δρώοδχος.

προσαναπλάττουσιν. This compound first attested in Philo. Also, "Longinus," 7.1. The sense of the verb seems to be "to attribute imaginary qualities to," cf. Post. 3; Sacr. 96; Dec. 54, 74.

62 ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ὡς οὐρανὸς οὐδ᾽ ὡς κόσμος. No doubt, as Colson suggests (App. p. 485), aimed at least partly at the Stoics, who held the cosmos and/or the heavens to be the οὐσία θεοῦ (SVF 1.164). Here, however, what seems at issue is God's form. For the unknowability of God, cf. Mut. 7; Spec. 1.20; QE 2.45.

ὀπαρεῖς. ὑπάρχειν/ὀπαρεῖς as term for God's mode of existence has its roots in the Stoic distinction, taken up by
the Neoplatonists, between ὑπάρχειν and εἶναι. Cf. Arist. Cael. 297b22; Met. 1045b10; SVF 2.65.

63 ὑπεστέρᾳ μὲν καὶ ἀμβλείγῃ . . . τῇ φώσει. Cf. Somn. 1.237, which also employs the passages Num 23:19 and Deut 8:5.

Perhaps a reference to the Stoic concept of διαστροφή or κατήχησις, wrong instruction acquired in childhood that stands in the way of the attainment of wisdom (SVF 3.228-236). Cf. Plato, Tim. 87B, and Rep. II 377A-383C, where fables and myths are linked to the education received in infancy from the mouths of mothers and nurses.

64 ἄπει πρὶν . . . χρείαις. χρείαις first attested in Philo. Here in fact it is an emendation of Wendland's, for χρείαις, but a convincing one, cf. Her. 77; Flac. 15; Legat. 53. Introduction of medical parallel, to be developed in 65-68.

The notion of the advantage for a foolish slave of having a stern master seems to owe something to the doctrine of Plato's Gorgias (479B). Philo expresses this thought again at Conf. 165, and Prob. 57, with reference to Esau's enslavement to Jacob. The concept of the Noble Lie is also introduced, with τὰ ψευδή, δὲ ἄν ἀφεληθήσονται.

65 τάληθ' ἐλεύθ οἷς ὑπομένουσιν. Cf. Cher. 15. The same notion is expressed by Plato in Rep. 389B. Cf. SVF 3.554-55; 2.132.

οἱ δοκιμώτατοι τῶν ζωτῶν. Mss. read νομιμώτατοι, which gives a difficult sense (perhaps "legitimate")? But Mangey's emendation is persuasive, unless we render νομιμώτατοι, "the most truly concerned with legality." This, however, is rather strained.
Diseases, properly speaking, do not "get better"; people do (but cf. Jos. 110, where λυμός is described as ὑψεῖσθαι). It is undeniable that someone took ὑψηθυσμένην in this sense, and added οὖ. Colson keeps οὖ, translating "and will bring no recovery from the malady," but this rather glosses over the problem, surely.

66 ταλητώς. Adverb first attested in Philo.

ἀσμενος. Slight textual problem here. Mss. read ἀσμενὸς ἐκ ὑε, which connects ἀσμενος with ἄπερει, giving a difficult sense, "will be glad to decline the treatment (?)." Colson proposes transposing ὑε to before ἐκ, giving an easier sense. Wendland proposed moving ἀσμενος to line 15, but that is more complicated.

67 τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς παθῶν καὶ νοσημάτων ἀρστος ἱερός. For the concept of Moses, or the philosopher in general, as Doctor of Souls in Philo, cf. Deor. 12; Mos. 1.42. Here the notion of removing the diseases of the soul αὐταίς δῆλοις is Stoic rather than Peripatetic. Cf. LA 3.129-31, an exegesis of Lev 8:29.

βλαστὴν ἀρωστηματος . . . δυσιάτου. ἀρωστήματι here, as above in 65, is no doubt used by way of variatio for νόσος, but it is also worth noting that ἀρωστήματι is a technical term in Stoicism for the imperfection that attends all but philosophers, cf. Cic. Tusq. 4.10.

68 ἀμφηντρόοις δίπλοις. Perhaps vos Platonica here, and at Somn. 1.235, cf. Plato Laws 944D: τὴν τῶν ἀμφηντρίων ὑπὸν δύναμιν. The context in Plato concerns the proper punishment of army deserters, but Plato has said just above: τὸν γάρ κακὸν ἢν ἢ δεῖ κολαζεῖν, ἵνα ἄμελιν ἢ, οὐ τὸν δεισυχην, which may have attracted Philo's attention to the passage (cf. Deor. 178, where the question of punishing λυποῦται also arises).

69 ο πρὸς τὸ ἁγιάν ο πρὸς τὸ φοβεῖσθαι. Cf. Somn. 1.237, where, however, the contrast between Love and Fear is not explicity made, but rather between τὸ ἀληθὲς and τὸ λυπητέλες. τὸν δύνα. Note use of masculine here, as opposed to neuter elsewhere in the passage (including περὶ τὸ δύν just
below). God is here thought of as having relationship to Man, and this makes the masculine more suitable.

VII

Deus 70-85

Commentary on Gen 6:7: Ὅτι ἐδυμόθην, Ὅτι ἐποίησα αὐτούς (Heb. "for I regret that I made them").

A. General Comments

Philo now finally comes to grips with the biblical words which have caused grave difficulties to most Jewish commentators, who were hard put to reconcile God's eternal and unchanging nature with the very human attribute of a sudden change of mind or heart. Through a type of mental acrobatics to which he had become accustomed in the course of his long struggle to reinterpret Scripture in accordance with the principles of Platonism, Philo boldly transforms the simple meaning of the biblical verse. He suggests that perhaps the intent of the verse is to indicate that the wicked are so through God's wrath i.e., through the wrath that comes from God, and the righteous by his grace, since the next words are "but Noah found grace with Him" (Gen 6:8). He then squeezes out of the fact that the word-order is "I was wroth in that I made them," rather than the reverse, "because I made them, I was wroth," the notion that these words are only a figure to convey the meaning that it was through wrath that God made or caused their blameworthy actions. Scripture's meaning, then, is that those human actions which result from any of the four primary passions or their derivatives are blame-worthy, whereas those which are the product of right reason are worthy of praise.¹

¹Cf. the rather more straightforward exegesis of QG 1.95, where the possibilities of juggling the Ὅτι clause have not yet occurred to Philo. For similar deductions from word-order, see LA 2.78; Mig. 140; Conf. 103. Bréhier (p. 151) sees a possible connection here with Philo's assignment of the creation of the sublunary world of growth and decay to God's Regent Power, whereas the aetherial world is assigned to his Creative Power (QG 4.8).
Having thus rendered innocuous a most troublesome set of words, Philo proceeds to the statement that Noah had found grace with God, and finds in it a pointed teaching concerning God's saving mercy.\(^2\) Were the divine judgment not tempered by mercy, we should find, he says, that the human race could not endure, since sin is unavoidable. In this connection, he makes use of Psalm 100 (101):1: "I will sing of pity and of judgment," in which he sees a statement of God's mixture of these two elements in his administration of the human race. This leads into a discussion of the nature of God's powers, which, according to Philo, are unmixed in respect of God himself, but mixed to created beings. He here brings in Ps 74 (75):9: "a drinking cup in the hand of the Lord, of unmixed wine full of mixture," where he bases his exegesis on giving full weight to the apparent contradiction between ἀμιθωτοῦ and ψευδωματος (see note ad loc.). Man is incapable of looking even upon the sun's flame untempered, much less upon the unmixed splendor of God's potencies, though the diluted draught he does receive should prove to be an ample source of joy. The same notion, continues Philo, may be extracted from Ps 61 (62):12: "One thing God has spoken; two things have I heard."\(^3\) "One" refers to the unmixed, which is a monad, whereas "twice" is like the mixed, since it admits both combination and separation. God thus speaks in unmixed monads or unities, for his work constitutes a naked disembodied unity, whereas man's hearing is a product of two factors, i.e., pneuma in concussion with air (and the consonance of a high and low pitch). In conclusion, Philo remarks that Moses did well to oppose to the multitude of unjust thoughts the single just man (Gen 6:8), since the righteous few more than counterbalance the wicked many.

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\(^2\)This leads him away from the topic of God's "anger" and immutability, a topic to which he does not, in fact, return. It is notable, thus, that only the sections 20-72 justify the title of the treatise, ὁδεῖον ἐκπληκτον τῷ ἁγγον.

\(^3\)It is noteworthy that Philo quotes from the Psalms three times in the course of this section (74, 77, 82), and bases his exegesis in large part on these quotations. Such a concentration seems to be matched only at Somn. 2.242-46, where he passes from Ps 36 (37):4 to 64 (65):10 to 45 (46):5.
B. Detailed Commentary

70 ἑπαυτιέον...σκέψειν. Philo here indicates that he is returning to the question originally raised in 52, "how is anger predicable of God?" The section from 52 to 69 has been a preliminary discussion.

διὰ μισθωμένην δὲ ἐπολίησα αὐτοῦ. Although some rabbis take God's regret literally, others connect Heb. הָנָּחָם with נְחָמָה, "consolation." Cf. BR 27.6, T-A 258: "R. Judah said: [God said] 'I regret that I created him from the elements below, for had I created him from those above, he would not have rebelled against me.' R. Nehemiah said: 'There is some consolation in my having created man from the elements below, for had I created him from those above, then just as he had caused those below to rebel against me, so would he have done with those above.'" It is noticeable that in the rejected hypothetical order of the clauses, Philo uses διότι (= "because"), whereas in the Biblical order he uses διὰ. He presumably wants to take διὰ not as meaning "because" (i.e. the divine anger caused by having made man), but in the sense "as is proved or shown by the fact that." Cf. LSJ s.v. διὰ, B2. διότι is not normally used in this sense; hence Philo's use of it in the re-ordered phrase which he rejects.

ὅτι οὐ μὴν φαύλοι ὁμορραγὸν θεὸν, οὐ δὲ ἄγαθος χάριτι. In the Jewish Wisdom literature it is similarly assumed that not all men are capable of obtaining wisdom, that some men are wise and others foolish (Prov 1:7, 32, 22; 9:7; 14:6; 17:16). Ben Sira, for example, spells out God's polar plan of creation which provides for two antithetical categories of people: "Likewise also all men are made from the clay, and Adam was created of earth. In his great wisdom God distinguished them, and differentiated their ways. Some he blessed and exalted, and others he hallowed and brought nigh to himself. Some he cursed and abased, and overthrew them from their place. As clay is in the power of the potter, to fashion it according to his good pleasure; so is man in the power of his creator, to make him according to his ordinance. Over against evil stands the good, and against death life; likewise over against the godly the sinner. Even thus look upon all the works of God, each different, one the opposite of the other" (Sir 33:10-15). See D. Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon (N.Y., 1979) 48-49.
71 χυρολογούμενον. First attested in Philo. Cf. Sacr. 101; Det. 58; Post. 7, 168; Somn. 2.245; Abr. 120; Mos. 1.75. (χυρολογία in Philodemus Rhet. 1.1745, "Longinus," 28.1.) τροπικός in sense of "figurative" not attested before the rhetoricians of the first century B.C.E., Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Philodemus and "Longinus." Philo uses the term frequently, e.g. LA 2.14 and Jos. 125 (τροπική ἀπόδοσις, opposed to ἐντή), LA 1.45 (τροπικός εἰρηναι); Det. 167 (τροπικότερον καὶ δι᾽ ὑπονοοῖν). At Post. 53 ff. it is used interchangeably with συμβολικός. At Conf. 190, ᾧ propros the Tower of Babel (Gen 11:7), we find the term used in the context of a (respectful) criticism of literal interpreters: ταῦτα μὲν ἡμεῖς· οἱ δὲ τοῖς ἐμφανέσιν, καὶ προχείροις μόνον ἐπαυγολοδουθοῦντες οἴονται νυν γένεσιν διαλέκτων Ἑλληνικῶν τε καὶ βαρβάρων ὑπογράφονται· οὓς οὐχ ἄν αἰτιολόγους—ἔσωχ γὰρ ἀληθεὶ καὶ αὐτοὶ χρώνται λόγῳ—παρακαλέσωμι' ἀν μὴ ἐπὶ τούτων στήναι, μετελθεὶν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰς τροπικὰς ἀποδοσίας, νομίζοντας τὰ μὲν ῥητὰ τῶν χρησιμῶν σκλας τινας ἄσανει συμάτων εἶναι, τὰς δ’ ἐμφανοῦντας δυνάμεις τὰ ὑπεστώτα ἄληθεα πράγματα. Nowhere else does it seem to be used in conjunction with χυρολογοῦμεν.

eὐθυβόλος. Adverb first attested in Philo. Cf. Cher. 1: χυρὸς καὶ εὐθυβόλος; Det. 22; Flac. 132; Spec. 4.51; Mig. 79. There is some uncertainty among the translators as to how this is to be taken, but it seems best to understand: "the term 'anger' . . . is accurately applied in a metaphorical sense to the Existent." εὐθυβόλος does not go comfortably in close connection with χυρολογοῦμενον.

δι’ ὀργήν. ὀργή in Stoic ethical theory is a species of ἐπιθυμία, and is defined as a desire for revenge against someone who appears to have wronged us (SVF 3.394-98). For the four primary passions, see SVF 3.391-93.

ἐπιληπτικός. In sense of "culpable," first attested in Philo.

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προφυλακή. In sense of "caution," first in Philo. Cf. Mos. 2.145; Decal. 98; Spec. 3.166; 4.104, 196. Also Plut. Soll. An. 978A.

"δι' ἑθυμώθην, δι' ἐποίησα αὕτως" εἰπών. The first δι', as Colson remarks, may either introduce the quotation or be a part of it, but the former seems more likely, in view of the form of the quotation in 70.

μετανοοῦντος. Cf. Aet. 40, where he calls μετάνοια, πάθος καὶ νόημα ψυχῆς.

τὰ πάντα προσιδοσμένη θεοῦ φύσις. Cf. LA 3.88; Seneca, Ben. 4.32.

συνεκτιμῶτατον. In the sense of "most essential" first attested in Philo. Cf. Op. 8, 101, 162; LA 1.59; 3.5, 145; Cher. 88, etc.

τιγή μὲν ἀμαρτημάτων θυμὸς. In Stoic usage, θυμὸς refers specifically to the πάθος or irrational emotions. For the distinction between καθήκοντα and καταρθώματα, see SVF 3.516-17. Cf. Cic. Off. 1.3.8; 3.3.14; LA 1.56.

73 τὴν δὲξίαν καὶ σωτήριον κεῖσα δρέγων. Cf. Sifre Numbers Pinhas 134, where it is said that God's "right hand," representing the attribute of mercy which is extended to all, is also called "the mighty hand," inasmuch as it has to repress the attribute of strict justice.

74 ἄνακερδόσηται. Thus is introduced the theme of "mixture" which occupies the rest of the passage, to 85.

"ἔλεον καὶ μίσους ἄσοιμα σοι". Ps 100 (101):1. Philo quotes accurately here, though reading έλεον for έλεος with the Codex Alexandrinus, which is the Classical form.

75 μηδένδος ἀνθρώπων . . . ἀπαλατον. Cf. Mos. 2.147; παντὶ γενητῷ . . . συμφέρει τὸ ἀμαρτάνειν ἐστίν. Even Noah's justice, we may note, is a relative thing. Without God's mercy, he too would perish.

ὁλισθήματιν. In moral sense first attested in Philo and found only in this passage. For life as "one long slipping," cf. Mut. 55-56, 185. Cf. Plut. Mor. 49C.
εἰδικόν. εἰδικός really seems to mean "individual" here. Cf. note on 95.

76 δόγμα. First attested in Philo. Cf. Det. 15, 100; Post. 153; Somn. 1.122; Mos. 1.175; Spec. 3.6; Legat. 357. Also Plut. Crass. 23. Some suggestion of the Flood seems present here.

tοῦ δεόν άνακαρπηθων. On God's mercy, cf. Sacr. 42; Spec. 1.308; Praem. 163; Ps 103:7-13; 78:38; Jonah 3:8; 4:3; Sir 17:29; 18:11-14; Wisd 11:23-26; 12:16-21; Test.Abr. A.10; BT R.H. 17b; Ber. 7a; M.Q. 16b; PT Peah 1.1; 16b. R. Berechiah [Amora of the 4th cent.] presents a similar view concerning God's tempering his judgment with mercy: "When the Holy One, blessed be He, came to create the first man, He foresaw that righteous and wicked persons would descend from him. He said: 'If I create him, wicked people will descend from him; if I do not create him, how shall righteous people issue from him?' What did the Holy One, blessed be He, do? He removed the way of the wicked from before him; made the attribute of compassion a partner in His action, and created man." A Scriptural basis for the idea of this partnership is to be found in the wording of the verse, 'In the day that Y. Elohim made heaven and earth.' The juxtaposition of the two Names was expounded by an anonymous homilist, under the influence of R. Samuel bar Nahmani, as follows: "It is like the case of a king who had empty cups. The king thought: If I put hot water in them, they will crack; cold water, they will become warped. What did the king do? He mixed hot with cold water and put it in them, and they remained undamaged. Even so the Holy One, blessed be He, argued: 'If I create the world with the attribute of compassion, there will be many sinners; if I do so with the attribute of justice, the world will not endure. Therefore I shall create it with both the attribute of justice and the attribute of compassion, and may it endure!'--(this is the meaning of) 'Y. Elohim.'" (BRL 8.4 T-A 59; 12.15, T-A 112.) (Cf. Tos. Sotah 4.1.) See Urbach, The Sages: 458-60.

πρεσβύτερος γὰρ δίκης ὁ δεός. Cf. QE 2.62; Deus 108. In the Yom Kippur liturgy we read: "He is merciful, and His mercy precedes His anger." (From an acrostic poem ascribed to Yannai, ca. 6th cent.) This statement is based on Exod 34:6, where we are first told that God is compassionate and only later that 'he does not remit all punishment.'
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77 ὁ λογομ. Quotation from Ps 74 (75):9. Heb. reads ὑγίν ἐκαμαρ, "foaming wine." Philo bases his exegesis on the apparent contradiction in the LXX between ἀματοῦ and πληρος κεραμάτων, deriving from this the doctrine that qualities or powers present in God in a pure or "unmixed" state can only be received or comprehended by us in a "mixed" state.

ταῖς δυνάμεσι πρὸς μὲν ἐαυτὸν ἀματοῦς χρήται. For the notion that God's powers are unmixed, cf. Op. 20, 71; Cher. 29; Mut. 184.

78 ἀματοῦ μὲν τὴν ἡλίου φλόγα μὴ δύνασθαι θεαθῆναι. Cf. Op. 71; Abr. 76; Somn. 1.239; Fug. 165; Spec. 1.40. The imagery derives probably from Plato Rep. VII 515C ff. and Laws 897D. The same notion is found in Sib. Or., Frag. 1.10-14: "For what flesh can see visibly the heavenly and true God, the Immortal, whose abode is the heaven? Nay, not even face to face with the sun's rays are men able to stand, being mortal, mere veins and flesh wedded to bones." Cf. BT 50b; Bemid. R. 14.3; Clem. Alex. Protr. 6.71; Xen. Mem. 4.3.14; Ps.-Xenoph. ap. Stob. 2 p. 15,5 Wachsmuth. See Festugière, RAH 4.13-14.

ταῖς δυνάμεσι . . . ἀματοῦς . . . κεραμάναις. Cf. Proclus, Elements 150: "Any processive term in the divine orders is incapable of receiving all the potencies of its producer, as are secondary principles in general of receiving all the potencies of their priors; the prior principles possess certain powers which transcend their inferiors and are incomprehensible to subsequent grades of deity."

ἀμυδρωτεῖα. See comment. on Deus 3.

πλῆμα. First attested in Philo, but obviously a school definition. Cf. [Arist.] De Mundo 394b2; Placit. 2.13.7; SVF 2.668; Ps.-Justin, Quærest. et Resp. ad Graecos 172c (ὁ ἡλίου πλῆμα αἰθέρου) ... τῇ ὕσσος) ... Cher. 26; Somn. 1.22, 145.

79 τὸ σωματοῦ τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς χρηματίστης ἀνείς καὶ χαλάσας. We find a similar idea in BR 6.17, T-A: 47: "R. Joshua said in the name of R. Bon: 'Then the heavens proclaimed His righteousness' (Ps 50:6), in the days to come the heavens will tell of the kindness which the Holy One, blessed be He, showed to his world in not placing the luminaries in the first heaven, for had He done so, no creature could have endured the day's heat." Cf. 16, "'nothing escapes his heat' (Ps 19:7), the sun has a covering;
whence do we know this, 'he placed in them a tent for the sun' (Ps 19:5), and there is a pool of water before it; when it goes forth, the Holy One, blessed be He, diminishes its strength by means of the water, so that it should not go forth and consume the world."

τῷ ταμευομένῳ ἐν ταῖς δωσεὶ συγγενεῖ αὐτοῦ καὶ φιλῷ ὑπαντίδοσιν ἀσπάσται. A clear echo of Tim. 45BC: "For they caused the pure fire within us, which is akin (Ἀδειλὼν δὲν) to that of day, to flow through the eyes . . . so whenever the stream of vision is surrounded by mid-day light, it flows out like unto like, and coalescing therewith it forms one kindred substance along the path of the eye’s vision." Philo adopts here the Platonic theory of vision, which was also that of the Stoics, cf. SVF 2.863-71.


τὸς ἀν ἀκρατὴς δεξιώθαι δύναι το θυμός δὲν. For the notion that even God’s benefits cannot be received by man in their fulness, cf. Op. 23; Post. 143, 145; LA 3.163; Mut. 218.

'ΑΛΛ’ οἶδ’ ὁ σύμπας σύμανδος τε καὶ κόσμος. Cf. Post. 144.

81 μεσότητας ἡγούμενος. The contrast here between μεσότητας and ἀκρατητικά below is interesting, in view of the common Middle Platonic doctrine (Plut. Virt. Mor. 444D ff.; Albinus, Did. p. 184,12 ff.) deriving from a remark of Aristotle’s in the EN (1107a23), that the virtues are both μεσότητας and ἀκρατητικά. Philo here seems to be playing upon this theme, adapting it to his own purposes.

82 ἀπαξ κόριος ἐλάλησεν. Ps 61 (62):12, LXX text: ἀπαξ ἐλάλησεν ὁ θεός. Miss UF of Philo read μὴν ἐλάλησεν ὁ θεός, δόο ταῦτην ἡμώνσαμεν. Such "corrections" are quite characteristic of this family of mss. See Intro. p. 89.

τὸ δὲ δίς τῷ κεκραμένῳ. For the impurity of the dyad, cf. QQ 2.12.

83 μονάδος μὲν οὖν ἀκρατοὺς ὁ θεὸς λαλεῖ. Cf. Gig. 52; Mig. 52 (derived from Tim. 67B; cf. Tim. Locr. 101A).
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γεγονός άρος πληξίς. This sounds very like a school definition of speech, though it is not attested elsewhere before Philo, cf. LA 3.183. The definition seems to be known to Plutarch, De E 390B, Def. Or. 436D, and, though doubtless Stoic, goes back in substance to Tim. 67B. Cf. [Plut.] Plac. 4, 16. γεγονός λόγος (a phrase not found elsewhere except for Plot. 5.1.6.9) is frequently used by Philo as the equivalent of προφορικός λόγος. Cf. Mos. 2.127; LA 3.41; Det. 38; Fug. 92; etc. See Rist, Plotinus: 100-101.


84 τὸ γὰρ ἄφ' ἡγεμονικὸν πνεῦμα. For the Stoic theory of hearing see D.L. 7.158 (SVF 2.872): "We hear when the air between the sonant body and the organ of hearing suffers concussion (πληττόμενον). Cf. SVF 2.836.

tὸ γὰρ συνηχοῦν. The γὰρ presumably picks up ἀρμονίως. The blending of high and low tones is the second way in which human speech is "dyadic." Cf. Tim. 80B: μίαν ἐξ ὀξείας καὶ βαρείας ξυνεκράσαντο πάθην.

85 ἀριθμὸς μὲν ἐλάττονα, δυνάμει δὲ πλείονα. It is a basic principle of Neoplatonism that entities further down the scale of being are greater in number than their priors, but inferior in power. Philo seems here to show acquaintance with an earlier form of this scholastic formula. Cf. Proclus, Elements 62: "Every multiplicity which is nearer to the One has fewer members than those more remote, but is greater in power"; Plot. 2.9.6.29, 6.7.8. Here, of course, there is no question of a hierarchy of being. Philo is simply contrasting the one just man with the many unjust, and saying that his power for good outweighs theirs for evil. Cf. Mig. 120-26, where Abraham is portrayed as single-handedly saving his environment.
Commentary on Gen 6:8-9: Νόε δὲ εὗρεν χάριν ἐναντίον κυρίου τοῦ θεοῦ. ἀδεια δὲ αἱ γενέσεις Νόε. Νόε δινήρωτος δύνας, τέλειος ὁ ἐν τῷ γενεὰν αὐτοῦ. τῷ θεῷ εὐθυρεῖτο Νόε.

A. General Comments

Philo now turns to the next verse in Genesis, "Noah found grace before the Lord God," the interpretation of which he has in fact anticipated in the previous section (73 ff.), where Noah is presented as the paradigm of the ἄγαθος, who exist according to the χάρις, or saving grace, of God, as opposed to the φαῦλος, who exist according to his ὁμός. In 86, however, Philo turns first to a discussion of the concept of εὐφρεσίν, provoked by the word εὗρε in the lemma. He begins with a scholastic distinction, possibly borrowed from some Hellenistic source, which may have been stimulated by Plato’s frequent use of διαπές in contexts associated with reminiscence (e.g. Phaedr. 252E, Meno 74A, Soph. 253E), between εὕρεσις, "discovery," and ἀνεύρεσις, "rediscovery." Of the former activity, he then declares, the Great Vow of the Nazirite, as described in Num 6, provides an excellent illustration.

His allegorical exegesis of the Nazirite Vow (87-91) concentrates on two aspects of it, the allowing of the hair to grow long, and the pollution, and consequent cancellation, of the Vow, occasioned by sudden death in one's vicinity. (These are the aspects, we may note, to which he confines himself also on the other occasions on which he deals with the Vow, LA 1.17, Agr. 175-76, Fug. 115.) The Vow is seen as the highest form of prayer, which consists in recognizing God as the sole author of all good things, indeed of all existence, not even granting the status of assistants in production to all the other apparent causal agents in the world. (For this form of contemplative prayer, cf. Fug. 92; Gig. 52; Plant. 126; Mig. 12; Spec. 1.272; Ebr. 194; Plot. 5.1.6.8-11. See also Rist, Plotinus 211-12; R. T. Wallis, "Nous as Experience," in The Significance of

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1Cf. such Stoic neologisms as ἀφωμή (as opp. of ὀρμή), ἀπομομένου, or εὐμάθεια (as opp. to μάθος). The distinction between εὐρεσις and ἀνεύρεσις seems not to be made elsewhere in so many words. [See also on this Supplementary Note 4, p. 71].
Neoplatonism 121-53). The growing of the hair symbolizes the fostering of the virtues in the mind; the pollution from contiguity to sudden death represents the sudden falls from grace which may afflict anyone in a state of prokopē, and kill the sprouts of the virtues.

What this leads on to (91-98) is the reflection that God's grace can make the attainment of virtue and happiness easy, like the unexpected finding of a treasure. Jacob, the Ἀκρατής, is brought in as an illustration of this, with special reference to Gen 27:20. This example leads to a contrast between the easy success of those with natural aptitudes and the fruitless struggles of those who are "sluggish and slow of soul," the assumption being that natural aptitude is a grace from God.

We may compare with this contrast of these two types the more elaborate four-way distinction which Philo makes at Fug. 120-77, where he enters upon a full discussion of Moses' doctrine on Finding and Seeking (εὑρεσίς καὶ Ζητεσίς). There are four classes of person: (1) those who neither seek nor find; (2) those who both seek and find; (3) those who seek but do not find; (4) those who find without having to seek. It is these two latter classes that are being distinguished in this passage. Particularly instructive is a comparison of 93-96 with Fug. 166-77, where the fourth class is being discussed, since Philo uses the same texts and examples in both places. First, at Fug. 169, we have Jacob's reply to Isaac in Gen 27:20 (where it is plain, as it is not here [see note ad loc.], that both are aspects of the same person, the naturally-gifted individual). Then, at Fug. 175-76, we find the passage of Deut 6:10-11, containing the promises of God to the Israelites, where the exegesis is the same as here, except that at Fug. 176 the Χάρις and αἱ εὐφυεῖς ψυχαί, who are ready to receive wisdom, while here they are rather τὰ χορταὶ τῶν πόνων τούτων πρόχειρα ἀδάνα, the intellectual prizes awaiting such souls.

Philo is not, however, it seems, really concerned to indulge in heartless mockery of his less gifted associates. It becomes plain from the next passage (99-103), which is an exegesis of Deut 1:43-44 (in particular the phrase παραβαίνοντες τινες ἀνέβησαν εἰς τὸ δρόμον), that the dullards whom he is criticizing are really those who are unregenerate at heart, not submitting their wills to God, but honoring him in externals only, and doing violence to their evil inclinations in order to
maintain an appearance of piety. This might seem a reasonably commendable alternative to not doing violence to one's evil inclinations, but it is not good enough for Philo. He characterizes it as δεισιδαιμονία (103), an interesting further example of the uses he finds for this concept (cf. note on Gig. 16).

All this, then, has been paving the way for the discussion of what it means for Noah to "find grace" with God. Only those of pure mind are in a state to "find" and benefit from the goods that God bestows.

Continuing his analysis of Gen 6:8, Philo goes on, first (104-8), to suggest various interpretations of the words "Noah found grace with the Lord God." (Contrast the far less sophisticated treatment of the lemma at QG 1.96.) That Noah merely obtained grace seems unreasonable to Philo, since, in his view, all creatures are recipients of divine grace, but the explanation that Noah was thought worthy of grace, inasmuch as he did not "deface with base practices the divinely stamped coin of his intellect," is not much better, since, strictly speaking, no one is truly worthy of God's grace. A more likely explanation is that Noah came to the realization that all things are the grace or gift of God, χάρις being taken in the sense of "free gift." God's creation of the world is thus a gift of his goodness (cf. the parallel discussion in LA 3.77-78), and elsewhere Philo designates one pole of the Divine Logos as άγαθότης or ποιητική δόναις. Philo proceeds (109-10) to point out that Noah, according to Gen 6:8, LXX, was pleasing to the Lord and to God, that is, to the Divine Powers, whereas Moses, and those of his company, are pleasing to God himself (this conclusion being drawn from a comparison with Exod 33:17: εὐρήκας χάριν παρ' ἐμοί). Elsewhere in the corpus, Philo makes similar distinctions between the type of mind that attains to a knowledge of God through his works, and one that achieves a direct intuition of him (the "sons of heaven" and "the sons of God" of Gig. 60). In Abr. 119-23 we are told that to the mind as yet uninitiated into the highest mysteries and still unable to apprehend the Existent alone by itself, but only through its actions, God appears as a triad constituted by himself and his two potencies, the creative and the regent. Elsewhere he speaks of those who apprehend God through his works as advancing from lower to higher levels by a sort of heavenly ladder and conjecturing his existence through plausible inference (εἰκότι λογισμῷ) (Praem.
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40-46). The latter are liable to take God's image, the Logos, not as a copy but as the original form of God himself (Somn. 1.232, 238, 66, 117, 148; Mig. 174; Conf. 145-46).

Philo now (111-16) contrasts with Noah and Moses the mind which loves the body and the passions and is enslaved by Pleasure, chief cateress of our compound nature, utilizing for this purpose the casting of Joseph into prison in Gen 39, in a rather perverse interpretation (Joseph is represented as a eunuch himself, and the fact that it was the Lord who gave him favor with the jailer [39:21] is disregarded). Brimming with all manner of impiety, possessors of the Joseph-mind are in the true sense of the word prisoners, and are deluded into serving as the courtiers and deputies of their prison warden, Lord Vice. However, it is better for them to endure the lot of prisoner, and through suffering find mercy, than to be prison-keepers, a seemingly pleasant task, but in reality an unending thraldom. Philo concludes with an exhortation to the soul to shun evil and seek to be pleasing to God, though if that be impossible then at least to his Powers, as did Noah.

Here (117-21) Philo turns to the exegesis of Gen 6:9, to which he gives a curious interpretation, made possible by disregarding 6:10, in which Noah's offspring, Shem, Ham and Japheth, are actually mentioned. For Philo, the "generations of Noah" consist in his being a man, just, perfect, and well-pleasing to God, the perfect products of a perfect mind, a sort of quartet of virtues, presided over by τὸ δεό εὖφαγικὰ as a supreme virtue, and the sum of them making up εὐδαιμονία, in the Stoic manner. The concept of generation then leads him to make a distinction between the normal sense of γένεσις, something coming to be (something) out of nothing, and what one might call the Platonic sense of γένεσις, which consists in the change from a higher genus to the lower species, which is referred to by Moses when he says, "But these are the generations of Jacob. Joseph was seventeen years old, keeping sheep with his brethren, being still young, with the sons of Bilhah and with the sons of Zelphah, his father's wives" (Gen 37:2). When Jacob's mind abandoned the divine heights and sank into the realm of mortality, then at once Joseph was born, symbol of bodily things. The treatment of Joseph in this passage is in accord with Philo's general low estimation of him (cf. Mig. 158-59; Conf. 72; Somn. 2.10-16, etc.). Only in the De Josepho is this estimation
reversed (apart from an isolated positive treatment at *LA* 3.237).
No doubt it is Joseph's connection with Egypt (the body) which
drags him down in Philo's estimation (see Colson's *Gen. Intro.*
to Vol. VI, pp. xii-xiii; note on Joseph, Vol X [by J. W. Earp],

B. Detailed Commentary

86 οὐνεπιστολωμέναι. Characteristic exegetical exhortation,
deriving from Plato (*Crat.* 422C; *Hipp. Maj.* 296B); cf. *Cher.* 91;
*Post.* 32; *Saor.* 24.

οἱ ζητητικοὶ τῶν ψυχῶν ὀνομάτων. One thinks originally
of such a man as Prodicus, but Philo must be referring to more
recent authorities. This class of person is also alluded to at
*Det.* 76, as being the experts on the question whether ἀνθωμοτής
is to be termed a γένος, an ἰδέα, or an ἐνσάμα (he himself, he
implies, would regard these terms as equivalent). At *Conf.* 5,
we find οἱ ζητητικοὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων being in agreement that the
earth is the central point of the universe. Now Diogenes
Laertius (9.69) gives ζητητικό as one name for the Sceptics,
but that seems hardly possible here. The term seems rather to
apply to someone of Posidonius' range of interests, covering
both grammar and astronomy. R. Pfeiffer writes: "Aristotle
had apparently drawn up a list of 'difficulties' of interpreta-
tion in Homer with their respective 'solutions;' this custom of
ζητήματα προσάλλεται may have prospered at the symposia of intel-
llectual circles . . . Although certain circles of the Alexan-
drian Museum seem to have adopted this 'method' of ζητήματα,
which amused Ptolemaic kings and Roman emperors, as it had
amused Athenian symposiasts, the great and serious grammarians
disliked it as a more or less frivolous game. It was mainly
continued by the philosophic schools, Peripatetics, Stoics,
Neoplatonists, and by amateurs, until Porphyry arranged his
final collection of Ουμειακά ζητήματα in the grand style, in
which he very probably still used Aristotle's original work"
Lieberman has pointed out that some copies of the Hexapla trans-
late midrash (in II Chron 13:22) ἐκζήτησις, inquiry, which is
the exact equivalent of the rabbinic use of that word. "Ezra
has set his heart to inquire into the Law of the Lord" (Ezra
7:10). The Hebrew לִידְרָשׁ is correctly translated by LXX:
ζητήσας. Didymus the grammarian (2nd half of 1st cent. B.C.E.
and begin. of 1st cent. C.E.) likes to introduce his disquisitions with ζητεῖται, διὰ τί, etc., and the ζητήματα constituted a notable part of the philologic, the philosophic and the juridic literature. (See Lieberman, Hellenism 48.) Cf. Demetrius (earliest known Greco-Jewish writer; lived during the reign of Ptolemy IV [221-204 B.C.E.]): ἐπιζητεῖται δε τινα πῶς οἱ Ἰσρα-λίται διὰ δοξον ἄνωπλοι ἔξελθόντες: (FPG 179).

87 εὐχῇ . . . αἴτησις ἁγαθῶν παρὰ θεοῦ. A Platonic definition, based on Laws VII 801α: εὐχῇ παρὰ θεῶν αἴτησις εἶσι, it being added immediately afterwards that one should be sure that one is asking for an ἁγαθὸν. Cf. Agr. 99; Sacr. 53.

μηδενὸς ἔτερον . . . συνεργοῦντος. It seems better to excise the τῶν before εἰς τὸ δοκεῖν ὡφελεῖν, as τὰ εἰς τὸ δοκεῖν ὡφελεῖν, meaning, presumably, "those things which are generally thought to be useful" is very strange Greek.

μεγάλη δὲ εὐχῇ. This is derived from LXX version of Num 6:2: δὲ εἰς μεγάλως ἐδημαίει εὐχῇ, where μεγάλως (ἐδημαίει) is the LXX rendering of γαρ τι (lindor), meaning "make an extraordinary, special vow," but interpretable as "great." Cf. Somn. 1.252-53, where the special feature of the nazirite vow is declared to be that one gives to God not only one's offering, but oneself as well.

κατόπτοκος. First attested in Philo, who uses it both in a literal sense (as here), and metaphorically (e.g. of ἄρετη, LA 1.49).


μεταβολάς . . . καὶ τροπάς. A frequent collocation in Philo, cf. LA 1.8; Cher. 88; Det. 87; Ebr. 91; etc.

89 αἰγνόλον. At LA 1.17 and Agr. 175-76, Philo actually quotes αἰγνόλον for ἐξάπνα at Num 6:9, though he quotes correctly at Fug. 115. ἐξάπνα is a vulgar form, so that we seem to have here an instance of Philo, when quoting from memory, unobtrusively "correcting" the LXX idiom.

οἶδα τίνις τυμωνόμον. A variant of the storm-at-sea image (cf. Agr. 174, also dealing with the Nazirite Vow). Here again, as in Deus 27 (see note ad loc.), Philo seems to recognize the irrational in human nature in a manner which gives the appearance of being alien to Greek philosophical thought, but
which may in fact exempt the Sage from this liability. The
sudden fall from grace seems to be unmotivated, and can happen
to the best of us, assuming we are still προκόπηκτοις. τροπὴ
is a favorite word of Philo's for this propensity of the human
soul to vacillate, cf. LA 2.83; Det. 122; Mut. 250; etc. For
the concept of sudden changes of purpose, cf. Somn. 2.145-49,
and see A. Bonhöffer, Die Ethik des Stoikers Epiktet (Stuttgart
1894) 148-49.

90 καὶ ἄπερ ἀπέβαλεν εὑρίσκει. From the context, one
would expect this to be an example of ἀνεύρεσις rather than of
εὑρεσις. Philo must be thinking of the necessity of starting
again from the beginning; and yet the verb ἀναμιμνήσκεται just
above makes this solution difficult to accept.

τὰς προτέρας τῆς τροπῆς ἡμέρας ἄλογους. As Colson
points out (ad loc.), the context here (and at LA 1.17, where
Philo also deals with the Vow of the Nazirite) requires that he
take προτέρας . . . ἡμέρας as "the former days of the defec-
tion," not as "the days before the defection," as the LXX
intended. Also, he toys with the idea that ἄλογους may somehow
mean παραλόγους, or "repugnant to reason," leaving the decision
as between this interpretation and taking ἄλογους as "out of
account," as the LXX surely intends, up to the reader.

"όν ἄλογος οὔσ' ἄριστος". Moses and Colson quote Theocri-
tus, Idyll 14.48: ἄμεσς ο' οὔτε λόγῳ τυνός ἄκιοι οὔτὲ ἄριστοι,
but this is only to be regarded as proof that both Theocritus
and Philo are acquainted with the common Greek proverbial expres-
sion, arising, it seems, from an oracle delivered by Delphi to
Megara (or to Aegium in Achaea), cf. Plut. Symp. V 7, 682F;
Parke and Wormell, The Delphic Oracle II p. 1; and Leutsch and

91 ὁπερ γεωμόνον βασι τινες. This is a stock school
example of a chance or accidental (ἄπο τύχης, κατά συμβεβηκός)
happening, deriving from Arist. EN III 3, 1112a27, and Met. 30,
1025a14: οἶον εἰ τις ὀρθῶν φιλό βόθρον εὑρε ἄκρον. It is
the normal example in later treatments of the topic of fate and
free will, e.g. Ps.-Plut. De Fato 572A: οἶον τὸ εὑρετίν χρυσόν
σκάπτοντα ἕνα φιλέως, which is verbally closer to Philo.
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92 πωδουμένου τού πατρὸς αὐτοῦ τῆς ἐπιστήμης. The commentators have been much exercised over the syntax of τῆς ἐπιστήμης. πωδουμένου should not take a genitive of the object of enquiry. Mosēs presumes a περί to have been omitted. Colson would prefer to take it with πατρὸς and translate "the father of his knowledge." Colson is surely correct. The comparison with *Somn.* 1.47, where Abraham is described as ὁ πάππος αὐτοῦ τῆς ἐπιστήμης, in the sense of his "intellectual grandfather," seems decisive.

93 οἱ τὰ δηματα πεπηρωμένοι. This may be a reference to the men of Sodom, who are given at *Fug.* 144 as an example of those who seek without finding. They are τυφλοὶ διάνοιαν, and are unable to find the door.

φύσεως ἐφωμολογ. Except for one use in Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Ars Rhetorica* 5.3)—if this work is genuine (cf. George Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World* [Princeton, 1972] 634-36)—the noun ἐφωμολογία is first found in Philo. He makes frequent use of the present phrase in discussions of ἐφωμία, e.g. *Post.* 71; *Sobr.* 223; *Congr.* 37; *Mut.* 2. Cf. Ps.-Plut. *Lib. Ed.* 14C.

ἐφωμολόγῳ καὶ ἐφθάντῳ ... προσβολή. For the collocation, cf. *Post.* 80. The noun ἐφθάντα, found first in Philo, is identified by him as a component of ἐφωμία, along with ἐπιμονή and μνήμη, at *LA* 1.55; *Cher.* 102; and *Somn.* 2.37, in a way which suggests some scholastic source.

τὴν ... ἀφυπέρεστήν ... κατάληψιν. Note the Stoic term. In this conceit, objects actually thrust themselves upon the senses of the natural "finder" and impose κατάληψις upon him.

95 πόλεις μὲν οὖν καὶ οἰκίας. In this distinction of genera and species of virtues Philo will presumably have in mind some such distinction as that which Diogenes Laertius attributes to the Stoics (7.92). Philo on various occasions makes the distinction between ἐλθικαί and γενικάλ ἄρετα, e.g., *Ebr.* 138; *Fug.* 176, but he never seems to give a list of ἐλθικά ἄρετα. On many occasions he speaks of the four generic virtues as ἐλθικαῖ, as opposed to Virtue in General (e.g. *LA* 1.63-65), but that does not count.

ἐλθικός, as a term opposed to γενικός, is Hellenistic, being first found in Dionysius Thrax. If we consider certain
passages similar to the present one, such as *Cher.* 7 or *Mut.* 77-80 (where Sarah's change of name is being discussed), we find εἶδων ἀρτή and εἶδος described as ὑφασμόν, seeming to indicate that εἶδος is understood either as "form immanent in matter" (necessarily, of an individual body), or simply "individual." This is an interesting complication in the use of the word.

96 οὐράνιων καὶ ποτίμων δεξιμεναλ ναμάτων. The association of the idea of cisterns with that of the sweet water of the virtues is perhaps provoked by the figurative usage of the adjective ποτίμως which depends on Plato (*Phaedrus* 243D) and often in Philo (e.g. *LA* 2.32; 3.12; *Post.* 129).

98 ὠσπρ ... ἐνδαλαττέουσα. Storm-at-sea imagery again. ἐνδαλαττέω and ὑπόδρομος first attested in Philo, in Greek prose.

99 "παραβιασάμενοι ... ἔως Ἑρμᾶ". This translates the Hebrew *watāṣidā*, and seems to mean simply "acting wilfully." Philo gives full weight to the concept of βία which he discerns here, as can be observed from his exegesis. Those who try to force themselves to acquire the arts for which they are not apt are doomed to failure and disgrace, as also are those who perform moral duties, and divine worship, without sincerity (Ἄσωγ-καταθέτω γνώμη).

100 τὸς τοῦ συνειδότος. Philo is the first on record to use τὸ συνειδός as a term for conscience. He uses it very frequently, e.g. *Deus* 128; *Det.* 23; *Fug.* 159; *Jos.* 47-48; *Spec.* 3.54, often in conjunction with the verb ἐλέγχω. It is hard to believe that he invented this term, but evidence to the contrary is lacking. (Cf. article on σύνοιðα in Arndt-Gingrich, Gk-Eng. Lex. to NT pp. 798-99.) See Intro., p. 207, and A. Pelletier, "Deux Expressions de la Notion de Conscience," *REG* 80 (1967) 363-71.

101 τὸς τὰς ὀλιγοχρημάτους παρακαταθήκας ἀποδιδόντας. ὀλιγοχρήματος is found only in Philo, but the example he gives here goes back at least to Aristotle (*EN* V 8, 1135b3 ff., itself a variation of Plato's example at *Rep.* 331C-332B; cf. Cic. *Fin.* 3.59). He gives the example again at *Plant.* 103; *Cher.* 14; and
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Spec. 4.67. It sounds like a stock school example of an honest act performed for dishonest motives. Cf. also *Decal.* 172: τὸ μὴ ποιεῖσθαι προκόλαμμα πίστιν ἄπιστας.


ἐπὶ συμμηχὺς ἱεροπρεπεστάτην . . . προαίρεσιν. Mangey's reading, ἱεροπρεπεστάτην, agreeing with προαίρεσιν ἔλου, gives much better sense than ἱεροπρεπεστάτης of mss., adopted by Cohn-Wendland.

102 ἡμολοχίαν. Philo uses this term again, at Spec. 1.319, to characterize the initiation ceremonies of mystery religions, which he declares to be forbidden to followers of Moses. A certain degree of ritual buffoonery was associated with some mysteries, notably the procession to Eleusis and the rites at the Theban Kabeirion.

ἐπιμορφάζειν. Attested only in Philo, but used by him frequently.

103 ἐπικλασθέντες διὰ τῶν ἐείσιδαιμονίας συμβόλων. ἐπισκιάδω ἐν a metaphorical sense is first attested in Philo (more Classical authors seem to have used ἐπισκοτείῳ). For Philo's concept of ἐείσιδαιμονία, cf. note on Gig. 16.

ἡ +κόλασις μὲν ἐστὶν ὀσοτήτος. Mss. read κόλασις, "chastisement," which seems to make little sense. Benzel reads κόλασις, which is accepted by Colson. Cohn and Wendland, followed by Mosès, read κόλουσις, "curtailing," which is rather more elegant. However, Philo does not use this noun elsewhere, though he uses κολούειν at Post. 150.

ἀστερ εἰς ἔενιας ἀλόντες. Details of laws concerning citizenship in Alexandria are not abundant. The best source for the various types of legal status in Alexandria and Egypt is *The Gnomon of the Idiologus* (Select Papyri II 206, Berlin Pap. 1.210). Cf. also the edict of the Prefect Tiberius Julius Alexander (Philo's nephew) in Evelyn-White and Oliver, The Temple of Hibis in the El Khargah Oasis, II. Greek Inscriptions, 4. These sources are discussed and translated in A. D. Johnson, Roman Egypt (vol. II of the Economic Survey of Ancient Rome,
Baltimore 1936, pp. 280 ff. (manumissions), and 711 ff. (Gnomon of the Idiologus). This might be a contemporary reference by Philo, or an historical one. παρεγγαγέω is a technical term for enrolling oneself illegally as a citizen, cf. Aeschines 2.76; Lucian, Bis Acaea. 27. As a leader of the Jewish community, Philo would be much concerned with claims to citizenship.

τὸ γὰρ βίατον ὀλγυχρόνιον. The etymology of βίατος as βαιως is very much in the spirit of the Cratylus (and of later Hellenistic etymologizing), but seems to occur nowhere else.

104 στοιχειώδεις ἀπλαὶ φύσεις. Contrast of στοιχεῖα, the four elements, with συγκράματα is Stoic in formulation (e.g. SVF 2.310, 323).

105 νόμισμα. Cf. LA 3.95; Det. 152: "change, if you can, the moulding and stamp of the divine coinage"; Plant. 18: "Our great Moses averred it [the reasonable soul] to be a genuine coinage of that dread spirit and Invisible One, signed and impressed by the seal of God, the stamp of which is the Eternal Logos": Det. 86. The metaphor is already found in Plato's Phaedo 69A: ἀλλ' ἣ ἔκειν μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὁρθόν ... φρόνησις. The Cynic slogan παραχαράτειν τὸ νόμισμα was well-known (cf. DL 6.20, on Diogenes). Cf. F. W. Kohnke, "Das Bild der echten Münze bei Philon von Alexandreia," Hermes 96 (1968) 583-90.

106 πρῶτον καὶ μεγεστὸν καὶ τελεώτατον τῶν θεῶν ἔργων ἐστὶν οὕτος. A Platonic notion. Cf. Tim. 37C; Plot. 2.9.8.16: "How should one not call it a clear and noble image of the intelligible gods?" A similar sentiment is expressed in BR 12.1: "R. Isaac b. Maryon said, 'Such is the story of heaven and earth as they were created' (Gen 2:4): their Creator praised them, who, then, will deprecate them, their Creator lauds them, who will find fault with them, but they are lovely and praise-worthy."

μὴ ποτὲ οὖν ἄμεινον. A characteristic formula for introducing one's preferred solution to an aporia, e.g. LA 1.90; 2.80; 3.60; etc. Cf. Proclus, In Tim. 1.65.9, 153.28, 230.18, etc. The implication here that the two previous interpretations of χάριν εὗρε are incorrect is more uncompromising than the exegesis at LA 3.77-78.
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107 χάριν δυνα θεοῦ τὰ πάντα. Cf. LA 3.78: χάριν δυνα τοῦ θεοῦ τὰ σώματα . . . τοῖς γονὶς ζητοῦσι, τίς ἀρχὴ γενέσεως, ὄρθοτατα δὲ τίς ἀποκόρυντο, διὸ ἁγαθότης καὶ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ. It should be noted that in BR 29.2, T-A 269, R. Simon deduces from the wording in Gen 6:8 that it was Noah who found grace, not the Holy One, blessed be He, i.e., Noah was not really worthy in God's eyes, but in comparison with his contemporaries he nevertheless found grace. Similarly, in Midrash Mishle 31, we read: "'Grace is deceitful and beauty is vain' (Prov 31:30), Noah's grace was false, for it is said, 'But Noah found favor with the Lord.'"

The same idea is clearly expressed in Plot. 6.9.6.40: ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὑπεράγαθον καὶ αὐτὸ ὁ διὸ ἑαυτῷ τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις ἁγαθῶν; 6.9.6.34: ἀρχὴ δὲ οὐκ ἐνδεές τῶν μετ' αὐτό· ἢ δ' ἀπάντων ἀρχὴ ἁνενδεές ἀπάντων.

108 ἀπώλον εἰς τὴν ἁλιὼν ἁγαθότητα. Perhaps an adaptation of the Demiurge's looking to the Paradigm, cf. Tim. 28A.

The idea is derived from Plato's Timaeus 29E: ἁγαθός ἦν, ἁγαθὴ δὲ οὐδεές περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται οὖννος. Cf. also Op. 21; LA 3.78; Cher. 127.

πρεσβυτάτη τῶν * * * χαρίτων οὖσα ἑαυτῇ. Wendland restores the text as follows: πρεσβυτάτη <δεοὺς δυνάμεως, τῶν> χαρίτων οὖσα πηγή. Colson and Whittaker, on the other hand, prefer to read: πρεσβυτάτη τῶν <χαρίτων, πηγή> χαρίτων οὖσα αὐτῇ, believing that "the scribe is more likely to have been misled by the repeated χαρίτων than by the repeated τῶν and that αὐτῇ is a less violent change from εαυτῇ than πηγή." Perhaps, in view of the question to which this is the answer, τὶς αἰτία γενέσεως κόσμου; <αἰτίων> might be a more suitable supplement.

109 τὸν μὲν οὐκ ἐπίνην εὐρεστήσοι, Here there is no question, we may note, of denying the natural meaning of εὐρεστήσοι, that Noah was well pleasing to God.

δερματοριζόμενος. This is a favorite word of Philo's to describe the relationship of God to his powers, or to his angels, cf. Abr. 122; Spec. 1.45; Sac. 59; Legat. 6; QE 2.67.

110 δ' ἑαυτοῦ μόνου. Cf. comment. on Gig. 45.
An analogous contrast between levels of wisdom is set up by R. Avin's statement in BR 44.12 that the Torah is an incomplete form (nobelet), i.e., only an image, of the supernal Wisdom. The combination of elōwiωτέρα with the notion of secondary and image-like is remarkable. It should only mean "more specific," as above, 95.

111 φιλοσόφις καὶ φιλοπαθὴς νοῦς. Cf. the allegory in LA 3.236; Ebr. 210 ff.; Mut. 173; Jos. 61 ff. For the sake of his allegory, Philo has transferred the characteristics of the eunuch Potiphar to Joseph. See Gen 39.

tοῦ συγχρίματος ἰμών. Cf. 117 below; LA 2.2; 3.191; Sacr. 49, 105; Det. 52: "for if we hold in honor the mind as father of our complex being, and sense as mother, we ourselves shall receive good treatment at their hands. Now honor is shown to the mind when it is cared for by the provision not of things that give it pleasure but of things that do it good"; ib. 84, 103, 139; Post. 58, 68; Gig. 62; Fug. 164; Mut. 184. For σύγχρωμα in the sense of the compound of body and soul, cf. SVF 1.45.

έξευνουχισθένς. First attested in Philo. Cf. Plut. Symposium. 692C; Ebr. 211-13: "For such a soul [έξευνουχισμένης ψυχῆς] is neither able to drop the truly masculine seeds of virtue nor yet to receive and foster what is so dropped . . . None such does Moses permit to enter the congregation of God, for he says, 'He who has lost the organs of generation shall not come into the congregation of the Lord' (Deut 23:1). For what use can he find in listening to holy words, who can beget no offspring of wisdom . . ." At LA 3.237, however, after a disquisition on the eunuch-soul, it is suggested that there is a favorable meaning for "eunuch," as ἐγκρατὴς τρόπος ψυχῆς.

112 διεσυωταί. Cf. Ebr. 101; LA 3.42; Mig. 9: "Depart, therefore, out of the earthly matter that encompasses thee: escape, man, from the foul prison-house (δεσμωτηρίου), thy body, with all thy might and main, and from the pleasures and lusts that act as its jailers"; Her. 85, 109; Mut. 173; Somn. 1.139. The exegesis of Joseph in prison enables Philo to draw upon the
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Platonic image of this mortal existence as the prison-house of the soul (e.g. *Phaed.* 114B; *Rep. VII* 517B).


113 ὁ ἄγειμὼν τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου. It seems rash to speak, as Moses does, of "cette figure satanique." It is not necessary that Philo is involved in anything more than a lively personification here.

114 ὁ ψυχή. For this diatribe-style apostrophe, so beloved of Philo, cf. *LA* 1.49, 51; 2.91, 106; 3.17.


λιμωδοξίας. Found only in Philo, and only here. λιμωδέξω in *Spec.* 2.18; *Flac.* 116. Cf. δοξομανής and δοξομανέω in *Fug.* 30 and *Sonn.* 2.114.

116 ἄρα ἄρα ἄδυνατής. "The man who is capable of running swiftly it bids stay not to draw breath but pass forward to the supreme Divine Logos, who is the fountain of Wisdom, in order that he may draw from the stream and, released from death, gain life eternal as his prize. One less swift-footed it directs to the power to which Moses gives the name God, since by it the Universe was established and ordered. It urges him to flee for refuge to the creative power, knowing that to one who has grasped the fact that the whole world was brought into being a vast good accrues, even the knowledge of its Maker, which straightway wins the thing created to love him to whom it owes its being. One who is less ready it urges to betake himself to the kingly power, for fear of the sovereign has a force of correction to admonish the subject, where a father's kindness has none such for the child. For him who fails to reach the posts just mentioned,
because he thinks them too far distant, another set of goals have been set up nearer the starting-point—the gracious power, the power which enjoins duties, and that which forbids offences . . ." (Somn. 1.232, 238, 66, 117, 148; Mig. 174; Conf. 145-46). At Abr. 124-30 also this theory of different modes of relationship to the Supreme Being is developed at length. It is a distinctive feature of Philo's metaphysics.

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the young Brahmin Kawi instructed his paternal uncles in sacred learning, addressing them as sons. Angered, they complained to the gods, who gave the following answer: "The lad addressed you rightly, for the unknowing is a child . . . not because he is white-headed is a man old; he who has read the scripture, even though he be young, him the gods account old." See E. R. Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages (New York 1953) 98-101.

Μωσέως θιασώτατοι. θιασώτης, with its rather Bacchic overtones, often has in Philo a derogatory connotation, e.g. Somn. 2.78: ὁσοι θιασώται τῆς κενής δόξης εἰσίν; Det. 45: Ἄσκοι τοῦ κακίας θιασώτου (as opposed to τὸν ἀρετῆς ἀσκητήν ἰαμώμ), but by no means always, cf. Cher. 85; Saor. 7. The phrase recurs at Plant. 39: ὁ τοῦ Μωσέως δὴ θιασώτης.

οἱ παλλακίδων δόντες. For Philo, the wives of the patriarchs are their virtues, while their concubines are producers of illegitimate spiritual offspring, i.e. passions. Cf. Congr. 36: δοῦλαις καὶ παλλακίς συμβιώναι τέχναις, νόθων δογμάτων οὐ παῖσιν ὀφειχέντα, and Gig. 17.

Βαλλάκ καὶ ζιλφάς. Elsewhere, Bilhah is etymologized as "swallowing" and represents the necessary subsistence of the natural life (LA 1.94-96; 3.146; Congr. 29 f.), and Zilpah as "walking mouth," signifying oratorical power (Congr. 24), cf. Earp's notes s.v. in Loeb Vol. X. Consorting with the sons of Bilhah and Zilpah, then, is quite natural for a πολίτικός.

IX

Deus 122-139

Commentary on Gen 6:11: ἐφαύρη ἢ γῆ ἐναντίον τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἐπιλήθη ἄδικίας.

Textual variants: ἐφαύρη δὲ LXX; ἐπιλήθη ἢ γῆ LXX.

A. General Comments

This section, one of the most important in the work, arises from an aporia occasioned by the admittedly rather abrupt
transition from mention of the virtue and the offspring of Noah to the statement that "the earth was corrupt before God and filled with injustice." Philo affects, at least, to understand that the appearance of Noah on the scene somehow makes the earth corrupt and unjust, and naturally wonders how this can be. For him it is one of those situations where a surface contradiction constitutes a sure sign that the true meaning lies beneath. The application of his exegetical method readily reveals that this is so, and the lemma in fact occasions a protracted and important discussion of the nature of Conscience (see further R. T. Wallis' essay in the Introduction).

The doctrine which Philo derives from this passage is that the arrival on the scene of an immortal and divine element, either in the world or in each one of us, causes that element in us which is "mortal" and ungodly suddenly to appear corrupt and sinful, whereas it did not seem so before the arrival of something to provide a contrast with it. What is being contrasted here in fact is what later theology would term "the age of reason" in the soul with "the age of innocence." If the passage is considered in this way, it becomes logical that the arrival of Noah on the earth should, not cause it to be corrupt, but rather reveal its intrinsic corruption.

To reinforce this point, Philo, as usual, adduces parallel passages. First he directs our attention to the so-called Law of Leprosy, in Lev 13:14-15. Here too there is a paradoxical situation presented, which becomes logical on the application of his principles. How can it be, first of all, that leprosy covering the whole of the body is "clean," whereas that which appears only in patches is "unclean"; and secondly, how does it come about that the entrance of the priest into the house of one so afflicted (Lev 14:34-36) makes all in the house unclean?

In each case here there is in fact a perfectly good literal explanation, had Philo been concerned to seek for it ("leprosy over the whole body" is not leprosy at all, but a relatively harmless skin rash; and in the second passage he ignores the true purport of the regulation); but he seizes gladly on what appears a paradox, as being a sign of a higher level of meaning. In either case, the key element in the interpretation is the fact that there is a point of reference according to which the uncleanness can be judged—in the case of
partial leprosy, the patches of clear skin; in the case of the visitation of the house, the priest.

Of these two, the priest lends himself more readily to further allegorizing, and perhaps in the process to some confusion. In 134, the priest is identified with ὁ δείος λόγος, which enters into the soul, and before the entry of which the soul is not capable of good or evil action, as having no point of reference. This λόγος, on entry, becomes the ἔλεγχος, the conscience. It seems thus to have both a transcendent and an immanent aspect, which is perhaps what Philo wishes it to have. However, this seems to raise the problem of the relation of the rational element in the individual soul to the omnipresent Logos of God. Is it simply an aspect of it in a particular body, or is it a separate entity? Or should any such distinction be made? The problem is analogous to, if not the same as, that with Aristotle's νοῦς πρωτεύως of De An. III.5.

A third parallel passage is now adduced, the encounter of the widow woman in Zarephath with the prophet Elijah (I Kings 17:8 ff.), to which is subjoined a reference to the widowhood of Tamar in her father's house, in Gen 38:11. "Widowhood" is here interpreted as "widowhood from the passions which corrupt and maltreat the mind," this being a necessary preliminary (in the case of Tamar, at least) to receiving θεία γυνή (137), in the shape of the Logos, and being filled with the seeds of virtue, which result in the production of καλὴ προφίτης.

The adducing of Tamar here is rather in the nature of a footnote to the main point which the I Kings passage was brought in to illustrate. That is that when the Logos enters a suitably prepared soul, it provokes within it a new consciousness of its past inadequacies and a firm purpose of amendment. Here the transcendent aspect is certainly in the ascendent, the force of conscience being described (138) as ὁ ἐρμηνεύως τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος καὶ προφήτης, but we are still talking about the individual conscience.

B. Detailed Comments

122 ἰδηματικὸν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ. Common formula for introducing a problem, or ἰδηματικα, cf. LA 1.33, 48; 2.103; etc., and above, 122. The λόγος follows just below. Cf. note on Deus 86.
123 ἐπειδὺν ... τὸ ἀφθαρτὸν εἴδος ἀνατείλη. The "incorruptible element" in the soul here is Noah, whose appearance causes the earth (the rest of the soul) to appear corrupt. The use of ἀνατέλλω suggests that light-imagery which recurs at various points in the passage, beginning just below with φωτὸς ἐπιλαμψάντος.

"Ἐὰν ἀνατείλη χρῶς ζῶν". It is plain from Philo's paraphrase below, "ζῶν ἐν φωτὶ χρώμα," that he takes χρῶς here as meaning "color" rather than "flesh," another instance of his imperfect understanding of LXX language, which is a translation of ἄνασαρ καὶ.

124 προσεπιφέγγων ... καὶ ἐσπερ ἐναποημανύμενος. Both verbs first found in Philo, and only here.


128 διὰ συμβόλων τούτων. Cf. Deus 96 and 154 for other instances in the present work of objects in the text being symbols.

τὰ μὲν ἀκοῦσια. This does not refer to "involuntary acts" in the normal sense, but to acts committed without proper understanding of their nature. Cf. the Hebrew distinction between δογμα and μήσβα, "inadvertent" and "intentional." Cf. Post. 11, 48; Agr. 178; Ebr. 163; Fug. 65, 76, etc.

129 ζωτικῶν ... καὶ ὁρθῶν ... λόγων. The adjective ζωτικός is generally contrasted with λογικός by Philo, as applying to the irrational soul (e.g. Det. 82, 92; Abr. 140; Mos. 1.100). Here it signifies "giving intellectual life." Philo's use of the term ὁρθὸς λόγος is too frequent to admit of comprehensive illustration, but at LA 1.46 there is a passage nicely illustrating the use of it here, interwoven as it is with light-imagery: καὶ μὴν κατὰ ἀνατολὰς ἐστιν ἡ φυτουργία τοῦ παραδείσου-σοῦ γὰρ δύτει καί σβέννυται, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ πέφυκεν ἀνατέλλειν ὁ ὁρθὸς λόγος, καὶ ἐσπερ, οὕτω, ἀνατείλας ἡλιος τὸν ἵδον τοῦ ἀέρος.
Commentary. Deis 122-139

φωτός ἐνέπλησεν, οὕτως καὶ ἄρετή ἀνατέλλασα ἐν ψυχῇ τὴν ἀχλῦν ἀότης ἐναυάξει καὶ τὸν πολὺν σκότον σκιεύανυνι. Cf. οἱ ἐν ἀχλῦι καὶ σκότω βαδεῖ, below, 130.

ὡς κυβερνήτῃ. A generalised reminiscence of the Ship of Fools simile in Rep. VI 488A ff. The reference to τοὺς ναυ-

τιλλάς ἀπείρους makes this clear. It is also, of course, a

variant of his favorite storm-at-sea imagery.

diaυsυνίστησι. First attested in Philo.

130 ἀποσκοράτως. Adverb first attested in Philo.

131 "καὶ προστάξει ὁ ἱερεύς ... καταμαθεῖν". This pre-

sumably is quoted from memory. LXX text: πρὸ τοῦ ἐσελθόντα ἵστεῖ τὸν ἱερεύ τὴν ἀφήν καὶ οὐ μὴ ἀκάθαρτα γένηται ὡς ἐδα θ ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ. There is no significant change in Philo's version, except that he alters the construction from the strong prohibi-

tion οὐ μὴ γένηται to the less emphatic future οὐ γενήσεται.

133 ταῦτα εἰ συνάδει τῇ ὅπῃ καὶ προχείρω διατάξει. συνάδει has the sense here of "is compatible with." Quite a strong

challenge from Philo to the supporters of literal interpretation. A good parallel occurs in Sobr. 33, a comment on Gen 9:25, where Canaan, son of Ham, is unexpectedly cursed by Noah because of his father's action in uncovering Noah's nakedness. "What was his offence?" says Philo. "Perhaps this question has been con-

sidered on their own principles by those who are used to discuss in details the literal and outward interpretation of the laws. Let us rather in obedience to right reason (ὁρθὸς λόγος) expound in full the inward interpretation" (Colson's trans.). Cf.


σκέψουται οἷς ἔθος καὶ φίλον. Wolfson (Philo I.131), plausibly enough, sees here a reference "to the members of the court of Jewish law (ḥāt din) in Alexandria," comparing Agr.

157, and Somn. 1.102.

134 Συγγνώμη δὲ ... ἀμαρτάνουσιν. Properly speaking, this should only refer to those in a state of primal "innocence." Ignorance after the accession of reason would surely be culpable. Cf. Plato, Tim. 87B, Rep. IX 585B; Arist. EN 1110b.

ἐναποκείμενα. ἐναπόκειται first attested in Philo.

ἐπιλήπτους καὶ ὑπαιτίους. ἐπιλήπτος in sense of "culpable" first attested in Philo, as is ὑπαιτίος in the sense of "blameworthy." For this collocation, cf. LA 3.247, De Vér. 206.

ἀποσκευασθήναι καὶ ἀποσυλληθήναι. ἀποσκευάζω in sense of "get rid of" first attested in Philo, as is ἀποσυλλάω in sense of "carry off."

136 τῷ χρηστεύειν ... τῶν παθῶν. Cf. Somn. 2.273: οἱ κε-χρηστεύεντες γενέσεως. Like εὐνοῦχος (cf. above 111) χήρα can have a good or a bad sense (Fug. 114 and Det. 147 being examples of the latter).


Βραβεῖα. For victory imagery, cf. 147 below.

"Ἐνδρωπε τοῦ θεοῦ ...". A paraphrase rather than a direct quotation of I Kings 17:18: εἰσῆλθες πρὸς με τὸν ἀναμνη-σάι τὰς ἀδικίας μου.

138 ὀλυμπίου. Philo likes this adjective, cf. 151, 156 below; Det. 85: τροφὰς ὀλυμπίου καὶ ἀφθάρτους; Plant. 63: οὐκ ἐπίγειον ἀλλ' ὀλύμπιον κτίμα. Philo seems to be the first to use the word in this sense of merely "heavenly."

διηρεθειμένος τοῖς ... ἀκατασχέτοις οἰκστροῖς. διερε-θίζω in sense of "stimulate" first attested in Philo. ἀκατασχε-τός is Hellenistic, first attested in Pythagorean "Hipparchus."

This characterization of prophecy as a form of μανία owed much to Plato's description of it as the first of three forms of μανία in Phaedrus 244BC. For οἰκστροῖς, cf. Ebr. 147.

μέγα στενάξασα καὶ μέγα κλάσασα. Cf. QE 1.15: "For those who naturally and genuinely repent become bitter toward their former way of life and are vexed with their wretched life, weeping, sighing and groaning ..."; Jos. 87; LA 3.211; Wisd. Scl. 9:3; Pes. R. 50; Sh. 38.4.
Commentary. Deut 140-183

139 ἐπιθετεσμῷ ἢ...περιαφήςεῖ. ἐπιθετεσμός, apart from one use in Thuc. (7.75), first attested in Philo. περιαφήςεῖ only attested in Philo. A reference here, surely, to Plato's "etymology" of ανθρώπος at Crat. 399c as from "ἀναθρώπων ἄ ὅσωμεν."

κύρια οὐνόματα. For use of term κύριον ονόμα in sense of "naturally correct name," cf. LA 1.75; Det. 22, 83; Mut. 11-15.

X

Deut 140-183


A. General Comments

With the elucidation of Gen 6:12, Philo brings his treatise to a close with an elaborate exposition of one of the central motifs of his religious philosophy, that of the "Royal Road." This is his most extended exegesis of the Royal Road, but he makes use of it also at Post. 101; Gig. 64; Mig. 146-47 (where the connection with Peripatetic ethical theory is made explicit), and Spec. 4.102, 168. The LXX translates ḏαρκὸ with ὀδὸν αὐτοῦ, "his way" (thus apparently making it agree with the general sense of καὶ βασάρ, "an expression occurring thirteen times in the narrative of the Flood and denoting sometimes, as here and v. 13, men alone" [cf., however, BR ad loc. which takes it to include animals], "sometimes animals alone, sometimes both" [Driver]), rather than the grammatically required ἀυτῆς. Philo, being unable to check the Hebrew, interprets this verse as signifying the destruction of the perfect way of wisdom which leads to the knowledge of God. The comrades of the flesh reject this path and seek to corrupt it, since no two things are so diametrically opposed as knowledge and pleasure of the flesh.

This leads Philo to think of Num 20:17-20 (145), the incident of the "Royal Road," which he then proceeds to interpret in detail. When Israel, the people endowed with vision, wish to journey along that royal road, they find their way
challenged by Edom, "the earthly one," who wishes to prevent them. They express their determination to proceed. Citing the well-known story concerning Socrates, who, on beholding a gaily decked pageant, is said to have asserted: "My friends, observe how many things there are I do not need" (cf. Plant. 65; Cic. Tusc. 5.91; D.L. 2.25. See also comment. on Gig. 34), Philo points out that whereas Socrates' rejection of external goods was the act of a lone individual, in Israel we have an entire and mighty people following this lofty ideal which rejects wealth, honor, glory, and bodily health and beauty. As proof he quotes the words of the envoys to the king of all that is good in outward appearance, the earthly Edom, "I will now pass by through thy land" (148). Philo insists, however, that the rejection of external goods must be under the guidance of right reason and not through faint-heartedness, sluggishness, or inexperience of them, if it is to count as perfect virtue. He is here clearly following the Stoics who held that to act appropriately is not in itself either good or bad, in the sense of being morally good or bad, and had accordingly designated "appropriate actions" (καθήκοντα) as "intermediate" (μέσος). It is only when the latter are performed by a wise man that they become "correct" (or absolutely appropriate) actions (κατορθώματα) (SVF 3.498-99; 516-17; cf. LA 1.56, 93; 3.210; Saar. 43; Cher. 14; Deus 100. See D. Tsekourakis, Studies in the Terminology of Early Stoic Ethics [Wiesbaden 1974] 1-60; A. Bonhöffer, Die Ethik Epictets [Stuttgart 1894, rep. 1968] 193-233). At this point (154), Philo makes something of the apparent contradiction between "passing through your land," and "not passing through the fields and vineyards." These latter he interprets as virtuous sentiments and actions, which one must not pass by, but rather remain in.

He next turns (155 ff.) to the words, "we will not drink water of any well of them," and elicits from them the notion that those upon whom God showers knowledge (cf. LA 3.162: "the soul is fed not with things of earth that decay, but with such words as God shall have poured like rain"), will not seek for the scanty springs that lie beneath the earth, i.e., for earthly goods. Similarly, Israel who claimed that it was God himself who nourished him (Gen 48:15), would clearly not even cast a glance upon the waters gathered beneath the earth. He who had received the undiluted draughts of knowledge that intoxicate the soul, sometimes through the Logos (when it is a matter of
Commentary. Deus 140-183

ridding the mind of ignorance and error), at other times through the direct agency of God (when it involves positive knowledge), would not deign to drink of a well (adducing the exegesis of Gen 48:15 at LA 3.177-78, when Philo explains that in both cases it is actually God who bestows the gifts, but in the case of secondary boons, He allows the Logos to take the credit, whereas in the case of the principal ones, He takes sole credit).

We who are convinced that we ought to shun earthly things, continues Philo (159 ff.), should without delay take to the king's high road, along which we shall walk unimpeded without flagging or fainting. That the path of wisdom is unwearying was a common Hellenistic theme. The author of The Wisdom of Solomon (6:14) assures us that he who anticipates the dawn on behalf of Wisdom will not grow weary (οὐ κομίδαι), and the author of De Mundo (319a, 13) writes: "So the soul, by means of philosophy, taking the mind as its guide, has crossed the frontier, and made the journey [to the heavenly region] out of its own land by a path that does not tire the traveller (Ἀκομίαρων τινα δόδων) (cf. Mut. 254; Mig. 145; Cher. 41, where Philo explains that Leah means rejected and weary [κομίδαι], because we all turn away from virtue and think her wearisome). Moreover, in the words "We will not turn aside to the right or to the left" but advance along the midmost line, Philo finds an exemplification of the doctrine of the Golden Mean (162-65).

(Cf. Spec. 4.102: "Moses opened up a path midway between Spartan austerity and Sybarite luxury." For the doctrine of virtue as μεσότης, see Arist. EN 1106b15, 36; 1107a7; EE 1227b8; Plut. Quomodo quis suis in virt. 84A; Virt. Moral. 444CD; Albin. Did. 184.13 ff.; Apul. Plat. 2.228; Arius Did., in Stob. EcL 2.39. 11 ff.; 2.137.14-142.13. Cf. Post. 101; Mig. 146-47.)

Continuing his analysis of the passage in Numbers, Philo finds that the words "we will go along the mountain country," signify the ideal of wisdom which continuously analyzes and defines all things in an effort to arrive at their essence, and is accompanied by a contempt for all that is external or of the body. Indeed, we may further infer from the words "for if I or my cattle drink of your water, I shall give you honor" (taking τιμῆ in this sense), that if we but touch bodily pleasures with our finger-tips, we shall provide honor to earthly Edom, who will then boast that the virtue-lovers, too, have yielded to pleasure's snares. If this appears to contradict the doctrine of the mean articulated above, it should be remembered that what
is to be held in utter contempt and not to be given even the slightest entrance is the enjoyment of bodily goods as pleasures ( fileSize), the latter being πάθος or irrational states, whereas the rational use of these same bodily things, though they yield agreeable physical feelings as an έπιγένημα or by-product, is not to be rejected. (For a detailed analysis of this question and Philo's ethical theory as a whole, see D. Winston, "Philo's Ethical Theory," ANRW.)


The treatise concludes (179-83) with an admonition to make full use of one's inner judge or conscience. Balaam, who was one of Edom's associates, had failed to do so, disregarding the monitions of his convicting Angel within, and was thus overwhelmed by folly and destroyed.

B. Detailed Comments

140 προσηκόντως οὖν. Good example of the way in which Philo is accustomed to introduce an allegorical or otherwise strained interpretation of the text, cf. Deus 122.

ἡν οὖν αὐτοῦ. The masculine pronoun referring back to σόος (the Hebrew actually requires αὐτοῦ) is a solecism occasioned
by the Hebrew בָּשָׂר, "flesh," which is masculine—unless we term it a "sense construction," taking "flesh" as meaning "mankind." Philo, not being in a position to appreciate this, must take the αὐτός as referring not to θάνατος but to God. He rejects as unacceptable the view of one who would see a solecism here. (It is not necessary that anyone should actually have made such a criticism.) His solution, of course, is that the αὐτός is not reflexive at all, and this leads to his whole exegesis, based as it is on the adducing of Num 20:17-20. The use of αὐτός without further reference to "himself," "the Master," is somewhat colloquial (found in the conversation of Menandrian slaves), but is also a Pythagorean way of referring to Pythagoras, as Philo himself points out at QQ 1.99. Roman slaves also referred to their master as ipsisimus (Plaut. Trin. 4.2.146) or ipsimus (Petr. 75.11).

141 ἡλικηφ. . . ἄρρενικην. These terms for feminine and masculine gender appear to be Hellenistic, not attested before Dionysius Thrax.

143 ταύτην ἐσθι σοφίαν. The Way itself is Sophia, and its end is γνῶσις καὶ ἐπιστήμη θεοῦ. Note Philo's favored term λεωφόρος in this connection, cf. Post. 102 (with ἄρραθος); Deus 61, 163, 182; etc.

144 τοῦ ὀρατικοῦ γένους. Philo is the first extant writer to use ὀρατικός to refer to persons, and with the special meaning of "visionary, endowed with insight." In this meaning it occurs very often, as it is his etymology of Israel (Her. 78; Conf. 91; Mig. 18; etc.). The antithesis to this visionary, "heavenly" class of person is often Egypt, as being earthy and subject to passions, but here the allegory requires that it be Edom, which can be suitably etymologized as derived from Hebrew ʾādāmā, "earth." Edom thus becomes a perfect symbol of the irrational soul, bound to things of earth. At points in the exegesis, however, Edom, or its king, seems almost to take on the characteristics of a Gnostic demiurge (e.g. 166), but this identification should not, perhaps, be pressed. There is no place for a being of this sort in Philo's philosophy.

ἀγριβῇ καὶ ἀπόρευτον. ἀγριβής is Classical, but ἀπόρευτος is first attested in Agatharcides (ap. Geogr. Gr. Min. I p. 11), 2nd cent. B.C.E.
145 "Παρελευσόμεθα . . . δι’ ἐμοῦ". This, apart from the paraphrase δ δὲ Ἐδώμ ἀποκρίνεται φάσιν, for καὶ εἴπερ πρὸς αὐτὸν Ἐδώμ, is an accurate transcription of the LXX text available to us. There are just a few minor launderings: οὗ δι’ ἀμπελώνων, οὗ πλωμέθα, for οὗδε . . . οὗδέ; ἐκ is omitted before λάκκου; and, most significant stylistically, on three occasions (τὰ δριά σου, εἰς συνάντησόν σου, δῶς τιμήν σου), Philo transposes a weak personal pronoun to before the noun which governs it, avoiding the unrhymetical effect of having it at the end of a clause (though we may note that mss. U and F preserve the LXX reading—probably, however, corrected from the LXX text).

146 τῶν παλαιῶν τυνα λόγος ἔχει. This anecdote about Socrates, repeated at Plant. 65, goes back to the Hellenistic anecdotal tradition which produces so much of the content of Diogenes Laertius' compilation. The story is used also by Cicero in Tusq. 5.91 (Socrates, in pompa sum magna vis auris argentique ferretur: 'Quam multa non desidero' inquit), sandwiched in between similar edifying stories about Anacharsis, Xenocrates and Diogenes the Cynic, in a diatribe passage. Diogenes Laertius gives the story with a vaguer context (2.25): πολλάκις δ’ ἀφορέω εἰς τὰ πλήθη τῶν πιοφανομένων ἔλεγε πρὸς αὐτόν "πόσων ἐγὼ χρείαν ὡκ ἔχω," but he seems to derive it in this form from the 1st cent. C.E. gossip-compiler Pamphila of Epidaurus, whom he has just quoted.

147 τῶν Ὀλυμπιακῶν ἀγῶνα. Imagery of victory in the games, a favorite of Philo's, cf. 137 above, etc. (See V. C. Pfitzner, Paul and the Agon Motif [Leiden 1967] 38-48.) We are in the middle here of a diatribe passage (note the "Du-Stil" τί λέγεις;).

148 τὰ προτέλεια τῆς σοφίας. It is reasonable here, perhaps, to discern imagery from sacrificial ceremonies in the use of προτέλεια. The word can be used in later Greek to mean simply "introduction," but it may never entirely lose its literal meaning of "preliminary sacrifice," and very probably not in Philo. Elsewhere, he uses it literally at Congr. 5 (προτέλεια τῶν γάμων) and metaphorically at Abr. 89.

149 Ἡ . . . ὑποσχέσεως. Typical diatribe-style exclamation; cf. Conf. 116, 162; Mig. 84; etc.
Commentary. Deus 140-183.

150 τοῦ πλούτου . . . δόξαν δὲ . . . υγείαν . . . κάλλος . . . ρώμην. Philo runs through the two lower classes of goods, external and bodily, as things from which the Israel-soul will turn aside. The inspiration behind this passage is distinctly Cynic-Stoic, as one would expect in a diatribe context—the lower goods are not "goods" at all (ὡς μηδὲν αὐτῶν κατατάξει ἐν τῇ τῶν ἁγαθῶν μερίδι).

151 ὅ τις ψυχῆς οἷος ἢ τύμβος. A reference to the Orphic tag σῶμα-σῆμα. Philo uses τύμβος in this connection again at Somn. 1.139, when contrasting the attitudes with which various classes of soul descend into bodies: αἱ δὲ πολλὴν φλοιάν αὐτοῦ καταγνώσατε δεσιωτήροιν μὲν καὶ τύμβον ἐκάλεσαν τὸ σῶμα.

153 τοῦτον χάριν. The passage beginning here is an excellent example of the way Philo can squeeze significant doctrine from small details of the text. The addition of διὰ τῆς γῆς σου to παρελθοῦσα intimates to Philo that one must not turn away from worldly lures simply through faintheartedness or ignorance of them. One must turn away from them in obedience to δοσθεῖ λόγος, which rejects them after having thoroughly surveyed them.

Cheerful. Unto a better translation and understanding.
null
Commentary. Deus 140-183

ἐκ λάκκου. Though λάκκος translates ἑκατόρ, "well," here, Philo understands it as "cistern" (cf. 156: πότων τεθησαυροσμένον ἐπὶ εἰπτεχνήσεως ἀνθρώπων), which it does mean at LXX Deut 6:11, commented on at Fug. 175, etc. Philo’s word for "well" is φρέαρ.

λιβάδας. In sense of "pools of water" not found before Strabo.

ἀνεπισχέτως. Adj. and adv. first attested in Philo.

νέκταρος καὶ ἀμβροσίας . . . ἁμείνω τροφὴν. The comparison of God’s grace with the nectar and ambrosia of the Olympians recurs interestingly at Somn. 2.249, where the Logos is termed ὁ οἶνοχός τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ συμποσίαρχος, but himself being the drink that he pours, which is described, among other things, as τὸ γάνωμα and τὸ χαρᾶς, τὸ εὑροσύνης ἀμβρόσιον. It may be that behind this is an allegorization of Ganymede as the Logos, or an aspect of the Logos (Hermes being, after all, a more obvious representation of it). At Spec. 1.303, again, the ἄναος τῶν καλῶν πηγῆ from which God rains down (ἀμβροσίαν) the virtues is declared to be a drink more immortalizing than nectar. Just below the present passage, at 158, Philo speaks of God dispensing draughts διὰ τινος ὑπηρετοῦντος τῶν ἄγγελων, δὲ οἶνοχοις ἥξιοις. The image of a banquet, in this case organized by Sophia, occurs at Prov 9:5, which Philo may also have in mind, as he seems to in Prob. 13.

156 ἐπιτεχνήσεως. Apart from one use in Thucydides (1.71), this noun is first attested in Philo (Ps.-Arist. De Mundo 398b10, being of uncertain date). Cf. Conf. 185.

ἐξανωτότες. Verb only attested here. ἀνωτάτῳ is Classical.


τὸν ὀλυμπίου θεσαυρόν. Cf. n. ad 138 above. This use of Deut 28:12 is quite popular with Philo, cf. LA 3.104 (where he explicitly identifies the οὐρανὸς with the Logos), and Her. 76, and it provokes a proliferation of imagery connected with the raining of blessings from heaven, such as has been noted above, 155.
157 ἐπήκοος. ἐπήκοος in passive sense, "hearkened to," is rare, and attested before Philo only in Plato, Laus XI 931b.

"Ὁ δὲ ἐδὸς ὁ τρέφων μὲ ἐκ νεότητος". A reference to the words of Jacob (Israel) at Gen 48:15 f., quoted more fully at LA 3.177 and Fug. 67.

δόσα κατὰ γῆς ὑδατός συστήματα. Here water stored in the earth is contrasted, as symbolizing earthly goods, with the heavenly waters poured down by God. Elsewhere, however, as Colson points out (App. to Loeb Vol. III, p. 489), "the figure of the well calls up more favourable ideas in Philo," e.g. Post. 136 ff.; Ebr. 112 ff. But in these passages it is other qualities of the well that attract him, such as its lying deep beneath the surface, and the purity of the water that it produces, so there is no real contradiction here, especially as Philo is thinking rather of cisterns here.

158 τὰς ἁμάτους μεθύσματος πόσεις. An evocation of the sobria ebrietas figure, so beloved of Philo. (Cf. Hans Lewy, Sobria Ebrietas [Giessen, 1929]) μέθυσμα is otherwise only found in LXX, so is presumably borrowed thence by Philo.

διὰ τινὸς ὑποτονοῦντος τῶν ἁγγέλων. This is presumably called forth by the continuation of Gen 48:15, quoted at LA 3.177 and Fug. 67, but not here: ὁ ἁγγέλος ὁ φωμένος με ἐκ πάντων τῶν κακῶν; but the mention of οἶνοχοσίν, as suggested above (n. ad 155), may be drawing on an allegorization of Ganymede.

159 ἀνυπερδέτως. Adj. first attested in Philo; adv. found in 1st cent. B.C.E. inscr. and in LXX (3 Macc 5:20).


160 ἱεττου ψυχαῖς. For the expression, cf. Det. 95; Post. 31; Her. 273.

162 αἱ γὰρ ἐγ’ ἐκάτερα ἐκτομαὶ. From here to the end of 165 we have an elaborate exposition of the Aristotelian doctrine of Virtue as a Mean (EN II 2 ff.), together with the corresponding excesses and defects, these latter introduced by the essentially musical terms ἐπίτασις and ἀνεσίς, which, although
adopted by the Stoics in their ethical theory (SVF 3.92, 525), are derivable from Plato (the actual terms in Rep. II 349E, the general doctrine of virtue as a harmony from Phaedo 85c, 92b, and Rep. III and IV). Plutarch, in his essay On Moral Virtue, makes the same connection, declaring that Virtue τὰς ἐκλάσεις καὶ τὰς ἐπιτάσεις καὶ δὰς τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἂττων ἐξαιρεῖ τῆς όμης (444F). Following EN II 7, Philo refers first to Courage, with its surrounding vices; then to Prudence, flanked by the vices of Meanness and Prodigality. After these two, however, he breaks away from Aristotle's order to complete the tally of the four cardinal virtues, producing sets of vices corresponding to Wisdom and Piety (substituting for Justice). Note the use of δεξιὸν and ἀριστερὸν, maintaining the imagery of the Road.

ἐκτροπαί. Not a technical term for a deviation from the mean, but, literally, "a by-path," or "wrong turning."

164 τὰς μακροάναμοι κακίαις. Probably not, as Colson has it, "the vices that war against us," but rather "the vices that are in contradiction to each other." Philo frequently uses μᾶχια in the logical sense, e.g. Det. 71; Post. 25; Conf. 32; Mig. 152.

165 οὐ Θὲν. These uses of Θέως and οὔ Θέως are perhaps Platonisms for Philo, cf. Apol. 21b; Tim. 29a, 30a; Polit. 269e, etc. Here the expression seems to mean no more than "it is not possible," though with a religious coloration.

ἐμπερικατέλει. Only previously recorded use of this word is in LXX, Lev 26:12. Cf. also 2 Cor 6:16 (quoting Lev).

166 πολέμων ἄθρωκτον. Possibly a voc Platonica here, cf. Plato Laws I 626a. Cf. also Mut. 60; Leg. 119.

σπειραὶ οὐκ ἔθροις. Metaphor of sowing and planting popular with Philo, cf. Conf. 150: ἄδρωταν μὴν σπειραίνεις, ἀσβεῖαν δὲ ἔπειναις; Mut. 268-69—probably partly stimulated by Isaac's sowing and reaping in Gen 26:12, but also by Noah's activity as a planter. Here Edom is imagined as having a harvest of sensual pleasures still growing, which he does not want the Israelites to ravage, i.e. he does not want to be forcibly reformed.

ἐπανατισσών. Cf. above 64.
The goods of the soul, as opposed to the two lower categories of good mentioned below.

**τυπολεγμ.** Cf. above, 55.

**δριμωσ.** Adverb found first in Philo, though the adj. is Aristotelian. In the passage where Aristotle uses it, *Topics* I 5, 102a9, he has just defined a δρος as λόγος ὁ τὸ τί ἢν εἶναι σημαίνων, making it probable that Philo is acquainted either with this passage, or at least with a handbook passage based upon it. Note the etymologizing connection between δρος and δρος implied here, made easier by the (presumable) elimination of the rough breathing. Cf. Intro. p. 171.

**πάντων δόσα ἐκτός καὶ περὶ σῶμα.** Reference to the Platonic-Aristotelian categories of external and bodily goods.

**καμαίζειλα.** Adj. used metaphorically, as "humble," first attested in Philo, and by him used thus repeatedly, usually coupled with ταμεινός, e.g. *LA* 3.19; *Speo*. 3.1.

168 **γέρας καὶ τιμήν.** Γέρας is here simply a synonym for τιμή, specifying the meaning "honor," which Philo requires of it here.

**φωναττόμενος γὰρ αὐχήσεις.** Φωνάττομαι, used properly of horses whinnying and snorting with exuberance, found first in Diod. Sic. (4.74) applied to humans (of Niobe's pride). Philo likes the word, cf. *Cher*. 66: καὶ φωναττόμενος ὑσαυχένη; etc. Since Aristophanes (*Wasps* 135) has φωναγμοσκύναως, an origin in Comedy may be suspected.

169 **οὗ τὸν λεγόμενον ὄνον παρὰ πολίταις.** Όνος is indeed a characteristically Homeric word, and perhaps that is all that Philo means here. It is used in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* always as "ransom" for a captive or "price" for someone captured and sold into slavery. What Edom wants from us is not money, but τιμή, by which the LXX means "value," "a fair price," but which Philo takes to mean "honor." Here is a case where Philo recognises the natural meaning of the word, but chooses to dismiss it.

**τιμήν τὸ γέρας . . . παραλαμβάνει.** Colson (n. ad loc.) understands the τὸ here as meaning "the word 'γέρας','" and
suggests that it would go better with τιμή, but the τό may rather be taken as generic.

170 ηκδος τι τῶν ἡδονής φιλτρων. For the phrase cf. Post. 135; Cont. 69.

ἐπινεανευώμενος καὶ ἐπιχειρονομόν. The former verb is first attested in Philo, the latter only in him. For the collocation cf. Spec. 4.215, where those who neglect the sabbatical year are spoken of as ἐπινεανευώμενοι καὶ ἐπιχειρονομοῦντες.

What exactly Philo means by ἐπιχειρονομά is not quite clear, but it should imply flamboyant and haughty gestures.

ἀποδοχήν. A Hellenistic word, first attested in Polybius, in the sense of "approbation." Here contrasted chiastically with ὑποκλίεια.

172 τό πράγμα...οδέν εἰστιν. This translates the Hebrew ἐν ἀδῆρ, of which it is rather an expansion. οδέν πράγμα, at least, is idiomatic Greek for "no matter" (e.g. Plato Gorg. 447B). As in the case of τιμή above, Philo presumably knows that the natural meaning here would be "It is no matter," but chooses to ignore this in favor of a meaning more promising allegorically.

ἐν’ αἰώρας τινος. αἰώρα in a metaphorical sense is not attested before Metrodorus, the pupil of Epicurus (331-278 B.C.E.). For Philo, αἰώρα and αἰώρις are connected with τύφος, κενή δόξα and εἴδωλα. Cf. Ebr. 36: κεναίς αἰωρουμένοις δόξαις; Somn. 2.16, 46, 61: διά τὸν φρουττόμενον μεγάλα τύφον καὶ τὴν ἐν’ αἰώρας φρουρουμένην κενήν δόξαν. This sentence, with its images of a swing or litter, walking on air, and deceptive dreams, forms a fitting prelude to a remarkable diatribe on the inconstancy
of human affairs, featuring the cyclic dance of the Logos
through history.

173. Μακεδονία ... διαμετείχα ... ἄνεοθεόσην. For the
theory of the succession of Empires, see J. W. Swain, "The Theory
of the Four Monarchies," Class. Phil. 35 (1940) 1-21; D. Flusser,
"The Four Empires in the Fourth Sibyl and in the Book of Daniel,"
Israel Oriental Studies, 2 (1972) 148-75.

174 Παρθηναί. The Parthians reckoned their era from 247
B.C., when they became independent of the Seleucids, and thus
masters of their former lords, the Persians.

175 τί δ’ Εὔρῳ α... ἡ οἰκουμένη; It is noticeable that
Philo studiously avoids mentioning Rome, though the whole ten-
dency of the passage suggests that Rome too will have her day
of reckoning. (Cf., however, Praem. 169, where, again, the
Romans are not mentioned by name.) For a somewhat imaginative
portrayal of Philo's views on Rome, see E. Goodenough's mono-
graph, The Politics of Philo Judaeus (New Haven 1938). (At
Legat. 16, however, οἰκουμένη does seem to refer to the Roman
Empire, as it often does in the NT [Luke 2:1; Acts 17:6, 24:5],
so it may be a periphrasis rather than a euphemism here.)

Ὡσπερ ναὸς θαλαττεύουσα. Storm-at-sea imagery. For
collocation κλονομημένη καὶ τυνασσομένη, cf. Conf. 69: ἰπαρατε-
tai καὶ κλονεῖται καὶ τινάτεται πάς ὁ τῶν φασιδίων βλος. κλονέω
is an Homeric and generally poetic verb, first attested in prose
in Philo, who liked it (also in Hipp. Morb. 4.55, of uncertain
date).

176 χορεῖ ἡ ἀν κύκλῳ λόγος ὅ θελος. Philo speaks fre-
cently of the dance of the heavenly bodies (e.g. Op. 70; Cher.
23), but he never seems elsewhere to speak of the dance of the
Logos. The denial of τύχη is Stoic (SVF 2.965-73), but also
Platonic (the ἄνδραγ of the Timaeus). For the notion of Time
εἶναι τὰ ἀνδρόπων περάματα. The relative ὅδε here refers to
λόγος rather than to κύκλῳ, but to the λόγος in its circuit.
On τύχη cf. Bion of Borysthenes F16 Kindstrand; Demades, ap.
Diod. 16.87.2. For detailed discussion, see PW 7A:2 (1948),
s.v. Tyche, cols. 1643 ff.; K. J. Dover, Greek Popular Morality
Commentary. Deus 140-183


ὅριστην πολιτείαν... δημοκρατίαν. Cf. Abr. 242; Spec. 4.237; Virt. 180. Whence Philo derives this concept of "democracy" is a mystery. It is also unexpected to find him terming it the best of constitutions. Neither Plato nor Aristotle would rank it thus, Plato ranking highest the rule of one man, or of a small body of sages, democracy being the second-worst arrangement, leading to tyranny; while Aristotle ranked highest a balanced constitution which he termed simply "politeia" (Pol. III 7, 1279a38). It is in fact this latter which Philo is here commending and terming δημοκρατία. The Logos in this cosmic democracy apportions to each race and nation its due. What Philo thought of what would be vulgarly termed "democracy" he makes plain in such a passage as Agr. 45-46, where he terms it ὀχλοκρατία, describing it as φαυλοτάτη τῶν κακοπολιτείων, and a παοδικομαί τῆς ἄριστης δημοκρατίας. He contrasts democracy and ochlocracy again at Conf. 108, where he identifies the distinctive mark of democracy as being that it honors λοιπά, which must be taken as denoting "geometrical equality," giving to each his due. Cf. Plato Menexenus 238C. See especially C. G. Starr, "The Perfect Democracy of the Roman Empire," American Historical Review 58:1 (1952) 1-16. Cf. Aelius Aristides, To Rome 60: "But a common democracy of the earth has been set up under one man, the best, as ruler and orderer; and all come together as in a common market place, each to receive what is worthy of him."

Starr points out that hints of the concept that the Roman Empire is the perfect democracy may be found in the first century, in such phrases as Philo's remark that Augustus was "the distributor to every man of what was suited to him" (Legat. 147), and its roots may well go back into the Hellenistic period, even though we cannot detect them.


ἀδμωτίζουτα. Verb attested only in Philo, cf. Spec. 2.143. The image of the ebb and flow of the sea in connection with human affairs is so basic to Philo as hardly to require illustration. Cf. n. ad 26 above, and the report of Theophrastus'

355
remarks on the question of the ἀναχώρησις of the sea in Aet. 120 ff.

μετὰ συμμόν καὶ πατάγου. For συμμός see note ad Gig. 13. For the collocation, cf. Abr. 160.

λυμάζεται. This verb used transitively, meaning simply "flood," or "make a lake of," is not attested before Philo. ἁμειρώω, likewise, is not attested before Ps.-Arist. De Mundo (400a28), probably more or less contemporary with Philo. The whole description here is more proper to one of the periodic shifts in the land-surface of the Mediterranean area than to simple tidal action.

178 πιστητὸς ἀρχαῖς. πιστητ in metaphorical sense of "prosperity" first attested in Philo. Cf. Post. 120-23, an exegesis of the name Noeman (Gen 4:22), which Philo etymologizes as "fatness"; Mig. 101, etc.

179 πεπηγότω δρό καὶ λόγῳ. It becomes clear just below that this thoroughly Aristotelian emphasis on definition as a means to wisdom is provoked by what must seem to us a far-fetched pun on δρός (in παρὰ τὸ δρός πορεύομαι) and δρός. But if Philo pays no attention to the rough breathing, which he would not at this era have pronounced, the connection becomes a little less preposterous, an δρός being, after all, a kind of δρός (of a valley or plain), which, in Greece at least, would often be the boundary of a state.

180 ταῖς ωφελαίς καὶ ὁρικαίς . . . δοίς. This indicates that Philo takes παρὰ τὸ δρός to mean along the crest of the mountain, rather than along its foot.

μετακλιναὶ καὶ μεταναστήναι. μετακλινω in sense of "move" (intrans.) first attested in Philo. μετανίστασθαι is used frequently by Philo in connection with Abraham's (the προκόπτων's) turning from Chaldaea (earthly things) (Mig. passim, e.g. 20: ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐπὶ τὰ νοητὰ μετανίστασθαι).

Ὁ μὲν οὖν γῆς νὸς ἐδῶμ. A comment on the final part of the lemma, ὅ δὲ τείπεν· οὐ διελέυοι ὅς ἐμοῦ.

διαφαίλων. First attested in Philo. Cf. Cher. 40; Prob. 85.
Commentary. Deus 140-183 357

διαφαλλων. Wendland's reasonable emendment for meaningless ἐν πᾶσι of mss.

181 γῆς θρήμα . . . οὐκ οὖρανος βλάστημα. Reminiscent of the contrast between the sons of earth and the sons of heaven, elaborated in the three-way division towards the end of the De Gigantibus (60 ff.). Balaam is etymologized at Cher. 32 as "foolish people," μάθασας λαὸς (Hebr. bal + 'am), the ass to whom he speaks being his ἄλογος προαίρεσις. He is a most suitable ὁμοζηλὸς for Edom (cf. also Conf. 159; Mig. 113; Det. 71). 

βλάστημα in a metaphorical sense is poetical, first attested in prose in Philo, used here for variatio. Cf. Mig. 140; Congr. 57; Prov. 2.109.

tὸ τῆς ψυχῆς μεμυκές ὅμω. A Platonic expression, Rep. VII 533D and Phaedr. 251 but also an allusion to part of the verse Num 22:31 not quoted by Philo, "Ἀπεκάλυψε δὲ ὁ θεὸς τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς Βαλααμ καὶ ὅψι τὸν ἄγγελον κυρίου ἀνθετηκότα ἐν τῇ ὀδῷ." 

ἐπιλυσθεὶς κατεπόθη. At Conf. 66 Balaam is said to live in Mesopotamia, signifying that "his understanding is submerged in the inmost depths of a river, unable to swim its way upward and lift its head above the surface." The influence of the Phaedrus myth (248A) is conspicuous here, with suggestions also of Odysseus battling the waves off Phaeacia.

182 οὗ δυσθεράπευτα . . . ἄνιατα. This would be the case with those in the heavenly ride of the Phaedrus myth who have not managed at any stage to raise their heads above the rim of the heavens and catch a glimpse of eternal truths. Note the Stoic term ἀφωστήματα, cf. above, 65.

ἐπιστάντως ἐλέγχου. The figure of Conscience returns here in the final passage of the treatise, appearing now very much like a guardian angel (especially if we could take λόγος ἅγιος as meaning not the divine Logos, but a divine logos), although it is still internal to the human soul (ὁ ἐνδον δικαιοσύνης, below, 183). Philo here makes one of his relatively infrequent references to Scripture outside the Pentateuch, to Psalm 90:11-12, a passage made use of later in the NT with reference to Jesus:

ὅτι τοῖς ἄγγέλοις αὐτοῦ ἐντελεῖται περὶ σου τοῦ διαφυλάξας σε ἐν πάσαι ταῖς όδοίς σου.
epi cheirōn árōsin se
mēpote prosekhês prōs lìdon ton pōda sou.

epi voudeía kai sōforonismos kai tē toû pantaís épavoros-
seî blίou. A nice rhetorical triad. For the collocution of the
first two terms, cf. Mut. 135: ἡ νουθεσία, ὁ σωφρονισμός, ἡ
παιδεία; Virt. 75. For the last phrase, cf. Mos. 2.36. Inter-
esting parallel in 2 Timothy 3:16. σωφρονισμός also in 2 Tim
1:7.

183 ὁθορνὴν τὴν μετὰ τῶν πραγματιῶν. This passage of Num
(31:8) is used again in the same connection, referring to Balaam,
at Mut. 203. Presumably the unsportsmanlike behavior of the
Israelites in killing the wounded of Midian was an incentive to
allegorization of this passage.

δυσκαθάρτος. In sense of "hard to purify" first
attested in prose in Philo.

τὸν ἔνδον δικαστὴν. Cf. above 128 and Op. 128: τὸν τοῦ
συνελάτον εἰλεχθον, δὲ ἐνεδρυμένος τῇ ψυχῇ καθάπερ δικαστῆς ἐπι-
πλήττων οὐ δυσκαθάρται.

ἀναδικάζοιες. Only occurrence in Philo. The verb is
proper to Attic legal terminology (Isaeus fr. 145). Here it
seems to mean "challenge," "appeal against."