Goodenough on the Beginnings of Christianity

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In 1925 The Theology of Justin Martyr had been out for two years and the publication of By Light, Light was still a decade in the future. This essay on the Oratio ad Graecos of Ps.-Justin, Goodenough’s first scholarly article, provides a bridge from the first book to the second. It is about a work of “Justin,” but most of it is devoted to Greek-speaking Judaism, here represented chiefly by Philo.

As soon as this essay was published, Adolf von Harnack quickly wrote a review of it, and of Goodenough’s criticism of Harnack’s own work on the Oratio. As a result Goodenough modified his own position when he discussed the Oratio again in By Light, Light. There (page 299) he wrote: "When the article was written I had not recognized the Mystery and its ramifications in Philo, and so missed a good deal of the implications of the Oratio." He withdrew the suggestion that Paul had drawn on the Oratio in his letter to the Galatians. But he maintained the essentials of his thesis as he rewrote the article in By Light, Light 299-305.

In a recent treatment of this text (Grant 1983), Robert M. Grant agrees with Harnack that the Oratio is Christian and that it draws on Galatians. However, Goodenough’s position has much to recommend it if it is accepted that the supposed parallels to Galatians are standardized commonplaces, the position he comes to in By Light, Light 298. The crucial chapter
five (translated on 3-4 below) is the point at which the Oratio comes closest to anything like Christian references. Goodenough asserts that, on the basis of that evidence, the Oratio "would not have been recognized by a Greek as referring to Christianity at all" (page 11 below). The Syriac translator of the Oratio must have agreed, for he felt it necessary to supplement the text in order to make the link to Christianity unmistakable (pages 10-11 below, cf. By Light, Light 305).

Following this story from the 1923 monograph to this article (1925) to By Light, Light (1935) provides a remarkable picture of a young and growing scholar "in transition," moving not only from one position to another but really from one scholarly field to the next. Goodenough was determined to master Greek-speaking Judaism. His reason for that was clear: it would help him to understand more completely the emergence of Christianity, and to chart its earliest directions. But already in 1925 he was so far into Philo that it is not surprising that he never successfully completed the return to the original subject, the beginnings of Christianity. With the possible exception of no. 3, none of the other articles reprinted in this volume will be as technical and full of scholarly detail as this early effort. (See also Eccles 1985:62.)


The "Oratio ad Graecos" is to be found in the third volume of Otto's "Corpus Apologetarum Christianorum," and in Harnack's "Die pseudo-justinische Rede an die Griechen." It represents itself as a defence for turning from the religion of the Greeks to the religion of the Logos, and presents its case most vigorously. The document opens with the traditional denunciation of the immorals of the Greek gods and heroes, a purely Greek polemic which was begun at least as far back as Xenophanes. To this subject the author adds nothing, but presents an excellent epitome of the usual arguments. He then discusses the current way of living among the Greeks, and says that he rejected it with loathing; he justifies his opinion with a half-dozen vivid statements about Greek practices. From commenting upon the Greek religion and morality he turns in contrast to describe with equal pithiness the high moral and spiritual character of his new faith, exhorting his former associates to find the same peace and exaltation which the change has

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1Sitzungsberichte, Berlin Academy, 1896, p. 634 ff.
meant to him. The writer has remarkable power of going to the heart of what he discusses.

The document depends entirely upon its own testimony for its date and classification. Only one manuscript copy came down to us, that in the Codex Argentoratensis (burned in 1870), in which the Oratio received an impossible ascription to Justin Martyr, corresponding to a work of similar title ascribed to Justin by Eusebius. There is, indeed, in the statements of the Oratio about the Logos, a close resemblance to some of Justin's ideas; but that Justin was capable of saying so much to the point in so small a compass is inconceivable. With this evidence for authorship discredited, there is no further tradition whatever to help us in identifying or dating the document. Harnack has investigated the date, and decides that it could not well be later than 240, because, as he ingeniously points out, paederasty is mentioned by the author as a shameful practice, but not as a breach of law. In this way it would have been alluded to until 240, when for the first time a law was instituted against this vice. At the same time Harnack alleges that the conception of the Logos is so advanced as to make an earlier date than 180 unlikely, and consequently he thinks that the date of the document falls between 180 and 240. With this Bardenhewer agrees. That the document is not later than 240 is made probable by Harnack's suggestion; but that the Logos-passage could not have been written before 180 is not so convincing. To this passage I will try to show that Harnack has not paid sufficient attention.

So far as the first four chapters of the Oratio are concerned, in which the immoralities of the Greek gods and of the Greek manners are set forth, they might have been written by a convert to almost any philosophic sect at any time after the third century B.C., and need not detain us. The last chapter, the fifth, is the only one in which positive remarks are made about the writer's own faith. It reads as follows:

Henceforth, ye Greeks, come and partake of incomparable wisdom (σοφία), and be instructed by the divine Logos, and learn to know the incorruptible king, and recognize his heroes who never slaughter whole nations. For he, our captain, does not desire strength of bodies and beauty of forms, nor the haughtiness of high birth, but a pure soul fortified by holiness. And indeed the divine Logos has ceaseless care over us, and teaches us both the passwords of our king and divine deeds. Oh thou soul which has been permeated with the power of the Logos! Oh trumpet of peace in the soul torn by conflict! Oh city of refuge from terrible passion! Oh teaching that quenches the fire within the soul! This instruction does not make us poets, it does not train us as philosophers, nor as skilful orators, but when it has been learned, it makes mortals become immortals, human beings gods, and from earth leads to the realms beyond Olympus. Come ye, and be instructed. Become as I am now, for I was like you. These things
captured me, the divine inspiration of the instruction, the power of the Logos. For as a skilful snakecharmer makes the terrible serpent creep out of its hole, and puts it to flight, so the Logos drives from the recesses of the soul the terrible sensual affections: first lust, through which every horror is born, enmities, strifes, envy, intriguing, anger, and such like. So when lust has gone forth the soul becomes serene and calm. And when the soul is relieved from the evils that flow about its neck, it returns to him who made it. For it must be restored whence it departed.  

The first and most striking fact about this fine description of the power of the Logos to release the soul from the tyranny of the lower nature is that it contains no hint of Christ, or any syllable that is distinctively Christian. And yet, so far as I have been able to ascertain, this obvious point has never been noticed. Found with Christian writings, its Christian character has gone unchallenged. It is this matter which I wish particularly to discuss.

At first sight the Logos-passage, and with it the whole document, might well appear to be the product of any of the late Platonic or Eclectic mystics, for it fits in perfectly with the Logos-ideas of both Plutarch and Cornutus. But the general tenor of the Oratio is against this. The Eclectics never, to my knowledge, set off such an antithesis as is here made between the gods of Greece and the Logos. They rather sought to find the Logos in mythology by allegorizing the ancient myths. So, to say nothing of the Hermetic literature proper, the identification of Hermes and the Logos was a common device of the Stoic "adaptation" of mythology. Cornutus says expressly: "And, as it happens, Hermes is the Logos, whom the gods sent us from heaven, making, of all living creatures on the earth, man alone to be rational."  

It is hardly necessary to quote from Plutarch. His identification of Osiris with the Logos, for instance, is a familiar example of his attitude toward popular mythology. Even Plato, fiercely as he denounced the gods, and peremptorily as he banished Homer from his Republic, preserved in the Timaeus their purified replicas as intermediate deities.

The presumption, then, from the sharp contrast of the gods and the Logos is that the document did not come from the pen of a pagan philosopher. But another school of thought, hellenistic Judaism, did scornfully reject the mythology of the Greeks for a pure devotion to the Logos. To the Jews in the Diaspora the legends of the immoralities of the gods were of course particularly distasteful. They preached openly

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2 The translation is made from the text as printed by Harnack.
3 Cornutus, c. 16 (ed. Lang, p. 20), following the text as altered by E. Krebs, Der Logos als Heiland im ersten Jahrhundert, Freib. i. B., 1910, p. 34, n. 2.
that such mythology must be rejected before a true knowledge of God was possible. So, for instance, Josephus reproaches the Greeks for ascribing "sodomitical practices to the gods themselves," and representing that "the gods married their own sisters, contriving this apology for their own strange unnatural lusts."\textsuperscript{4} In another passage Josephus refers to Plato's expulsion of the gods from the Republic.\textsuperscript{5} The polemic against Greek mythology in the Oratio is thus quite compatible with the spirit of hellenistic Judaism. Unquestionably, in preaching against polytheism, the Greek reproaches against mythological immorality would be as handy a weapon for hellenistic Judaism as they proved later for early Christianity.

But more positive evidence for the nature of the Oratio is to be found in the Logos-passage itself. Here the soul of man is represented as a divinely pure creation which is sunk to the neck in evils. It is subject to sensual passions, whose affections produce states in the soul which change its fundamental nature, essentially pollute its pristine purity, and hence estrange it from Him who made it. Only one thing can change this tragic apostasy. Man must appeal for help to the divine Logos, and listen to its instruction. As one does so there comes to him a mystic knowledge with active power of its own to chase the evils of sense from the soul. Like enchanted serpents the sins creep forth and go away. The conflict of spirit is stilled by a trumpet of peace, the fire of the soul is quenched. No information is given which will make one wise in worldly wisdom, but the mystic password by which man rises beyond humanity and himself becomes divine. For by its nature the soul must necessarily return to Him who made it, if it is to be freed from sensual slavery. In such a restitution, and so alone, is peace to be found. The Logos is a city of refuge, where the pursuing passions cannot follow; it is an incorruptible king, whose presence in the soul drives out all sin.

The figure of the Logos as a city of refuge undoubtedly has its source in Judaism rather than paganism. The word \(\phi\epsilon\nu\gamma\alpha\delta\epsilon\nu\tau\eta\varphi\iota\rho\iota\nu\) used in the Oratio is the familiar Septuagint word for cities of refuge, and these cities were taken by Philo as the basis for one of his most beautiful Logos-passages. In his treatise "De fuga et inventione" (§§91 ff.) Philo has a fine description of the mystic purification of the soul. The soul, he says, must strip off from itself its base affections, first the body, then the \(\lambda\acute{o}g\omega\varsigma\ \pi\rho\sigma\varphi\omicron\omicron\iota\kappa\omicron\sigma\varsigma\) (speech), in order that the \(\lambda\acute{o}g\omega\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\ \delta\acute{i}a\nu\omicron\omicron\alpha\nu\) (reason) alone may be left. Thus freed, the highest part of man can in purity embrace true Being (\(\tau\omicron\nu\ \mu\omicron\omicron\nu\ \delta\nu\)) "in such a way that it can not be separated." Philo now changes the figure, and

\textsuperscript{4}C. Apion, ii, 275, ed. Niese; cf. ii, 242 ff.
\textsuperscript{5}Ibid., ii, 256.
represents this liberation of the highest part of the soul as a flight to the cities of refuge. "These," he says, "are very beautiful and well-walled cities, the best possible refuge for souls worthy of eternal salvation" (§ 96). The six cities are all explained as being powers of descending value from the first city, which is the divine Logos. There were three cities provided on each bank of the River Jordan by the law. Those on the Canaan side, where the majority of Israelites lived, were of course more readily accessible to an unfortunate person hotly pursued by avengers. These three, therefore, are explained by Philo as places of refuge from the rougher passions, adapted to the majority of men, whose lives are lived on a low plane and hence have little reserve with which to meet bodily temptations. Such people need immediate help. The first city on the Canaan side is thus explained by Philo to be the negative injunctions of the Jewish law, which is the part of the Jewish system most easily understood. Even the most ignorant man can be controlled by specific prohibitions. It is still on the lower plane, but one step in advance brings to the positive injunctions of the Torah, which he calls the second city, and one step farther still to the third city, where man finds refuge from the sins of his life in an experience of God's tender mercy. All three of these cities, or refuges, are so close to all men as almost to touch their daily lives. But across the great divide of life, which separates between an animal and a reasonable way of living, is a refuge from animal temptation in the activity of the mind. To Philo this was graphically illustrated by the cities of refuge beyond the Jordan accessible only to the few permanent residents of the other side, men who lived habitually contemplative lives, and to those whose passions harassed them so slightly that they had time to get over to the other side. The first city of refuge here Philo explains as being the kingly power of the Logos, by which he seems to mean a mystic apprehension of the divine majesty, which must result in a compelling fear of God that will overpower all evil desires. Higher than the majesty is the next city, which is represented as being a mystic apprehension of the creative power of the Logos, which Philo here says is the power commonly called God by Moses. For an apprehension of that creative power which out of its own goodness has made the world, including man, will awaken not fear but a spontaneous love for the author of our being. Philo does not here use the phrase, but he has in mind the recognition of the fatherhood of God as a more exalted experience than the recognition of his kingliness or majesty, and suggests the powerful effect upon a man's life which the apprehension of God's fatherhood must exercise. But all these five are lesser manifestations of the Logos, the mind of God, which is the sixth city. Greater than the majesty or love of God, or the merciful provisions of
The law, is the mind itself of God. "Therefore," says Philo, "Moses urges him who is able to run swiftly, to stretch out without stopping for breath to the most exalted divine Logos, who is the source of wisdom, in order that by drawing from the flowing source he may win the prize of eternal life instead of death."  

It seems plain that in making the cities of refuge to be a symbol of experience of the Logos, the author of the Oratio could only have been drawing upon hellenistic Judaism.

Another figure of the Logos in the Oratio is found in the representation of the Logos not as a place of refuge but as a power coming into the soul of man and cleansing him from evil. Does man himself, in hellenistic Judaism, have to be able to run to the inaccessible sixth city in order to find the Logos and experience its power, or does the Logos meet the seeker half way? It is first to be noticed that in the Oratio the Logos comes to man, and charms and drives from his soul by a mystic power all the sins and passions of the senses, but apparently only after he has himself turned to the Logos. There is no prevenient grace in the Oratio, for it is the clear implication of the spirit of the exhortation that only when man of his own will leaves his sins and turns to the Logos can he hope for any help from the Logos.

We have but to turn a page in Philo from the passage I have just been citing to find a similar representation of man as needing only to forsake his will for sin and seek the Logos, in order to have the Logos come and drive out sin from his life entirely. Here Philo is still discussing the cities of refuge, and now he takes up the additional element that a fugitive must remain in the city until the death of the high priest. This Philo interprets by shifting his ground. The high priest is of course identified with the Logos. From Philo's point of view the question is how long we may remain in the city of escape from the life of sense. He answers that we may remain until the high priest, the Logos, dies. The death of the Logos, he explains, is the departure of the Logos from the soul, for of course, properly speaking, the Logos cannot die. But

so long as this most sacred Logos lives and survives in the soul, any involuntary error (change) is powerless to return into it; for the Logos has by nature no share in any sin, and is incapable of contamination.

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6§ 97. One familiar with Philo will recognize that in this passage Philo is adapting to the Old Testament account of the cities of refuge his famous doctrine of the descending powers of the Logos as described in Quaest. in Exod. ii, 68; Harris, Fragments of Philo, p. 67. Paul's race to the goal in Phil. 3, 13 finds here a striking parallel.
from it. ...For if by the vigorous indwelling of the Logos sin was dispossessed, so, when the Logos departs, sin by all means comes back in. For the blameless high priest, who is a reproof (ἐλεγχός) of sin, enjoys from nature the elect honor that a slip of purpose never finds place in him. Wherefore it is right to pray that that should live in the soul which is at once the high priest, king, judge, and reproof, who having been elected to jurisdiction over the whole of our minds is never put to shame by any of those led in for its judgment (§§ 117 f.).

Philo has badly mixed his figures here, but the sense is sufficiently plain. Before the incorruptible purity of the Logos, which comes into a man who wishes to turn from sin, all sin vanishes ashamed. As Philo says further on in the same treatise, the Logos nourishes the soul, illuminates and sweetens it (§§ 137, 139). The author of the Oratio and Philo thus agree in believing that if a man will turn from his sin and pray to the Logos, the Logos will answer by coming to live in his soul. Once in the soul, the presence of the Logos is so sweetening and illuminating that sin dare not remain or try to enter. Indeed, when thus blessed by the Logos, a man cannot fall even into slips of purpose, unless the Logos first be dismissed from the soul. The passages in Philo and the Oratio are in perfect agreement as to the function of the Logos, and in their attitude toward it. But further comparison shows a still more detailed resemblance.

For the Logos is represented in the Oratio as a captain, στρατηγός, that is, as our leader in the struggle with evil. With this figure goes that of the Logos as having ceaseless watch over us. Both figures are military. Philo wrote similarly about the divine help which is ready to assist men in the struggle of life:

Again, when you see in the wars and disasters of life God's merciful hand and power (χείρα καὶ δυναμιν) hovering over you and defending you, be silent, for this ally (βοηθός) has no need of assistance in the fight. And the witness of this fact is the statement of the Holy Scriptures, "The Lord will fight for you, and you shall be silent" (Ex. 14, 14). So if you see the legitimate offspring and first-born of Egypt being destroyed (Ex. 11, 5), that is, lust, pleasure, pain, fear, iniquity, frivolity, and riotous living, then be silent in awe, shrinking before the fearful power of God, "For," say the Scriptures, "not a dog shall move his tongue, from man down to the beast" (Ex. 11, 7). Which is to say that it is not fitting that the doglike tongue, with its howling and barking, should vaunt itself, nor should the man in us, the dominating mind, do so, nor the bestial creature, the senses, when the ally comes wholly from outside and of his own accord to shield us, after that which is peculiarly ours has been destroyed.7

7De Somniis, ii, 265-267.
Philo here speaks of the χειρα και δυναμιν of God and does not specify the Logos. But in this δυναμις anyone familiar with his writing will recognize the divine Logos. In representing the Logos as a military aid, the Oratio is thus quite in accord with hellenistic Judaism.

Still another figure of the Oratio is that the Logos is a doctrine, of automatic power to help the soul. The conception is clearly that which gnosticism and the mystery religions had in common, that of a saving knowledge epitomized in passwords. The conception was early taken into Christianity and finally used with great force by Clement of Alexandria. But that it had long before been assimilated by hellenistic Judaism has, I think, been clearly demonstrated by Friedländer in his dissertation entitled "Der vorchristliche jüdische Gnosticismus" (Berlin, 1898). I refer to only two passages in Philo, not mentioned, I think, by Friedlander, one where Isaac with only one wife and no concubine is contrasted with Abraham who had both Sarah and Hagar. Abraham, Philo explains, represents here one who had to supplement his inadequate grasp of divine things (Sarah) by turning to earthly wisdom (Hagar). But Isaac was satisfied with Rebecca because she was at once virtue and a divinely given knowledge, which needed no completion in concubine arts, whose offspring are bastard doctrines. In another passage Philo says that true doctrine, ὁρθὸς λόγος, comes to man not by seeking in the wells of the earth (human science), but as a blessed shower from heaven of divine knowledge, which not only waters the best vegetables growing in the soul, but is itself a rain of manna coming ready to eat, saving man from starvation in the desert. The manna is of course the Logos as well as the ὁρθὸς λόγος. So, in representing the Logos as a saving knowledge, the Oratio is again quite in accord with hellenistic Judaism.

Directly suggestive of hellenistic Judaism is also the identification of σοφία with the Logos.

The list of sins of the flesh in the Oratio is a typical hellenistic Jewish borrowing from Stoicism. Lietzmann has noted over two dozen such lists in Philo, besides lists in the Wisdom of Solomon and 4 Maccabees. One such I have already quoted.

The Oratio closes with a striking statement of mystical consummation: "And when the soul is released from the evils which flow about its neck, it returns to him that made it. For it must be

8De congressu quaerendae eruditionis gratia, 34 ff.
10Handbuch zum Neuen Testament: Römerbrief, pp. 34 f.
restored whence it departed." The author may mean here either the mystical consummation in this life, or he may be referring to what happens at death to one whom the Logos has purified. For though the Logos can and does purify the soul, yet so long as man is in the body he is still surrounded, if no longer permeated, with fleshly evils. It needs no demonstration to point out that this was the usual heaven looked for in hellenistic Jewish literature from the Wisdom of Solomon on. While the Palestinian Jew and after him, with some modification, the Christian looked for a resurrection of the dead, and an immortality in company with his beloved body (for of this love the Palestinian Jew was not ashamed), the hellenistic Jew more usually expected at death to be freed from the filthy prison of his body, and to return to an eternal consummation of mystic communion with the Logos, or with God himself.

So while I find no literary parallelism to indicate that the author of the Oratio used Philo as a direct literary source, the parallelism of ideas is certainly very close. According to both writers the Logos is σωφία, the military conqueror and protector in the soul's warfare, an incorruptible king, a city of refuge from sin, a power whose pure presence in the soul drives out all sensual desire, and a mystic knowledge which is itself empowered to overcome evil; both look for release after death to effect a return to the soul's spiritual source. Clearly the author of the Oratio must have been trained in a hellenistic Jewish school. But was he also a Christian? As I have pointed out, there is no mention of Christianity, and I can find no shred of specifically Christian thought. In second-century Christian documents, as for example in Justin, the same philosophy of life presents itself, mixed with many foreign elements, but (what is most important) in the process of syncretization with the conception of Jesus as the Son of God. Had the Oratio been written by a Christian, the point brought out in such an exhortation to former Greek associates as we have here would have been the identity of Jesus Christ with the Logos which can thus transform the soul.

Harnack, in speaking of the Logos-passage, compares it to Clement of Alexandria's Logos. As is well known, Clement's Logos is avowedly developed directly from Philo's writings. In one respect, however, Philo's Logos is distinguishable from Clement's, namely in Clement's repeated insistence that the Logos was incarnate in Christ. Indeed, in the Syriac recension of the Oratio which Harnack has discussed in detail, the one essential difference between the two documents has not been noticed at all by Harnack, namely, the fact that the author of the

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11Sitzungsberichte, Berlin Academy, 1896, p. 646.
recension is obliged to supplement the original with the statement that he is turning from Greek mythology specifically to Christianity. As I have pointed out elsewhere, the distinguishing difference between hellenistic Jewish and Christian apologetic is that hellenistic Jewish apologetic takes the Logos as needing no demonstration, and centers its attention upon monotheism, while Christian apologetic pays less attention to monotheism, because it had to face the reproaches of all who understood the Greek Logos-doctrine, that in identifying the Logos with Christ it was simply talking ignorant nonsense. So the Oratio, as an explanation to Greeks for becoming a Christian, answers not a single question that the Greeks would have raised, and indeed it would not have been recognized by a Greek as referring to Christianity at all. As an explanation, however, for becoming a "God-fearer" in a Philonic synagogue, the document is consistent and admirably pithy.

It seems to me then plain that we have here not a Christian document at all but the speech or letter of some Greek convert to hellenistic Judaism addressed to his former associates. That throughout the Diaspora many such converts found in Greco-Jewish mysticism a haven which nothing else could offer them is well known. That many of them were God-fearers who accepted the ethics and mysticism of hellenistic Judaism without its legal code and circumcision is equally familiar. It would rather be surprising that the writings of these people (for some of them must have written) should have completely disappeared, than that a document from such a source should now be discovered.

Thus far I have ignored one very important aspect of the Oratio. In the brief Logos-passage there are apparently two direct though unacknowledged quotations from Paul's letter to the Galatians. The first is, "Become as I am, for also was as you," γίνεσθε ὡς ἐγώ, ὅτι θανόν ἡμῖν ὡς θανεῖς, which corresponds exactly to Gal. 4, 12, except that all manuscripts of Galatians lack θανεῖς. Again, a few lines below this sentence in the Oratio is the list of sins from which the presence of the Logos frees the soul: "Enmities, strifes, jealousy, factions, wraths, καὶ τὰ δίμοια τούτοις," which again corresponds exactly to a part of Paul's list of the works of the flesh in Ga. 5, 20; 21, ending like Paul's list with καὶ τὰ δίμοια τούτοις. Here some literary dependence is unmistakable.

The significance of the similarity becomes still more striking when the context in Galatians is studied. Paul has been urging the Galatians to stand fast in their new liberty in Christ, which he has won for them in freeing them from slavery to the στοιχεῖα, the elements of this

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12In my Theology of Justin Martyr, Jena, 1923, pp. 139-142.
world, which, he insists, are not gods in the proper sense at all. The argument of Lietzmann seems to me conclusive that Paul is here classing the Jewish feasts, set according to movements of heavenly bodies, with heathen worship of the stars as gods. He is urging the Greek Christians not to turn to Jewish rites, because such a change would be essentially but a reversion to their old worship of the gods, while Paul has been leading them to a pure worship in the Spirit of Christ. True freedom is to be found only by walking in the Spirit, whereby we may cease producing the fruits of the flesh to produce the fruits of the Spirit. Therefore become as I am, Paul urges, who was once as you are. The entire argument in the latter part of Galatians is thus very similar to the fundamental plea of the Oratio, while the two verbal parallels make it clear that the connection was direct.

The question then which must be decided is whether Paul used the Oratio, or the author of the Oratio used Galatians. I am convinced that Paul used the Oratio, for while his argument is entirely consistent as an adaptation of an older hellenistic Jewish argument as found in the Oratio, it is inconceivable that a Christian would use the argument of Galatians, as he must have done were the Oratio a Christian production. If the Oratio is a Christian argument based upon Galatians, the author for some reason has carefully rejected all mention of Christ to return to a non-christian Logos doctrine. He has introduced specifically hellenistic Jewish imagery to describe the Logos in a purely Philonic fashion. He has taken a part of Paul's list of the works of the flesh, but omitted Paul's beautiful list of the fruits of the Spirit, though this would have fitted strikingly with his argument. On the other hand, if Paul is using the Oratio, he has christianized it, and adapted it to fit a group of people threatening to go over to Jewish legalism. He has supplemented the list of the works of the flesh in the Oratio, and balanced it with the fruits of the Spirit. The saving Logos has become the Spirit of Christ. That is to say, if Paul was using the Oratio we have a natural and intelligible adaptation for Christian purposes of some ideas which he found in an hellenistic Jewish document. If the author of the Oratio was a Christian who knew Galatians, the way in which Galatians is used is inconceivably forced and artificial. The only conclusion which the two documents seem to me to permit is that Galatians is later than the Oratio, and that Paul knew it and used both ideas and phraseology from it.

_A tertium quid_ would be that the Oratio is an hellenistic Jewish document, but written after, and using, Galatians. But hellenistic Judaism seems to have been thoroughly disorganized by the preaching

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of Paul. For while we have mention of σεβομένου in Josephus, there is no indication that after the spread of Christianity Judaism presented itself to outsiders in any such form as is to be found in Philo and the Oratio. The clash with Christianity shortly led the Jews even to reject the Septuagint, which had come to be the symbol alike of hellenistic syncretism and Christianity, and to supplement it by new and more literal translations. We have no trace or hint of a post-christian hellenistic Judaism, and such a group must be invented if it is to be the background of the Oratio. We are thus driven back to our dilemma between an author of the Oratio who was a Christian and used Paul, but eliminated all trace of Christianity from his argument so as to produce a purely hellenistic Jewish document, and on the other hand one who was an hellenistic Jew writing a treatise later used by Paul.

If I am right in taking the latter alternative, there remains the question of date. I should incline to set the date in the first fifty, perhaps the first twenty-five, years of the Christian era, though it might have been written earlier. The author seems to represent an advanced stage of hellenistic Judaism, which it is difficult to put much before Philo and which was probably nearly contemporary with him. With no external testimony a closer dating would be entirely arbitrary.
