According to Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy², it is Kantian philosophy which opens up the possibility of Romanticism. Due to an unforeseeable relationship established between philosophy and aesthetics in Kantian philosophy, a “passage” to Romanticism is made possible. Yet this relation is not something that can easily be put to work because where there should be a passage, a bridge, there is an abyss instead. Therefore this passage to Romanticism is actually a passage where nothing is allowed to pass. At the origin of this passage which allows nothing to pass, there is the subject emptied out by the Kantian transcendental. If what I call the “I” is unrepresentable except within the forms by means of which I make it representable to me, that is, if it is always bound to remain as a *phenomenon*, or, if it becomes knowable — outside the limits of the *noumenon* — only by means of representations of the “I” with reference to the transcendental, then what I call the “I” is an empty form. At one end of the abyss, there is this emptied form and, at the other, the transcendental imagination which will bestow on it infinite possibilities. Although a passage between the two is possible, since it will always be carrying a risk of failure, unavoidably it will end up in questions such as: “Is this the true form?” Having thus reached the status of an epistemologically unknowable, emptied-out form, the subject will be given the right of constructing itself on the levels of the social and the political only via its deeds of morality. Yet, this can be achieved only in the form of negation, in the form of

a moral subjectivity which cannot produce knowledge of itself. It is as if the negativity it surrendered to the transcendental just in order to overcome the crisis of representation has opened up an infinite space of freedom before the moral subject, and thus it seems as if it will be able to constitute a consciousness — though it will not be able to produce an absolute knowledge — of itself. However, questions still remain, such as: Whose morality is this? Whose consciousness is this which the moral subject will constitute in the light of the formal question?

The Jena School\(^3\) is the reversal of this abyss in aesthetic terms through the grounding of life on this absolutely impassable passage — or, in other words, by transforming life into a space of freedom comprised of absolutely artistic representations. Jena Romanticism would be perfectly Kantian if it did not include an element of “creation,” if it did not see the world as the creation of a subject — in all its negativity, therefore, it means to turn one’s back on the transcendental in matters of freedom. If the subject — not epistemologically, but morally — can create a consciousness and a world by its moral deeds, why would it still need to be formed by the transcendental? That which underlies this question is more horrifying than any possible way of answering it: just because it means the recognition of the fact that the world is made of the creations of a moral subject, made of its forms of representing the world to itself, opening up a route towards recapturing the negativity from the transcendental. The Jena School proposes a “political” which, by appropriating a negativity, becomes capable, though on micro levels, of questioning the authoritarian despotic, repressive regimes which

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3 Jena Romanticism or the Jena School is the first phase of Romanticism in German literature, represented by the work of a group centred in Jena from about 1798 to 1804. The movement is considered to have contributed to the development of German idealism in late modern philosophy. The group of Jena Romantics was led by the versatile writer Ludwig Tieck. Two members of the group, brothers August Wilhelm and Friedrich von Schlegel, laid down the theoretical basis for Romanticism in the circle’s organ, the Athenaeum.
are established by the force of the transcendental. For example, Georg Büchner’s *Lenz*, in this sense, is a novella where the politics of fixation maintained by concepts like citizen and citizenship is problematized. What happens if man leaves behind the politics of fixation exercised by authorities and sets out on the paths to schizophrenia? The *political*. 