Definitions

2.1.1 The acceptance of a term is an awareness of the contract as renewed in the return to the beginning.

2.1.2 Liability implied by that initial understanding is a universal term-to-be-decided.

2.1.3 Thus prohibited from knowledge of the world to come, the only obligation is to name.

2.1.4 That the contract came to be cannot be reasoned.

2.1.5 Enter the contract to the world.
2.2.1 Everything is owing to the contract.

2.2.2 The essential operation of the contract has defined itself as funding.

2.2.3 For the most part will the contract be assumed without awareness of its fundamental role in the unfolding of the universe in which there be perception. That it cannot be a part of this unfolding to observe is what allows it to be taken thus for granted.

2.2.4 Notwithstanding the awareness of the contract is the essence of mankind.

2.2.5 The contract as discovered as the contract is the basis of the human thus contracted.

2.2.6 To speculate on that to which the contract be relation—that it be between a “god” and any “human,” for example—is to make of this an object that takes place among the countlessly diverse specifications of the contract, as another mere example of contraction.

2.2.7 That to which the contract be relation disassociates from every speculation.
2.3.1 A term is a conception of the contract.

2.3.2 A term is not the cause of all that follows, but allows that cause to be.

2.3.3 A conception of the contract is enabled by the contract.

2.3.4 Its conception is not knowledge of the contract, but acceptance of the need for its ulterior fulfilment.

2.3.5 A conception of the contract is internal to the contract, and so cannot be assumed as more than merely an example of its funding operation. An example nonetheless that would be relevant to everything contracted in the future.

2.3.6 A term is an example of the contract; or a clause that may refer to a specific obligation; or a period of time.

2.3.7 The contract is a term for that which constitutes the contract.

2.3.8 Beyond this simple act of constitution, its significance is void.

2.3.9 A term that would initiate the contract has no lasting application whatsoever.
2.4.1 Every instance of the contract is the contract as a whole. The attention must be undivided always.

2.4.2 An imperative to concentrate derives from the uniqueness of each vision. There is no determination that may equally apply to all or anything that follows.

2.4.3 Independently of any other term a term will constitute the contract.

2.4.4 Every term is as the contract, of the contract, and towards another contract.

2.4.5 That a term be an expression of the contract irrespective of those past explains their intercontradiction.

2.4.6 Between the terms may be no obvious connection that would constitute the essence of the contract. This may never be consistently derived from the conjunction of the terms that have already been accepted—even if those terms could be presented in the manner of objective recognition, which they certainly cannot.

2.4.7 A term is a fulfilment of the contract, and a sign of its eventual fulfilment.
2.5.1 The contract is not fixed for once and all, but must be redefined, or reaccepted, in the wake of every instance.

2.5.2 It is not to terms already of the contract that would have to be adhered, but to ongoing termination.

2.5.3 Only by continuing acceptance of the terms may the agreement be adhered to. Definitions of a stationary contract are unable to account for what they cannot take account of. Their persistence is the basis of illusion, and illusion could prove deadly.
2.5.4 The conception of the contract as a process of contraction — not as this or that contracted — is an unfulfilled acceptance of the contract. An awareness of the contract is awareness of the need to let such go. Its conception is ongoing.

2.5.5 Adherence to the contract is the redetermination of the sense to be adhered to, in the sense that this adherence must be learnt each time anew.

2.5.6 Thus the signing of the contract is the always unintentional acceptance of the sense of an agreement to renew in terms of endless resignation.

2.5.7 The signing of the contract is the tentative acceptance of what cannot be conceived by such an instance.

2.5.8 Thus to sign is to renounce the world as given by the contract.
2.6.1 The contract was accepted in the darkness of the womb.

2.6.2 The conception of the terms, and so the entrance into life, cannot be chosen by that life itself elected.

2.6.3 Live according to the terms.

2.6.4 An explicit formulation of the contract is a fact of that which cannot be returned to.

2.6.5 A conscience stands in witness to the contract.

2.6.6 The inherent incompletion of the contract is an openness to other kinds of meaning.

2.6.7 The capacity to live from day to day will be dependent on an openness to other obligations. Funding may not ever be procured for once and all, but must be endlessly entreated.

2.6.8 The slow specification of the contract is the differentiation of concerns as they concern.

2.6.9 The contract must be kept in every moment. This imperative derives from the particular import of every moment, and the incomparability of any situation.

2.6.10 Survival is a process of adherence to the contract.

2.6.11 The ability to keep the terms is given by the terms.

2.6.12 Keep not to terms, but termination.
2.7.1  *Adhere not* to an image of the contract, nor of anything besides that presupposes the existence of the contract, but the contract of itself, as an imperative that brings the world to light in an ongoing self-fulfilment.

2.7.2  The contract is not specified by absolute conditions to adhere to, but adaptable provisions to enable.

2.7.3  To keep the contract one must learn to learn at every single turn.

2.7.4  Every term is a fulfilment of the contract.
2.8.1 An adherence to the contract is the swearing of an oath not to adhere to this or that.

2.8.2 To swear is to fulfil an obligation formed already by the contract.

2.8.3 The acceptance of the contract is in heed to its forbidding to begin with. For the matter this would signify is yet to be decided. The obedience to terms is their acceptance.

2.8.4 The decisions are not chosen, but accepted as they come. A difficult decision is of relevance to failure to perceive, and not a conflict of positions.

2.8.5 The contract is a process of contraction (to adhere to).

2.8.6 Irreversible contraction of the terms is the performance of the contract.
2.9.1 The contract would provide for any outcome.

2.9.2 The capacity to meet the unexpected is provided by the terms.

2.9.3 The worth of the provisions is impossible to measure by whatever other means than realisation.

2.9.4 No thing may appear without the contract, which is not itself a thing to be considered. That implied in the perception of whatever is could never be perceived as such directly.

2.9.5 The acceptance of the terms allows for any thing to be.

2.9.6 That to which the contract has brought access must be seen as something borrowed. A definitive account of all that is cannot be given.

2.9.7 A difficulty keeping the agreement may derive from the persistency of vision.

2.9.8 The present application of the terms will be an obstacle to future implications.

2.9.9 Functionality of terms preserves their structure, in which every one makes sense, or has a meaning; but significance is lost to such a structure.

2.9.10 The polysemous nature of the terms enables coverage.

2.9.11 The significance of such a clause will have to be decided. For the time that is its information functions.
2.10.1 The contract is perceivable by means of its contingent applications, but in no such seen directly. The conception of an absolute totality of means is an invalid application of the contract.

2.10.2 The agreement may be kept as long as active. Only by continued demonstration of specific obligations may the contract be adhered to.

2.10.3 The particulars are void — and the investment must continue.

2.10.4 The lapse of the agreement is to understand as need for further funding.

2.10.5 The universe is brought to light by signing.
2.11.1 There is no reason for the contract, in the sense that it be taken to achieve a given aim. The sole condition for whatever aim or purpose is the contract. These are consequent to such, and not its reason.

2.11.2 One is not to presuppose a space of possible occurrence, but prepare for unforeseen considerations.

2.11.3 Understanding of the contract as the source of all that is in terms of funding is not knowledge of what can or not be funded.

2.11.4 The terms provide for no specific outcome, but for “anything to come.” They are provisional in such that they allow one to respond to the interminate unknown that would invalidate their temporary structure.

2.11.5 *Accept* the need to alter.
2.12.1 Awareness is both consequence and keeping of the contract.

2.12.2 The awareness becomes consciousness when taken from the drafting of the contract. As detached from the condition of the term it corresponds to the extension of an instance of default.

2.12.3 Incorporation of a fundamental term is a formation of the self.

2.12.4 The signing of the contract is no choice that may be taken or discarded. There has never been an option.

2.12.5 A term is that which frees the self from failure to perceive.

2.12.6 The acceptance of a term is an expression of consent to keep accepting the expression of the terms.
2.13.1 As considered independent of its own determinations will the contract be accepted as the promise of another kind to come. The contraction of a term, which as a deeper understanding would initiate that other kind of contract, will not satisfy the need for its ulterior fulfilment.

2.13.2 The implication of another kind of contract in the presence of some thing before unseen would be the only guarantee that such be certain.

2.13.3 The signing of the contract is what certifies the presence of all things.

2.13.4 The contractions are internal to the contract, whereby that which was without an understanding may be suddenly brought forth by an internal alteration of the contract.

2.13.5 A term is less important than the contract it determines. The necessity for such could have resulted in innumerable such terms — or at least it would appear from a perspective that seems destined to have happened.

2.13.6 That when looking back a term appears an unavoidable resultant is a given point of view that cannot lay aside its late determination.

2.13.7 Only in the predisposed contingency of hindsight may one contract seem implied within one former.

2.13.8 That that past that would appear as antecedent to the term that has enabled its appearance as a cause will also signify an undecided future.
2.14.1 A performance of the contract brings a limited potential to invest with.

2.14.2 An inefficient contract lacks a fundamental term that would decide its operation.

2.14.3 The condition for the fullest operation of the contract will be met at such time as would allow for its effective implication.

2.14.4 The condition that would guarantee the freedom to invest remains unknown to the contracted.