Richard A. Myren, a member of the Wolfgang Committee and author of *Education in Criminal Justice*, observed: “Berkeley exhibits probably the widest range of attention to crime studies of any university in the United States today.”¹

However, from 1973 tenured faculty covered all bets. To placate university authorities, Diamond, Skolnick and Messinger swiftly validated the half-truths and outright lies justifying purging the radicals. Previously, for example, Messinger had eagerly supported the move to broaden the curriculum; however, after the Sindler Committee claimed that the School had abandoned its professional mission, he proposed keeping the School but narrowing the curriculum, confining it to the “administration of criminal justice.”²

Skolnick’s turn-about also made the Sindler Committee credible. In a confidential memo to the Chair of the

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² Messinger’s memos to Charles Dekker, Committee on Educational Policy, and Sanford Elberg, Dean, Graduate Division, on June 28, 1973 and on July 11, 1973.
Academic Senate Committee on Educational Policy,³ he wrote,

First, I agree with the committee’s recommendation that the School of Criminology ought to be phased out, but I don’t agree with certain parts of the analysis. I believe it would be possible and desirable to have a School of Criminology that would, precisely because of its high academic standards, make important contributions. ... It seems to me that historically the school has suffered from extremes: either the police and correctional training orientation of earlier generations, or the antithesis—the grandly systemic, Marxist orientation of a sizeable proportion of the current generation of faculty.⁴

Second, as one of the faculty who counseled a broader orientation for the School in the direction of Law and Society, I support the general trend of the recommendation, but find its specifics to be both inadequate and inconsistent. ... The resources now allocated to the School of Criminology should be shifted into a department—say of legal concepts, organization and institutions.

³ Confidential memo to Professor Charles Dekker, Chairman of the Academic Senate Committee on Educational Policy, June 25, 1973.

⁴ Only two professors at the School considered themselves Marxists. Diamond, in an interview with a San Francisco Chronicle reporter about the School closing, also employed a similar rational.
Although Skolnick juggled his recommendations with finesse, his memo clearly favored the second alternative—a “law and society” department. Undoubtedly concerned about his own continued employment, he repeatedly stressed the necessity for equipping this department with a core faculty and adequate funds.

Diamond added his own patronizing counsel to this well-timed enterprise. After the administration in the final months made him the School’s “Acting Dean” to oversee the closing, he affirmed his place on the side of the angels and loudly expressed his disdain for the School’s standards and curriculum. Suddenly, this famous forensic psychoanalyst—whose “expert testimony” at the Robert Kennedy assassination trial claimed that Sirhan Sirhan wasn’t legally responsible because he was psychotic—issued a memo requiring every remaining graduate student who had not taken a course in law to take one at the Law School. He then conducted a vendetta against Takagi and Platt after they declined to ratify his attempt to fail an African-American doctoral student in an oral exam. He accused them of abandoning their academic responsibilities. To humiliate them, he insisted on bringing faculty in from other departments to monitor oral examinations taken by their doctoral students.

They refused to submit to Diamond’s arrogant disregard of their academic prerogatives. Of course, Platt had

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5 But it would not include the much maligned criminalistics program, which he recommended terminating.

6 This idiotic proposal was dropped when graduate students expressed their outrage over this last minute requirement.

7 Four doctoral students who were affected sent written objections to Diamond. Also, Takagi rightfully refused to serve on any oral exam governed by these new conditions.
been denied tenure and the School’s closing meant that he could not maintain his position. But tenured faculty at Berkeley were not dismissed unless the administration could prove that they had committed a crime or a serious breach of ethical standards. Takagi had tenure and the administration could not dismiss him on these grounds. Nevertheless, his courageous defiance of Diamonds’ demands jeopardized his prospects. Despite his tenured position, Takagi’s continued employment at UCB was not assured if the School was closed.

Diamond gave lip service to Berkeley mores. He had previously announced that he would only accepted the responsibility of Acting Dean if the senior faculty was assured of continued employment. But student protests and legal actions taken against his sycophantic and unnecessary acquiescence to authority⁸ resulted in his unwillingness to do anything to ensure employment for Takagi, a senior faculty member. After the School was closed, Takagi was not given a position with Skolnick and Messinger in the Law and Society program at the School of Law in Boalt Hall. Instead, he was added to the faculty at the School of Education where he was isolated and left “twisting in the wind.”⁹ He did not receive a single merit increase in salary and retired 10 years later without being promoted beyond the rank of Associate Professor which he had at the School of Criminology.

To discredit the UC administration’s treatment of Tagaki, we should note that his family in 1942 had been forcibly interned in Manzanar—the first of 10 permanent “War Relocation Centers” where almost 120,000 Japanese and Japanese Americans were incarcerated un-

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⁸ He was particularly outraged over a civil suit, initiated against him by the African American student whom he failed.

⁹ See, Takagi 1999, op. cit.
(Two-thirds of the individuals in these internment camps were American citizens.) During their internment, young men were allowed to leave the camps when they volunteered to serve in a renowned unit that fought in the European theatre during WWII.

During the post-war years, Takagi was employed by the Alameda County’s Adult Probation Department. By early 1963, he was a parole officer in Los Angeles working with drug users and dealers. Three years later, he transferred to San Quentin Prison, where he worked as a classification officer for the California Board of Corrections.

Simultaneously, Takagi enrolled in Berkeley and Stanford. He finally received a PhD and joined the School of Criminology because of his notable contributions to statistical methods and parole for government correctional agencies.

On January 21, 1969, the Third World Strike at Berkeley began and the Asian component of the student groups involved in the strike asked Professor Takagi to be their sponsor. He also co-taught the first course on Asian American history at Berkeley in the winter quarter of 1969. Also, Takagi was the faculty sponsor of an “experimental course,” then called Asian Studies 100X. Today, Asian-American studies programs exist at 140 universities.

Takagi also sided with the students and faculty at the School who opposed the Vietnam War. In addition, his article, “A Garrison State in a ‘Democratic’ Society,” became recognized as the pioneering study about the degree to which police used force when dealing with

10 Takagi was born in the US. His family history is described in
African Americans.\textsuperscript{11}

During the 1980s, Takagi and Tony Platt were jointly awarded the Paul Tappan Award for 1980–1981, and Paul was elected the chair of the criminology section of the American Sociological Association, 1986–1987. He also received the National Council on Crime and Delinquency’s Gerhard Mueller Award, which honors outstanding contributions to criminology that brought a global perspective to U.S. justice policy and advance human rights. He was also honored by the Association for Asian American Studies

Upon Takagi’s retirement, Rep. Ronald V. Dellums honored him on the floor of the House of Representatives. Dellums had come to know him and his work over a period of two decades and “counted on his knowledge, his training, his wisdom, and his ability to articulate the critical issues and problems about the justice and penal system in the United States.”

During these years Takagi helped edit \textit{Crime and Social Justice}\textsuperscript{12} and continued to contribute writings on criminal justice. While Carter was president, Tagaki was a consultant for federal agencies, evaluating criminal-justice proposals especially concerned with racial discrimination. He worked with the Justice Department on police use of deadly force and was invited to speak at annual meetings of black police officers’ organizations. He was sought as a consultant by cities such as Berkeley and Portland on police chief selection, and gave talks at mandated cultural sensitivity workshops—where 46 judges, for instance, including the Alaska Supreme


\textsuperscript{12} The name of the journal was changed to \textit{Social Justice: A Journal of Crime, Conflict and World Order}. 
Court justices, were informed about the relations between racial discrimination and the criminal justice system. Other programs in which Takagi participated included multi-cultural training of public-school teachers from the western United States and The National Council on Crime & Delinquency’s training program of senior probation officers across the country.

Takagi’s ill treatment when the School was closed speaks volumes about the racist hypocrisy behind Bowker and Sindler’s claims that the School was being abolished because it had lost its professional mission. Takagi served at the School as the preeminent example of professionally dedicated faculty. No one—including Diamond, Messinger and Skolnick—came close. Nevertheless, he was no longer able to teach graduate courses in criminology. Platt, too, never taught graduate criminology students again. Neither did Krisberg nor Schwendinger.

**A Post Mortem to End All Post Mortems**

Caleb Foote, who shared an appointment at the School of Law and the School of Criminology, walked lock-step behind Diamond, Messinger and Skolnick. Frank Morn, resorting to hyperbole, reported that Foote “had vivid recollections of Dean Lohman’s frenzied attempts to maintain a balance between professional and academic goals.” To support professional training, Lohman, according to Foote, admitted large numbers of “professional” teachers and “professionals as graduate students, whose intellectual mediocrity and narrow vision hung like a deadly pall over the school’s intellectual climate.”

Morn added,

Regarding the scholarship of the School of Criminology and the field, Foote believed that Lohman had overloaded the place with ill-conceived ‘evaluative’ or agency-action ‘research projects’ for which he had to hire staff of sufficiently limited vision to be willing to devote themselves to such trivia. As these researchers tended to drift into the teaching program whenever a course vacancy needed to be filled, the level of the faculty tended towards the same mediocrity that characterized the graduate student body. This, in turn, inhibited Lohman’s efforts to recruit and retain able scholars.14

But Morn’s report and Foote’s so-called “recollections” were wildly inaccurate. Foote surely would exclude his friends, Messinger, Skolnick, Diamond and his Law School colleagues who taught at the School, from his list of “mediocre” “agency-action” researchers even though they primarily dealt with legislative, juridical, correctional and police agencies. Yet, if the truth were told, the “radicals” never engaged in “mediocre,” “agency-action” research. Platt had written an acclaimed historical work on the juvenile court and, before joining the faculty, worked with Norval Morris at the University of Chicago. Lohman had sponsored the Schwendingers’ research project but that project was entirely based on their causal theory.15 Although it could prove useful for

14 Ibid.
15 Lohman was the principle investigator and Schwendinger the Co-Principal because it was felt that the project, which was devoted to Schwendinger’s delinquency theory, would be funded if the Dean had ultimate fiscal responsibility. As indicated,
“agency-action” research it tried to uncover the nature and parameters of delinquent subcultures. Finally, only a bonehead would use the word “mediocre” to label Takagi’s or Krisberg’s scholarship. Takagi was active in agency evaluation and training, but he also produced pioneering works on police killings of African Americans and the historical development of correctional institutions. Krisberg, on his part, never was employed in “agency-action” research conducted at the School itself. He joined the faculty after graduating from the University of Pennsylvania, and his interests ran the gamut of criminological concerns even though they converged on delinquency prevention and control. Krisberg in 1976 published one of the finest historical accounts of the juvenile-justice system. After the School closed, he became a research director and then President of NCCD, the foremost organization in the field of juvenile justice.

What about the veracity of Foote’s arrogant reference to the students? Overwhelmingly, the so-called “mediocre” and “intellectually narrow” students became academics and directors of research institutes. Their scholarly contributions to criminology can then and now be compared favorably with those from any graduate

Schwendinger, after all, was still a graduate student and preparing for his oral examinations when the NIH reviewed his proposal.


18 In the 1967 to 1972 period alone, the number of post-graduates assuming academic posts (professorships) accounted for about 80 per cent of the graduate student population.
program in the country. They certainly were superior to Foote’s law school students who were being trained to be legal practitioners rather than scholars. When the Sindler report was issued, about 80 percent of the students in the doctoral program had obtained jobs in universities and research institutes. Most of them are still employed today as professors, chairpersons and deans. One of the foremost criminal-justice research institutes in the United States, the Michael Hindelang Institute, is named after a student in the program at that time.\(^\text{19}\)

The School’s contribution also included graduates who became administrators in public institutions. Its graduates included the head of the Atlanta Police, director of the Georgia Juvenile Justice system, Chief of Police for Charleston (North Carolina), a General in the United States Army, Chief of Detroit police and the Sheriff of San Francisco County. One of the most famous United States prison reformers of the last century, Tom Murton, was a graduate of the School. As Superintendent of the Arkansas Correctional system, he courageously instituted democratic reforms, exposed administrative corruption and the assassination of prisoners by trustees, committed at the behest of the guards. Robert Redford dramatized him and his work in the Hollywood film, *Brubaker*.

The final reviewers, the Dekker Committee, also took the low road and its majority, without seeming to cave-in to the administration, tacitly legitimated the purge by

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\(^{19}\) We would like to express our appreciation of Garafalo’s acceptance of Herman’s article in a Hindelang Institute publication on the historical origin’s of the privatization of prison reform. He had received funds that supported his study but the government agency that provided these funds refused to publish it.
recommending replacement of the School with a “law, society and criminal justice” program in the School of Law. Their recommendation, however, was suspect because most of the Law faculty, including Caleb Foote, were “mediocre,” “agency action” academics. The Law School was under fire from students who attacked its traditional law training and its conspicuous avoidance of affirmative-action policies. While two right-wing members of the Dekker Committee\(^\text{20}\) demanded the immediate closure of the School of Criminology, Laura Nader, a professor of anthropology (and Ralph Nader’s sister) dissented from the Committee’s recommendation. On May 9, 1975, she co-signed a statement with two student members on the committee that said,

The law schools of the state have been successful in training private lawyers for private concerns and the legal research done is most usually technical writing for lawyers, by lawyers. There has been glaring failure to research and write on subjects which interest the general citizen. Boalt Hall in particular has a reputation for being culture bound and traditional rather than innovative, and, is among the most professionally oriented of the leading law schools . . . we fail to see, when what we are dealing with is a social science endeavor, the necessity for ‘complete administrative integration’ with the law school—an institution with no commitment to social science research and teaching. . . . We question the competence of the law faculty

\(^{20}\) One of these members, Paul Seabury, had been condemned as a war criminal by anti-war tribunals set up by Berkeley students and residents.
to train citizens to understand the operation of law in society, and at the same time to maintain goals of the profession as taught at the law school. That is, we raise doubts concerning the ability of the law school to accommodate philosophical perspectives in such a program.

In another minority report, student members of the Dekker committee, R. Harrison, A. Kolling and S. Smith, also expressed their objections: “after careful study, [they] concluded that two of these factors, the School’s rejection of a professional mission and the absence of a viable academic field cannot be substantiated and that the faculty’s disagreement on common goals (implicitly raised by memos written by Messinger and Skolnick) is not alone a reason for not continuing the School.” They applauded “the services performed by and through the School for the community and the State; and the School’s efforts in the area of affirmative action.”21

Yet Morn’s fairytale continued to reinforce lies about the School. Without citing sources, Morn said, “many considered criminology education as it existed in the School as a ‘cheap’ degree.” Ignoring all the evidence to the contrary, he claimed, “there was remarkably little resistance or fanfare” to the closing of the School. He added, “In fact, many students later remembered with pride that they “had closed down the school.”

Morn could have applauded a Hollywood production about the School’s closing ending with lifeboats of sailors cheering as they witnessed their wounded ship go to the bottom.”

Apparently, in Morn’s scenario, the usual suspects among the faculty were mediocrities and the students, irresponsible sea-faring lunatics.

**A S T H E S H I P B E G A N T O S I N K**

Bowker and Sindler had difficulty scuttling the School; they couldn’t make it sink fast enough with radical students supposedly cheering as it flipped stern upward Titanic-style and plunged to the bottom of the sea. At one point, in fact, Diamond, Kadish, Selznick, Skolnick and Messinger—who were busily reinventing a strategy used in 1961 to save the School when Lohman became Dean—distracted them. Kadish and his *compadres* now tried to prevent the School from being closed by recommending Norval Morris, from the University of Chicago Law School, to be the Dean of Criminology at Berkeley. This move, they felt, would placate Bowker because Morris was an eminent professor of law who could be counted on to administer a School swept clean of its radicals. However, too many students read Morris’ *Honest Politician’s Guide to Crime Control,* and no amount of damage control could stop them from politely expressing their candid opinions when he visited the campus. Morris declined the offer to become Dean.

Unable to enter a familiar harbor because of stormy political weather, Diamond, Skolnick, Messinger and others reversed course, sailed to a cove where they met secretly with Philip Selznick and other members of the

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22 Morn, op. cit., p. 113

Law and Society Center. Hoisting Boalt Hall’s colors, they micromanaged the close of the School while formulating a plan for a Law School department for the study of “law and society.” When their planning was completed, administrative demagogues invited a politically diverse group of faculty to meet and formally legitimate the plan. This duplicitous process secured Messinger’s and Skolnick’s posts at Berkeley, although the new “department of law and society” never gained the worldwide prestige and legendary status the School of Criminology had achieved.

Unlike the motley collection of ship’s officers, the mutineers among the students and faculty continued to defend the School. Letters seeking support were sent to professionals in the United States and abroad. All sorts of communications, memos, letters, petitions and handbills were sent to Bowker from Academic Senate committees, UCB faculty and students at large, including people who worked as criminal-justice administrators and specialists who said that the School had played a vitally important role raising issues that needed to be confronted by their agencies. At one point, Bowker reported that he had received from 50 to 60 letters about the School. And even though the administration decided that the School would be closed, the radical students fought them every step of the way.

Early in 1973, criminology students, accurately interpreting the Sindler report as a political purge, formed the

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24 Reportedly, Selznick had once led a Trotskyite sect called the “Schachtmanites” but he had made a 180 degree turn and become a virulent anti-communist.

25 Support from 31 academics and researchers in England, for instance, urged Bowker to retain the School “as it was presently constituted,” thereby retaining the radical faculty and courses.
Committee to Save the Criminology School (CSCS) to organize mass student support. Petitions, rallies, marches, demonstrations, letters to regents, administrators, faculty and newspapers followed. San Francisco Sheriff Richard Hongisto addressed a Sproul Plaza rally that spring followed by a march to California Hall, entering it with a list of demands. Two students were arrested and then released after the demonstrators agreed to leave the building. The students wanted reinstatement of undergraduate and graduate admissions to the school, more resources for the school and an insured place for radical criminology. A campus-wide impeachment convocation at the Greek Theater was held in support of the School. Statements supporting the School arrived from the newly formed Berkeley Police Review Commission, Bay Area Women Against Rape, and criminologists in England, France, Italy, Netherlands and Norway. A petition with 3599 signatures supporting the school was submitted to Bowker by November.

Bowker, up to that time, had depended on the dilatory tactics learned at CUNY. Now, however, he rivaled the show, *Best Little Whorehouse in Texas*, by promising students that the university would satisfy their every desire. He said a much larger multidisciplinary interdepartmental program would replace the School. He gave them the same line he had given students who were trying to establish an ethnic-studies program and black studies school.

A million words justifying or opposing the School’s closing were eventually produced by university authorities, the Sindler Committee, Academic Senate, Dekker Committee, Committee on Educational Policy, Graduate

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26 The administration had terminated admission of undergraduate majors and graduate students.
Council, Criminology faculty, Student Association Committees, criminology students, Local 1474, student anti-war and civil-rights movements and the mass media. The central point to keep in mind, however, is that Bowker and the counter-reformist alliance never appraised the School in good faith. Their tactical vacillations were prompted by opposition from faculty at large, student demonstrations, and concern with the appearance of “due process” and moral legitimacy. They delayed announcing the decision to finally sink the School until the very end of the Spring 1974 semester—just before students were to return home.

During the previous year, the NLF, North Vietnam and the U.S. government signed a cease-fire agreement in January. By March 1973, the last U.S. troops left Vietnam and most of the remaining U.S. prisoners of war were released. U.S. bombing of Laos and Cambodia ended in August. In the following spring, Congress denied Nixon’s request for additional funds to aid Saigon.27

Although several thousand students had turned out repeatedly to defend the School, the numbers dropped off in 1974. Just before the closing of the School was announced, about a thousand protested the plan to close the School on May 31. When asked about this final protest, Vice Chancellor Mark N. Christensen, remarked, “As I sit here and the students march around and I think about those poor bastards who were here a few years ago, I realize there is one big difference now. There’s no unpopular war on now.”28

27 On April 1975, Saigon was captured and the last U.S. personnel fled in a helicopter from the U.S. embassy compound.

The battle for the School was lost but on the way we “poor bastards” had joined forces with others in the struggles for affirmative action, to defend women who were victims of violence, to bring the crime of rape out of the closet, to create a new criminology, to support prison reforms, and to fight police brutality. Also, we opposed a war in which more than 58,000 American troops were killed, over 153,000 were wounded and over three million Vietnamese were slaughtered. To our everlasting credit, we joined with millions of people to help end the killing in Vietnam. We helped end the war that McNamara called a “mistake” after the slaughter had occurred.

Sometimes we dream about those days, idealizing the people who fought for a School whose program we had helped to create. And we visualize our old colleagues and students encamped overnight in a valley surrounded by craggy California hills, singing, dancing and talking the hours away before sleep revived them for the struggle the next day. They conducted themselves honorably while the jackals howled in the hills. 

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