Atopological Trilogy: Deleuze and Guattari

Zafer Aracagök, Manola Antonioli

Published by Punctum Books

Zafer Aracagök and Manola Antonioli.
Atopological Trilogy: Deleuze and Guattari.

➡️ For additional information about this book
https://muse.jhu.edu/book/76484

🔗 For content related to this chapter
https://muse.jhu.edu/related_content?type=book&id=2659333
Reading Deleuze like a musician, interested in philosophical rhythms, Zafer Aracagök draws our attention to the question of the “indécidable” in Deleuzian thought. His meeting with Deleuze and Guattari is obviously a “love affair,” not a “business affair,” nor is his task that of a professional philosopher who prepares his courses and makes profit out of his knowledge. Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of becoming (“becoming-woman,” “becoming-animal,” “becoming-imperceptible,” “becoming-intense,” etc.) opens a crack in their thought which Aracagök pushes to its borders and extremes: as the lava of this volcanic thought flows out, “lines of flight,” or the “witch’s flight”—which both Deleuze and Guattari engineered in their common work—fracture into new combinations and consequences. The purpose of this operation is to bring to the foreground, by means of quantum theory as well as queer theory and psychoanalysis, the aspects of Deleuze and Guattari’s thought which remain implicit, dark, or always indécidables, even for the philosophers themselves. It is thus a question of repeating with Deleuze and Guattari what Deleuze proposed
with the classical philosophers whom he studied (Spinoza, Kant, Leibniz, Nietzsche, Bergson): *to take them from behind*.

The undecidable could be here another name of what, in a very different tradition of thought, Jacques Derrida calls the *aporia*, from Greek *a-poros*, which means what is without outcome, without an already drawn path. “Becoming is real,” and thus it’s impossible to choose between the decidable and the undecidable: the decidable *is* undecidable. If Deleuze and Guattari recognize the becoming-woman of the woman and the becoming-woman of the man, they nevertheless hesitate in front of the becoming-man of the man or the multiple Nietzschean masks of the transvestite. Less radical or less quantum than Derrida, they hesitate at the edge of the volcano in eruption; they avoid thinking “becoming-queer” or “becoming-sexual of the sexual” without any synthesis; they avoid thinking the *aporia* of the undecidable, which is the task Aracagök takes up here in the first chapter of this small book.

Aracagök then takes up this question: Sound, noise and music—how can we decide among three? How can we browse the subterranean paths which separate them while also re-connecting them? One possible route by which to undertake this labor, Aracagök suggests, is to read Deleuze and Guattari reading Kafka, with Kafka’s becoming-animal—his screams transformed into voices, and voices metamorphosing imperceptibly towards the scream, all of which offers us a line of flight for thinking this strange topology of a “non-relational relationship” between sonorous elements or sonorous events. If Deleuze in *The Logic of Sense* again seems to believe that there is a clear border between noise, sound, and voice, Aracagök, deterritorializing this border, re-deterritorializes the deterritorializing force of the sound that Deleuze and Guattari introduce in *Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature* in order to establish a link between “schizo-incest” and sound: once more, the distinction between the audible and the inaudible is an undecidable one, which we can call, with the author, the “meta- audible.”

In “Clinical and Critical Perversion,” Büchner’s unfinished 1836 novella *Lenz* becomes the exemplary test case of the
undecidable which is simultaneously literary, political, psychoanalytical, and sexual, staged by the Body without Organs (BwO). It’s a matter of an impossible decision between mimesis and diegesis, criticism and clinical practice, oedipal-incest and schizo-incest, psychastenia and schizophrenia—a strange topology where it is impossible to separate the traveller from the landscape (reminiscent of Nietzsche, for whom it was impossible to separate “big health” from illness). But Lenz also becomes a tool, for Aracagök, with which to think through the tradition of the notion of “perversion,” as well as the undecidable position between man and animal, which may be one of the main sources of all undecidable matters. Lenz opens up a universe where, in Aracagök’ words, “one no longer knows where one is,” where one no longer knows what one hears, or with whom (man, woman, transvestite, or animal) s/he/it makes love.

“Becoming-sexual of the sexual,” “schizo-incest,” “meta-audible,” “homosexual effusion,” “critical perversion”—all may be “monstrous” concepts, which academic philosophy can never render completely familiar, but they are also, maybe, the (undecidable) concepts of the future:

The future is necessarily monstrous: the figure of the future, that is, that which can only be surprising, that for which we are not prepared . . . is heralded by species of monsters. A future that would not be monstrous would not be a future; it would already be a predictable, calculable, and programmable tomorrow. All experience open to the future is prepared or prepares itself to welcome the monstrous arrivant.1
