The thought of Gilles Deleuze (and Félix Guattari) bears an ambiguous relation with respect to the “affective turn” in social and political thought that it supposedly helped initiate. This ambiguity touches on the very role and meaning of affects. From Deleuze’s writings on Friedrich Nietzsche and Baruch Spinoza through the collaborations of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze and Guattari insist on the central role of the affects, joy, sadness, fear, and hope, as structuring individual and collective life. In that sense, Deleuze and Guattari are rightfully hailed as central figures in a turn toward affect. However, if, as some argue, the “affective turn” is a turn toward the lived over the structural and the intimate over the public, then Deleuze and Guattari’s thought has a much more complex relation to affects. The broader polemical target of Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, beyond the specific polemics with psychoanalysis, is any explanatory theory that would reduce social relations to expressions of individual passions and desires. Deleuze and Guattari’s claim that there is only “desire and the social, and nothing else” is oriented against such individualistic accounts of not only
social relations but subjectivity as well. Moreover, Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of capitalism argues that it reproduces itself in and through the encounter of abstract quantities of money and labor power, and as such is a social relation that is indifferent to the beliefs and meaning that we attach to it. Thus, if affect is central to Deleuze and Guattari’s thought, it is necessary to add the caveats that affect must be thought of as anti-individualistic rather than individualistic, as social rather than intimate, and as impersonal, reflecting the abstractions that dominate life.

The caveats with respect to affect are as much strengths as they are limitations. Which is to say that it is not a matter of simply reconciling the concept of affect with Deleuze and Guattari’s critiques of Oedipal explanations and theory of capital, but of producing a concept of affect which is both anti-individualistic and adequate to the real abstractions and structural complexities of contemporary capitalism. If affect is to be the basis of a critical theory of contemporary society it must be radically separated from individualist accounts of social relations, accounts that have become increasingly pervasive in a neoliberal self-help culture, on the one hand, and attuned to the “real abstractions” of contemporary capitalism, on the other. Affect must be a way of grasping the abstractions that determine individual and collective life, rather than a retreat into an interior free of them.

*Intensive affects and extensive emotions*

Deleuze’s engagement with affects is framed by two different philosophers: Spinoza and Gilbert Simondon. It was Spinoza who recognized both the ontological dimensions of affects, defining everything by its capacity to affect and be affected, and the political and social dimension of affects; they do not orient mere individual striving but do so only in and through the encounters and relations with others. Political collectives are

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defined more by common structures of feeling than common notions and ideas. The central task of politics, any politics, is then of organizing and defining the affects. Affects are thus necessarily both anti-humanist, defining all of existence in various ways, and transindividual, passing in and through relations with others. Deleuze’s definition, or use of affects, exceeds Spinoza in that he adds another distinction: between the intensive order of affects and the extensive order of emotions. This definition is close to Simondon, as we will see below, for whom affects correspond to the intense and metastable dimension of existence, defined by tensions and transformations, while emotions are more defined and individuated. It is thus no surprise that this distinction has been read by affect theorists, such as Brian Massumi, to correspond to a distinction between affect, understood as an impersonal intensity, and emotion, understood as a subjectivized and individuated feeling. As Massumi writes:

An emotion is a subjective content, the sociolinguistic fixing of the quality of an experience which is from that point onward defined as personal. Emotion is qualified intensity, the conventional, consensual point of insertion of intensity into semantically and semiotically formed progressions, into narrativizable action-reaction circuits, into function and meaning. It is intensity owned and recognized. It is crucial to theorize the difference between affect and emotion.²

While such a distinction may help orient Deleuze’s thought of affect, it is completely absent from Spinoza’s work. Spinoza’s use of the term affect (affectus in Latin) is absolutely and rigorously consistent; affects define not only the different states of human subjective life, from the basic joy and sadness to the complex and ambivalent affects of jealousy and ambition, but define everything, every finite thing has a capacity to affect or be affected. Affects are less some uniquely human attribute, making us a

kingdom within a kingdom, but the general rule of existence; that of being modified or affected by encounters and relations, of which human life is only a particularly complex instance. For Spinoza we are constituted and individuated through our affects; the affective composition differs from individual to individual, but this individuation does not take the form of a distinction between affects and emotions.

Despite these terminological differences it is thus possible to understand affect in Deleuze as reconciling two different problems: Spinoza’s emphasis on the political organization of affect, and Simondon’s emphasis on affects as individuation. Simondon’s thought is oriented around a central problematization of the individual. Individuation has to be considered as a process and not the default state of being. This process moves from a milieu that is considered pre-individual, made up of tensions and relations, to a process of individuation that increasingly encompasses different levels and aspects, biological, psychic, and social. The social is then not a negation of individuation, but its condition. Transindividuality lies in the fact that the social is not so much a suppression of individuality, a loss of the individual in the collective, but its transformation and condition. Within this relation the distinction between affect and emotion figures twice. First in that affects are less individuated than emotions; while emotions are the emotions of specific subjects relating to specific objects, affects constitute more of an inchoate sense or sensibility. Second in that affects are intensive while emotions are extensive. The passage from affects to emotions is part of general individuation, and as such it necessarily passes through the constitution of collectivity. As Simondon writes:

If one is able to speak in a certain sense of the individuality of a group or such and such a people, it is not by virtue of a community of action, too discontinuous to be a solid base, nor of the identity of conscious representations, too large and too continuous to permit the segregation of groups; it is at
the level of affective-emotional themes, mixtures of representation and action, that constitute collective groups.³

The individuality of the collective, if it is to have any individuality at all, must be sought at the level of particular affects and emotions, particular ways of feeling and perceiving the world, which is often tied to particular objects. In place of the rigid distinction between affect and emotion, in which one is social, the other individual, Simondon argues that both individuals and collectives are constituted by affects and emotions. Individuals individuated as subjects and the individuation of collectivity, the constitution of definite collectives, are both constituted through the pre-individual dimension of affects, and their increasing individuation into emotional evaluations. Collectives are defined by their “structures of feeling.”

Despite the terminological difference of affect and emotion, both Spinoza and Simondon see affect as something that passes between the pre-individual and the transindividual (even if these specific terms are missing from the former). For Simondon affects are part of the metastable milieu that remains, even as individual emotions and perceptions are constituted. The affective dimension carries over from the pre-individual constituting a kind of indetermination at the heart of individuation, an indetermination that demands a social dimension in order to be at least partially resolved. In a similar fashion, Spinoza’s affects are pre-individual, they are less determinate states of individuals and properties of objects than passages and transformations, increases and decreases of power. Joy is nothing other than a passage from a lesser to a greater perfection and sadness is only the opposite. Affects are intensities, transformations of states, rather than determinate conditions. These states cannot be separated from their supposed opposites, from the ambivalence of the affects; sadness cannot be rigorously separated from joy, hate from love. As much as the affects are less determined

³ Gilbert Simondon, L’individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information (Grenoble: Jérôme Million, 2005), 248.
states than an index of their transformation, initiating a process of the constitution and destruction of individuation, they are necessarily transindividual. Or, more to the point, it is because the affects are always situated in the increases and decreases of power that they are necessarily transindividual. For Simondon the progression of individuation that takes place between affects and emotions necessarily passes through the transindividual as affects coalesce around perceptual points of view and relations.\(^4\)

While in Spinoza it is not that one passes from the pre-individual affects to individuated emotions, but the basic affects of love and hate enter into increasingly individuated combinations as they shape the affective composition of an individual. As Spinoza writes, “each affect of each individual differs from the affect of another as much as the essence of one from the essence of the other.”\(^5\) The different essences are nothing other than the different compositions and combinations of affects. Affects and emotions are the transindividual intersection between individual and collective individuation.

The difference of terminology between affect and emotion risks obscuring other, more salient, differences between Simondon and Spinoza. Spinoza’s relational account of the various affects is oriented around a fundamental distinction, the fundamental axiological distinction of an increase or decrease in power.\(^6\) It is this distinction that initially distinguishes joy and sadness, and is carried over into the various permutations of love and hate. This is not to suggest that this duality constitutes some kind of core that all of the affects could be reduced to, so all that matters is joy or sadness, increase or decrease in power. There is a constitutive tension between the basic orientation of joy and sadness and the constitutive complexity of the myriad ways sadness and joy are combined and articulated. Second, this duality of joy and sadness is divided again in the split between


the joyful passive affects and the sad passive affects, between those affects which are joyful, reflecting an increase of power, but have an external cause, and those that have their own internal determination. At the level of affects one divides into two. This complicates the initial axiology of joy and sadness, introducing the idea that there is a negative dimension to passive joys, a possibility that they can be excessive, and a positive dimension, or at the very least a utility, to such passive sad affects as fear and humility. Spinoza’s definition of the affects is situated within the ethical horizon of becoming active.

Between Simondon and Spinoza we have the basic coordinates that orient Deleuze’s thoughts on affect. Affects are situated within the process of collective and individual individuation, constituting the basis of both collective relations and individual subjectivity. The axis of the individual and collective is in turn bifurcated by the axis dividing the becoming active from becoming passive. Which is to argue that affects are the conditions of both subjection and transformation, situated between power and individuation.

Consuming affects

Anti-Oedipus, the first of the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, opens with a citation of the fundamental political question of Spinoza’s work, “Why do men fight for their servitude as if it was salvation?” Spinoza’s answer to this question necessarily involves the affects of fear, ambition, and hope as they structure both political life and individual desires. Thus, it is somewhat odd to note that affect does not appear in Anti-Oedipus, at least by name. Affect appears between the lines in terms of both the general problems outlined above, and, more importantly, Anti-Oedipus shifts the basic problem of servitude

8 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 29.
and salvation in Spinoza’s thought from politics understood as the rule of tyranny to political economy.

In Anti-Oedipus, affect is introduced first under the name of *Stimmung*, or mood. While the term *Stimmung* suggests a reference to Martin Heidegger, who philosophers such as Étienne Balibar and Antonio Negri have recognized as the other, often opposed, philosopher of affect, the reference is to Nietzsche by way of Pierre Klossowski. Either way, the fundamental effect suggests a broader basis for a philosophy of affect. What ties these different and disparate philosophies together, is the assertion of the unavoidable affective or emotional dimension of all thought and practice, as a fundamentally orienting dimension of thought. Deleuze and Guattari situate *Stimmung*, the intensities of affect, with the third synthesis; that of conjunctive synthesis of consumption. A few provisional conclusions can be drawn from this placement (without necessarily engaging Deleuze and Guattari’s entire reading of syntheses). First and foremost: affects are consumed and this consumption comes after the synthesis of the production and the recording of desire. Deleuze and Guattari locate the subject on this synthesis. The subject comes after the production of desire and the recording of desire, caught in the tension between the forces that constitute the world and their inscription. As Deleuze and Guattari write,

Thus this subject consumes and consummates each of the states through which it passes, and is born of each of them anew, continuously emerging from them as a part made up of parts, each one of which completely fills up the body without organs in the space of an instant.9

Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of subject can be compared to Spinoza’s assertion that we do not want something because it is good, but we call it good because we want it, desire it, and strive for it. Our affects come after history, a history of produc-

9 Ibid., 41.
tion and recording, that determines them, and our awareness of affects comes even after that. Subjectivity is secondary to, and unaware of, the process that produces it. It is situated between desiring production and the body without organs, between the process of production and its product; a product that in turn appropriates the various processes of production. Phrased differently, we could say that affects, intensities are always situated between the process of individuation, the production and practices that produce and exceed individuation, and its product, the individual, between the conditions of individuation and individuation itself. Affect is the instability and tension of the relation of individuation and production, and as such it can always misrecognize its conditions. As Deleuze and Guattari cite one of Karl Marx’s more prosaic statements, “we cannot tell from the mere taste of wheat who grew it; the product gives us no hint as to the system and the relations of production.”

Deleuze and Guattari draw profound insights from this statement, connecting it to the idea of commodity fetishism, a process of production. This is the condition for Oedipal subjectivity; a subject that continually misrecognizes the condition of its production, seeing itself as the product of the family rather than the historical process which has produced it.

What does it mean to consume affect, or think of affect as consumption, and how does it relate to both the theory of capital and the critique of Oedipus? Deleuze and Guattari’s particular rewriting of the distinction between pre-capitalist and capitalist economic formations focuses on the role of the family in social production and reproduction. As Deleuze and Guattari argue, the various social formations that precede capitalism all have as their defining characteristic the fact that the very relations that produce and reproduce individuals are directly intertwined with the praxis and politics of social reproduction. Familial relations are directly both political and economic. It is only in capitalism, in the massive privatization of desire, that there is a separation of reproduction from social production.

10 Ibid., 24.
Capital puts to work deterritorialized flows of labor; it is thus indifferent to the specific marking or memories of individuals. As Deleuze and Guattari write:

The alliances and filiations no longer pass through people but through money; so the family becomes a microcosm, suited to expressing what it no longer dominates. In a certain sense the situation has not changed; for what is invested through the family is still the economic, political, and cultural social field, its breaks and flows. Private persons are an illusion, images of images or derivatives of derivatives.\(^\text{11}\)

Of course the family still continues to reproduce social relations, but it does so, paradoxically, through its separation and privatization. The family becomes an intimate space that represents social relations rather than reproducing them, all of society is seen through the idea of the father and the mother. Presidents and dictators become father figures and nations become motherlands: all of history and society is folded back into the family. This representation is itself a kind of reproduction, but one that has been privatized and depoliticized because it is outside of the conditions of social production.

Capitalism is defined by social production that passes through axioms of abstract quantities, flows of money and labor that are the real relations of alliance and filiation, rather than codes. Codes have become private matters, searches for meaning. This split between production and reproduction constitutes a very particular affective relation as well, which Deleuze and Guattari summarize as, “the age of cynicism, accompanied by a strange piety. (The two taken together constitute humanism; cynicism is the physical immanence of the social field, and piety is the maintenance of a spiritualized Urstaat […]).”\(^\text{12}\) These two affects, cynicism and piety, correspond to the division of social production and reproduction. In the first, in the axioms of capi-

\(^{11}\) Ibid., 264.
\(^{12}\) Ibid., 225.
tal, we have a social order that reproduces itself without meaning or code. Axioms merely set up a relation between two quantities, a flow of labor and a flow of money. One does not believe in, or justify, the rate at which labor is exchanged for money — it simply is. Cynicism is an affect attuned to the indifference of the axioms that produce and reproduce social life, the recognition that the flows of the market mean nothing, have no justification, than their brute effectivity. Piety is reserved for the home, for the intimate sphere of reproduction that becomes the source of all the pleasure and pain. Capitalism’s affective economy of cynicism and piety is thus distinguished from the savage economy of cruelty and the barbarian economy of fear, both of which were public despite all of their cruelties. Deleuze and Guattari’s division of affective life between cynicism and piety is given a contemporary update by Paolo Virno, who writes:

It is no accident, therefore, that the most brazen cynicism is accompanied by unrestrained sentimentalism. The vital contents of emotion — excluded from the inventories of an experience that is above all else an experience of formalisms and abstractions — secretly returns simplified and unelaborated, as arrogant as they are puerile. Nothing is more common than the mass media technician who after a hard day at work, goes off to the movies and cries.13

What connects these two theories of affect in contemporary society is that what is depleted from any affective investment in public life, in the activities of work and politics, returns in private life.

What ties together cynicism and piety, indifference and sentimentality, is that each affect is passive. These affects are passive in two senses. First, the conditions of their production are elsewhere, outside of the familial space in which they are produced.

Secondly, the conditions of the production of affects cannot be acted on. The axioms remain outside the sphere of politics, of individual and collective action. They are each passive, but in different senses. Cynicism, the affect attached to the working of the economy, confronts an economy that is perceived as being indifferent to human actions, while piety attaches itself to the family, which is perceived as being absolutely ahistorical. Far from seeing the privatization of desire and affects as liberation, as setting it free from the collective structures and relations, Deleuze and Guattari see the privatization as their subjection. To be passive is to be acted on, without acting in turn. The Spinozist critique of passivity is coupled with Marx’s critique of fetishism: it is not just that we are passive in the face of the structures and relations that determine us, but unable to comprehend them, relating them back to ideal representations, the family, the father’s love, rather than material conditions. Representation, especially the representation that passes through the interiorized conflicts and codes of the family, making the entire outside world an allegory for it, is the ultimate repression of production, of the productive powers of desire.

The genealogy of Oedipus is one in which intensity, what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the “immense germinal flow,” desiring production in all of its multiple connections and multivalent associations, is eventually interiorized, extended into representations. The process begins in the first coding of desire, the mnemotechnics that breed and constitute a “man that can keep promises,” and culminates in the private home. Affects have lost their intensity, their productivity and multiplicity, to become grounded in the family, to become representations of the world rather than its production. There is nonetheless a tension in Anti-Oedipus between a genealogy of the specific affects of cynicism and piety, affects that reflect the split between production and reproduction in capitalism, and a general critique of the reduction of the entire level of affect to consumption and representation, the reduction of intensity to extension, and production to representation. In the former the rise of Oedipus and capital is associated with particular “sad affects”; those of cyni-
cism and piety, while in the latter it is a matter of not so much
the particular constitution of affects, than a general reduction
of affects to consumption, to representation, and privatization.

Capturing affects

Of the many conceptual and rhetorical changes that underlie
the shift from *Anti-Oedipus* to *A Thousand Plateaus*, perhaps
one of the most striking is the loss of Oedipus as a target of cri-
tique. The elimination of the entire polemic against Sigmund
Freud and psychoanalysis shifts fundamentally the status of af-
fect. Affect is no longer associated with consumption, and thus
with the privatization of desire, but part of a general dimension
of the micropolitics of society. The ninth plateau on “Micro-
Politics of Segmentary” resumes some of the central themes of
*Anti-Oedipus*’s social theory, only now they are presented less as
a genealogy of Oedipal subjectivity and more as a general theory
of the micro-politics of all of society.

The first task of any such theory is to differentiate between
the molecular and the molar. These terms do not address scale,
with the molecular constituting the private spaces of home or
family, and the molar addressing the state and its institutions.
The molecular is not more individual than the molar, and the
molar is not more collective than the molecular. Rather, the mo-
lecular and the molar constantly intersect at all levels of society
and subjectivity, framing two different ways of perceiving, two
different politics. As Deleuze and Guattari write:

In short, everything is political, but every politics is simulta-
neously a *macropolitics* and a *micropolitics*. Take aggregates
of the perception or feeling type: their molar organization,
their rigid segmentarity, does not preclude the existence of
an entire world of unconscious micropercepts, unconscious
affects, fine segmentations that grasp or experience differ-
ent things, are distributed and operate differently. There is a
micropolitics of perception, affection, conversation, and so forth.\textsuperscript{14}

The terminology of the molecular and the molar was already at work in \textit{Anti-Oedipus}, specifically in the final, programmatic section dedicated to schizoanalysis, but it operated in tension with the genealogy of Oedipus, and an ironic conception of history in which savagery, barbarism, and capitalism culminate in Oedipus, a kind of motley painting of everything ever believed. \textit{A Thousand Plateaus} could be understood as a culmination of the positive project of schizonanalysis over the polemical one, as the critique of Oedipus, of psychoanalysis, which gives way to the construction of an ontology and politics of assemblages, a nomadic politics. It is in many ways an an-Oedipal book rather than an anti-Oedipal book, which not only does not need to kill any fathers — Oedipus, Freud, Jacques Lacan — but also no longer pays tribute to any lineage, any filiation. In place of the multiple debts to Marx, Nietzsche, and even Antonin Artaud and Franz Kafka, we get a series of nomadic borrowings and deterritorializations from various fields and disciplines from ancient history to ethology and the study of birdsongs. While such a distinction captures much of the shift of tone and style between the books, it does not fully capture what is at stake. Eduardo Viveiros de Castro has offered two points of reorientation that shed light on the shift between the two volumes. The first is the shift from production to becoming. As Viveiros de Castro argues: “The concept of becoming effectively plays the same axial cosmological role in \textit{A Thousand Plateaus} that the concept of production plays in \textit{Anti-Oedipus}.”\textsuperscript{15} Desiring production is replaced by the various becomings, woman, animal, etc. This shift from production to becoming marks another shift, one in which filiation is no longer the privileged term of an ontology of social

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{14} Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, \textit{A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia}, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 213.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, \textit{Métaphysiques Cannibales} (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2009), 133.
\end{itemize}
relations, but alliance takes its place. In the first volume, filiation, the intense germinal influx of desire and production, was what every society must repress, and emerges in the productive capacity of capital. Alliance is always the inscription, the coding of this intensity into determinant subjects goals and desires. It is only once filiation is coupled with alliance that we get social reproduction, the rule of the relations of production over the forces of production. While in the second volume it is alliance, the alliances between humans and animals, the nomads and the outside, that constitutes the basis for becoming and transformation. Filiation, the lines of descent, are always those of the state, of memory and authority. This shift could be understood as a shift of critical targets, even politics, from the critique of capital, which appropriates the power of filiation, appearing as the quasi-cause of capitalist production, to the critique of the state, which subordinates alliance to the state as a condition of belonging. The task of *Anti-Oedipus* was to think a production irreducible to teleological and instrumental logics of production, breaking production from the “mirror of production,” while the task of *A Thousand Plateaus* (at least some of the latter plateaus) is to think exchange irreducible to possessive individualistic foundations of the social order. Thus, the first volume endeavored to break the production, an intensive filiation, free from its subordination to the inscription of dominant orders and relations, the domination of dead labor over the living, while the second endeavors to break alliance, an alliance of becoming, free from the filiation of the state. There is a general shift of valorized terms from production and filiation to becoming and alliance, a shift which has ontological and political effects.

Returning to the question of affect, it is now possible to ask what do these shifts of focus, alliance and filiation, production and becoming, relate to, and resituate the idea of affect. We have already seen how *Anti-Oedipus* juxtaposes the productive nature of desire, of affect, from its consumption in the family, effectively drawing a line of demarcation between two filiations, one intensive and productive, the other extensive and consumptive. What line of demarcation separates becoming from alliance organized
under the categories of the state? For Deleuze and Guattari this distinction has to do with an apparatus of capture. An apparatus of capture functions through two terms, through direct comparison and monopolistic appropriation. Direct comparison reduces the various activities to one homogenous activity in the case of labor, or the various objects to instances of one homogenous object in the case of the commodity. Monopolistic appropriation, on the other hand, is not a secondary accumulation imposed upon this comparison but its necessary precondition. As Deleuze and Guattari write:

Surplus labor is not that which exceeds labor; on the contrary, labor is that which is subtracted from surplus labor and presupposes it. It is only in this context that one may speak of labor value, and of an evaluation bearing on the quantity of social labor, whereas primitive groups were under a regime of free action or activity in continuous variation.

It is the monopoly, the appropriation by force, which constitutes the very ground for the comparison of different activities, different objects, making them interchangeable.

The point of contrast to this apparatus of capture is becoming. Becoming establishes a relation, between man and woman, humanity and animals, but it is never a relation predicated on a shared identity, is never an exchange. “A becoming is not a correspondence between relations. But neither is it a resemblance, an imitation, or, at the limit, an identification.” A becoming is a transformation, but not one that passes in and through discernible identities, not a matter of some thing becoming some thing else, but is a transformation at the level of the pre-individual, a reorganization at the level of the very conditions of indviduation. If capture passes through hierarchy and identity, revealing the secret unity that connects identity to hierarchy,

16 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 444.
17 Ibid., 442.
18 Ibid., 237.
then becoming passes through immanence and transformation, undoing both identity and hierarchy. This is why becomings pass through the very hierarchies that place men above women, humans above animals, undoing them by challenging the very identity of man and woman, human and animal. The examples of becoming are drawn from the history and mythology of transformations, where humans take on the qualities of animals and vice versa, transformations that exceed imitation or resemblance. Becomings are alliances, but strange alliances that constitute neither resemblance nor identity. The apparatus of capture makes the disparate similar by subjecting them to the same standard and the same rule; in contrast to this, becoming makes the similar different, even from itself, undoing all standards and all hierarchies of comparison.

It is in this context, in the distinction between capture/exchange and becoming, that we get a definition of affect. As Deleuze and Guattari write, “For the affect is not a personal feeling, nor is it a characteristic; it is the effectuation of a power of the pack that throws the self into upheaval and makes it reel.” Affects are tied to becomings, to transformations. If we then wanted to think of affects in terms of an opposition to emotions, it is possible to argue that emotions are affects rendered comparable and exchangeable. Thus, we could place affects and emotions alongside the opposition between free action and work, in which the second term is the comparison and capture of the latter. Emotions, then, are not only more individuated, more discrete and determined, they are comparable and more exchangeable. From this perspective to have an emotion is to have a determinate feeling (sadness, joy, etc.), while affects are less discernible feelings than indices of transformation. These discernible emotions constitute a common point of comparison, a common ground of experience between interchangeable subjects. Despite the fact that Spinoza argued that there are as many loves and hates as there are objects to love and hate, and as many lovers and haters, revealing the nominalist multiplic-

19 Ibid., 240.
ity underlying the oppositions of love and hate, we continue to speak of love and hate, jealousy and envy, as if they were always the same thing, constituting a common ground of comparison and experience. It would also be possible to argue that these two different organizations of feeling refer to two fundamentally different planes: on the first, that of affects, there are only relations of movement, change and transformation, while on the second, that of emotions, there is always a reference to a hidden plane of transcendence. Emotions always seem to refer us back to some transcendent idea of human nature, an idea that is all the more pernicious in remaining entirely hidden.

The opposition between affect and emotion then would refer back to the underlying opposition of Deleuze and Guattari’s work, the opposition between immanence and transcendence. Fredric Jameson has criticized Deleuze and Guattari, especially the later Deleuze and Guattari of *A Thousand Plateaus*, of departing the material analysis of the production of desire for an increasingly moral distinction between concepts such as virtual/actual, immanent/transcendent.20 However, this opposition is less a stark binary between good and bad terms that one can select or choose, than it is a relation of production and representation, organization and its capture. It is necessary to see the hierarchy and transcendence that constitutes the apparatus of capture as nothing other than a product of the organization of immanent relations. Frédéric Lordon and André Orléan have coined the term “immanent transcendence” to characterize the production of the transcendent by the immanent.21 Their primary point of reference is Spinoza, whose ethics and politics could be understood as an examination of how it is that the organization of striving produces multiple ideals of transcendence,

the state to God. These are not empty illusions, but actually re-
organizations of desire functioning like feedback loops — the 
points of resonance that Deleuze and Guattari discuss. We or-
ganize our lives around these concepts, making them effectively 
true. The same point could be raised with respect to emotions; 
once an affect is labeled, recognized, and made a common point 
of comparison, it functions as an ordering principle for future 
affects. Affects become the raw material for a socially recognized 
system of emotions. From this perspective it then becomes even 
easier to relate these affects to “ideal” and transcendent modes 
of causation — the taste of wheat tells us nothing of the condi-
tions that have produced it.

Such a reading of the distinction between emotion and affect 
corresponds to the shift in the definition and deployment of axi-
oms in the second volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia. In the 
first volume axioms were stressed in terms of their indiffer-
ence to meaning and belief as social reproduction was in some 
sense divorced from the reproduction of the family. Axioms 
were juxtaposed to both the collective meaning of codes and the 
private meaning of recoding. The affective tenor of axioms was 
that of cynicism, of an indifference to meaning and belief. This 
affective evacuation was coupled with the recoding of various 
forms of piety and nostalgia. In the second volume, however, 
the emphasis shifts from an opposition between axioms and 
codes to one internal to axioms; it is an opposition between the 
denumerable sets that axioms act on and manipulate, and the 
nondenumerable sets that exceed them. As Deleuze and Guat-
tari write:

What characterizes the nondenumerable is neither the set 

or its elements; rather, it is the connection, the “and” pro-
duced between elements, between sets, and which belongs 
to neither, which eludes them and constitutes a line of flight. 
The axiomatic manipulates only denumerable sets, even in-
finite ones, whereas the minorities constitute “fuzzy,” non-

The nondenumerable relates to the becomings that exceed capture and subjectification. Axioms can be added or subtracted for every identity, but cannot contend with the passages and transformations which exceed identity. Affects are the moments of transformation, the increases and decreases of power that pass between the determinable and identifiable emotions; they are pre-individuated, to use Simondon’s terminology, or ambivalent in Spinoza’s sense. Affects exceed the defined and denumerable states. However, as such they risk being simply epiphenomenal, vanishing moments of transformation that pass between determinate states.

The opposition of affect and emotion then returns us to what could be considered the question of revolution as understood by Deleuze and Guattari. It is not a matter of consolidating all of these various affects and intensities of change and transformation into a new code or axiom, referring them back to some higher unity of organization, but of constituting a politics of becoming, a minor politics of transformative possibilities. In *Anti-Oedipus* there was a search for the figure of this transformation, the schizo, the revolutionary etc., while *A Thousand Plateaus* searches for the nomad, the minority, the becomings that pass beneath identities and relations. The overall project remains fundamentally the same. However, there is a difference in that the first book gives this rupture a subjective figure, even a persona, hence the “schizo,” while in the second the schizo not only disappears almost entirely, but the emphasis is on the minority, the becoming, that which exceeds representation and axiomatization. This difference of focus could be seen as something of an improvement, removing the awkwardness of arguing for something that could be considered pro-schizophrenia. The minor politics of the nondenumerable set avoid such awkward identifications. However, the difference of focus also raises the

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question as to what extent a politics can bypass figures, codes, and emotions altogether? Is it possible to constitute a politics of affects that would not require reterritorialization in new emotions, a new structure of feeling.

**Affective consumptions and productions**

The concept of affect and its attendant concepts and provocations shift in the two volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. In the first, the genealogy of affect pivots around a central conceptual opposition, that between production and consumption, but this general distinction between production and consumption, also constitutes a specific genealogy of affects, of the cynicism and piety that constitute the affective composition of capital. In the latter volume, the conceptual distinction shifts from production and consumption to becoming and its capture, and the genealogy of affects, to an opposition between affects, understood as indices of transformation, and emotions, understood as determined and subject to capture. History gives way to categorical distinctions, even a morality of good and bad. This is Jameson’s critique.

Rather than read the transitions and transpositions of affect from *Anti-Oedipus* to *A Thousand Plateaus* as either a linear trajectory of improvement, in which the concept is developed, or denigration, in which original insights are lost, I prefer to read the two different texts as each posing distinct and different problems. These different problems can be understood as a genealogy of affects in the first text, in which each particular epoch or era of social production can be considered to have a dominant affect, or affects. In this case cynicism and piety, rationalism and sentimentality, are the particular affective composition of capital, of a mode of production defined by the separation of production and reproduction. (To which I could add, but it really deserves more than a parenthesis, that these two different tasks constitute a gendered division of labor, with the gendering of cynicism as the masculine affect par excellence, while sentimentality is feminized. This division cuts through
culture as well as economy, constituting various genres of entertainment, from cynical anti-heroes of action films to the sentimentality of lifetime movies.) There is much to be said for such an understanding of contemporary capital, making it possible to understand not only the current fatalism that defines economics but also the sentimentality that defines contemporary politics. From this perspective political candidates can be understood by precisely how they articulate and embody this combination of cynicism and sentimentality, deferring to the market while posing for the right photo ops, and shedding tears at the right moment. However, such a division also risks being too historicist, too oriented toward a hegemonic structure of feeling. Against this conception A Thousand Plateaus provides a necessary corrective. The later volume’s emphasis on affect as the outside of emotion makes it possible to label the hegemonic structures of feelings as emotions, as recognized, comparable, and public structures of feeling, reserving the term “affect” for the transformations that pass between and under these states, never being named or conceptualized. It is through these affects that change happens, not just the change of passing from one emotion to another, but becoming, the transformations that disrupt and undo the existing emotional order.

The first offers us a history of affects, a history that situates affects within the divide between axiom and code, the abstractions that govern life and the codings that constitute its experience, while the second posits affects in terms of their untimely becomings that exceed historical determination. Both are required to not only make sense of the stabilizations and uncertainties of the present moment, but to ultimately transform it. In order to change the present it is necessary to identify the dominant structures of feeling, the cynicism and sentimentalisms, but also to trace the affects and becomings that pass between them, that constitute a new sensibility dwelling in the heart of the old.