Street Politics in the Age of Austerity

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Mobilization of Protest in the Age of Austerity

Hanspeter Kriesi

In a recent piece, McAdam and Tarrow (2010) discuss the question of the relationship between contention and convention in political action. Self-critically, the authors observe that their joint effort (together with Tilly) to overcome the compartmentalization of studies concerning different forms of political action had given little attention to elections. They consider their inattention to the connection between elections and social movements ‘a serious lacuna’ in their Dynamics of Contention (McAdam et al. 2001), “as it is in the entire broad field of contentious politics” (532). To overcome the segmentation of the study of elections and social movements, they propose a series of six mechanisms that they believe “link movement actors to routine political actors in electoral campaigns”. These mechanisms focus on how movements influence the electoral process: movements may turn into parties that participate in elections, or they may form within parties; they may introduce tactical innovations that can be adopted as electoral tools; they may become active in electoral campaigns or react to the outcome of elections. In my own attempt to link the two worlds of social movements and political parties, I have been interested in the opposite causal relationship, i.e. in the question of how political parties influence mobilization by social movements (Kriesi et al. 1995). In our comparative analysis of the mobilization of the new social movements, we were able to show that the configuration of the old and new left – and whether the left was in or out of government – made a key difference to their success.

I share McAdam and Tarrow’s preoccupation with the segmentation of our discipline, because I believe that it fundamentally limits our possibilities to understand contemporary politics. In my view, however, previous attempts to come to terms with this segmentation are too partial and should be replaced by a more fundamental approach. Electoral choices and protest, mobilization by political parties and social movements are part and parcel of one and the same process of political interest intermediation that continuously links the different forms of interest articulation in the various channels and arenas of the political system. Taking the mobilization of protest in the age of austerity as the point of reference, I would like to formulate some general conceptual points as an introduction of such an
approach, which I shall then go on to illustrate with the experience of protest mobilization in three countries – Greece, Spain, and the US – in the age of austerity.

Conceptualization of the Relationship between Contention and Convention

The literature on social movements tells us that political mobilization depends on the interaction between three sets of factors: grievances, organization, and opportunity. Grievances constitute the starting point: an exogenous shock like the financial and economic crisis creates a tremendous amount of popular discontent, which constitutes a latent mobilization potential. It is unlikely, however, that the crisis creates such mobilization potentials from scratch. In any given society, there are more or fewer latent mobilization potentials linked to the structural conflicts, which predate the crisis and which pre-structure the way the crisis mobilization will play out. The mobilization potential newly created by the crisis adds to this already existing stock of grievances that has already been present at the time of the intervention of the shock of the crisis. In different ways, the crisis may serve as a catalyst for protest mobilization. It may reshape an already ongoing mobilization process: it may redirect it by orienting it to new issues and goals, and it may reinvigorate it by intensifying the protest activities. Or it may trigger the articulation of mobilization potentials that have remained latent until the occurrence of the crisis.

People with grievances seek to express them, and they do so by raising their voice or by exiting (Hirschman 1970). They raise their voice to the extent that they are organized and have an opportunity to do so. In democratic societies, citizens have the right to vote and they have the opportunity to express their grievances as voters. As Piven and Cloward (1977: 15) have already noted a long time ago, “ordinarily, defiance is first expressed in the voting booth simply because, whether defiant or not, people have been socialized within a political culture that defines voting as the mechanism through which political change can and should properly occur”. Accordingly, one of the first signs of popular discontent are sharp shifts in voting patterns. More generally, in democratic societies, the action repertoire of protests is likely to make use of the available institutionalized channels of access, which means that the privileged institutional spaces – i.e. the privileged arena to voice grievances – are the electoral and, where available, the direct-democratic arena. In democracies, voters resort to the
protest arena to the extent that they are unable to express themselves in the electoral or direct democratic channel, or to the extent that their vote has no impact.

The voters may not be able to express their discontent in the electoral arena because the next elections are too far off to provide an opportunity to voice their grievances. This constraint imposed by the electoral cycle is alleviated by the availability of elections at different levels – there are not only national but also local, regional, and European elections taking place at different moments in time and offering as many opportunities to voice discontent. Voters may use each one of these elections to protest against the governments and their policies at various levels. But even if elections are held sooner or later, they may not provide an opportunity to voice discontent because of the lack of a suitable alternative offered by the parties competing in the elections. The menu of alternatives provided by the parties is extended when new challengers mobilize in the electoral arena or when established mainstream parties transform themselves into new challengers. New challengers certainly have greater opportunities to enter into the fray and to make a difference in proportional systems than in majoritarian ones.

The literature on economic voting provides us with more precise ideas about how the crisis may have played out in electoral terms (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007; Duch and Stevenson 2008). This literature indicates that incumbents are generally punished in times of an economic crisis but that the impact is likely to vary as a function of context conditions (Powell and Whitten 1993; Hellwig and Samuels 2007; Duch and Stevenson 2008: chapter 9; Kriesi 2013). Specifically, this literature shows the importance of taking into account the kind of democracy (majoritarian vs proportional), the degree of institutionalization of the party system, and the openness of the national economy. It tends to suggest that the Great Recession is just another instance of economic distress, which has cyclical but no long-term effects on politics. Accordingly, the economic voting literature has largely failed to account for the kind of parties that may benefit when voters turn to punishing the governing parties (Van der Brug et al. 2007: 18-19; Tucker 2006: 4-5).

In a longer-term perspective, one could argue that the external shock of the Great Recession reinforces long-term trends in the West European party systems that have already been under way before the crisis. One such trend concerns the erosion of the mainstream parties’ representation function. According to this trend, above all put into evidence by Katz and Mair (1995, 2009) and Mair (2000, 2002, 2006), mainstream parties have moved
their center of gravity from civil society to the state and have strengthened their governmental role to the detriment of their representation function. Mair (2000) summarized this development by what he called the rise of a ‘partyless democracy’. What he had in mind was a largely neutral and non-partisan system of governance, appealing to a largely undifferentiated mass electorate whose relations with the institutions of government are no longer mediated to any significant extent. As the mainstream parties’ representation function weakens, opportunities for populist protest in the party system increases. The decline of the parties’ representation function invites populist reactions in the party system. Mair (2011: 14) expected, in fact, a division of labor within the party system between mainstream parties that habitually govern and take responsibility and parties that give voice to the people, i.e. that fulfill the representation function and that often adopt a rather populist style. He expected “a growing divide ... between parties which claim to represent, but don't deliver, and those which deliver, but are no longer seen to represent” (Mair 2002: 88). According to this thesis, by restricting the maneuvering space of the mainstream parties, the Great Recession has played into the hands of populist challengers within the party system by offering them the opportunity to mobilize against the mainstream parties and by presenting themselves as the true advocates of the people’s will.

Such new challengers in the party system may be movements turned into parties, or, even more importantly, the challengers in the party system may be movements that have taken the form of parties in the first place. Arguably, the most important recent movements in Western Europe have been movements of the right, the new populist right, which have established themselves in the form of parties and have more or less explicitly avoided protest mobilization. The exogenous shock of the Great Recession might contribute to reinforcing the transformation of the partisan space driven by the rise of the new populist right that we have already observed in Western Europe before the crisis. As I have argued together with several colleagues in previous publications (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008, 2012), globalization has transformed the basis of politics in Western Europe by giving rise to what we have called a new ‘integration-demarcation’ cleavage opposing globalization ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. We suggested that the mobilization of the group of ‘losers’ by new challengers – parties of the new populist right and transformed established parties of the liberal and conservative right – has provided the key impetus for the transformation of the party systems in the six countries of our study – Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK.
The paradox of the populists from the new right relying on party instead of movement politics is linked to a strategy of ‘double differentiation’, which is rooted in core value orientations of populist right leaders and followers (Hutter and Kriesi 2013). Both try to set themselves apart from their adversaries on the left, whom they view as ‘chaotic’ protesters, as well as from the extreme and neo-fascist right – not only for historical but also for more practical reasons. If those who openly advocate the most right-wing and racist ideologies take part in the mobilization by populist right parties, then the populists run the risk of being equated with them. For both the challengers on the left and on the right, the ‘medium is the message’, i.e. the choice of the channel in which they express themselves is at the same time an expression of their underlying message. While the rebels on the new left are libertarian and more post-materialist, the rebels on the new right have authoritarian and materialist values, and prefer (orderly) conventional political action over (disorderly) protest politics. In other words, at least in Western Europe, while the left protests in the streets, any protest from the right is found above all in the electoral arena.

If mobilization in the electoral channel is the most obvious choice, direct-democratic institutions are also increasingly available for the articulation of protest. As our comparative analysis of new social movements in Western Europe has shown, such institutions are readily used by social movements when they are available (Kriesi et al. 1995). Other institutional options for protest include litigation in courts. Kolb (2006) points out that courts provide access to the voices of those who might not otherwise be heard: “In contrast to the normal policy making process, access to and influence in the court system is not dependent on connections or social and economic position, but on the strength of legal arguments. In addition, judicial decisions can have important extra-judicial effects – such as creating publicity or increasing the bargaining power of social movements.” Relying on courts for imposing reforms is, however, severely limited by the bounded nature of constitutional rights and by the fact that the judiciary is appointed by the other branches of government.

In the absence of available options in the institutionalized arenas discontented citizens have no choice but to resort directly to protest and to try to force political concessions from political elites by appealing to the general public. This is Schattschneider’s idea (1960) of the expansion of conflict. Public protest is designed to unleash a public debate, to draw the attention of the public to the grievances of the actors in question, to create controversy where there was none, and to obtain the support of the public for the actors’ concerns. Controversial public debates and support by the general public
open up the access and increase the legitimacy of speakers and allies of the protest movements with journalists and with decision-makers who tend to closely follow the public debates (Gamson and Meyer 1996: 288). Wolfsfeld’s ‘principle of political resonance’ (1997: 47)formulates this relationship in the following way: challengers who succeed in producing events that resonate with the professional and political culture of important news media can compete with much more powerful adversaries.

In Western Europe and North America, however, citizens do not only resort to the contentious mobilization of protest today, if no other options are available. In Western Europe and North America, protest mobilization has become increasingly conventional, as these societies have become what is aptly called a ‘movement society’ by Meyer and Tarrow (1998). The term suggests that political protest has become an integral part of modern life; that protest behavior is employed with greater frequency and by more diverse constituencies, and is used to represent a wider range of claims than ever before; and that professionalization and institutionalization may be changing the social movement into an instrument of conventional politics. As protest becomes a part of everyday politics, we facilitate the “normalization of the unconventional” (Fuchs 1991). At the same time, social movement organizations become rather like interest groups. While protest becomes conventional, the typical repertoire of protest may still vary from one country to the other. Thus, in southern Europe, the political strike combined with large demonstrations constitutes a core element of the protest repertoire, while it is much less common or conventional in the north of Europe.

As unconventional forms of participation become increasingly accepted and political systems become more open to unconventional forms of mobilization, these forms are likely to become more moderate, less prominent, and less effective. As a result of its routinization, the protest repertoire loses some of its news value, its surprise effect, and its impact on the general public. As the repertoire of protest becomes routinized and loses its effectiveness, tactical innovations (McAdam 1983) become all the more important – innovations that catch the adversaries off guard and force them to innovate as well, i.e. to neutralize the challengers’ moves through effective tactical counter-measures.

If a response to more or less conventional protest is not forthcoming, however, challengers, even in democracies, may not only try to innovate, they may also be tempted to step up their protest, to radicalize, and to create a political crisis through massive use of disruption (Keeler 1993). A political crisis can create a sense of urgency predicated on the assumption
that already serious problems will be exacerbated by inaction. In addition, a political crisis can create a sense of genuine fear predicated on the assumption that inaction may endanger lives and property or even result in a revolution or coup d’état. When either of these mechanisms comes into play, the government may feel compelled to make substantive concessions to the challengers or, if it is unable to implement such concessions, fundamental realignments in the party system may occur. Latin America provides telling examples of party system collapse and realignments as a consequence of economic liberalization reforms in the aftermath of the debt crisis of the 1980s and 1990s (see Lupu 2012; Morgan 2013; Roberts 2013; Rovira Kaltwasser 2013).

Finally, it is also possible that the challengers come to reject the institutionalized channels of established democracies altogether. They may turn against representative democracy and the electoral process and demand more direct, participatory forms of democracy. This is, indeed, what the student movements of the late 1960s and the new social movements of the 1970s and 1980s have called for and what the New Left had been pursuing from the start. Thus, in the late 1960s, exponents of the New Left had already denounced the deficiencies of existing representative models of democracy (e.g. Agnoli and Brückner 1968) and demanded more participatory forms of ‘strong’ democracy, as reflected in the scholarly literature of the day (Pateman 1970; Macpherson 1977; Barber 1984).

Whatever the action form and the political objective, political mobilization in both the institutional and the protest arenas requires an organizational infrastructure. In a democracy, the key political organizations are political parties, interest/advocacy groups, and social movement organizations (SMOs). Each type of organization focuses on a specific arena for its mobilization. Parties mainly, although not exclusively, mobilize in the electoral and the direct-democratic arenas, interest groups in the direct-democratic and the administrative arenas, and SMOs in the protest arena. In the absence of a political organization, the exit option – taking the form of apathy or of ‘voting with the feet’ – is the most likely reaction to grievances. This also applies if the established political organizations do not pick up the grievances of the population and if no new challenger is available. People who are not mobilized or who do not feel that the available options of mobilization allow them to express their grievances in any meaningful way are unlikely to move at all. In the electoral and direct-democratic arenas, this means low turnout; in the administrative arena, this means no lobbying; in the protest arena, this means no mass protest, no strikes, and no demonstrations.
The Dynamics of Contention and Convention in the Age of Austerity and the Transformation of the Party System

The financial crisis constitutes an exogenous shock of an extraordinary magnitude. At first, governments focused their efforts on stabilizing their national banking systems and alleviating the negative impact on the real economy. They adopted bank rescue packages (Weber and Schmitz 2011; see also the chapter by Ross in this volume). They also countered the economic impact of the crisis by adopting modest fiscal expansionary measures (Armingeon 2012), relying on some version of ‘liberal Keynesianism’ (Pontusson and Raess 2012). Not all countries succeeded in reducing the short-term adverse effects of the crisis. Although the financial crisis had a severe impact on all the advanced industrial economies, the effect differed per country. As the crisis continued, governments generally changed policies and turned to austerity measures. In the case of the weaker economies, however, these measures largely failed to achieve their intended goal of reducing the public deficit. As a result, economic imbalances in Europe were aggravated, and the weaknesses in the EMU governance structures were revealed (Featherstone 2011; De Grauwe 2011; Eichengreen 2012). The ensuing complex policies of crisis management, which involved hard bargaining between European governments, their domestic constituents, and supranational actors (the European Commission, the ECB, the IMF, and the European Banking Authority), provided one of the key triggers for the political mobilization of grievances by European citizens in the face of the Great Recession.

My heuristic framework for the analysis of the interactive dynamics starts out with a set of five highly stylized political actors that includes: (1) international actors (such as the European Commission, the ECB, or the IMF), (2) the national government, (3) the (mainstream) opposition, (4) other (competing) public authorities (such as the [symbolic] president, the courts, [part of] the media, or the voters in a referendum vote) or established interest groups, and (5) outside challengers (populist parties, social movement organizations, trade unions, public interest groups). I assume that, in times of crisis, the international actors and the national governments have the initiative, while the other three types of actors may or may not react to the actions of these key actors. I am most interested here in the interaction between the mobilization of protest in the different channels and its impact on the party system in particular.

I shall look at three cases – the US, Greece, and Spain. In none of these three cases has the new populist right – i.e. a party defending the
globalization ‘losers’ – had any significant electoral success before the crisis. In all of these countries, a rather majoritarian electoral system discourages the success of new challengers in the party system. Accordingly, Green parties have also been very weak or non-existent in these countries, and even strong new social movements have not left behind a legacy of strong party organizations ready to mobilize discontent in these countries. Another similarity between the three countries is that, at the moment the crisis hit, the left-wing incumbent government made it difficult, at first sight, for labor unions to organize any kind of mobilization.

United States

The focus on the interaction between contention and convention in the age of austerity suggests that we must broaden our view beyond ‘street politics’. Indeed, in the age of austerity, mobilization has not only taken place in the streets. In fact, what I have called the most important recent movements in Western Europe – the movements of the new populist right – have established themselves in the form of parties and hardly mobilized in the streets at all. This is also true of the functional equivalent of the new populist right in the US – the Tea Party – that has launched the first and, I would argue, the most consequential mobilization against the US government in the age of austerity.

Compared to the Tea Party that started to mobilize against the new Obama Administration in early 2009, the Occupy movement came late – it only mobilized in the fall of 2011 – and it faded away as quickly as it came onto the public scene. As Gitlin (2013) suggests, it was more moment than movement. Tarrow (2011) has noted as much early on: “[w]e are here’ movements often flare up rapidly and fade away just as quickly, or disintegrate into rivulets of particular claims and interests”. The number of people mobilized by the Occupy movement remained rather limited (they peaked at some ten to twenty thousand participants in the 5 October 2011 demonstration in New York City), and levels of support for the movement by the general public plunged rapidly. This does not mean that Occupy was inconsequential: the movement’s slogan (“We are the 99%”) struck a responsive chord and entered into popular lore. “This was brilliant framing” (Calhoun 2013: 33) that drew media attention to the problem of rising inequality, and even if media attention did subside after the movement’s eviction from Zuccotti Park, the broader political discourse continued “to be peppered with references to ‘the 1 percent’ and to other issues Occupy had raised” (Milkman et al. 2013: 38). However, Occupy did not seek a direct political impact. It
did not target the government and its handling of the financial crisis but instead shifted the focus to inequality in society (Calhoun 2013: 33). As Gitlin (2013: 8) points out, the inner core of the movement “didn’t want different policies; it wanted a different way of life”. And it was “phobic about the risk of being coopted”, even though such risks were rather limited given that its natural political ally, the Democratic Party, “handled the movement gingerly, for fear that any more intense expressions of friendliness might tar them with unruly brushes”.

Contrary to the Occupy movement, the Tea Party movement has had considerable political impact, not least because it pre-empted the stage for mobilization by other movements. It has, of course, not been a reaction to austerity, but it reacted to the first ‘liberal Keynesian’ phase of the government’s reactions to the crisis. Contrary to the Occupy movement, it targeted the government and it crucially shaped its natural ally – the Republican Party. Paradoxically, it mobilized against an administration that had inherited the mess from its predecessors and was trying to make the best of it by adopting the recipes already introduced by its predecessors, which were the recipes all the other governments applied at that time.

In presenting the case of the Tea Party, I essentially follow the study by Skocpol and Williamson (2012). The cast of characters is purely domestic in this particular case and includes the government (the incoming Obama Administration), the mainstream opposition (the Republicans), and three types of challengers: 1) grassroots local groups, composed of a gaggle of about 1,000 local groups (in 2011), not particularly well-coordinated and none of them directly controlled by the Republican party; 2) professional national advocacy groups (‘idea pushers’), top-down organizations leveraging grassroots activism to gain new advantage, financed by a few billionaire families, especially the Koch family, whose resources allow them to push their own world view in civic and political affairs; 3) the highly partisan sector of the conservative media complex – including Fox News, the right-wing blogosphere, and nationwide networks of right-wing talk radio programs. The grassroots organizations got the movement off the ground, the conservative advocacy groups jumped on the bandwagon, and the conservative media quickly joined and helped to orchestrate the movement, breaking down the barriers between media and movement that have usually been so challenging for protesters to navigate. The thrust of local and national Tea Party activism through the November 2010 elections was maximized by loosely connected organizational efforts. The relationship between the local chapters and the national advocacy groups was loose and mutually beneficial, allowing the advocacy groups to set the agendas and disseminate
general arguments without becoming accountable to the local groups. The conservative media – Fox in particular – served as a kind of social movement orchestrator during the critical early period of initial mobilization: they forged a community of meaning. As a result of the segmentation of the public sphere, the Tea Party activists often unblinkingly believed wildly inaccurate things about what government does, how it is financed, and what is actually included in key pieces of legislation or regulation (Skocpol and Williamson 2012: 199).

Tea Party efforts moved forward within and across the edges of the Grand Old Party (GOP) but never came under party control. However, the movement had its greatest effect in the mid-term elections of 2010, when the Republicans gained 63 seats and control of the House, and took control of both the governorships and the legislatures in twelve states. The Democrats ended up with control of the fewest state legislative bodies they have had since 1946 (Drew 2013). Of course, the economic recession and high unemployment helped the opposition party, but the Tea Party and selective participation helped, too: the participation rate fell from 61.6 per cent in the 2008 elections to 41.6 per cent in the 2010 mid-term elections. Mid-term voters tend to lean to the Republicans, but in 2010 this was even more the case than usual thanks to the mobilization by the Tea Party. As Skocpol and Williamson put it: “The Tea Party and their adoring media surely helped re-inspire grassroots conservatives, set a national agenda for the election, and claim a Republican-wave election as vindication for a particular, extreme conservative ideology” (2012: 163). And Drew (2013) maintains that the 2010 elections were the single most important event leading up to the domination of the House by the Republican far right.

The bigger story is, indeed, the impact of the Tea Party on the GOP. The Republican Party has been moving toward the right for some time, and that movement only quickened after the advent of the Tea Party. The Republicans newly elected in 2010 were much more to the right than the outgoing Republicans. Moreover, the Tea Party activists fulfilled ‘watchdog functions’, barking at the heels of the GOP. They took over local committees, which is significant because Republicans who want to run for election or reelection to state legislatures and Congress will think twice before ignoring the stated policy preferences of even relatively small Tea Party minorities in their districts. According to Skocpol and Williamson (2012: 183), the Tea Party’s ultimate impact on Congress – and on state legislatures – lies in its capacity to coordinate national pressure from wealthy funders and ideological advocates with contacts from grassroots Tea Partyers who have a reputation for clout in local districts. When coordinated pressure can be
mounted – as it has been in budget battles – the Tea Party delivers a loud and clear absolutist message to legislators, a message that comes both from advocates in Washington DC and from local districts. Although the symbolism of ‘the Tea Party’ is already fading in popularity, the power of hard-right ideologues consolidated during the first years of the Obama Administration is continuing to drive Republican politics, crowding Republicans into an ultra-right corner and contributing to the paralysis of the American political system (Drew 2013).

Greece

Greece has been arguably the country hardest hit by the Great Recession. It goes without saying, then, that anti-austerity protests appear to have been much more intense in Greece than elsewhere. International actors played a key role in how Greece dealt with the crisis and became, together with the government, the key target of the protests. The mainstream opposition did its best to undermine the government without openly joining the challengers, who were mainly organized by the (old) radical left and the trade unions. The government’s anti-austerity measures – whether unilaterally adopted (at first) or imposed by the Troika (beginning with the first Greek bailout in May 2010) – triggered the mobilization. The series of large-scale mobilizations was a direct response to the series of measures imposed by the government on an increasingly alienated population.

Timing is again crucial. Just as in the case of the US Tea Party, the movement got off the ground only once a new government was voted into office. In the fall of 2009, the Greeks had the possibility to sanction the incumbent government in national elections. With a rapidly burgeoning public deficit necessitating increasingly tough austerity measures, the conservative Prime Minister Karamanlis announced in a dramatic televised address on 2 September 2009 the dissolution of parliament and early elections on 4 October, only two years after the previous one. As in 2007, Karamanlis sought to pre-empt the further erosion of electoral support for his government and to ensure the shortest possible campaign. But this time, he did not get away with it. Under the pressures of the economic crisis, Karamanlis’s center-right New Democracy party (ND) could only promise austerity measures to decrease the runaway public debt. In sharp contrast, Pasok, the socialist party in opposition, offered not only a stimulus package to boost demand but also the vague prospect of ‘green development’ as a new model for the country. George Papandreou cheerfully proclaimed that the country’s problem was not the lack of resources but only their mismanagement. This
was enough to hand him the premiership after an overwhelming victory at the polls (Mavrogordatos and Marantzidis 2010: 997f). The elections constituted a typical example of economic voting: the incumbents were seriously punished and the mainstream opposition took over: Pasok won 5.8 per cent, rising to 43.9 per cent, while ND lost 8.3 per cent, dropping to 33.5 per cent, its lowest percentage ever. The radical left (KKE and Syriza) also lost some votes.

The new socialist government under George Papandreou was, however, quickly hit by the tough reality of the economic crisis. In December 2009, the new government admitted that the public debt figures had been manipulated by previous governments and that Greece was actually burdened with public debt amounting to 113 percent of GDP – nearly double the Eurozone limit of 60 percent. Rating agencies started to downgrade Greek bank and government debt. In January 2010, an EU report condemned Greece for “severe irregularities” in its accounting procedures. Its budget deficit in 2009 was revised upwards from 3.7 per cent to 12.7 per cent, more than four times the maximum allowed by EU rules. Instead of a stimulus program, the Papandreou government was forced to implement a series of austerity measures in February 2010. These measures were immediately opposed by political forces further to the left. In spite of the fact that it was a socialist government who was forced to take these measures under heavy international pressure, the unions and the radical left (KKE and Syriza) mobilized against the government’s austerity program. They believed that Pasok had “lost its soul”. As a result of the crisis, both major political parties had thus lost legitimacy. The master frame of the protestors was mobilizing against the political corruption symbolized by parliament. One of the central slogans was “burn, burn the brothel called Parliament” (Psimitis 2011: 196).

Over the next three years, Greece saw no less than 27 general strikes against the austerity programs. In addition to general strikes, Greece experienced large-scale demonstrations, sit-ins, arson attacks against public buildings, and widespread destruction of private property, verbal and physical attacks against MPs and the parliament, and terrorist attacks, many of which were directed against immigrants. The anti-austerity protests in Greece undoubtedly constitute a mass movement in which, according to the estimates of Karyotis and Rüdig (2013), no less than 30 per cent of the entire population was engaged in one way or another in 2010. In spite of the large-scale mobilization of this movement, at its core, this was a movement rooted in Greece’s traditional left-wing political culture. As Karyotis and Rüdig (2013) argue, at the time of the outbreak of the crisis, Greece had a large reservoir of people who had previously been engaged in
protest and on whom any protest mobilization may have been able to draw. This was essentially a left-leaning protest potential that was part of what Andronikidou and Kovras (2012: 712) have called “a deep-rooted culture of resistance” that was extended during the crisis. Already before the crisis, the frequency of general strikes – which were a regular feature of Greek life well before the austerity protests – made Greece clearly stand out from other countries. Moreover, the role of trade unions in mobilizing people for these strikes had been crucial already before the crisis.

What the analysis of Karyotis and Rüdig clearly shows is the importance of this potential for the mobilization of anti-austerity protests in 2010. Previous protest involvement turns out to be the most important predictor of involvement in anti-austerity protests. Those who have been involved in both strikes and demonstrations multiple times before are the most likely to take part in anti-austerity protests as well. The traditional network of trade union and voluntary group membership, as well as public sector employment, played a crucial role in recruiting protesters for the previous protests as well as for the anti-austerity protests. Once previous participation is controlled for, none of these network factors is a predictor of protest. For Karyotis and Rüdig (2013: 22), it is “beyond doubt that anti-austerity protest involves, to a large extent, mobilizing an existing pool of experienced strikers and demonstrators”. While grievances (relative deprivation) are significant predictors of opposition to austerity policies and support for protest, they do not predict turning potential into actual participation.

Karyotis and Rüdig also show that this is not a middle class or ‘new’ social movement. Instead, the Greek anti-austerity movement is a movement of ordinary people of all educational backgrounds and ages. It includes people fully involved in economic life, not people at the margins of the labor force. Only people with a job can take part in a strike, after all. What seems plausible is that “the usual suspects in Greece, through their organizational infrastructure, act as first movers in the generation of protest opportunities, who trigger the latent protest socialization of a broader public that is not strongly defined ideologically in left-right terms” (239). No less than 29 per cent of Karyotis and Rüdig’s representative national sample indicated that they had previously participated in either strikes or demonstrations or both.

This enormous mobilization, which continued through 2011, had far-reaching consequences for electoral politics. Eventually, Greece experienced a deep political crisis that culminated in the collapse of its party system during the consecutive parliamentary elections of May and June 2012. In the local elections that took place in November 2010, the two mainstream
parties seemed to hold out. The incumbent socialists (Pasok) took a beating (dropping by 9.3 per cent), but they still came out ahead with 34.7 per cent nationwide, compared to 32.8 per cent of the conservative ND (-0.7 per cent). However, there were already signs of a fundamental change as well: the analysis of Karyotis and Rüdig reveals the weakness of Pasok’s support base at the time already. This weakness manifested itself, among other things, in the weak turnout: for the first time in memory, more than half of all eligible voters abstained in the second round. Moreover, almost 30 per cent of mayors who won run-off contests around the country were independents.¹ In addition to independents, the clear winner was the old communist left, which benefited from a year of intense mobilization but still only to a limited extent (+3.3 per cent for a new total of 10.9 per cent). Syriza remained stagnant at 4.5 per cent.

Although the mid-term program of fiscal consolidation was adopted in June 2011, Papandreou continued to lose power and credibility. The second Greek bailout in July 2011 accelerated the decay. It was then that Papandreou made the fateful decision to submit the second bailout agreement to a national referendum. The European leaders, who had fought hard for this agreement, felt betrayed by his decision; both Merkel and Sarkozy made it clear that if Greece wanted to have a referendum, it could be only about the country’s continued membership of the Eurozone. In the ensuing turmoil, Papandreou was forced to resign. He was replaced by a technocratic government under the leadership of Lukas Papademos, the ex-director of the Greek National Bank. Reluctantly and only under pressure from the Troika, the conservative opposition (ND) agreed to give its vote of confidence in the new government. In the aftermath of the second bailout, the two mainstream parties started to disintegrate and the party system reconfigured under the impact of a new political conflict opposing the partisans and foes of the bailout agreement (Dinar and Rori 2013: 274-276). Two interrelated issues dominated the campaign in May: the bailout agreement and punishment of the political elites who were responsible for the crisis. Based on data from the European Manifesto Project, Halikiopoulou et al. (2012) show that, on the new political conflict dimension of the bailout issue, the two pro-European mainstream parties were radically opposed by the smaller opposition parties from the left (KKE and Syriza) and the right (LAOS). This new conflict could be regarded as the Greek version of the ‘integration-demarcation’ cleavage that we have identified in northwest European countries. The specifically Greek aspect is that this conflict has

¹ The Economist, 20 November 2010: 35.
predominantly been articulated by a populist left (KKE and Syriza). For the communists (KKE) in Greece and elsewhere, the EU is a product of imperialism, which the radical left opposes in an attempt to protect the nation (equated with class), its territory, and sovereignty. Syriza, by contrast, adopted an ambiguous position: while radically in favor of punishing the incumbents and opposed to the bailout agreement, it wanted to stay in the Eurozone. LAOS ended up supporting the technocratic government, which was equivalent to signing its death warrant in the upcoming elections. The fragmentation of the mainstream parties added to the forces opposed to the bailout. When early elections were announced in April 2012, the Greek party system had very little in common with what it had been in 2009. Fragmentation and polarization reigned on both sides of the political spectrum.

The punishment of the two major parties was exemplary: together they lost no less than 45 per cent of their 2009 votes, jointly obtaining no more than 32 per cent. Pasok was literally destroyed, losing more than 30 per cent, but ND was not able to benefit from this collapse and also lost 15 per cent. The winning anti-bailout forces were, however, too fragmented to be able to form a government. The election resulted in a deadlock, which led to the organization of a second election in June. The June election saw a limited comeback of ND to become the largest party with 29.7 per cent. The big winner of the elections was, however, Syriza, a party that had started out in 2004 as a confederation of leftist organizations, which were, in turn, split-offs from the communist party (Moschonas 2013: 35). Gaining votes mainly from Pasok, KKE, the Greens, and other smaller parties of the left, Syriza rose to become the second strongest party in the June election, only three percentage points below the leading party (Dinar and Rori 2013: 279). Moschonas suggests that “without the shock of the economic crisis, Syriza’s meteoric rise would not have occurred, and without Álexis Tsipras’s leadership and strategy, Syriza would not have become the main party of opposition” (2013: 36). The collapse of Pasok and the rise of Syriza closely resemble the experience of Latin American countries, where parties of the left had to implement neoliberal reform programs and, in the process, diluted their party ‘brand’ to such an extent that their voters lost their party identity and abandoned them for a populist alternative (such as Hugo Chavez in Venezuela). In the early Greek elections in January 2015, Syriza won the elections with 36.3 per cent of the vote and was able to form a government together with the right-wing populists of ANEL (Independent Greeks).
Spain

The Spanish Indignados movement also began rather late in the financial crisis, in May 2011. It was preceded by huge demonstrations in Portugal in March 2011, which were triggered by four young university graduates mobilizing their ‘lost generation’ (‘geração à rasca’) via Facebook. Some 200,000 persons took part in this not only peaceful but festive event in Lisbon, and 80,000 in Porto. The discontent expressed in these demonstrations was fuelled by the announcement of another set of austerity measures (by then the fourth one in Portugal). At about the same time, Spanish students also began protesting massively against education cuts, calling attention to their unpromising future. The Spanish Indignados followed two months later.

As shown in the contribution by Perugorría, Shalev, and Tejerina in this volume, the Spanish Indignados were mainly composed of those with left-wing sympathies but, like the Occupy movement in the US, they did not want to be associated with any established political force. For the Indignados movement was not only an outcry against politicians and bankers and a call for social justice, it was also a critique of the way Spanish democracy functioned and a demand for real democracy now, i.e. for more participation, transparency, accountability, and proportional representation. It was a protest against politicians and parties, against the powerlessness of politics in coping with the economic problems created by the crisis. Similar to their Portuguese predecessors, the Indignados mobilized people through trusted social networks without formal ties to established organizations. Compared to other protest movements in Spain, the Indignados were younger, less male-dominated, more highly educated, and less organized, although they had a roughly equal amount of previous experiences with unconventional participation (Anduiza et al. 2013). If anything, this was a movement of the new left, comparable to the movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s in the northwest of Europe. Its rejection of formal organizations and established elites and its call for real democracy resemble the original call of the new left for participatory democracy and autonomous cultural spheres. Contrary to the limited mobilization capacity of the Occupy movement, this Spanish movement reached high rates of active participation. As reported in the chapter by Perugorría, Shalev, and Tejerina in this volume, the overall active participation rate was 11 per cent of the Spanish population, which is lower than the corresponding rates in Israel and Greece but higher than active participation in the famous French revolt of May 1968, when the participation rate reached 8 per cent for the whole of France (although up to 30 per cent in the ‘hottest’ regions) (Converse and Pierce 1986).
Why was there such a lag between the outbreak of the financial crisis and the emergence of the Indignados movement? One reason for the lack of protest was that the Spanish socialist government was late in taking austerity measures. The government expected public debt to stabilize at 70 per cent of GDP, up from 60 per cent but well below the euro-area average. It was only after much initial hesitation that the Socialist Zapatero government took some tough measures, which included cuts in the salaries of public sector employees, a freezing of pensions, and a loosening of employee protection against dismissal. Another reason is that the Spanish unions, although well-known for their radicalism, did not conspicuously mobilize against their government’s austerity measures. In spite of their militancy, the Spanish unions had adopted a cooperative stance and have participated in corporatist arrangements ever since the Moncloa Pact, which established the Spanish social partnership system after the transition to democracy in 1977 (Pérez 2000). Unlike the Greek unions, the Spanish unions maintained a close relationship with the socialist government.

If the Spanish unions did mobilize against austerity, they did so mainly in the framework of cross-European events. The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) organized two European days of action for a joint protest across Europe. The first one – called ‘Fight the crisis: Put the people first’ – was organized in May 2009. The campaign was launched with a demonstration on 14 May in Madrid, with the support of some 150,000 participants. This event was followed by a demonstration on 15 May in Brussels, involving about 50,000 participants, and by further events on 16 May in Berlin (100,000 participants) and in Prague (30,000 supporters). Demonstrations were also held in other European countries, including Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia, and the UK. A second European day of action followed in September 2010, when tens of thousands of protesters took to the streets across Europe as strikes and demonstrations caused widespread disruption. In addition to Brussels (around 100,000 participants), the main action took place in Greece, and again in Spain. On the second day of union action across Europe, Spanish unions organized the first general strike in eight years, protesting against the austerity measures of their government. The result of the strike was acceptable for both sides: the unions were able to save face, and the government was not really threatened. “Rarely can a general strike have been so placid”, commented The Economist. The government all but laid down a red carpet for the unions. The Spanish prime minister Zapatero had sweetened the pill by announcing a tax increase for

2 The Economist, 2 October 2010: 33.
the rich in 2011. The unions seemed to be performing more out of a sense of duty than rage. The mutual restraint can only be explained by the fact that the Spanish socialists have been the unions’ traditional allies.

In January 2011, however, it seemed very likely that the unions would call another general strike, triggered by the government’s announcement of a rise in the retirement age from 65 to 67. But under pressure from a deteriorating economy and expected socialist losses at the coming municipal elections in May, the unions and the government (together with the business confederation) got together to negotiate a new social pact instead. After two weeks of intense negotiations, the three partners agreed on a pact to revive the economy and to cut the soaring unemployment rate (especially among the young). The main reform consisted of the previously announced measure to gradually raise the retirement age from 65 to 67 starting in 2013.

Just as the Greek incumbents, the Spanish socialists were in for a severe electoral lashing. Not only had they underestimated the crisis for too long, once they began taking measures against the crisis, these proved to be incapable of improving the situation. In the first elections after their announcement of austerity measures in May 2010 – the regional elections in Catalonia – the socialists had already lost heavily to the regionalists, and to the conservative People’s Party (PP), its main opponent at the national level. In local elections held in May 2011, right around the time of the Indignados’ initial mobilization, the socialists once again received a severe beating. In these elections, which had a rather high participation rate, the conservative PP became the largest party. These defeats forced Prime Minister Zapatero to step down and to call for early national elections in November 2011. In these elections, the socialists lost a record amount of 15.1 per cent, obtaining only 28.8 per cent of the vote. The winner was once more the conservative opposition, which gained 4.7 per cent for a total of 44.6 per cent and an absolute majority in the Cortès.

Thus, just as in France in 1968 when the voters returned General de Gaulle to power after the May events (Converse and Pierce 1986: 413-484), the Indignados did not seem to have any impact on the electoral outcome. However, more recent developments suggest that this would be too hasty a conclusion to draw. As a matter of fact, the Spanish public quickly became disillusioned with the new conservative government, too. For one thing, it proved as incapable as the socialists of leading Spain out of the depression. Indeed, the level of unemployment continued to increase under the new government. In addition, the new government was shaken by a series of corruption scandals that greatly undermined the credibility of the conservative prime minister. As a result, mobilization against the government has
broadened. The sentiment of not being represented by any party or union spread beyond the ranks of the Indignados, and by the end of 2012, there was hardly a day without a demonstration or a strike in the Spanish capital. A movement against foreclosures enjoyed unexpected success, and the number of action committees to defend the interests of ordinary citizens increased. Most importantly, the monthly polls of the electorate have indicated a steady decline of the PP’s support. By early 2015, it had dropped down to around 25 per cent. At the same time, however, the socialists have not been able to benefit from the decline in support for their main adversaries, but have instead stagnated at the level of support they obtained in the last national elections. The voters have been turning to either Podemos, a new radical left-wing party that grew out of the Indignados movement, or to Ciudadanos, a new center-right party that originated in Catalonia but has mobilized more broadly in recent years. In the 2014 European elections, Podemos, which had just been created, obtained 8 percent of the vote, while Ciudadanos polled 3.2 percent. In the regional and local elections in the spring of 2015, left-wing coalitions close to Podemos won the race for mayor in the two largest Spanish cities, Madrid and Barcelona. In the 20 December 2015 national legislative elections, Podemos gained 20.7 per cent of the vote and Ciudadanos 13 per cent.

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The three cases presented in this paper serve to illustrate the two key points that I wish to make. First, they show that the movements spawned by the Great Recession differ greatly from one country to the other, making it difficult to generalize. In the case of the US, the key movement has been a conservative one. In Greece, it has been a movement of the old left. In Spain, it has been a movement that claims to be neither left nor right but that, if anything, resembles the new left of the late 1960s in the northwest of Europe. This brings me to my second point: the make-up of the movements in the age of austerity depends on the national political context. In all three countries, the target of the mobilization was the incumbent government, and in all three countries, this government was a centre-left government – the Democrats in the US and the socialists in Greece and Spain. But these governments were challenged for quite different reasons, and the opposition that benefited from the challenge was quite different, too. However – and this is a point that all three cases share – the mobilization by the movements

3 NZZ, 12 December 2012.
had a tremendous impact on electoral politics, the party system, and the political process more generally.

In the US, the government was challenged not for its austerity measures but for its liberal Keynesianism. The opposition that benefited was the mainstream opposition. Given the US two-party system, any movement seeking to impose its view in politics can try to capture one of two parties – the Republicans in the case of conservative movements, and the Democrats in the case of progressive movements – or it can try to run a third-party campaign. A precedent to the Tea Party’s capture of the Republicans is the presidential campaign of Barry Goldwater (1964); precedents on the progressive side are the presidential campaigns of William J. Bryan (1896), Franklin D. Roosevelt (1932-40), and Eugene McCarthy (1972). Third-party candidates have tried as well: George Wallace or Ross Perrot on the right, or Ralph Nader on the left.

In Greece and Spain, the governments were challenged for their austerity policies, but the challengers in the two countries were quite different from each other. The Greek challenge was carried out by a broad popular movement that was rooted in the traditionally rather radical left subculture, but expanded beyond it. The movement destroyed not only the Greek socialist party but also the Greek party system in which two major parties pursuing centrist strategies dominated. It replaced the socialists by a new party on the left whose main characteristic is that it opposed the austerity policies imposed by the second bailout agreement. At the same time, it replaced the centripetal competition in the party system by a polarized competition. In Spain, by contrast, the movement constituted a new political force that did have roots in the left political culture but did not associate itself with the political organizations of the left. Its apolitical character explains why, at first, it did not have much impact on the party system other than that it contributed to undermining the incumbent government. In the long run, however, this movement may influence Spanish politics and society in an even more fundamental way than the Greek protest. While the Greek protest was purely reactive and concentrated on the austerity measures imposed by the government and its international backers, the Spanish protest took a broader view and contained a utopian element: a promise of a better society beyond a world of austerity and the restitution of traditional privileges. The Spanish movement may eventually not only contribute to the transformation of the Spanish party system but also to the transformation of Spanish democracy in a more fundamental way, just as the new left in the northwest of Europe had done back in the late 1960s and 1970s. As Fuchs and Klingemann (1995: 435) have argued, in the aftermath of the ‘silent
revolution’ of the late 1960s and 1970s, a ‘democratic transformation’ took place in these countries, involving a change in the interaction between the actors of the polity and the public, a process that actually produced greater responsiveness on the part of the major political actors towards citizens’ demands. There was a process of successful adaptation of representative democracy to the new participation demands of their citizens, and the emergence of new collective actors who articulated new issue demands in their collective actions. Citizens became generally more active as well as more effective in the political process.

Bibliography


