Part 3
Experts, intellectuals, and media
Intellectuals are central players in all social movement and movement organizations, broadly conceived as people specialized in discourse production as a result of their education and experience. They often take up leading roles within organizations, setting up decision-making procedures, negotiating with authorities, writing legal proposals, and communicating with the media. The fact that intellectuals are better than others in producing (legitimate, convincing, enticing, coherent) discourses creates certain dilemmas. On the one hand, it is good for the movement as a whole if intellectuals use their wit and knowledge to the fullest, effectively appealing to the public and pushing forward the movement’s ideas. On the other hand, such wielding of power may marginalize others within movements. They may simply not be represented and there may even be cases where the discourses espoused by intellectuals delegitimize and marginalize weaker groups within the movement. Intellectuals who represent the movement thus contribute to the movement’s strength but may – wittingly or unwittingly – repress images and ideas not fitting their representations. The risk that marginalization by intellectuals happens is probably higher when the people they represent have scarce cultural and symbolic resources (as in the case of movements for undocumented immigrants) than when they have substantial resources (as in the case for movements for LGBT people). Still, the power to represent the movement and what it stands for is an issue to some degree in all movements. In short, intellectuals can be a force for the movement but may also exercise power over others within the movement. The resulting Power of Representation dilemma – intellectuals have superior skills of representation but if they use them for the movement, they marginalize others within the movement – has been a topic of heated debate within many movements. Prominent movement intellectuals have suggested different ways of resolving the dilemma both in theory and in practice.

This chapter provides an overview of how some activist intellectuals in the past have addressed and sought to resolve the Power of Representation dilemma. It then zooms in on one particular way of resolving the dilemma
advocated by Michel Foucault. By introducing the concept of “specific intellectual,” Foucault outlined a role for intellectuals that would allow them to supersede the Power of Representation dilemma. Specific intellectuals could and would use their concrete expertise in different arenas (planning, law, psychiatry, etc.) to assist marginalized groups rather than lead or represent them. They would lend their technical expertise to struggles, “speaking with” the people in those struggles rather than “speaking for” them (Foucault, 1984; Artières, 2002; Kurzman and Owens, 2002). In this way, he argued that this new kind of intellectual (or what other scholars have called the “new class” [see King and Szeléyni, 2004; Eyal and Buchholz, 2010]) would play a different role than the “traditional intellectuals” like Émile Zola, Jean Paul Sartre, and others: rather than claim superior knowledge of the truth, specific intellectuals would use their intellectual resources to facilitate marginalized peoples to represent their own interests and meanings in the public sphere.

The remainder of the chapter empirically examines the roles of specific intellectuals in two prominent social movements seeking equal rights for marginalized and stigmatized people: the immigrant and LGBT rights movements in the United States. These movements seek the extension of basic rights within a liberal citizenship regime. The common conditions of exclusion (legal-juridical) and hostility facing immigrants and LGBT people present activists of these different movements with common constraints, goals, and internal dynamics. These movements are players within political arenas where they position themselves in relation to other players, including opponents and bystanders. Movements are internally also arenas, with different factions and persons struggling to define what the movement is about and how it should be achieved. The Power of Representation dilemma arises because choosing strategies in political arenas will have repercussions for the internal functioning of movements; it is a form of the Janus dilemma (Jasper, 2006).

The “arenas” facing the “players” present them with “rules” that help set the stakes of political action, inform strategic possibilities, and distribute value to the specific kinds of resources (capital) that “players” bring to the game (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Fligstein and McAdam, 2012; Jasper, this volume). We understand that intellectuals can constitute their own arenas, with their own distinctive rules of the game (Jasper, this volume). However, for the purposes of this chapter, we focus on them as players with certain resources that enable them to play a specific and important role within social movements. By focusing on these two social movements – both struggling against stigmatization discursively but having very dif-
ferent resources to do so – we can deepen our analyses of the factors that precipitate intellectual involvement and better assess persistent dilemmas within them. The chapter shows that specific intellectuals took up key positions within the largest organizations within these movements, and in both cases produced discourses that resonated strongly with the general public. However, their strategy also marginalized certain voices, which sparked conflicts over the nature of rights being demanded and the ways in which subject populations were represented.

Specific Intellectuals as Players in Social Movements

Intellectuals have long been key players in social movements (see Gramsci, 1971; Mann, 1993) and their roles have been debated by scholars and activists alike (Kurzman and Owens, 2002; King and Szélényi, 2004; Eyal and Buchholz, 2010). This section traces the efforts of theorists involved in past social movements (from Lenin to Foucault) to define the roles of intellectuals, the dilemmas arising from these roles, and different ways for resolving these dilemmas. Early Marxists argued that it was the task of intellectuals to reveal the deeper meaning of particular struggles to the marginalized working classes engaged in these struggles (King and Szélényi, 2004). While many of these Marxists employed the concepts of “false consciousness” and “ideology” to analyze problems with working-class thought, Lenin employed the concept of “trade union consciousness” to diagnose the problem (Mayer, 1994: 673). He argued that the squalid living conditions of the working class tempted most workers in the struggle to forego the distant goal of class emancipation for the immediate goal of winning “bread and butter” concessions from employers. The intellectual possessed the knowledge and cognitive resources to see beyond day-to-day struggles and to fashion strategies and visions that would enable the working class to achieve far-reaching goals. Intellectuals played a strategic role in social movements because they served as the true consciousness of the working class. Without intellectuals, the working class would be tempted into one short-term concession after another, trapping itself in the cul-de-sac of reformism.

Many of his contemporaries agreed with Lenin’s diagnosis of the problem (trade union consciousness), but some believed that his solution introduced an important dilemma: the Power of Representation dilemma. Top-down intellectual leadership would bolster the revolutionary resolve of working-class social movements but this created a new oligarchy and blocked workers from speaking for themselves. Lenin and his allies accepted
this as a necessary trade-off that would be resolved after the emancipation of the working class. However, democratic socialists like Leon Trotsky and Rosa Luxemburg argued that the intellectual leadership needed to design institutional mechanisms (workers’ councils, soviets, etc.) that could diffuse intellectual resources and skills to workers and help raise their consciousness. By diffusing intellectual resources downward in this way, workers could see the true meaning of class struggle and assume leadership of the movement, avoiding the Power of Representation dilemma (Trotsky, 1970). Most Marxists involved in these debates agreed that the resources of intellectuals (theoretical knowledge and discursive skills) were essential for keeping working-class social movements on their historical mission and saving them from reformism. The disagreement stemmed over whether workers could acquire the intellectual capacities needed to think, speak, and lead themselves. Lenin was skeptical, while democratic socialists believed that the dilemma could be resolved by diffusing theoretical knowledge to the working classes through consciousness-raising activities.

Antonio Gramsci (1971) addressed the Power of Representation dilemma in a new way by seeking to dissolve the very distinction between intellectuals and workers. He questioned the assumption that intellectuals possessed a monopoly on legitimate knowledge and argued that “all men are intellectuals but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals” (Gramsci, 1971: 121). He argued that the values, norms, and ethics of the dominant class were reproduced in the everyday lives of people through institutions like the church, schools, associations, trade unions, and the family. Through the diffusion of ideas across different sites in civil society, the dominant ideas of the bourgeoisie became the common sense of the people. This common sense denied workers the vocabulary and concepts needed to make its implicit knowledge of wrongs and injustices explicit. In this context, “organic intellectuals” (part-time theorists and organizers, teachers, religious leaders, etc.) aligned with the working class played a fundamental role by introducing discourses and ideas that challenged the “common sense” and provided the working class with frames needed to articulate what the class implicitly knew but did not know how to say. The organic intellectual was therefore to function as the “tongue” of the working class rather than its conscience. Because of the proximity (knowledge, social, geographic) of the organic intellectual to real working communities, they would not “speak for” the people but would “speak with” them, resolving the Power of Representation dilemma.

The 1960s and 1970s marked a widespread embrace of Gramsci’s bottom-up intellectualism. Paulo Freire (1971) developed a “pedagogy of
the oppressed” that largely drew on Gramsci’s work (O’Cadiz et al., 1998). His theories were influential in Latin American social movements and counterbalanced the Leninism of traditional communist parties and of the Cuban Revolution. Freire’s theories and methods would diffuse to the United States through the concept of “popular education” in the 1980s and 1990s as Central American immigrants became active members in labor and immigrant rights movements (Milkman, 2006).

In France, Michel Foucault and his colleagues extended Gramsci’s ideas of the organic intellectual by introducing the concept of the “specific intellectual.” It must be noted that his formulations coincided with similar efforts by other sociologists during this time to broaden the concept of the intellectual beyond that of the traditional intellectual (Eyal and Buchholz, 2010). Foucault highlighted the growing importance of a new kind of intellectual in the post-1968 mobilizations. The expansion of the postwar welfare state increased the need for teachers, psychiatrists, planners, and so on. This expansion channeled intellectuals to work in a wide variety of institutional sites where power was deployed to discipline and control different population groups (such as hospitals, housing, schools, prisons, and factories). These changes reflected an important departure from traditional intellectual work. Their work in concrete institutional sites blurred the distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge. It also moved intellectual work away from the search for a single transcendent truth to the application of useful and practical knowledge in a wide variety of institutional settings. Structural changes therefore precipitated a dramatic change in intellectual work and the use of knowledge, moving from the search for universal truth to gaining concrete understandings of governing practices and applications in plural, concrete, and specific institutional settings. Moreover, specific intellectuals became frontline executors of state power but this raised ambivalences with regards to the populations they were supposed to govern. As they worked in institutional sites, the interests of some specific intellectuals coincided with the patients, students, migrants, residents, and prisoners they were supposed to govern. Intellectuals in other words found themselves drawn into criticisms of specific modalities of power alongside actually repressed people.

According to Foucault, these changes in intellectual work (from theoretical to practical knowledge; from the search for truth to engaging in governing practices; from thinking in the “ivory towers” to concrete and face-to-face engagements with repressed people) changed intellectuals’ role in social movements. Specific intellectuals were less likely to focus on giving voice to the voiceless or reveal the truthfulness of particular struggles. Instead, they
played a more supportive role in these struggles, deploying their technical knowledge of institutions (prisons, hospitals, schools, immigration law, etc.) to support the multiple forms of resistance. Foucault thus resolved the Power of Representation dilemma by inverting the role of intellectuals and the groups they represent. While Marxists had claimed that intellectuals possessed supreme knowledge of the (class) struggle, Foucault argued the opposite, that workers and other oppressed groups best knew what their struggles were about. The role of the intellectual, too, is inverted as specific intellectuals take on the role previously assigned to workers – they put their labor at the service of struggles envisioned by others.

Foucault's analysis of these changes is reflected in the way he assessed his own activism in support of prisoners. In 1971, he helped organize an anti-prison organization called the Prison Information Group (GIP), which laid out its new position:

The GIP does not propose to speak in the name of the prisoners in various prisons: it proposes, on the contrary, to provide them with the possibility of speaking for themselves and telling what goes on in prisons. The GIP does not have reformist goals; we do not dream of some ideal prison: we hope that prisoners may be able to say what it is that is intolerable for them in the system of penal repression. (Eribon, 1991: 228)

The prisoners know the wrongs being done to them. They do not need intellectuals to reveal the “hidden” powers of penal repression or the deeper meanings of their political action. What they lack are the technical skills and information needed to express these problems to the public. They need the practical knowledge of specific intellectuals to express themselves in the public sphere. This latter point is reiterated in a discussion between Foucault and a striking worker, when he tells the worker,

We are in agreement that workers have no need of intellectuals to know what it is they do. They know this perfectly well themselves. His [the intellectual's] role consequently is not to form the workers' consciousness, since that already exists, but to allow this consciousness, this worker's knowledge, to enter the information system and be circulated. (Foucault, in Eribon, 1991: 253, emphasis in the original)

Intellectuals' technical and practical knowledge permits the experiences of marginalized groups to get into the “information system.” Intellectuals
are thus key players enabling marginalized groups to voice grievances within political arenas.

Foucault’s intervention was not simply a normative prescription (what intellectuals should do). It stemmed from an analysis of the dramatic changes of intellectual work in the postwar period and reflects contemporary efforts to theorize this “new class” in the postwar context (Gouldner, 1982; Kurzman and Owens, 2002; King and Szélényi, 2004). We can summarize his argument in the following way: First, power in the postwar context was diffused through a wide variety of relatively autonomous institutions (psychiatry, medicine, penal institutions, schools, housing, immigration) and these institutions created demand for professionals with intellectual skills. Second, as more intellectuals were channeled into disciplinary institutions, the line between theoretical and practical knowledge was blurred. Most intellectuals were no longer searching for universal truths by acquiring substantive/theoretical knowledge but instead focused on the technicalities of governing target populations in diverse institutional spaces. These intellectual workers interacted with targeted populations and many developed strong motives to ally themselves with the struggles of prisoners, patients, residents, and students. Third, because mobilizations and campaigns were carried out in a diverse range of very specific institutional domains, they tended to be partial and nonuniversal. Overlaps were possible (universities were envisioned as a connecting point for assembling diverse struggles) but such overlaps were not enough to create a single, “historical” social movement. This marked the age of partial resistances to localized power rather than large social movements for achieving singular truths and historical change. Lastly, these structural changes brought new intellectuals into proximity (in knowledge, social relations, and physical relations) with marginalized groups. As a consequence, intellectuals were less inclined to “speak for” marginalized groups and would “speak with” them. Thus, the core Power of Representation dilemma associated with intellectuals (“speaking for” or “speaking with”) was supposed to be dissolved as intellectuals mobilized their technical and practical knowledge – rather than pointing the way, they would help others to get to where they wanted to go.

Specific intellectuals have indeed assumed a great presence in different social movements. Scientists and experts in European environmental movements legitimated the idea that uncontrolled industrialization posed a threat to the planet (Hajer, 2005). When struggles emerged in the 1970s to deinstitutionalize psychiatric care, trained welfare and medical professionals assumed central roles (Duyvendak, 2011). Trained professionals (such as lawyers, nonprofit professionals, or communication experts) have
assumed important roles in the immigrant rights movements in Europe and the United States (Siméant, 1997; Voss and Bloemraad, 2011; Nicholls, 2013a; Nicholls, 2013b). Urban planners trained in the most prestigious universities of the United States have dedicated themselves to a range of urban mobilizations to expand the “right to the city” (Soja, 2010). Social movements that have undergone professionalization assign specific intellectuals prominent and strategic roles to play.

The following sections assess the actual role of specific intellectuals in two social movements of highly stigmatized groups seeking recognition for rights in hostile environments. We find that the rising importance of specific intellectuals has not resolved the Power of Representation dilemma as Foucault predicted. Instead, the increased professionalization of social movements and the increased importance of mass media both make specific intellectuals more powerful players within social movements and exacerbate the Power of Representation dilemma.

Marginalized Groups as Threats: Denying the Rights of Others

Marginalized groups have historically been denied recognition to equal rights because they are represented as a threat or polluter to the established political community (Elias, 1994; Isin, 2000; Benhabib, 2004; Alexander, 2006). “Others” are said to lack necessary values that would make them fully productive citizens: they don’t have the mental capacities to participate in democratic deliberations or the civility needed to fulfill core citizenship duties (Rancière, 1993; Raissiguier, 2010). For example, workers in 19th-century France were denied political rights because they were said to lack the mental and moral capacities to engage in a public debate over the “general interest” (Rancière, 1989, 1993). Marginalized groups may also possess beliefs, values, needs, manners, and languages that pollute or contaminate the community of citizens (Isin, 2000; Alexander, 2006). The lack of necessary attributes and the possession of polluting conduct/cultures make these marginalized groups into fundamental threats to the established political community. If established members want to preserve their community, it is argued that they have no choice but to deny marginalized others recognition as human beings deserving full rights. In Hannah Arendt’s terms, their otherness makes them ineligible for the “right to have rights” in the established political community (Arendt, 1973; Benhabib, 2004). While some individuals may consider these inequalities in how basic rights are distributed to be a “moral shock,” most people assume that inequalities are a normal and
banal part of the order of things and that the denial of rights to the other is a necessary part of life (Arendt, 1994).

Since the 1980s and 1990s, immigrants and rights activists have faced an extremely hostile discursive and political context in the US (Nevins, 2002; De Genova, 2005; Menjivar, 2006; Chavez, 2008; Massey and Pren, 2012). Anti-immigrant forces produce compelling messages for why federal and state governments should strip immigrants of many basic rights (social, political, and civil) and forcefully remove them from the country. They stress that immigrants present a core threat to national stability, economically and culturally. They (immigrants) make Americans foreigners in their own lands, competing for jobs, and cheating the welfare state. Following from this, anti-immigrant forces argue that even though some immigrants may have sympathetic stories, it would be impossible to allow them access to basic rights because this would open the “floodgates” for more immigrants. These arguments were articulated by professional anti-immigration associations (Federation for American Immigration Reform, Americans for Immigration Control, Numbers USA, among others) and taken up prominent state and national politicians (Diamond, 1996; Money, 1999). Moreover, a new generation of public intellectuals articulated a coherent discourse that painted immigrants, and particularly Latino immigrants, as a cultural threat (rather than just economic) to the national community (Chavez, 2008). Framed in this way, it became “common sense” that immigration was a serious if not existential problem that required some kind of action from local, state, and national government officials. This resulted in a series of government measures to criminalize unauthorized migration and suspend the rights of immigrants in the country (Nevins, 2002; Massey and Pren, 2012), including the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) and Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PROWARA), both signed into law in 1996 by President Bill Clinton.

The 1980s and 1990s presented the LGBT community with a similarly hostile environment. First, the prominence of the Christian right within the mainstream Republican Party contributed to mainstreaming culturally conservative discourses. The discourse on “family values” saw the decline of the heterosexual and patriarchal family contributed to deviance, breakdown, and decline. The LGBT population was seen as a threat because it embraced moralities, practices, and categories that departed from established norms. It needed to be kept apart from the “normal” populations, criminalized through the continued enforcement of anti-sodomy laws, and denied some basic rights. Second, the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s compounded the stigma
associated with the LGBT population. The disease’s strong association with gay men reinforced general perceptions that this population was a polluting element. Christian conservatives in organizations like Moral Majority and the Family Research Institute used AIDS to reinforce stigmas, asserting that the disease was brought upon gay men as punishment for their wicked ways. By the 1990s, conservative forces had gained enough political and ideological influence that they were able to push through the passage of the highly restrictive Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 1996.

Undocumented immigrants and LGBT people were both represented as a powerful threat to the country. The threatening character of these populations provided justification to enact laws (both signed by President Bill Clinton in the same fateful year) that suspended access to basic rights.

The Stakes: Gaining Recognition of the Right to Have Rights

When basic rights are denied to marginalized people, activists must craft counter representations that demonstrate that these people indeed have the “right to have rights” in the country (Arendt, 1973; Benhabib, 2004). Only when activists craft such representations can “banalities of injustice” (Arendt, 1994) (such as borders, closets, raids, and segregated spaces) be considered “wrong” by larger portions of the population and recognized as a violation of fundamental principles of equality. For those groups that bear the greatest stigmas and face the greatest hostility, the options for creating effective representations tended to be limited. An effective representation consists of demonstrating that they are not irreducibly different and do not bear polluting attributes that threaten the established community. They must show that they share established values and cultures and stand to make contributions to the community. Representations of conformity cleanse the marginalized group of stigmas that made them polluters and threats. By emphasizing their intelligence, love of family, love of country, creativity, and civic engagement, they demonstrate that they are not threats but instead reinvigorate the moral, political, and economic life of the country (Honig, 2006). Demonstrating identification with established values helps to transform this “impossible” other (Raissiguier, 2010) into a group that may indeed deserve recognition of equal rights. Facing the positive representations of a marginalized group, other players within political arenas have greater difficulty justifying restrictive policies on moral and ethical grounds. Effective stories, arguments, messages, and performances do not guarantee the extension of full rights, but make such an extension a
legitimate issue for public debate. The centrality of mass media in structuring the “public sphere” has only served to enhance the importance of crafting effective representations as a preliminary step in gaining recognition as rights-bearing human beings (Gamson, 1995; Koopmans, 2004).

The modern immigrant rights movement dates to the 1980s (Coutin, 1998; 2003). While this movement faced increasing hostility through the 1990s, the situation worsened significantly in the 2000s with the War on Terror (De Genova, 2007; Coleman, 2007; Massey and Pren, 2012). Within this context, immigrant rights activists pushed for several measures to legalize the status of undocumented migrants. Two of the most prominent measures were the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act (2006, 2007) and the Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act. The latter measure aimed to provide a pathway to legalization for college students, youths involved in community service activities, and military service members. Advocates of the DREAM Act have sought to increase public support for the measure by representing undocumented youths and their cause in a favorable light. In particular, the immigrant rights movement has sought to destigmatize undocumented youths by stressing their conformity with national values (Nicholls, 2013a). The youths were also portrayed as the “best and the brightest,” rebutting the stereotype of immigrant youth as deviant and delinquent. Rights associations also sought to absolve youths from the stigma of illegality by stressing that their status was “no fault of their own.” These youths could not be held legally accountable for breaking the law because they did not choose to cross the border. The argument stressed that this group of immigrants possessed the right set of cultural and moral attributes that made them deserving of rights within the existing order of things.

The LGBT movement has a longer history than the contemporary immigrant rights movement and has experimented with various strategic lines (Armstrong, 2002). Whereas one faction embraces a strategy that stresses the common values of homosexual and heterosexual populations, another faction argues that society needs to accept different forms of partnerships that depart from heterosexual norms. While both representational strategies became prominent in the early 1970s, growing hostility in the 1980s and 1990s favored a strategy that stressed identification and assimilation over disidentification and difference. In the late 1990s the fight against the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) placed marriage rights on the movement’s political agenda. Gaining recognition of this basic right depended on representations of same-sex couples as people sharing the same values, aspirations, and family structures as “normal” heterosexual couples:
Marriage provides families stability and security.

One thing that both sides of the marriage issue can agree upon is that marriage strengthens families. ... [LGBT] people deserve equal access to the American dream. Gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender people grow up dreaming of falling in love, getting married and growing old together. Just as much as the next person, same-sex couples should be able to fulfill that dream. We know from anecdotal evidence that after same-sex couples have a commitment ceremony, their friends and family treat them differently – as a married couple. Shouldn’t they, too, have the legal security that goes along with that? (Human Rights Campaign, in Davidson, 2006: 46)

A powerful discourse emerged that stresses the universal virtues of the “traditional” family. By denying lesbian and gay couples the right to marry, the state is denying them a fundamental right. In this instance, identification with established values has become a way to assert that a fundamental wrong has been committed against this population.

During the 1990s, both undocumented immigrants and LGBT people were embedded in political arenas that framed them as potent threats to the national community. Within such a context, the fight for rights depended first on their need to demonstrate that they were indeed rights-deserving human beings. In both cases, similar strategic lines were pursued: they asserted their “right to have rights” by stressing their sameness with the established population and, following from that, asserted that continued denial of inalienable rights from these clearly deserving human beings was unjust and morally wrong. Producing and expressing effective discourses in the arena of public opinion was a necessary part of the struggle to achieve recognition as rights-deserving human beings.

The Role of Specific Intellectuals

To craft resonant representations for stigmatized groups requires particularly high concentrations of cultural and symbolic capital that intellectuals possess (Bourdieu, 1994; Wacquant, 2005). Activists must have an intimate knowledge of the political culture of the established community and understand how to pitch messages that resonate with the public at intellectual, moral, and emotional levels. They must also possess enough symbolic capital to ensure that the arguments, messages, and stories they articulate
are considered legitimate by the national public. Lastly, they must possess connections with media gatekeepers who can assist in transmitting their frames, messages, and talking points to the public (Koopmans, 2004). These forms of capital however are not equally distributed across a social movement. University-trained professionals embedded in social movements have greater access and control over these forms of cultural and symbolic capital. By contrast, less educated activists and newcomers to social movements are less prepared to craft and disseminate compelling representations of themselves or their rights claims, requiring them to depend on well-trained professionals to represent them in the public sphere. These specific intellectuals therefore become key players as representational brokers mediating relations between marginalized groups and the outside world.

Professionals in local and national immigrant rights associations have played instrumental roles since the 1980s (Coutin, 2003; Varsanyi, 2008). In the mid-2000s, prominent immigrant and human rights associations formed coalitions to support the DREAM Act. The rights associations took a leading role in crafting a discourse that represented undocumented youths in a way that would gain broad public support for their cause. The more the campaign sought to convince people in conservative areas of the country, the greater the need to produce a clear, simple, and sympathetic representation of these youths and their cause. Highly professionalized specific intellectuals took leading roles in devising messaging campaigns, working with media, and ensuring messaging coherency across the national social movement network. Legal and communication experts within these organizations crafted representations and played brokering roles within this campaign. The undocumented youths making up the rank and file of the movement played a marginal role in crafting representations of themselves and their cause, at least until 2010 when an internal struggle erupted over these power imbalances in the movement issues (more on this in the next section).

Similarly, the hostile conditions of the 1980s and 1990s encouraged one of the leading LGBT organizations in the United States, the Human Rights Campaign (HRC), to pursue a strategy that stressed identification with the values and moralities of the established community. While the HRC competed with other organizations within the LGBT movement, it eclipsed these organizations in the late 1990s and 2000s. Its national membership is estimated at 600,000, its 2010 income was $37.92 million (up from $21 million in 2001), and it has local steering committees in 21 states. Like the immigrant rights organizations discussed above, the organization’s leading staff members are university-trained legal and communication professionals, with advanced expertise in messaging, marketing, public relations,
and political lobbying. Communication experts assumed responsibility for producing representations of the LGBT community and arguments for equal rights. Once these arguments are produced, they also diffuse them through different media channels (online and offline), across regional networks, into the political arena, and into national and state-level courthouses across the country. These communication experts assume a strategic role in creating a discursive space through which both activists and different publics think about and frame the issue at hand. They provide thousands of activists and sympathizers with a discursive template to think and speak about why the denial of basic rights to this group is wrong and why changes are needed.

Thus, specific intellectuals have played vital roles in producing discourses that represent these marginalized groups and their claims for equal rights. They became “brokers” because they created representations that connected groups discursively and emotionally to publics that had cast them to the margins. However, contrary to Foucault’s expectations, the specific forms of knowledge possessed by these intellectuals placed them in a leading role in crafting and disseminating representations of marginalized groups. By assuming a central role in demonstrating how the status quo is wrong and expressing the case of these groups in the public sphere, the specific intellectuals in these cases became both the “voice” and “conscience” of these groups.

We turn now to two variants of the Power of Representation dilemma. Each is associated with distinct cleavages in these kinds of social movements.

**Cleavages between the Leadership and the Rank and File**

The greater control that specific intellectuals have over cultural and symbolic capital introduces representational hierarchies whereby they assume a leading role in crafting and disseminating messages to the broader public. Assuming this role raises the risk of specific intellectuals “speaking for” marginalized groups. While most movements are internally stratified in this way, the gap between the intellectual leadership and the rank and file depends on the cultural and social composition of the movement. The tendency for a large representational gap increases when a social movement is made up of large numbers of people with low levels of cultural and symbolic capital (e.g., immigrant movements). In these instances, there is less likelihood that the specific intellectuals will be drawn directly from the rank and file and a greater likelihood that they will be drawn from
the professionalized organizations (i.e., human rights groups, nonprofit organizations, etc.) that support these struggles. This contributes to the likelihood that the leadership will “speak for” marginalized groups rather than “with” them, planting the seeds of conflict between the leadership and rank and file of the movement.

Conflicts erupted in 2010 between youths and the intellectual leadership of the immigrant rights movement over the strategic direction of the movement, reflecting deeper cleavages over who should represent who in the immigrant rights movement. Many of the undocumented youths were frustrated that their calls for a change in strategy were not taken seriously by the leadership of the movement. These sentiments were expressed in an op-ed article in Dissent (Perez et al., 2010). The piece, written by some of the more prominent dissident youths, questioned the legitimacy of the traditional leadership to represent undocumented immigrants like themselves. They argued that the leaders did not share their social background and residency status and because of this, they did not face the same pressures as undocumented youths. They also argued that while the professionalized leadership gained increased funding, political prestige, and media exposure, these gains were not distributed to undocumented activists who took most of the risks. “Because if we accept and embrace the current undocumented student movement, it means the social justice elite loses its power – its power to influence politicians, media and the public debate. The power is taken back by its rightful holders” (Perez et al., 2010). These critiques ultimately culminated in efforts of the undocumented youths to reject the leadership of the movement, with many shifting their support to more “organic” immigrant leaders around the country.

Movements with more mixed levels of cultural and symbolic capital have more muted hierarchies, with intellectuals more likely drawn from the rank and file. Their common positioning with the rank and file allows them to “speak with” the movement rather than for it. For example, the mixed social, cultural, and activist background of LGBT activists increased the likelihood that the leading intellectual forces of the movement would also be drawn from the gay and lesbian community itself. There was no need to go “outside” the group to find people with the resources needed to pursue core intellectual functions. Nevertheless, the middle- and upper-middle-class backgrounds of leading intellectual voices (now and historically) has resulted in representations of the LGBT cause with a very distinctive class background (Valocchi, 1999; Armstrong, 2002). The dominance of middle-class framings provides greater opportunities for activists with middle-class dispositions to assume leadership roles. These internal class divides have
spurred complaints by working-class activists of cultural marginalization, fewer opportunities for upward political mobility, and less influence. They feel that the leadership is “speaking for” them rather than “with” them. Thus, the LGBT movement has been able to recruit intellectuals from its own ranks, allowing it to temper a central dilemma of intellectual involvement in social movements. Nevertheless, class-based selection mechanisms result in the prominence of an intellectual leadership from middle- and upper-middle-class backgrounds, resulting in representations and representatives that stress middle-class values and silencing those from working-class backgrounds.

In sum, specific intellectuals assume a leading representational role within the social movements of marginalized groups because their access to scarce resources enables them to craft effective representations. Their possession of these scarce and necessary resources makes them into powerful players within movements, introducing divides between them and rank and file activists. Although the Power of Representation dilemma cannot be fully resolved, the tendency of intellectuals to “speak for” marginalized groups does seem to vary according to movements’ social and cultural makeup: divides are more likely in movements predominantly composed of resource-poor groups.

Cleavages between “Deserving” and “Undeserving” Groups

Gaining rights for a marginalized group depends on crafting representations that stress conformity and identification with the values of the established group. Specific intellectuals working for the largest organizations in the LGBT and immigrant rights movements have worked hard to cleanse the movements they represent from stigmas by emphasizing the qualities that make these groups normal, law-abiding, and productive citizens. While this representational strategy opens the door for some, it also differentiates “good” and “deserving” subjects from those who fail to conform to established values, norms, and moralities. Those who fail to fit the discursive boxes of the “good” and “deserving” subject often find themselves pushed further to the legal and symbolic margins. Strategies by intellectuals to improve the position of the movement within political arenas therefore have trade-offs for groups unable or unwilling to meet mainstream norms of respectability.

Within the undocumented youth mobilization, leading advocates have become fully aware of this dilemma. On the one hand, they recognize
that representations of the “good immigrant” sharpen differences between this group and other immigrants who may not assimilate so easily with established norms. If “good” immigrants deserve legal rights because they are the “best and brightest” and are not at fault for their legal status, those who are not particularly the “best,” “brightest,” or “innocent” find it difficult to justify their own rights claims. Some within the general immigrant rights movement criticize the messaging strategy of the youth campaign and the leadership responsible for creating it. On the other hand, while undocumented youths and their advocates fully recognize problems associated with these representations, they also recognize that they have been effective in gaining support from conservative publics and politicians. They believe that their ability to become a leading force in the general immigrant rights movements has been a function of this particular messaging strategy and that changing it dramatically would weaken their political support. Thus the dilemma: that the more they push this representation the more they alienate other immigrant groups making up the broader social movement but the less they push this representation the less likely it is to gain the support of hostile publics and wavering politicians.

Similar debates developed within the LGBT movement with the increasing centrality of the marriage campaign in the 1990s and 2000s. The conservative turn in the 1980s and 1990s favored representational strategies stressing identification, assimilation, and marriage. This shift aggravated tensions with factions that had rejected heterosexual assimilation and embraced difference. As one observer noted, “Since 1993, marriage has come to dominate the political imagination of the national gay movement in the United States. To read the pages of The Advocate or Out is to receive the impression that gay people hardly care about anything else. ... I have no doubt that a large constituency has formed around this belief. But the commitment is not universal, to put it mildly” (Warner, 1999: 120, emphasis added). The prominence of Queer theory provided specific intellectuals working in dissident groups a powerful discursive repertoire to deepen their critiques of the assimilation line. Josephson summarizes these criticisms in the following way:

For some queer critics of the same-sex marriage quest, the current heterocentric vision of marriage inappropriately associates the public granting of a privacy privilege with adult citizenship for those professing lifelong, monogamous sexual relationships. Their objection is not so much to the fact that same-sex couples wish to have such relationships recognized, but rather to privileging this form of sexual relationship above all others.
If married couples – opposite or same-sex – are provided greater social, economic, and political privileges than nonmarried individuals, the result will be secondary exclusions and reinforcement of an undesirable link between a particular form of intimate association and adult citizenship. (2005: 271)

The central criticism was that in focusing on gay marriage, LGBT rights advocates were inadvertently privileging (morally and legally) one way of living (marriage) and downgrading multiple others who did not agree with a “heterocentric” vision of life. Marriage advocates have come to recognize the merits of the critique, but they also recognize that the marriage campaign (and its associated representational strategy) has provided the LGBT community an important vehicle to achieve basic rights in the country. This exposes a critical dilemma within the movement (again, a dilemma shared with undocumented immigrants): representational strategies that stress identification with the norms of the established group work to extend basic rights to marginalized groups but the strategy produces new divides because it privileges certain norms and groups within the broader marginalized population over others. Those failing to abide by established norms and expectations are excluded; deprived of privileges and rights accorded to those who can more easily adopt to the moral and cultural attributes of the “good” and “deserving” lesbian or gay person.

Conclusion

All contemporary movements consist in part of intellectuals, i.e., people with comparatively strong skills of representation. These skills are an important resource of movements but they also raise an important dilemma: if intellectuals use their skills for the movement, they marginalize others within the movement who lack such skills. Different movement intellectuals have sought to resolve this Power of Representation dilemma in different ways. While Marxists debated how exactly intellectuals should use their privileged position to guide the masses, more recent theorizing has maintained that intellectuals can and should speak with movements rather than for them. This idea is most clearly stated by Michel Foucault, who argued that specific intellectuals would and should use their skills not to guide or represent marginalized groups but amplify their voices.

We examined how specific intellectuals actually operate in two movements in the US: the immigrant rights movement and LGBT movement.
While recognizing important differences between the immigrant rights and LGBT movements, our analysis shows that the largest organizations within them have as a central objective to convince the general public that their constituents merit recognition as equals. Before actual laws are enacted to extend basic rights to excluded others, these groups must first gain recognition of these people as rights-deserving human beings. They must be deemed to have the “right to have rights” within the existing citizenship regime before legal-juridical rights are granted to them (Arendt, 1973). The imperative of gaining recognition from a hostile public raises the importance of representations (i.e., discourse, symbols, performances, diffusion) in the campaigns for marginalized groups. In these contexts, an important function assumed by the specific intellectuals is to craft such representations and articulate them in public. They produce new languages and feelings that connect the worlds of outsiders to the worlds of the established group, working to reveal the humanity (and therefore their inalienable rights) of the “other” through the careful construction of arguments, talking points, storylines, public performances, etc. In performing these functions, the specific intellectuals become representational brokers between the previously disconnected worlds of marginalized groups and established populations.

Although there are important differences between the LGBT and the immigrant rights movement, we also find similar dilemmas. Tensions continue to arise over elites “speaking for” marginalized groups. We also find that the representations produced by leading intellectuals contribute to differentiating “good” and “deserving” groups from less deserving others, introducing a powerful and important cleavage within both movements. In both cases intellectuals and activists may temporarily patch up cleavages and fissures but the dilemmas cannot be fully overcome. In both cases we studied here, the largest movement organizations aimed for legal reform and strategically decided to selectively portray the groups they represent as sharing established values and moral norms. Representations of conformity cleansed the marginalized groups of stigmas that made them polluters and threats but at the same time alienated more radical and marginalized groups. These dilemmas are by no means accidental. They result from the efforts of specific intellectuals to employ their resources and respond most effectively to the “rules of the game” of their political arenas.

The promotion of the intellectual as a mere channel for already existing voices and the rejection of the intellectual as leader of interpretation and representation amounts to what Bourdieu called a “strategy of condescension” – “the refusal to wield domination can be part of a strategy of
condescension or a way of taking violence to a higher degree of denegation and dissimulation, a means of reinforcing the effect of misrecognition and thereby of symbolic violence” (Bourdieu, in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 145). By claiming to merely assist marginalized groups or amplify their voices, specific intellectuals simultaneously hide and exercise their power to shape and steer mobilizations. Contrary to what the idea of the specific intellectual assumes, intellectual action cannot merely assist groups but necessarily selects some rather than other voices and helps to construct identities, groups and claims. For intellectuals operating within movements it is essential to recognize this in order to assess their own role and responsibility as central players within movements. For sociologists studying movements it is essential to recognize that the resources of representation within movements are unequally distributed. The unequal distribution of these powerful resources results in many different conflicts that fragment social movement and shape their internal relational dynamics.

Notes

2. Baird and Rosenbaum expressed early on the criticism in the following way, “Traditional marriage is integral to the corrupt authoritarian structures of society; it is a suspect institution embodying within itself the patriarchy. ... [T]he most important issue for gay and lesbian couples is whether or not they should ‘sell out’ to the enemy – the patriarchal culture – that seeks to oppress and eliminate them” (Baird and Rosenbaum, 1997: 11).

References


