III A Closer Watch on Schliemann (1882-1885)

In October 1881, Ottoman authorities granted Schliemann a new permit to continue his excavations at Hisarlık. In a supplement to this firman, he later received permission to explore the Troad plain as well. This enabled him to carry out ‘excavations on any other site of the Troad.’ Schliemann's impressive ability to obtain diplomatic support for his ventures had once again yielded rich rewards. This time it was the intervention of the powerful German chancellor Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898) that enabled Schliemann to obtain a permit under extremely liberal conditions, as he profited from the increasingly close ties between the Ottomans and the German Empire in the 1880s.

Although the firman initially suggested flexibility and liberty, in reality Schliemann's venture was once again plagued by difficulties. Ottoman officials were loath to allow such an extensive undertaking on their soil. Schliemann's latest archaeological project coincided with a new phase in the Ottoman Empire’s involvement with museology and archaeology. With Osman Hamdi in charge, the Imperial Museum was expanding rapidly, the Ottomans were participating in archaeological research, and in 1884 a new antiquities regulation, Asar-ı Atika Nizamnamesi, came into effect.

1 Profitable Political Conditions

The integrity of the Ottoman Empire was under constant threat. Faced with emerging nationalism among different communities in the Empire and under pressure from the Great Powers, the Ottomans were desperate to avoid the collapse of the Empire. Disturbing political movements in France and Britain, particularly after the Russo-Turkish War, made the Ottoman position even more insecure. France – the dominant partner of the Ottoman Empire in the late 1850s and 1860s – was strengthening ties with Russia, arch enemy of the Ottomans, which led to a breach in Franco-Ottoman relations. Britain’s colonial intervention in Egypt and Cyprus, culminating in the occupation of Egypt in 1882, also had a negative

1 Schliemann, Troja, 5.
2 Arık, Türk Müzeciliğine Bir Bakış, 1-4.
impact on Anglo-Ottoman relations. These political developments created a profound Ottoman aversion to these powers.\(^3\) Meanwhile, Germany was making overtures to the Ottomans.

Although Germany’s powerful chancellor Bismarck strove to maintain a neutral position in Asia Minor and believed that his government should not be drawn into Ottoman affairs,\(^4\) Germany could not resist the temptation to expand its economic and military influence in the Ottoman Empire. Another motive often expressed for German involvement in the Empire was to bring culture to the unenlightened Turks.\(^5\)

From an Ottoman perspective, Germany was the least threatening of Europe’s imperialist powers. This was the only Great Power without any evident interest in its partial or complete disintegration. Crucially, Germany was the only European power that had not colonized Muslim lands. Under these circumstances, Sultan Abdülhamid II adopted a positive attitude towards Germany’s approaches. As a result, the Turkish-German economic, diplomatic and military ties were strengthened and Germany became the leading foreign influence in Istanbul from the 1880s until the First World War. Bilateral trade relations intensified and German commercial investments in the Ottoman Empire increased rapidly. Between 1890 and 1910 the German share in the Empire’s trade increased from 6 percent to 21 percent.\(^6\) In military affairs, German advisers became the principal trainers of the Ottoman army and the Ottoman military elite adopted German military doctrines.\(^7\)

Abdülhamed II maintained close ties with Kaiser Wilhelm II (1859-1941). The Kaiser supported Abdülhamid II’s Islamic politics and visited Istanbul twice, in 1889 and 1898. From the 1880s until the First World War, as bilateral relations intensified and ties between the two emperors became closer, German archaeologists had the opportunity to carry out a series of new excavations in the Ottoman Empire, often under favourable conditions. Germany’s advanced diplomatic involvement allowed Ottoman officials to liaise closely with German museum bureaucrats, diplomats, scholars and politicians.\(^8\)

Schliemann, who owed his earlier permits mainly to diplomatic pressure on Ottoman authorities, used the new opportunities to full advantage. Given the improved relationship between the Ottomans and the young German

\(^3\) Zürcher, *Turkey*, 81-83.
\(^4\) Schölgen, *Imperialismus und Gleichgewicht*.
\(^5\) On Kulturpolitik, see: Marchand, *Down from Olympus*, Chapter 7, in relation to the Orient: 102, 190-220, 237.
\(^6\) Birken, *Die Wirtschaftsbeziehungen*, 176.
\(^7\) Zürcher, *Turkey*, 82.
\(^8\) Marchand, *Down from Olympus*, 200-202; See also Baytar, ‘İki Dost Hükümdar.’
Empire, the Ottomans could not decline Bismarck’s request in support of Schliemann’s application for a new permit to continue excavating, or his endorsement of the latter’s plan to explore the Troad plain extensively.9

2 The Excavations

Schliemann resumed his excavations at Troy on 1 March 1882. The focus of the season, which lasted until 21 July 1882, was the eastern half of the mound of Hisarlık. This was Calvert’s land, which had been neglected until then. Excavation architects Wilhelm Dörpfeld (1853-1940), attached to the German Archaeological Institute (DAI), and Joseph Höfler (1860-1927) from Vienna accompanied Schliemann. To supervise the workmen at the site, Schliemann engaged three overseers. Two of the foremen were from Greece, and the third was Gustav Batthus, the son of the French consul at the Dardanelles.

Since this part of the country ‘was infested by marauders and highway robbers,’ Schliemann recorded that he had requested Hamid Pasha, the civil governor of the Dardanelles, to give him eleven gendarmes for security.10 However, according to a letter from the local authorities, these gendarmes were supplied not so much for Schliemann’s safety, as for the security of the excavations and to ensure the regulations were observed.11

Schliemann’s loyal employee Nicolaos Giannakes was once again his purser. He hired approximately 150 labourers, mainly local Greeks, but also Sephardic Ottoman Jews and about 25 Ottoman Turks. While Schliemann was not especially keen on Ottoman officials, he waxed lyrical about the Turkish workmen: ‘I would gladly have increased their number had it been possible, for they work much better than the Asiatic Greeks, [they] are more honest, and I had in them the great advantage that they worked on Sundays and on the numerous saints’ days, when no Greek would have worked at any price. Besides, as I could always be sure that they would work on with unremitting zeal, and never need to be urged, I could let them sink all the shafts and assign to them other work, in which no superintendence on my part was possible. For all these reasons I always allotted to the Turkish workmen proportionally higher wages than to the Greeks.’12

9 Schliemann, Troja, 5.
10 Schliemann, Troja, 7.
11 Letter from Hasan Pasha to Schliemann, 22 April 1882 (B 88/253), Schliemann Archive, Gennadius Library, American School of Classical Studies, Athens.
12 Schliemann, Troja, 10-12.
During the first season in 1882, unlike earlier years, Schliemann had two Ottoman overseers. The first appointee was the previous overseer Kadri Bey. Schliemann wanted to avoid complications caused by intrusive officials and through the intervention of the German Embassy, he managed to have Kadri Bey dismissed. Kadri Bey had not made things easy in the past, and so Schliemann organized ‘a simple Turk’ instead. The new overseer, Muharrem Bey, was appointed by the local authority. As usual, Schliemann paid his salary and provided his lodgings. However, this was not the arrangement with his co-inspector, Bedreddin Efendi, appointed and paid by the Ottoman government.

Given the increasing Ottoman desire to control the export of antiquities as well as to collect them for their own museum, a second overseer directly under the government suggests a more deliberate Ottoman wish to control Schliemann’s archaeological activities at the Troad. The Ministry of Public Instruction clearly had no intention to leave the inspection of the excavations at Troy to someone financially dependent on a foreign archaeologist, especially Schliemann, with his tainted reputation.

Growing public interest in the preservation of antiquities had led to a critical stance towards ‘incompetent officials’ at excavation sites, ‘whose minimal salaries’ were paid by foreign archaeologists. In a scathing letter published in the newspaper Vakit in 1880, the minister of public instruction was urged to abstain from appointing overseers ‘who were completely incapable of managing such delicate undertakings.’ The writer argued that ‘if the official at the site were learned and attentive […] he would do his best to secure the benefits of the Imperial Museum.’

Although Muharrem Bey had already been appointed as overseer, the local authorities eventually decided that he was ‘scientifically not competent enough’ for the task. Considering ‘the importance of the occupation and in order to give no room for misappropriation,’ they asked the Ministry of Public Instruction by telegram on 22 April 1882 to appoint two ‘experienced’ officials ‘capable of the science of antiquities’ to inspect the activities at Troy.

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13 ‘einen schlichten Türken,’ Herrmann and Maas, Die Korrespondenz zwischen Heinrich Schliemann und Rudolf Virchow, 313.
14 IBA: MF.MKT. 75/153: 27/C/1299 (16/05/1882); See also letters from Hasan Pasha to Schliemann, 18 May 1882 (B88/326) and 1 June 1882 (B88/340), Schliemann Archive, Gennadius Library, American School of Classical Studies, Athens.
15 Vakit, 01/1297 (11/04/1880), also published in Cezar, Sanatta Batıya Açılış ve Osman Hamdi, 286.
16 IBA: MF.MKT. 75/153: 27/C/1299 (16/05/1882); MF.MKT. 75/153: 27/C/1299 (16/05/1882).
The local authorities suspected Schliemann of hiding valuable discoveries from them. In fact they were right. Schliemann wrote to Virchow on 14 May 1882 that he had found some ‘pretty items,’ such as ‘a sling (or weight?) made of haematite, weighing 1,130 grams, as well as a trove of bronze items, including a remarkable large 3 inch wide ring, similar to our napkin rings, decorated so artistically [sic] that any Berlin goldsmith would have been proud had it been made of gold. Since I have done all this in secret, I cannot send you drawings, nor should you speak of it, lest they hear of it in Constantinople.'

Following the request from the Dardanelles, on 15 May the Council of Education decided to send Bedreddin Efendi to the Troad. He was considered well-suited and the previously appointed overseer could assist him. Bedreddin Efendi was experienced and well able to supervise archaeological excavations. Moreover, he could communicate in French. Bedreddin Efendi would definitely not be standing on the sidelines.

For Schliemann, Bedreddin Efendi’s presence was especially provocative. The failure of the archaeological venture of 1876 had been largely due to the obdurate supervisor, and Bedreddin Efendi’s remit far exceeded this predecessor’s. Schliemann complained that Bedreddin Efendi was extremely uncooperative: ‘I have carried on archaeological excavations in Turkey for a number of years, but it had never yet been my ill-fortune to have such a monster of a delegate as Beder Eddin, whose arrogance and self-conceit were only equalled by his complete ignorance, and who considered it sole office to throw all possible obstacles in my way.’

Protecting Trojan Patrimony
It is noticeable that as soon as Schliemann met with any resistance on the Ottoman side, he considered it unwillingness, ignorance or deliberate obstruction. Viewed from an Ottoman perspective, however, it is possible to see that the authorities simply wanted to protect the Trojan patrimony. Yet

18 IBA: MF.MKT. 75/153: 27/C/1299 (16/05/1882); MF.MKT. 75/155: 27/C/1299 (16/05/1882).
19 IBA: MF.MKT. 79/97: 12/Ca/1300 (21/03/1883).
20 Schliemann, Troja, 12.
Ottoman efforts to participate in the nineteenth-century European custom of claiming antique heritage and appropriating Classical civilization were clearly not recognized. Like many of his contemporaries, Schliemann was or preferred to remain ignorant of the political and cultural change resulting from the process of modernization and the new sense of identity in which the Ottomans embraced the different historical layers of the land.  

The increasing value of heritage ‘aggravates conflicts over whose it is.’ Nurtured within a Western environment imbued with Hellenism prevailed and a dynamic appropriation of and identification Homeric heritage, Schliemann also believed, along with many of his contemporaries, that this legacy belonged to Western civilization and had to be rescued from people who did not in their view have a share in this culture. By contrast, Turks – present in Europe for ages – saw themselves as a European power, especially after the Tanzimat with their Western sympathies. The Ottomans aspired to be included in Europe’s cultural history. Yet Europeans saw the Ottomans as the ‘other’: Europe’s fear of Ottoman imperial expansion through to the seventeenth century had transformed into a cultural prejudice against the Ottoman appropriation of Hellenistic heritage.

Schliemann’s opinion of the Ottoman Turks did not differ from the prevailing view in the West. While the Ottoman authorities considered the preservation of antiquities paramount, Schliemann saw Ottoman efforts to safeguard Trojan artefacts as an irritating obstacle, not the expression of an Ottoman appreciation of their heritage and a key aspect of a cultural policy in which their imperial identity formed part of the universal history of civilization.

The way Ottoman authorities claimed antiquities differed from the European manner. The dynamic appropriation of antique traditions, reinforced by education in Classical literature, and the use of Ancient heritage to establish a Western identity were less intense and occurred later in the late Ottoman Empire. In fact, the Ottoman drive to claim Classical civilization

21 For the process of the Ottoman appropriation of Classical heritage, see for example: Bahrani, Çelik and Eldem, Scramble for the Past; Shaw, Possessors and Possessed, 96; Çelik, ‘Defining Empire’s Patrimony,’ in Essays; Ersoy, ‘A Sartorial Tribute to Late Ottomanism,’ 188, 190. On Ottoman appreciation of Troy, see: Kelder, Uslu, and Şerifoğlu, Troy: City, Homer and Turkey, esp. Chapters 6.1, 7.2 and 7.3.

22 Lowenthal, Possessed by the Past, 234-236, 248.

23 Den Boer, ‘Homer in Modern Europe,’ in Pharos; Moormann, “The Man Who Made the Song Was Blind”; Moormann, “There Is a Triple Sight in Blindness Keen”; Den Boer, ‘Neohumanism’; Den Boer, ‘Homer in Modern Europe,’ in European Review; Den Boer, ‘Homer and Troy.’

24 Finkel, Osman’s Dream, 455, 491.
was largely a response to the European desire to appropriate antiquities from Ottoman lands and to remove archaeological objects from the country, thereby excluding the Ottomans from the history of Western civilization.

Classical artefacts linked Western nations with the much vaunted Classical past. Owning these objects relayed a sense of superiority. By the same token, the Ottomans used the same artefacts to show Europe that Classical heritage was in fact autochthonous and more native to the Empire than to the West.25

**Strict Supervision**

By sending an experienced second official who was financially independent of Schliemann, the Ottoman authorities were protecting Troy. Bedreddin Efendi took his responsibility seriously. He was cautious. He knew he was dealing with someone who had already smuggled antiquities out of the Empire and with whom the Ottoman authorities had fought a year-long legal battle. His distrust and inflexibility towards Schliemann was understandable. Bedreddin Efendi sent frequent warnings to his superiors expressing his suspicions. As Schliemann said, ‘he had the telegram to the Dardanelles at his disposal, and he used it in the most shameless way to denounce me and my architects to the local authorities.’26

Bedreddin Bey did his work accurately and consistently informed the authorities about events at the site. He reported suspicious activity and research developments at the site as well as any discoveries. In fact he even illustrated his accounts with photographs of the new finds.27 Contrary to Schliemann’s opinion that he was continually accusing him and his circle, it seems that Bedreddin Efendi was merely trying to perform his job as well as possible and to meet the wishes of his superiors.

Schliemann, on the other hand, was determined to circumvent this intrusive official. When Schliemann started exploratory excavations at various sites in June 1882, he evidently tried to exclude Bedreddin Efendi, who did not accept this. On 26 June, the inspector warned the Ministry of Public Instruction of the situation: without having informed him, Schliemann was ‘excavating a wide area,’ whereby he ‘divided his workmen in little groups’ to ‘excavate at various sites at the same time.’ Although Bedreddin Bey ‘warned him several times to inform him,’ Schliemann resisted and refused to do so.

26 Schliemann, Troja, 12.
27 IBA: MF.MKT. 76/43: 22/B/1299 (09/06/1882).
In this way, Bedreddin Efendi reports, Schliemann was ‘obstructing him in the execution of his duty’ (Fig. 25). 28

The ministry took a firm decision. Schliemann was barred from carrying out exploratory digs. In addition to emphasizing strict observance of the Antiquities Law, the authorities also stressed that a supervisor should be present. Without the required supervision, Schliemann was forbidden to continue his excavations (Fig. 26). 29 The civil governor of the Dardanelles sent a written warning to Schliemann ordering him to stop acting illegally and that any excavation without Bedreddin Efendi present was out of the question (Fig. 27). 30

Schliemann was constantly looking for ways to explore tumuli in and around the Troad. Although his permit did not extend to the European side of the Dardanelles, in April 1882 he began digging on the Gallipoli peninsula clandestinely. Since Bedreddin Efendi had yet to arrive, Ottoman authorities only discovered Schliemann’s move a day and a half into the new excavations. 31 He was told to stop his illicit activity immediately since this was a military area. 32 With the arrival of Bedreddin Efendi, however, Schliemann was bound hand and foot.

Soon after his arrival, Bedreddin Efendi instructed the gendarmes who Schliemann thought were engaged to protect him, to keep an eye on his movements. Their loyalty towards Bedreddin Efendi infuriated Schliemann: ‘A Turk will always hate a Christian, however well he may be paid by him, and thus it was not difficult for Beder Eddin Efendi to bring all my eleven gendarmes over to his side, and to make so many spies of them.’ 33

Bedreddin Efendi’s appeals to the Ottoman authorities ensured that Schliemann and Dörpfeld – who had been hired to produce accurate maps and plans of the site with surveying instruments – could not take measurements of any sort for another five months. When Bedreddin Efendi found out about the surveys, he reported this to Cemal Pasha, military governor of the Dardanelles. Cemal Pasha informed the Grand Master of the Artillery at Istanbul, Said Pasha, that he suspected Schliemann and his crew of using the excavations at Troy as an excuse to draw plans of the fortifications at

31 Traill, Schliemann of Troy, 220.
32 Hasan Pasha to Schliemann, 22 April 1882 (B88/253).
33 Schliemann, Troja, 12.
Kumkale, an important strategic spot in the Dardanelles. So Said Pasha decided that Schliemann should be forbidden to use the surveying instrument or even draw any plans at all.

Clearly, Bedreddin Efendi kept a close eye on Schliemann’s excavations and warned the military governor of the Dardanelles several times when Schliemann disregarded the prohibition to take measurements and draw plans in secret. He even prohibited Schliemann ‘from taking notes or making drawings within the excavations, and continually threatened to arrest’ Dörpfeld and Höfler ‘and send them in chains to Constantinople in case of their disobedience.’

Meanwhile, the Ottoman government was extremely pleased with Bedreddin Efendi’s performance. He received compliments from the grand vizier for doing his work ‘with such a great energy and effort.’ Moreover, the grand vizier praised his ‘extraordinary attention and cautiousness regarding the protection of the antique objects.’

Although Schliemann tried to have the ban lifted through diplomatic channels, this time the efforts of the German Embassy did not succeed. His letter to Richard Schöne (1840-1922), director of the German Royal Museums, illustrates the way Schliemann operated. On 23 July 1882, Schliemann asked Schöne ‘Please ask His Majesty the Emperor to send a personal letter to the Sultan regarding Hissarlik, otherwise we shall never succeed.’ Schliemann explained that this letter should include the information ‘that the Grand Master of the Artillery is preventing me from measuring the depth of the walls of the Trojan houses, even to measure them with string, pretending that Hissarlik is too close to Kum Kale, although it is two hours away; that is why His Majesty should ask that the ignorant officer’s silly objections be overridden and order that the Acropolis plain and outlying areas of Hissarlik be taken up immediately, if you did not do so we will never get out of here as long you are represented in Constantinople.’

34 Schliemann, _Troja_, 12-14.
“Turkish objections,” would be difficult to overcome. The Grand Master of the Artillery refused to cancel the prohibition.

In September 1882, Schliemann’s repeated messages to German diplomatic bodies in Istanbul and Bismarck’s intervention resulted in a limited permit. This allowed him to make new plans of areas below ground level. Measurements above the ground were prohibited. Schliemann considered the permission useless. Finally, after a personal meeting in November 1882 between the German ambassador and Sultan Abdülhamid II, Schliemann received permission to draw the plans. Dörpfeld was sent back to the Troad on 18 November to produce the main site plan for Schliemann’s new book *Troja*.

Results of the Season

Official correspondence reveals that before the actual division in Çanakkale in July 1882, a shipment with antique works and broken ceramic objects from Troy had already been sent to the Imperial Museum in Istanbul. The pottery fragments were included in the museum collection and stored in the basement.

Early in July 1882, Osman Hamdi received a letter from the Troad. Schliemann informed him that he was bringing the season to an end around 12 July. He invited Osman Hamdi to join the conclusion (Fig. 28). Bedreddin Efendi, however, suspected that this invitation was a trick. He wrote to the minister of public instruction that Schliemann’s invitation ‘was just one of his many plots’ to get the much-desired permission to take measurements and to make plans at the Troad. By meeting Osman Hamdi personally, he said, Schliemann was hoping ‘to persuade’ him to arrange permission. Furthermore, he implies that ‘another reason why Schliemann invited Osman Hamdi Bey’ was ‘that he wanted to avoid a division at Çanakkale as required by the Antiquities Law.’ Bedreddin Efendi believed that with Osman Hamdi present, Schliemann hoped to arrange the division of the antiquities at...
Hisarlık instead of at Çanakkale. In this way, Schliemann might circumvent a thorough inspection by the officials of the customs house at Çanakkale. Since Schliemann evidently succeeded again in secretly moving the most important finds to Germany, his assumption was well founded.

The Ottoman authorities in Istanbul were evidently alarmed by Bedreddin Efendi’s warnings. To realize a proper division of the finds, secure the correct course of events in the Troad, and, in particular, to stop Schliemann from excavating at different sites at the same time, Mansurizade Mustafa Nuri Pasha, the minister of public instruction and an eminent historian, decided Osman Hamdi should go to the Troad. In his letter to Osman Hamdi, Mustafa Pasha emphasizes Schliemann’s illegal activities. And so Osman Hamdi left for Troy. He preferred to divide the finds at the public sphere of the customs house in Çanakkale, where the actual division took place on 24 and 25 July 1882.

Osman Hamdi was accompanied by the assistant director of the Imperial Museum and a sculptor. This impressive delegation ensured that Schliemann could not dominate the division. In fact, the official claimed some important artefacts, which Schliemann was reluctant to give up: ‘At the last moment, the director of the museum decided [...] to take a badly damaged yet highly desirable metope which we particularly wanted.’

Nevertheless, Schliemann managed to keep most of his best finds from the Ottoman authorities and found ways to ship them to Berlin. Despite Bedreddin Efendi’s caution, he could not prevent valuable finds making their way to Schliemann clandestinely. This accounts for at least one of the two treasures found in 1882 – the one Schliemann talked about to Virchow. As we know, Schliemann kept this treasure secret, hidden from the Ottomans, and made sure it was not part of the division. This entire cache was brought to Germany and catalogued in Berlin in 1902.

This also accounts for the bronze figurine he found and identified as the original or a copy of the Palladium. On 17 May 1882, Schliemann asked

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43 ‘Erst im letzten Augenblick kam der Direktor des Museums [...] um uns eine sehr verdorbene, aber doch brauchbare Metope, die wir gerne haben wollten, wegzunehmen.’ Herrmann and Maaβ, *Die Korrespondenz zwischen Heinrich Schliemann und Rudolf Virchow*, letter from Schliemann to Virchow, (310), 328.
44 Herrmann and Maaβ, *Die Korrespondenz zwischen Heinrich Schliemann und Rudolf Virchow*, 306.
Virchow to be discreet about this discovery; otherwise ‘I may be seriously inconvenienced.’\textsuperscript{46} Since the figurine was broken into three pieces he was able to obtain it in the division with the Ottoman government. The three pieces, he explained, ‘were covered with carbonate of copper and dirt, and altogether indiscernible to an inexperienced eye.’\textsuperscript{47} Schliemann certainly enjoyed strong diplomatic backing: not only when applying for permits, but also when exporting objects illegally. The assistance of the Italian vice-consul at the Dardanelles, Emilio Vitalis, in the illicit shipment of the treasure to Berlin, is just one example of this support.\textsuperscript{48} The Ottoman government’s dragoman, Nicolaos Didymos, was another collaborator. On 19 October 1882, Schliemann informed Virchow that ‘as the danger of losing his position and everything loomed, Didymos secretly took 21 large baskets of the finest antiquities to Athens (of which I took a few of those especially prized smaller items to Frankfurt).’ Schliemann clearly knew how to persuade officials to support him. For the excavations of 1882, Schliemann promised Vitalis and Didymos German decorations in return for their help.\textsuperscript{49} After intensive lobbying the two partners received their medals in January 1883.\textsuperscript{50}

Ottoman authorities simply could not match Schliemann’s strategies and political tactics. Moreover, the Ottoman government lacked the international support Schliemann had gained for his venture. Schliemann was determined to leave no artefacts to the Ottomans at all. Concerning Trojan pottery, he told Virchow on 19 September 1883 that ‘to give nothing to the Turks, [he] kept all the characteristic pieces separate and sent them ahead secretly.’\textsuperscript{51} Schliemann believed that he was saving the artefacts from the Turks, while the Ottomans were trying to protect Trojan heritage from Schliemann.

\textsuperscript{46} ‘kriege ich vielleicht schwere Unannehmlichkeiten.’ Herrmann and Maaß, \textit{Die Korrespondenz zwischen Heinrich Schliemann und Rudolf Virchow}, 308.

\textsuperscript{47} Schliemann, \textit{Troya}, 169.

\textsuperscript{48} Saherwala, Goldman and Mahr, \textit{Heinrich Schliemanns ‘Sammlung trojanischer Altertümer’}, 99, 105, 227; Allen, \textit{Finding the Walls of Troy}, 212.

\textsuperscript{49} ‘Didymos […] bei der drohenden Gefahr seine Stellung und sein alles zu verlieren, 21 große Körbe mit herrlichen Altertümern heimlich nach Athen geschafft hat, (von denen ich die Kleinigkeiten, die soviel bewundert wurden, mit nach Frankfurt nahm):’ Herrmann and Maaß, \textit{Die Korrespondenz zwischen Heinrich Schliemann und Rudolf Virchow}, 334-336.


\textsuperscript{51} ‘um den Türken davon nichts abzugeben, alle mehr charakteristischen Stücke separat legte und heimlich fortschickte.’ Herrmann and Maaß, \textit{Die Korrespondenz zwischen Heinrich Schliemann und Rudolf Virchow}, (368), 374-376.
Schliemann deemed the excavation season of 1882 a success. Dörpfeld and Höfler had made significant progress in clarifying the stratigraphy of the site. They renumbered the six prehistoric strata and split the level above the burnt second stratum of Priam’s Treasure in two. This was based on Dörpfeld’s important discovery that the city wall of Troy II continued in a north-easterly direction after the fire. As a result, Troy II doubled in size.

Schliemann was immensely relieved by this discovery. After publishing *Ilios* in 1880, he had begun to doubt the extent of the stratum which he had connected with Homer. The size of the settlement in which he had found the treasures which he claimed belonged to Priam did not correspond with Homer’s description. In fact, the settlement was too small to be Homer’s Troy. Dörpfeld’s discoveries solved that problem. As Schliemann explained to Gladstone on 3 May 1882, the architects had proved that the second stratum was ‘a large city, which used Hisarlik merely as its acropolis and sacred precinct of its temples, as well as for the residence of its king and family. They have laid bare the ruins of two very large buildings in this city. […] These walls have been burnt by a fire put on both sides; this is proved by their vitrified surfaces. […] This large city […] is no doubt the *Homeric* Ilios.’

However, Schliemann’s relief was brief. Ernst Bötticher, a retired army captain, proved an implacable opponent to Schliemann with his alternative view of the ruins at Hisarlık. Bötticher claimed that Schliemann had not uncovered Homer’s Troy or any city at all; Hisarlık was a necropolis. His theory gained increasing scholarly attention and acceptance. So Schliemann felt obliged to resume excavations in 1890.

**Trojan Pottery**

Schliemann wanted to acquire as many Trojan objects as possible. He had his eye on the pottery collection at the Imperial Museum. This would be a fine addition to his collected Trojan works. He communicated his wish to Osman Hamdi in July 1882. In his letter he formulated his request carefully, assuring him that he was only interested in ‘worthless, broken and imperfect pottery.’ Schliemann asked Osman Hamdi to sell these ceramic objects to him.
Osman Hamdi was not impressed with the Trojan objects that ‘had fallen to the museum’s share of the finds from the excavations of the past few years.’ In 1883, he complained to the Ministry of Public Instruction that after making an inventory, many objects in the museum’s Trojan collection were not important or prestigious enough to exhibit. Indeed, as we have seen, the items which were part of the division were usually not the most valuable finds. Schliemann had already shipped these out illegally before the division.56

Osman Hamdi informed the minister of public instruction, Mustafa Pasha, that many of the recently discovered artefacts were ‘not of importance for the museum.’ He suggested selling these to Schliemann in order to buy other antique works ‘worthy to display.’ As a museum director, Osman Hamdi was primarily interested in expanding the museum’s antiquities collection with more objects suitable for presentation.

The minister of public instruction, perhaps alarmed by Schliemann’s reputation, did not immediately follow Osman Hamdi’s advice, but requested an itemized list of the objects which he wished to study first.57

Determined to obtain the objects held at the Imperial Museum for his own Trojan collection, Schliemann called in the influential German diplomat Josef Maria von Radowitz (1839-1912) to mediate for him. In January 1884, negotiations with the Ottoman government resumed to buy the ‘truly colossal collection of broken terracotta vessels which was part of their 2/3 portion of objects in 1879, 1878 and 1882’ from the Imperial Museum.58

A year later, on the expert advice of an official council, Ottoman authorities decided that the Trojan potsherds stored in boxes in the museum’s basement were not valuable enough to preserve or to exhibit. Mustafa Pasha argued that no one else except Schliemann would be interested in these fragments. Finally, after the approval from the grand vizier and the palace, it was decided to sell the pottery to Schliemann.59

Apparently the Imperial Museum and the Ottoman state attached more importance to the suitability of artefacts for display, although the financial and political crisis in the Ottoman Empire also played a part.

56 IAMA: K26/1, Eyüb Sabri 98, 99, 300, File no: 1536, 11/Ra/1300 (20/01/1883).
57 IAMA: K26/1, Eyüb Sabri 98, 99, 300, File no: 1536, 11/Ra/1300 (20/01/1883).
59 IBA: I.D 75171: 19/B/1302 (04/05/1885); included in Cezar, Sanatta Batıya Açılış ve Osman Hamdi, 537-539, document 29.
Financial Limitations
Despite the desire to collect as well as to preserve and display Ancient objects, Ottoman authorities were seriously hampered by the Empire's financial weakness. The government had no budget to support archaeological ventures or to expand the museum's collection more robustly. Osman Hamdi's suggestion to sell the Trojan pottery in the museum's storage space in order to buy more suitable antiquities for display illustrates the Ottoman situation.

This financial impotence was frustrating for Osman Hamdi, as a critical letter to the minister of public instruction shows: the Germans were spending thousands of liras to excavate on Ottoman soil and to exhibit their finds in their museum in Berlin. 'As for the French,' he states:

... for the excavations that have been continuing for 17 years, 50,000 francs have been spent yearly. [...] It is regrettable that although in accordance with the new Antiquities Law, which requires that the discovered antique works have to be handed over to the Royal Museum, the works that have been discovered by the Germans in Didyma are left at the site to be transferred to the [Imperial] Museum. There is no possibility to acquire the necessary 100 liras for the transfer of these to Der Saadet [Istanbul].

The funding for the museum's new premises in 1891 illustrates how hard-pressed the Ottomans were for money. Since the Ministry of Public Instruction budget fell short, funds for a new hospital, the budget for unexpected government expenses and the budget of the provinces were diverted to the new museum. No state funding was available either for the Empire's first 'national' archaeological venture under the direction of Osman Hamdi. Thanks to the lobbying and the financial campaign launched by his father, Ibrahim Edhem Pasha, a considerable sum was collected for the museum's first archaeological project. The government's financial predicament even prompted Osman Hamdi to donate his yearly salary to the construction of the museum's new premises in 1901, although the offer was not accepted.

60 This five-page memorandum no. 355 (24 January 1316/1900) in the Archaeological Museum Istanbul archive was partially translated in modern Turkish by Aziz Ogan. See: Ogan, Türk Müzeciliğinin 100 üncü Yıldönümü, 11-13.
61 Cezar, Sanatta Batıya Açılış ve Osman Hamdi, 275.
62 La Turquie, 7 April 1883, 20 April 1883, in Cezar, Sanatta Batıya Açılış ve Osman Hamdi, 315.
63 Ogan, Türk Müzeciliğinin 100 üncü Yıldönümü, 12.
3 The Ottoman Elite’s Displeasure with the Ineffective Antiquities Law of 1874

The Empire’s financial problems and its political weakness created opportunities for foreign archaeologists to undertake expensive excavations on Ottoman soil and to remove the objects they found from the Empire, legally or illegally. It also created situations in which foreigners such as Schliemann could buy artefacts from the Imperial Museum. The removal of antiquities by Western archaeologists infuriated the Empire’s intelligentsia.

The antiquities law of 1869 and Safvet Pasha’s order to collect antiquities of the same year show that the desire in Ottoman circles to possess these Ancient objects. However, the law and the decree proved inadequate. They could not keep antiquities in the Empire. So the authorities resolved to take action. It was vital to protect artefacts from foreign acquisition. In a letter to the palace on the subject, the grand vizier stated that ‘for some time inside of the [Empire] people of various countries have been collecting attractive and rare works the protection of which needs to be kept in mind.’

The Antiquities Law of 1874, prompted by Schliemann’s illegal actions in 1873, was equally ineffective. Its vague wording and the absence of sanctions meant that large-scale illegal expropriation of antiquities from the Empire continued. The excavations of Pergamon (Bergama) – where German railroad engineer, architect and archaeologist Carl Humann (1839-1896) played a major role – illustrates the general disregard for the law.

Through his consultancy work on railway and road routes for Grand Vizier Fuad Pasha, Humann had established valuable connections in the Ottoman bureaucracy. Moreover, by supervising the construction of roads in Asia Minor he became acquainted with the area, particularly the west coast. Backed by the director of the Imperial Museum in Berlin, Alexander Conze (1831-1914), Humann employed a cunning strategy to acquire the rights to the excavation site at Pergamon. First, Humann played down the potential of the site so that he would be in a better negotiating position with the Ottomans. Secondly, he did not publish the findings of 1878 until 1880. Meanwhile, flouting the antiquities regulation, Humann persuaded the Ottoman authorities to sell the property to him by secret treaty. He also convinced the Ottomans to sell their one-third share of the finds to

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64 Shaw, Possessors and Possessed, 89.
65 Rehnuma quotes the writ of the grand vizier to the Sultan (arz tezkeresi) for the new law, from Topkapı Palace Archives (Maruzat Arşivi), in Shaw, Possessors and Possessed, 89.
66 Allen, Finding the Walls of Troy, 215; Shaw, Possessors and Possessed, 91.
the museum in Berlin for a small sum. Humann's efforts resulted in a huge amount of antiquities arriving in the German Museum of Antiquities in Berlin. These included the altar of Zeus, which was later reconstructed within the museum. Clearly Humann's deal with the Ottoman authorities was the result of corruption, and also of Ottoman bankruptcy.67

At the same time, public displeasure and opposition to the large-scale export of antiquities to the West was also increasing. As the correspondence between Osman Hamdi and the director of the German Museum of Antiquities Alexander Conze in 1882, shows. To maintain good relations with the Imperial Museum, Conze informed Osman Hamdi that he had sent him a number of publications on the excavations at Bergama (Pergamon). Conze also wrote to Osman Hamdi that he would send him a plaster cast of an Apollo statue found at the site. In exchange for this Conze asked Osman Hamdi for a stone set into the exterior wall of the Bergama mosque. Osman Hamdi ignored Conze’s request and replied that he would accept the plaster cast and, furthermore, that he requested copies of all the great statues of Bergama. Meanwhile, to secure the stone in question he sent a museum official to Bergama to remove it and add it to the Imperial Museum collection.68

The Excavations at Nemrud Dağı
Presumably in reaction to Conze's plans to initiate new excavations at Nemrud Dağı69 and Sakçagözü70 – both located in south-eastern Turkey – in 1882, the Ottoman government decided to send Osman Hamdi and his associate Osgan Efendi to Nemrud Dağı to examine the site in 1883.71 Osman Hamdi’s exploration of Nemrud Dağı was the first archaeological project supervised by the Imperial Museum. It was made possible, along with other imperial excavations in this period through the efforts of leading political figures such as Ibrahim Edhem Pasha (the foreign minister) and Izzet Bey (the director of the Post and Telegram Department), who launched a campaign to raise funds. Alongside various ministers, the boards of institutions such as Eastern Railways and Haydarpaşa Railways, as well as the Ottoman Bank supported the financial campaign. The appeal generated over 500 liras, a

67 Marchand, Down From Olympus, 93-95; Stoneman, Land of Lost Gods, 290; Diaz-Andreu, A World History of the Nineteenth-Century Archaeology, 115; Shaw, Possessors and Possessed, 108-110.
68 Shaw, Possessors and Possessed, 109.
69 Presumably the tumulus and sacred seat of the first-century BC Commagene King, Antiochus I Epiphanes, a UNESCO World Heritage Site since 1987.
70 The ruins of a late Hittite city (eighth century BC) were found here in 1883.
71 Recent publication on archaeological research in Nemrud Daği: Brijder, Nemrud Daği.
vast sum at the time, which enabled Osman Hamdi to implement his plan. To present the Ottoman archaeological enterprise on the European stage, the impressive discoveries at Nemrud Dağı were published in French with photographs and illustrations of the expedition and the huge first-century BC statues.\textsuperscript{72}

For the Ottoman elite it was important to undertake archaeological excavations, collect and preserve antiquities, and especially to protect objects from European acquisition. This fundraising campaign is a revealing illustration. The articles and reports in newspapers and journals emphasizing the importance of preserving and displaying antiquities reflect an increasing interest among the Ottoman intelligentsia in archaeology and museological practice, yet they also show the lack of resources and understanding in official bodies.\textsuperscript{73} Given the Empire’s straitened circumstances, the Ottomans could not hope to rival the efforts of the Europeans on whom they depended financially. Indeed, the Ottoman Empire, by now the ‘sick man of Europe,’ was in the unfortunate position of having no financial resources and no political power.

The outcry which followed each major loss of archaeological treasure prompted the enactment of stricter antiquities legislation. The need for a new antiquities law was the subject of a directive from the grand vizierate to the council of the Ministry of Public Instruction in November 1883. It stated that the regulation of 1874 had created a situation in which ‘transport of rare and fine works to Europe’ had continued freely. Moreover, in other countries the archaeologists were only allowed to export plaster casts of their finds, while the originals remained. The directive ordered that a new law should include a provision that only copies of artefacts be given to archaeologists excavating on imperial lands, and that the originals be stored at the Imperial Museum.\textsuperscript{74}

Soon after this decree, on 23 February 1884, a revised antiquities law came into effect, defining tangible Ancient heritage as imperial property.\textsuperscript{75}


\textsuperscript{74} Cezar, \textit{Sanatta Bathya Açığs ve Osman Hamdi}, 332; Allen, \textit{Finding the Walls of Troy}, 215; Marchand, \textit{Down from Olympus}, 201.

\textsuperscript{75} Shaw, \textit{Possessors and Possessed}, 110-113.
4 New Antiquities Legislation (1884): Ottoman Claim to Ancient Heritage

All of the artefacts left by the Ancient peoples who inhabited the Ottoman Empire, that is, gold and silver; various old and historical coins; signs engraved with informative writings; carved pictures; decoration; objects and containers made of stone and clay and various media; weapons; tools; idols; ringstones; temples and palaces, and old game-areas called circuses; theatres, fortifications, bridges and aqueducts; corpses, buried objects, and hills appropriate for examination; mausoleums, obelisks, memorial objects, old buildings, statues and every type of carved stone are among antiquities.76

The new Antiquities Law, based to a large extent on the Greek antiquities law of 1834, began by defining antiquities.77 The law declared that ‘all types of antiquities extant or found, or appearing in the course of excavation or appearing in lakes, rivers, streams, or creeks,’ belonged to the state. The law identified all antiquities ‘as automatically part of the Ottoman patrimony.’ The Ottoman Empire became the legitimate owner of all archaeological objects. While their removal or destruction was forbidden, the state had the right to confiscate private property for archaeological purposes. Archaeologists were not allowed to own the land and private persons could no longer possess antiquities ‘without the government explicitly relinquishing that object.’ The law also forbade the export of antique objects ‘without the express consent of the Imperial Museum’ and included instructions to limit such exports.

The law reflected an increased awareness of the historical and archaeological value of artefacts. The definition of antiquities demonstrates an improved understanding of archaeological artefacts and their relation to sites. Now the law prohibited the disturbance of archaeological sites: no construction was allowed within a quarter of a kilometre of an archaeological site and it was also forbidden to lift stones lying on the ground of such a site. This included ‘taking measurements, drawing, or making moulds of antique stones as well as constructing scaffolding around ruins.’

In the wake of nineteenth-century nationalism, the Ottomans created a law with which they aspired to strengthen their claim to their territories by appropriating the artefacts left behind by those who had lived there before.78

76 IBA: I.MMS. 78/3401: 23/R/1301 (21/02/1884), translated by Shaw, Possessors and Possessed, 111.
78 For a review of the dialectic of the law, see: Shaw, Possessors and Possessed, 110-115.
Yet the Ottoman determination to keep antiquities in the Empire did not succeed. It was impossible to implement this stricter legislation effectively. While instructions for granting permits to archaeologists were followed, finds were often exported before they were registered in the excavation journals kept by the museum representative and the archaeologist, which the law required to be updated and signed daily. Moreover, Sultan Abdülhamid II’s close ties with Kaiser Wilhelm II and Emperor Frans Joseph I often prompted him to circumvent the law and grant incidental permits. The practised diplomatic savoir-faire of Europe’s archaeologists and classicists also played a major role in this circumvention of the law. In the Troad, for example, Calvert ignored the new law and continued to scout clandestinely for potential archaeological sites.

Nonetheless, the severity of the new law did act as a deterrent. It put many European archaeologists off excavating in the Ottoman Empire, including Schliemann. Calvert’s attempts to convince him to reopen his excavations were fruitless. The new antiquities regulation prevented Schliemann from starting a new campaign at Hisarlık. He preferred Crete, at least for the time being.

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79 Marchand, Down from Olympus, 102, 200-202; Shaw, Possessors and Possessed, 116-124.
80 Allen, Finding the Walls of Troy, 215-219
81 ‘The Law on Antiquities’; Allen, Finding the Walls of Troy, 217.
Schliemann tried to outmanoeuvre his exacting supervisor Bedreddin Efendi. When he started simultaneous exploratory digs at different sites in June 1882, he tried to exclude Bedreddin Efendi from these excavations. Bedreddin Efendi did not accept this. On 26 June, he warned the Ministry of Public Instruction. Bedreddin Efendi states that Schliemann was ‘obstructing him in the execution of his duty.’

Besides emphasizing the strict observance of the Antiquities Law, the authorities also noted the requirement that an Ottoman supervisor be present. Otherwise Schliemann was forbidden to continue his excavations.
Figure 27  Letter from the governor of the Dardanelles, Mehmed Reşad, to the Ministry of Public Instruction

Photo: Günay Uslu, 2008

Letter from the governor of the Dardanelles, Mehmed Reşad, to the Ministry of Public Instruction, stating that Schliemann had been told to avoid illegal actions and that he could not excavate without his supervisor Bedreddin Efendi being present. Information about the transport of an Ancient find to Istanbul is also included in the letter.
Letter from Schliemann to Osman Hamdi Bey

Schliemann informed Osman Hamdi that he was bringing the season to an end around 12 July. He invited Osman Hamdi to join the conclusion. Schliemann had his eye on the Imperial Museum pottery collection. He believed that these objects would be a fine addition to his Trojan collection. He made his request to Osman Hamdi in this letter, in cautious terms. He reassured Osman Hamdi that he was only interested in ‘worthless, broken and imperfect pottery.’
This is the first attempt to translate the *Iliad* into Ottoman Turkish. Na‘îm Fraşeri, born in Frashër (now in modern Albania), was a civil servant with the Ottoman Ministry of Education. His prose translation of the first book of the *Iliad* – a booklet of 43 pages – includes a fifteen-page foreword in which he introduces the *Iliad*, Homer and Troy in some detail.