Fascism, Liberalism and Europeanism in the Political Thought of Bertrand de Jouvenel and Alfred Fabre-Luce

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Published by Amsterdam University Press


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Liberation and Persecution

For Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce, emigration and imprisonment respectively precluded any journalistic or literary activities during the final year of the German occupation. Though a free man by October 1943, Fabre-Luce was intimidated enough to temper his incessant urge to comment on current events at least until the Germans were gone. Just how literally he took this imposed silence is illustrated by the fact that he published the fourth volume of *Journal de la France* on 18 August 1944, the very day the Germans were beginning to leave Paris – and almost immediately landed in trouble with the liberation authorities.¹ In his Swiss exile, Jouvenel soon mingled with the growing French émigré community living on the north shore of Lake Geneva. He continued to work on the manuscript of his future magnum opus *Du Pouvoir*, but he was not to return to France for several years. At the moment of the liberation of Paris, he noted in his diary that there was ‘nothing worse’ than feeling ‘cut off from the national communion’ like he did.² The summer of 1943 not only put an end to both intellectuals’ prior activities at a practical level, it also marked the definitive end of their anticipation of a fascist Europe under German leadership. As we shall see in this chapter, this did not mean they welcomed the post-war order or that they distanced themselves thoroughly from their earlier engagements. The French Fourth Republic, the *Épuration*, the domestic appeal of communism, the Soviet expansion, the Cold War and the post-war European project fundamentally changed the political context of their intellectual activities.

Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel’s absence from the French political scene meant that they largely missed the most radical phase of the war. The final year before the liberation saw a radicalisation on all fronts. The German occupation of the southern zone – a reaction to the Allied landings in North Africa – had robbed the Vichy regime of what little agency it had and turned it into a de facto German puppet state led by a powerless and increasingly passive Pétain. Support for the Vichy government dwindled, but those still willing to serve it became ever more radical. In early 1944, Déat finally

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¹ Fabre-Luce, *Journal de la France IV* (1944); idem, *Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II*, 195.
² Jouvenel, *Un Voyageur*, 463.
became minister of labour, while the information ministry was given to Philippe Henriot, an anti-Semitic collaborator whose inflammatory radio speeches earned him the nickname ‘the French Goebbels’. The rising internal influence of the paramilitary Milice Française under the leadership of Secretary General Joseph Darnand (who also became SS Sturmbannführer after August 1943) is often taken as a sign of Vichy’s ‘fascist drift’ during its final year of existence, even by historians inclined to consider Vichy as essentially conservative.\(^3\) In marked contrast to his earlier admiration of the LVF volunteer Doriot, Fabre-Luce described Darnand as a member of ‘such a weak International that it is just the fifth column of a foreign nation’.\(^4\)

The Service du Travail Obligatoire (STO), established in February 1943, further discredited Vichy and dramatically enlarged the ranks of the Resistance by driving large numbers of young men into illegality, unwilling to be forcefully enlisted to work in Germany. The Resistance manifested itself more openly, taking control of inaccessible rural areas and committing acts of terrorism and sabotage that were requited by brutal reprisals by the Germans (and the Milice). Especially after the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, the presence of a Free French authority in liberated North Africa created a supplementary pole of attraction for the French population, one directed against Vichy and collaboration. Although De Gaulle was initially forced by the Allies to share power with Henri Giraud, a senior general who was seen as a hero after escaping from a German prison during both world wars, the younger general was able to gradually outmanoeuvre Giraud and establish himself as the unquestioned leader of Free France.\(^5\)

While the events were not directly linked, there is a symbolic side to Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel’s departure from the scene precisely when violent radicals like Darnand were on the rise. For all their frequenting of events and receptions on the \textit{bel étage} of the collaborationist world, it seems that Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel rarely ventured into its less refined basement. Foul-mouthed fascists such as Rebatet and Céline – who considered himself the only true collaborator for having proposed already in 1938 to annihilate all Jews and sign a ‘colossal’ alliance with Hitler – probably seldomly encountered the two intellectuals during the war years.\(^6\) In Céline’s wartime writings, only one mention is made of Fabre-Luce, in a complaint about not

\(^{3}\) Payne, \textit{A History of Fascism}, 401; Jackson, \textit{The Dark Years}, 232; Paxton, \textit{Vichy France}, 231.
\(^{4}\) Fabre-Luce, \textit{Journal de la France IV} (1944), 11.
\(^{5}\) Jackson, \textit{The Dark Years}, 228, 458, 480.
\(^{6}\) Céline, \textit{L’École des Cadavres}, 283.
having been included in his *Anthologie de la Nouvelle Europe.* In a letter published in *La Gerbe* in February 1941, Céline attacked Jouvenel’s *Après la Défaite* for keeping all options open on France’s future and for refusing to talk about the Jews. According to Céline, if things had gone very differently, Jouvenel would have happily written ‘*Après la Victoire,*’ a remarkable 225-pages work looking almost perfectly like the one he published.\(^7\)

Culturally sophisticated members of the occupation authorities like Abetz, Heller and Jünger (with the notable exception of Karl Epting) preferred Fabre-Luce over Céline, whose strong language, uncivilised behaviour and inadequate personal hygiene appalled them probably more than his anti-Semitic obsessions. The description in Jünger’s diaries of ‘Merline’ (Céline) as ‘a maniac who cannot really be made responsible for his declarations’ speaks volumes.\(^9\) After the war, while in hiding in Denmark from the French authorities who he thought wanted to have him killed, Céline bitterly lamented his fate. He convinced himself that he had been made into a scapegoat – through some Jewish machination, of course – for the collaborationist crimes of others. In a letter to a friend, he expressed his disbelief that he had to fear for his life while people like Fabre-Luce walked around freely:

> If it wasn’t him it must have been his brother. Fabre-Luce was *collaborating* and a lot. He wrote a *big book,* a kind of retrospective history of the collaborators, their merits etc. – IN WHICH I DID NOT FIGURE – and after Stalingrad, wanting to exculpate himself [...], he starts pissing off the Germans, who lock him up. *Oh just a bit!* [...] He counted among the most appreciated guests at the Embassy – [rue de] Lille – where they were drooling, having tenderness only for plutocratic and slightly Jewish collaborators [...].\(^10\)

There is no mention of Jouvenel in Rebatet’s fascist autobiographical novel *Les Décombres,* which competed with *Journal de la France* on the bestseller list of occupied France. The only mention of Fabre-Luce in the book is Alfred’s cousin Robert Fabre-Luce (1897-1966). An early convert to racism

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7  Godard, Céline, 318.  
8  Céline in *La Gerbe,* 13 February 1941, included in Céline, *Choix de Lettres de Céline et de Quelques Correspondants,* eds. Godard & Louis, 618.  
10  Céline to Albert Paraz, 9 March 1951, in: Céline, *Choix de Lettres de Céline,* 1397. Italics and caps in original. Céline was obviously referring to Fabre-Luce’s *Anthologie de la Nouvelle Europe.*
and National Socialism, ‘baron’ Robert Fabre-Luce had on several occasions lent his voice to Nazi propaganda during the 1930s. In June 1940, he was imprisoned on the orders of Minister of the Interior Georges Mandel for being a member of the pro-German ‘fifth column’, along with a few other radicals. This crackdown turned Mandel – a Jewish conservative who had taken outspoken anti-Nazi and anti-appeasement positions during the 1930s – into a hate object of the French extreme right, which led to his assassination by the hands of the Milice in 1944. Released after the armistice, Robert Fabre-Luce went to Vichy and served the regime in various functions before being arrested again during the Liberation.¹¹ In his memoirs, Alfred claimed that his cousin ‘was interested in the same questions as me, but took position more strongly’. Robert ‘had always caused trouble in the family’ and Alfred had avoided him since his youth, even to the point of refusing to see him while they were detained in the same prison camp in 1945.¹²

Jouvenel’s fascism certainly was more scrupulous than Rebateet’s, and not even the Fabre-Luce of the first Journal de la France came close to Céline’s hysterical, genocidal brand of anti-Semitism. Nevertheless, the distinction was probably due to a difference in style, milieu and social circles rather than ideology. Even Fabre-Luce’s remark on his pariah cousin, who shared his political interests but expressed himself too imprudently, illustrates this attitude. Moreover, both Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel remained very close to their ultra-collaborationist friend Drieu la Rochelle throughout the war. Despite having made biting remarks about Jouvenel in his private diaries during the early war years – calling him a nervous ‘half-Jew’ and a pathetic ‘bastard’ whose unstable mind was the product of ‘miscegenation’ – Drieu visited Jouvenel and his wife in Switzerland in late 1943 and spent several days having long, personal conversations with him. Jouvenel recalled his sadness when Drieu left and claimed he sensed it had been their last meeting.¹³ Living in hiding since the liberation and having already made several failed attempts, Drieu committed suicide in Paris in March 1945. In a letter to Drieu’s first wife Colette Jéramec, at whose apartment Drieu was staying when he ended his life, Jean Paulhan wrote that Drieu had sacrificed himself in order to save his peers: ‘It is certain that Drieu’s trial would have also been the trial of Chardonne, Jouhandeaux, Fabre-Luce...’¹⁴

¹¹ Rebateet, Les Mémoires d’un Fasciste I, 454; Jackson, The Dark Years, 579. For Robert Fabre-Luce’s pro-Nazi activities, see, for example, Binding et al., Sechs Bekenntnisse zum Neuen Deutschland, 21.
¹² Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté I, 24.
¹³ Remarks cited in Dard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, 156; Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 462.
¹⁴ Cited in Lottman, La Rive Gauche, 436.
Drieu was not the only one who had to go in hiding after the liberation. As the Allied armies approached Paris, some collaborationist intellectuals like Céline and Luchaire followed Pétain and the remnants of the Vichy administration to a castle in the southern German town of Sigmaringen, where the Germans set up a French government-in-exile that officially strove to ‘liberate’ France from the Allied invasion. Those who remained in France faced the prospect of both legal prosecution and arbitrary acts of vengeance. Especially during 1944 and early 1945, with the war still underway, the authority of De Gaulle’s Provisional Government was feeble to say the least, and local impromptu liberation committees often took matters into their own hands, summarily executing any supposed collaborator they could find. Though figures have often been inflated by writers sympathetic to Vichy or the collaborators, the more trustworthy estimations range between 9,000 and 15,000 summary executions – an illustration of the civil-war-like atmosphere that reigned in France during and in the immediate aftermath of the liberation. Both arbitrary violence and measures that took place within a legal framework of some kind are included under the French term Épuration [‘purification’], which is still a point of much debate in French society.15

As the French version of the almost Europe-wide phenomenon of post-war transitional justice, the Épuration had a double aim: to punish those guilty of having collaborated with the enemy and to ‘purify’ French society as a whole by removing these unwanted elements. There was possibly also a symbolic side to the operation: the German invader having symbolically defiled French national territory, a ritual act of cleansing was necessary in order to re-establish French independence. This implied the temporary or permanent exclusion from society of all people who had worked with the enemy. Despite De Gaulle’s famous declaration in October 1944 that collaboration had been the work of only ‘a handful of miserable and unworthy’, the post-war purges quickly grew into a vast enterprise. Investigations were launched against 350,000 persons (including both Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce) belonging to every branch of French society, of whom more than 125,000 had to appear in front of a judge.16 Besides the Gaullist drive to preserve the myth of an undivided and heroic French nation by focusing on the punishment of a small number of traitors, other members of the Provisional
Government had different aims. The Communist Party sought to profit from its unequalled level of popular support (capitalising on its leading role in the Resistance, it called itself ‘the party of the 75,000 shot’) to use the Épuration to reshape France and to extend its influence. A purge of the entire French state apparatus had the additional advantage of opening up positions to which communist militants could be appointed.17

For writers, journalists and intellectuals, the Épuration took on a distinctive form. This was partially linked to the special qualities of ink on paper. Since it was considerably easier to assemble written proofs of collaborationist statements than it was to reconstruct acts that had taken place years ago, writers were among the first to be tried – while the war was still going on – and tribunals were inclined to punish severely. Public intellectuals lacked the kind of position or technical expertise essential for the functioning of the state that would have saved them from persecution, in contrast to many higher public servants, lawyers and magistrates.18 Moreover, intellectuals themselves were largely in charge of the intellectual Épuration, people who almost by definition believed in the utmost importance of the written word. Already during the occupation years, writers close to Les Lettres Françaises and the clandestine editing house Éditions de Minuit formed a Comité National d’Écrivains (CNE) that later played an important role in purging the French literary world of collaborators. The members of the CNE, intellectuals such as Vercors, Louis Aragon, Jean-Paul Sartre, Jean Paulhan, François Mauriac, Simone de Beauvoir and Jean Guéhenno, established a ‘blacklist’ of ‘undesirable’ writers and announced they would collectively refuse to contribute to any newspaper, review or editing house that published articles by these proscribed authors. Both Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce figured on the list, alongside Drieu la Rochelle, Montherlant, Chardonne, Jouhandeau and many others.19

While the CNE blacklist had the character of self-censorship that placed it outside the legal system, collaborationist authors were also hit by more direct criminal sanctions. The high-profile trial and execution in early 1945 of Robert Brasillach, the young journalist, novelist and former chief editor of Je Suis Partout, was meant to be a model for trials against intellectual collaborators of the worst kind – and was initially greeted as such by a majority of the French population. However, it rapidly became a symbol of unnecessary bloodshed that robbed France of a promising

17 Drake, Intellectuals and Politics, 13.
18 Sapiro, La Responsabilité de l’Écrivain, 525.
19 Sapiro, La Responsabilité, 535; Assouline, L’Épuration des Intellectuels, 161, 163.
writer. In addition to providing the post-war extreme right with a martyr and multiple-use poster boy, Brasillach's death rapidly provoked an intellectual debate in French society about a writer's responsibility and his eventual 'right to err'. After Brasillach's condemnation, a petition asking for his pardon was signed by many intellectuals including Paul Valéry, François Mauriac, Paulhan, Colette and Camus, but De Gaulle refused to show clemency, presumably because he mistakenly believed Brasillach had worn a German uniform.  

The journalist Georges Suarez, a former PPF member and colleague of Jouvenel at Gringoire whose book about Briand had received a laudatory NRF review by Fabre-Luce in 1941, had already been tried and executed several months earlier. Fabre-Luce had had few contacts with Brasillach during the war, but the two had worked together at the periodical L'Assault back in 1936. The person dearest to Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel to face the firing squad was Jean Luchaire. The former chief editor of Notre Temps, with whom Jouvenel had spent so many wine-filled evenings during the 1920s discussing youth movements, corporatism and the future United States of Europe, had become a hated symbol of collaboration and venality. Inspired by the same 'realism' that he saw as the defining trait of his generation, Luchaire had taken advantage of France's defeat to further his career. He headed the German-controlled Paris press corporation, founded his collaborationist journal Les Nouveaux Temps with German money and lived lavishly throughout the occupation years. After leaving for Sigmaringen, he served as propaganda minister in the French government-in-exile led by Fernand de Brinon. In this function, Luchaire frequently spoke on the French airwaves, calling upon his compatriots to resist De Gaulle's call to arms and announcing that the Allies were delivering France to a 'Bolshevik' takeover. Arrested on the run in his native Italy in May 1945, 'the Führer of the French press' was brought back to France. Luchaire was condemned to death in January 1946 and executed one month later, his death marking the end of the most violent phase of the Épuration of intellectuals.  

Despite the emotion and media attention surrounding these trials, legal executions remained relatively rare. A total of 7,000 people were sentenced

20 Assouline, L'Épuration, 88; Kaplan, The Collaborator, 212.
21 Assouline, L'Épuration, 34; Alfred Fabre-Luce, 'Briand, tome V, par Georges Suarez' (book review), Nouvelle Revue Française (August 1941), 251.
22 Fabre-Luce, Journal 1951, 91.
23 Alden, 'The Road to Collaboration', 268, 278; Geo London [Georges Samuel], 'Jean Luchaire le Super Traître, Führer de la Presse Française, est Enfin Jugé!', Paris-Presse (22 January 1946).
to death during the Épuration, but fewer than 800 of these sentences were actually carried out. A far larger number of people were subjected to less definitive punitive measures, ranging from prison sentences and forced labour to the confiscation of property and the partial loss of their rights as citizens. In addition to the traditional crime of treason, a new crime known as ‘indignité nationale’ (‘national unworthiness’) was formulated. While treason was reserved for people who had collaborated directly with the Germans, ‘indignité nationale’ was aimed at the more indirect kind of collaboration of those who had merely served Vichy. Since legally the Pétain regime had been France's official government, treason did not apply to this group. Though controversial in the eyes of legal scholars due to its air of ex post facto legislation, indignité nationale made possible the extended purge of collaborators while creating differentiated ways of punishing them. While the regular punishment for treason was death, those guilty of indignité nationale were to be punished with what could be called a form of ‘civic death’, now reformulated as ‘civic demotion’ (‘dégradation nationale’): the loss of active and passive election rights; exclusion from government service and the exercise of certain liberal professions (lawyer, advocate, notary); exclusion from the right to lead or regularly contribute to newspapers, editing houses, radio stations or cinemas; exclusion from the right to head a bank or an insurance company; alongside the possible confiscation of all their belongings and the loss of pension rights. Almost 95,000 people were condemned to dégradation nationale, making it by far the Épuration’s most applied sanction.

Both Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce had every reason to fear persecution. While by the end of 1943 Jouvenel was already anticipating a post-liberation trial in France, his Swiss exile saved him from arrest during the ‘wild’ months directly following the liberation. In early 1945, when he considered coming back to France to defend himself against the allegations of collaboration and ‘collusion with the enemy’, he asked the advice of Philippe Boegner, a journalist friend from his La Lutte des Jeunes days with Resistance credentials. Boegner strongly advised him to stay where he was, since a fair trial was improbable:

26 Simonin, ‘L’Indignité Nationale’, 40, 42, 47.
I believe that you currently enjoy a blessing that you have never known in your life, the one of being forgotten, and I don’t see any necessity to end this oblivion. [...] In many ways we are in 1936 again. There are no facts, only interpretations, there is no truth but only emotion. One can say that four years of defeat and eight months of liberation have changed almost nothing. Perhaps if there had been precise charges against you, I would tell you to come and justify yourself, but since there is nothing, you would find yourself accused of being called J., of having had friends that they don’t like at this moment, and what can you do against that?28

If his plans to end his exile had been serious at all, this letter convinced Jouvenel to stay in Switzerland and quietly wait until legal investigations against him were closed without further action.29 In the meantime, Fabre-Luce had a more serious rendezvous with French transitional justice. On 26 August 1944, less than a week after publishing the fourth and last volume of *Journal de la France*, Fabre-Luce witnessed the triumphant entry of De Gaulle down the Champs Élysées. The American troops arrived three days later, giving him the impression of ‘an army of truck drivers [...] throwing cigarettes to the spectators as to an African crowd’.30 French Resistance forces arrested him three days later, as part of a first wave of arrests targeting Chardonne, Jean-Pierre Maxence, Maurice Bardèche and about any other collaborationist writer or intellectual they could find.31 Fabre-Luce spent a month in an overcrowded prison cell in the Parisian suburb of Fresnes before being sent to the Drancy camp. Located in another suburb and originally intended as a modernist residential project, Drancy had functioned as the main transition camp of the Holocaust in France. Nine out of ten Jews arrested in France passed through Drancy on their way to the extermination camps. After the liberation, the camp was used by the Resistance to intern collaborators and criminals.32

Outraged with his arrest, the shabby treatment he received, the chaotic amateurism of the authorities who failed to tell him what he was accused of and who denied him access to a lawyer or a judge for several months, Fabre-Luce found inspiration for several furious books and articles. In one of the

28 Philippe Boegner to Bertrand de Jouvenel (21 March 1945), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (295).
29 Sapiro, *La Responsabilité*, 546, 559. Elsewhere, Sapiro used the term ‘non-suit’ to describe the outcome of the investigations against Jouvenel.
30 Fabre-Luce, *Vingt-Cinq Années de Libération II*, 193.
31 Sapiro, *La Responsabilité*, 540.
first of these, titled *Double Prison* and published without an editor in 1946, he contrasted his ‘German’ with his ‘Gaullist’ captivity, while explaining both as the logical result of his position as a free-thinking intellectual who refused to make any concessions to political powers. Presenting himself as a humanist and a liberal in profoundly illiberal and inhumane times, Fabre-Luce claimed he had almost accepted that such would be his fate. He went so far as to take pride in it. By refusing to go in hiding and by turning himself in after the police had come looking for him, he had forced the authorities to make a mistake, which was the best way to fight them. At least he was showing more courage than ‘the “collaborator” who fled to Switzerland and will come back on a wagon-lit’. Such people, Fabre-Luce thought – possibly alluding to Jouvenel (who ended up doing both) – may have escaped prison but ‘will not dare to look in the eyes of those who have suffered’.33

Whether out of irony or ignorance, Fabre-Luce contrasted the treatment of Drancy’s former Jewish inhabitants with his own situation, arguing that at least the Jews had heating and more personal space in the barracks: ‘there used to be four Jews where there are now ten “collaborators”’. In terms not so different from those used in the third volume of *Journal de la France*,

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33 Fabre-Luce, *Double Prison*, 148, 221.
Fabre-Luce continued to allude to the idea that the liberation was some kind of revenge of the Jews, in which they made the collaborators suffer the same treatment hitherto inflicted upon them. He noted that relatives and lawyers were not allowed into Drancy to visit the prisoners, while ‘communists, Anglo-Saxons and Jews can inspect us as they please. They give them entry tickets, as to a zoo.’ Jewish visitors were especially vindictive, taking pleasure in witnessing the detainees’ humiliation. He wrote that he would have liked to believe that a Jew would speak out in defence of him and others, just like he had himself supposedly defended the Jews during their years of suffering, but he had the impression his hope was in vain.34

Fabre-Luce shared the camp with a colourful mix of other prisoners: Milice and PPF members, shaved women accused of ‘horizontal collaboration’ with German soldiers, madmen, petty thieves and collaborationist socialites with nobility titles. The comic actor Sacha Guitry was a long-time inmate of Drancy, as were Bernard Faÿ and Georges Ripert, a law professor and member of the Institut de France. The actress and model Arletty, who had famously defended her love affair with a German officer by declaring ‘my heart may be French, but my ass is international’, made a short appearance.35 While Fabre-Luce liked to spend his time with Guitry and Ripert, he was not willing to meet his cousin Robert Fabre-Luce, who was at Drancy too. When the prison director summoned Alfred and offered to correct the ‘inhumanity’ of not even introducing him to his own relative, he declined politely.36

While Fabre-Luce had good reasons to paint the Épuration as black as he could, his trial record does give the impression of chaos and amateurism on the side of the ‘épurateurs’, although this did not always work to his disadvantage. In September 1944, notified by his wife, Fabre-Luce’s lawyer wrote the minister of justice to complain about being denied access to his client, which was ‘a violation of republican legitimacy’.37 Only in late October did the overburdened legal apparatus open investigations against him, after he had spent more than two months in captivity. Fabre-Luce was summoned for questioning for the first time on 13 November. But as his file was empty and an indictment was still lacking, the policeman in charge instead asked him what he had to declare.38 Five days later, Fabre-Luce was transferred

34 Ibid., 158, 159, 163.
35 Jackson, The Dark Years, 335; Fabre-Luce, Double Prison, 170, 177, 185.
36 Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté I, 25.
37 Daniel Viraut to ‘Monsieur le Ministre’ (30 September 1944), Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648.
38 ‘Réquisitoire introductif’ (28 October 1944) and ‘Procès-verbal’ by Jean Tesnière (13 November 1944), Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648; Fabre-Luce, Double Prison, 205.
back to the Fresnes prison. In the meantime, an indictment had been found: ‘intelligences avec l’ennemi’ [‘collusion with the enemy’], formulated more specifically (though still rather broadly) as ‘to have knowingly, in France or abroad, delivered direct or indirect help to Germany or its allies, or to have undermined national unity or the liberty and equality of Frenchmen’. This was a crime against the security of the state, punishable under laws voted in 1939 and early 1940, and considerably more serious than indignité nationale.39

On 25 November, Fabre-Luce finally appeared before a judge, who wanted to know why the Germans had not condemned him to death in 1943.40 Unable to answer that question, he protested instead against his detention and refuted the charges by claiming that, instead of helping the Germans, he had been ‘one of the only, if not the only French citizen writer, to engage in an open resistance against the enemy’. In line with arguments used by collaborationist politicians such as Laval, he defended his support of collaboration during the first two years as a logical consequence of military defeat and an attempt to save as much as possible of what was left of French ‘national independence’ – against which De Gaulle’s categorical non was as symbolically admirable as it was unworkable in practice, that is: in France as opposed to London. But he claimed his attitude had changed fundamentally in November 1942, when the entire occupation of France and the liberation of North Africa convinced him that collaboration had become ‘contrary to the French interest’.41

Additional notes drafted by his lawyer stressed Fabre-Luce’s absolute ‘independence’ as a writer and his categorical refusal to engage in political activities during the occupation or to take part in propaganda trips to Germany. Furthermore, he had played a subtle game that only few could understand. Despite becoming bestsellers, the Journal de la France books had been originally intended for ‘a minority of cultivated readers able to appreciate the constraints imposed by censorship and the resulting value of nuances and stylistic reservations’. That is, if only people had been ‘cultivated’ enough to read between the lines, there would have been no doubt about Fabre-Luce’s subtle yet open resistance. After reminding the judge that Fabre-Luce had criticised the Jewish Statutes and the enlistment of French workers, his lawyer stated that writers like Gabriel Marcel, André

39 Sapiro, La Responsabilité, 540; Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648.
40 Fabre-Luce, Double Prison, 239.
Siegfried and Édouard Bourdet, ‘most of whom are today members of the Comité National d’Écrivains’, had apparently been able to grasp Fabre-Luce’s real attitude, since they had ‘at the time congratulated Fabre-Luce with his work’.  

The judge ordered his provisional release on the same day. A letter written by François Mauriac probably played a role in the judge’s decision. The famous Catholic writer, Académie Française member and future Nobel Prize winner was a founding member of the CNE and had put his signature underneath the blacklist that included Fabre-Luce’s name, but after the Liberation he soon became disillusioned with the consequences of the Épuration. In his regular contributions to Le Figaro, Mauriac criticised the ‘vengeful spirit’ in which his colleagues were busy calling for each other’s arrest and tried to vindicate an intellectual’s ‘right to err’. In doing so, Mauriac engaged in a passionate press debate with Camus (who initially demanded harsh justice). Mauriac had personally handed over the clemency request for Brasillach to De Gaulle. His indefatigable defence of those accused of collaboration earned him the mocking nickname ‘Saint-François-des-assises’ ['St. Francis-of-the-Assizes']. One day before Fabre-Luce’s release, Mauriac wrote a letter reminding the judge that with the third volume of Journal de la France, he had braved German censorship and earned himself ‘five months’ of imprisonment at the Cherche-Midi. Considering this feat of bravery, Mauriac suggested, the judge might take Fabre-Luce’s ‘very fragile health’ into account and release him provisionally.  

Fabre-Luce went back home to his wife and children, but the investigations against him continued. When on 31 January 1945 two policemen came to his house to take him with them, he decided he had seen enough, despite his former resoluteness to challenge the authorities by letting them commit the error of persecuting him. Fabre-Luce asked to first make a phone call to his lawyer. When he was allowed to do so in a side room, he made a run for the back stairs and then for the street. Fabre-Luce spent the following six months in hiding, frequently changing places: first with different friends in Paris, then at home while staying away from the windows, in Biarritz, in provincial chateaux owned by acquaintances and even in a Benedictine

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43 Declaration by the prison director (25 November 1944), Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648.
44 Assouline, L’Épuration, 117.
45 François Mauriac to the Juge d’instruction (24 November 1944), Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648.
monastery in Solesmes. In his absence, the judge ordered the partial confiscation of his belongings and the freezing of his bank accounts.

In the late summer of 1945, Fabre-Luce was back at his apartment and walked the streets of Paris undisturbedly, but he was still unsure as to what he could expect. If the authorities were alternating between repression and laissez-faire, it was because they were under pressure from different groups. Besides the slow functioning of the legal system and calls for clemency from Mauriac and others, communist and other left-wing journalists were putting pressure on the government to arrest more people and punish them more harshly, since anything else would be nothing but an insult to those who had paid with their lives during the occupation. Already during Fabre-Luce’s time at Drancy, l’Humanité had called the camp ‘a holiday resort for the fifth column’ and called for the quick punishment of Guitry and Fabre-Luce, ‘demimonde’ collaborators ‘without scruples and without a fatherland’. Fabre-Luce noticed how the ‘tidal’ movement of French politics directly influenced the situation in the camp. Communist demonstrations meant a new wave of arrests, while the prison regime was eased as soon as bourgeois newspapers had begun to write critically about the Épuration’s excesses.

The anger of Resistance newspapers against Fabre-Luce further increased as a result of his many publications in which he attacked the Épuration, mocked the importance of the Resistance and defended Marshal Pétain. Even from his prison camp, he succeeded in having an article published telling ‘The Truth about Drancy’ (it was not exactly a holiday resort, diseases were breaking out and some detainees had been tortured, tattooed or physically abused) by having it smuggled out of the camp. After his release, he continued to publish books and brochures at an unequalled pace. Initially unable to find an editor willing or daring to publish them, he decided to do so by himself. He invented the name ‘Éditions de Midi’, a mocking reference to the Resistance editing house Éditions de Minuit and in line with his statement that he was speaking out at clear daylight, not clandestinely at midnight.

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46 Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II, 218, 230, 233, 237; Fabre-Luce, Hors d’Atteinte, 8.
47 Document by Juge d’Instuction Raoult (15 May 1945), Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648. It seems this confiscation was not carried out.
48 Diquelou, ‘Drancy Deviendra-t-il Villégiature Pour la 5e Colonne?’. Fabre-Luce, Double Prison, 198, 211.
49 Alfred Fabre-Luce, [untitled] (11 October 1944), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 2; idem, Double Prison, 215.
50 See, for example, Fabre-Luce, En Pleine Liberté, I.
also self-published three brochures, which were eventually bundled in *Au Nom des Silencieux*, in which he paid homage to the ‘hommes du Maréchal’ who had sincerely followed Pétain and were now wrongfully accused of treason, while calling Gaullism a ‘new inquisition’ and comparing it to the Ku Klux Klan.52 During the summer, Fabre-Luce published a lengthy report on the Pétain trial that mixed appreciative comments on the Marshal with refutations of most of the accusations against him. In his concluding remarks, Fabre-Luce suggested that De Gaulle could be persecuted for the same kind of treason attributed to Pétain.53

During 1945, Resistance newspapers published outraged commentaries on Fabre-Luce, who was ‘abusing’ his freedom by publishing his admiration for Pétain and the ‘Krauts’ and his hatred of De Gaulle and other ‘patriots’. How was it possible that the police were letting such a man walk around freely, a member of the fifth column ‘who, at the moment of the debacle of 1940, uttered a cry of triumph’?54 In fact, the police were not entirely inactive in stopping Fabre-Luce’s activities. The entire unsold print runs of *Double Prison* and *Au Nom des Silencieux* were confiscated from bookshops and storage, provoking protests by Fabre-Luce and a long-lasting legal fight against this ‘censorship’.55 Fabre-Luce’s trial record contains a report about fruitless police attempts to obtain the other texts he published via the ‘Éditions de Midi’, despite a declaration from the Juge d’Instruction that post-liberation material could not be part of the accusation. Bookshop owners questioned by the police declared that they had only ‘heard about’ those books and claimed they were not selling them.56

At the end of 1945, the Juge d’Instruction decided that Fabre-Luce was again to be held in administrative detention, but the police could not find him at his home. Fabre-Luce’s wife declared that they were late: her husband

53 Fabre-Luce, *Le Mystère du Maréchal*, 47, 193. Fabre-Luce would finally take on this challenge himself, with *Haute Cour* (1962), a play in which De Gaulle is brought to trial for high treason by a Supreme Court consisting of the Senate and the National Assembly sitting in joint session.
had gone to Switzerland.57 This was true. In the summer and autumn of 1945, several personal and more general events had convinced Fabre-Luce that his best option was to look for shelter abroad. At the October 1945 parliamentary elections – the first since the liberation and the first French elections in which women were allowed to vote – the communist and socialist parties won an absolute majority. With more than 27% of the votes, the PCF became the country’s largest party, raising fears of a long-lasting communist hegemony if not a direct political take-over. Around the same time, Pétain’s death sentence (commuted to life imprisonment by De Gaulle) and the execution of Laval proved that, despite the end of the War, the Épuration was still capable of showing its teeth. Together with the confiscation of his books and the attacks against him in the press, these developments prompted Fabre-Luce’s decision to apply for a visa for Switzerland. To his own surprise and surely also that of his Juge d’Instruction, his visa was granted by regular procedure, and he crossed the Swiss border by car in early November.58

Exile and Exclusion

Going to Switzerland to escape arrest in France, Fabre-Luce was making the same journey that Jouvenel had made just over two years earlier. In 1943, Jouvenel and his wife crossed the border as illegal immigrants requesting refugee status, and only the reputation of Bertrand’s father Henry de Jouvenel prevented them from being housed in a refugee camp. Instead, the couple were temporarily placed under house arrest in a luxury hotel, then moved into a more modest place in Fribourg before settling with their daughter in a three-room apartment in Saint Saphorin, a village on the shores of Lake Geneva, not far from Lausanne. Jouvenel was distrusted by the Swiss authorities, who considered him a collaborator and kept a close watch on him during 1944. As a condition of his residence in Switzerland, he had to promise he would refrain from any political or journalistic activities. This ban from what had until then been Jouvenel’s main occupation caused him serious financial difficulties, which were partially alleviated when he received permission to publish books about economic subjects and articles in the Swiss press as long as he used a pseudonym. Signing his

58 Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II, 245; Vinen, Bourgeois Politics in France, 1.
articles with ‘Guillaume de Champlitte’, ‘G. de Monfort’ or ‘XXX’, Jouvenel became a regular contributor to Curieux and the Gazette de Lausanne, both conservative Pétainist newspapers.\(^{59}\)

Jouvenel’s owed his most important support to his integration into the curious émigré community living on the shores of Lake Geneva. When he arrived, this community still consisted of a mix of those who had fled the occupation and those wanting to escape the post-war order. Pétainists and former collaborators soon started to dominate, including the Vichy diplomat Paul Morand, Pétain’s former chief of staff Henry du Moulin de Labarthète, René Belin, Coco Chanel, Georges Bonnet, René Gillouin, Raymond Abellio, Charles Rochat and many others. The Belgian Hendrik de Man was also part of these circles. The pre-war planist socialist, who had been strongly admired by Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel at the time, had become a leading collaborator during the war and fled to Switzerland to escape persecution in his native Belgium. His king Leopold III, equally exiled after his dubious role during the Belgian capitulation and the occupation years, was also living on the shores of Lake Geneva. The central figure in this high society was Jouvenel’s old friend Jean Jardin. Jardin had been a member of Ordre Nouveau, one of the ‘non-conformist’ formations of the 1930s. After serving as Laval’s chief of staff during most of 1942 and 1943, Jardin joined the French embassy in Berne, where he established personal contacts with the Swiss authorities, Gaullists, the American Office of Strategic Service and German officers conspiring to kill Hitler. As a neutral country, Switzerland provided excellent opportunities for these kinds of mixed frequentation. When Paris was liberated, Jardin resigned his diplomatic position, but he retained connections with France’s former and new authorities that would ensure him few problems with the Épuration and a long post-war career as an influential political background figure in the Fourth Republic.\(^{60}\)

Well-placed to provide financial and political services to his contacts, Jardin became the linchpin of the French émigrés. The weekly Saturday afternoon tea parties at the Jardins in Vevey was the occasion for everybody to meet, exchange novelties and escape the boredom of daily exile life. Aware of Jouvenel’s presence after reading one of his articles in Curieux, Jardin quickly included him in these circles and helped him by acting as an intermediary for money sent from France by the family of Jouvenel’s wife.\(^{61}\)

When Fabre-Luce arrived in Switzerland, he soon established contact with

\(^{59}\) Dard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, 185, 189; Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 463.

\(^{60}\) Assouline, Une Éminence Grise, 130, 177, 205.

\(^{61}\) Jouvenel, Un Voyageur, 463; Assouline, Une Éminence Grise, 202.
his ‘dear friend’ Jouvenel and was naturally absorbed into the same milieu. Fabre-Luce’s memoirs give a vivid description of the atmosphere reigning in this intact micro-Vichy. While remarking with irony that ‘there are many things I can blame on the liberation government, but not for failing to provide me with pleasant company in prison and in exile’, he described his encounters with Bonnet, Jouvenel, Morand, De Man and Jardin and their collective joy at being safe from the ‘madness’ of the Épuration. When they heard that one of them, Charles Rochat – according to Fabre-Luce an ‘irreproachable functionary’ but also a long-time Vichy secretary-general for foreign affairs who had followed his government to Sigmaringen and then fled to Switzerland with Jardin’s help – had been condemned to death in absentio, ‘we were split between indignation and the giggles’.63

Jardin founded À l’Enseigne du Cheval Ailé, an editing house that became an important recourse for the French émigré community. Officially led by the Swiss extreme-rightist editor Constant Bourquin but in reality directed by Jardin, the ‘Winged Horse’ specialised in books, memoirs and justifications by fascists and collaborators, alongside a few nineteenth-century classics. These books were intended for export, resale and clandestine distribution in France, appearing in unrealistically large print runs for the Swiss francophone home market. Du Moulin de Labarthète published his account of the war years through the Cheval Ailé, as did Louis Rougier, René Benjamin, Georges Bonnet, Pierre Dominique, André Thérive, Hendrik de Man, and even Dino Alfieri, Léon Degrelle and the Spanish fascist (and Franco’s brother-in-law) Ramon Serrano Suñer.64 Providing the only publishing opportunity for writers who were blacklisted, persecuted or otherwise excluded from the public sphere in France, the Cheval Ailé acted as a bridge between collaboration and the post-war French extreme-right.

Jouvenel published his magnum opus Du Pouvoir at the Cheval Ailé as well as an edition of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Du Contrat Social that included his long introductory essay.65 With Jouvenel’s help, Fabre-Luce also obtained a contract with Bourquin – an attractive alternative to amateurish self-publishing, given that most of the copies had been confiscated by the police. In Geneva, Fabre-Luce published Au Nom des Silencieux and Le Mystère du Maréchal, a longer version of his commentary on the Pétain trial, as

62 Alfred Fabre-Luce to Bertrand de Jouvenel (28 December 1945), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (299).
63 Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II, 251, 254.
64 Clavien ‘Les Intellectuels Collaborateurs Exilés en Suisse’, 87. Amongst others, see De Man, Au-Delà du Nationalisme; idem, Cavalier Seul; Du Moulin de Labarthète, Le Temps des Illusions; Serrano Suñer, Entre les Pyrénées et Gibraltar.
65 Jouvenel, Du Pouvoir; Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, 13-165.
well as a two-volume ‘final edition’ of *Journal de la France*, essentially a fundamentally cleansed and mutilated version of his four wartime books. He also published *Journal de l’Europe*, a series of political observations from post-war France, England and Italy and an attempt to continue his approach from the war years.\(^6^6\) These publications permitted Fabre-Luce to exchange his rented room in an insane asylum – the only place accepting French francs – for an apartment in Geneva that he could pay for in freshly earned Swiss currency. Especially *Au Nom des Silencieux* soon became a success in France, selling 40,000 copies in the first six months alone and inspiring an Italian translation published in 1946.\(^6^7\) In Montreal, a Canadian editor published *Double Prison* but balked at Fabre-Luce’s suggestion that he do the same with the ‘final’ *Journal de la France*, fearing the book might cause ‘emotions’ and accusations of ‘defeatism and the spirit of collaboration’\(^6^8\).

Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce’s contracts at the Cheval Ailé brought them their first post-war successes while at the same time closely associating them with people who had plunged considerably deeper into collaboration than they ever had. In 1949, at Le Cheval Ailé, Degrelle published his memoirs from his time on the eastern front where he had fought as the leader of the Walloon SS brigade and become a ‘European’ hero celebrated by Nazi propaganda. The backside of the book listed Le Cheval Ailé’s ‘greatest successes’: Du Moulin, Rougier, De Man, Bonnet, Serrano Suñer, Goebbels (his diaries) and Alfieri figured alongside Fabre-Luce (*Journal de la France*) and Jouvenel (*Du Pouvoir*).\(^5^9\) Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce did not see this as a problem. Instead, they thought of their Swiss publications as providing a necessary correction to the censorship (self-imposed or otherwise) and one-sidedness still prevailing in French journalism and publishing. In a letter to the chief editor of the *Gazette de Lausanne*, Jouvenel stated that, in Paris, his newspaper was held in great esteem for writing ‘what our newspapers don’t say’. According to Jouvenel, the *Gazette* was in fact playing ‘the role of the deliveries from Holland under the ancien régime’.\(^7^0\)


67 Fabre-Luce, *Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II*, 249, 259; idem, *La Verità sul Generale De Gaulle*, 5. Probably with some exaggeration, the introduction to the Italian translation stated that ‘millions of Frenchmen recognize themselves in this book’ and that it was ‘the most sold book in France’.

68 Paul Péladeau to Fabre-Luce (18 October 1945), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 2.


70 Jouvenel to Pierre Béguin (6 August 1946), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (300).
Understandably, these publications initially did not contribute to an end to Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel’s ostracism in France. On the contrary: both the French authorities and the left-wing press continued to see them as pariahs or worse, and this antagonism only exacerbated as their Swiss books started pouring into France. When the University of Lausanne considered making Jouvenel professor of political doctrine, the French diplomatic service in Switzerland intervened to prevent the appointment of someone with ‘anti-democratic tendencies’ who had published books under the German occupation. In the end, a French member of the appointment commission made it clear that the chair should go to a Swiss national. Similarly, the new French ambassador in Berne was outraged with Fabre-Luce’s frequent trips to Paris and his ‘propaganda against the national interest’. He alerted the French foreign ministry and called for a re-examination of his visa for Switzerland. In 1947, when Fabre-Luce was planning a trip to Belgium, he received a letter from the Belgian authorities asking him to reconsider his visit. It is unclear whether this request had been inspired by the French diplomatic service.

In August 1946, the communist newspaper Ce Soir started a full-fledged press campaign against those ‘traitors on the run’ leading a luxury life in ‘the most reactionary’ corner of Switzerland, with the help of police protection and secret funds provided by Vichy. The special reporter Serge Lang was outraged at seeing Fabre-Luce publishing his books with impunity, ‘three quarters’ of which were being spread in France. In a separate article, he tore Jouvenel apart:

This haughty character, with his monocle and his little chinstrap beard, is the laughingstock of the little village of Chexbres, above Vevey […]. The winemakers amidst whom he lives are frank and simple folks who cannot understand his pretentious manners […]. Sometimes, he tries to pose as a ‘resistant’, brandishing a certificate written by a FFI officer from Tulle, who has by the way been sacked for having given Jouvenel this certificate of complacency.

The bellicosity of these attacks could not eclipse the fact that the political climate in France had started to change. The summer of 1946 saw a turn away from the Épuration and the Resistance discourse dominated by the

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71 Assouline, Une Éminence Grise, 178, 214.
73 Cited in: Assouline, Une Éminence Grise, 211, 214.
Marxist left and towards national reconciliation, centrist politics and a willingness to forget about the recent past. At the 5 May 1946 referendum, a proposed new constitution mainly backed by the communists and socialists was narrowly defeated, much to most people’s surprise. At subsequent parliamentary elections, these two parties lost their absolute majority, while the centre-right MRP (Mouvement Républicain Populaire) replaced the PCF as France’s largest party. A tripartite coalition of MRP, PCF and SFIO subsequently drafted a new constitutional project that was finally accepted by referendum in October as the constitution of the Fourth Republic. Unhappy with the course of events and the choice for a parliamentary system instead of the strong executive he desired, De Gaulle had already relinquished his position as president of the provisional government in January 1946.74

Like many other former supporters of Pétain and collaboration, Fabre-Luce was relieved when the news of the outcome of the first referendum reached him in Switzerland and considered it a sign that ‘the tide had started to withdraw’. Pierre Andreu, who was in Paris and in a similar mood, remembered clinging to the radio during the entire night as the results from all the corners of France poured in. He was convinced that with the final result, France had narrowly escaped a communist coup of the sort that Poland and Czechoslovakia had experienced.75 Despite some friends advising him to stay where he was, Fabre-Luce decided that it was safe to end his exile and go back to Paris at the end of summer. In August, he defiantly wrote to his Juge d’Instruction pretending that he had been surprised to hear that his investigation had not been definitively closed, especially since he had regularly obtained a visa for Switzerland ‘to follow a cure’. Now that things had turned out to be otherwise and with his health sufficiently recovered, ‘I will soon come back to France and will be at your disposal at my home, 56 Avenue Foch in Paris, 1 October the latest’.76

More exchanges took place during the next two years and Fabre-Luce was questioned several times, but it was not until 1949 that his trial took place – a sign that the authorities were by this time hardly more enthusiastic about the affair than Fabre-Luce himself. Furthermore, the amateurism that had marked the early days of his persecution continued to play a role. The Juge d’Instruction hired a translator for a German text by Fabre-Luce about collaboration, without realising that he already had the original: the

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74 Rioux, *La France de la Quatrième République I*, 146, 152.
75 Fabre-Luce, *Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II*, 259; See also Andreu, *Le Rouge et le Blanc*, 240.
76 Fabre-Luce to the Juge d’Instruction (16 August 1946), Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648.
text came from the German translation of the first volume of *Journal de la France.*\textsuperscript{77} Fabre-Luce was repeatedly confused with his cousin Robert, a mistake that he did not fail to exploit in order to cast doubt about other, occasionally correct, incriminating claims. Amongst other things, Fabre-Luce denied he had ever met Léon Degrelle and been a member of the PPF, both incorrectly. He claimed that his long article about Hitler’s European Empire as a more successful successor to Napoleon’s ‘dream’ and about the need for France to be inspired by the ‘teachings’ of Hitler had never been intended to be published in the *Cahiers Franco-Allemands* in 1942.\textsuperscript{78} The authorities had the greatest trouble finding a copy of Fabre-Luce’s *Anthologie de la Nouvelle Europe,* and it had to resort to the French National Library to finally get a copy. Altogether, the trial record seems to suggest that, except for introductions and summaries, the Juge d’Instruction did not bother to actually read the four to five Fabre-Luce books that would have normally been the focal point of any trial against him.\textsuperscript{79}

These mistakes permitted Fabre-Luce to develop his double strategy of defence. Since the authorities often failed to pin him down on his manifest support for the German New Order and his admiration of National Socialism, he was able to largely bypass this inconvenient subject, limiting himself to selective self-quotations (the collaboration was a ‘black stock market’ full of ‘crooks’, Jews were ‘symbols of human suffering’, etc.), and switch to what had become his favourite topic: the political legitimacy of Vichy and Pétain. As in his publications from these years, Fabre-Luce built his defence on the supposedly positive role that Vichy – recognised by both the US and the Soviet Union as France’s legal government – had played in protecting as much as it could of the French population (including its Jews) against the Nazi onslaught, while keeping the fleet and military reserves safe until armed resistance was effectively possible. Although this policy became pointless with the German occupation of the ‘free’ zone in November 1942, it had been perfectly reasonable until that moment.\textsuperscript{80} There is a marked contrast between the relatively secondary role of Vichy in Fabre-Luce’s wartime books and the importance it had suddenly gained in his trial defence and in his post-war books. This served both as a decoy

\textsuperscript{77} Translated text and invoices by Léon Buée, Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648.
\textsuperscript{78} ‘Procès-verbal’ (4 December 1947); Fabre-Luce to the Juge d’Instruction (10 January 1948); ‘Exposé des Faits’ (19 March 1949), Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648; Reaction by Fabre-Luce to the ‘Exposé des Faits’, Fonds AFL, 472 AP 1.
\textsuperscript{79} The Service des Recherches de Presse to the Juge d’Instruction, Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648.
\textsuperscript{80} ‘Projet de Défense’, Fonds AFL, 472 AP 1.
and to cause a different kind of controversy, one that was associated with a dissenting view on France’s recent history rather than with treason.

Stressing the importance of his intellectual shift in the third volume of *Journal de la France* and of his imprisonment by the Gestapo, Fabre-Luce attempted to affirm his status as a free-thinking intellectual independent of any political power. In court, he ended his spoken defence with something that held middle ground between a challenge and a profession of faith:

My independence has already caused me several prison terms. I will persevere in the future. [...] Last Sunday on the radio, I heard the President of the Republic speak about the ‘disgrace of the armistice’. A historian by
profession, I studied all the documents relative to this question and I have formed myself a different opinion. I think the armistice was honourable, appropriate and useful. And as I think so, I say so. Since a few years, many people have ceased to express their real opinion, even if legitimate, out of fear to have ‘their files opened again’ or to make an unfavourable impression upon their judges. I will not, by adhering to what I consider a false history, buy the indulgence that I estimate I do not need. Let me be frank with you: I’d rather be condemned because of my ideas than acquitted out of ambiguity or renunciation.81

In the end, the French legal system was willing to do him this favour. On 19 March 1949, the Court of Justice of the Seine department reached its judgment. While recognising that Fabre-Luce had kept his distance from the collaboration press, it concluded that in his books from the first two occupation years, he had ‘at least indirectly, served Hitlerian propaganda’. Especially in his *Anthologie de la Nouvelle Europe*, Fabre-Luce celebrated ‘the cult of force, aristocratism, racism, the critique of democracy, Germany’s predestination to hegemony’. The judge was less pronounced in his statement on *Journal de la France*, declaring that Fabre-Luce had expressed himself ‘in a very nuanced way’, although the first two volumes were ‘clearly oriented towards intellectual and material collaboration with Germany within the framework of a New Europe’. It was also to Fabre-Luce’s advantage that he had changed his course in late 1942, spent several months in German captivity and maintained ‘a certain independence from anti-national and pro-German organisations’. Moreover, ‘it has not been established that he was in contact with members of the occupation troops’. Taking these elements into account, the judge decided that Fabre-Luce’s case was not heavy enough to be treated by a Court of Justice, and he referred the trial to the Chambres Civiques.82

The Chambres Civiques were special sections of the Courts of Justice intended for the persecution of collaborators who were not punishable under regular criminal law. This automatically meant that Fabre-Luce had escaped the verdict of ‘collusion with the enemy’ (and thus the potential sanction of forced labour, a long prison term or theoretically death) and could now only be condemned for the lighter crime of indignité nationale. Acquittal had also become unlikely, though, since the Chambres Civiques condemned

81 Fabre-Luce, [untitled], Fonds AFL, 472 AP 1.
82 Transcription of judgment by the Court of Justice (19 March 1949), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 1.
about three-quarters of the accused who appeared before them.\textsuperscript{83} On 31 May 1949, the Chambre Civique heard his case. In his memoirs, Fabre-Luce wrote that he felt pity for his judge, who had probably himself sworn an oath to Pétain and was now supposed to persecute him for his loyalty to the same man. Fabre-Luce’s defiant defence plea had not missed its effect on the prosecutor, who placed pressure on the judge to show some severity: ‘If you think he has talent, condemn him severely.’ Fabre-Luce claimed that this left him feeling almost offended when the judge condemned him to ‘only’ ten years of dégradation nationale, without banishment from the country.\textsuperscript{84}

This condemnation failed to have any concrete consequences for Fabre-Luce. Apart from his confiscated books, his property was left untouched, and within two years the first of two amnesty laws put an end to his electoral and professional restrictions. Nevertheless, and despite his own indifferent comments, Fabre-Luce was perfectly aware of the weight that the sanction carried at a symbolic level. Like tens of thousands of other Frenchmen, he had been found ‘unworthy’ of his nationality because he had served the propaganda of the enemies of the French nation and turned against its most elementary values. Several of his citizens’ rights had been temporarily taken away from him. When friends wrote him letters to express their solidarity with him, they often did so with a certain reserve.\textsuperscript{85} In a book written in 1945, Fabre-Luce had described the significance of dégradation nationale for a man who had enlisted for work in Germany in order to feed his wife and children: ‘he will have to suffer the sanction of ostracism. “Unworthy”: this word will haunt him for a long time. Around him, there will be a vague suspicion of treason.’\textsuperscript{86}

‘Beyond Nazism’: Monarchism and the Heritage of Fascism\textsuperscript{87}

Their Swiss exile brought Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce together again, with both in roughly the same circumstances. There are clear differences, however, between the position and experience of the two intellectuals during the early post-war years. Fabre-Luce’s Swiss exile was but a short intermezzo compared to Jouvenel’s, who only moved back to France at the end of the

\textsuperscript{83} Sapiro, \textit{La Responsabilité}, 540; Cointet, \textit{Expier Vichy}, 503.
\textsuperscript{84} ‘Audience’ of the Chambre Civique (31 May 1949), Dossier d’Épuration, AN, Z/6/285 dossier 8648; Fabre-Luce, \textit{Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté III}, 89.
\textsuperscript{86} Fabre-Luce, \textit{Au Nom des Silencieux}, 88.
\textsuperscript{87} Fabre-Luce, \textit{Journal de la France III} (1943), 267.
1940s. Though Jouvenel was initially as blacklisted and ostracised as Fabre-Luce, he was ultimately not the object of legal prosecution. He profited from his longer stay abroad to lay low and generally avoid provocation, mainly writing about economic subjects and political theory. This was partially because his permission to stay in Switzerland depended on it, but it was also due to changes at a personal level. Jouvenel's more distanced attitude marked a major shift in his career as a public intellectual, especially with regard to his behaviour during the interwar period, but it did not preclude sharp political remarks in private. In the meantime, as we have seen, Fabre-Luce faced persecution and condemnation. Choosing a tactic that was the exact opposite of Jouvenel's, he openly struck back at the authorities and became a vocal spokesperson of Pétainists, former collaborators and other 'victims' of the Épuration. This conscious choice in favour of controversy brought him admirers and prominence in extreme-rightist circles as well as enemies and a more lasting exclusion from the mainstream press. Despite these major tactical differences, there are striking similarities in the two intellectuals' political ideas and their affiliation with several publications and associations of the post-war French extreme right.

Both intellectuals felt uncomfortable about the demise of fascism. As the Allies landed in Sicily and Southern Italy, the Russians advanced through Eastern Europe, and the German occupation of France descended ever more into civil war and arbitrary violence, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel became aware that the approaching defeat of Germany was turning into a mirror image of how they had interpreted the Fall of France just a few years earlier. It would mark not only the end of Axis rule in Europe but also the collapse of an ideological system that they had admired and identified with for a long time. They saw fascism fall into near-universal discredit, not because of the crematoria of Auschwitz, Bełżec and Sobibór – of which they seem to have been either unaware or unable to grasp the political significance – but due to its association with brutality and treason. The disappearance of the fascist alternative cleared the way for communism or a return to parliamentary democracy – a less-than-appealing prospect for both Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce. A striking expression of this pessimism is found in the holiday greetings card that Fabre-Luce sent to Jouvenel in December 1945 in which he cynically congratulated his friend that, whatever would happen, the New Year 'couldn't be worse than the last'.

88 For a longer treatment of the personal and intellectual elements of Jouvenel’s ‘metamorphosis’, see the next chapter.
89 Alfred Fabre-Luce to Bertrand de Jouvenel (28 December 1945), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (299).
Mussolini was the first fascist leader to go. In early August 1943, just after the Duce had been deposed by the Grand Council of Fascism and imprisoned on the orders of King Victor Emmanuel III, Jouvenel reflected on his heritage. While many people saw Mussolini’s fall as proof of the victory of democracy, Jouvenel admitted to arriving at other conclusions. He noted that Mussolini had been in power for more than twenty years, about as long as the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire combined. Not only had Mussolini ‘shaped all the men who will play a role in his country for a quarter of a century to come’, he also ‘represented a principle that has manifested itself all over the world’. Furthermore, since his enemies had copied his tactics, Mussolini’s defeat was proof of the success rather than the failure of his ideology: ‘doesn’t the collapse of the providential man in Germany and Italy go together with the apotheosis of the providential man in the United States, in Great Britain and above all in Russia?’

A few months earlier, seeing Mussolini’s ‘star fade’, Fabre-Luce remarked that people had forgotten how he had ‘pulled his country out of anarchy and, during eighteen years, brought order and peace.’ People were unwilling to see that ‘even his opponents are today inspired by the political formula that he has created.’

The prospect of an Allied victory and a return to the Third Republic made Jouvenel sick with dread. In his diaries, he fulminated against ‘this horrible pre-war society without respect for essential values’ in which ‘officers were despised […] until the moment people needed them’ and in which he ‘had to write chit-chat articles for *Paris-Soir* to survive’. He was equally unenthusiastic about the ‘fake’ heroism of the Gaullists – whom he described as a collection of renegades, gamblers and adventurers – and ‘the little moralists of democracy’, inspired by nothing but ‘sentimentality and lies’. Facing this prospect, Jouvenel claimed to even prefer the communists, who at least had ‘something virile and military that pleases me’, and of course the fascists, whose style he liked even more despite having ‘fought them as a nationally-minded Frenchman’. He admitted preferring ‘the fascist punch to the adipose and suffocating envelopment of the democrat.’ Jouvenel was convinced that the victory of the Gaullists and democrats would be short-lived:

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90 Journal de travail, cahier 1 [early August 1943, exact date unknown], Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (37).
92 Journal de travail, cahier 1 (4 July 1943), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (37).
I don’t believe that my country will fall prey to this clique for long. It has lived without them for three and a half years. New ways of feeling and thinking have taken root. By living with the Germans and by fighting them, virtues similar to theirs have been awakened among us. We shall see what the returnees from London will do. [...] I give them six months before they will be overwhelmed by the communists. Against the danger of the extreme left, they will then have to call upon the men of the right, like Noske did in Germany.\textsuperscript{94}

Fabre-Luce imagined the return of Herriot as the ‘incarnation of collective foolishness’ at the head of a future government that was supposed to embody all the flaws of the Third Republic. He advised the first post-war session of parliament to start with an expiatory ceremony during which the MPs would have to wear dunce caps and write down ‘elementary truths’ on a chalkboard such as ‘It is impossible to win without working’, ‘A defeat forces one to take the victor into account’ and ‘It takes young people to nourish the old’.\textsuperscript{95}

After the war, Jouvenel explained fascism as a counter-reaction against communism that was as regrettable as it was useful. Fascism copied and sometimes ‘exaggerated’ communist methods, since only these were capable of protecting society from the Bolshevik ‘poison’ against which a regular democracy was defenceless.\textsuperscript{96} Fabre-Luce went further than that, and once the \textit{Épuration}’s most heated phase was over he was not afraid to say so in public. According to him, fascism had a larger positive legacy that could not be ignored by discarding it as a whole. Fascism was worthwhile both as ‘a reaction against [Soviet] totalitarianism’ and ‘a generous effort to render to the bourgeoisie its value as an elite [...] and to unify the people, not through envy, civil war or foreign imitation, but through the admiration of a leader and the cult of the fatherland’.\textsuperscript{97} In another publication, he listed what he saw as the ‘best’ elements of National Socialism: ‘the cult of work, the sense of a community, the respect of natural hierarchies, and even a certain pride of white man that is the superior form of racism’.\textsuperscript{98}

Referring to Salazar and Mussolini as examples, Fabre-Luce stressed that terror, racism and warmongering were neither exclusive nor necessary traits

\textsuperscript{94} Cited in Delbecque, ‘Bertrand de Jouvenel ou le Libéral Désenchanté’, 300.
\textsuperscript{95} Fabre-Luce, \textit{Journal de la France III} (1943), 255, 257. See also id, \textit{Journal de la France IV} (1944), 49.
\textsuperscript{97} Fabre-Luce, ‘Devant le Monstre’, in \textit{Persiflages}, eds. Clay e.a., 34. Italics in original.
\textsuperscript{98} Fabre-Luce, \textit{Le Projet Churchill}, 79.
of fascism.99 In a statement reminiscent of his 1942 distinction between good (Europeanist) and bad (opportunistic) collaborators, he claimed there had been good and bad fascists in France. While both groups had been sincere in their will to defend their country against the Bolshevik menace, the latter had ‘undergone the Hitlerian contagion to the point of preferring their political solidarity with Germany to the French interest’, while the former had only retained ‘certain assimilable elements’ of fascist ideology like unity, discipline and a strong executive with the objective of using these to establish ‘the French conditions of freedom’. While the former had been ‘traitors’, the latter were ‘patriots’ who had an important contribution to make to post-war politics and society.100

Despite their lasting appreciation of fascism, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel could not entirely ignore the Holocaust and its moral implications. In their publications immediately following the end of the war, both intellectuals explicitly mentioned the death camps, albeit drawing very different conclusions than those predominant today. Instead of the emphasis put today on the uniqueness of the Holocaust as a genocidal event of unprecedented scope and brutality, Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel saw it as an integral part of larger developments in politics and civilisation.101 Fabre-Luce, whose brother-in-law François de Brantes had been arrested for Resistance activities and died in Mauthausen,102 welcomed the Nuremberg trials, especially as punishment for the ‘sadistic torture’ of the camp system. Although the Allies could have simply executed those responsible on the spot ‘without shocking anyone’, a trial was the better option because it showed to the world how these crimes had become possible. Only by letting the Nazi leaders speak could ‘their ignominy and their stupidity’ fully come to light: ‘how they have killed their state in the name of the state, betrayed their fatherland while invoking it and committed, by “realism”, crimes that coalesced invincible forces against them’.103

Fabre-Luce, who managed to discuss Nuremberg and the camps without mentioning Jews, also stressed that ‘a single nuclear bomb destroys as many lives as a German extermination camp’. He was outraged that the Russians – the ‘inventors of the concentration camp’ – were present in Nuremberg solely as judges and not as accused. Referring to Jouvenel’s Du Pouvoir, Fabre-Luce

99 Fabre-Luce, Le Siècle Prend Figure, 218.
100 Fabre-Luce, Hors d’Atteinte, 201.
102 Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II, 234; Garbe, Alfred Fabre-Luce, 265.
103 Fabre-Luce, Hors d’Atteinte, 96.
remarked that ‘Roosevelt (or his successor) has let the assassins of Katyn put on a judge’s cap’, something that ‘Wilson would not have dared to do’. This development illustrated how far morality had regressed between 1919 and 1945.104 Fabre-Luce was unconvinced that the crimes of Nazi racism would necessarily lead to a lasting discredit of eugenics and what Jouvenel called ‘biopolitics’. Though regretting that Hitler had ‘compromised’ it, he continued to be interested in negative eugenics as a way to improve the genetic make-up of the population. Again citing Rostand, who had already figured in his 1942 *Anthologie*, he stated that the ‘sterilisation of idiots’ remained a useful instrument to achieve the ‘extinction’ of certain ‘flaws of society’.105

With arguments very similar to those later used by Ernst Nolte, Fabre-Luce even suggested that the contagious influence of the Soviet Union – ‘a Slavic semi-barbarianism’ – was somehow to blame for the crimes the Germans had committed. In reaction to the violence of the Russian Revolution, Central Europe’s conservative forces had gradually borrowed its methods, thereby drifting away from Western civilisation. Hitler’s war against the Soviet Union had done the rest. In France, ‘the correct occupier that we have known in 1940’ had by 1942 turned into a barbarian ‘drunken with blood’: ‘he came back from a country that refused to admit the Red Cross and to humanise war’.106 Even the French Resistance had drunk from this well, since it had triumphed over ‘Hitlerism’ only to ‘repeat, to a certain extent, its excesses’.

This made the Nuremberg trials a deserved, though very selective, punishment for crimes that Fabre-Luce linked to a plethora of other acts.

For Jouvenel, the concentration camps were yet another sign that he was living in profoundly barbaric and inhumane times. In a peculiarly pessimistic article, written for the Swiss *Curieux* in March 1945, he compared the Holocaust to the Allied bombing of German cities as two symptoms of a general rupture of civilisation. The first had been ‘the largest manhunt in history’ during which ‘hundreds of thousands, maybe millions of men, women, even children’ had first been ‘marked as prey’ by the wearing of the yellow star and subsequently arrested, separated and deported ‘as if by the slavers of the past’. And ‘a great people’, which had made ‘an immense contribution to our common culture, the people of Leibnitz, Bach and Goethe, has allowed this abomination to take place in its name!’ And now (with Jouvenel apparently still unsure about what had happened to the Jews

104 Fabre-Luce, *Le Siècle Prend Figure*, 155, 156; idem, *Hors d’Atteinte*, 96.
107 Fabre-Luce, *Le Siècle Prend Figure*, 155.
after their deportation) another ‘drama’ was unfolding, as Allied carpet bombing marked ‘the greatest extermination operation in history’. Noting that 51% of Königsberg had been destroyed and 69% of Darmstadt, he wondered if mankind had fallen back into savagery. ‘But savages themselves are incapable of this kind of fierce cruelty. Their destructive rages are brief, ours is systematic.’ Jouvenel stated that civilisation as such was not at fault, it was the gradual political usurpation of religion and morality and the subsequent development of political ‘pseudo-religions’ that was to blame:

How can one not see that […] it was by posing as a spiritual and moral leader that Hitler was able to excite the foolish fanaticism that Europe has fallen victim to? How not see that it was by promising a moral order that his adversaries have rallied the peoples? And who would dare to assure that these promises will be kept? For political reasons, propaganda has forged pseudo-religions of which the people are now possessed. The creators of these great emotions have lost control over them. And we see the destruction of cultural heritage in the name of civilisation, the massacre of women and children in the name of humanity, the rule of injustice in the name of justice and the death of intellectuals in the name of the mind [l'esprit].

Apart from these lamentations, what kind of political future did Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce envisage for the post-war period? Although pessimism often predominated, the two intellectuals’ hopes and aspirations were reflected in two elements: a political synthesis of fascism and freedom, and a new attempt at European unification. During the last years of the war, Fabre-Luce rejected a return to parliamentarianism as essentially an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ machination to forever prevent Franco-German rapprochement. ‘To a pure Frenchman, parliamentarianism and Nazism appear both as foreign imports. If we have kept some pride, we will reject them equally and we will be the first to develop the political synthesis that the whole of Europe will end up looking for.’ Jouvenel was less hopeful about these prospects, writing in his diary about his fear that ‘for all the brutality and

109 XXX [Bd], ‘La Confusion’. For more on these aspects of Jouvenel’s thought, see the next chapter.
110 Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France III (1943), 254.
the clumsiness of their approach, the Germans may have been Europe’s last chance’.\footnote{Cited in Dard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, 191.}

At the national level, Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce looked for a political alternative to parliamentarism that would secure fascism’s ‘positive’ legacy – essentially understood as order, unity, authority and heroism – without plunging into the murderous chaos of war. At the same time, this peace-loving ‘néo-fascisme assoupli\footnote{Fabre-Luce, Le Siècle Prend Figure, 218.} would have to be strong enough to fight communism, and to effectively do so it needed the free use of methods that were not allowed within a democratic system. Fabre-Luce specified what measures he deemed necessary to counteract ‘communist sabotage’: the dissolution of trade unions and their replacement by state-led corporations, a ban on strikes, the interdiction of the PCF and the removal of communist MPs from parliament. Although these measures were ‘incompatible with formal liberty’, universal suffrage and freedom of association, they would allow ‘the vast majority of citizens to breathe freely’. As an example, he referred to the constitution of Salazar’s Portugal, which promised freedom of expression while also providing for all kinds of ‘special laws to repress “any perversion of public opinion”. In fact, it is always possible to camouflage fascism as a “presidential republic”. That is the deep tendency of neo-Gaullism.\footnote{Ib., 219.}

Yet Fabre-Luce was obviously not attracted to Gaullism. During the mid-1940s, a monarchy best reflected both intellectuals’ aspirations. In 1943, Fabre-Luce first mentioned the possibility that Vichy’s failed National Revolution might succeed in a future liberated France under the authority of a fresh ‘leader or monarch’. One year later, he suggested that France needed a king both to re-establish order in society and as a rampart against totalitarian tyranny. All the ancien régime’s abuse of power was surely nothing compared to the revolutionary terror that succeeded it.\footnote{Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France III (1943), 257; idem, Journal de la France IV (1944), 50.} In 1946, he admitted thinking, ‘after having for a long time held a different opinion, that the overthrow of monarchy at the end of the eighteenth century has been a serious mistake’. He even interpreted this regicide as a psychoanalytical root cause of the hatred and violence that had henceforth characterised French politics: ‘Vaguely, France continues to reproach itself for having murdered its king and queen, and it tries to justify itself with new violence.\footnote{Fabre-Luce, Hors d’Atteinte, 203, 204.} Even in 1949, when the Fourth Republic had long since established itself, Fabre-Luce continued to
stress that France needed ‘a hereditary prince’ to re-establish ‘an exchange of feelings between rulers and ruled, a common consciousness of responsibility towards the ancestors, a presence of the sacred’. Fabre-Luce also published *Une Tragédie Royale* (1948), a book about the Belgian king Leopold III, whose behaviour during the occupation had given rise to the Royal Question and his replacement by a regent. He had nothing but praise for the exiled king – ‘le plus pur des épurés’ – whose ‘mystique’ he presented as the only thing that stood in the way of a communist takeover. Without the king’s influence as a ‘mediator’, Belgium was bound to fall prey to the sectarian politics and mutual hatred that had already marked the *Épuration*.

Fabre-Luce avoided explicitly naming his candidate for king of France, but he was referring to Henri d’Orléans (1908–1999), ‘Comte de Paris’ and Orleanist heir to the French throne as King Henry VI. Banished from France like all pretenders under the Third Republic, Henri had lived in Belgium during the 1930s, occasionally visiting the country in secret and publishing a newspaper, *Courrier Royal*, which targeted his French followers. Despite the Action Française being the only serious political movement that campaigned in his favour, Henri d’Orléans gradually distanced himself from Maurras and his crew and in 1937 publicly condemned their doctrine of ‘integral nationalism’. This did not mean he lacked political ambition. Since the February 1934 riots had convinced him that regime change was possible, the Comte de Paris nourished the hope of somehow becoming France’s ‘providential man’ as a stepping stone to claiming the throne.

When Pétain usurped that position in 1940, Henri publicly announced his support of Vichy, hoping to eventually become his successor. Pétain and Laval, however, showed only minimal interest in the Comte de Paris, so he then tried his luck with the other side. Residing in Morocco, he established connections with Allies and members of the Resistance. In December 1942, he was involved in a royalist assassination plot aiming to put him in charge of French North Africa instead of Darlan. Though Darlan was shot dead by a monarchist member of the Resistance and Henri arrived in Algiers to claim power, his attempt was thwarted by the categorical refusal of the Americans to accept this *fait accompli*. Power went to Giraud, while the Comte de Paris was sent back to Morocco, suffering from an infection and discredited in the eyes of the Allies.

116 Fabre-Luce, *Le Siècle Prend Figure*, 223.
118 Osgood, *French Royalism Under the Third and Fourth Republics*, 128, 133.
Jouvenel had been in touch with Henri d’Orléans since the mid-1930s, when they became acquainted via the Catholic agrarian syndicalist (and future Vichy agriculture minister) Jacques Le Roy Ladurie. Fabre-Luce first met him during a trip to Morocco in late 1941, and the young pretender’s modesty and charm made a very favourable impression on him. He regretted that the 1942 plot had not succeeded in bringing the Comte de Paris back to power. In 1947, Henri was a frequent guest at his friend Jardin’s tea parties in Vevey, possibly meeting Jouvenel there and trying to win the support of the exiled Pétainists and collaborators for his plans for a French constitutional monarchy as part of a new European Holy Roman Empire. The Comte’s Swiss activities gave rise to speculations in the French press about a ‘Leman Connection’ and the existence of a ‘Maquis Noir’ of extreme-rightist resisters, monarchists and Vichyites plotting to overthrow the republic. An official inquiry by the French embassy in Berne concluded that no such conspiracy existed, but the prince felt obliged to deny the allegations in public.

During the same years, with the Action Française out of the way due to its role in Vichy and the trial and condemnation of Maurras, the Comte de Paris made an attempt to revive the monarchist movement in France and tie it to his own ideas. Amongst other press initiatives, he founded the weekly *Ici France* that bore Henri’s motto ‘La mission essentielle du pouvoir est de rendre les hommes heureux’ as a second title. Contributors consisted essentially of close collaborators of the Comte de Paris (Pierre Longone), Catholic conservatives (Gabriel Marcel, Gustave Thibon) and extreme-rightists (Pierre Boutang, Antoine Blondin, François Le Grix). In its fourth edition, the front page of *Ici France* approvingly cited a statement by Fabre-Luce about the ‘nationalisation’ of the British royal family as the embodiment of the nation in which the people were happy to recognise themselves. Jouvenel contributed several articles to *Ici France* in which he criticised the popularity of revolutionary ideologies and defended the concept of order as the foundation of Western civilisation. All the talk of a ‘Révolution permanente’ was nothing but ‘an inversion of aesthetic, moral and above all religious sense’. In line with these conservative ideas, Jouvenel also worried about the intellectual development of French youth, for the

120 Walter, *Paysan Militant*, 222.
121 Fabre-Luce, *Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II*, 101; idem, *Le Siècle Prend Figure*, 223.
first time not counting himself as part of it. In order to prevent young people from falling prey to cynical opportunism or ‘base Marxism’, intellectuals and teachers had an important role to play. But all too often these very intellectuals had themselves become recruiters in party service, which led Jouvenel to conclude that ‘M. Benda had not been wrong to denounce the “treason of the clerics”. If there was a natural selection in the world of ideas, it worked not in the normal way but rather ‘virus-like’: ‘the newest ones often prove to be the most vigorous, and, as far as we are concerned, the most dangerous’.124

With their republican upper-bourgeois origins, Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce lacked the conservative Catholic background that was the natural hotbed of French monarchism, but their post-war affiliation with the Comte de Paris is not surprising if one takes a closer look at the political programme defended by Henri d’Orléans. First of all, Henri had shaken off the suffocating embrace of the Action Française while keeping certain corporatist ideas advocated by the right wing of the 1930s non-conformist movement. Claiming to oppose party struggle and the mutual hatred of left and right, his vision of monarchical restoration promised order, social peace and a certain degree of democracy. Like the two intellectuals and many other former collaborators, he was also a supporter of the European federalist movement. Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce recognised their own political desires in the Comte de Paris’ promise that his royal ‘mystique’ – something the Fourth Republic entirely lacked – was the only way to reconcile France’s warring factions (republicans, socialists, Gaullists and former Pétainists) and unite them against the communist menace.125

**Reinventing the Extreme Right**

*Ici France* soon shipwrecked due to poor sales as well as competition from *Aspects de la France*, not only in its initials a reincarnation of *L’Action Française*. A few years later, the Comte de Paris entirely abandoned all royalist propaganda as a precondition for permission to return to France. This robbed Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel of only one out of many journalistic platforms. Fabre-Luce also contributed to *Aspects de la France* – the newspaper


125 Goyet, *Henri d’Orléans*, 279; Osgood, *French Royalism*, 191. For more about European federalism, see the final part of this chapter.
that the young law student Jean-Marie Le Pen at the time was energetically hawking on the rue de la Sorbonne – but the two intellectuals’ main activities were for publications issued by the broader extreme right.126 Not that there was a big difference between the two. Despite its moderate tone, *Ici France* overlapped with other extreme-right periodicals in its themes – anti-communism, attacks on the *Épuration*, praise for Francoist Spain and other authoritarian regimes – and at least partially in its personnel. In France as well as in exile, monarchists, Pétainists, former collaborators, fascists and anti-republican Catholics were quick to reorganise themselves after 1944. Their very real political differences were largely sublimated by their shared troubles with the *Épuration*, their position as outcasts in the post-war order, and their rejection of the Fourth Republic and its ‘system’. Grouped together under the epithet ‘opposition nationale’, this community revolved around several ‘study centres’ bearing very general names in order not to arouse suspicion. To avoid covert censorship like being cut off from the paper supply, their press often started as members-only bulletins before becoming regular periodicals in 1946 or 1947. Contributors used multiple pseudonyms and had to resort to side activities to make ends meet.127

The most successful extreme-right press initiative in the late 1940s, *Les Écrits de Paris*, published contributions from both Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel. Founded in 1946 as *Questions Actuelles*, the internal bulletin for members of the ‘Centre d’Études des Questions Actuelles, Politiques, Économiques et Sociales’ and initially camouflaging itself as a monthly of the moderate right, its true political colour had already begun to show before it transformed into a regular periodical at the beginning of 1947. Chief editor René Malliavin oriented the journal along two main lines: the struggle against the ‘lynch law’ of the *Épuration* and the defence – close to veneration in practice – of Marshal Pétain and the Vichy regime. After Pétain’s death in 1951, the *Écrits* continued to dedicate commemorative articles to him, often written by Jacques Isorni, the lawyer who had eloquently defended him at his trial. Many contributors were old (Pierre Dominique, Émile Roche, Jean Montigny, Maurice Martin du Gard) or new (Pierre Boutang, Henri Massis, René Gillouin, François Le Grixt) acquaintances of Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel. The fiercely anti-Semitic Xavier Vallat, who had headed Vichy’s

127 Vinen, *Bourgeois Politics in France*, 104. Vinen mentions one case of a journalist who ‘supported himself by writing books about the English royal family under the pseudonym Caroline Jones’.
General Commissariat for Jewish Questions, also contributed articles to the periodical. Under Malliavin’s leadership, the Écrits de Paris soon grew from a circulation of 4,000 to about 30,000 copies, making it by far the largest extreme-right press initiative of the late 1940s.  

From the beginning, its editors held Fabre-Luce in high esteem for his outspoken attacks against the Épuration. In December 1946, Questions Actuelles paid tribute to him as the ‘psychoanalyst of the Resistance’ for his dissecting analysis of the Resistance mentality in Hors d’Atteinte. In this book, Fabre-Luce interpreted the ‘hysteria’ of the Épuration and the Gaullist Resistance myth – “I am big and strong, I have never been beaten, I liberated myself” – as symptoms of ‘overcompensation’ for a reality that was much less glorious and of which even the noisiest ‘résistantiste’ was secretly aware: France had lost the war in record time in 1940, after which it had been ‘successively occupied by all the belligerents’, and all the Resistance had done was to make things worse by creating a vicious circle of mutual bloodshed. Pretending to put France on the Freudian sofa, Fabre-Luce concluded that the nation was not very different from the girl suffering from erotic dreams who punished herself with neuralgia. Similarly, France was ‘secretly in love with Nazism’, and it punished itself for these ‘bad thoughts’ through political paralysis and food deprivation.

Similarly, Fabre-Luce saw the Épuration as essentially a ‘biological struggle. It’s about sterilizing the opponent, through prison or ostracism, for the period of his life during which he can act and enrich himself with experience. They try to prematurely ossify him.” He was furious against left-wing intellectuals who approved of the Épuration, especially Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, whom he felt had blood on her hands for refusing to sign Brasillach’s clemency request because she claimed he had during his trial ‘conquered her respect’. By honourably recognising Brasillach as an existentialist free to undergo the ultimate consequences of his choices, Beauvoir had proven the ‘inhumane rigidity’ of her principles. While Camus and Maurice Merleau-Ponty also initially defended harsh justice against collaborators and violence ‘in the name of the proletariat’, they had at least been willing to admit their mistakes, whilst Sartre and Beauvoir never had such scruples. For Fabre-Luce, Sartre symbolised the

128 Algazy, La Tentation Néo-Fasciste, 66; Cotillon, Ce Qu’il Reste de Vichy, 122.
130 Fabre-Luce, Journal 1951, 95.
‘résistantialiste’ whose own Resistance credentials were ‘very questionable’. ‘During the Épuration, Jean-Paul Sartre published a defence of the Jews that would have been admirable during the occupation. But, at the same moment, he pinned the yellow star on other chests, the ones of the indigènes nationaux, who were the Jews of the moment’. ¹³¹

Starting from early 1948, Fabre-Luce soon became one of the most authoritative voices expressing themselves in the Écrits de Paris, publishing an impressive 26 articles between 1948 and 1954. He published travel impressions, excerpts from his new books and commentary on foreign policy¹³² but also a criticism of the Fourth Republic dubbed ‘the reign of chaos’. While the biggest merit of Vichy had been to keep the country safe from ‘Polandisation’ (the famous idea that Hitler would have treated France in the same way as Poland if it hadn’t been for Vichy) and with an intact elite able to rebuild the country, the post-war situation came down to a carnivalesque travesty of values and hierarchies that had devastated France. Fabre-Luce held the republican regime responsible for lowering the nation’s gold reserves, rising inflation, sinking living standards for the ‘honnêtes gens’ (while all kinds of crooks could freely enrich themselves), the fall in productivity, the weakening of the army and foreign exploitation of French diplomacy. Since no one still believed in the regime, its collapse was only a matter of time. The communists had secured important positions within the regime ‘in preparation of the next war’, while the Gaullists were actively working to make the chaos worse, hoping that a final crisis would bring their icon to power.¹³³

Apart from printing Fabre-Luce’s frequent articles, the Écrits de Paris also prominently announced his upcoming lectures and books.¹³⁴ This was scant consolation for the near-complete silence of the mainstream press, which not only rarely reviewed his books but also often refused to publish paid advertisements for them. In reaction to one such refusal from Le Figaro, Fabre-Luce sent a personal letter to a number of readers of the newspaper, objecting to ‘a systematic operation of suppression’ against his work. At least one reader agreed, replying to Fabre-Luce that Le Figaro

¹³¹ Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté II, 264, 267.
¹³² See, for example, Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘La Séparation de Wynendaele’, Écrits de Paris (February 1948); idem, ‘Dublin 1948’, Écrits de Paris (October 1948); idem, ‘Impressions d’Allemagne’, Écrits de Paris (November 1949); idem, ‘Crise au Quay d’Orsay?’, Écrits de Paris (December 1951).
¹³⁴ See Écrits de Paris (January 1948); idem (February 1949); idem (March, 1950) idem (November 1953).
was indeed unequalled in its ‘cowardliness and spinelessness’. This letter was yet another episode in a long-running feud between Fabre-Luce and the newspaper and especially its long-time chief editor Pierre Brisson. After supporting (and accepting subsidies from) Vichy between 1940 and 1942, *Le Figaro* had ceased publication when the Germans occupied the southern zone. Fabre-Luce was outraged that after 1944, Brisson hypocritically tried to ‘buy an antedated “resistance” certificate’ by attacking other Pétainists, including Fabre-Luce himself. When *l’Humanité* reminded Brisson of his former Pétainism, the editor, rather than standing by these positions, humbly acknowledged his own lack of ‘perspicacity’. Fabre-Luce furiously concluded that Brisson’s fabricated ‘super-Gaullism’ was nothing but ‘insurance’ against his own past: ‘He went to the “Resistance” just like Maurice Chevalier went to the communists, and he has been rewarded for that – because, as everyone knows, the “collaborator” is not the man who approved of Montoire or sang for the Germans, but whoever subscribed neither with Gaulle, nor with Thorez.’

Fabre-Luce was angry enough to resort to menace. In 1953, in response to an article by Dominique Auclères in *Le Figaro* accusing him of being a member of a ‘fascist international’, Fabre-Luce demanded that his reply be published unabridged, threatening legal action if the newspaper failed to do so. When the publication of his letter (together with a reaction by Auclères) failed to satisfy him, he wrote another reply, personally addressing himself to Brisson: ‘For as far as my opinions are concerned, I do not recognise you any right to judge them. You have too much forgotten your support of Marshal Pétain to conserve its merit, and I only accept resistance lessons from the journalists I met in the Gestapo prisons.’ Demanding once more the full publication of these words, Fabre-Luce concluded with a threatening postscript: ‘If you desire to continue this controversy about the past – which I have not aroused – I am at your disposal, with a very complete record.’

In 1955, after he discovered that even the Swiss press was uninterested in his recent *Histoire de la Révolution Européenne*, a furious Fabre-Luce wrote Jouvenel asking him to signal his book to the *Gazette de Lausanne*: ‘That the work of several years [...] is not even noticed by the French big press

135 Fabre-Luce to unnamed readers of *Le Figaro* (8 July 1949) and response from a reader [name and date illegible], Fonds AFL, 472 AP 3.
137 Fabre-Luce, *Hors d’Atteinte*, 165, 166.
138 Fabre-Luce to Pierre Brisson (15 April 1953), idem to Pierre Brisson (21 April 1953), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 1.
(with one exception) does not need to surprise us. That is the way things are. But if Switzerland also participates in this conspiracy of silence, what hope do we still have?"\footnote{Fabre-Luce to Bertrand de Jouvenel (21 January 1955), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (299). In response, Jouvenel cited the book in one of his own articles in the \textit{Gazette de Lausanne}.}

Fabre-Luce did not share the uncritical veneration of Pétain that is present in the articles of Isorni and several other contributors of the \textit{Écrits de Paris}. In his eyes and at least retrospectively, the Marshal had, despite his ‘good intentions’, made a mistake by staying in Vichy after November 1942, and many of his later decisions were also questionable.\footnote{Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘M. Charles Roux Relate Cinq Mois Tragiques aux Affaires Étrangères et M. Schlumberger Commente le Procès Pétain’, \textit{Écrits de Paris} (January 1950), 94; idem, \textit{Journal} 1951, 307, 390.} But this did not stop Fabre-Luce from making his occasional contribution to the Pétain cult. When the Marshal died, Fabre-Luce was ‘by coincidence’ just spending a holiday weekend at the Île d’Yeu, the isle off the Vendée coast where the Marshal had been imprisoned since 1945. He watched the arrival of Pétainists, First World War veterans and a few officials of the state and the Catholic Church, all emerging from the same small ferry that linked the island to the mainland. He met Pétain’s widow and attended the funeral service at the Yeu Marine cemetery. In a special mourning edition of the \textit{Écrits de Paris}, Fabre-Luce reported from Yeu with an homage to ‘the man whom, in our times, the French have loved the most’. He expressed the hope that his inconsiderable grave, ‘amidst drowned sailors, crashed English pilots and German occupiers who died of neurasthenia’, would be only temporary, in preparation for his glorious reburial at the Douaumont Os- suary near Verdun.\footnote{Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘À l’Île d’Yeu’, \textit{Écrits de Paris} (July 1951), 35, 38; idem, \textit{Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté III}, 185.}

Jouvenel started publishing in the \textit{Écrits de Paris} in early 1947, one year before Fabre-Luce. During his two-and-a-half-year involvement with the review and in line with his general post-war attitude, he stuck to his careful avoidance of political provocation, mainly addressing economic topics or political ideas and treating these subjects in an analytical, distinguished style. Nevertheless, the concrete political dimension of his contributions is evident. In November 1947, Jouvenel favourably contrasted the ‘happy impotence’ of royal power during the ancien régime – held at bay by traditional beliefs and feelings of responsibility – to the ‘arbitrary despotism’ of popular sovereignty. In April of the same year, he stated that the British Labour
government’s interventionist economic policy was inevitably leading the country towards Soviet authoritarianism.142

Jouvenel also contributed to La France Catholique, a right-wing weekly linked to the Action Catholique (the successor to Édouard de Castelnau’s Fédération Nationale Catholique from the interwar years) that catered to conservatives, monarchists and many former or unrepentant Pétainists. Its chief editor, Jean de Fabrègues, was a 1930s ‘non-conformist’ and former supporter of the AF, PPF and Vichy whom Jouvenel knew from La Lutte des Jeunes and their joint activities for Doriot. Although he may have published in La France Catholique before, Jouvenel’s contributions only started to become a regular feature in early 1950 when Fabrègues offered him 3,000 francs per article.143 Their correspondence shows a mutual admiration and the conviction of fighting for a common cause but also frequent clashes about the general line of the weekly, especially regarding the wars of decolonisation. In early 1952, after discovering that a sentence had been deleted from one of his articles, Jouvenel angrily complained about the periodical’s utterly un-Christian ‘right-wing howling’ and announced he saw no choice but to cease his collaboration, even if that meant a ‘financial sacrifice’ for him.144 Jouvenel’s contributions did not cease, however, and in September 1952, his criticism of French policy in Tunisia led to him receiving angry letters from readers. More clashes followed in 1955 and one year later, Fabrègues’ refusal to publish an article in which Jouvenel expressed his shock about the French bombing of the Tunisian village of Sakhiet Sidi Youssef led to a lasting break between the two.145

Jouvenel was in touch with other Vichy nostalgics, united in the Association des Représentants du Peuple de la Troisième République (ARPTR). Camouflaging as a generic association of Third Republic politicians and led by Catholic priest and former MP Jean-Marie Desgranges, the ARPTR in fact represented those who had been declared ineligible to run for political office due to their vote in favour of full powers for Pétain in 1940. The organisation’s main objectives were to campaign against the ‘illegal’ ineligibility law and

143 Jean de Fabrègues to Jouvenel (13 February 1950), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (299); Cotillon, Ce Qu’il Reste de Vichy, 121.
144 Jouvenel to Fabrègues (undated, 1952). See also Fabrègues to Jouvenel (25 September 1950); Jouvenel to Fabrègues (10 August 1952), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (299).
145 Jouvenel to anonymous reader (12 September 1952); Jouvenel to Fabrègues (29 October 1955), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (299); Dard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, 313.
against the system of the Fourth Republic, plead for a general amnesty and an end to the Épuration, fight communism and defend the heritage of Vichy by stressing the legal continuity between the Third Republic and Pétain’s regime. The ARPTR published a journal, sought and received the support of French and foreign politicians and organised a petition to the United Nations.\textsuperscript{146} Desgranges, who had himself been exempted from ineligibility because of his Resistance activities, also authored a book about the ‘Hidden Crimes of Résistantialisme’. This concept, originally coined by Malliavin, conveniently created a distance between the actual wartime Resistance and the ideology that exploited its heritage after the liberation. In the eyes of Desgranges and many other extreme-rightists, while the Resistance had its merits, résistantialisme was a base ideology of hatred and persecution that was the driving force behind the Épuration, mainly adhered to by people with fairly limited or no real Resistance credentials. A recurrent theme in the ARPTR campaigns was to describe Vichy and the Resistance as two equally honourable reactions to the defeat, with both sides counting a few criminal individuals amongst them.\textsuperscript{147}

The highlight in the existence of the ARPTR was the ‘Banquêt des Mille’ that it organised in March 1948. This massive ‘banquet of a thousand ineligibles’, marking the centenary of the 1848 revolution, featured speeches by a dozen prominent ineligible politicians, including former Third Republic and Vichy minister Pierre-Étienne Flandin. In his speech, included in an official ARPTR brochure among Jouvenel’s papers, Flandin positively contrasted the patriotism and unity of the Third Republic with the ‘present disorder’ of the Fourth, while stating that the liberation had only exchanged Hitler’s imperialism for Stalin’s. Unless a strong European federation quickly took hold and received American support, Flandin concluded, ‘mankind’s only choice is between the totalitarian mill and death!’ The banquet ended with a short speech by Desgranges, during which he requested a minute of silence for ‘the thousands of innocent’ who were still in prison. In terms befitting a defender of the Third Republic, he called them ‘the new Dreyfuses’ and compared their sort to that of the Jews during the War: ‘Remember that the people of Paris have eased the ignominy of the yellow star by paying the highest respect to those who were forced to wear it.’\textsuperscript{148}

\textsuperscript{146} Côtillon, Ce Qu’il Reste de Vichy, 172; Vinen, Bourgeois Politics in France, 106.
\textsuperscript{147} Côtillon, Ce Qu’il Reste de Vichy, 172, 174. Vinen, Bourgeois Politics in France, 103. See also Michel Daclier [pseudonym of René Malliavin], ‘Le Résistantialisme’, Écrits de Paris (January 1947).
\textsuperscript{148} Association des Représentants du Peuple de la IIIe République, Banquet des ’Mille’ du 14 Mars 1948: Les Discours (1948), brochure included in Fonds BdJ, Don 90 39 (13).
Jouvenel’s own ideas were politically close to the ARPTR, especially when it came to denying the legitimacy of the post-war order by describing Vichy and the Resistance as equally honourable, or collaboration and the Épuration as equally reprehensible reactions to the course of events. In 1946, he characterised the Fourth Republic as essentially a system of lies of opportunism: in a ‘society bereft of foresight or principles’, people were mainly occupied with proving that they had been ‘neither a collaborator, nor munichois, nor anti-communist’ just like they had asserted in 1940 that they were ‘neither Jewish, nor freemason, and that they had never been a warmonger’. Continuing this comparison, Jouvenel stated that under the tripartite coalition of PCF, SFIO and MRP, people had cowardly accustomed themselves to the illusion of ‘a quasi-communism that would not be communist, just like they did under Vichy with a quasi-fascism that would not be fascist’.149 In a letter to Rudolph Binion in 1954, he described the Épuration and the collaboration as ‘two periods of autocracy and madness’.150

Olivier Dard, Jouvenel’s biographer, seems a bit too eager to justify Jouvenel’s contributions to the Écrits de Paris by pointing to his ‘marginalisation’ in the mainstream press, downplaying the importance of Jouvenel’s ideological proximity to the post-war extreme-right.151 Nonetheless, Fabre-Luce’s position in these circles was more prominent than Jouvenel’s. Fabre-Luce’s journalistic productivity, his outspokenness and his position as a ‘victim’ of the Épuration earned him the admiration of many members of the extreme right, who often asked for his help. The Belgian fascist journalist Robert Poulet, an acquaintance of Fabre-Luce from the 1930s who was arrested after the liberation and put in prison awaiting an execution that was ultimately not carried out, was forever beholden to Fabre-Luce for enabling him to publish an excerpt from his prison memoirs in the French press. In several long letters, he expressed his gratitude to Fabre-Luce and emphasised how important he had become for him and his fellow prisoners:

Should I repeat to you how strongly, inside this hell and around it, we admire you, love you? We thought that your career would be that of a superior but cerebral and aloof writer. For five or six years, your books, and the man who appears through it, have found the hearts of countless readers. Something has magnificently grown in your person, in your heart, in your destiny. If one looks for the origin of this change, one finds

150 Jouvenel to Rudolph Binion (August/September 1954), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (294).
151 Dard, Bertrand de Jouvenel, 266.
this: you have been courageous at the moment when all your colleagues were cowardly. You alone have not stepped back from certain truths.\footnote{152}

Fabre-Luce’s prominence was also recognised outside this milieu. In 1955, Jean Paulhan named three men who were important for the resurgence of the extreme right since the Liberation: Pierre Boutang, Maurice Bardèche and Fabre-Luce.\footnote{153}

Fabre-Luce received a letter, addressed ‘from the French border’, from Pierre Clementi, a French fascist who had founded a tiny fascist fringe party in 1934 that became one of the supporting pillars of the LVF during the war. Having fought on the eastern front in 1942-1943, Clementi chose to go into hiding in Italy and Germany when the war was over to escape the death penalty. Clementi expressed his admiration for Fabre-Luce’s work and asked him for a copy of \textit{Au Nom des Silencieux} and other books published through the Cheval Ailé. Through Clementi’s tips about the Italian press, Fabre-Luce seems to have come into contact with the famous Italian journalist Indro Montanelli, who discussed his books in an article published in \textit{Oggi}. In a cordial but distant letter, Montanelli expressed his interest in a meeting ‘between Europeans united not by similar ideas, but by a similar “civilisation”’.\footnote{154}

Fabre-Luce’s apogee as an extreme-rightist journalist and political writer came during the early 1950s with the foundation of the weekly \textit{Rivarol}. Named after the anti-revolutionary writer Antoine de Rivarol (1753-1801) who had in his days criticised the Reign of Terror, \textit{Rivarol} was launched on the initiative of René Malliavin together with Fabre-Luce, Thérive, Blondin, Dominique, Boutang and many other members of the Écrits de Paris team. Under the chief-editorship of former Vichy youth secretary Maurice Gaït, \textit{Rivarol} soon grew to a circulation of 45,000, making it the French extreme right’s most successful and most influential weekly. This success was due to the quality of its contributors, its effective use of derision and provocation, and its extremist political positions. While the Écrits de Paris often defended the heritage of Pétain and Vichy and the supposedly good intentions of those who served them, \textit{Rivarol} did not eschew associating itself outright with collaboration, Nazism and anti-Semitism, including regular flickers of Holocaust denial.\footnote{155} Adhering to a variant of Europeanism that figured prominently in the

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\begin{itemize}
  \item[152] Robert Poulet to Fabre-Luce (24 March 1947), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 2.
  \item[154] Pierre Clementi to Fabre-Luce (13 August 1946); Indro Montanelli to Fabre-Luce (7 October 1946?), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 2.
\end{itemize}
programme of early-post-war neo-Fascism – during the 1950s it adopted the subtitle ‘Hebdomadaire de l’Opposition Nationale et Européenne’ – Rivarol was also quick to establish connections with like-minded movements and reviews in other countries, primarily in Italy and Germany.\footnote{Mammone, ‘Revitalizing and De-Territorializing Fascism in the 1950s’, 306.}

Fabre-Luce wrote the front-page article for the first issue of Rivarol, in which he struck a conciliatory tone between supporters of Pétain and De Gaulle. Denouncing the Épuration as a machination of the Left to play out the Right against itself in a useless ‘civil war’, he called for an end to ‘yesterday’s quarrels’ and a united front of all nationally minded Frenchmen. This meant putting an end to the persecution of collaborators, opening all ‘political prisons’ and the ‘elimination of the fifth column in the whole of Western Europe’. He deemed all these measures necessary to save the country from a communist coup and to protect Western Europe from an attack from the East.\footnote{Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘Les Maux dont Souffre l’Europe s’Appellent Peur et Neurasthénie’, Rivarol (18 January 1951).}

The risk of France falling prey to a Soviet takeover from the inside or outside was a recurrent theme in Fabre-Luce’s contributions to Rivarol. He repeatedly pointed out that the country had been infiltrated by Stalin’s future collaborators – sometimes quoting Léon Blum’s dismissal of the PCF as essentially a ‘foreign nationalist party’ – and how quickly it could become a Soviet ‘satellite’. While Jacques Duclos or Maurice Thorez were ready to be France’s next Laval, even the non-communist press was already anticipating its ‘gleichschaltung’.\footnote{Alfred Fabre-Luce, ‘La France Peut-Elle Devenir un Satellite en 24 Heures?’, Rivarol (8 February 1951); Fabre-Luce, Journal de l’Europe, 121.}

Fabre-Luce’s contributions to Rivarol ceased after three months, probably due to conflicts between him and the neo-fascist hardliners among the editors. When Le Figaro linked him in 1953 via Rivarol to a ‘fascist international’ consisting, amongst others, of Europa Nazione (Italy) and Nation Europa (Germany), he was quick to stress that he had ‘withdrawn’ from Rivarol and had only published one article in Nation Europa.\footnote{Fabre-Luce to Pierre Brisson (15 April 1953), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 1. This claim is supported by an unpublished Swedish MA thesis, which established the existence of one article by Fabre-Luce in Nation Europa during the years 1951-1954. Frölander, ‘Att Kunstruera en Kontinent’, 84.}

You will surely remember my remarks about the anti-Semitic articles, a certain obsession with the past, the systematic praise for any fascist
regime, even when the leader rules against good reason (example: Peron). [...] Such a pity that Rivarol often combines good insights and legitimate protests with outrages that to me appear as hardly tenable.¹⁶⁰

As much as this sounds like a clean ideological break, Fabre-Luce returned to lead Rivarol at the end of 1954. When Gaït gave up his chief-editorship to pursue a teaching career, Malliavin asked Fabre-Luce to take over as head of the weekly. In his memoirs, Fabre-Luce – remaining silent about his initial contributions in 1951 – claimed that he mainly joined Rivarol because no other newspaper allowed him to express his opinions with the same freedom. Though he ‘disliked the tone’ of Rivarol and tried to ‘introduce more nuance’, he soon discovered that his real influence was limited. Editors told him that this was a suicide strategy since readers only wanted to see their pre-established opinions confirmed. ‘It was a no-win situation. Once more, I was going to look like a fascist to the liberals, like a liberal to the fascists.’¹⁶¹ Still, Fabre-Luce was to lead Rivarol for a full year. He later claimed that his friendship with Dominique, Poulet and Jean Madiran kept him at the weekly, as well as his fascination for Malliavin:

a strange, slightly diabolic man. [...] One day, he told me the depths of his thought. According to him, history was made by the groups of people who were determined to persevere in their being. This general view led him to admire authoritarian regimes, to feel a certain indulgence for racism (including Israel’s), to fiercely oppose anything that could lead to the weakening of our traditions and the disappearance of our elites.¹⁶²

He also felt that the Rivarol ‘fanatics’ had their purpose: ‘Their narrow-mindedness was often paired with much loyalty and selflessness. Amongst them, I sensed a reserve of strength that could be of use to France in days of trouble.’¹⁶³

It is probable that in retrospect Fabre-Luce overemphasised the distance between himself and the other editors of Rivarol. While his subtler intellectualism clashed with the weekly’s propensity for extremist provocation and his positions were indeed more nuanced than those of authors like Rebatet and Madiran, Fabre-Luce fitted within the range of positions adopted by

¹⁶⁰ Fabre-Luce to Maurice Gaït (?) (date unknown, 1953?), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 1.
¹⁶¹ Fabre-Luce, Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté III, 199, 201.
¹⁶² Ibid., 202.
¹⁶³ Ibid., 202.
periodicals like *Rivarol* and the *Écrits de Paris*. The ‘opposition nationale’ was a loose coalition of royalists, collaborators, neo-fascists, authoritarian Catholics, Pétainists and conservatives who were often more united by what they were against (the Fourth Republic, De Gaulle, Marxism) than by what they were for. Of very different backgrounds but forged together by their common experience of exclusion and persecution in the period after the Liberation, they relied on a press that could only exist by including a variety of opinions and positions. This pluriformity is illustrated by readers’ different reactions to Fabre-Luce’s return to *Rivarol*. The Swiss writer Aldo Dami, who had submitted articles to *Rivarol* before but had fallen out of grace after criticising its ‘outdated fascism’, congratulated Fabre-Luce and hoped that he would ‘kick out a few extremists’.\(^{164}\) Fabre-Luce’s papers include a copy of a letter to Malliavin in which a reader from Rouen complained about the chief editor. Claiming to speak for ‘a certain number of your readers’, he called upon the board of editors to more clearly distance themselves from Fabre-Luce’s ‘multiple theses’.\(^{165}\)

Despite Fabre-Luce apparent distaste for *Rivarol*’s anti-Semitism, his own contributions were not entirely devoid of anti-Semitic references. Especially in a commentary on Pierre Mendès-France, who was prime minister from June 1954 to February 1955, Fabre-Luce alluded to his Jewish identity as well as the high numbers of Jews in his ‘brain trust’ of young functionaries and politicians. Quasi-innocently, he also mentioned the glass of milk that Mendès drank at a reception in Washington.\(^{166}\) Mendès-France’s Jewish background as well as his role in the decolonisation of Indochina, Tunisia and Morocco made him one of the extreme right’s favourite hate objects. Despite being a member of the Radical Party, not a socialist, Mendès was often paired with Léon Blum, that other Jewish prime minister and favourite target of the anti-Semitic right. When as part of a government campaign against alcoholism, Mendès-France drank a glass of milk during a high-profile reception in Washington, Pierre Poujade lashed out at him as a dangerous foreigner without ‘one drop of Gallic blood in your veins’ who was ruining the country’s wine and champagne producers.\(^{167}\) In his memoirs, Fabre-Luce caricaturised Mendès as a nervous Jew who ‘only felt secure inside his little ghetto’ of Jewish counsellors. In a resurgence of his anti-Semitism from the war years, Fabre-Luce took Mendès’ leadership as an

164 Aldo Dami to Fabre-Luce (10 December 1954), Fonds AFL, 472 AP 3.
166 ???
occasion to blame the outbursts of anti-Semitism on the Jews themselves. As in his wartime diatribe about ‘Léon Blum and the Jewification of ministerial cabinets’, he reproached Mendès and his counsellors for not having understood the capital lesson of the Popular Front, during which the ‘indiscreet invasion’ of the government by too many Jews had laid the foundations for the racial hatred that Hitler’s propaganda could all too easily tap.\textsuperscript{168}

Fabre-Luce preferred Antoine Pinay to Mendès as prime minister, as he made clear in a book he published in 1953.\textsuperscript{169} Pinay, a conservative industrialist from the Rhône department, was a member of the Centre National des Indépendants et Paysans (CNIP), a loose coalition of right-wing politicians who identified neither with the MRP nor with Gaullism. In the political landscape of the Fourth Republic, the CNIP often held the key to governmental majorities. Despite calling itself ‘moderate’, the CNIP displayed a relative openness towards ideas from the far right. Jacques Isorni, a prominent extreme-rightist and a regular contributor to the \textit{Écrits de Paris} and \textit{Rivarol}, had been included in the party together with a few other Pétainist MPs. Seemingly out of nowhere, Pinay rose to prominence in the early 1950s to become minister for public works and subsequently prime minister in 1952. After the fall of the Mendès-France government in February 1955, he became foreign minister under Edgar Faure. Pinay’s mass appeal was based on his unpretentious looks and manners. While cartoonists despaired over his near-complete lack of characteristics, many Frenchmen valued him as an everyman whose modesty was in every sense the opposite of the ambitions and personality cult of Gaullism and Stalinism.\textsuperscript{170} In November 1953, Fabre-Luce declined a dinner invitation from Jouvenel because he had to go to Bordeaux ‘to deliver a eulogy of Pinay’.\textsuperscript{171} Jouvenel appreciated both Pinay and Mendès, whom he knew from his \textit{Notre Temps} days and with whom he corresponded in the early 1950s. The former sent him a letter in which he expressed his admiration for ‘a Frenchman who, during cruel and difficult circumstances, has voluntarily placed himself at the service of the country’.\textsuperscript{172}

\textsuperscript{168} Fabre-Luce, \textit{Vingt-Cinq Années de Liberté III}, 195; idem, \textit{Journal de la France I} (1940), 229.
\textsuperscript{169} Sapiens [pseudonym of AFL], \textit{Mendès ou Pinay?}, 46, 152; Fabre-Luce, ‘Bonne chance, Monsieur Pinay’, \textit{Rivarol} (10 February 1955).
\textsuperscript{170} Assouline, \textit{Une Éminence Grise}, 277; Shields, \textit{The Extreme Right in France}, 64.
\textsuperscript{171} Fabre-Luce to Jouvenel (23 November 1953), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (299).
\textsuperscript{172} Correspondence between Jouvenel and Mendès-France included in Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (303); Antoine Pinay to Jouvenel (31 October 1952) Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (304). Pinay was possibly referring to Jouvenel’s intelligence activities for Vichy.
Fabre-Luce and other members of the extreme right had additional reasons for appreciating Pinay. A right-wing senator during the late 1930s, Pinay had voted in favour of giving full powers to Pétain on 10 July 1940 and had subsequently sat on Vichy’s Conseil National. Ineligible as a result of his vote for Pétain, Pinay profited from the 1951 amnesty law to return to politics and stand for elected office. Although he had hardly been a prominent servant of Vichy, Pinay’s election as prime minister nevertheless marked an important step in the rehabilitation of Pétainists and Vichyites in post-war France. In addition, despite looking back on a decades-long uninterrupted political career, Pinay presented himself as an apolitical candidate, as a man who ostentatively ‘hated politics’ but ‘loved administration’ and for whom the categories of ‘left’ and ‘right’ had no meaning. Richard Vinen has remarked that this apolitical attitude could be interpreted in two possible ways: as a pragmatic distaste for ideology and a preference for concrete problem-solving, much like the attitude of the Parti Radical at the time, or as a revulsion against the political system as such. This latter variant came remarkably close to the opposition nationale’s attacks against ‘the system’ of the Fourth Republic and its supposedly all-permeating ideology of ‘résistantialisme’.

Fabre-Luce repeatedly tried to interest his friend Jouvenel in writing for Rivarol, but it seems the latter maintained a certain distance towards the review. In March 1955, Fabre-Luce sent out a large survey around the question: ‘Can France get rid of the “system”? With what means?’. An announcement in Rivarol asked readers to give their opinion, while Fabre-Luce sent letters asking for contributions to a number of prominent writers and journalists, including Jouvenel. In his letter to Jouvenel, he specified that by the word ‘system’ he meant the Fourth Republic characterised by ‘a parliamentary regime and a deep penetration of communism and progressivism in the governmental and administrative machinery’. Describing Rivarol as the principal bulwark of the ‘opposition nationale against this system’, Fabre-Luce concluded: ‘a large number of citizens Frenchmen today recognise and sense the relevance of our criticism. Maybe even the hour of construction is close.’ If Jouvenel agreed at all, he abstained from participating in the survey. The resulting publication in Rivarol was a cacophony of different views on France’s situation and the possibilities of gradual or

173 Vinen, Bourgeois Politics in France, 244; Assouline, Une Éminence Grise, 277.
174 Fabre-Luce to Jouvenel (21 January 1955), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (299).
175 Fabre-Luce to Jouvenel (28 March 1955), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (299); ‘Rivarol Ouvre und Enquête’, Rivarol (21 April 1955). Crossing-out in original.
revolutionary change, both from readers and from the intellectuals who did take part (René Gillouin and Jacques Plassard, among others). In the conclusion, Fabre-Luce faced the difficult task of finding common ground between the desires of his conservative, monarchist and neo-fascist readers. Navigating carefully, he concluded:

\[\begin{align*}
&\text{We can have [...] different views on the ideal regime that should be established in the future. That is legitimate and even desirable.} \\
&Rivarol is not and must not be the device of any faction. No totalitarianisms against totalitarianism! But whatever our particular preferences [...] we all want to defend our Western and Christian civilisation against materialism and against the law of the numbers. There is a combat, small or big, that needs to be fought every week.}^{176}
\end{align*}\]

The many contributions of Fabre-Luce to *Rivarol* ended abruptly in December 1955. In his published resignation letter to Malliavin, he explained that his main reason for quitting was his loss of faith in the possibility of ‘constructive action’ in the near future. Having wrongly believed that men like Pinay and Faure would pursue a politics different from Mendès, in which France would retain its colonial empire and take the initiative for the military integration of Western Europe, Fabre-Luce admitted that he was arriving ‘at the end of the road that we could follow together’. Having lost all hope for improvement within the regime, he saw only two remaining possibilities: fundamental protest against the authorities, including ‘an appeal to a France of the past that might be resurrected in an indeterminate future’, or ‘retreating in the shadows’. While he saw Malliavin had chosen the former option, Fabre-Luce preferred the latter. He stated that France had become nothing but ‘a fortress under siege’, and he predicted the foreseeable collapse of the European project, NATO, the Empire, the French franc and the Republic. Only after this deluge, Fabre-Luce thought, ‘in front of humiliation and a vital threat, old quarrels can become meaningless and many Frenchmen will be ready to surmount them together. I wish – without being certain – that these new chances will find us in agreement.’\[177\]

Fabre-Luce’s departure and the return of Gaït to the head of *Rivarol* marked a step in the periodical’s evolution to even more extremist positions and the burning of bridges towards the established political system. In the

\[\begin{align*}
&176 \text{ Fabre-Luce, ‘La France Peut-Elle se Débarasser du Système? Par quel Moyen?’, } Rivarol (12 May 1955).} \\
&177 \text{ Fabre-Luce, ‘Lettre d’Alfred Fabre-Luce à René Malliavin’, } Rivarol (1 December 1955).}
\end{align*}\]
wake of Gait’s return, collaborationist hardliners like Rebatet, Henri Lèbre and Guy Crouzet joined the Rivarol team. Although his observation fails to do justice to Fabre-Luce’s collaborationist attitude during the occupation, the historian Jérôme Cotillon considers his departure a key moment in ‘the marginalisation of Pétainists to the advantage of journalists who were much more marked by their collaborationist engagement’. To this day, Rivarol has specialised in revisionist views on the history of the Second World War. More straightforwardly, it is one of France’s principle channels for Holocaust denial and the glorification of fascism and collaboration. While its editors are regularly faced with fines and legal condemnations, Rivarol has on several occasions lent its columns to Jean-Marie Le Pen’s statements about the Nazi occupation as ‘not particularly inhumane’ and about Pétain as a French patriot unjustly treated during the Épuration. Today, Rivarol owns the Écrits de Paris and considers it its intellectual ‘brother’.

Europeanism, Federalism and the Reconfiguration of the Extreme Right

In his study of the extreme right in Europe after 1945, Pierre Milza professes to be surprised by the Europeanist discourse of French neo-fascists during the early post-war years. At a loss to explain this sudden upsurge of internationalism among movements ‘whose identity was founded on a particularly narrow and rigid conception of the national fact’, he came up with the ‘internationalisation of the Waffen-SS’ during ‘the two final years of the war’ as the phenomenon’s sole historical antecedent. One does not need to have extensive knowledge of the Europeanist thought of fascist intellectuals in interwar France, their relations with foreign intellectuals, movements and regimes, the conflict potential between French fascists and traditional nationalists and the shift of pacifism to the right during the late 1930s to establish the short-sightedness of this statement. Nevertheless, Milza did signal an important post-war trend. After 1944, Europeanism became a key feature of large segments of the extreme right in France, Italy, the UK and many other countries. Partially, this was due to the strategic need to

178 Côtillon, Ce Qu’il Reste de Vichy, 125.
181 Milza, L’Europe en Chemise Noire, 49.
make fascism attractive within a post-war context and especially to escape association with aggressive nationalism and war. It can also be seen as an attempt of the extreme right to adapt to a changing global environment in which decolonisation, the Cold War and Western European cooperation played an important role. For the French extreme right, Europeanism had the additional advantage of harking back to an element of its own ideology that long predated the Second World War.\(^{182}\)

The several attempts at the establishment of a neo-fascist ‘International’ were but one manifestation of the Europeanism of the extreme right and largely the work of its most radical fringes. After a previous meeting in Rome, neo-fascists from various European countries came together in Malmö in 1951 for a conference hosted by the Swedish fascist Per Engdahl and with important contributions from Giorgio Almirante’s Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), which was for a long time post-war Europe’s most important extreme-right party (until the rise of the Front National). Participants at the Malmö conference were inspired by ‘universalist’ ideas from Fascist Italy, Nazi Pan-European romanticism and the writings of Europeanist fascist intellectuals like Drieu, Brasillach and Julius Evola. Maurice Bardèche, Brasillach’s brother-in-law and political heir, headed the French delegation to the Malmö meeting, during which the European Social Movement was founded. This ‘Malmö International’, as it was soon called, inspired by the MSI but ideologically closest to Bardèche’s periodical Défense de l’Occident, officially strove for a European ‘Empire’ with a central government, army and economic zone and without parliamentarianism and Russian or American influences.\(^{183}\)

Jouvenel was entirely uninvolved with these initiatives, while Fabre-Luce’s involvement – albeit hard to grasp due to fragmentary information – seems to have been limited to links via Rivarol and his single contribution to Nation Europa, the German review created in the wake of the Malmö congress. Nation Europa, like its short-lived Italian MSI cousin Europa Nazione, took its name from the ‘Europe-a-Nation’ campaign launched in 1947 by Oswald Mosley. Founded in 1951 and edited by former SS Colonel Arthur Erhardt, Nation Europa became Germany’s foremost right-extremist press platform. During its first years it published articles from Hans Grimm and Karl-Heinz Priester, a prominent member of the Deutsche Reichspartei, alongside an important contingent of foreigners: Engdahl, Mosley, Bardèche,

\(^{182}\) Mammone, ‘Revitalizing and De-territorializing Fascism’, 300, 308.

\(^{183}\) Shields, The Extreme Right in France, 60; Mammone, ‘Revitalizing and De-territorializing Fascism’, 301, 315.
Pierre Dominique and Fabre-Luce. In addition to its dream of a neo-fascist Europe with Africa as its colonial ‘Lebensraum’, Nation Europa campaigned for German rearmament and the rehabilitation of the Waffen-SS, considered a bare necessity in a future war against the ‘Soviet hordes’. Mosley frequently published in Nation Europa and provided it with financial aid during its first years.184 Fabre-Luce’s article, titled ‘Frankreich und Deutschland’, was published in mid-1951. During the early 1950s, the aforementioned Le Figaro article was not the only one to cite Fabre-Luce as a ‘sympathiser’ or even a member of the Malmö International.185

Fabre-Luce was in touch more directly with Mosley, whom he knew from their contacts during the 1930s, and they regularly met after Mosley’s move to Paris in 1953. In his book on Mosley’s post-war activities, the historian Graham Macklin even claims the English fascist had an affair with Fabre-Luce’s wife.186 Fabre-Luce was also an attentive reader of Bardèche, and he approvingly cited his attack against the retroactive character of the Nuremberg trials in his revisionist pro-Nazi tract Nuremberg ou la Terre Promise. He criticised his younger colleague, though, for attempting to revive the ‘Maurrassian tradition’ and for equating all kinds of internationalism with a Jewish conspiracy, ‘as if the old notion of national sovereignty weren’t obsolete in any case’.187 With his participation in the Malmö International, Fabre-Luce must have been happy to see Bardèche subsequently shake off this ‘outdated’ nationalism.

Unrelated to and arguably more important than these Eurofascist fringe groups was the connection between important segments of the French extreme right and more mainstream Europeanist initiatives. Several authors have signalled the striking numbers of former Pétainists and collaborationists who ended up as champions of post-war European unification.188 Both Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel were early supporters of the European project, which they saw as the logical continuation of their pre-war thought, made more urgent by the experience of the Second World War. Despite being in

184 Macklin, Very Deeply Dyed in Black, 111, 112; Barnes, ‘A Fascist Trojan Horse’, 178.
186 Macklin, Very Deeply Dyed in Black, 136. Fabre-Luce’s personal papers are entirely silent on these post-war connections.
187 Fabre-Luce, Le Siècle Prend Figure, 156, 158.
no way an admirer of Winston Churchill, Fabre-Luce was thrilled by his speech in Zürich in September 1946 in which he called for a ‘United States of Europe’ based on Franco-German rapprochement and with the UK as its friendly neighbour. The man he otherwise described as the ‘gravedigger of capitalism and the British Empire’, whose dogmatic insistence on unconditional surrender had unnecessarily prolonged the war and facilitated Soviet expansion, who had not shrunk back from carpet-bombing Dresden and killing 135,000 civilians in one day and who was mendaciously denying his secret negotiations with Pétain and his own earlier statement that the armistice had been ‘useful’ to the Allies, was suddenly worthy of his praise.\textsuperscript{189}

Whereas the French government initially showed little enthusiasm for the proposal, Fabre-Luce dedicated a book responding to ‘Churchill’s project’.\textsuperscript{190}

Agreeing with Churchill that there was no time to lose, Fabre-Luce saw ways to realise the United States of Europe within a short time. He imagined an initial campaign by a few great men in every country who would mobilise electoral mass support for the idea, after which it would depend on ‘technicians’ to organise the transition process and to provide ‘the embryo of a common government’ with the right institutions. Fabre-Luce was happy to hear from Coudenhove-Kalergy, whom he met in Switzerland during the summer of 1946, that even De Gaulle was sympathetic to his Paneuropean Movement, which had associated itself with Churchill’s proposal.\textsuperscript{191}

Fabre-Luce dedicated a large part of his book to refuting various arguments against European union. To ‘the liberal objection’ he responded that ‘Europe will not be an autarky’; to ‘the communist objection’ that ‘Europe will be an intermediary between the Great Powers’; and to the ‘résistantialiste’ that ‘Hitler did create Europe, but despite himself’. He saw Europe’s socialist and Christian democratic parties as the natural supporters of European integration. If these two ‘strongest political forces of the West’ joined hands, the inevitable opposition of communists and narrow-minded nationalists could be overcome. On his concluding pages, written in February 1947, Fabre-Luce noted that in the five months between Churchill’s speech and the publication of his book, the idea had gained momentum. The support of various groups and intellectuals, amongst whom were René Courtin, Arthur


\textsuperscript{190} Fabre-Luce, \textit{Le Projet Churchill}, 15.

\textsuperscript{191} ‘Coudenhove – 23 Novembre’, Fonds AFL, 472 AP 10 dr. 4; Fabre-Luce, \textit{Le Projet Churchill}, 146, 149, 151.
Koestler and Raymond Aron, confirmed his hope that ‘United Europe will finally – after two big defeats – be the victory of the men of our century.’

Fabre-Luce specifically cited the action of a group called La Fédération, led by André Voisin and Alexandre Marc, as a hopeful sign that the European ideal was winning support. Since 1946 and at least until 1952, Jouvenel was an active member of this circle of European federalists, often contributing to its press and maintaining regular contact with its leaders. Its eponymous monthly only became a regular periodical at the beginning of 1947, after initially lacking government authorisation and appearing as the internal information bulletin of the associated ‘Centre d’Études Institutionnelles pour l’Organisation de la Société Française’. La Fédération’s difficult start and the very vague and general name of its associated ‘study centre’ may sound familiar to the attentive reader of this chapter. There were more commonalities between La Fédération and reviews like the Écrits de Paris, as many of its members belonged to the same group of right-extremist outcasts of the post-war order. André Voisin, whose real name was André Bourgeois, had been the personal secretary of the Comte de Paris, while many other members were Pétainists who had formerly belonged to the Action Française or the PSF: Jean de Fabrèges, Louis Salleron, Jacques Bassot, Daniel Halévy and even François Mitterand and Jouvenel’s PPF colleague Pierre Andreu. There was also an important component of 1930s ‘non-conformists’ in La Fédération who, still inspired by Mounier’s ‘personalist’ philosophy, supported the idea of a federal and ‘communitarian’ Europe: Alexandre Marc, Denis de Rougemont, Robert Aron and Thierry Maulnier. La Fédération’s version of Europeanism was strongly inspired by corporatism and anti-parliamentarianism.

Despite its modest membership figures, La Fédération proved highly influential during the early post-war years. In addition to the intellectual qualities of some of its early members and its effective political lobbying work, it was successful in gradually attracting people less tainted by their past political activities, many of whom had been members of the Resistance. La Fédération was also quick to build an international network of like-minded European federalists, which led to the foundation in December

192 Fabre-Luce, Le Projet Churchill, 147, 153, 155.
193 Ibid., 154.
1946 of a European Union of Federalists at its offices in Paris. With the help of a joint agenda of anti-communism and the relatively vague principle of federalism, *La Fédération* even managed to draw contributions from neoliberal intellectuals like Raymond Aron and Wilhelm Röpke. Jouvenel participated in the organisation’s first International Congress of Federalists held in Montreux in August 1947. A draft of his speech demonstrated both his prominence in the movement and the degree to which he identified with its ‘communitarian’ ideology. Rejecting both the principle of nationalities and ‘the partisan spirit’, which led states to move from ‘the oppression of ethnic minorities’ to the ‘even more brutal oppression of ideological minorities’, Jouvenel celebrated federalism as ‘a return to the true notions of command’. According to Jouvenel, federalism meant ‘neither the enslavement of man to political powers, which is tyranny, nor the enslavement of political powers to the human will, which is disorder, but the accord of these powers as docile servants of a same master, all of which are sanctified and humanised’.

In October 1946, Jouvenel published his first article in *La Fédération*’s internal bulletin as ‘B. de J.’, in which he stated that in 1938 ‘the Sudeten question would have never arisen [...] if Czechoslovakia had been a federal state’ assuring the Sudeten Germans the protection of their rights. A year later, this time using his full name, Jouvenel sceptically described European history not as a march towards union but as a fatal drifting apart of its peoples under the pressure of particularism, culminating in the post-war triumph of ‘national socialism’ in every country. If Europe’s present-day ‘national socialist representative governments’ sincerely wanted to build Europe, they merely had to ‘undo what they have done’: relinquish their currency rights, denationalise their education systems and recognise the authority of a natural law transcending their own temporary interests.

Jouvenel considered the human rights declaration of 1789 a suitable candidate for this transnational law system. A ‘European tribunal’ could protect Europe’s citizens against violations of this ‘superior law’ by ‘particular governments’. He rejected the idea of a European parliament, though, as an unrealistic and unnecessary imitation of the United States, whose history...

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had taken a fundamentally different course. Instead, Jouvenel hoped that ‘a revulsion of public sentiment’ would put an end to ‘the prison regime’ of the nation-state.\textsuperscript{199} The historian Marco Duranti has established the importance of \textit{La Fédération} for the post-war human rights revolution, and especially its successful lobbying for the creation of a supranational human rights court during the 1948 Congress of Europe in The Hague. According to Duranti, the French extreme right had two reasons to play a key role in the establishment of a transnational European human rights regime: it correctly estimated that such a regime would create opportunities to undermine the entire legal system of the \textit{Épuration}, and it saw the regime as a bulwark against the despised principle of parliamentary sovereignty. France’s ‘prison regime’ was indeed altered drastically as a result of these actions. At the turn of the 1950s, anticipating the risk of the European Court of Human Rights toppling \textit{indignité nationale} as an illegal retroactive law, the French parliament was quick to adopt several amnesty laws.\textsuperscript{200}

Fabre-Luce stressed that his abiding faith in Europe was the cornerstone of his thought, and he was not afraid to contrast it in very essentialist terms with the supposed omnipotence of money in America, the inhumane cruelty of Asia and Africa’s lack of civilisation.\textsuperscript{201} At the concrete political level, Fabre-Luce jumped to action in defence of the European Defence Community (EDC) in the spring of 1954, when it became clear that the French parliament might reject it. Lacking a journalist platform, Fabre-Luce decided to send a series of eight long letters to ‘thousands’ of acquaintances and influential persons, including Jouvenel, whose personal archives contain a full collection. The EDC was a French suggestion, developed to make the controversial issue of West German rearmament, which the United States was insisting on, part of the foundation of a Pan-European army. Fabre-Luce considered it essential to ensure the security of Western Europe against Soviet aggression. In his third letter, he told his readers that in the long run, NATO forces would also be able to achieve victory against Russia without West German military participation, ‘but you won’t live to see that day, since you would have been first deported to a mine in Siberia where you would have died working’.\textsuperscript{202}

In other letters, Fabre-Luce tried to address possible objections against the EDC while stressing its absolute necessity to prevent the ‘Anglo-Saxons’

\textsuperscript{199} Jouvenel, ‘La Femme Coupée en Morceaux’.
\textsuperscript{200} Duranti, ‘The Holocaust’, 174, 179. See also his monography: Duranti, \textit{The Conservative Human Rights Revolution}.
\textsuperscript{201} Fabre-Luce, \textit{Hors d’Atteinte}, 192.
\textsuperscript{202} Fabre-Luce, Letter 3 about the EDC (undated, 1954), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (299).
from taking their hands off the continent and Germany rearming on its own. A vote against the treaty could have far-reaching consequences: ‘By rejecting the treaty, you overthrow […] Dulles or Adenauer. Do you believe that their successors will be more favourable to our interests? I already see you run after them to propose sacrifices that today you withhold from them, just like you gave to Hitler what you refused the Weimar Republic.’

When De Gaulle expressed his opposition to the EDC, thereby bringing about exactly the double communist-nationalist opposition to Europe that Fabre-Luce had anticipated in 1947, Fabre-Luce reacted furiously. After accusing the general of conspiring with the communists against the Fourth Republic and mocking his vanity and ‘circus-like’ public appearances, he took consolation in the certainty that even if the EDC were to fail, at least De Gaulle would never come to power. Although the communist danger remained strong, at least ‘we do not in any case have to fear a victory of the general.’ Fabre-Luce’s final two letters were a last-ditch effort to convince the fifty MPs who were still in doubt about their vote, reminding them that a refusal to ratify the treaty meant the triumph of ‘France’s enemies, and those of the regime you represent’: the USSR, the communists, the ‘neo-Nazis’ and the ‘neo-Bonapartists of Gaullism’. A vote for the EDC was a vote to help France in its essential mission: ‘to defend, in close cooperation with its neighbours, her own territory and its African extensions’.

Both Jouvenel and Fabre-Luce initially imagined Africa as the colonial backyard of their project of European integration. In 1946 and in accordance with his geopolitical ideas of the early 1940s, Jouvenel explained the present-day power of the United States and Russia as the result of their historical capacity to expand towards immense, sparsely populated territories in their West and East. This unchecked ‘centrifugal’ expansion, which he compared with the conquest of Mexico by Hernán Cortés, was the exact opposite of the behaviour of Europe’s Great Powers, who had engaged in endless attempts to expand ‘centripetally’ in the middle of Europe, always clashing with each other on ‘the eternal battlefields of Flanders, Lombardy and the upper Danube’. Whilst the former kind of expansion harboured enormous gains, Europe’s had largely been a zero-sum game. Crediting England as the only European power to have sufficiently understood the importance of centrifugal expansion, Jouvenel stated that France would inevitably be reduced to the status of a ‘dwarf amidst giants, if she fails to do in the South

203 Fabre-Luce, Letter 1 about the EDC (undated, 1954), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (299).
204 Fabre-Luce, Letter 5 about the EDC (undated, 1954), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (299).
205 Fabre-Luce, Letter 7 and 8 about the EDC (undated, 1954), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (299).
what the Russians have succeeded doing in the East and the Americans in the West’. Similarly, in a long article in 1952, Fabre-Luce called for the construction of ‘Eurafrica’ based on the joint European exploitation and industrialisation of the ‘almost virgin’ territories of French North Africa.

While Fabre-Luce claimed this project was also in the interest of the North Africans, who would be given ‘the order, justice and prosperity satisfying their aspirations’ instead of ‘the toys of a verbal democracy and an ephemeral independence’, racism and feelings of Western superiority were manifestly present in his thought. In 1947, he mockingly discussed the ‘unease’ caused by the presence of ‘blacks’ in France’s parliament during a debate about the French Union. The behaviour of several overseas deputies aroused the question: ‘is this assembly entirely French?’ A lady in the audience wondered if it were not better to ‘give them their independence, as long as they don’t bother us in our country’, but Fabre-Luce disagreed with her suggestion. ‘There are, despite everything, still indigènes who remain loyal and France has a mission to fulfil amongst them. But she could maybe give them a little more clothes and a little less “democracy”.’

Jouvenel was the earliest of the two to realise that the empire could not be maintained. He was worried about the success of the Soviet Union in exploiting the colonised nations’ desire for independence and the inability of Western countries to respond to this challenge. In private notes, he complained about the British sympathy for Sukarno and indignation against the Dutch, while he found the Netherlands to have accomplished ‘a civilising work’ in Indonesia that was ‘materially important for the West’. In an article, he concluded that given the circumstances, the only reasonable foreign policy was to ‘gently engage these [colonial] peoples on the road towards liberty’. He even stated that France was better able to pursue such a policy than the British, since ‘we do not feel differences of colour’, whereas for the British ‘feelings of superiority’ made them less able to succeed in the ‘necessary fraternisation’.

Although at the time Jouvenel still shared Fabre-Luce’s hope that North Africa could be preserved through the more efficient exploitation and development of Africa as a part of the European project, he soon relinquished this hope. When Prime Minister

206 Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘L’Europe, Tombeau des Ambitions Européennes’ (26 April 1946), in idem, Quelle Europe?, 209, 211.
208 Fabre-Luce, ‘Construisons l’Eurafrique’.
Mendès-France signed a Franco-Tunisian agreement granting autonomy to its former colony, Jouvenel congratulated him: ‘I persist in thinking that it is a duty of a Frenchman who cherishes his country’s honour, to get us out of an attitude that is contrary to our principles and our commitments, in which we appear as malevolent and unjust. This merit has been yours [...]’

In mid-1954, despite France’s crumbling empire; the persistent anti-European opposition of communists, Gaullists and other nationalists; and the approaching failure of the EDC, which was eventually rejected by the French parliament, Fabre-Luce was confident about the success of European unification. Looking back upon the ten post-war years, he concluded that Europe’s different peoples had, ‘unbeknownst to themselves, made a revolution’. After a long period of destructive warfare and mutual hatred, the Cold War had given them the ‘sobering cold shower’ that made them ‘wake up as brothers’. The heart of this united Europe should not consist of a European parliament, which Fabre-Luce – like Jouvenel – rejected as the ‘sum of weaknesses’, but of ‘an open elite, nourished by the life-juice of the people, impregnated with the notion of service’. By embracing international parliamentarianism, Europe would turn its own ‘errors, because Hitler denounced them, into a counter-religion’, thereby ‘robbing itself of the ways to arrest its decadence’.

In an interesting revival of his metaphors of love from the occupation years, Fabre-Luce stated that the prime ingredient of European unity was to be the ‘fusion’ or even the ‘marriage’ of France and Germany. In 1950, in a lecture in Hamburg that was subsequently published in the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, he presented the same idea to a German audience. Citing Plutarch’s description of the mass wedding of 10,000 Greek-Persian couples following Alexander the Great’s conquest of Babylon, after which the ‘lives and customs of the different races melted together’, causing them to ‘forget their old feuds’, he called the European Coal and Steel Community the occasion for the same kind of ‘blending’. ‘One day, I hope, the unification of France and Germany will be celebrated in a symbolic feast reminiscent of the ceremony [...] that the Great Alexander celebrated more than two thousand years ago.’

During the ten years following the liberation, the French extreme right reinvented itself, emerging from a situation of near-complete discredit and

211 Jouvenel to Pierre Mendès-France (19 April 1955), Fonds BdJ, Don 96 01 (303).
212 Fabre-Luce, Histoire de la Révolution Européenne, 341, 343.
213 Fabre-Luce, ‘Mittel und Wege zur Deutsch-Französischen Einigung’, 56; idem, Histoire de la Révolution Européenne, 343.
marginalisation. This resurrection, limited by its lasting organisational weakness, was based on a profound transformation of its ideology. The two traditional Maurrassian dogmas of aggressive nationalism and contempt for republican legality, which had also been dominant in many circles unassociated with the Action Française, were largely discarded and replaced by something more fluid: an attachment to the legal framework of the Republic and a suspicious attitude towards national delusions of grandeur. Three elements were the driving force behind this transformation: the experience with persecution during the ‘civil war’ of 1944-1946, the defence of the legacy of Pétain and his supporters, and hostility to Gaullism.

As Vinen has remarked, during the Épuration, the legal system was often the only thing that stood ‘between right-wingers and political banishment, prison or the firing squad’.

With leftist militants calling for the harsh punishment of collaborators and for revolutionary action, the extreme right’s natural reflex was to focus its hope on the judges (most of whom had also served under Vichy) and on governmental authority to uphold a system of due process. The attacks on the Épuration were mainly aimed at demonstrating how it was a violation of republican legality. After 1947, the calls for amnesty, reconciliation and forgetting the ‘quarrels of the past’ were often paired with an appeal to human rights and international law, while republican diversity and the right to free speech were invoked to defend the fledgling extreme-right press against censorship measures.

In 1951, Fabre-Luce noted the obvious incompatibility of ‘the defence of human rights with the monopolisation of information, retroactive laws, exceptional jurisdiction, ineligibility because of crimes of opinion [délits d’opinion], etc.’

As we have seen, Fabre-Luce played a leading role in defining his and his peers’ choice of Vichy (while obfuscating his own pro-German collaborationism) by developing a ‘realist’ interpretation of France’s position during the war. With France having lost the war and political power having been legally transferred to Pétain, the armistice was honourable and necessary. While Pétain sacrificed his reputation and his aura of invincibility to protect French lives, De Gaulle, safe in his London exile, enjoyed the freedom to persist in his theoretically impeccable but practically impossible position of refusal and resistance. While the Resistance had merely caused bloodshed

214 Vinen, Bourgeois Politics in France, 105.
215 Fabre-Luce, Au Nom des Silencieux, 102; idem, Double Prison, 161.
217 Fabre-Luce, Journal 1951, 171.
among Frenchmen, its military contribution to the liberation of the country had been marginal given that the country had been liberated by foreign powers. Though neither as outspoken nor as prominently published as Fabre-Luce’s, Jouvenel’s ideas were not far removed from this analysis. The same line of thought was continued into the post-war years, with both intellectuals often stressing the extent of France’s downfall. The country’s supposed weakness not only rendered it defenceless in the face of a Soviet attack, it also illustrated both the impossibility of De Gaulle’s politics of national grandeur and the urgent need for European integration.218 Fabre-Luce and Maurice Bardèche depicted De Gaulle as vainglorious and cruel, willing to sacrifice French lives and the future of the nation in order to pursue abstract notions of France and victory.219 In Fabre-Luce’s eyes, only European unification and NATO protection could save France from again falling prey to invasion and disintegration.

While the ‘opposition nationale’ found many allies in its campaign for the release of prisoners and the abrogation of the ineligibility law, especially after the break-up of the tripartite coalition in 1947, its own political organisations remained weak. Partially this is a distorted image, however, since the CNIP and other parties who were at the centre of political power showed considerable interest in the extreme right’s personnel and ideas.220 This openness of the centre to the extreme right was due to the specifically uneasy situation of governmental politics during the Fourth Republic, which was based on a fragile coalition of interests. Since 1947, governments had faced the double opposition of the communists and the Gaullists, who were both hostile to the system as such, which increased the need to do business with whoever was willing to work with them. Despite its revulsion against the republican system, the ‘opposition nationale’ still largely preferred it to the two main alternatives of communist revolution or personal rule by De Gaulle. While for the extreme right, the late 1940s were marked by survival and ideological innovation, the 1950s were to offer new perspectives for political success. Decolonisation, European integration, the Algerian War and the regime crisis brought opportunities that the extreme right did not fail to exploit. With Fabre-Luce and Jouvenel’s Europeanism and their ‘realism’ reaching back all the way into the 1920s, they were extremely well-situated to contribute to this ideological transformation.