Spain, China, and Japan in Manila, 1571-1644

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Part II
Cross-cultural Encounters in the Philippines
The Early Modern Philippines

The Philippines were, according to the abovementioned quote by Governor General Santiago de Vera (r. 1584-1590), as fragile as a flower bud. De Vera's credo became a motto for the early decades of the Spanish period. The colonisation of the Philippines differed in many respects from what were seemingly similar projects in the Americas. In Asia, Spanish colonisation had less drastic demographic and ecological effects. Nonetheless, the application of similar administrative patterns as in the New World created a picture of a 'coercion-intensive state'. Indeed, early conquest under Legazpi and his men did not differ much from what had happened in the Americas: soldiers were stealing, raiding, and exploiting the natives, as criticised by the Augustinian friars Martín de Rada and Diego de Herrera. Yet, in contrast to leyenda negra scholarship, the local population of the Philippines experienced more humane Spanish colonising methods. John Crossley has emphasised that Philip II, strongly influenced by the teachings of Bartolomé de las Casas, was determined to prevent a repetition of the bloody conquest of Mexico. The strong impact of the church was another distinguishing feature of historical treatises on the Spanish Philippines. They state that the islands were first and foremost a Catholic project because the colonisers' religion had greater effect on the population than their language, their institutions, or even their food. As a matter of fact the

1 AGI Filipinas 18 A, r. 5, n. 31, ‘Carta de Vera sobre situación, comercio, japoneses’, 26 June 1587.
3 AGI Filipinas 84, n. 9, ‘Carta de agustinos sobre situación en Filipinas’, 8 June 1576. Martín de Rada complained that Spanish soldiers and officials did not observe the kings' instructions for peaceful conquest, collected tribute from the indigenous people and gave them a hard time in general.
5 On the question why Castilian was never established as an official lingua franca in the Philippines, I refer to Phelan (1955), ‘Philippine Linguistics’, pp. 153-170. See also Rafael (2005), Contracting Colonialism; Díaz-Trechuelo (2002), Filipinas.
archipelago was far less Hispanicised than certain regions of the Americas. Many imperial goals were never accomplished, which made giving up the colony a permanent option of various Spanish governing bodies. In 1647, after almost one hundred years of active colonisation, Philip IV (r. 1621-1665) concluded that their colonial efforts in the Philippines were inefficient and that the conversion in the Far East was nothing but a disappointment. The Philippines remained under Spanish rule only because they never were a purely Spanish project.

The positive reputation the islands enjoyed among friends and foes alike, regardless of whether these had actually set a foot on Philippine soil or simply judged based on hearsay, had roots in Manila’s character as a cross-cultural arena. There were always enough influential supporters in favour of the colony’s future as part of the Spanish territories. Ríos Coronel, for example, named evangelisation, political reasoning in connection with trade with China and Japan, and the need to secure Portuguese India as important reasons not to abandon the colonial project in Asia. Such propaganda was necessary due to the widespread view in Spanish governmental circles that the colonial effort in the Philippines was a heavy financial burden. Against a background of silver flowing out to China, numerous petitions to give up the colony reached the Spanish King, because it was nothing but a losing deal for the royal treasury.

The Islands in Pre-colonial Times

Approximately one to two million people with different languages, life styles, customs, traditions, and physical appearance inhabited the archipelago by 1550. After first contact with the autochthonous population, the Spanish divided them into two groups, indios and moros, thereby disregarding their heterogeneous origins. The distinction was based on religious beliefs: Moros were Muslims and indios members of local tribes of Polynesian

6 Colín (1900-1902), Labor Evangélica, vol. 1, pp. 43-44.
8 AGI Filipinas 6, r. 4, n. 52, ‘Carta de Ronquillo sobre armada de Carrión contra Japón’, 1 July 1582. In this letter to Philip II, the Governor invoked the King to abandon the Philippines for causing nothing but deficits.
9 The word ‘Filipino’ was not in use as generic term in the early modern period but only emerged during the nineteenth-century national movement. The term usually refers to the mestizo civilisation born in the Philippines. For the semantic development and historical denominations, see Scott (1994), Barangay, p. 5; Zaide (1949), Philippines, pp. 6-8.
origin worshipping native deities. In terms of the language diversity, 170 languages and dialects survived over the years. Many of them, including the eight major tongues (Cebuano, Tagalog, Hiligaynon, Waray, Ilocano, Pangasinan, Bicolano, and Kapampangan) show a dominant influence of the Austronesian language tree. Since Tagalog, with its Malay, Chinese, and Sanskrit loan words, became the historic *lingua franca* of colonial Manila, it also forms the basis for today’s national language – Pilipino. Literacy was not widespread in the pre-colonial Philippines, contrary to polemics in early Spanish chronicles (e.g. Pedro Chirino’s). Indeed, early Spanish observers were impressed by the natives’ use of writing skills, their Baybayin script to be precise. The script consists of 20 letters comprising syllabary for only three vowels and no letter for ‘r’, and showed Arabic and Sanskrit influence.

Islam had arrived on the islands from regions of present-day Malaysia and Indonesia around 1380. First the Sultanate of Sulu was founded under Sharif ul-Hashim, a second followed under Sharif Muhammad Kabungsuan in Maguindanao, from where Islam spread north to Mindoro Island, Maynila, and Batangas. The archipelago’s native population lived together in the *barangay* (conventionally, even if etymologically incorrectly, translated as village), a socio-political unit of between 30 and 100 families under the rule of a petty chief (tl. *datu*, meaning ‘leader’ rather than ‘ruler’). Not only were these villages constantly competing with each other, decentralisation and the limits of subsistence agriculture further hampered growth in pre-Hispanic times. According to Philippine historians, a *datu* ruled over common people (tl. *tao*) and was the only person who could accumulate wealth because theoretically everything belonged to him. A *datu* possessed

13 Examples can be found in Juan de Plasencia’s *Doctrina Christiana*, printed by woodblock in Tagalog in 1593.
political, military, and religious power and his distinguished appearance depended to a large degree on his charisma. Similar to other pre-colonial South East Asian domains, servitude and slavery were common across the islands and often resulted from debt bondage, judicial punishments, inheritance, and capture in warfare. The traditional social hierarchy included a datu, a non-chief elite, commoners, and slaves.

Maritime people had been attracted to the Philippines long before lucrative interregional trade flourished in the Spanish colony. During several periods in history inhabitants of the archipelago participated in Asian long-distance trade. Although reliable written data is scarce, evidence for commercial contacts with China exists for the tenth century, when Chinese and Muslim trading networks connected the South East Asian archipelago with the mainland. The first secured Chinese record is part of the official Song Shi and dates back to the year 972, when people from Ma‘i (probably located on the southern coast of Mindoro) are mentioned together with other Barbarian tribute bearers, whose trade passed through Guangzhou (Canton). In 982, traders from Ma‘i brought goods, including pearls and sea and forest products, to the Superintendent of Guangzhou. In 1001, the King of the city-state of Butuan, named Kiling, sent two tribute missions of gold to Beijing. The superintendent of maritime trade and customs inspector in Quanzhou, Zhao Rugua (趙汝适), includes detailed descriptions of Ma‘i, which he located north of Borneo, in his Zhufan Zhu (諸蕃志, Chu Fan Chih, An Account of the Various Barbarians) of 1225. Accordingly, they had brought beeswax, pearls, tortoise shell, medicinal betel nuts, and cloth. In return, they received porcelain, iron pots, lead, iron needles, and coloured glass beads. Archaeological evidence furthermore backs a long history of trade with incoming Chinese junks in the regions of Pangasinan, the coast of Lingayen Gulf from Bolinao (Zambales) to Balaoan (La Union), and the

17 Abinales, Amoroso (2005), State and Society, p. 28.
18 Junker (1999), Raiding, pp. 131-137.
19 For pre-Iberian Muslim and Chinese trade routes between Borneo and Luzon, see Ptak (1992), ‘Northern Trade Route’, pp. 38-41.
23 William Henry Scott translated Zhao’s record. Scott (1984), Prehispanic Source Materials, pp. 68-69. Another Chinese official, Wang Da-yuan 汪大淵, composed a treatise 125 years later, Daoyi zhilüe 島夷志略 (Description of the Barbarian Isles), which included accounts on trading nations from several islands that form part of the modern Philippines.
delta of the Agno River. From China’s Song period onwards, people in Pangasinan used porcelain jars for wine, and according to an early Spanish account in the sixteenth century, even ordinary people were wearing Chinese silk and cotton garments.

Miguel de Loarca’s bold statement that ‘people of Pangasinan were more intelligent due to their contact with Chinese, Japanese and Bornean merchants’ comes to mind. It not only summarises Spanish stereotypes but also encourages speculation about the significance of Chinese and Japanese traders before the arrival of the Spaniards. In the case of Japan, commercial contacts certainly did not evolve before the sixteenth century. As for China, when the Ming dynasty rose to power a ruler of Luzon responded to their diplomatic initiative by sending a tribute mission in 1373. Following the promotion tours of Zheng, the smaller kingdoms of the Philippine archipelago began to send tributary missions to the Middle Kingdom in the early years of the fifteenth century. According to the Ming Shi, Emperor Yongle sent an officer with orders to establish Chinese suzerainty in 1405. Henry Scott claims that the Muslim ruler of Mao-li-wu on Mindoro visited China in 1405. The little that is known about direct interaction between Mindoro and China is that petty rulers soon lost interest in this demanding foreign trade pattern and stopped sending tributary missions to China. In the meantime, Chinese private maritime ventures started to arrive regularly in Visayas, Luzon, Pangasinan, and Mindanao.

25 When the Chinese-speaking father Bartolomé Martínez was shipwrecked on the coast nearby he was able to baptise 20 Chinese traders he found there. Scott (1994), Barangay, p. 248.
29 BR 34, p. 189; Guerrero (1966), ‘Chinese in the Philippines’, p. 16: ‘The Ming annals mention that in the second year of his reign, the Emperor (Yung Lo) sent an Admiral Cheng Ho to Luzón to establish Chinese suzerainty over the island. Cheng Ho’s fleet of 60 vessels thrice attempted to reduce Luzon and the neighboring islands to vassalage. However, this attempt at dominion was discontinued after the death of Yung Lo and his admiral.’
31 One of the most illustrious descriptions of pre-Hispanic interactions between the archipelago and East Asia and how it allegedly contributed to the archipelago’s pre-Spanish economic history comes from the advisors to the US Chamber of Commerce of 1905: See Regidor, Jurado, Warren, Mason (1925), Commercial Progress, pp. 6-8. Their peculiar narrative stressed Chinese and Japanese contributions to the development of certain modes of production such as breeding fish or working in metals. For the origins of Chinese interest in the islands, see also Von den Driesch (1984), Grundlagen, p. 291.
The Arrival of the Spaniards

As a consequence of Ferdinand Magellan's discovery of the passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean in 1520-1521 in the service of the Castilian Crown, the first group of Spaniards landed in the Visayas, the central region of today's Philippines. The Portuguese explorer himself died in battle on the island of Mactan, ironically before being able to finish his journey around the world. Yet not the Islas San Lazaro, as his expedition corps called the realm at first, but the nearby Moluccas (Spice Islands) caught the Spaniards’ fancy. The original target of exploring and gaining territory had overtones of the hegemonic dispute between the Castilians and the Portuguese that dated back to the beginning of the European expansion in the Atlantic. Magellan’s arrival in Cebu (also in the Visayas) shook the newly established balance of power between the two Iberian sea powers, who could not agree in whose sphere the Moluccas were located. Mathematicians, cartographers, and Crown officials came into action but a first attempt to solve diplomatic disputes in Badajoz and Elvas in 1524 failed. In the meantime the Habsburg court under King Charles I (V) quickly commissioned further expeditions. A delegation led by Fray García Jofre de Loaysa set out to explore the Pacific in 1525. For a large percentage of the crew members, this adventure ended in a disaster even before reaching the Strait of Magellan. Under the command of Hernando de la Torre, 127 men eventually reached the Moluccas. However, the Portuguese from Melaka, a permanent Lusitanian trading colony in Malaysia since 1511, thwarted Spanish disembarkment.

A similar project, initiated by Hernán Cortes in New Spain fuelled tensions with the Portuguese even further. A bilateral treaty was eventually concluded and signed on 22 April 1529 in Zaragoza. The imaginary line of the Treaty of Tordesillas was virtually extended to the Pacific and laid down 297.5 leagues to the east of the Moluccas. The Portuguese received exclusive rights to take action in the Moluccas and the Spanish Crown abandoned her claims on the Moluccas in return for 350,000 ducats and the right to colonise what a few years later would be named the Islas Filipinas in honour of the Habsburg heir to the Spanish throne.

32 It was Magellan’s naval commander Juan Sebastián Elcano who completed the first world circumnavigation.
33 Hernán Cortes, in 1526 Governor and Captain General of New Spain, claimed that Spain should broaden its influence across the Pacific. Charles I provided him with a royal charter (cédula) dated 10 June 1526. See the articles in the following compilation: Martínez-Shaw, Alfonso Mola (eds) (2008), Ruta de España.
Conventionalising the Pacific as Spanish Lake (*lago español*)\(^{34}\) or *mare nostrum*, like the Romans used to call the Mediterranean,\(^{35}\) the Spanish Crown organised further explorations in the ‘new’ ocean.\(^{36}\) A Mexican viceroy keen on direct access to the spice trade commissioned Ruy López de Villalobos’s expedition in 1542-1543, sailing with six ships from Navidad, New Spain, to Mindanao, and Leyte. Local hostility and a shortage of food supplies obliged the explorers to abandon their attempts to found a colony and to prepare the ground for a future Christian mission. Seeking sanctuary on the Moluccas, they finally surrendered to the Portuguese before Villalobos died in Ambon in 1546.\(^{37}\)

For decades Castilian explorers failed to establish a return route (*tornaviage*) to New Spain as an alternative to the Cape Route, which had been reserved for the Portuguese since the Treaty of Tordesillas. King Philip II had explicitly listed the establishment of a ‘return route from the western isles’ that he deemed ‘fairly short’,\(^{38}\) as a condition for future intervention in the East. Andrés de Urdaneta, who had not returned to Spain from the Loayza expedition for 11 years until 1536, was able to lay the foundation for the trans-Pacific trade by establishing a feasible return route free of Portuguese interference on the galleon San Pedro in 1565.\(^{39}\)

On 8 May 1565, Miguel López de Legazpi’s expedition founded the city of San Miguel from where Legazpi started the conquest or ‘pacification’ of Cebu.\(^{40}\) In light of assaults by the indigenous population, he deemed it impossible to follow the King’s instructions to avoid bloodshed. Continuous struggles, conspiracies and a Portuguese attack in September 1568 persuaded him to move the colonial centre to the northern island of Luzon.\(^{41}\) The following year Legazpi, who was originally not equipped with the necessary order to

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\(^{34}\) Steinberg (2001), *Social Construction of the Ocean*, pp. 62-65; Such views, however, have lost ground in modern scholarship. To the contrary, the historical Pacific is nowadays widely understood as open, centreless space, where peoples, goods, and ideas moved rather unrestrictedly. See Matsuda (2006), ‘The Pacific’, pp. 758-780.


\(^{36}\) Steinberg (2001), *Social Construction of the Ocean*, pp. 75-84.


\(^{39}\) Schurz (1985), *Manila Galleon*, p. 181: Heading towards the northeast, Urdaneta and his crew arrived on the 39th degree. From there they crossed straight to the coast of California on the 34th degree from where they would continue southwards and finally reached the port of Navidad on 1 October and Acapulco on 8 October the same year. See Macías Domínguez (2003), ‘Presencia española’, p. 35; See also Spate (1979), *Spanish Lake*, pp. 104-106.

\(^{40}\) Díaz-Trechuelo (2003), ‘Legazpi’, p. 49.

\(^{41}\) According to Spanish sources, a fleet under the command of Gonzalo Pereira supported by war prahu from the Moluccas led an unsuccessful attack.
conquer or colonise, was appointed *gobernador general* of the Philippines, and finally received a royal charter that gave him the title *adelantado* and the right to found cities and distribute trusteeships (*encomiendas*) among his people. Following Urdaneta’s nautical achievement, the first group of Spanish and Mexican merchants and soldiers arrived with military supply in Cebu. When Spanish *conquistadores* spearheaded by Martín de Goiti and Juan de Salcedo reached the far more attractive Manila Bay in 1570 for the first time, they burned Muslim Maynila in a battle and left again. The following year Legazpi returned with 27 vessels and Visayan support to the Maynila area. In the meantime, local Muslim rulers had rebuilt the town but only to once again accept defeat on 3 June 1571.

**The Castilian Territorial Model**

**Land Seizure and Regional Administration**

After the victory in Manila, Spanish rule gradually extended over Luzon and partially over the Visayas, while large parts of the rest of the islands remained outside of the Spanish sphere of influence throughout the entire colonial period. Manila offered particularly favourable conditions for a permanent settlement, a productive hinterland, a considerable number of inhabitants, a strategic position, and existing trading structures. After having outwitted the Muslim ruling elite, the Spaniards began systematically to suppress the independent *barangay* in order to enforce Spanish authority. The use of a divide-and-conquer (*divide et impera*) strategy and the implementation of colonial policies, which included the establishment

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43 *Encomienda* refers to the labour system that was employed in the Spanish overseas colonies in the Americas and the Philippines. It was a sort of feudal right granted by the King to the colonial elite to obtain tribute or service from the native population in exchange for protection and indoctrination.
44 Written in the *cédula real* of 14 August 1569 that reached the Philippines at the end of the same year.
46 This study does not allow looking at early colonising efforts in detail. For a concise overview, I refer to Gorriz Abella (2010), *Filipinas antes de Filipinas*. The author summarises and re-interprets the far-reaching studies by early Spanish reports by Miguel de Luarca, Santiago de Vera, and Pedro Chirino.
of permanent bases with political, military, economic, and religious centres, helped to impose Spanish rule. Unlike the Portuguese in Melaka, who used the existing structures of the Muslim outpost, the Spaniards built a new network of cities in the Philippines, all of them dependent on the central government of Manila.\(^49\) Nonetheless, even if Spaniards were the nominal rulers of the Philippines Spanish colonial rule in sixteenth-century South East Asia remained characterised by a very fragile power structure at the periphery of influential actors.

Early centralising measures failed due to the disunity of the population and ethno-linguistic differences. As was often the case with imperialist constructs, ethnic heterogeneity proved originally favourable to the Spaniards. It enabled them to manipulate the situation by initiating wars between the local tribes and collaborating with antagonistic local leaders, the aforesaid divide-and-conquer strategy. Although the majority of the Spaniards believed in destroying traditional structures for the sake of minimising indigenous resistance, after the conquest they had to rely on a mediating native elite and its existing socio-political organisations. Moreover, for the purpose of consolidating their rule it was necessary to grant special rights to the natives in urban centres, which ultimately assured the survival of their traditional culture. *Datu* who deliberately brought their people into Spanish settlements received the reward of being appointed *gobernadorcillos*. Natives who collaborated with the Spaniards were often given the task of demanding tribute from the local population and therefore enjoyed certain privileges and formal authority over the others, which gave them an opportunity to enrich themselves.\(^50\) These practices created a new class with *principalía* status.

Towns or pueblos were managed by native *principalías*, often under the strong influence of a parish priest. Provinces and municipalities, in turn, were administered by the mostly Spanish-born so-called *alcaldes-mayores*.\(^51\) The administration of the Manila region was divided among *alcaldes*. Inhabitants of the municipal quarters were legally and officially considered subjects of the local *alcalde*, who functioned as political official,

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\(^49\) For Portuguese Melaka, see Pinto (2006), *Portuguese and the Straits of Melaka*.

\(^50\) For a synopsis of the lives of indigenous population under Spanish rule, see Newson (2009), *Conquest and Pestilence*. Newson argues against the common belief that the indigenous suffered a demographic decline, although to a less lethal extent than in the Americas, the reason being the complicated transport and communication networks that left many regions of the archipelago largely unaffected by Spanish conquest. For Spanish direct interaction with the native population, see Alatas (1977), *Myth of the Lazy Native*.

\(^51\) Álvarez (2009), *Costo del Imperio*, p. 134.
military leader, and financial manager. The office was an easy source for revenue and consequently enjoyed great popularity. For the same reason the offices and their distribution mostly among Spaniards constituted a very controversial matter, and over the years accusations of corruption filled hundreds of court pages.\footnote{AGI Escribanía 403B, Legajo 1 de pleytos de Manila, 1614/1620, f. 95: ‘Es cosa muy notario [...] no se les paga a los alcaldes del Parián cosa ninguna sino solo el aprovechamiento que tienen de las tiendas de los dichos sangleyes que de ellas la pagan al dicho alcalde cada mes dos reales [...] vienen a montar un muy grueso salario y a los dichos alcaldes ordinarios ni de la real caja ni de los dichos sangleyes se les da cosa ninguna.’}

Spanish economic structures did not directly affect the subsistence of the natives, and the pre-Hispanic political organisation of cabezas de barangay continued to serve social order more than decisions of the Manila government did.\footnote{La rkin (1972), Pampangans.} Social and juridical matters were also subject to bargaining. Consultation of public opinion, interrogation, and questionnaires were typical tools of a reasonably democratic colonial administration between Hispanic and indigenous agencies. Inhabitants of the nearby Tagalog region were furthermore integrated into Spanish affairs by supplying Manila with necessities. We may conclude that this experience of administrative bargaining and constant compromising between the Spanish ruling elite and various indigenous agencies created an important condition for the development and maintenance of cross-cultural relations. Even if we accept that the role the colonial state played was comparatively strong, there is no way of denying that Manileños and surrounding peoples shaped and reshaped foreign maritime relations.

Regardless of economic dependence on foreign trade, politics were primarily based on the land-oriented encomienda system, without paying much attention to a region’s specific conditions. The encomienda was a ‘well-defined institution in which the holder performed certain governmental duties and in return received tribute’.\footnote{Schwartz, Lockhart (1989), Early Latin America, p. 92.} After having been introduced in the Americas by the early conquistadores, it developed into a genuine tax resource for the Spanish Crown, funding both administration and exploitation of the new territories.\footnote{In recent years research has focused on the socio-political dynamics behind the system. Subrahmanyam (2007), ‘Holding the World in Balance’, for instance, stresses the dynamics from below in the spread of royal policy in the Spanish colonies.} In the year 1576, an official count listed as many as 143 encomenderos in the Philippines, yet with limited rights. Between 1574 and 1576, the monarch rejected two requests for further encomiendas.
and grants.\textsuperscript{56} In combination with collecting indigenous tribute, \textit{alcaldes mayores} and \textit{gobernadorcillos} were granted major competences as heads of the indigenous communities.\textsuperscript{57} Although missionaries had long criticised the \textit{encomienda} system for exploiting and abusing indigenous labour, their number grew.\textsuperscript{58} In 1591, 270 \textit{encomiendas} forced 668,000 natives to work for the colonial economy.\textsuperscript{59} Upset by a growing rich land-owning class with the potential to undermine political power, they soon imposed restrictions and furthermore promoted the cultivation of agricultural products and thereby hoped to boost exports, although it never materialised.\textsuperscript{60} Private \textit{encomiendas} were gradually confiscated and, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the colonial government appointed officials and priests instead of \textit{encomenderos} to administer the indigenous people. However, these reforms did not change the social welfare of the locals.\textsuperscript{61} In the long run, friar estates were not a perfect solution either.

By and large, Iberian colonisation-cum-evangelisation followed the doctrines of Tomas of Aquin and Francisco de Vittoria, which stipulated that force was only justifiable when the sovereign of a territory refused conversion of the people living in his realm.\textsuperscript{62} Vittoria’s claim ‘that under the law of nations Spaniards had the right to trade with them and preach Christianity’ became the basis for famous debates between Las Casas and Sepúlveda in Valladolid in 1550-1551. Similarly, in the Spanish Philippines indigenous people were theoretically only forced into a tribute relationship after they had had the opportunity to hear the gospel. The entire process, ironically referred to as ‘pacification’, forced the indigenous people to pay tribute. As indicated earlier, friars were the first to advocate better social conditions of the local population under Spanish rule, long before the

\textsuperscript{56} Kamen (2012), \textit{Spain’s Road}, p. 202; De la Costa (1961), \textit{Jesuits}, p. 13: ‘In the 1580’s, the area within five leagues [approx. 20 kilometres] of Manila was divided into four private encomiendas with a total population of 3,500 and one Crown encomienda with a population of 4,000.’

\textsuperscript{57} For a detailed description of the colonial administration, see Von den Driesch (1984), \textit{Grundlagen}, pp. 268-270; His study reflects common narratives of contradictory views on how the indigenous should be dealt with.


\textsuperscript{60} Hausberger (2008), ‘Reich’, p. 352.

\textsuperscript{61} Yun-Casalilla, Comín Comín (2012), ‘Spain’, pp. 234-244.

Audiencia decreed in 1598 that ‘Indians’ must not only be treated better but also instructed in the Catholic faith as ‘free vassals’.63

Another matter for constant debate was whether tribute should be paid in cash or kind. Although often paid in kind, it ‘forced the colony to produce for the market’.64 Thus, especially during periods of inflation, the system caused much hardship.65 Rates were not fixed but varied depending on the prosperity of a region. The clergy warranted against increasing indigenous tribute that would throw a large number of indigenous into slavery for not being able to afford higher taxes. Although slavery was generally forbidden based on the maxim that a Christian must not own anyone, a maxim introduced to the Philippines by order of the King in 1583, occasional exceptions were made for *moro* slaves.66 Slavery moreover continued to exist in indigenous circles since it was impossible to wipe out a socio-economic system that had functioned for centuries.

The average annual tax rate was changed to between 4 and 6 reals at the end of the sixteenth century.67 Hernando de los Ríos Coronel (1560-1623), *procurador general* and advocate of the rights and the well-being of the native population, carried out a thorough investigation of their living conditions, published in his 1621 memorial to the King.68 He concluded that the indigenous population paid 2 reals annually.69 Tribute was always a burden for large parts of the indigenous population, but was particularly high during the armed maritime conflict with the Dutch from 1610 to 1640.70 This was also a period when food became scarce, because peasants had to leave their farms as they were forced into labour, often for shipbuilding.71 With

63 Cunningham (1919), *Audiencia*, pp. 53-54. The Manila synod of 1581-1582 and 1586 was launched to solve growing dualism in handling interactions with the indigenous population. The event took place under the chairmanship of Bishop Salazar. The outcome had only limited effects on the politics and justice on the archipelago.

64 Alonso (2003), ‘Financing the Empire’, p. 86.


66 Newson (2009), *Conquest and Pestilence*, p. 7. Regardless of the official policy, random sources frequently mention house servants whose exact status remains unclear to the historian.


69 Von den Driesch (1984), *Grundlagen*, p. 232; Based on such contemporary accounts, the historian Leslie Bauzon even calculated that by 1619 the Spanish government owed the Filipino people one million pesos due to forced labour and unfair trade policies. See Bauzon (1981), *Deficit Government*, p. 43.

70 Álvarez (2009), *Costo del Imperio*, p. 174. Financial data illustrate high military expenses during the same period; p. 157; See also García Fuentes (1980), *Comercio español con América*.

an ever-growing unproductive population that required food, substantial shortcomings led to rising prices of commodities and goods.\textsuperscript{72} The US-trained Filipino historian Leslie Bauzon has illustrated the financial misery of the Spanish Philippines in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, concluding that the Filipinos were largely ‘paying for their own colonisation’.\textsuperscript{73} Bauzon furthermore argued that the colonial economy was dependent on financial aid from New Spain, the so-called situado real.\textsuperscript{74} Deriving from the treasury of New Spain, this imperial approach significantly helped to fund the colonial government by transferring financial surpluses.\textsuperscript{75} Between 1610 and 1640, the situado included the ad valorem tax collected from the Manila Galleon trade in Acapulco, as well as 40 ducats per ton collected in Acapulco, and amounted to an annual average of 300,000 pesos.\textsuperscript{76}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Year} & \textbf{Collected tribute (in pesos)} \\
\hline
1584 & 22,000 \\
1588 & 30,404 \\
1590 & 26,364 \\
1591 & 36,829 \\
1592 & 69,705 \\
1595 & 88,645 \\
1603 & 38,266 \\
1604 & 34,667 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Indigenous Tribute 1584-1604\textsuperscript{77}}
\end{table}

\textbf{Colonial Offices}

Three types of high officials administered the colony: (1) the Governor General, (2) the judges and fiscals of the Supreme/High Court (sp. Audiencia), and (3) the Archbishop and the bishops.\textsuperscript{78} The hierarchical structure

\textsuperscript{73} Bauzon (1981), Deficit Government, p. 46.
\textsuperscript{74} Meaning subsidy, income, or appropriation. A general fund created to support ‘non-self-supporting Spanish imperial outposts’. It was ideally raised from the returns from the Manila Galleon trade and freight duties in Acapulco. Bauzon (1981), Deficit Government, pp. 56-60.
\textsuperscript{75} The system was not exclusive for the Philippines, but generally applied to help regions with perennial deficits. Grau y Monfalcón (1640), Justificación, pp. 9-10.
\textsuperscript{77} Source: AGI Contaduría 1200-1206, cf. Álvarez (2009), Costo del Imperio, p. 166.
\textsuperscript{78} Bauzon (1981), Deficit Government, p. 6.
of governing institutions had proven their efficiency in Spain and Spanish America. The Governor General acted on behalf of the King and held executive authority in the Philippines. His far-reaching competences covered judicial and administrative affairs as well as military duties as captain general. Acting as royal vice-patron his relationship with the church in the colony equalled the King’s back in Spain. Financial matters were usually taken care of in the Governor’s weekly meeting of the Council of the Royal Treasury (Junta de Real Hacienda). The average tenure of a governor was short and many candidates saw this job as part of a tour of duty (royal authorities’ cursus honorum) prior to a more prestigious post on the other side of the Pacific, rather than building a permanent residence in Manila – even though this often remained a remote dream for many.79

Established in 1583, following the intervention of Gabriel Ribera, envoy of Governor Gonzalo Ronquillo de Peñalosa to Spain in 1582, the Audiencia was set up as court of appeal, with a board of oidores (judges). Being in charge of civil and criminal affairs, entitled to intervene in both state and religious affairs, and even entitled to take over the government in the absence of the Governor, members of the Audiencia enjoyed undisputed political influence.80 In addition to the Audiencia, city councils (cabildos) were established in the major colonial centres.81 As a general rule of royal control each Audiencia consisted of senior officials sent from Spain. They should not develop too close ties to the region they were working in. A peculiarity that illustrates the fragile character of Spanish rule was the abolition of the Audiencia between 1589 and 1595.82 Its failure has been explained with a general unpreparedness for the situation in Manila, plus an unfitting personnel and undefined laws. Reopening the Audiencia after seven years was both a decision to keep the Philippines a part of the Overseas Empire and a clear initiative to demand serious commitment from the Spanish settlers to the colonial project in the East. The King urged Governor Tello de Guzmán and the judges to collaborate in creating a stable

79 Cunningham (1919), Audiencia, pp. 32; 195-197. In the later period of our study the average time in office amounted 4.5 years, until 1609 it was only 3.5 years. For a list of Governors see BR 17, pp. 285-312.
80 AGI Patronato 25, r. 2, ‘ Expediente sobre gobierno Islas Filipinas’, 1583; In the year of its establishment Governor Vera and three other auditors became the supreme organ for decision-making in colonial matters. See Cunningham (1919), Audiencia, pp. 99-119.
82 Alonso Sánchez, an ambitious Jesuit, whose scheming will receive more attention in subsequent chapters, was one of the driving forces behind the temporary abolition of the Audiencia.
government in light of growing trade with China. Control over colonial officials was thereafter secured by the institution of the residencia – a body that scrutinised evidence for potential corruption and fraud against the Crown at the end of each official’s term in office, as well as occasional visits by inspectors (visitadores).

Spanish spiritual conquest went hand in hand with ecclesiastical administration. In 1579 Philip II established the first diocese in Manila, the Dominican Domingo de Salazar was chosen as the first Bishop. Before his arrival, Augustinians controlled correspondence with the King and informed him about the needs of the islands. The Manila Synod of 1581/2 was the first systematic step in that direction, being launched to solve growing dualism in handling interactions with the indigenous population. The outcome had only limited effects on politics and justice in the Philippines.

With the foundation of further dioceses, such as Nueva Segovia (Cagayan) under its first Bishop Miguel de Benavides in 1595, Manila was promoted to an archbishopric. Before long, the far-reaching political powers of the clergy caused friction with the civil government. The latter harshly criticised that ‘ecclesiastics and religious quietly take away from and add to the instruction at will, and without the supervision of the Governor and the ecclesiastical superior, contrary to his Majesty’s orders’. Deciding which areas would be designed as joint agendas and in which fields prelates and bishops were not to meddle with the government was a complex matter. The Crown aimed at keeping the bishops from overusing their power of excommunicating government officials and also at limiting the secular power of ordinary priests by prohibiting their active participation in foreign trade.

Within the Overseas Empire, the Philippines were subordinate to the Viceroyalty of New Spain and strictly speaking it was only after 1821 that the Philippines were ruled directly from Spain. Nevertheless the Philippines were not exclusively treated as a dependency of New Spain, or a colony under the auspices of another colony, as often proclaimed in historical

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83 Cunningham (1919), Audiencia, p. 79.
84 Hausberger (2000), Für Gott und König; The Spanish Inquisition had not been officially introduced in the early decades and no independent tribunal existed in the Philippines. Mexico was responsible for religious control or heretic trials. Yet that did not mean that the Philippines would have been spared religious intolerance: revisionist work has dug up shocking inquisition files on Filipino cases in Mexico, crushing the narrative of a bloodless conquest of the Philippines.
85 Camuñez (1980), Sínodo.
86 BR 10, p. 80. A quote by Antonio de Morga.
87 Cunningham (1919), Audiencia, p. 80.
writing.88 In fact, the Crown tried hard to restrict the growing power of the Viceroy. In 1607 Philip III (r. 1598-1621) issued a decree ordering his highest representative in Mexico to ‘give aid to the governor and captain general of the Philippines in whatever may occur’ and to send him the necessary amounts of arms, men, munitions, and money for the conservation and management of those islands.89 The King’s intervention has to be understood in the context of lingering Dutch naval aggression in the China Seas. With regard to the question of the role of Mexico, it is particularly crucial to distinguish between financial and political agendas. Regina Grafe and Alejandra Irigoin argued in 2008 that ongoing internal struggles over who would finance overseas politics characterised colonial reality in the Spanish Overseas territories, emphasising that any ‘legislative initiative [...] was subject to influences from multiple players’.90 Their assumption holds major relevance for the Philippines: Both the colonial authorities of the Philippines and their Mexican colleagues ultimately had to bend to the wishes of the Habsburg monarch. Yet, since colonial staff did not always feel obliged to carry out missives from above, I agree with Leslie Bauzon that ‘the Philippines were practically independent and self-sufficient in the consideration of matters purely political in nature’.91 Royal orders were ignored in places far away from central control.92 Several scholars have suggested that the Spanish administration indeed worked according to the principle _se obedece, pero no se cumple_ (‘one obeys but does not comply’), a tactic that naturally invited conflict, and was all too present in such geographically remote place.93

**Secular and Ecclesiastical Administration**

Prospects of spreading Roman Catholic Christianity in the region was without any doubt a fairly strong imperialist impulse behind the colonisation and friars were often regarded as particularly reliable colonisers. The Catholic mission has often been ideologically linked to the spirits of the

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91 Bauzon (1981), _Deficit Government_, p. 8: ‘The only years during which the Philippines colonial regime can be said to have been subordinated to the viceregal government of Mexico were those from 1565 to 1583 and between 1589 and 1595, when no audiencia existed.’
92 Nuchera (1995), _Encomienda_, p. 188.
93 AGI Escribánia 403B, Legajo 1 de pleytos de Manila, 1614/1620; Phelan (1960), ‘Authority and Flexibility’, p. 59.
crusades and occidental fights against Islam. Although the Roman Catholic faith is indeed the most visible heritage of the Spanish colonisation, I would not go as far as nineteenth-century American historian Edward G. Bourne, who stated that the Philippines were ‘more of a mission outpost than a colony’.94 During the early colonial period, friars were easily lured to the Philippines: Eager to work in the promising fields in China or Japan many aimed to use to use the Philippines as a way station but these hopes were mostly dashed by reality and doors to China and Japan were kept shut. Even so, any official Spanish action in Asia also has to be regarded in the context of regular endeavours to spread and protect Catholicism globally. The King initially hesitated before finally decreeing on 8 June 1585 that passages to China were prohibited for any Spanish missionary without explicit permission given in the Philippines to enter China for conversion.95

Collaboration with Catholic missionaries was conveniently institutionalised through the _patronato real_, an agreement between the pope and the Spanish Crown that gave the Spanish monarch and colonial authorities power over the clergy and churches in the colonies.96 In return for Rome’s support, it was the King’s duty to provide financial support and protection to the church in its overseas possession and to pay the friars’ passage to the Indies.97 In the Philippines, clergymen often depended on the favour of willing _encomenderos_ for covering missionary expenses,98 which to some degree made them ‘salaried employees of the Spanish Crown’, as Luis H. Francia has termed them.99 The situation changed once Catholic priests had found profitable ways to sustain themselves in form of friar estates, where they virtually governed absolutely.

Catholic friars’ governance had far-reaching effects on the indigenous population. With a desire to translate the Christian gospel and occidental values into local languages, clerics early on showed interest in learning indigenous languages. Juan de Plasencia was one of the first friars to master Tagalog, determined to integrate the indigenous into the colonial society.100

94 Bourne (1907), _Discovery, Conquest and History_. Both John Leddy Phelan (1959) and Vicente Rafael (1993) have extensively studied forms of syncretism and so-called Philippine ‘folk Catholicism’.
95 BR 25, p. 137.
96 Lach, Vankley (1993), _Asia_, vol. 3,book 4, pp. 202-204. Pope Leo X granted the Jus patronatus to the Portuguese Crown in 1514; For the religious orders’ contribution to the administration of Manila see AGI Filipinas 77, n. 15; 1602; see also Montalbán (1930), _Spanische Patronat_, pp. 108-110.
98 Montalbán (1930), _Spanische Patronat_, p. 110.
99 Francia (2010), _History_, p. 64.
100 Camuñez (1988), _Sínodo_, pp. 29-30. His early efforts in collecting material on the Tagalog language and producing material for the conversion of the native population are part of Plasencia’s legacy.
In their function as the educating class, the clergy took care of moral issues such as guarding the residents against forbidden gambling and indulging in immoral practices that were common among the Chinese. Nonetheless it is hard to deny the double standards and blackmailing tactics behind charitable work. On the one hand, the native population was often lured into moving into church estates by being promised titles and presents, and if that did not help, friars sought the help of soldiers. On the other, missionaries were of utmost economic and social importance for infrastructure projects such as building roads, bridges, irrigation canals and dams, introducing new plants from New Spain and Europe, and for providing for social welfare by running orphanages and hospitals. They were the only source of organised education and the first to found schools and universities. Needless to say, only a small percentage of the native population benefitted from the like.

Despite the friars’ undisputed importance as Spanish colonisers, in the long run, Catholic celibacy hindered active integration of indigenous communities. Early on, they were requested to employ a more bureaucratic approach to accelerating indigenous acceptance of Spanish rule across the archipelago. Implemented jointly by church and state, resettlement programs (reducciones) from barangays to newly built towns with a church in the centre should serve religious submission for better access to work force and more efficient taxing. In social terms, the all-encompassing power of the friars was particularly harmful to women and their important social status alongside their healing practices in the pre-Hispanic traditional society. Since religious administration was an entangled political issue, baptism determined the status and treatment of the settlers from East Asia. Economically speaking, however, conversion to Christianity was not a requirement for a fruitful life in Manila. The majority of migrants from China did not convert to Catholicism and kept their status as sangleyes infieles, as we shall see later.

102 Filipino historian Vicente Rafael has claimed that Catholicism was the integrating element for the Filipino nation and that especially conversions of Tagalogs accelerated that process. See Rafael (1993), Contracting Colonialism, pp. 6-19. Phelan (1959) analyzed the filipinisation of Catholicism in Hispanization of the Philippines. The first school for indigenous children opened in 1589 in Manila (San Ignacio) and was run by the Jesuits. A university was added in 1621. The oldest university of Manila is Santo Tomás, a Dominican establishment of 1611. See Barrón (1992), Mestizaje, p. 108.
Between 1575 and 1596, a total of 454 members of mendicant orders reached the Philippines.\textsuperscript{105} As soon as the strategically gifted Dominicans obtained the Episcopal See in Manila power struggles with the Augustinians, as the first Catholic order on the archipelago, became obvious and with the arrival of the Jesuits debates on who used the better proselytising methods did not come to a halt anymore.\textsuperscript{106} The government of Philip II felt impelled to intervene on 27 April 1594: Doctrines were unified for the entire colony in order to avoid confusion among the natives\textsuperscript{107} and the orders’ competences were geographically divided.\textsuperscript{108} Only in the Tagalog provinces around Manila were all the orders represented. This measure both increased clerical power in the countryside and affected the linguistic development of the archipelago since friars could concentrate on the language(s) of their realms. However, with the exception of Tagalog most efforts were inefficient, as John L. Phelan concluded.\textsuperscript{109}

Table 2  Catholic Friars in the Spanish Philippines\textsuperscript{110}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Order</th>
<th>Time of first arrival</th>
<th>Number of towns founded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Augustinians</td>
<td>1565</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franciscans</td>
<td>1577</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jesuits</td>
<td>1581</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominicans</td>
<td>1587</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recollects</td>
<td>1606</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{106} Pastells (1925), Historia General, vol. 1, p. ccxlix: In 1625, archbishop Don Fray Miguel García Serrano requested from the King to assign the entire missionary work exclusively to the Jesuits.
\textsuperscript{107} Chirino (1969), Relación de las Islas Filipinas, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{109} Phelan (1955), ‘Philippine Linguistics’, pp. 158-159. In order to facilitate the spread of the gospel among the native population, four different printing presses were established: the Dominican press in 1593, the Franciscan press in 1606, the Jesuit press in 1610, and the Augustinian press around 1618.
\textsuperscript{110} Data is based on De la Costa (1961), Jesuits, p. 9: The first four Jesuits who arrived in the Philippines in 1581 from Mexico travelled at the King’s expense and were given additional 1500 pesos for their journey. They left Acapulco on the galleon San Martín, the same vessel on which the first bishop of Manila travelled. The passengers of that year’s Manila Galleon are representative and underline the political importance of evangelisation at that time: Next to 96 officers, about 100 passengers including Domingo de Salazar and his secretary, Fray Cristóbal de Salvatierra, eighteen Augustinians and six Franciscans and the four Jesuits were on board.
In terms of religious practise, the Philippines did not differ much from other colonial stages: Christian belief blended with native religious rites, and the longer the engagement the more hybrid forms of worshipping and celebrating emerged.\(^{111}\) The native society had to no other means than understanding the new religion through familiar concepts.\(^{112}\) What is more, the Spaniards did not succeed to integrate the entire population. While the Igorotes north of Luzon resisted all evangelisation efforts,\(^ {113}\) Islam remained the biggest challenges for the new ruling elite. Backed by the Sultanate of Sulu, a fierce enemy of the Spaniards, Islam was disseminated in the southern Philippines, where Muslim *datus* united against the Spanish.\(^ {114}\)

**Crown Monopolies: Overseas Spain’s Political Economy**

It goes without saying that a territorial colony of a size and scope of the Philippines was not easy to maintain and caused considerable financial drawbacks in the long run.\(^ {115}\) During the whole period, Spain failed to make the islands self-sufficient and struggled with expenditures higher than income. In 1584 the colonial government spent officially 41,231 pesos and, had pending bills of 30,000 pesos, while only 30,000 pesos had entered the royal treasury.\(^{116}\) Between 1608 and 1637 expenditure exceeded income twice; under these circumstances the colonial government was permanently indebted to the people and the church organisations of Manila such as the Hermandad de la Misericordia (est. 1594). Alonso, who criticised Bauzon’s established study for not using primary sources, argued – based on analysing *contaduría* data – that after initial low income the royal treasury annually gained an average of 560,000 pesos between 1604 and 1648, coinciding with increased military spending due to conflicts with the Dutch.\(^ {117}\) Records of 1611 confirm that declining income from indigenous

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112 According to Vicente Rafael the Tagalog society viewed Christianity through cultural lenses of ritual debt. On religious authority and clerical privileges, see Abinales, Amoroso (2005), *State and Society*, p. 50.
taxation was compensated by licence fees collected from incoming Chinese merchant ships.¹¹⁸

Next to military expenses embassies to neighbouring countries were financially challenging.¹¹⁹ By 1608 costs incurred for diplomatic exchange had gone up to 6000 pesos but were cut down to 1500 pesos the following year.¹²⁰ Even if placed in context of a peak in diplomatic exchange with Japan (discussed in depth in the following chapters), these numbers are telling. It would be wrong to understand them as mere expenses in the sense of spending with no return; instead they are a sign of Spanish adaptation to the profitable framework of East Asian diplomacy and trade. They were classified ‘extraordinary expenses’ and reasonably considered a necessary means to ‘maintain friendship’, in other words peaceful trade relations with China, and in particular with Japan.

Table 3 Revenues and Spending of the Manila Treasury in 1611¹²¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Revenue</th>
<th>in pesos</th>
<th>Expenses</th>
<th>in pesos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balance</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>Official salaries</td>
<td>37,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribute</td>
<td>20,223</td>
<td>Extraordinary expenses for Manila</td>
<td>177,258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situados</td>
<td>10,904</td>
<td>War expenses</td>
<td>41,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraordinary revenue</td>
<td>172,208</td>
<td>Factory</td>
<td>86,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almojarifazgo</td>
<td>31,725</td>
<td>Doctrines</td>
<td>14,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade fines</td>
<td>1,445</td>
<td>Sailors</td>
<td>6,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice fines</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>Wage labour</td>
<td>14,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenth in gold</td>
<td>2,888</td>
<td>Mercies</td>
<td>1,687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecclesiastic tenth</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>27,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>6,556</td>
<td>Jurisdiction</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refunds</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>War with the Moluccas</td>
<td>40,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver from New Spain</td>
<td>295,776</td>
<td>Balance</td>
<td>131,914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freight</td>
<td>4,170</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sold offices</td>
<td>2,320</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licence fees for sangleyes infeles</td>
<td>23,032</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>572,911</td>
<td></td>
<td>580,360</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹¹⁹ Bauzon (1981), Deficit Government, pp. 43-45. In 1580, these embassies cost the Philippine’s treasury 1500 pesos.
Philip II’s secretary Juan de Ledesma’s memorandum of the Council of the Indies of 1586 neatly summarises the economic dilemma. He stressed that the royal treasury had spent more than 3,000,000 pesos on the discovery, settlement and maintenance of the Philippines, whilst only 12 pesos were levied on one tonelada of export and import. Early on, a remarkable gap existed between political theory and economic reality. Very different from his two direct predecessors (Gonzalo and Diego Ronquillo were active investors in the trade between Peru and China), Governor Santiago de Vera (r. 1584-1590) exhibited a surprisingly conservative economic understanding. In the year 1586, he claimed that colonisation should be encouraged by the abundance of a country’s natural resources as well as the good prospects for future discoveries, not by the profits of commercial exchange. Therefore, he concluded, trade with China had to be stopped. As we will see, trade with China did not come to an end, nor was the monopoly officially abolished; in fact, after 1587, Vera himself became a great supporter of triangular trade relations.

Mexican merchants were particularly interested in keeping good trade relations with China. In the 1590s, Spanish officials commonly believed that integrating the hinterland and its people would help to improve the economic situation of the Philippines. Yet, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries only 10 per cent of exports leaving the Philippines were of native origin, mostly harvested forest and sea products. Measures aiming to prevent the outflow of silver pesos to China remained the most prominent economic policy, resulting in a strictly controlled Manila trade. The Manila Galleon regulations of the years 1593 and 1604 (discussed in more detail in the next chapter) have to be considered against this background. The perception of the economic possibilities of the Manila market was also a matter of biased, public discourse fuelled by the idea that liberalisation would cause high expenditures either for Madrid or Mexico City. Indeed, in sharp contrast to the Portuguese Estado da Índia, the Philippines were

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123 Ratified by the King in June 1586. BR 6, pp. 297-298.
124 Montalbán (1930), Spanische Patronat, pp. 118-119.
125 Legarda (1999), After the Galleon, pp. 101-145. The end of the galleon trade and export of cash crops changed the number to 90 per cent after 1840.
126 Grau y Monfalcón (1640), Justificación, pp. 11-14.
not maintained merely through profits from maritime trade. Here, of course, the question arises how feasible it is to compare the Philippines as territorial colony with a trading post. The Crown did not provide much support for the few Spaniards who traded in Manila, let alone invested in creating institutions for the trans-Pacific trade. In light of this official attitude the Philippines may have lacked the same ideological rank as the colonies in the Americas. The fact that the metropolis had shifted important issues of finance and human resources to the viceregal authorities is just one example for their negligence of the Philippines.

Crown intervention undeniably had an inhibitive impact on foreign trade. Yet it must not be overlooked that Manila trade grew rapidly, largely beyond the Crown’s supervision. Fully aware of these dynamics the Crown consequently aimed at channelling profits from the colonial economies to the motherland. Control was pursued with the help of expanding functions of the Casa de Contratación in Seville. In fact, the Crown aimed at monopolising the entire Manila trade since the very day when Legazpi established a customhouse (real hacienda) right after the foundation of Manila. An ad valorem tax on both imports and exports, the almojarifazgo, was established for all Spanish colonies. In Manila it was collected from Chinese and Portuguese traders, initiated by Governor Ronquillo de Peñalosa in 1581 as a 3 per cent tax on in- and outgoing Chinese commerce that netted about 30,000 to 40,000 pesos a year during the 1590s.

128 Subrahmanyam (2007), ‘World in Balance’, pp. 10-11. For the organisation of the Portuguese realms in Asia with the largely autonomous Estado da India that financed the enterprise with customs, taxes and other tributes, see Feldbauer (2005), Portugiesen in Asien, p. 82: ‘Was die Portugiesen so zäh verteidigten, war keine Kolonie im spanisch-lateinamerikanischen Sinn.’ They only had sovereign power over Ceylon, the Moluccas, Goa and the coastal region of Gujarat.
129 See, among many others, Gipouloux (2009), Méditerranée Asiatique, pp. 144-148; 160-161. However, most scholars who praise the first outpost empires in Asia overlook the fact that the Portuguese came under totally different conditions, with different aspirations, and were in many cases only successful until the Dutch arrived with more elaborate means of coercion.
130 Burkholder, Johnson (2001), Colonial Latin America, p. 146; Reed (1978), Colonial Manila, p. 90.
131 Mahoney (2010), Colonialism, pp. 37-38; AGI Filipinas, 339, l. 1, f. 41v, ‘Petición de cuentas detalladas de la Hacienda de Filipinas’, 4 June 1572.
132 AGI Filipinas 18 A, r. 6, n. 43, ‘Carta de Ayala sobre ventas de oficios, encomiendas’, 29 June 1589. The Leyes de Indias (Laws of the Indies) are a set of commands and decrees for the overseas territories. Originally passed by the Catholic Monarchs, the Laws of the Indies have often been considered an inefficient instrument to assert real authority in the New World. However, in economic terms they helped to levy revenues (such as the quinto real) in the name of the king.
Mainly imposed on luxury goods, it was quickly promoted as a safe source of revenue and a backup in case of failing encomienda policies. In 1609 the almojarifazgo changed from 3 to 6 per cent in 1609.\textsuperscript{134} Pierre Chaunu calculated for the period between 1600 and 1640 that almojarifazgo revenues annually ranged between roughly 17 and 27 per cent of the royal treasury (caja real).\textsuperscript{135} Supervision and trade control began with Spanish soldiers inspecting the junks from Fujian before anchoring in Manila Bay. No merchant was allowed to step on the mainland before the registration of all the merchandise had been concluded. In the seventeenth century a judge (juez de visitas), often together with a clerk (escribano) and a resident Chinese or Chinese mestizo as interpreter, replaced the ordinary soldiers. This pattern of port control became a lucrative business for the inspectors who had the chance to enrich themselves through bribery.\textsuperscript{136}

The Pillars of the First European Capital in the East

What has not been mentioned yet, promising trade relations with China were the strongest impetus for Legazpi and his followers to found the colonial capital at the site of Manila; the initially small trading port offered optimal conditions for foreign trade with East and South East Asia and guaranteed supply from outside.\textsuperscript{137} Within a few years Manila transformed into a European colonial city with native elements. Before long the city would be replete with typical Spanish colonial features such as parallel and perpendicular straight streets, a cathedral, and government buildings made of stone in the centre. Urbanisation has often been regarded as a major accomplishment in Spanish colonial settings and the key in understanding Spanish imperialist success. Towns and cities efficiently accelerated centralisation and control through the colonial architecture of power, resettling the native population, which could also be interpreted as effort to keep ethnic groups ‘governmentally, ecclesiastically, socially, and

\textsuperscript{134} AGI Filipinas 18 A, r. 6, n. 43, ‘Carta de Ayala sobre ventas de oficios, encomiendas’, 29 June 1588. Data collected by Ríos Coronel in 1621. Cf. Von den Driesch (1984), Grundlagen, pp. 232-233. For the year 1626 the same author listed only 22,000 pesos.
\textsuperscript{135} Chaunu (1960), Les Philippines, p. 92.
\textsuperscript{136} Gil (2011), Chinos, pp. 36-49.
\textsuperscript{137} Illustrated in the foundation document by notary Hernando Riquel, 19 June 1572. Cf. Díaz-Trechuelo Spinola (1959), Arquitectura Española, p. 7. Three years later, on 20 June 1574, Manila received the title insigne y leal and in 1595 cabeza de Filipinas, capital of the Philippines. Its coat of arms composed of half lion and half dolphin with a castle and a crown as imperial symbols was created in 1596. See also BR 9, p. 211.
spatially separate’.  

Spanish architecture was unsuitable for the climate, fires and earthquakes that destroyed large parts of constructions made of ill-suited traditional materials such as reed and local wood, jeopardising early Spanish urban planning.

In any newly founded city of the Overseas Empire, a municipal government (sp. *cabildo municipal*, or city council) oversaw the development and administration of the new community. Carla Rahn Phillips has stressed the importance of ‘municipal identity’ for the organisation of any Spanish colonial society. The municipal government was Manila’s first governing institution and linked the overseas community and the metropolis to each other. During the early years, the small *cabildo* of Manila of only two mayors (sp., *alcaldes*) and a varying number of municipal councils or aldermen (sp., *regidores*), one *alguacil mayor* (judge in charge of peace and order), and a clerk, met twice a week. Being in charge of guaranteeing the city’s supply *cabildo* members were instructed to collaborate with native and Chinese residents.

**Vicious Demographic Circles**

Early modern reports on living conditions in Manila create a confusing image: While many settlers seemed unhappy and disillusioned, the outside world envied their prospects of allegedly easy access to huge profits. In reality, the tedious migration across the Pacific and the high mortality rate

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138 Doeppers (1972), ‘Development’, p. 769; Reed (1978), *Colonial Manila*, p. 65: ‘Just as writers on Southeast Asian urbanism seem inclined to ignore or to give only passing reference to the pivotal role of hispanized towns and cities in facilitating the early transfer of a Great Transformation nurtured in Iberia to the Philippines, so have they failed to adequately depict the revolutionary impact of Spanish resettlement programs in inaugurating the colonial urbanization of Filipinos before most Western power had even acquired a tenuous foothold in lands to the east of the Cape of Good Hope.’

139 Colín (1900-1902), *Labor Evangélica*, vol. 1, p. 53.


141 Díaz-Trechuelo (2003), ‘Legazpi’, p. 51. For a list of all *alcaldes* and *regidores* see Merino (1980), *Cabildo*, pp. 120-124. Jurisdiction lay in the hands of *alcaldes ordinarios*, who were usually not part of the municipal government.

142 For a general study of the Philippines’ demographic development, see Merino (1980), *Cabildo*, pp. 35-36. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the number of Spaniards in the whole colony including soldiers amounted to some 2200, at best. Three hundred households were registered in Manila. In the same period already more than 20,000 Chinese lived in the area around Manila, despite the official order from Spain that their number must not exceed 6000.
of Spanish settlers made circumstances in Manila difficult: the entire colony suffered from a shortage of willing, well-educated settlers and Manila would indeed not have survived without input from China. Yet, this must not be overrated. Urban history research has made it clear that no major city in the sixteenth and seventeenth century was able to reproduce its population without external help. A permanent surplus in the male population was another factor shared by many cities, including Manila.

One of the earliest accounts we have is a record of Governor Francisco Sande (r. 1575-1580), who counted 500 Spaniards in the entire colony in the year 1576. In 1581, the city hosted between 300 and 400 Spaniards, of whom only 50 were adult females. Of around 1000 new Spanish settlers who were sent from New Spain to colonise the archipelago in 1585, 800 were garrisoned in Manila. About 20 years later, Governor Tello (r. 1596-1602) estimated that 1200 Spaniards lived on the islands, lamenting the lack of military men in Mindanao and Cagayan. Forty per cent of the Manila Spaniards at the beginning of the seventeenth century were encomenderos and more than 30 per cent soldiers or ordinary citizens. In the 1620s, 2400 men and women, including some mestizos, were registered in the Manila parish. In 1637, more than 65 years after the foundation of the city, Manila only counted 150 households. Due to a dearth of Spanish women, the Spanish-indigenous mestizo population grew rapidly. Comparatively speaking, these numbers were not so much smaller than the Spanish population of Peru in the first 40 years of colonial rule, however in the Americas it grew at a much faster pace during the following century.
While the number of colonists from Spain was stagnating, people from Southern China began to arrive in large numbers. By the year 1600, hundreds of Fujianese and Japanese merchants would not only supply the Spanish colony, but also settle in large numbers around the walled Spanish city, and thus became the real colonial settlers of the Manila Bay area. The following numerical data has to be regarded as approximate, often exaggerated for various political reasons. An early account by Juan Ramón Bautista states that after the devastating fire in Manila of 1583, 2500 Chinese were waiting in Cavite to trade with the Castilians. Curiously, the number of Chinese is mentioned directly after a petition for financial and military support for the hard-pressed colony. According to a letter of Santiago de Vera to the King in 1589, 4000 Chinese lived permanently in and around Manila. The size of the Chinese community was usually fluctuating along with economic prospects and reached 30,000 in peak years. A resident of Manila noted in 1614 that during March and July, the period of the Manila Galleon trade (feria), about 16,000 Chinese (including hibernating and visiting merchants) lived in Manila while between 8000 and 9000 were permanent settlers. Registers of licence fees (or poll taxes) for the Chinese sangleyes give us a more accurate estimation of the size of the Chinese community. In 1621, there were over 21,000 licensed Chinese residents in Manila and approximately 5000 who were unlicensed. The Chinese community came to dominate the majority of the business sectors, ranging from retail to the building and the service industries. By way of a macro-regional comparison: In Nagasaki the number of Chinese is reported to have increased in ten years from 20 to 2000 in 1618. The number of Japanese residents in Manila rose steadily too. Evidence for their rapid increase, including the frequently quoted number of 3000 Japanese settlers in the year 1606, can be found in various sources,
Map 5  The South China Sea, ca. 1571-1644
including Japanese ship registers.\textsuperscript{159} Many passengers were Japanese and a remarkable number settled in the urban surroundings.\textsuperscript{160}

Elsewhere I will analyse the wavering attitude of the metropolis towards the ever-growing number of Chinese and Japanese in Manila against the background of a stagnating Spanish population. Chinese and Japanese immigrants were certainly less marginalised than members of different Filipino tribes and an integral part of the city and its society. A trend that reminds us of the study by Carla Rahn Phillips where she has detected a similar phenomenon with regard to Africans in the Spanish Americas.\textsuperscript{161} Needless to say that as ‘others’, they constantly faced constraints, discussed in detail later.

\section*{Towards Manila’s Global Integration}

What justifies calling early modern Manila a global enterprise are the manifold contributions of geographically dispersed actors and agencies that turned it into a thriving melting pot of people, cultures, and ideas. Despite their differences, when meeting in Manila they acted in concert when transforming it. While individual settlers, disconnected from their native states, did so actively at the end of the sixteenth century, political units chose a far more passive way. Referring to Japan and China, Henry Kamen called it ‘the tolerance of the two major powers in Asia’.\textsuperscript{162} Shimizu Yūko, in turn, stressed that misleading interpretations of Hispano-Japanese relations result from using the state as model of analysis. Instead she urges a focus on the actual actors, such as friars and merchants.\textsuperscript{163}

Other researchers suggest thinking of Manila as an entrepôt rather than a failed capital of a territorial colony. Spanish historian Manuel Ollé has

\begin{quotation}
\textsuperscript{159} Murillo de Velarde, \textit{Historia}, libro 18, cap. 20: ‘En noviembre de 1606 había en Manila mas de 3000 Japoneses pues se fuja allí este numero como limite en que debieran en cerrar los gobernadores a esta población extranjera.’ Murillo de Velarde was an eighteenth-century chronist, whose compilation is based on letters between the Philippine domains and missionaries from China and Japan to Manila. With regard to the number of Japanese immigrants, Gonoï Takashi calculated that an average of 236,5 people travelled on board of merchant junks from Japan to destinations in South East Asia between 1593 and 1633. Gonoï (2008), ‘Betonaumu’, p. 51.

\textsuperscript{160} See an anonymous report on early trade relations between Japan and Spain. Tōyō Bunko,\textit{Filipinas y el Japón}, p. 15; Iwao (1937), \textit{Nanyō nihonmachī}, pp. 292-300.

\textsuperscript{161} Phillips (2007), ‘Organization’, p. 82.

\textsuperscript{162} Kamen (2002). \textit{Spain’s Road}, p. 206. The number of factual and spelling mistakes in the chapter on the Philippines could be taken as indication for the obvious disinterest in this area.

\textsuperscript{163} Shimizu (2012), \textit{Kinsei nihon}.
\end{quotation}
argued that the multicultural setting of the China Seas hindered the initially pursued territorial model. Using the entrepôt thesis as a way to understand proto-globalisation, he argued that the city stopped ‘acting according to the logics of territorial domination’ and instead ‘respond[ed] to the mercantile logics of the region’. For me this explanation is not sufficient: the incontrovertible limits of mercantilism have to be emphasised in light of the ambivalent balance of power between the state and the market in the colonial setting; in particular, when taking into account that mercantilism is nowadays no longer understood as ‘top-down, state-building enterprise’, but rather ‘a product of the private and public pleading [and] lobbying’. Against that background, attention has to be paid to Manila’s colonial urban context under the presumption that in early modern South East Asian market economy, the state existed because of trade, not trade because of the state.

In essence, understanding Manila merely from the logic of being part and parcel of the emerging world economy falls short in many respects: First of all because the territorial model did not lose significance during the period of my study, nor in later decades. Regardless of the importance of foreign trade for the survival of the colony, high-ranking Spaniards preferred strong military command to liberal trade. The Jesuit friar Juan José Delgado, who spent over half of the eighteenth century in the Philippines, insisted that the ‘islands need disinterested military governors, not merchants; and men of resolution and character […], not students, who are more fit to govern monasteries than communities of heroes’. The constantly felt need for displaying military strength has often been explained as a result of the proximity of Japan and China. Such a view not only misinterprets East Asian

164 Ollé (2006), ‘Formación’, p. 27: ‘Este inicial optimismo se vería transformado a las pocas décadas en un estrategia defensiva, con rápida construcción de murallas, con adopción de una posición pasiva y receptiva, que convierte a Manila en un entrepot, una ciudad de enlace, que no actúa ya según la lógica de dominación territorial importada de América sino según la lógica mercantil de la región, con captura de plazas clave, que marcaba las interacciones de competencia y rivalidad entre comunidades mercantiles en el sureste asiático.’
166 The Melaka sultanate is a typical example for a South East Asian mercantilist state that dealt with commerce and movable wealth more or less in the way traditional agrarian states did with real estate. See Reid (1993), Southeast Asia, vol. 2, p. 205. Abu-Lughod (1989), Before European Hegemony, p. 303.
foreign policies but also overlooks aggression from neighbouring Muslim communities, the long years of Dutch attacks, and the Spaniards’ own unwillingness to give up its claims on the Moluccas.\textsuperscript{169} Expeditions from the Philippines to the Spice Islands, including claims on Tidore, continued until 1662. In the context of European hegemonic battles on the Asian stage, the Philippines moreover served as stronghold for America against Asian forces.\textsuperscript{170} Second, similar to other port cities such as Hoi An in modern Vietnam or Ayutthaya in Thailand, Manila attracted Japanese and Chinese traders as a ‘neutral setting’.\textsuperscript{171} With Japan’s debut in maritime commerce in South East Asia such neutral settings were booming.\textsuperscript{172} Ultimately new forms of connections and trans-regional exchange of new qualities and quantities prospered.

\textsuperscript{169} AGI Patronato 24, r. 61 ‘Cartas a los capitanes mayores de Macao, Ambon, Molucas’, 1582; AGI Patronato 47, r. 21, ‘Relación de las islas Molucas’, 1606.
\textsuperscript{170} Crailsheim (2014), ‘Las Filipinas’, pp. 139-141.
\textsuperscript{171} Von Glahn (1996), Fountain, p. 121.
\textsuperscript{172} Wills (1979), ‘Maritime China’, p. 211.