The Integration of the Second Generation in Germany

Published by Amsterdam University Press

The Integration of the Second Generation in Germany: Results of the TIES Survey on the Descendants of Turkish and Yugoslavian Migrants.
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8 Family formation and partner relationships

8.1 Introduction

As the TIES survey group consists of 18- to 35-year-olds, partner relationships in the form of cohabitation and marriage only occur in 40 per cent of cases. Sixty per cent are either living alone or with their family of origin. The conclusions that can be drawn from the TIES survey in this context must therefore be regarded as assessments of the situation as it was at a specific moment, not applying to the majority of the respondents.

As an area of integration, the private sphere of partner relationships and family formation is considered to be of interest in terms of not only intra- and intercultural affiliations, but also gender relations and demographic trends. The main focus, however, is on the origin-related composition of partnerships. This is because migrants’ marriages within their own group are often interpreted as evidence of distance from the majority population, while inter-group marriages are credited with more adaptive and integrative capacities (see Beck-Gernsheim 2006; Nauck 2004). In this line of argument, immigrants’ access to a majority group in the country of immigration (through marriage and family) is understood as a yardstick of assimilation (see Esser 2006; Ohliger & Raiser 2005) and as an indicator of the openness or closedness of a society (Klein 2000). This is because structural socio-economic differences between population groups tend to be reproduced and consolidated by means of intra-group family formation, with far-reaching impacts on the next generation. A general tendency towards endogamy in several migrant groups is, besides individual preferences and socio-cultural factors, in large part dependent on demographic and social opportunity structures (see also chapter 6 on ethnic and cultural orientations). It also depends on actual access to certain population groups in socialising contexts such as school or the workplace (Straßburger 2003). Such contexts are also shaped by the attitudes of the majority population (Beck-Gernsheim 2006).

1 The TIES respondents were not asked about their sexual orientations. Partnership can therefore also refer to homosexual relationships, with an average statistical probability of 2-4% (TNS Emnid, Presseunterlagen Eurogay-Studie ‘Schwules Leben in Deutschland’, Hamburg 2001).
8.2  Cohabitation, marriage, and procreation

In Germany a trend towards increasing marital age and declining interest in marriage has been in evidence since the 1970s. Marriage has lost its monopoly as the one legitimate form of partner relationship, and cohabitation has become a commonly practised alternative (Heß-Meining 2004; Lenz 2006). At the same time, birth rates in Germany have declined, and the average age of first-time childbirth is advancing. Late procreation or non-procreation seems to be strongly connected with increasingly unstable partner relationships, economic uncertainties, and long phases of education and career foundation. But it is the decreasing inclination to marry that plays a particularly large role here, since marriage has been proven to have an accelerating effect on the individual disposition to procreate (Pavetic 2009).

Looking at the TIES respondents as a whole, the first notable finding is that the ratio of living-together partner relationships is almost identical in the three groups surveyed (about 40% each) in both cities. This must be attributed to the age group as the sole determining factor; neither ethnicity nor religion nor gender have an influence on the general occurrence of such relationships. Significant differences only occur when the marital status of the cohabitants is considered. While 86.8 per cent of the second-generation Turks and 71.9 per cent of the respondents of Yugoslavian descent are married to their partners, this applies to only 45.5 per cent of the control group. The trend towards cohabitation of unmarried partners thus does not apply to the second-generation migrants. Among these groups, respondents with a Turkish background are least likely to live together with a partner without being married. This difference might be due to a generally lower acceptance of non-married cohabitation due to presumably more traditional attitudes towards family (see Haug 2002). In line with this, the second-generation Turks in the survey also tend to marry at a younger age than the other respondents. The greatest difference is between females with a Turkish migration background, who marry at 23 years of age on average, and females without a migration background, whose average age at marriage is 26. In any case, the average marital age of all surveyed women undercuts the German average by four years, which is probably due to the disproportionately high quota of respondents under 30. The mean cohabitation age tends to be lower in all three groups than the mean marital age, suggesting – as might be expected – that the decision to live together involves a lower threshold

\[2\] In 2006, the average age of first marriage was 29.6 for women and 32.6 for men (Statistisches Bundesamt (ed.), Statistisches Jahrbuch 2008, Wiesbaden.
than the decision to marry. Nonetheless, the interviewees of the second generation have shorter phases of cohabitation before marrying than their counterparts in the control group. This coincides with the findings of other studies (see Naderi 2008). In partner relationships in all three groups surveyed, women are on average two years younger than their male partners.

Of the TIES respondents who are living with a partner, 62.9 per cent of the second-generation Turks and 55.2 per cent of the second-generation Yugoslavs have children. The non-migrant Germans come a distant third, with only 27.9 per cent. This hints at a clear (and well-documented) tendency for second-generation migrants to start their families at an earlier age than the corresponding generation of the majority population. It might even already suggest a general difference in procreation rates (which cannot be scrutinised here as the TIES interviewees could potentially continue to have children for many years after the survey). The vast majority of the total couples with children are married, which, again, corroborates the assumption that marriage is conducive to procreation. Marriage with children is twice as likely, however, for the respondents with a Turkish background as for those from the control group. This general tendency is also reflected in terms of the actual number of children: the TIES parents with a Turkish background have 1.8 children on average, those of Yugoslavian origin 1.5, and those in the control group 1.3.

Taking into account the potentially long phases of education and educational qualifications as a potential factor in procreation, table 8.1 shows the educational levels of the TIES respondents with children. In total, 27.2 per cent of these respondents have low educational qualifications, while the majority (64.2%) have completed education/training in the dual system (see chapter 3 on educational careers and educational outcomes). Just under 9 per cent have a higher level of education, and only 0.6 per cent are still in vocational or academic training. In alignment with the overall educational levels of the respondents with children, low educational levels are over-represented among the mothers with a Turkish background, while high educational levels are over-represented among the fathers from the control group. This could mean that for the female second-generation Turks, a solid education is not an especially vital factor in the decision to have children. Conversely, it does seem to be a prominent factor for the other respondents, particularly for the non-migrant German men. The latter are the only parents in the TIES group who are more likely to become fathers with high educational qualifications than with a low level of education. The control group is also the only one

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in which the mothers tend to be as well-educated as the fathers. It is in the Yugoslavian group, on the other hand, that parenthood is least likely to coincide with low educational levels in general.

Table 8.1  Educational levels of respondents with children by sex and group (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2nd generation and CG</th>
<th>ISCED 1-2</th>
<th>ISCED 3</th>
<th>ISCED 4-6</th>
<th>Total N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavs</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: CG = Control group  
Source: TIES Survey Germany

Among the parents interviewed, the unemployment rate is 3.8 per cent, which is significantly below the TIES respondents' average of 12.5 per cent. This finding supports the assumption that a decision to procreate is closely connected with a stable income and financial security. This is also reflected in the monthly net incomes of the parents interviewed, as displayed in table 8.2. Since many respondents refused to answer the question about their financial situation, the table can only give a rough impression of the tendencies within the groups. Here it is striking that the parents from the control group make up the largest low-income group as well as the largest higher-income group, while the second-generation interviewees are far less often represented in the low-income bracket. Note that the number of cases is too low for a comparison involving the actual number of children.

Table 8.2  Monthly net income of respondents with children by group (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>&lt; € 1000</th>
<th>&lt; € 2000</th>
<th>&gt; € 2000</th>
<th>Total N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavs</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: CG = Control group  
Source: TIES Survey Germany

4 Only counting respondents who stated that they are looking for a job.
In sum, demographic trends in the family formation of the TIES respondents are basically in accordance with German population averages within the limits of the relevant age group. Common assumptions about the three groups surveyed are for the most part confirmed. As in the other areas of inquiry of the TIES survey, the greatest differences are between the second-generation Turks and the control group. In the context of marriage and procreation, however, the second-generation Yugoslavs come closer to their counterparts of Turkish origin than in other areas. It can also be established that the second-generation Turks, and particularly the women, deviate from the other two groups in that low levels of education do not seem to discourage them from having children. The respondents from the control group, on the other hand, differ from the other groups in that they are least likely to be prevented from having children because of a low income.

8.3 Ethnic, cultural, and socio-economic orientations in partner relationships

As described in chapter 7 on social relations, ethnicity is regarded as having specific importance in the formation of personal social relations, but must be seen in the context of opportunities and access. For migrants, it is assumed that there are three different partnership markets to refer to when looking for a significant other. These are the majority population in the country of immigration, the community with a similar migration background in the country of immigration, and the population in the country of origin. Where the partner is actually found depends on various factors: family intervention, intra-group affiliations and preferences, and general potential for romantic contact within the individual’s own group and other groups. Partner choices along the lines of ethnic orientation, whether inter- or intra-ethnic, can have far-reaching consequences for individual integration processes, but also for the children born in these partnerships (see Nauck 2004).

The differences found between the three TIES groups in terms of friendships appear to be replicated in the context of partner relationships. Here too, the second-generation Turks and the respondents from the control group focus on their own group to a considerable and comparable degree (both well above 80%). The respondents of Yugoslavian descent significantly deviate from this rule, with roughly 50 per cent intra-group partnerships, as
However, the proportion of second-generation Yugoslavs with intra-group partnerships clearly exceeds the proportion of those with friends from a similar migration background (30%). Intra- and inter-group orientations in partner choices can first of all be aligned with the opportunity structures provided by individual friendship groups. Roughly 39 per cent of the total respondents in relationships (second-generation Turks: 29.3%; second-generation Yugoslavs: 45.9%; control group: 40.8%) met their current partner ‘through friends’. Since the respondents of Turkish descent and the control group have fairly homogeneous groups of friends as far as national origin is concerned, there is obviously also a high probability of meeting a partner of one’s own national origin. The respondents with a Yugoslavian background, on the other hand, draw on friendship groups that include many Germans from non-migrant backgrounds.

Table 8.3  Intra- and inter-group orientations in partner relationships by sex and group (in %)

| Partner is … | 2nd generation | | Group (in %) |
|-------------|----------------|----------------|
| | Turkish (Male) | Turkish (Female) | Yugoslav (Male) | Yugoslav (Female) | Control Group (Male) | Control Group (Female) |
| German      | 14.4           | 9.6             | 53.2           | 55.8             | 80.0                   | 83.3                   |
| Of own national origin | 82.2           | 88.7            | 43.9           | 55.8             |                        |                        |
| Of other national origin | 3.3            | 1.7             | 3.9            | 9.5              | 20.0                   | 16.7                   |
| Total N     | 205            | 172             | 202            |                   |                        |                        |

Note: CG = Control group; no significance between sexes in groups
TR-YU $x^2 = 92.226$  $p = .000$
TR-CG $x^2 = 305.556$  $p = .000$
CG-YU $x^2 = 96.432$  $p = .000$
All other differences are not statistically significant
Source: TIES Survey Germany

The second-generation Turks surveyed mostly met their current partner in the periphery of their family of origin (43.9%, as compared to 12.8% of the second-generation Yugoslavs and 3% of the control group), i.e. at a family celebration, through an introduction by their parents, or through their parents’ friends. In this respect, it should be mentioned that the extent of contact with the family of origin does not significantly differ in the three groups surveyed. Thus the second-generation Turks’ orientation towards
their families is not about numerical opportunities, but seems to arise from a greater inclination to base partner choices on familial contexts. Here it is particularly striking that almost three times as many women (15.7%) as men (5.5%) of Turkish origin were introduced to their partner by their parents. This suggests that women are more reliant on their parents’ assistance in partner choice. In line with this, 35.6 per cent of the female respondents with a Turkish background state that they were actively encouraged to choose their current partner by their parents. In comparison, this applies to 27 per cent of the men in this group. This gender difference does not feature in the other two groups. However, while 15.5 per cent of the second-generation Yugoslavs had active parental support in their partner choice, this applies to only 5.4 per cent of the control group. Thus the non-migrant Germans are the only group for whom parental influence is not a noteworthy factor when it comes to choosing a partner. In this respect, a more traditional attitude seems to be present among the second-generation migrants, especially the respondents of Turkish descent. At the very least, parental approval of the partner seems to be of greater importance here, and partner choices tend to be considered a family issue (see Beck-Gernsheim 2006; Heß-Meining 2004). As for other opportunities to meet a partner, notable gender differences again only occur among the respondents with a Turkish background. Only 1.7 per cent of the female second-generation Turks met their current partner at work, as opposed to 7.1 per cent of the male respondents in this group. The women from the other two groups are far more likely to have met their partner at work (9.6% of the female respondents of Yugoslavian descent and 11.8% of the female non-migrant Germans). Presumably, the fact that the female respondents with a Turkish background generally participate less often in the labour market (see chapter 4 on labour market positions) is a factor here.

Opportunity structures, in the form of quantitative chances of meeting a partner in specific social surroundings, are certainly not independent of the qualitative socio-economic and cultural criteria that influence partner choice. One of the possible qualitative criteria of partner choice scrutinised in the TIES survey is religious orientation. As pointed out in chapter 6 on ethnic and cultural orientations, a general identification with Islam or Christianity (regardless of actual religious membership) is much more exclusive than the general orientation towards ethnically defined groups. It was also argued that religious orientation seems to be of more strategic than practical value, and often coexists with a secularisation of actual lifestyles. This secularisation, however, does not unfailingly extend into the respondents’ partner choices. In fact, the absolute exclusiveness of religion is nowhere
as dramatic as in the context of partner relationships, where 97.2 per cent of the devoutly religious couples have the same religion (second-generation Turks: 96.8%; second-generation Yugoslavs: 98%; control group: 97.4%). It is therefore highly unlikely that a devoutly religious respondent will enter into a relationship with a devout partner from a different religion. In contrast, striking differences between the groups occur when at least one partner is not religious. Only 13.7 per cent of the second-generation Turks are in a relationship where only one of the partners is religious, in contrast to 32.2 per cent of the respondents of Yugoslavian descent and 34.2 per cent of the control group. Twenty-three point five per cent of the respondents with a Turkish background, 38.6 per cent of the second-generation Yugoslavs, and 46.5 per cent of the non-migrant Germans are in relationships where neither partner is religious. This finding basically coincides with the general religious affiliations of the three groups discussed in chapter 6. Thus the exclusiveness of religion in terms of partner choice is most consistently reflected in the case of the respondents with a Turkish background, most of whom are either in homogeneously religious, or homogeneously non-religious partnerships. For the second-generation Yugoslavs and non-migrant Germans, on the other hand, there is a much greater likelihood of religious individuals entering partnerships with non-believers. This again might to point to Christianity’s weaker potential for identification and commitment as far as the TIES respondents are concerned. It may also indicate that Christianity offers greater scope for negotiation in terms of partnership-related religious issues such as church weddings, infant baptism, and religious child-rearing.

Another important socio-economic criterion for partner choice is educational background, which was already identified as relevant with regard to friendships in chapter 7. For modern societies, numerous studies indicate an increasing trend towards educational homogamy, i.e. a preference for partners with a similar educational background (e.g. Klein & Lengerer 2001; Timm 2004). Table 8.4 shows the relative educational levels of the TIES respondents as compared to their partners, based on ISCED levels. As it turns out, only 46.9 per cent of the total respondents actually have a partner with a similar level of education (German average: 61%). In all three groups, men are less likely than women to choose a more highly educated partner. While 30 per cent of men Germany-wide have a higher educational qualification than their partner, this applies to more than 40 per cent of the men in the TIES survey. On the other hand, the proportion of female TIES

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6 Statistisches Bundesamt 2010: Paare in Deutschland.
7 Ibid.
respondents who have a higher level of education than their partners is 36 per cent, four times as high as the German average of 9 per cent.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8.4</th>
<th>Educational levels of respondents’ partners by sex and group (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2nd generation and CG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ISCED level of partner is:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower than respondent’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslav</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslav</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: CG = Control group
Source: TIES Survey Germany

The majority of the interviewees are on ISCED level 3, which includes a school-leaving certificate from a Hauptschule or Realschule, plus completed vocational training. A closer look at the respondents with ISCED 3 reveals that they more often enter into partnerships with individuals on a lower educational level than with equally or better-educated partners. Well-qualified women with a Turkish background are least likely (34.7%) to choose a poorly educated partner, and the men in the control group with ISCED 3 are most likely (62.3%) to choose someone less qualified. On this educational level, the second-generation Yugoslavs are least inclined to ‘marry up’, i.e. to choose a more highly educated partner (9.9%, as opposed to 14.9% of second-generation Turks and 12.4% of the control group). Overall, as is to be expected, such a tendency to ‘marry up’ occurs much more seldom in the case of men (4.5%) than women (19.3%). Of the women, those with a Turkish background have the strongest tendency (24.6%) to choose a better-educated partner.

In sum, the findings should prove that, as far as the respective TIES respondents are concerned, educational homogamy is not a particularly decisive feature of partner relationships. The tendency to ‘marry down’ could be indicative of limited upward social mobility. Such a tendency was already identified in terms of the respondents’ friendships (chapter 7). Since friendship groups play a major role as a matchmaking context, particularly
for the respondents of Yugoslavian descent and the control group, there is certainly an increased probability that this pattern will also be reproduced in partner relationships. But despite the tendency to ‘marry down’ in terms of education, only 4.5 per cent of the total respondents in relationships report their partner to be unemployed. The lowest unemployment rate is among the partners of the second-generation Turks (2.0%), followed by the second-generation Yugoslavs (4.7%) and the control group (6.9%). It is not possible to determine here whether this is actually a criterion of partner choice.

Basically, ethnic and cultural orientations in partnerships correspond with the findings generated in other fields of the TIES survey. The second-generation Yugoslavs are most likely to marry outside their own group, while both the second-generation Turks and the respondents from the control group lean towards ‘ethnic’ homogamy. In the context of partner choice, the respondents of Turkish origin are more influenced by parental advice than the second-generation Yugoslavs, who in turn are more influenced by their parents than the non-migrant Germans. This pattern also seems to apply to the other areas investigated. Religion and religious affiliation are factors that are more exclusive for the second-generation Turks than for the other two groups, which coincides with their general tendency to identify with Islam. In all three groups surveyed, as far as partner choice is concerned, there is a tendency to ‘marry down’ in terms of educational backgrounds – something already encountered in the context of friendships.

8.4 Family life

The organisation of family life with children is regarded as an interesting aspect of the integration issue, particularly in terms of gender roles. It should be mentioned here at the outset that in all of the respondents’ families, fathers are extremely unlikely to be the main caregivers of their pre-school children. This applies on average to only 5.8 per cent of the fathers in the survey, indicating a fairly traditional role distribution in general. As for the male caregivers, the non-migrant German fathers are at the bottom of the scale (4.2%), followed by the fathers with a Turkish background (5.4%) and the fathers with a Yugoslavian background (7.8%). Differences between the three groups mainly concern the tendency to outsource child-care for pre-school children by means of nannies, nursery schools, and day-care centres. This is at least occasionally an option9 for 25 per cent of the second-generation

9 Note that multiple answers were possible in this category.
Turks, 33.4 per cent of the respondents of Yugoslavian descent, and 43.7 per cent of the control group. In total, 87.2 per cent of the mothers with a Turkish background, 82.2 per cent of the mothers with a Yugoslavian background, and 73.2 per cent of the non-migrant German mothers are the main caregivers of their pre-school children. Child-care thus remains firmly in women's hands in this generation, and even in cases where the mother is not the main caregiver, this does not automatically mean that the task falls to the father.

As was already implied in chapter 4, the men in all three groups surveyed are more likely to pursue a paid profession, while the women more often do unpaid family work. The distance is greatest between the men and women with a Turkish background, and smallest between the men and women of the control group. As far as the total TIES respondents with children are concerned, it can be established that none of the men in either group gave up their job after their first child was born. Under the same circumstances, the employment situation of the female respondents changed drastically. Before the birth of their first child, 57.6 per cent of the mothers with a Turkish background had paid work; afterwards the number drops to 30.6 per cent. The rate of employment for the mothers with a Yugoslavian migration background is 89.5 per cent before their first child versus 45.6 per cent afterwards. For mothers without a migration background the figures are 81.4 per cent before and 48.8 per cent after having their first child. So while labour market participation before and after childbirth is lowest among the women with a Turkish background, it is the women of Yugoslavian origin who are most likely to stop working after their first child is born. This suggests that traditional role divisions, which are quite common among respondents with a Turkish background, become more pertinent for women with a Yugoslavian background once they enter motherhood. This tendency is less pronounced in the case of the women in the control group. At the same time, the women of Yugoslavian origin are most likely to continue with the same working hours as before their first child was born (21.2%). In contrast, only 8.2 per cent of the women of Turkish origin and 8.3 per cent of the control group kept their jobs without cutting back working hours. In comparison, only 2.1 per cent of all the fathers worked fewer hours after their first child was born. Instead, 19.9 per cent of the fathers worked more hours than before (male second-generation Turks: 23.2%; male second-generation Yugoslavs: 13.8%; male respondents of the control group: 20.6%), as opposed to only 2.9 per cent of the mothers.

In line with this, a rather traditional division of labour along gender lines also becomes apparent in the context of family tasks. In general, tasks are divided along traditional lines: women are mainly responsible
for household chores and cooking, and men for earning the household income. Here it is conspicuous that the men more often claim to be mainly responsible for household chores (11.3% in total) than the female respondents make this statement about their partners (1.6% in total). On the other hand, the women more often report that such chores are distributed equally between the partners (18.3% in total) than the male respondents (6.5% in total). This sort of bias can be found throughout the family tasks mentioned in the survey, with the women being much more inclined than the men to claim that such tasks are distributed equally. So we have to consider the possibility that the findings are at least partly shaped by respondents’ wishes. On the other hand, when looking at the three groups separately, we can see that gender differences also vary from group to group. Evaluating the division of labour in their own families, it is the control group of non-migrant Germans which shows the least variation between the women’s and the men’s assessments. This also happens to be the group with the lowest index of gender-related labour division in total. Among the respondents of Yugoslavian descent, the women’s and men’s evaluations hardly diverge in the categories ‘cooking’ (mostly a woman’s task) and ‘financial and administrative matters’ (either a man’s job or shared equally by partners). Yet assessments of ‘household chores’ and ‘income earning’ differ noticeably. The second-generation Turks display the strongest disparities in all categories except ‘cooking’, which, according to both the female and male respondents, is clearly a woman’s task. In the other categories, however, women are considerably more likely than men to claim an equal division of labour in terms of household chores and finance management. They are also likely to claim a greater share in income earning than the male interviewees ascribe to their partners. Of course, it has to be borne in mind here that the TIES respondents do not have partnerships with one another. Differences are thus not necessarily to be attributed to the origin-related level of comparison, particularly in the case of the second-generation Yugoslavs, half of whom have bicultural partnerships. Then again, it does not seem very likely that the male and female TIES respondents have entirely different relationships. It can therefore be established that the male respondents of the second generation, and especially the men of Turkish origin, tend to describe their partnerships along traditional lines. The women, on the other hand, are more inclined to underline aspects of an equal partnership.

Figure 8.1 shows the gender-related labour division for the three groups surveyed, in terms of the categories included in the survey. What we actually see in Figure 8.1, keeping in mind the strong gender biases discussed above,
is that traditional women's tasks basically remain the women's responsibility in this age group. Women have, to some degree, taken over traditional men's tasks, but have not been substantially disburdened in their traditional domains. Especially in the case of the second-generation Yugoslavs, finance management and income earning are often equally distributed, but this seems to have little impact on the women's responsibility for other family tasks. Emancipation is not necessarily a two-way street here, and the same applies, to a lesser degree, to the control group. It is only among the second-generation Turks that traditional labour division is generally consistent throughout the categories mentioned in the questionnaire, and that women are thus not systematically overburdened. This means that on the one hand, the TIES results confirm other findings that point to a more traditional way of life on the part of Turkish migrants (see Pupeter 2000), and a more emancipated attitude among women with a Yugoslavian background (see Boos-Nünning & Karakaşoğlu 2005). On the other hand, actual gender equality is far from being reached in either group, with women who have a more ‘emancipated’ relationship being at a clear disadvantage in terms of additional workload and responsibilities.

In keeping with this, when asked about their satisfaction with the current division of labour in their partnership, the women of Yugoslavian origin (13.5%) and from the control group (15.7%) are dissatisfied much more often than the women with a Turkish background (3.3%). By contrast, the

**Figure 8.1** Gender-related labour distribution of respondents in partnerships per group

![Figure 8.1: Gender-related labour distribution of respondents in partnerships per group](image)

Source: TIES Survey Germany
men are extremely content with the situation regardless of their origin (second-generation Turks: 100%; second-generation Yugoslavs: 98.6%; control group: 99.2%).

8.5 Conclusions

Looking at family formations and partner relationships as a sphere of integration, the generation under scrutiny here does not deviate substantially from common expectations as far as marriage behaviour and patterns of procreation are concerned. Relevant differences between the three groups surveyed confirm that the greatest discrepancies are between the second-generation Turks (most likely to get married, most likely to procreate, highest procreation rate) and the control group (least likely to get married, least likely to procreate, lowest procreation rate). Once more, the second-generation Yugoslavs are somewhere in between. The latter differ from the other two groups in terms of their stronger tendency towards ‘ethnic’ heterogeneity in their partner relationships. They appear to be the group with the greatest openness towards populations with different migration backgrounds or non-migrant backgrounds, particularly Germans. This allows a better prognosis of their own and their children’s ability to integrate. At the same time, all three groups surveyed have a tendency to ‘marry down’ as far as the educational backgrounds of their partners are concerned. This means that with regard to social mobility, possible impacts of ethnically distinguished homo- or heterogeneity might be masked by the general socio-economic homogeneity. This, in turn, can be assumed to result in the reproduction of differences between the groups. The reproduction of traditional gender differences in terms of the domestic division of labour, however, seems to prevail regardless of ethnicity or education.