A New Era of Civil Society and State in East Asian Democracies*

David Chiavacci and Simona A. Grano

Contemporary East Asia is marked by new and diversifying interactions between civil society and the state, which merit renewed scholarly attention (Cliff et al. 2018; Morris-Suzuki and Soh 2017; Ogawa 2018). In particular, the present volume focuses on various forms of entanglement and contention in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, as these three countries represent the fully consolidated democracies of the region (Cheng and Chu 2018). The impacts of globalization and the 2008 financial crisis have, in recent years, led to protest movements and political backlashes across the globe (Della Porta 2017; Rodrik 2018). East Asia’s ‘mature’ democracies have witnessed their own share of protests and conflicts. In spring 2014, the Sunflower Movement occupied the parliament in Taiwan for weeks and organized mass demonstrations that forced the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) government to make concessions regarding the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Ho 2015; Rowen 2015). In South Korea, a mass protest movement and nationwide demonstrations with millions of participants sustained over several months during the period 2016–2017 led to the enforced resignation and impeachment of President Park Geun-Hye (Shin and Moon 2017; Turner et al. 2018). Even in relatively ‘quiet’ Japan, the Fukushima nuclear disaster and security policy initiatives of the current Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) administration have resulted in the emergence of new social movements and mass demonstrations of a magnitude not witnessed in decades (Chiavacci and Obinger 2018b; Machimura and Satō 2016; Oguma 2013).

* The editors thank the Swiss Academy of Humanities and Social Sciences, the Swiss National Science Foundation, the Taiwanese Ministry of Education, and University of Zurich for their generous support, which made the publication of this volume possible.
Such large, progressive protests against conservative establishments that featured on the front pages of Western mass media are only the tip of the iceberg in the changing relationship between civil society and state in democratic East Asia, however. All three societies studied in this book have in fact reached a novel era of post high growth and are now established democracies, which has led to new social anxieties and increasing normative diversity. These, in turn, have repercussions on the relationship and interactions between civil society and the state marked by surprising new avenues of cooperation and complex areas of contention. Moreover, the present book does not merely focus on progressive protest movements but attempts to reach beyond the classic dichotomy of state vs progressive civil society by including novel cases of so-called conservative countermovements.

Nevertheless, these developments are embedded in specific East Asian institutions and path dependencies. To gain a better understanding of the East Asian context, we will start with a short overview of the developmental state and its implications for the path of the three East Asian countries and their economic success story.

**Developmental State as Success Model of High Growth and Global Rise**

While not completely concurrent in their development, the three cases studied in the book are united by their strong state settings. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan represent three prime examples of developmental states in which fast-paced economic development was realized through state-led macroeconomic planning and intervention. In fact, the whole theoretical model of the developmental state and its building blocks (such as industrial policy or developmentalism as the dominant national ideology) are based on studies and theoretical considerations about the political economy in these three East Asian economies (Amsden 1989; Cumings 1984; Johnson 1982; Wade 1990; Woo-Cumings 1999). Despite relinquishing their ties as colonies of Japan after World War II, South Korea and Taiwan share with their former colonial master an institutional path dependency from the total war (later 1930s up to 1945), in which the Japanese empire mobilized all the resources of its economy and society. During this period, the economy came under strict state control and was fully geared to support the aggressive expansion wars of the Japanese empire. The formerly liberal political economy of laissez-faire capitalism was transformed into a system of total war, which constituted the foundation of the strong planning states after
the war when economic growth became the main national goal in all three countries. Moreover, all three became United States (US) protectorates in the post-war era, and they were part of a region that was traumatized by several large-scale conflicts during the Cold War era. Consequently, regional insecurity forced their conservative establishment to succeed in their plans for economic development, and their bilateral security alliances with the US provided these three countries with crucial technological and economic support as well as preferential access to its markets.

High economic growth and rapid industrialization were the two top national priorities of the bureaucratic, economic and political elites in all three countries. The respective conservative establishments proved to be extremely successful in achieving these goals and in leading their respective countries to join the ranks of advanced industrial economies. By the late 1990s, these three East Asian economies had succeeded in becoming clear winners in globalization, modelling themselves as export champions and breaking the financial, economic and technological predominance of the West. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan embodied the core of those high-performance economies, which constituted the ‘East Asian miracle of economic growth and public policy,’ as it was called by the World Bank (1993) in its highly influential and controversial study sponsored by the Japanese government (for a retrospective view, see Page 2016).

Most importantly, the East Asian model did not merely propagate growth per se but ‘shared growth’ (Campos and Root 1996). On the one hand, state elites spurred private interests and encouraged business leaders to contribute to high growth. On the other hand, conservative establishments successfully mobilized workers and citizens for the national project of developmentalism by promising that the whole population would get its fair share of the growing pie, bringing increased purchasing power and prosperity. Economic development and shared growth introduced mass consumerism but also guaranteed stable life courses and general upward mobility, which lasted for decades and created new, large middle classes. The East Asian model of development also included a productivist welfare regime (Choi 2013; Holliday 2000), in which the welfare state was minimized and subordinated to economic progress. Social inclusion was achieved through shared growth rather than through comprehensive welfare states and social redistribution between social classes. Thus, developmentalism created a ‘developmental citizenship’ (Chang 2012) or a system of ‘welfare through work’ (Miura 2012), in which social inclusion was based on individual contribution to and shared benefits from the realization of high national growth.
However, in all three countries, national development was not only a success story of harmonious economic growth and rising wealth. This path was also marked by intensive social and political conflicts. In Japan, the social contract of shared growth was only established in the 1960s after severe and violent disputes concerning the pillars and ideological orientation of Japan after the collapse of the expansionist politics implemented up to 1945 (Chiavacci 2007). In fact, the post-war conflict cycle came to an end as late as the mid-1970s when the idea of shared growth finally gained undisputed hegemony and became common consensus (Chiavacci and Obinger 2018a). In South Korea and Taiwan, economic development under authoritarian regimes led to increasingly self-confident and politically active middle classes that demanded greater political participation. It was in the 1980s, with the emergence of a more urban-based and cosmopolitan middle class, that both countries witnessed their first collective organized movements for political liberalization and then democracy. This increasing pressure and political uprising of citizens eventually led, in the second half of the 1980s, to the repealing of martial law and political democratization (Hsiao 2019: 27; Kim 2000). In both countries, however, developmentalism and shared growth remained the basic social contract after democratization for years to come.

In recent years, however, the three countries reached a fundamental turning point after their rapid economic development and compressed modernization came to a rather sudden end. A number of shocks ushered all three democracies into a new phase of post high growth.

**The Era of Post High Growth**

The most fundamental shock in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan has been the abrupt change from a path of rapid economic growth to sluggish economic development. In democratic East Asia, Japan was the first to undergo such a transformation. The bursting of the speculation bubble in the stock and property markets of the early 1990s marked the beginning of a stop-and-go period in Japan’s economic trajectory that resulted in economic stagnation in the past decades, as well as in heated public debates and political discussions about the so-called lost decades and the urgent need for structural reforms (e.g. Funabashi 2015). Growth figures for South Korea and Taiwan over the same period are significantly higher; nonetheless, they have also been experiencing slower growth, de-industrialization and restructuring since the Asian financial crisis of 1997, which marked a turning point in
their development and led – in particular, in South Korea – to deregulation (London 2018: 230-233). This trend was further reinforced after the 2008 financial crisis, which had a curbing impact on all three economies, with especially harsh influences on their respective export industry. The global financial crisis resulted in decreasing growth rates in South Korea and Taiwan, which began their downward descent towards Japan’s low levels of economic growth (Ito 2017: 9). However, compared to what was happening in numerous advanced economies of the West, in which growth was even lower and unemployment figures were much higher, democratic East Asia was not faring too badly after the 2008 financial crisis. Even Japan’s economic expansion, when measured in terms of GDP per capita growth, compared to that of most other advanced industrialized economies has not fared so poorly. However, such phases of economic stagnation in democratic East Asia in all three countries led to a breakdown of the former model of shared growth acquired by a strong state.

What undermined the previous social contract was not slower economic growth per se, but the fact that this was accompanied by social diversification processes and new social insecurities. In recent years, income inequality has been increasing in all three economies (Solt 2019). In addition, especially in Japan and Taiwan, real wages are stagnating (ILO 2018: 123). In Japan and South Korea, labour market deregulation and neoliberal reforms have resulted in a significant increase in flexible non-standard employment with no career opportunities and low salaries (Chiavacci and Hommerich 2017; Kim 2018; Shin 2018; Shin 2019). The dominant self-view in Japan changed in the first half of the 2000s from the former narrative of a general middle-class society marked by fairness and equality of opportunities and of outcomes into one of a gap society featuring growing social division, inequality and poverty (Chiavacci 2008). Similarly, debates in South Korea revolve around questions regarding the ongoing contraction and fundamental fragmentation of the middle classes into winner and losers, which are undermining social cohesion and leading to new anxieties (Koo 2019; Yang 2018). Likewise, Taiwan was able to achieve both growth and equality in the process of national development until the 1980s but has, in recent years, been facing an increasing imbalance and rising low-income employment that are undermining citizens’ trust in the government and its capacity to achieve a fair society (Chang 2017; Ku and Hsueh 2016: 354-355). Consequently, all three East Asian democracies are prime examples of the current challenges to shared or inclusive growth in East Asia, as highlighted in a recent report by the World Bank (2018).
Moreover, existing problems gained new momentum. The earlier prioritization of economic growth as well as fast industrialization had triggered the creation of environmental protection movements in all three countries because of the rampant pollution and environmental degradation caused by rapid economic development (Broadbent 1998; Eder 1996; Grano 2015; Hsiao 1999; Lee and So 1999; Nakazawa 2001). In Japan, anti-pollution movements had started in the 1960s and forced the conservative establishment in the early 1970s to implement far-reaching adaptations in its policies. Environmental civil society actors and organizations in South Korea started primarily as anti-pollution movements and gained influence from the 1980s onwards. In Taiwan, the environmental movement became a key player in the island’s political transition, starting from the mid-1980s, as the emergence of anti-pollution protests accelerated the loosening of political control (Grano 2015: 42-48; Ho 2006: 27-85; Hsiao 1999: 31-54). Once established, environmental awareness never completely disappeared from the public and political agenda in all three countries. Furthermore, as will be further discussed below, global warming and the Fukushima nuclear disaster of 2011 breathed new life into environmental civil society organizations and movements across East Asia.

At the international level, the rise of the PRC has been rapidly tilting the regional power balance, contributing to rising economic and political insecurities in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. For instance, all three economies have benefited greatly from China’s economic high growth and transformation. Investment and companies from all three countries played a central role in China’s industrialization and ascendance. At the same time, however, the rise of the PRC presents numerous challenges to the regional advantage and economic leadership of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Even though China’s ascendance has likewise presented Western states – especially the US, as the dominant world hegemon – with novel insecurities resulting in a political backlash and increasing international tensions, the geopolitical vicinity in the case of East Asian democracies renders the PRC a factor for more serious consideration by the three countries under study. In view of the PRC’s global might as well as its increasingly bold policies and claim to regional leadership that represent far more than mere economic challenges embodying de facto national security concerns (especially in the case of Taiwan and its uncertain political future), the political authorities and populations in all three countries have several reasons to be concerned.

Moreover, it is not only the growth gap difference with the PRC that is a source of anxiety, but also the fact that demographic development is at
a fundamental turning point in all three countries, reinforcing the view that national development has reached its peak and has now started its downward spiral. All three East Asian democracies are faced with rapid aging due to their late and compressed first demographic transition, which presents a huge challenge (Obe 2019). Regarding this transformation, Japan is again the precursor. Until 1990, its proportion of elderly people (aged 65 and older) was still low compared to Western advanced industrial economies but increased rapidly in the subsequent years and turned Japan into the oldest society worldwide by the mid-2000s (see Figure 1.1). Demographic models, which are very accurate compared to economic or political prognosis, show that South Korea and Taiwan will follow this path of drastic demographic transformation in the coming years (Suehiro and Ōizumi 2017). In South Korea and Taiwan, the inescapable process of fast aging has started in the 2010s. Their demographic transformation will be even faster than that of Japan and will convert both countries into super-aged societies with over a fifth of their total population aged 65 or older in the mid-2020s (see Figure 1.1).

In fact, previous high growth rates in democratic East Asia were connected to the first demographic dividend of a fast-growing population and an increasing proportion of working-age people. Some authors identify an opportunity for a second demographic dividend with aging that may lead to rapid capital accumulation in East Asia (Mason and Kinugasa 2008). Nevertheless, debates about future development, in all three countries, are dominated by rapidly increasing proportions of aged and dependent people linked to questions regarding the future financing of the welfare systems. The economic slowdown of democratic East Asia compared to the still dynamic PRC almost represents a type of natural law and structural inevitability. For nations that have, for decades, defined their identity and pride primarily through the prism of their economic success stories and relevance, such outcomes are very bleak indeed. Moreover, rapid demographic change has already resulted in the transformation of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan into new immigration countries (Bayok et al. 2020; Fielding 2016). While all three East Asian democracies were non-immigration countries par excellence with no significant inflows up to the late 1980s, they have become new and important immigration countries with a significant net inflow that is starting to change the population's composition and is another challenge for national identity.

Finally, it has to be noted that all three countries have become fully consolidated democracies that have already experienced several changes of ruling parties. In all three, the formerly tight-knit conservative establishment
It is not only the progressive side of civil society that has become better organized and more diverse, however. Conservative countermovements, which have risen as a backlash to more progressive governments and influences, have likewise gained momentum in the past decade and are now well established in all three countries. These conservative civil organizations and networks testify to the increasing normative diversity, which has arisen as a reaction to the advancement of progressive social ideas such as, to name but one example, same-sex marriage in Taiwan. Taiwan’s conservative movement to defend the threatened traditional morality regarding the issues of abortion, same-sex marriage and gender equity in education is an intellectually fascinating case of a countermovement that is often neglected by scholars of Taiwan’s civil society. Likewise, attempts

Figure 1.1 Proportion of elderly people (aged 65 years and older) in the population, 1965-2050

Source: OECD data (France, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, and US); Department of Statistics, Ministry of Interior, Population Projection, National Development Council (Taiwan)
of Civil Society and State in East Asian Democracies

Table 1.1  Change in power between conservative and progressive governments in democratic East Asia, 1988-2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japanese Prime Minister</th>
<th>South Korean President</th>
<th>Taiwanese President</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Noboru Takeshita</td>
<td>Roh Tae-woo</td>
<td>Lee Teng-hui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Sōsuke Uno</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Toshiki Kaifu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Kiichi Miyazawa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Morihiro Hosokawa</td>
<td>Kim Young-sam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Tsutomu Hata</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Tomiichi Murayama</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Ryūtarō Hashimoto</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Keizō Obuchi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Yoshiro Mori</td>
<td>Kim Dae-jung</td>
<td>Chen Shui-bian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Junichirō Koizumi</td>
<td>Roh Moo-hyun</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Shinzō Abe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Yasuo Fukuda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Tarō Asō</td>
<td>Lee Myung-bak</td>
<td>Ma Ying-jeou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Yukio Hatoyama</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Naoto Kan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Yoshihiko Noda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Shinzō Abe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conservative governments  Progressive governments

Source: Own compilation.

to legalize same-sex partnerships in Japan and South Korea have led to conservative backlashes.

Overall, these fundamental transformations have led to a reconfiguration of the playing field between the state and civil society that is marked by new
forms of entanglement and contention as well as a new salience of social movements and political protests. Moreover, the former social contract of shared growth is under extreme pressure and the developmental state now appears to be an increasingly outdated model that is no longer able to successfully steer national development. In fact, it has been sidelined by a wave of neoliberal policies introduced by conservative establishments themselves that have weakened the previously successful social contract of shared growth.

New Relation State vs Civil Society

The present volume introduces a comparative perspective in identifying and discussing similarities and differences in East Asian democracies based on in-depth case studies. The contributions in our volume focus on three areas of entanglement and contention between civic agency and state control: (1) environmental issues, (2) identity politics, and (3) neoliberalism and social inclusion. These are highly topical issues that allow us to gain a fuller understanding of the most recent sociopolitical and regional developments.

Environmental Issues

The three papers in the first section focus on the issue of how civil society tackles environmental issues. As mentioned above, developmentalism, high economic growth, and rapid industrialization have led to high levels of pollution, which has sparked outrage and created important citizen movements in all three countries, resulting in the amendment of state policies in some areas. As an important issue that can no longer be overlooked globally, climate change has likewise reinvigorated civic activism against global warming in all three East Asian democracies. Moreover, the Fukushima nuclear disaster reinforced anti-nuclear movements, intensifying the level of contention (Chiavacci and Obinger 2018b; Grano 2014, 2016, 2017; Kim and Chung 2018; Machimura and Satō 2016).

Simona Grano's chapter deals with the political repercussions of the widespread discontent regarding the previous KMT administration in Taiwan and the ensuing change in ruling party in 2016. Popular discontent regarding several 'secondary' issues once again prompted the progressive Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to revert to its early pro-environmental and social justice rhetoric to attract more voters. In the 2016 national elections, the DPP once again included in its ranks several former civil society
leaders, activists and academics with strong environmental and social engagement that trace their origins to the galaxy of progressive social movements. This chapter explores whether more than three years after the start of the new administration, concrete results have been achieved by these activists or whether they have become, once again, quieter after having been re-integrated into the ranks of the ruling party. The chapter consolidates research on recent interactions and conflicts between the state trying to exert more influence across several fields – in this case the environmental one – and newly emerging or well-established social movements under two different political administrations (the Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen administrations) to pinpoint key differences.

The second chapter by Mary Alice Haddad addresses a fundamental puzzle: East Asia is a region still dominated by developmental states that favour business and constrain advocacy organizations, and yet Japan has been leading the world in high emissions standards for decades, and South Korea and Taiwan have both embarked on major green initiatives that involve not only green business development, but also new national parks, widespread energy conservation, and comprehensive recycling efforts. This chapter discusses how environmental organizations are networking with one another to make and empower allies within the government and business to effect pro-environmental changes. Focusing on the issue of the environment, it argues that non-profit organizations (NPOs) play important roles in developing the coordinating networks that facilitate policymaking in challenging and diverse political contexts. Haddad's chapter begins by discussing three specific types of networks commonly created by NPOs in East Asia to improve environmental policy: hub-and-spoke, horizontal, and vertical. It then discusses three ways that these networks influence policy: (1) facilitating peer-to-peer information sharing; (2) piloting new projects and disseminating best practices; and (3) empowering allies within the government. The chapter concludes by arguing that East Asia is a particularly good region to study how advocates and the networks they form are able to influence policy because of the challenging and diverse political contexts they face.

Finally, in the last chapter in this section, Tobias Weiss analyses the emergence of a countermovement in reaction to the rise of the movement against nuclear power in Japan since the 1970s. He traces the emergence of the conservative countermovement in the historical perspective and analyses the organizational and social basis, mobilization processes, and framing and political influence of the groups involved. Weiss then attempts to pinpoint the political impact of the Fukushima 2011 nuclear disaster on
the movement. His chapter shows how the countermovement was able to survive a period of intense contestation, preserving its resource basis and retaining significant influence on the policymaking process due to support from large parts of the conservative establishment.

Identity Politics

National identities are the key issues addressed in the second section of our volume. National identities in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have been interwoven with economic success stories and the ensuing increase in affluence and wide-ranging social inclusion. In recent years, however, these societies have been confronted with sluggish economic growth while at the same time facing the impending threat epitomized by the rise of the PRC. Both developments are fundamentally changing regional dynamics and have led to growing social anxieties in all three countries. Moreover, the growing influx of immigrants further impacts the question of national identity. Against this background, the first two contributions in section two analyse the recent upsurge in ultra-conservative and ultra-nationalistic movements.

Naoto Higuchi discusses in his chapter how Japan perceived the rise of nativist demonstrations and hate crimes from the late 2000s, which led the parliament to enact the country’s first anti-racism law in 2016. The aim of his chapter is to examine the pro-establishment nature of Japan’s nativist movement. Although the movement often criticizes the ruling conservative establishment, it should be regarded as indirectly linked to the establishment in two ways. First, Japanese nativism is a variant of historical revisionism and the emergence of nativist violence is a ‘by-product’ of the rise of historical revisionism among the conservative establishment in post-Cold War Japan. Although the nativist movement and the conservative establishment are not directly associated with each other, the former took full advantage of the discursive opportunity that the latter offered. Second, the general public favour the nativist movement as part of the conservative establishment. The movement bridges sympathy with conservatism and antipathy towards neighbouring countries.

In his chapter, Ming-sho Ho analyses the rise of conservative religious movements in Taiwan, which are becoming increasingly active in the country’s political arena, as a backlash to recent progressive activism in a variety of fields. Taiwan’s conservative movement to defend the threatened traditional morality and sexualities is an intellectually fascinating case of countermovement yet an oft-neglected aspect of Taiwan’s civil society. This chapter locates its origins in the preceding change of Taiwan’s Christian
community. Protestant and Catholic leaders pioneered the opposition to gender equity and pluralism, and over the years, they gained support from other religions. Ho analyses the contestation over the issues of abortion, same-sex marriage, and gender equity in education. On the whole, the conservative movement has largely failed to turn back the clock. However, its presence was powerfully felt and had the potential to usher in a new political alignment that moved beyond the pre-existing cleavage.

Taking a similar perspective, Dafydd Fell and Tommy Kwan analyse the relationship between the mainstream and the ‘new movement’ parties in Taiwan in recent years. Since democratization began in the mid-1980s, Taiwan’s party system has been dominated by two parties, the KMT and the DPP. Smaller parties have at times played an important role, however, bringing diversity into the system, emphasizing different marginalized issues, and representing neglected communities. These small parties tended to be those that split off from the mainstream parties, while alternative social movement parties struggled to be electorally relevant. The picture changed only recently with the rise of two different types of movement party, the New Power Party as well as the Green Party and Taiwan Social Democratic Party Alliance. In their chapter, Kwan and Fell examine the relationship of these new players with a mainstream party, the DPP. Were these parties better off working in alliance with the main parties or preserving their autonomy? The authors also offer some thoughts on why these parties adopted such strategies and how the relationship affected the development of these alternative parties.

In the final chapter of this section, David Chiavacci discusses immigrant advocacy groups’ influence in Japan’s immigration policy. Japan has been a new immigration country for three decades. However, its immigration policy has been marked by ideational and institutional fragmentation. This resulted in a deadlock without bold reforms and immunized state actors to external pressure. Even powerful business association, despite being core members of the conservative establishment, have struggled to impact immigration policy. Against this backdrop, civil advocacy has been surprisingly influential. While civic groups have generally not been included in decision-making bodies, they have altered the perception of immigration. Moreover, civic activists have cooperated closely with international organizations and foreign states, which gave them a voice indirectly through third parties. By analysing reforms combating human trafficking, this chapter identifies factors that resulted in decisive indirect influence of civic advocacy in this exceptional case. This allows us to gain a differentiated understanding of the limited, yet still sometimes significant, influence of civic activism on Japan’s ‘strong’ state in immigration policy.
Neoliberalism and Social Inclusion

The third section of our volume grapples with questions concerning neoliberal reforms and social inclusion in East Asia. The guiding principle of developmentalism involves a significant amount of state intervention in markets through industrial policies and bureaucratic leadership rather than a comprehensive welfare state. However, in recent decades, neoliberalism, as it has been shaped in the United Kingdom or the US, appeared to be more successful in generating economic growth and thus rose to prominence in East Asia. Even though neoliberal policies include the state’s activation and co-optation of civil society (Hundt 2015; Maeda 2012), they continue to undermine social inclusion, resulting in a backlash and new antagonistic civic activism against state policies.

Against this background, Akihiro Ogawa’s argument in his chapter builds on long-term research at SLG, an NPO in eastern Tokyo, which was established under the 1998 NPO Law. Incorporated as an NPO in 2000, SLG is one of the largest civic society organizations promoting lifelong learning in Japan. Over nearly two decades, SLG successfully offered more than a hundred innovative courses to the local community. However, SLG faced a state of crisis and risked dissolution in 2018 due to the municipal government’s decision to cut its funding. In his chapter, Ogawa argues that SLG was a successful case of neoliberalism-oriented public administration, pursuing decentralization and reduced costs. He claims, however, that SLG was not conducive to encouraging independent, citizen-oriented activities. His chapter documents current discussions at SLG, which reflect the reality of the Japanese civil society landscape, in which NPOs are central.

In his contribution, Jin-Wook Shin turns to South Korea. His chapter examines the changing patterns of South Korean social movements from the 1960s to the 2010s in terms of their constituents, their communication and mobilization structure, and the way in which they influenced institutional politics. Some long-term trends that require particular attention include the extension of participants from cultural elites and organized activists to a huge number of ordinary citizens; a shift of the structure of the field of social movements from the inter-organizational ties of committed activists to highly decentralized networks of organizations, communities, and individuals; and a change in the way social movements affect institutional politics from the moralized acts of cultural elites through the disruption as well as negotiation by movement organizations to large-scale protest actions of individual citizens influencing public opinion and party politics. In response to such changes, the South Korean state and civil society now have the task of innovating their ideas, action repertoires, and mutual relationships.
The examination of local/national trajectories of social movements for homeless people in Japan is the topic in Mahito Hayashi’s contribution, the third chapter in this section. Hayashi argues that such ‘pro-homeless’ activism has fundamentally improved the Japanese welfare state. Japan’s welfare-providing programmes are prone to exclusion. State-led high growth historically allocated resources for capitalist expansion, not for people’s welfare. This persistent tendency hit the homeless the most. In turn, this has given pro-homeless activism significant potential and capacities. First, pro-homeless activism has predominantly taken local forms, improving welfare provision at welfare offices. Second, in the late 2000s, activism won improvements at the national level as it reframed homelessness as a national problem of not only the ‘outsiders,’ but also the ‘insiders’ of society. Third, the wholesale inclusion of the homeless/poor has evoked their re-marginalization. Today, neoliberal/neoconservative forces are advancing undeserving-poor discourses and anti-poor politics to cancel out movements’ prior successes, which paradoxically testifies the power of pro-homeless activism to open up the welfare state.

Finally, Celeste Arrington discusses legal mobilization in the field of disability policy in South Korea. Since the 1990s, South Koreans have gained better access to the courts as a channel for pursuing social and policy change. In particular, Koreans with disabilities began using the courts to challenge discrimination, enforce their rights, augment other tactics and influence policymaking. Through qualitative comparative analysis of recent legal mobilization by Koreans with disabilities, Arrington investigates factors that influence when and why people mobilize the law. Drawing on sociolegal and social movement theories, her chapter shows that explanations focused on evolving legal opportunity structures – encompassing procedural rules, statutes, and legal interpretations – can only partly explain the changing patterns in legal mobilization. Explanations should also consider the ‘support structures’ for legal mobilization: lawyers, advocacy organizations, and funding. This research demonstrates the importance of considering the interaction between institutional and extra-institutional activism and reveals how legal mobilization has contributed to changes in how disabled people’s organizations interact with the state in Korea.

Concluding Remarks: Three Key Findings

This book investigates the novel dynamics at play in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan by analysing the role (and respective interests) of the most important
actors after the recent reconfiguration of state-civil society relations and the interplay of various stakeholders, social organizations and agencies at the local and national levels. Overall, we think that the different chapters of this book crystallize three key findings that testify to the increasing complexity of state-civil society relationships in East Asian democracies.

First, civil activism and movements have become better organized and more influential in East Asian democracies. Although their organizational base and resources are generally still quite limited, civil society actors have consciously worked to increase their influence in the policymaking process. They have built large, proactive policy networks and utilized them strategically to impact policymaking practices. These networks include relational webs among themselves as well as links to national policymakers and political parties (see chapters in this volume by Grano, Haddad, Kwan and Fell, and Hayashi). In this context, more progressive administrations that did not belong to more traditional conservative establishments that were heavily present in the past in all three countries have in recent decades presented activists with opportunities to become more vocal and effective in attaining their goals. Civil society actors, however, have not been able to achieve all their goals during these windows of opportunity. Cooperation with progressive administrations and parties has in fact sometimes been marked by friction (Grano, in this volume). Nevertheless, civil society actors have started to gain important experience in policymaking. Moreover, these networks include links to academic and juristic specialists and international actors, which are of crucial importance to gain expertise for policymaking despite having limited resources and to build stronger leverage on the conservative establishment (see chapters in this volume by Arrington as well as Chiavacci). Beneath the large protest events that received worldwide attention, a ‘quiet revolution’ is reshaping and strengthening the influence of civil society actors in East Asian democracies.

Second, even though the central state remains strong in East Asian democracies, the developmental state model as the dominant social contract has weakened significantly. All three polities still feature the centralization of power in which national governments and state bureaucracies issue policies and directives that are then applied in the localities. Conservative establishments face a period of transition with an uncertain outcome, however, and have to adapt to novel challenges such as rising social inequality, a sharp increase in elderly population rates, and a rising hegemon – the PRC – in the East Asian neighbourhood (see also Yun 2019). In this context, neoliberal reforms seem to offer the opportunity to generate renewed growth yet often turn out to be a de facto double-edged sword (see Ogawa, in this volume).
Governments have outsourced certain duties to cut costs and rejuvenate the economy by enforcing freer market competition. This often results in the direct weakening of central states, however, which, in turn, become increasingly dependent on civil society. Moreover, neoliberalism has been identified in public discourse as a central factor in rising inequality and social exclusion. Therefore, conservative establishments in all three democracies have to find new arrangements and show renewed consideration for the population (see Mahito, in this volume). To remain strong, the state and its conservative establishment can no longer rely on quasi-absolute political dominance but have to develop abilities and techniques to absorb and integrate civil society as a driving force of innovation (see Weiss, in this volume).

Third, all three countries have witnessed the rise of new conservative movements (or countermovements) as a reaction to recent progressive shifts in society and politics. Furthermore, in contrast to the new right-wing populism in many Western democracies (Blee and Creasap 2010; Gross et al. 2011), almost none – or very few – of these new movements and actors are directed against the conservative establishment and/or adopt a clear anti-elitist stance (see also Hellmann 2017; Lie 2019; Wang 2019). Conversely, such conservative countermovements are usually somehow connected and nurtured by previously dominant conservative establishments (see chapters in this volume by Ho as well as Weiss). As a case in point, the new radical right movement in Japan featured in Higuchi’s chapter, which is the most radical countermovement discussed in the book, still sports a pro-establishment nature (see also Higuchi 2018). In this context, it has to be noted that the largest conservative countermovement rallies of East Asia in recent years were probably the pro-Park demonstrations in South Korea, which attempted to impede the enforced resignation and impeachment of President Park Geun-Hye (Lee and Brown 2018). This is another strong indicator of the increasing maturity and diversity of East Asian democracies as the pressed conservative establishments have started to embrace ‘street politics’ and social movements’ strategies from progressive civil society.

References


Grano, Simona A. 2014. ‘Perception of Risk towards Nuclear Energy in Taiwan and Hong Kong.’ Taiwan in Comparative Perspective, 5: 60-78.


Nakazawa, Hideo. 2001. ‘Kankyō Undō to Kankyō Seisaku no 35-nen: “Kankyō” o Teigi suru Kökyōsei no Közoku Tenkan’ [35 Years of environmental movement


About the Authors

**David Chiavacci** is Professor in Social Science of Japan at the University of Zurich, Switzerland. His research covers political and economic sociology of contemporary Japan in a comparative perspective. He is known for his publications on social movements, social inequality as well as Japan’s new immigration and immigration policy. His recent publications include *Re-emerging from Invisibility: Social Movements and Political Activism in Contemporary Japan* (Routledge, 2018, co-edited with Julia Obinger) and *Japanese Political Economy Revisited: Abenomics and Institutional Change* (Routledge, 2019, co-edited with Sébastien Lechevalier).

**Simona Alba Grano** is Senior Lecturer at the Institute of Asian and Oriental Studies at the University of Zürich, Switzerland. She is also a research fellow of the European Research Center on Contemporary Taiwan (ERCCT), at Tübingen, Germany. She has authored several book chapters and articles dealing with environmental and anti-nuclear concerns in East Asia over the past few years. In 2016 she guest edited a special number of *China Information* on the topic of ‘environmental governance in China,’ which includes articles on environmental rules and regulations by renowned China specialists. Her latest book as a single author is *Environmental Governance in Taiwan: A New Generation of Activists and Stakeholders* (Routledge, 2015), which analyses environmental governance mechanisms and actors in Taiwan through a multidisciplinary research approach.