Everywhere Taksim
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Introduction

Although studies on how Turkish football fandom has been affected by hyper-commodification are few in number, it is fair to say that the economic transformation of the football sector in Turkey has rendered this sport a less affordable form of leisure for the lower economic classes. Frequently attending games or watching them on television requires a certain amount of disposable income, which has created two types of football fans: those who have access to games and those who do not. This distinction was created decades ago by the lack of fandom on the local level and the over-centralised character of Turkish football. Therefore, it can be said that while the three major football clubs have millions of fans, those who can attend games frequently constitute a privileged layer. This layer is, in fact, one of the objectives of hyper-commodification, as season tickets and ID cards are used to gather information about these fans in order to develop marketing and security strategies.

In our example, football fans able to attend games are usually from urban, middle and upper-middle economic classes, presumably with higher education. This profile relates to a relatively high level of cultural capital among fans. Also, their fandom experience in the stadiums complies with the European standards defined by UEFA; therefore, they are expected to behave according to contemporary criteria. Modern football requires that the football fandom experiences in the TT Arena of Galatasaray or Şükrü Saracoğlu Stadium of Fenerbahçe should not differ dramatically from those in the Amsterdam Arena or Stade de France. This depends not only on facilities, but also on fan behaviour. What needs to be analysed is whether this transformation of fandom and the accumulating cultural capital in stadia manifest as a wave of politicisation, notably in a period in which the young, middle classes of Europe and the Middle East have taken to the streets to reclaim their rights.

Turkish football was born in a political and modern context, and thus is a part of Turkish modernisation. The effects of this phenomenon were less obvious in the period 1960-1990 as professional football spread throughout
the nation with the introduction of professional national leagues. The ‘Three Giants’ (Fenerbahçe, Beşiktaş and Galatasaray), followed by 90 per cent of the fans, acquired a rather homogeneous identity. However, after 1990, the aforementioned transformation created a distinction between the different layers of fans and redefined stadia as modern social places, reserved for people of certain socio-economic status. Stadia gradually began to represent the urban elite with higher economic, social and cultural capital. Meanwhile, the same period devaluated the middle classes to precariat due to neoliberal policies, which triggered a global politicisation among these people.

In Turkey, these policies have been represented mainly by the AKP government since 2002. Turkey’s integration into the global economy and the European community was completed in the early 2000s by means of economic reforms and candidacy to the EU. AKP came to power in a setting in which the ever-present military intervention to Turkish democracy had lost its impact. However, after this process was completed by a constitutional referendum in 2010, the AKP increasingly pushed its own conservative, pro-Islamic agenda and sought to substitute the former military-backed domination with its own hegemony. The transformation of the middle classes through the economic and democratic reforms therefore shifted to a lifestyle-based modern, urban and secular counter-hegemonic resistance. This reunited the different groups threatened by the set of rules imposed by the AKP government, such as the LGBTI community, the Kemalists and the Anti-capitalist Muslims. Football fans shared similar concerns, such as electronic ID cards, a regulation against crowd violence, restrictions on away game trips and bans on alcohol that diminished their fandom practice. All these groups, including football fans from the ‘Three Giants,’ manifested themselves in the Gezi protests in June 2013, under the banner of ‘Istanbul United.’

As football fans previously had had experience of physical confrontation with the police, they played a major role in the protests. It should also be noted that their effect on the discourse of the protests could be seen in the many football chants that were adapted by the protesters, such as ‘Biber Gazi Oley!’ (‘Pepper Gas Olé!’) or ‘Sık Bakalım, Sık Bakalım, Biber Gazı, Sık Bakalım’ (‘Oh yeah, go ahead and spray your pepper gas, let’s see what happens’). This adaptation was similar to the adaptation of Beatle songs to football chants by the fans of Liverpool in the 1970s and combined football fandom with the cultural climate of the era. Without the cultural capital football fans acquired over years, this smooth integration would not have been possible.

In the 1970s, when youth political movements in Turkey were very active, football was dismissed as the ‘opium of the masses’ by the political
movements and football fans were completely excluded from protests. But in 2013, political movements and football fans merged almost seamlessly and even cooperated with feminist and LGBTI movements during the Gezi Park occupation, exchanging knowledge about non-sexist chants and self-defence tactics.

Another important aspect of fan cultural capital during the Gezi protests was their use of social media, notably Twitter, which was crucial for the organisation of the protests. In fact, social media had been dominated by sports fans long before the protests started. Particularly after the 3 July 2011 match-fixing operation, Twitter had become a semi-politicised sphere for football fans, many of whom started to express discontent with the AKP government. However, these messages had mainly been based on the interests of their own clubs and rivalries with other clubs. During the Gezi protests, football fans were unified for the most part by lifestyle concerns. Also, after the protests, reconciliation on other issues, such as the introduction of electronic ID cards, failed as the strong rivalries among clubs kept fans apart. The spontaneous Istanbul United organisation during the protests was not transformed into a nationwide organisation to protect fans’ interests, such as the Football Supporters’ Federation of England and Wales. Indeed, the absence of political organisation experience in Turkish society, in comparison with that in Britain, should be taken into consideration when assessing this situation.

Methodology

As the Gezi Protests erupted spontaneously and spread throughout the country, even though its antecedents can be detected now retrospectively, the number of concrete field studies about the events is small. Also, the intensity of the events and the extreme police violence against the protesters rendered it difficult to gather sound data about the protests and their actors. Therefore, all of the sociological work carried out on the Gezi protests either predominantly depends on theory or on post-event surveys. In these conditions, the fieldwork conducted by Bilgiç and Kafkaslı (2013) with protesters stands out. However, a recent critique by Yavuz (2014, 100-106) raises important questions about the methodology of the survey. Yavuz claims that the authors made some methodological and analytical mistakes in collecting and classifying the data, and conclusively made an ‘explanatory’ study (as Bilgiç and Kafkaslı suggested [2013, 5]), rather than an ‘exploratory’ one. We agree with this point of view.
Yavuz (2014, 111-112) dismisses the research as ‘unusable’ and ‘academically worthless.’ Nevertheless, as the only field study carried out during Gezi, the unrepeatable nature of the events forces us to be more tolerant of some of Bilgiç and Kafkaslı's mistakes, and to employ some of their data. However, we use only one part of the study that is considered crucial and list all the possible concerns that could be brought up about it beforehand. The hasty approach employed by the scholars during the events requires a critical eye on their analysis, and their results should be verified by as many field studies as possible before jumping to rapid conclusions. Yet, any data recovered from those intense days of June 2013 should be regarded as valuable and cannot be dismissed as invalid unless they are proven wrong by other studies.

In order to explain the motives of football fans for participating in the protests, we compare the major concerns of football fans today with the general motives of protesters at Gezi. Bilgiç and Kafkaslı (2013, 7-8) asked 3008 protesters to assess thirteen possible reasons for participating in the protests according to the Likert scale. Yavuz (2014, 107) disqualifies this technique, claiming that ‘the reasons were arbitrarily formulated by the authors and the data were therefore manipulated.’ While Yavuz’s criticism about the protesters not being asked open questions rather than formulated choices is valid, the inclinations defined by the answers are clear (only in this part of the research) and they overlap with most of the other research carried out after the events. Therefore, we find it important to convey the validity of Yavuz’s critique; however, we maintain that the results of this section of the research provide valuable data.

In this chapter, we will trace the politicisation of football fans and how it overlapped with the Gezi events. Again, the results of our analysis need to be supported by fieldwork and cannot be regarded as definite conclusions otherwise. Nevertheless, a socio-historical analysis of football fans’ politicisation may be useful in developing the fieldwork on this area and give the researcher a head start, providing hypotheses to prove or falsify. Hence, we present the historical and political context of Turkish football, followed by an analysis of football’s three-decade long wave of hyper-commodification in line with the neoliberal political trends in Turkey and worldwide. We will also look at the transformation of football fans into middle-class consumers, and the middle-class consumers into protesters from a socio-political perspective. Finally, these trends will be related to the AKP’s football policies; the recent, politically-motivated events in Turkish football; and the fans’ concerns before the Gezi protests about the political atmosphere in the country.
The Political Context of Turkish Football

Football, as we know it, was transformed from a rural pastime activity into a modern sport in eighteenth-century Britain, when it was brought to industrialising cities by migrating peasants who formed the first working classes. Its codification and institutionalisation were conducted by the emerging elite of the public schools, who took over working-class activities and turned them into physical education drills and leisure activities. The game quickly spread throughout the world via merchants, expatriates and foreign students who had lived in Britain. Therefore, apart from Britain and Ireland, especially in the port cities of the world, football was imported by either members of the bourgeoisie or aristocrats who had contacts with the British.

In the late years of the Ottoman Empire, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, football was introduced to Turkey in the same way. The game was popularised by the higher educated elite (Emrence 2010, 242-243), first by non-Muslim Ottomans and later by Ottoman Muslim Turks. The latter’s late initiation to the game was due to the rule of Abdülhamid II, who forbade most social activities to Muslim Ottomans out of security concerns. Because it had been imported by modernist intellectuals and developed in a rather ethnically-segregated way, football rapidly became an arena for ethnic rivalries. Especially in Izmir, football, as was true for most athletic activities, was embraced by local Greeks, who had been influenced by Europe’s rediscovery of Antiquity and supported the emergence of the Hellenic State. Football offered the local Orthodox clergy, bourgeoisie and intellectuals a common agenda (Irak 2013, 30-33).

The Turkish clubs founded after the declaration of the Second Constitutional Period in 1908 shared a similar approach and, especially in the capital (Istanbul), most clubs were founded with nationalistic agendas. For instance, Galatasaray founder Ali Sami Yen’s statement illustrates perfectly how nationalism and modernism dominated the football scene at the beginning: ‘Our objective is to play together like the English, have a name and colours, and beat non-Turkish teams.”

After World War One, with the occupation of Istanbul, the nationalistic agenda of the Turkish sports clubs gained importance. Clubs like Galatasaray, Fenerbahçe and, later, Beşiktaş played several games against the teams of the occupation forces. Even today, these games are regarded as ‘national games which contributed to the Turkish cause’ (Gökaçtı 2008, 75). Thanks to these games, each club acquired a considerable fan base and

used its popularity to establish strong bonds with the political, bureaucratic and, later, economic elite, who were already close to the club board members because of class similarities. Therefore, Galatasaray, Fenerbahçe and Beşiktaş stood out, not only as the most popular teams, but also as teams with strong social networks that helped them in difficult times and prevented them from disappearing, like many other neighbourhood clubs in Istanbul. After the foundation of the Turkish Republic, these clubs became the protégés of powerful politicians, some of whom, like Prime Ministers Şükrü Saracoğlu and Recep Peker, acted as presidents of Fenerbahçe and Beşiktas, respectively, at the same time as they held national office.

Hence, long before football was nationalised and professionalised in the late 1950s, the ‘Three Giants’ of Istanbul had established a massive advantage over other Istanbul clubs, which were plagued by economic problems, and provincial clubs, unaccustomed to professionalism. Only two other clubs, Trabzonspor and Bursaspor, have won the Turkish league title. Starting from the 1970s, as the football scene gradually became commodified, these teams also attracted the attention of businessmen and began to accumulate economic capital. Today, it is estimated that 90 per cent of the football fans in Turkey support the ‘Three Giants.’

The privileged positions of Galatasaray, Fenerbahçe and Beşiktaş and their ties with the elite also created dependency and left them open to political intervention. While their popularity has given them power, during difficult times politicians sought to control this power, notably during coup d’état periods. Also, the clubs were expected to take a stance on national issues, such as the Cyprus question or the Kurdish issue, which made them inseparable from the official state ideology. It should also be noted that the vast majority of provincial professional clubs were founded by the state authorities in the late 1960s by merging the amateur clubs; therefore, the other football teams are also involved in this dependency relationship. Notably, after the 1980 coup, this dependency became the modus operandi of Turkish football. The game became integrated with the core of the nationalistic official ideology of the last three decades.

The Hyper-Commodification of Turkish Football

The hyper-commodification era in football started on a global level in the 1970s, with the widespread introduction of TV broadcasts. In Britain, as early
as in 1967, the English Football League received the biggest bid (£781,000) the BBC had ever made to a single sports organisation up to that date. Other countries followed as live broadcast technology became more available. TV broadcasts created not only a major source of income for the sports clubs, but also made football fandom visible, in the form of singing and dancing in the stands (Long et al. 2001, 102-103). The more enjoyable football stadiums became, the more the investments in football accelerated. However, just as football started to be considered a business, the global economic crisis of 1973 brought it to a halt until the end of the Cold War.

As the neoliberal economy started to dominate the world in the 1980s and early 1990s, football's marketability became a major issue and modernisation projects, such as the English Premier League, were put into effect in order to appeal to an audience with greater purchasing power. With the fall of the Warsaw Pact, players from former communist nations were able to sign with Western clubs freely, and while the quality of the European top leagues (England, Spain, France, Germany and Italy) increased, the other leagues could no longer compete against them economically. Also, with the introduction of encrypted satellite TV platforms, which further increased clubs' revenues, the more successful and popular clubs also took the lion's share of this newly introduced capital. UEFA also contributed to a monopolised and unbalanced football market by transforming the European Champion Clubs' Cup into the Champions' League and allowing top leagues to compete with several teams, while forcing others to play preliminary matches and distributing revenues per success. Finally, the 1995 Bosman Ruling allowed players' free movement of labour and the smaller clubs lost their main source of income – selling players to the top clubs.

In Turkey, the modernisation of football did not start until the 1980s, as the country suffered from a major foreign currency deficit in the 1970s, and a ban on foreign players between 1979 and 1984. After the 1980 coup, the Junta prioritised football as a harmless social gathering, as a substitute to the political mass movements of the 1970s, and actively supported its modernisation. After the 1983 elections, the government formed by the junta-backed Turgut Özal established a neoliberal scheme for the economy, of which football became a part. The new Turkish Football Federation (TFF) board, appointed by Özal and presided over by Kemal Zorlu (a member of Özal's Motherland Party), lifted the restrictions on foreign players, brought taxation privileges, supported the big clubs' modernisation attempts and

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3 ‘£781,000 Bid for TV Football.’ *The Times*, 14 March 1967.
let the clubs sell and price their own season tickets, which enabled bigger clubs to accumulate more capital than others. In 1991, the first private TV station, Magic Box, founded by Ahmet Özal, the son of Turgut Özal (by then President of the Republic), took over the broadcasting rights of the major clubs from the state-run TRT. In 1993, encrypted TV broadcasts were introduced.

Meanwhile, the TFF became autonomous. This fast commodification process attracted many expensive foreign players and coaches to Turkey and Turkish clubs started to excel in international competitions. This wave of successes (such as Galatasaray playing in the semi-finals of the European Cup in 1989 and Turkey qualifying for the European Championships in 1996 for the first time) overlapped with a period in which Turkey was largely ignored by the European community, due to the invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and the 1980 coup. Therefore, football became a source of national prestige, openly supported by the state, and created political value that triggered a wave of popular nationalism in the 1990s. Meanwhile, a political and economic dependency was established between football and the state.

**Politicisation of Football Fans in Turkey**

In the 1990s, with the rise of popular nationalism triggered by the worsening of the Kurdish issue and isolation from Europe, football appeared to be a suitable field for conveying nationalistic messages and nationalist organisations such as the MHP sought ways to enter the terraces to reclaim the popularity they had had before the 1980 coup. With the election of former MHP militant Güven Sazak to the Fenerbahçe presidency in 1993, nationalists started to appear in stadiums in an organised manner. The rise of nationalists also caused a limited but powerful reaction from the left-wing and Beşiktaş's fan group Çarşı, led by Turkish-Armenian Alen Markaryan, stepped up as an unusual political alternative in the stands. However, the lack of political experience on the part of fans and the distance of the Turkish people from active politics after the coup did not allow for the creation of an engaged political fan group. Finally, the official ideology in football continued to function as cultural hegemony over alternative discourses.

This changed with the AKP’s rise to power in 2002. With the economic crisis in 2001, the nationalists were weakened and reintegration into the European community eased the tension between Turkey and Europe. Therefore, on the terraces, the nationalistic narrative was transformed into
rivalries and instead of contesting Kurds or Europeans, the fans picked on each other. After the referendum in 2010, which gave the AKP sound support and the authority to make important changes in the constitution, the AKP took advantage of the political détente in the stands and tried to form its own hegemony in football, as it did in many other domains.

The party first tried to enter the football field through AKP-run municipalities such as Ankara and Istanbul. After these attempts failed, the business elite in conservative cities such as Bursa, Sivas and Kayseri cooperated with the municipalities and the government. The teams of these cities appeared as title contenders and Bursaspor became the fifth club ever to win the Turkish League title in 2010. The rise of a pro-government elite in provincial clubs also affected the TFF, and pro-government candidates like Hasan Doğan, Mehmet Ali Aydınlar and Yıldırım Demirören became TFF presidents. Also, Istanbul mayor Kadir Topbaş’s son, Hüseyin Topbaş, and former Interior Minister Abdülkadir Aksu’s son, Murat Aksu, became board members at Fenerbahçe and Beşiktaş, respectively. In 2010, the Prime Ministry Housing Development Administration of Turkey (Toplu Konut İdaresi, TOKİ) helped Galatasaray finish its new stadium.

On 15 January 2011, the AKP’s domination of football received its first negative reaction. Before the opening game of Galatasaray’s TT Arena Stadium, TOKİ chairman Erdoğan Bayraktar delivered a speech and accused the late Galatasaray president Özhan Canaydın of incompetence. After the speech, Galatasaray fans booed Bayraktar as well as Prime Minister Erdoğan. Three months later, a new regulation punishing fans heavily for stadium disorder came into effect. In addition, match fixing came under court jurisdiction as well as in the TFF’s internal law.

In May 2011, in the neighbourhood of Beşiktaş (where Erdoğan’s Istanbul office is located), fans clashed with the police several times. On 3 July 2011, a massive operation against match fixing at the clubs of Fenerbahçe and Beşiktaş was launched, resulting in months of detention for several club officials, including Fenerbahçe president, Aziz Yıldırım. In May 2012, after the league title game against Galatasaray, Fenerbahçe fans clashed with the police in the streets of Kadıköy. Eleven days later, a group of pro-government businessmen took over the football club of Kasımpaşa, Erdoğan’s birthplace, and the team became an instant title contender after a huge injection of cash. Fenerbahçe fans particularly complained about the lack of media coverage of these events and started using fan blogs, forums and Twitter to organise mass protests against the government, the justice system, the police and the media. Beşiktaş fans used similar practices.
Fans’ Reasons for Joining the Gezi Protests

In order to understand football fans’ spontaneous and massive participation in the Gezi protests, it is necessary to compare the issues that pushed them onto the streets. According to Bilgiç and Kafkaslı (2013, 7-8), the Gezi protesters conveyed four main motives to explain their participation in the events: political hegemony, police violence, the democratic deficit and distrust of the media. These reasons were cited by more than 80 per cent of the protesters, while environmental concerns were the initial motive shared by half of them.

A sentiment analysis conducted on the content of pages of Fenerbahçe’s fan blog, Papazın Çayırı, published between July 2011 and August 2012 about the match-fixing operation, showed their concerns about the football world. According to the breakdown of the articles, a majority of the content on the blog is negative about the media, other clubs, the justice system, the police and the government. The only difference between these concerns and the Gezi protesters’ reasons for participating in the events was the negative stance towards other clubs. Also, environmental concerns were not listed. It should be noted, however, that in May 2013, Fenerbahçe fans also participated in a protest against a shopping centre project adjacent to their stadium. Therefore, it can be said that what Gezi changed about
fans was that it created a supra-identity among fans of different clubs, spontaneously nicknamed ‘Istanbul United.’ This identity emerged due to the urgent nature of the events, as all of the aforementioned concerns reached a climax during the protests. Had this cooperation been the result of an ongoing process of reconciliation between the fans of rival clubs, it would have turned into a well-established local or national structure. To date, no such organisation has emerged.

Discussion

The transformation of football fans in stadiums takes place in a dynamic relationship with the socio-political conjuncture. The hyper-commodification of football aims to create football fans who are middle-class consumers, who employ football as a substitute for leisure and lust in a civilised manner, therefore regulating their extreme emotions and also replacing the former ‘extreme’ of football stadiums, defined by hardcore lower class fans. However, due to the global crisis of capitalism from the 2000s on, during this transformation, the socio-economic status of the new group of fans, who have been promoted from being ‘flaneurs’ as the stadiums offer less violence and more comfort, has changed. This new target audience has become precarious; therefore, not only can their tensions be regulated by the system, but they have also been politicised in order to reclaim their former comfort.
This new ‘precariat’ class, questioning the failure presented by capitalism to them instead of the promised wealth, also started to empathise with the lower classes, whose suffering they had not been aware of before. Also, they took on some of the tactics of these groups and combined and improved them with their own cultural capital, developing new weapons and fields of counter-hegemony, such as the social media, concerts and football matches. Karadağ (2014, 187-188) emphasises that this new class, the ‘intellectual’ wing of the middle class according to Bourdieu, not only were the leaders of the Gezi protests, but also defined the strategies of the counter-propaganda, such as posters, slogans, graffiti and the content produced by advanced use of computers and foreign languages. Loader et al. (2014, 148) also point out that this is a global phenomenon and different political protests, such as Occupy Wall Street in the US, indignados in Spain, the German Pirate Party and the Italian Five-Star Movement, were also predominantly carried out by this class. The widespread use of football slogans and other fandom practices during the Gezi events indicate that football fans joining the protests are a part of this new class.

The football fans who participated in the Gezi protests consisted mainly of this new, qualified, disappointed generation, who had begun to display their discontent at elite sports events such as the World Basketball Championships and the WTA Tennis Championships in Istanbul in previous years. These fans freely and almost instantly managed to develop their own habitus to reclaim those areas and use them to show the world their discontent with the AKP, live, on hundreds of global TV channels that the AKP government previously had considered to be means of self-promotion.

The protests against Prime Minister Erdoğan and the TOKİ head, Erdoğan Bayraktar, on the opening day of Galatasaray’s luxurious TT Arena Stadium, marked another example of this discontent. This event has particular value supporting our hypotheses, as the opening game had been reserved for fans who held special fan cards, a sort of priority ticket. Hence, this political protest in the stadium was staged predominantly by fans who had been selected to replace the hardcore, lower-class fans.

During the Gezi events, protesters of a similar nature appeared in front of pro-government TV network buildings, business centres and shopping centres. It should be noted that all these places had been transformed during the AKP reign by its massive economic and social capital. Thus, the appearance of the young middle class at such protests happened in order to reclaim their former habitats. The government largely failed to suppress these protests, as their agents in these places such as club presidents, media bosses and middlemen appointed by the regime fell into a collective
‘allodoxia’ (in the Bourdian sense of the term) – not being culturally accustomed to the places they economically dominated. As you will read in other chapters of this book, the AKP regime suffered a major symbolic defeat against the Gezi protesters because of the cultural gap and tried to compensate for this with widespread physical violence, which further damaged the government’s already faltering international prestige.

As discussed above, these arguments about the Gezi protesters, precariat and transformed football fans require solid fieldwork to be proven. However, the course of events in the football world globally and in Turkey, the socio-political conjuncture of our times and recent scholarly works confirm that the presence of football fans at the Gezi protests depended on the transformation of football fandom by hyper-commodification and the emergence of football fans equipped with higher cultural capital, as well as the politicisation of the urban middle class (from which the new generation of football fans emerged) amid losing economic-social capital and falling into precarity, which pushed them to develop a habitus to reclaim their losses.

In our example, the AKP regime, imposing hegemony without sufficient cultural capital, openly threatening the modern lifestyles of these classes and exerting extreme physical and psychological violence against them, acted as a catalyst and accelerated the process that reached a climax during the Gezi events. It also enabled football fans to take their concerns out of their reserved space (stadiums) to the streets at an unprecedented level. As in an accurate description by Doğuç (2014, 158-159) of how different groups contributed to Gezi spontaneously and simultaneously, the protests acted as a ‘prison riot’ against a totalitarian structure, unifying groups otherwise distinct from each other, through the deprivation of their freedoms and the lack of a public sphere. However, it should be stressed that these groups revolting at the same time was not the result of a coincidence, or of an international plot as the regime spokespeople repeatedly claimed, but rather because of a transitivity between different prison cells that made individuals feel persecuted for several reasons of different magnitudes (for instance, Beşiktaş, Kadıköy and Beyoğlu, the headquarters of the ‘Three Giants’, have also been the sites of major urban gentrification projects). Football fans may have felt oppressed because they lost their jobs or were forced to work flexibly, or resented the electronic ID system, and other football-related issues, or the ban on alcohol.

Bourdieu (1993) links the production of sports as a supply for a social demand and claims that choosing to follow or practice one or another sporting activity depends on rationalisation and a political philosophy. Therefore,
football fans participate in football-related events to fulfil specific demands. Those attending games are in constant interaction with the commodified, transformed football environment, and every conflict they have with this environment also relates to the socio-political transformations that reshape football. Hence, their problems with the football world, in Turkey and globally, are not only football-related, but inevitably political and merge with the general wave of politicisation.

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