Migration from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe

Sievers, Wiebke, Bommes, Michael, Fassmann, Heinz, Fassmann, IMISCOE
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Part I
Country profiles
1 Euro-Mediterranean migration futures: The cases of Morocco, Egypt and Turkey

Hein de Haas

1.1 Introduction

Over the past 50 years, the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean regions have evolved into the main providers of labour migrants to the European Union. In the early stages of the post-war economic boom in North-West Europe in the 1950s and 1960s, most workers were recruited in Southern European countries such as Portugal, Spain, Italy, the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Greece. However, since the mid-1960s, the place of these countries has been rapidly taken over by Turkey, Morocco and, to a lesser extent, Algeria and Tunisia, while the recruitment of workers has shifted from governments to companies, mainly from Germany, France, the Netherlands and Belgium. Although the stay of these ‘guest workers’ was expected to be temporary, many migrants ended up settling, a process which was accompanied by large-scale family reunification and, later, by family-formation migration as a consequence of new marriages.

Due to an unprecedented economic boom, a rapid demographic transition in some countries and the southward expansion of the European Union, most Southern European countries have gone through migration transitions, thereby transforming from net emigration to net immigration countries. Spain, Italy and Greece, in particular, have now evolved into major immigration countries. In the meantime, Turkey, Morocco and other Maghreb countries have maintained their position as major source countries of EU immigration. While family and other network-facilitated migration perpetuated flows to the traditional destination countries of North-Western Europe, new labour migration has occurred from the Maghreb to Southern European countries.¹

While the Maghreb countries and Turkey have been fully integrated into Euro-Mediterranean migration systems over the past half century, migration from poorer Mediterranean countries south of Turkey, and from

¹ In Southern Europe, only Albania, most former Yugoslav republics and, to a certain extent, Portugal, have not (yet) evolved into major immigration countries.
Egypt, has mainly been oriented towards the oil-rich Gulf countries and, to a lesser extent, Libya. As a consequence of the consistent southward expansion of Europe’s economic heartland, the Euro-Mediterranean ‘migration frontier’ – the imaginary line separating immigration and emigration countries (Skeldon 1997) – has also shifted steadily southward. In this process, the place of North African and Middle Eastern countries in the global migration order seems to be changing. This is mainly exemplified by increasing transit migration and even settlement migration from Western and Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, respectively. This poses the challenging question of whether these latest developments are heralding further southward and eastward shifts of the Euro-Mediterranean migration frontier and whether the current emigration countries in North Africa and the Middle East might increasingly evolve into areas of immigration and settlement.

In popular perception, countries in the Middle East and North Africa tend to be seen as a ‘migration liability’, linked to the image that galloping population growth, economic misery and political oppression will fuel an ever-mounting ‘migration pressure’ from this region. However, besides revealing a clearly xenophobic undertone, a closer look at factual trends shows that such representations are fundamentally flawed. Not only do they deny the huge demographic, economic and political changes that have taken place in the region in past decades, but they also obscure the huge diversity between countries within the region.

For instance, the popular perception that the region will remain an almost infinite pool of young, unemployed migrants ready to move to Europe as soon as they are presented with the opportunity ignores the fact that all countries have achieved dramatic declines in fertility over past decades. In some cases, such as in Turkey, this is combined with steady economic growth and increasing political freedom. In such cases, it cannot be taken for granted that the emigration potential will remain invariably high in the near future. However, a combination of economic stagnation, political unfreedom and rising aspirations due to increased access to education and media may well increase emigration potential from other countries. This chapter analyses how migration patterns from, within and to the Middle East and North Africa may evolve in the next few decades. In order to capture the variety in migration history and patterns, as well as the diverging economic and political trends in the region, this

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2 Along with the expansion of the EU there has been an eastward shift of this migration frontier into Eastern European countries.
study will focus on the cases of Morocco, Egypt and Turkey. What these countries have in common is their position as the region's major emigration countries.

It is of crucial importance to ground our analysis in a sound theoretical understanding of migration determinants. As a more powerful alternative to simplistic ‘push-pull’ frameworks, I start by outlining a theoretical framework combining the concepts of migration systems and migration transitions, in order to understand the often-counterintuitive linkages between social and economic development and migration.

Subsequently, I analyse the recent migration histories of Morocco, Egypt and Turkey and show how they are related to underlying political and economic factors. It is important to relate current migration patterns to historical trends by analysing continuities and discontinuities. Recognising the continuity between current migration paths and those of the past helps to identify areas of discontinuity and their structural causes. This will also facilitate our analysis of future migration patterns. Based on this understanding, the chapter analyses long-term demographic trends and the evolution of a range of social, economic and political development indicators. A number of hypotheses will then be developed about possible trends in the near and more distant future.

1.2 Beyond ‘push-pull’ frameworks: Migration systems and transitions

Our conceptualisation of migration determinants is of crucial importance to the outcomes of this analysis. Most analyses of migration determinants are set within ‘push-pull’ frameworks. This is unfortunate, because the push-pull framework is generally unable to explain actual migration patterns. Besides their fundamentally ahistorical nature, push-pull frameworks are based on a simplistic equilibrium model which assumes that migrants move from the poorest to the wealthiest societies. Another assumption of push-pull frameworks is that development will lead to less migration.

However, this is fundamentally at odds with theoretical and empirical evidence showing that the relationship between relative levels of social and economic development and propensities to emigrate is anything but linear or inversely proportional. This chapter combines the two concepts of migration systems and migration transitions to provide a more realistic theoretical framework for understanding actual migration patterns and
how they tend to change over time as a consequence of broader development trends and the internal social and economic dynamics of migration processes.

The fundamental assumption of migration-systems theory is that migration alters the social, cultural, economic and institutional conditions at both the sending and receiving ends – that is, the entire developmental space within which migration processes operate. Mabogunje (1970), the founder of migration-systems theory, defined a migration system as a set of places, linked by flows and counterflows of people, goods, services and information, which tend to facilitate further exchange, including migration, between the places.

Where Mabogunje focused on rural-urban migration within the African continent, Portes and Böröcz (1987) and Kritz, Lim and Zlotnik (1992) extended this to international migration. International migration systems consist of countries – or rather places within different countries – that exchange relatively large numbers of migrants, and are also characterised by feedback mechanisms that connect the movement of people between particular countries, areas and even cities to the concomitant flows of goods, capital (remittances), ideas and information (Fawcett 1989; Gurak & Caces 1992; Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino & Taylor 1998).

Mabogunje (1970) stressed the role of feedback mechanisms through which information about the migrants’ reception and situation at the destination is transmitted back to the place of origin, thus facilitating subsequent movements and leading to almost-organised migratory flows between particular places, regions and countries. While pioneer migrants are often among the relatively well-off, this diffusion process tends to make international migration more accessible to other groups. Money sent back to families in migrant-sending communities may also increase the feeling of relative deprivation among non-migrants. This may subsequently increase aspirations to migrate as a way to achieve upward socio-economic mobility (de Haas 2003; Quinn 2006). Besides this motivational effect, remittances may also be directly used to finance the migration of other family and community members (Van Dalen, Groenewold & Fokkema 2005).

In the same vein, Levitt (1998) stressed the importance of local-level, migration-driven forms of cultural diffusion. This flow back of ‘social remittances’, consisting of ideas, behaviours and identities, affects the perceptions and aspirations of people, and is also likely to stimulate subsequent migration patterns along established pathways. This may lead to
the emergence of a ‘culture of migration’, in which migration becomes a social norm or a modern *rite de passage* (Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino & Taylor 1993). Due to this complex of social, cultural and economic dynamics internal to the migration process itself, migration tends to generate more migration. Migration systems link people over space in what, today, are often referred to as transnational communities (Vertovec 2004). The selective and spatially clustered flows of information and social remittances result in a ‘rather neat geographical structuring and clustering of migration flows, which is far from “random state”. The end result is a set of relatively stable exchanges [...] yielding an identifiable geographical structure that persists across space and time’ (Mabogunje 1970: 12).

Thus, migration systems tend to be multi-layered and hierarchical – transcontinental migration systems may contain various sub-systems of international and internal migration. For instance, the imminent danger of conceiving ‘the’ Euro-Mediterranean migration system would therefore be to assume a false degree of regional unity and the communality of national migration experiences. Due to geographical, colonial and more recent political factors, the specific migration experiences of Mediterranean countries reveal striking differences. It is necessary to get below the surface of dominant international migration flows in order to understand the multiple, often hierarchical, layers of migration which make up the overall patterns of movement. It is perhaps more appropriate to conceive of the Mediterranean and the Middle East and North Africa as regions in which countries are connected to two major transcontinental migration systems and one intra-regional migration system to varying degrees. At the most general level, we can make a distinction between the core Maghreb countries (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) and Turkey – which have been predominantly incorporated into Euro-Mediterranean or EU-Mediterranean migration systems – and Egypt, which is predominantly connected to the Gulf migration system and other Arab countries such as Libya, Jordan and Lebanon. Nevertheless, there has also been migration from the Maghreb and Turkey to Arab oil-producing countries and, over the past decade, there does seem to have been a certain reorientation of Egyptian migration towards Europe.

This also points to the necessity of conceptualising and explaining change in established migration systems. The main weakness of migration-systems theory is that it is caught in a circular logic in which migration leads to more migration. Conceptually, it is unable to explain why migration systems often break down and migration movements cease,
and why we see such huge geographical and intertemporal variety in the rise and fall of particular migration systems. The policies of both sending and receiving states have played a crucial role in shaping initial migration patterns. Although such initial patterns tended to develop their own momentum through the self-perpetuating dynamics of migrant networks, irrespective of migration policies (Castles 2004; Massey 1989), forces majeures such as political and economic shocks, warfare and structural transformations at the global level (e.g. oil crises, EU enlargement, the successive Gulf wars or the Arab Spring) have a distinct influence on the slowing-down of certain migration movements and the shaping of new migration itineraries.

Another important source of change is the general process of social and economic development itself. This brings us to transitional-migration theory (de Haas 2007a, b). It is tempting to explain large-scale migration from Turkey and North Africa by large spatial economic inequalities. However, because migration involves relatively high costs and risks and requires the necessary aspirations and social and human capital, most international migration tends not to occur from the poorest communities and countries.

The migration transition is the notion that societies and countries, in parallel with economic restructuring and the concomitant social change and demographic transitions, tend to go through a sequence of initially increasing emigration, via the coexistence of significant but diminishing emigration and increasing immigration, to eventually become net immigration countries (Martin & Taylor 1996; Skeldon 1997; Zelinsky 1971; see also Figure 1.1). In contrast to popular views of migration as the result of poverty, there is ample evidence that the relation between development and migration is neither linear nor inversely proportional (de Haas 2007b; Martin & Taylor 1996; Olesen 2002).

This is linked to the notion of the ‘migration hump’, as proposed by Martin (1993) and Martin and Taylor (1996), who argued that a temporary increase in migration – a migration hump – has been a usual part of the process of economic development, since a certain threshold of wealth is necessary to enable people to assume the costs and risks of migrating.

I would like to stress that we should extend the notion of development beyond income indicators to a broader notion, as devised by Sen (1999), of development as the expansion of the real freedom people enjoy to lead the lives they have reason to value. Sen argued that the litmus test for development theorists should not be income growth itself, but the question of whether the capabilities of people to control their own lives have
expanded. This ‘capabilities approach’ contrasts with narrower views of development that are largely restricted to income indicators (e.g., gross national product per head).

The crucial issue here is that the non-economic dimensions of capabilities-enhancing development also tend to increase not only people’s capabilities, but also their aspirations to migrate as a means to improve their lives. In particular, improved education and access to information not only give people enhanced capabilities (for instance, to migrate), but are also likely to increase young people’s socio-economic life aspirations. As long as these aspirations are not matched by growing employment and economic opportunities in origin countries, this will probably result in increasing aspirations to migrate. So, initially, development tends to stimulate emigration because, firstly, of its capabilities and, secondly, of its aspiration-enhancing effects. Therefore, development in the form of increasing incomes, improved transport and communication infrastructure, and education tends to give people the capabilities and aspirations to migrate: initially predominantly internally (assuming that internal migration is usually cheaper and easier); in later stages increasingly internationally (de Haas 2005).

In their analysis of European mass emigration between 1850 and 1913, Hatton and Williamson (1998) showed that emigration usually increased as wage rates in source and destination countries converged, because declining wage differentials initially tend to be outweighed by the mass arrival of cohorts of young workers (as a result of past fertility) on the labour market. Simultaneously, the growth of emigrant populations leads to the accumulation of social capital in the form of migrant networks, which promoted substantial chain migration irrespective of the declining wage gap (Massey 2000). Only in the longer term, after sustained growth and significantly decreasing wage and other opportunity gaps with destination countries – often, but not necessarily, coinciding with demographic transitions (Zelinsky 1971) – long-distance (generally ‘South-North’) emigration tends to decrease and immigration to increase. In this way, countries tend to gradually transform from net emigration into net immigration countries (Martin & Taylor 1996; Rotte, Vogler & Zimmermann 1997). It has been argued that this transition occurs first for internal migration, then for international unskilled migration, and finally for the migration of the highly skilled (Fischer & Straubhaar 1996).

The end result is that economic growth, infrastructure, improved education and exposure to information tend rather to have a J-curve or inverted U-curve effect on net emigration (even if opportunity differentials with
destination countries decrease), steeply increasing in the initial phases of
development and only later gradually decreasing. This quite adequately
reflects past (Hatton & Williamson 1998; Massey 1991) and contemporary
(Olesen 2002) migration patterns. In recent decades, countries such as Spain,
Italy, Greece and Ireland, in Europe, and Malaysia, Taiwan and South Korea,
in Asia, completed their migration transition. The result of the complex
interplay of demographic, social and economic forces embodied in the term
‘development’ is a ‘stylized emigration curve characterized by an introduc-
tory phase of slow development, a growth phase of rapidly accelerating
emigration, a saturation phase during which emigration approaches a peak
and levels off, and a regression phase when rates of emigration rapidly fall’

In line with this transitional migration theory, it is striking that the
countries with the lowest GNP and the highest population growth gener-
ally do not exhibit the highest rates of (transcontinental) migration to the
Western world (Olesen 2002).3 Instead, the world’s main labour exporters are
typically upper-lower- to lower-middle-income countries (such as Mexico,
North African countries and the Philippines), which are generally located in
a zone that Skeldon (1997) has conceptualised as the global ‘labour frontier’.
Labour-frontier countries generally experience falling birth rates but a

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3 It should be noted that there is significant ‘South-South’ mobility of labour migrants and
refugees. It is, instead, the more costly and risky transcontinental migration to wealthy countries
that is generally more limited from the poorest countries.
high growth of their working-age populations, at least moderate economic growth, urbanisation and de-agrarisation. From the poorest countries (less than US$1,500 per capita in terms of purchasing power parity, or PPP) we see comparatively limited South-North migration and, if substantial transcontinental migration occurs, it often concerns refugee movements (Olesen 2002).

The exact duration of such migration transitions cannot be predicted since this crucially depends on many external factors, notably the pace and character of economic growth. In any case, the period between the migration take-off and the in-out migration break-even point is likely to last several decades (Russell & Teitelbaum 1992; Weintraub & Díaz-Briquets 1994). It is also important to note that the relation between development and migration is not unidirectional, because a decreasing development level relative to other countries may also transform an immigration country into an emigration one. Moreover, the right tail of the migration hump (decreasing emigration, increasing immigration) is by no means inevitable: poor infrastructure and public services, political instability, warfare and the failure of public policies may severely impede development. Under such unfavourable conditions, a trade-induced migration hump may be extended or transformed into a semi-permanent ‘migration plateau’ of sustained out-migration which may last decades or even centuries (de Haas 2007b; Martin & Taylor 1996).

Previous analyses have suggested that emigration tends to decrease steeply if the income differential between sending and receiving countries declines to 4:1 or 5:1, provided that the emigration country is growing fast and offering hope and opportunity (Martin & Taylor 1996). Others have determined that this migration turning-point occurs at income differentials of 3:1 to 4.5:1 (Böhning 1994; Olesen 2002). It is not entirely clear whether this pertains to income gaps based on absolute income or income adjusted to purchasing power. Instead of using relative income gaps, some studies in the mid-1990s suggested an average real per capita income threshold of around US$4,000 at which migration transitions would occur (Stalker 2002).

Combining the spatial notion of migration systems with the temporal notion of migration transition, we can hypothesise that the transformation of Southern European countries has coincided with the southward shift of the European ‘labour frontier’, a development which has offered renewed and reinforced labour-migration opportunities for North African countries and Turkey. The challenging question here is whether the increasing migration towards and through Turkey and North Africa is heralding these countries’ further integration into the expanding European migration system and their future transition into immigration countries, as theory would predict.
In the following sections, I try to answer this question by closely examining recent migration trends and a range of economic, political and demographic development indicators.

1.3 Migration histories: Morocco, Egypt and Turkey

1.3.1 Post-colonial and post-imperial migration

In Morocco, modernisation and colonial intrusion occurring as of the early twentieth century triggered processes of urbanisation and substantial rural-to-urban migration. This process started with the movement of Moroccan workers to Algeria, which became a French colony in 1830. Labour recruitment in Morocco started during World War I, when an urgent lack of manpower in France led to the active recruitment of tens of thousands of men for the army, industry and mines (Muus 1995). In World War II, labour shortages again led to the recruitment of Moroccan workers and soldiers (Bidwell 1973). Most of these workers returned. After Morocco became independent from France in 1956, ‘colonial’ migration patterns largely persisted. Because France stopped recruiting Algerian workers during the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962), the migration of factory- and mine-workers from Morocco was boosted (de Haas 2007a).

In Egypt, which came under English control in 1882, modernisation policies – pursued as of the second half of the nineteenth century, and symbolised by the completion of the Suez Canal in 1869 – intensified traditional patterns of internal migration towards Cairo and, to a lesser extent, Alexandria and the Suez Canal zone. Until the 1950s, few Egyptians – except for students – migrated abroad and, in fact, more foreigners from Arab and other countries migrated to Egypt (Sell 1988; Zohry & Harrell-Bond 2003). Egypt regained full independence from the UK in 1953 and, after the 1956 Suez Crisis, President Nasser came out of the war as an Arab hero, which reinforced Egypt’s position as leader of the Arab world. Except for policies to promote the education of Egyptian students abroad in the 1960s, the Egyptian state actively discouraged labour emigration, mainly through ‘exit-visa’ requirements (Choucri 1977; Sell 1988). Under Nasserist socialism, migration was seen as endangering national development as a consequence of an alleged ‘brain drain’.

In contrast to Morocco and Egypt, Turkey was never colonised by Western powers. The Ottoman Empire, the predecessor of the Turkish Republic, had

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4 The French protectorate over Morocco was formally established in 1912.
a long history of emigration, immigration and forced migration. The gradual contraction of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of new states from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries led to the wide-scale displacement of Armenians, Greeks, Muslim Albanians, Bosnians, Pomaks, Tatars and Turks from the Balkans (Kirişci 2003). In the events around the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923), over 1 million Greeks left Turkey and almost half a million Muslims and Turks moved from Greece to Turkey. Between the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 and the early 1960s, Turkey was predominantly an immigration country. The government of the Turkish Republic established an immigration programme encouraging Muslims and Turks from the Balkans to settle in Turkey, as part and parcel of the Turkish nation-building exercise (Avcı & Kirişci 2006).

1.3.2 The Turkish and Moroccan guest-worker boom (1961-1972)

The 1960s were characterised by a huge increase in labour migration to North-West Europe from Morocco and Turkey, which would develop into two main source countries of labour and family immigrants from outside the EU in the decades to follow. Rapid post-war economic growth in North-West Europe had created a demand for unskilled labour in sectors such as industry, mining, housing construction and agriculture from the 1950s. This triggered an increasing emigration of ‘guest workers’ from poorer countries around the Mediterranean. Until the early 1960s, most were recruited in Southern European countries.

When this migration stagnated, attention shifted towards Southern Mediterranean countries. The agreement which the Turkish and West German governments signed in 1961 for the recruitment of ‘guest workers’ would trigger an unprecedented migration from Turkey to West Germany. Similar agreements were signed with the governments of Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Sweden (Avcı & Kirişci 2006). The Moroccan government also signed agreements on the recruitment of workers with the governments of West Germany (1963), France (1963), Belgium (1964) and the Netherlands (1969). This was the onset of a spatial diversification of Moroccan migration to Europe, which used to be exclusively directed towards France, although the latter would remain the dominant destination until the 1990s. Migration from Morocco and Turkey peaked in the early 1970s (Avcı & Kirişci 2006; de Haas 2007a). The influence of formal recruitment by specialised agencies was only important in the initial years of labour migration and in setting the stage for subsequent chain migration. Already, in the 1960s, spontaneous settlement and informal recruitment
through migrant networks by companies was far more important numerically. Administrative obstacles, long waiting-lists and the accompanying bribery incited people to circumvent official channels and to migrate as ‘tourists’, subsequently ‘overstaying’ (Reniers 1999).

This emigration was actively stimulated by the Turkish and Moroccan governments, since they expected that the ‘guest workers’ would return and that their skills, knowledge and money would help to modernise the economy and trigger economic growth (Heinemeijer, van Amersfoort, Ettema, De Mas & van der Wusten 1977; Kirişci 2003). Certainly, in the Moroccan case, emigration was considered as a political safety valve, as migration and the counter-flow of remittances were expected to reduce poverty and political discontent. Quite in contrast, Egypt maintained its policy to largely discourage migration during this period and to foster the autonomous growth of its economy. Unlike in Turkey and Morocco, much of the emigration that did occur was of the highly skilled.

1.3.3 The 1973 Oil Crisis turning-point

The shock of the 1973 Six-Day War, the Oil Crisis and the ensuing economic recession in Western Europe and economic boom in the Gulf region would reshape the Euro-Mediterranean migration landscape. For Turkey and Morocco (and also Tunisia), it meant the end of the recruitment phase and the onset of increasingly restrictive immigration policies pursued by European states, a trend that has persisted until the present day.

Quite to the contrary, the events of 1973 marked the beginning of massive labour recruitment for the Arab oil countries. Europe’s recession coincided with an economic boom in the Gulf countries and Libya. The 1973 Arab oil embargo against the US and a number of its Western allies (the ‘Oil Crisis’) led to a quadrupling in oil prices and revenues, which was followed by ambitious development programmes in the Arab oil-producing countries, leading to a huge increase in the demand for labourers. This triggered unprecedented migration from oil-poor countries in the Middle East and North Africa.

This particularly affected Egypt, where the number of registered emigrants increased from 70,000 in 1970 to a reported 1.4 million in 1976 and to 2.3 million in 1986 (Zohry & Harrell-Bond 2003). This was directly linked to the remarkable reversal of relative economic conditions (Sell 1988: 93) between Egypt and its eastern (Gulf) and western (Libyan) neighbours. But it also coincided with a striking turnaround in Egyptian economic and foreign policies when Sadat came to power in 1970. Sadat’s infitah or open-door policy
meant a reorientation away from the Soviet Union and towards the United States, and a move from a centralised-plan economy towards economic liberalisation and the increasing opening of the Egyptian economy to foreign investment. Temporary migration came to be seen as a means to alleviate demographic pressures and stimulate economic growth. In 1971, all legal barriers to migration were lifted; government workers were allowed to emigrate while maintaining the right to return to their jobs (IOM 2005). The foreign demand for Egyptian labour peaked in 1983, when 3.3 million Egyptians were estimated to be working abroad (Zohry & Harrell-Bond 2003: 27-31).

The majority of Arab and Turkish migrants moved to Saudi Arabia, although all other Arab oil countries received their share of Egyptian migrants. Both skilled and unskilled workers migrated to the Arab oil countries, although most skilled migrants preferred the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Iraq, in particular, became a popular destination for unskilled Egyptian migrants, because of its liberal immigration policies towards Arabs, and its need for foreign labour as a result of the 1980-1988 war with Iran. Libya attracted many North African and Turkish migrants. Egyptians were the largest nationality present in Libya; they worked predominantly in agriculture and education (Hamood 2006: 17). Most migrants to the Arab oil countries were temporary workers, typically men. The longer-term migration of skilled workers to the Gulf countries, such as that which occurred from Egypt, remained relatively modest.

Although the economic boom in the Arab oil countries generated significant migration flows of workers from Morocco and Turkey, in contrast to Egypt, migration from these countries remained predominantly oriented towards North-West Europe. The European economic downturn provided the mirror image of the boom of the Arab oil economies. In Europe, the 1973 Oil Crisis heralded a period of economic stagnation and restructuring, resulting in rising structural unemployment and a lower demand for unskilled labourers. However, contrary to expectations, after a first wave of return it became clear that large numbers of Turkish, Moroccan and other Mediterranean immigrants decided not to return, and ended up staying permanently. Policies by sending and receiving states to encourage the return of their migrants typically failed, primarily due to economic crises

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5 Restrictions on labour migration were already relatively eased after the 1967 Six-Day War and the subsequent economic downturn, which heralded the start of more long-term emigration, whereas students abroad tended to stay abroad (Zohry & Harrell-Bond 2003).
and political instability in Morocco and Turkey (Avci & Kirişci 2006; de Haas 2007a; Entzinger 1985).

Moreover, the increasingly restrictive immigration policies and, in particular, the introduction of visa restrictions, had the paradoxical effect of pushing migrants into permanent settlement rather than the reverse (Entzinger 1985; Fargues 2004). Subsequent massive family reunification heralded the shift from circular to more permanent migration. This phenomenon mainly explains why Moroccan and Turkish migrant populations kept on increasing throughout the 1970s and 1980s, despite the official immigration stop.

1.3.4 The 1991 Gulf War turning-point

After a period of relatively steady labour migration from Egypt and other MENA countries to the Gulf countries and Libya, and besides family migration from the Maghreb to Europe, a series of political upheavals (the Gulf War, the outbreak of the Algerian Civil War and the UN embargo on Libya) occurring in 1991-1992 played a major role in setting a number of new migration trends.

Already, from 1983, the Iran-Iraq War, falling oil prices, and policies to replace foreign labour with nationals, started to cause a certain decline in the demand for Egyptian, North African and Turkish workers in GCC countries. It was particularly the 1991 Gulf War that led to the massive forced repatriation of migrants from GCC countries (Baldwin-Edwards 2005: 28). These events reinforced the already existing tendency in Gulf countries to rely increasingly on Asian immigrants. This went together with efforts to ‘indigenise’ the labour force of the Gulf countries to decrease their dependency on migrants (IOM 2005).

Another major development which would impinge on regional migration processes was the impact of the air and arms embargo imposed on Libya by the UN Security Council between 1992 and 2000. Disappointed by the perceived lack of support from his fellow Arab countries, Gaddafi embarked upon a radical reorientation of Libyan foreign policy towards sub-Saharan African countries (Hamood 2006), positioning himself as an African leader by developing a policy of creating alliances with and offering substantial development aid to them. In this context of pan-African foreign policy, Libya started to encourage sub-Saharan Africans to work in Libya (Hamood 2006; Pliez 2002). In the early 1990s, most migrants came from Libya’s neighbours, Sudan, Chad and Niger, which subsequently developed into transit countries for migrants from a much wider array of sub-Saharan countries (Bredeloup & Pliez 2005).
Despite a certain slowdown, migration from Egypt and other MENA countries to the Gulf and Libya has been more persistent and permanent than the policies intended. It has proven notoriously difficult to implement the indigenisation policy while semi-legal migrants continue to enter through intricate systems of visa-trading (IOM 2005) or through making the *hadj*, the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca. In fact, after the Gulf War, migration rates quickly returned to pre-War levels (Zohry & Harrell-Bond 2003). The recent surge in oil prices due to the war in Iraq and the lifting of the UN embargo on Libya seem to have reversed the economic decline in the Arab oil countries, which is likely to increase future demand for migrant labour. A qualitative change did occur, however, in the strongly segmented labour markets of GCC countries and Libya. Although an economic downturn in the 1980s and 1990s led to calls to indigenise the workforce, native workers might have partially taken over the high-level positions in the labour market, but they have continued to shun the heavy, lower-level jobs in the poorly paid private sector (Baldwin-Edwards 2005; Hamood 2006). While Asian and, in the case of Libya, sub-Saharan immigrants have increasingly filled manual jobs in the unskilled segments of the labour market, migrants from MENA countries to the Gulf have increasingly tended to occupy the middle segments of the labour markets.

1.3.5 Diversification of migration and the Arab Spring

Although migration from Egypt to the Arab oil countries has continued, Moroccan and Turkish migration to these countries slowed down over the 1990s. Migration from Turkey and Morocco to the classic destination of Europe continued predominantly because of family reunification and family formation – mainly as the result of the transnational marriages of Turks and Moroccans with the children of migrants.

Although Moroccan and Turkish ‘guest-worker’ migration to Europe shares many features in character, scope and timing, there are a number of important differences. First, Turkish migrants tend to be relatively better-educated, which primarily reflects the more developed state of the education system in Turkey in comparison to Morocco (Reniers 1999). Second, while the number of Moroccan asylum applicants is negligible, since the mid-1980s and mid-1990s the migration of (predominantly Kurdish) asylum seekers has been an important additional source of Turkish migration to Europe. Between 1983 and 2003, approximately 1 million Turkish nationals sought asylum from Western European countries (Avcı & Kirişci 2006). Third, Turkish migration is overwhelmingly concentrated on Germany, whereas Moroccan migration has shown a relatively higher degree of diversification.
beyond France. Over the 1990s and early 2000s, a new, large-scale movement of Moroccan migration has occurred to the new immigration countries of Southern Europe, mainly Spain and Italy, where the demand for cheap migrant labour boomed (de Haas 2007a). Although many of these migrants were irregular, many succeeded in obtaining residency status due to recent regularisations. Between 1980 and 2004, the combined Moroccan population officially residing in Spain and Italy increased from about 20,000 to 650,000 (de Haas 2007a).

While Southern Europe has developed into the dominant destination for new Moroccan migrants, it is striking that Turkish migrants did not explore new destinations in Southern Europe, and have rarely migrated to Greece, Italy or Spain. An interesting hypothesis to explore is whether this may be related to a relatively higher level of development in Turkey and declining emigration potential (see İçduygu, in this volume).

A recent migration trend which both countries have in common is the increasing outmigration of high-skilled Turkish and Moroccan migrants to Europe, the US, Canada (mainly for Moroccans) and the former Soviet republics forming the Commonwealth of Independent States or CIS, for Turks (Avcı & Kirişci 2006; de Haas 2007a). On the basis of an extensive data analysis, a report on Mediterranean migration (Fargues 2005) identified a striking pattern in which Europe attracts the lesser-educated while the US and Canada succeed in attracting the more highly skilled migrants from the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. Interestingly, Egypt seems to have gone through the opposite development. Until the 1990s, most Egyptian migration to Europe and North America used to consist of students and other highly skilled migrants. In more recent years, there has been an increase of often-irregular migrants from Egypt heading to Southern Europe to work in low-skilled jobs in agriculture, construction and services, thereby following the more established migration patterns of Moroccans and other Maghrebi migrants. This is linked to a more structural change in the regional-migration landscape, in which the Maghreb countries and Libya have increasingly developed into a destination and transit zone for migrants coming from sub-Saharan countries. In particular, the anti-immigrant backlash occurring in Libya since 2000 has encouraged increasing numbers of Egyptian and sub-Saharan migrants working there to join the flow of Maghrebis who had already started migrating illegally to Southern Europe in the early 1990s.

This also coincided with a striking diversification of trans-Saharan migration routes, with Algeria and Morocco experiencing more and more immigration from sub-Saharan migrants. Rather than a reduction in
migration, increasing border controls in Southern Spain and Italy caused a diversification of attempted sea-crossing points, with migrants now crossing from the Eastern Moroccan, Algerian, Tunisian, Libyan and even West African coasts to the European islands of Malta, Sicily, Lampedusa, Sardinia and Crete and, in recent years, the Canary Islands (de Haas 2007c; de Haas & Sigona 2012).

The wave of political unrest that began in Tunisia in December 2010 and spread throughout the Arab world caused the death of thousands of people, while more than 2 million others had been forced to leave their homes by mid-2012. While the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt remained relatively peaceful, the violent conflicts in Libya and Syria generated large flows of refugees, most of whom went to neighbouring countries such as Tunisia and Egypt in the case of Libyans, and Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and even Libya for Syrians (de Haas & Sigona 2012).

In early 2011, the violence in Libya led to large-scale outflows of Libyan citizens and migrant workers. The hundreds of thousands of sub-Saharan and other migrant workers stranded in Libya who sought refuge across the Egyptian and Tunisian borders suddenly exposed to the global public the scale of intra-African migration. Overall, migrant workers from more than 120 countries were displaced during the conflict. The most vulnerable group were African migrants who were not able to return because they often lacked the resources and connections. This coincided with an upsurge in racist violence against African migrant workers – some of whom were accused of having fought in Gaddafi’s militias. Many Africans thus got trapped inside Libya.

In the wake of the revolution, European politicians sowed panic that these people would cross the Mediterranean en masse to land on European shores. The Italian government warned of an exodus of ‘biblical proportions’. This panic had no basis, as most migrants wanted to return home. Only 4 per cent of all people fleeing Libya (27,465 persons out of 790,000) ended up in Italy or Malta (Aghazarm, Quesada & Tishler 2012). The large majority of them found refuge in neighbouring Egypt and, particularly, Tunisia. After the death of Gaddafi in October 2011, most Libyans returned and migrant workers started to come back, although African migrants, in particular, continued to experience racist violence.

Nevertheless, the Arab Spring has not radically transformed long-term migration patterns in the Mediterranean. Mass flight has been largely confined to Libya and Syria, and there has been no major increase of emigration from other North African or Middle Eastern countries. The increase in Tunisian emigration to Lampedusa, an Italian island 113 km off the Tunisian
Hain de Haas, the coast, was stimulated by reduced policing during the revolution, but was part of a long-standing tradition of irregular boat migration to Europe that has existed since Southern European countries introduced visas for North Africans in around 1991 (de Haas & Sigona 2012).

1.3.6 Immigration and settlement

Although Morocco, Egypt and Turkey are known as typical emigration countries, all three are also destinations for migrants from other regions. This is especially the case for Turkey, which has experienced substantial immigration, mainly of ethnic Turks, over the past century. From the establishment of Turkey in 1923, more than 1.6 million immigrants had settled in Turkey by 1997 (Kirişci 2003).

Since the early 1990s, however, Turkey has witnessed a new form of (often irregular) migration, mainly involving transit migrants and immigrants. Many are involved in small-scale trade; others overstay their visas and find jobs in informal sectors working as domestics, labourers in construction, tourism or other services (Kirişci 2003). Over the last decade, major incoming migration movements have been from Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Significant numbers have also arrived from Moldova, Romania, Ukraine, the Russian Federation and Georgia (İçduygu 2006). Although many migrants aim to use Turkey as a transit country to get to Europe, a significant proportion settles down, at least temporarily, and finds work with relative ease in Turkey's large informal sectors, especially in the less desired jobs generated by informalisation (İçduygu 2006). The total number of irregular immigrants is estimated at between 150,000 and 1 million. Turkey also has a significant immigration of asylum seekers. In addition, an estimated 100,000-120,000 European retirees have recently settled in Turkey and their numbers are increasing (Kirişci 2003). Growing immigration and decreasing emigration rates, apparently combined with increasing return migration from Europe by migrants who are attracted by the improved conditions in Turkey, would indicate that Turkey has already entered the last phase of its migration transition.

Historically, Egypt has attracted migrants from the Middle East and the parts of the Upper Nile located in what is nowadays Sudan. Despite quite considerable emigration to the Gulf countries and elsewhere, Egypt has continued to receive significant numbers of labour migrants, asylum seekers and refugees in the post-independence era. Cairo hosts one of the largest urban-refugee populations in the world – mainly Sudanese but also Palestinians, Somalis, Ethiopians and Eritreans. In addition, since the 1970s
many Sudanese workers have migrated to Egypt. The current refugee and immigrant population in Egypt (mainly Cairo) is estimated to be anywhere between 0.5 and 3 million (Zohry & Harrell-Bond 2003). Most of these refugees and immigrants have de facto settled and found work in marginal jobs in construction and informal services, while women often find work as domestic servants (Ahmed 2003; Arbaoui 2006; Grabska 2005). In Cairo, the labour market for domestic workers seems to be increasingly feminising and globalising. Refugee women and men from Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea work as domestics in Cairo. In addition, agencies appear to be active in recruiting Nigerian, Filipino, Malaysian and Indonesian workers (Arbaoui 2006).

While Morocco has received limited numbers of student migrants and highly skilled workers from sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere, immigration remained very limited in the post-independence era. This changed after the mid-1990s, when more and more trans-Saharan migrants started to move to Morocco in their attempts to cross the Mediterranean (Lahlou & Escoffier 2002). A substantial proportion of migrants failing or not venturing to enter Europe preferred to settle in Morocco on a longer-term basis rather than return to their more unstable and substantially poorer home countries (de Haas 2005). Although lacking residency status and therefore vulnerable to exploitation, they sometimes find jobs in specific niches in the informal service sector, tourism, petty trade, construction, agriculture, etc. An increasing number of sub-Saharan students pursue their studies in Morocco, sometimes as a means to gain residency status (Alioua 2005; Berriane 2007). Alioua (2005) estimated the number of sub-Saharan migrants and refugees living in Morocco at several tens of thousands.

1.3.7 Migration determinants

The above description has exemplified that the specific migration patterns occurring from the three case-study countries show remarkable similarities and striking differences.

- Political and economic forces majeures, such as colonisation, the Oil Crisis, warfare, economic decline and the restructuring and segmentation of regional labour markets have exerted a significant influence on shaping contemporary migration patterns. Such structural political-economic forces have often been more important in determining migration than migration policies per se. The only exception is labour recruitment, which has played an important role in establishing new migration patterns by linking specific origin countries and regions to particular destinations. Rather than standing alone, migration policies are often a function of
more general political-economic processes. If migration policies do not match economic realities, the usual result is irregular migration.

– The existence of substantial differentials in economic and social opportunities between sending and receiving countries seems to be a *conditio sine qua non* for large-scale migration to occur. When such differentials decrease substantiably, migration is likely to decrease, and the other way around. However, such factors cannot explain the actual migration patterns we see, with highly specialised flows between, for instance, the Emirdag region of Turkey and Belgium, or the Rif area of Northern Morocco and the Netherlands.

– The preponderance of Turkey and Morocco in European immigration confirms the hypothesis derived from transitional-migration theory that very little ‘South-North’ migration occurs from the least-developed countries, as well as the fact that geographical proximity probably plays an important role too.\(^6\)

– The evolution of Turkish and Moroccan migration to Western Europe, and Egyptian migration to the Gulf region and Libya, demonstrates that, once migration systems are established, migration movements gain their own momentum, partially or even largely independent of their immediate causes. Initial migration patterns tend to be reproduced, partly because of the internal social and economic dynamics inherent to the migration process itself, giving rise to migration systems that link places in countries of origin and destination through relatively stable exchanges of people, goods, capital (remittances), ideas and information. In particular, migrant networks tend to facilitate continuing labour, family and undocumented migration over formally closed borders (Massey et al. 1998). Because of these self-reinforcing dynamics, migration tends to follow historical migration patterns. Thus, current migration patterns cannot be explained without taking into account the regional political-economic *forces majeures* of the past, the initial patterns of labour recruitment or initial journeys of ‘spontaneous’ pioneer migrants, who still leave their ‘footprint’ on actual migration patterns through the functioning of migrant networks.

\(^6\) In fact, geographical proximity to Europe and levels of socio-economic development seem to be correlated, and it is likely that both factors are reciprocally related.
1.4 Recent migration trends

1.4.1 Migrant population data

Figure 1.2 reveals that Morocco and Turkey are dominant source countries for migrants from the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean to the EU. The data reveal that France has been the dominant destination for Moroccan migrants over past decades, while Germany occupies a similar position for Turkish migrants. What these data also show, however, is that the degree of diversification of migration to Europe is much higher for Moroccans than for Turks. As we will see, this partly reflects the new ‘primary’ labour migration that occurred from Morocco to Spain and Italy, while Turkish emigration has slowed down and predominantly consists of family migration to Germany and a few other traditional destinations. Egypt shows a very different picture, with the lion’s share of its unskilled and skilled workers migrating to the Gulf and Libya, and most elite migrants and students going to North America and Australia. At least until recently, migration from Egypt to Europe has remained very limited.

Figure 1.2 Emigrant stocks according to destination

Although the estimated number of Moroccan citizens living abroad (3.1 million) is almost equal to that of Turkey (3.6 million), Table 1.1 shows that they represent a much higher share of the total population (10.1 per cent) than is the case for Turkey (4.9 per cent) and Egypt (3.6 per cent). While 8.6 per cent of all Moroccan citizens and 4.2 per cent of all Turkish citizens
live in Europe, this is the case for only 0.6 per cent of all Egyptian citizens. In comparison with other North African countries, Morocco also has the highest share of its population living abroad.

Tables 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 provide a detailed breakdown of the countries of residence of Moroccan, Turkish and Egyptian citizens living abroad. They confirm that migration from Morocco is more diverse in terms of destination than Turkish migration. Nevertheless, similar North-Western-European countries – France, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium – appear among the predominant destinations for Turkish and Moroccan emigration. This largely reflects the ‘guest worker’ migration of the 1960s and 1970s and the ensuing chain migration in more recent decades. Turks are relatively numerous in Scandinavia compared to Moroccans. The most striking feature of Moroccan emigration is the recent flow to Spain and Italy. Spain, in particular,

Table 1.2  Moroccon citizens residing abroad (2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,113,176</td>
<td>2,616,871</td>
<td>79,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>300,332</td>
<td>991,796</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>102,000</td>
<td>33,479,948</td>
<td>25,637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>293,097</td>
<td>10,132,252</td>
<td>27,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>423,933</td>
<td>72,935,323</td>
<td>13,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>298,949</td>
<td>16,475</td>
<td>16,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>5,366</td>
<td>5,366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>20,197</td>
<td>6,368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>11,500</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>472,219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>8,687</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European</td>
<td>20,197</td>
<td>Other Arab countries</td>
<td>77,713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,616,871</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>6,368</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Consular data in Fargues (2005: 231–232)
has evolved into the second country of residence and the main country of destination for Moroccans, while few Turkish migrants have moved to Southern Europe over recent decades. Recent limited increases in Egyptian migration to Europe have mainly concentrated on Greece and, particularly, Italy.

These tables draw on official statistics from countries of origin, which tend to include naturalised migrants (those who retain citizenship of their origin countries and thereby become dual citizens) and the children and even grandchildren of migrants – who are technically not migrants. Therefore, estimates of the migrant population of destination countries tend to be lower. Figure 1.3 shows the significant differences between sending and receiving countries’ estimates, although overall patterns remain the same.

The difference is particularly large for Moroccans and much smaller for Turks, probably reflecting the fact that Moroccans had relatively easy access to citizenship in the main destination countries of France, Belgium and the Netherlands. In contrast, until the reform of the citizenship law in 2000, this tended to be difficult for Turkish migrants in Germany. Another factor is that relinquishing Moroccan citizenship is very difficult, if not almost impossible (de Haas 2007d). The gap is also large for Egyptians, linked, seemingly, to the serious undercounting of Egyptian and other immigrants in the Gulf countries and Libya, which generally lack transparent migration statistics. For all sending countries, the differences also partly reflect the fact that consulates abroad often register migrants irrespective of their residence status, so that these figures might include a significant share of irregular migrants.

Table 1.3 Turkish citizens residing abroad (2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Elsewhere</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1,999,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>326,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>320,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>134,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>56,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>36,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>33,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other EU</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,067,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: General Directorate of Services for the Workers Abroad, Attached to the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (2002) in Fargues (2005: 359)
Table 1.4  Egyptian citizens residing abroad (2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘Temporary’ migration</th>
<th>‘Permanent’ migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>65,629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>226,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>190,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>12,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>332,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>923,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>95,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,912,729</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 1.3  Comparison between numbers of migrants counted by origin and destination countries

1.4.2  The evolution of migrant populations

Figure 1.4 displays the evolution of the total number of Turkish, Egyptian and Moroccan nationals living abroad, irrespective of destination country. It shows a quite steady increase for Turks and Moroccans, and a somewhat more erratic increase for the Egyptians, following the unstable immigration
policies of the Arab oil countries. Currently, at least 8.7 million nationals of these three countries live abroad. This is a remarkable increase in the light of earlier expectations that this migration would decrease after the 1973 Oil Crisis. In fact, between 1973 and 2003, the combined Moroccan and Turkish expatriate population increased from 1.4 to 6.2 million. Besides natural increase, this mainly reflects the effects of family and asylum migration (for Turks) and new labour migration (for Moroccans) to Southern Europe. While the increase in the Moroccan emigrant stock has accelerated since the late 1990s, that of the Turkish emigrant stock has stagnated in recent years. Whereas, in 1973, the number of Moroccans abroad represented 42 per cent of the Turkish migrant stock, this percentage stood at 85 per cent in 2003.

Figure 1.4  Turkish, Egyptian and Moroccan nationals living abroad

So far, we have used migrant-stock data as a proxy to study migration flows. However, since migrant-stock data include non-migrants (members of the so-called second and third generations retaining the citizenship of their origin countries) it is better to look at flow data, that is, to compare the immigration rates of Moroccans, Turks and Egyptian nationals into the main European receiving countries. The main problem here is that reliable, long-term time series exist only for a few destination countries. Moreover, with a few exceptions, official flow data do not include irregular migrants, who are more likely to show up in migrant-stock data through
the registration of irregular migrants by origin countries’ governments or after migrant regularisations.

We only had access to complete flow data from the main European destination countries over the period 1994-2003, as displayed in Figure 1.5. Despite limited data reliability (due to irregular migration and the poor quality of statistics in Southern European countries), the figure shows a clear trend, confirming the hypothesis that migration from Turkey has been stagnating and even slowing down, and that, since the 1990s, Moroccan migration has undergone a dramatic increase, reaching similar levels to Turkish immigration at around 85,000 per year. Although Egyptian immigration is at far lower levels – below 15,000 per year – there has been a clear increase. Real figures are likely to be much higher, because a considerable number of Egyptians migrate irregularly to Greece, where data are unavailable, and Italy – where data quality is generally poor. Comparatively, the quality of Spanish data, the prime destination of recent Moroccan labour migrants, is good and the data even include irregular immigrants.

Total Moroccan migration into OECD countries was estimated at 96,000 in 2000 and 128,000 in 2005, consolidating its position as the prime origin country for migrants from outside the EU. Over the same period, net Turkish migration decreased from 79,000 to 66,000, although Turkey is still non-EU origin-country number 3 after Morocco and the Ukraine (OECD 2007: 38). With about 60,000 students living in OECD countries, Morocco has also

Figure 1.5  Immigration of Turkish, Moroccan and Egyptian nationals to Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Spain and Italy, 1994–2003

Sources: OECD immigration database, Eurostat, National Statistical Services
become the fourth principal non-OECD source country for students, after China (close to 340,000 students), India (almost 125,000) and Korea (95,000) (OECD 2007). In view of its much smaller population size, this means that, in relative terms, the largest non-OECD immigrant population residing in OECD countries is of Moroccan origin.

These overall trends are replicated at the country level, where we sometimes have immigration figures covering much longer periods. Figure 1.6 compares immigration trends from Morocco, Egypt and Turkey to Germany. Because Turkish immigration is much larger in absolute terms, and in order to facilitate comparison, immigration has been plotted with the 1970s serving as the reference year (= 100). The figure shows a declining trend for Turkish migration, in particular, after 1980, whereas Moroccan and, particularly, Egyptian migration showed a post-1983 increase, peaking in the early 1990s. Since then, immigration has stagnated at lower levels. While Turkish immigration is now about one quarter of its 1970s level, current Moroccan and Egyptian migration is about half as high as in 1970.

Migration to Sweden has followed largely similar patterns, with a relative increase in Moroccan and Egyptian migration since 1980, and a peak in the early 1990s and again in the early 2000s (Figure 1.7). In contrast, Turkish immigration decreased in the early 1990s to stagnate at levels just above 50 per cent of those in 1980.

Turkish and Moroccan migration to the Netherlands is of similar magnitude and Figure 1.8 displays immigration figures going back to 1965. Turkish

Figure 1.6 Immigration of Turkish, Moroccan and Egyptian nationals to Germany, 1970–2004

Source: German statistical office
and Moroccan immigration shows a high degree of correlation, suggesting that the two nationalities react to similar economic and policy trends in the Netherlands. While, in the 1970s, Turkish immigration clearly exceeded Moroccan, immigration rates have been largely similar. There has been a major decrease in immigration, to levels of 2,000 and 3,000 in 2005 for Moroccans and Turks, respectively – about one fifth of immigration levels in 1990. It has been argued that this was largely due to the decline of family migration after the introduction of more-restrictive family-reunification measures (OECD 2007).

Turkish and Moroccan immigration to Belgium was at almost equal levels in 1985 (see Figure 1.9). Since then, while following similarities in ups and downs, Moroccan migration has far exceeded Turkish immigration and is now at almost double the level, although there has been a decrease since 2002.

Moroccan immigration into France is much more important than Turkish and Egyptian immigration. At least 1.1 million Moroccan nationals live there, and Moroccans have even overtaken Algerians as the largest immigrant group. However, since 1996, relative immigration trends have been remarkably similar and increasing for Moroccans, Turks and Egyptians alike (see Figure 1.10). In particular, Turkish migration to France is striking and goes against the overall trend of stagnating or declining Turkish immigration to other EU countries. With at least 326,000 Turkish nationals living in France, this country has overtaken the Netherlands as the second most
important destination country in Europe after Germany, with its Turkish expatriate community comprising about 2 million individuals.

Figures 1.11 and 1.12 show recent immigration trends to Spain and Italy and, if anything, the preponderance of Moroccan immigration. The recent surge in Moroccan migration to Spain has been phenomenal, and is one of the most remarkable migratory phenomena of the early 2000s. Although these figures partly reflect recent Spanish regularisations, there has undoubtedly been a major surge in Moroccan immigration. Benefiting from geographical proximity, this upsurge has largely been a consequence of the strong demand
for immigrant labour in agriculture, construction and the informal service sector. Spain is now a more important destination country than France. After the guest-worker migration of the 1960s and 1970s to North-Western Europe, Morocco witnessed a remarkable second wave of primary labour migration to Southern Europe in the 1990s and 2000s – this in stark contrast to Turkey.
The sharp fluctuations in Moroccan migration to Italy largely reflect measurement problems as well as the effect of regularisations, but show an increasing trend. Italy has evolved into the second destination country of new Moroccan labour migrants. While the level of Turkish immigration in Italy is as negligible as it is in Spain, Egyptian immigration – although at much lower levels – seems relatively important in comparison with other countries. In fact, Italy has the highest level of legal immigration of Egyptians – about 59,000 were officially residing in Italy in 2005, making it by far the largest Egyptian immigrant community in Europe, compared to the 25,000 in the UK (de Haas 2007c). It is likely that the real numbers are significantly higher, due to substantial irregular immigration. A growing number of Egyptians – who traditionally migrated to Libya to work – make the crossing to Italy via Libya (Hamood 2006).

1.5 Development trends and migration futures

1.5.1 The real question: Where will future migrants come from?

It is not difficult to understand why Western European countries have continued to attract migrants. This cannot exclusively be explained by family or chain migration. Persistent economic growth, the changing structure of the labour market and growing female labour participation (which led to an increasing demand for personnel in cleaning, care and other services)
have generated a greater demand for low- and high-skilled migrant labour in specific sectors. This not only pertains to high-skilled jobs, but also to a whole range of un- and semi-skilled (often irregular) jobs in agriculture, construction, catering, cleaning, domestic and other formal and informal services. In fact, the correlation between family migration (e.g., of Turks and Moroccans to North-Western Europe after 1973) and economic growth suggests the limited usefulness of migration categories, which primarily reflect legal categories rather than the real, complex and generally mixed motivations of migrants.

Assuming future economic growth and political stability, EU member states will in all likelihood continue to attract migrants in the coming decades. Although the idea that migration can ‘solve’ population ageing is fundamentally flawed, it is likely that population ageing will increase labour demand in specific sectors, in particular in care and other high- and low-skilled services. The demand for migrant labour is likely to increase even in scenarios of a somewhat drastic increase in labour participation (de Jong, Nicolaas & Sprangers 2001; Entzinger 2000; Fargues 2004).

Therefore, the real question for the future is not whether immigration will continue, but where these migrants will come from. Why has the number of Turks migrating to EU countries been constantly decreasing over recent years, while Moroccan migration to Southern Europe has recently seen a resurgence? Why has Egyptian migration to Europe remained so limited, and is the recently increasing Egyptian migration to Italy possibly heralding a future major increase in Egyptian migration to Europe? Assuming future demand for migrant labour in the EU, we therefore now turn to studying trends of demographic, economic and political development in our case-study countries, and analyse how these might be connected to the different migration trends described above. On that basis, we develop some ideas about the future migration potential of the countries in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean and beyond.

1.5.2 Demographic trends: A world running out of children

It is often thought that fertility decline and ageing are phenomena that uniquely affect Western societies. It is less known that, globally, almost all countries have entered their fertility transition phase, as testified by rapidly falling fertility levels around the world. In our case-study countries, this process started in the 1950s and 1960s. While Turkish fertility rates declined earlier and have now achieved replacement levels (around 2.1), Morocco and Egypt have also achieved spectacular reductions in fertility (see Figure 1.13). The decline
has been the most spectacular in Morocco, with a reduction from around 7.1 in 1965 (just at the onset of the great guest-worker migration to Europe) to 2.5 at the turn of the century. The decline has been slower in Egypt, with current fertility levels around 3.0. Medium-variant forecasts by the UNPD suggest that the long-term trend is towards convergence with European countries.

Figure 1.14 shows how reductions in fertility have resulted in a slowing down of yearly natural population growth (birth minus death rates, irrespective of migration). Again, the decline has been the fastest in Turkey, with current natural growth at around 1.3 per cent, against 1.5 per cent for Morocco and 1.9 per cent for Egypt. Although this is still much higher than the minimal or even negative natural population growth rates in many Western and Eastern European countries, the times of galloping population growth in Mediterranean countries are clearly over.

Although there is often an indirect link between demographic and migration transition, it would be treacherous to suggest that high population growth is a direct cause of emigration. For instance, high natural population growth in the Arab Gulf countries has not coincided with increased emigration – quite the contrary. In fact, if there is a relationship, it can at most be an indirect one. Current developing countries have experienced extraordinarily high peaks in population growth because their demographic transition is evolving much faster than was the case in Northern Europe (Kirk 1996). In many countries, this seems to go along with a temporarily decreased capacity for economic and employment growth to keep up with galloping population growth.
These factors might explain why international outmigration persists in relatively advanced stages of the demographic transition, as we have perhaps seen in countries like Turkey and Morocco. Furthermore, the growth of the working-age population seems to be a more essential factor than fertility or gross population growth. The pressure on the Moroccan and Egyptian labour markets – unlike in Turkey – is not expected to decrease significantly in the short term. However, Morocco has almost reached the point where the dramatic reductions in fertility since 1972 will begin to entail the reduction of the number of people attaining working age in 2010, and will reach full momentum in the period 2015-2020 (Courbage 1996; Fargues 2004). The next generation entering the labour market will theoretically face less competition and also bear an exceptionally light demographic burden compared to past and future generations (Fargues 2004).

This delayed, positive effect of past declines in fertility is clearly visible in Figure 1.15. Dependency ratios in Turkey, Morocco and Egypt reached a peak around the 1970s, after which they started to decline with fertility rates. In the next few decades, dependency levels will further decline while population ageing in European countries will result in the exactly opposite trend of dramatic increases in dependency levels. Population ageing will start to affect our case-study countries only from 2040 onwards. Until then, these countries will be offered a unique demographic window of opportunity of exceptionally low dependency ratios and decreasing new entries into the labour market.

This positive, delayed effect of fertility decline on the rate of domestic (labour-market) absorption may eventually contribute to declining inter-
national migration, as transitional-migration models predict. However, we need to stress that this is an indirect relationship. Whether, to what extent and when this will really happen crucially depends on other factors such as economic growth, job creation, education, political stability, freedom and trust in government institutions.

1.5.3 Income and quality of life

Turkey, Morocco and Egypt have achieved remarkable improvements in human development, as testified, for instance, by considerable increases in life expectancy to about 70 years nowadays and by the fact that gaps with European countries consistently narrowed between 1955 and 2005 (see Figure 1.16). All three countries are classified as middle-income countries, although Turkey is considerably wealthier than the other two. Between 1970 and 2006, Egyptian and Moroccan per capita gross domestic product (GDP) was 38 per cent and 52 per cent of Turkish per capita GDP, respectively, as shown in Figure 1.17. In recent years, per capita GDP growth in Turkey has greatly accelerated, doubling from US$2,626 in 2002 to US$5,307 in 2006. This has widened the gap with Morocco and, particularly, Egypt, where per capita GDP was only 28 per cent of Turkey’s in 2006.

More relevant for the analysis of migration from the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean to EU countries is the comparison between countries of GDP per capita corrected for PPP. The data depicted in Figure 1.18 show...
that the income gap between Turkey and Germany decreased from 1:4.2 in 1980 to 1:3.4 in 2006. These are precisely the critical values of the migration turning-points identified by Martin and Taylor (1996), who hypothesised that emigration tends to decrease steeply if the income differential between sending and receiving countries declines to figures between 1:4 and 1:5 (between 1:3 and 1:4.5 according to others – Böhning 1994; Olesen 2002).

The Turkish case also reflects the hypothesis that migration transitions would occur at levels of *per capita* income of around US$4,000 (Stalker 2002).

Over the same period (1980-2006), the income gap between Turkey and Spain slightly decreased from 1:3.1 to 1:2.8. This is higher than hypothesised migration turning-point threshold values. In other words, the income gap between Turkey and Spain, as well as other European countries, seems too low to compensate for the financial, social and psychological costs and risks of migration for an increasing number of Turks. Income gaps between Morocco and Egypt with Germany have remained high, from values of around 1:6 and 1:7, respectively, in the 1980s to 1:5.5 and 1:6 in recent years. Income gaps between Morocco and Spain have actually increased from values of around 1:4.2 in the early 1980s to about 1:5 in recent years. Rapid economic growth in Spain might, indeed, have generated a higher demand for migrant labour from nearby Morocco. For Egypt, the gap with Spain has increased from approximately 1:5 in the mid-1980s to 1:5.9 in recent years. These values still lie well below the migration-turning values. The global economic crisis has not closed these gaps, although rapidly increasing unemployment in countries like Spain has caused significant out-migration (Castles, de Haas & Miller 2014).
When Martin and Taylor (1996: 58) hypothesised that emigration tends to decrease steeply if the income differential between sending and receiving countries declines to figures between 1:4 and 1:5, they emphatically added
‘[…] provided that the emigration country is growing fast and offering hope and opportunity’. Turkey certainly meets the ‘growing fast’ condition, and this might also be the case for Morocco, albeit to a much lower extent. The second ‘offering hope and opportunity’ condition extends beyond the economic realm, and also includes economic and political freedom. This fits well into a freedom and capabilities understanding of development as devised by Sen (1999). Although capabilities have an important intrinsic value in enhancing people’s freedom, they also tend to be positively correlated to economic performance (Easterly 2006; Sen 1999).

In order to compare the level of democratic values across countries, Figure 1.19 depicts country scores on the POLITY 2 Index developed by the Polity IV Project of the Center for Global Policy at George Mason University. The data clearly indicate that, over the past twenty years, after a period of political instability and coups d’état, Turkey has consolidated its position as a country with strong democratic institutions and freedom for its citizens. The contrast with Morocco and Egypt is stark. Although Morocco has recently witnessed substantial increases in civic freedom, it is classified at similar levels as Spain under Franco. According to this index, Egypt made very little progress until the mid-2000s.

Obviously the ‘Arab Spring’ has quite drastically changed the outlook for Arab countries, although the extent to which the uprisings have led to real democratisation and increased civil liberties varies across countries. While Tunisia has turned from one of the most repressive regimes to a nascent democracy and one of the freest societies in a very short period, progress has

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**Figure 1.19 Level of democracy and autocracy (Polity 2 Index)**

![Graph showing levels of democracy and autocracy over time for Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, and Spain.]

*Source: Polity IV Project*
been slower, and more erratic and uncertain in Egypt. Morocco remained invariably authoritarian as the king enacted constitutional reform although his cling to a central position of power has remained largely unaffected. It is very difficult to predict future developments, but the coming-of-age of a new, well-educated and aspiring generation is likely to generate continuous pressure for reform.

1.6 Conclusion

The recent migration histories of Morocco, Egypt and Turkey illustrate the diversity of country- and region-specific migration patterns on the one hand but, on the other, also reveal certain regularities. In particular, the comparison between Morocco and Turkey is instructive. Both countries have followed quite similar trajectories as the main origin countries of the guest workers moving to North-Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, followed by a phase of large-scale family reunification. This led to the establishment and permanent settlement of the largest immigrant groups from outside the EU. Since the early 1990s, Morocco’s and Turkey’s paths have clearly diverged. While Turkish family migration to Europe gradually decreased and the country witnessed more and more immigration, Morocco experienced a second, new wave of primary-labour emigration to Italy and, particularly, Spain, while emigration to North-Western Europe has also remained relatively high in comparison with Turkish migration. This can, at least partly, be explained by the fact that income differentials have remained relatively high despite recent economic growth in Morocco and that political and other freedom has remained relatively low.

Although family formation is still fuelling substantial Turkish migration to North-Western Europe, very few Turks have migrated to Southern Europe recently. In fact, due to increasing return migration and immigration from CIS countries, Asia and Europe, Turkey has entered the third phase of its migration transition by passing the in-out migration break-even point, thereby becoming a country of net immigration. This can be explained not only by the extraordinarily high levels of economic growth in the recent past, but also by the many structural institutional reforms and macro-economic stabilisation which recent Turkish governments have established. This has created a more general climate of optimism and hope for the future, which seems to be increasingly luring Turkish migrants back from Europe to Turkey.

Egypt’s migration story is entirely different. While it is the poorest and apparently least stable country in our three case-studies, Egyptians did not
participate in the ‘guest-worker’ migrations of the late 1960s and 1970s. This might partly be explained by its geographical position, which complicated the ‘spontaneous’ migration occurring from Morocco and Turkey, and by pan-Arab socialist policies. As a poor and populous country squeezed in between Libya and the Gulf countries, it was a logical candidate for mass migration to those countries after the 1973 Oil Crisis. Yet the proximity factor cannot explain why there are more Egyptian migrants living in North America and Australia than in Europe. However, the majority of these are relatively highly skilled migrants. In the absence of labour recruitment agreements, which played an important role in triggering Turkish and Moroccan migration, labour migration to Europe was probably simply beyond the capabilities and imagination of most Egyptians. However, the recent increase in the irregular migration of Egyptians to Italy and elsewhere might herald an increase in Egyptian labour migration to Europe.

It is very difficult to predict future migration trends, as they critically depend on sustained economic growth, stability and increasing freedom, which will determine the extent to which the middle-income countries to the south and east of Europe will offer trust and life perspectives to their citizens. In that sense, the future EU membership of Turkey seems the best long-term guarantee of creating such trust in and hope for the future in ways similar to those for Portugal, Spain and Greece in the past (Kirişci 2003). Although such membership and the freedom of movement this implies might create an upsurge in largely temporary labour migration, as is currently occurring from countries such as Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, this is less likely to create a large, new, permanent immigrant population in Europe because of the high economic growth and trust which (the prospect of) membership is likely to create.

While the migration potential from Turkey is likely to further decline given the possible future political stability and sustained economic growth, the migration potential from Morocco is likely to remain substantial, at least in the short term. First, recent labour migration to Spain and Italy has laid the foundation for new Moroccan migrant communities, whose numbers are likely to increase due to the same processes of family migration that led to a huge increase in Moroccan and Turkish migrant communities in North-Western Europe in the two decades after the Oil Crisis. Moroccans are therefore likely to overtake the Turks as the largest resident immigrant group in Europe. While it seems to be at the peak of its ‘migration hump’, Morocco’s migration potential for the more medium term fundamentally depends on the extent to which recent substantial increases in civic liberties are sustained and real democratisation occurs. If the current trend persists, and the Moroccan
economy continues to grow, the unique ‘window of opportunity’ offered to the next generations entering the labour market, bearing an exceptionally light demographic burden, may well result in a rapidly decreasing emigration potential, as Morocco seems quite close to the origin-destination income-gap threshold levels at which emigration seems to decline. This is likely to coincide with increasing immigration and settlement from sub-Saharan Africa, a process which has already been set in motion (de Haas 2007a). However, if recent reforms are not sustained and economic growth remains sluggish, Morocco’s migration hump may be extended or transformed into a semi-permanent ‘migration plateau’ of sustained out-migration. Although this primarily depends on domestic political factors, the implementation and effects of Morocco’s association agreement with the EU will play a fundamental role, too.

Assuming a steadily declining emigration potential of Eastern European countries, Turkey and perhaps even the Maghreb countries (such as Tunisia), in the more-medium term, the challenging question then becomes where future immigrant workers will come from.

Perhaps this will bring Egypt onto the agenda, as it is a comparatively poor middle-income country with relatively few economic prospects and little political freedom bordering the ‘migration frontier’ of the expanding European migration system. Perhaps the current increases in the regular and irregular migration of Egyptian labourers to Italy (often via Libya), and even Greece, will create new bridgeheads in the form of new migrant communities which may facilitate more migration. While income gaps with the EU seem ideal for generating ‘take-off’ migration, Europe seems to be an increasingly attractive destination compared to the low salaries and poor working conditions which Arab countries can offer, in particular to the lower-skilled. This may lead Egyptian workers to increasingly shun the Arab countries in the same way that Maghrebi and Turkish workers have done.

So far, the Arab Spring has not radically transformed long-term migration patterns in the Mediterranean. It also seems naïve to think that successful political and economic reform will lead to rapidly decreasing emigration. The same processes that created the conditions for revolutionary change are also conducive to emigration. The coming-of-age of a new, educated and aspiring generation, frustrated by mass unemployment, dictatorial rule and corruption, has increased both the emigration and the revolutionary potential of Arab societies. So the idea that emigration will stop is as unlikely as the idea of a ‘mass exodus’ towards Europe (de Haas & Sigona 2012).

Nevertheless, as recent migration trends in Turkey and the migration transitions of Southern European countries have clearly shown, we cannot simply take for granted that current migration trends will persist. In addi-
tion, the data presented above undermine any assumption that the EU is surrounded by countries where there is an almost infinite source of cheap labour ready to migrate as soon as the opportunity presents itself. This assumption – which underlies popular perceptions of mounting ‘migration pressure’ (often ignoring labour demand in Europe and disregarding rapidly decreasing fertility levels in origin countries) and which fuels fears of migrants swamping the European continent – is fundamentally flawed.

First, this assumption is based on the erroneous belief that absolute poverty is the root cause of migration, ignoring the fact that the relation between development and migration is fundamentally non-linear. The above analysis has largely confirmed the transitional-migration theory proposed in the second section of this chapter. The most important emigration countries are middle-income ones located at the periphery of the expanding core of the European migration system.

Second, this assumption overlooks the significant social, demographic, economic and political transformations that countries bordering the EU to the south have experienced. These transformations, embodied in the term development, are likely to affect future emigration and immigration potential in somewhat unexpected ways.

Much depends on future economic growth in Europe, which has been the main driver of rising labour demand attracting immigrants. The economic crisis in Europe has significantly reduced inflows. Since 2010, many Southern European countries have become emigration countries. However, in the longer term, the core of the European migration system – consisting of net immigration countries – keeps on expanding, future migrants may increasingly come from more distant countries located in, for instance, West and Central Africa. Although it is notoriously difficult to make long-term predictions, in the more distant future the global demand for skilled and unskilled labour may increase due to the now global and universal decline in fertility. As more and more countries are turning into net receivers of migrants, this raises the question of where all these migrants will come from; even if there are workers interested in migrating with the eagerness people assume, it is unclear whether they want to migrate to Europe right now. The future question for European policymakers might no longer be ‘How to keep them out?’ but ‘How to attract them?’.

This turnaround in policy views is already happening for high-skilled migrants, as testified by the growing European appetite for Green Card-like point systems to attract high-skilled migrants, and the boom in student immigration. Pressing and growing labour-demand-specific sectors of EU labour markets may perhaps also lead to a similar turnaround concerning low-skilled migrants.
References


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