8.3 Cross-Cultural Epistemology

How European Sinology Became the Bridge to China’s Modern Humanities

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Introduction

European sinology since Matteo Ricci (1552-1610), founder of the Jesuit mission in China, was occupied with interpreting the Chinese classics, unpacking the learned worldview of the elite that adhered to them. However, the Swedish explorer Sven Hedin’s late-nineteenth-century rediscovery of ancient hidden cities buried along the Silk Road unleashed a new wave of sinology [Fig. 25]. The magnificent collections of Silk Road material that Paul Pelliot, Aurel Stein, and Albert Grünwedel then plundered provided European scholars with previously unknown source material that the Chinese themselves could not easily consult. Hedin’s find sparked a modern direction in sinology and inspired Western sinologists to travel east for more discoveries. In the same time it sent Chinese scholars going the opposite direction.

For a thousand years the Chinese examination system created scholars for service in the administration of the empire. The knowledge required prescribed a hierarchically ordered world based on relations and personal virtue. But in the early twentieth century the sudden fall of this two-thousand-year-old imperial system also brought the demise of this regime of knowledge. Before 1905, when the examination system was abolished, radical intellectuals had been involved in a tug of war with conservative scholars. With the May Fourth Movement political demands became clearly coupled with a cultural politics that wanted to displace everything old and Chinese. Scholars like Lu Xun and Hu Shi elevated the culture and language of the people, reforms that helped the Chinese to imagine the nation in a more Western manner. The reforms would, of course, also radically challenge the formerly exclusive position of the educated elite. With this process arrived the formation of a modern humanities based on a secular scientific study of man – academic disciplines similar to those in existence already in the West.
That many Chinese intellectuals under pressure of Western imperialism disavowed their history and tradition is understandable; but it had its dire effect on cultural heritage. The material archive of the Chinese state – the treasures, libraries, and document collections relating to the previous six hundred years of Ming and Qing rule – came under serious threat. Antique porcelain and other valuables were pawned for providing money to run the imperial household and then sold off at auctions. Eunuchs stole priceless treasures from within the vermilion walls while the last emperor himself smuggled out precious imperial objects. Even the Inner Chancery archives of the Ming and Qing dynasties were threatened. These priceless documents were stolen, sold, even used as scrap papers, until first the antiquarian, Luo Zhenyu, and then the historian Fu Sinian intervened. In these precarious times neither politicians nor intellectuals could see the value of documents that were pertaining to the history of dynastic rule. The empire had become the abject Other for the Chinese modernizers and in 1928 a member of the Republican government even tried to pass a bill to ‘Abolish the Palace Museum and sell or auction off all of the objects in the former palace in lots’. The proposal was hotly debated and a committee was set up to deal with what was regarded as the ‘illicit property’ of the former imperial house.
The New Culture Movement that raged from the years of the failed republic to the mid-1920s wanted to get rid of old China. Scholars like Gu Jiegang consequently tried to deconstruct the Chinese master narrative. But things were about to change. With the catchphrase of zhengli guogu or ‘reorganizing the national past’ a countermovement to this iconoclasm appeared. Thus China’s history became significant again for the intellectuals. To reconnect with older scholarly traditions, national studies (guoxue) institutes were established at a number of universities in the early 1920s. This ambivalent manner of both discarding and reviving the tradition is reflected also in its treatment of European sinology.

This article evaluates the role of Western sinology for the incorporation of the methodology and institutional practices of academic humanities in China. Because of a certain politics of knowledge this connection has been occluded. With American dominance in the Cold War this sinology with its tradition of philology and immersion in other cultures was supplanted with a social science-oriented area studies. For China studies the question of modernization was highlighted. First the idea was that the Western challenge set China on the path to modernization. The Vietnam War ushered in a reaction, bringing forward a similarly binary but China-centric approach seeking the roots of modernization in internal Chinese factors. Postcolonial scholarship now instead focuses on the circulation of ideas and practices inside such a colonial modernity and breaks down the binaries into a more fluid reality of cross-fertilization of ideas and approaches. However, postcolonial writers have simultaneously shared the Cold War social sciences scholarly movements’ critique of sinology, discarding it as simply part of a Western Orientalist project; racist and biased. In reality sinology served as an important epistemological bridge between cultures. European sinology was the cross-cultural space where an indigenous Asian cultural tradition could fuse with Western scientific standards, then be safely repatriated and put to service in the project of providing cultural legitimacy to a rejuvenated Chinese state.

In the following we will trace how a Chinese anxiety concerning foreign incursions escorted appreciation of the groundbreaking sinological research coming from Europe. We will then outline how this challenge was met with ‘national studies’ research centers and with scholarly organizations protesting against Western research expeditions in China. Finally we will discuss the implementing of laws on archeology and the export of antiques, as well as the significance of the Academia Sinica’s Institute of History and Philology (IHP) in returning to the Chinese scholars their lost prestige.
From European sinology to national studies

As Europeans during the disorderly 1920s were pursuing scholarly aims in the Far East young Chinese scholars were going the other way. Japan was geographically and culturally their closest choice but in the interwar era many also studied in Europe. Berlin had a thousand Chinese students in 1924; coming there not solely out of scholarly considerations but because inflation made living on a Chinese-currency scholarship relatively cheap. Others, like Liu Fu and Xu Xusheng, went to Paris, which at the time was the world’s capital for sinology.

Some of these students were to become important Chinese historians. Although starting out with natural sciences while studying in Europe they often drifted toward sinology and other areas of Oriental studies. The historian Yao Congwu studied with the sinologists Otto Franke and Eric Haenisch and also worked at the Oriental Institute in Bonn. Another remarkable historian, Chen Yinke, cooperated with the Orientalists Friedrich W.K. Mueller. Back in China, Chen became associated with the French sinologist Paul Pelliot while learning more Sanskrit from Baron Stael von Holstein. Fu Sinian, the most important of the Chinese scholars in shaping the modern humanities in China, also assisted Western sinologists. He had set out to study psychology in London but ended up studying Tibetan in Berlin. Together with Chen Yinke, Fu Sinian also took several courses with the German sinologist Herbert Franke. Eventually, just like his compatriots Chen Yinke and Yao Congwu, he returned to China as a historian.

So why were these Chinese scholars drawn to study sinology while in Europe?

The first decades of the twentieth century saw the zenith of European colonialism. With the many Western dominions in India and East Asia, Oriental studies flourished. European powers needed more knowledge about the foreign countries they were set to administer and therefore universities in the European capitals founded new positions in Asian languages and culture. The archeological sources, libraries, and archives brought from various Asian dominions helped to bring about a revival in Oriental studies. Surprisingly then, the Western metropolises of a Paris, London, and Berlin became centers for studying the East. The Asian scholars who came there looking for the essence of Western learning were simultaneously exposed to the forefront of scholarship about their own countries, cultures and civilizations.

While studying abroad many of the Chinese scholars, of course, found out how good European sinology had become. In contrast to the financially poor and institutionally isolated Chinese scholars, European sinologist had modern methods and were supported by their universities and museums at home. During the chaotic period between the fall of the empire and the full-scale Japanese invasion, Westerners also gained access to Chinese source materials. Collecting new source
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materials and reinterpreting China’s past the European sinologists became a formidable threat to native scholars committed to a nationalist cause.

The Chinese scholars finally banded together to protest against this situation. They were, however, not just opposed to Westerners conducting research in China and of their spiriting away of historical and other artifacts from the country. They were also dismayed by the treatment they received from their own government. The main reason for setting up the National Scientific Union, for example, was certainly to a large extent the dire situation of Chinese researchers themselves. Xu Xusheng describes the situation for him and his fellow scholars in the mid-1920s:

Not only did no one support them, but they were even hindered from doing research. At the same time, foreigners came and with their superior resources, took what they wanted of our research material! They forcefully removed from our country limitless amounts of rare items. If this were not stopped, then the future of our ability to undertake national studies [guoxue] would suffer inconceivable damage.16

The interest Westerners paid to China’s history had an unforeseen effect. The New Culture Movement at first strove to get rid of the Chinese tradition. Now appeared a culturalist revival, a return to the purported core of China’s civilization and a desire to rethink what actually made up this Chinese nation under threat of foreign aggression. An effort of zhengli guogu, of ‘ordering’ or ‘setting right’ of the country’s past, was launched. It appears paradoxical at first that many of the radical iconoclasts of the May Fourth Movement were involved in this project. But as Hu Shi, head of the Qinghua National Studies Institute, explains, the zhengli guogu movement wanted to ‘do research like the Western sinologists and the Japanese sinologists [zhinaxue] who had learned from the West’.17

It was the radical anarchist turned educational reformer, Cai Yuanpei, who set up the first institute for guoxue research. Right after he took position as head of China’s first university he turned to the old scholar and mentor of the last emperor, Luo Zhenyu for advice. Luo’s only suggestion was to establish an institute for the research of antiques (guwu) aimed at halting the exportation of ancient books and antiquities out of China.18 Two years later, in 1922, Cai established the first Chinese research institute ever, and it was exactly the kind of institute for national studies that Luo had requested.

The Beijing University School of National Studies that Cai Yuanpei set up was constructed around five areas. While one concerned the important archives of the Ming and Qing dynasties, all the others were on subjects where European sinologists had recently proved very successful: First was linguistics, where Bernhard Karlgren’s research on Chinese historical phonology – via ancient rhyme books and modern dialect studies – was already legendary. Second was archeol-
ogy, where Johan Gunnar Andersson had recently made the decisive discovery of the first ever known Chinese Stone Age culture. Ethnography and folk songs, in which the Frenchman Marcel Granet had excelled, became the other two fields researched in the Beijing University School of National Studies.19

This dependence on European sinology also shines through in naming practices. In translations, the center as well as its scholarly journal is denoted with the term ‘sinology’. The front page of their bulletin thus featured, below the name in Chinese, the subtitle Bulletin de l’institut de sinologie. The Beijing University School of National Studies moreover relied heavily on the assistance on European sinologists and Western institutes of Oriental studies. All except one of the advisory scholars of the institute were foreigners. Their bulletin furthermore ran a large number of path-breaking works of European sinology in Chinese translation.20

Another famous New Culture figure, Hu Shi became the director of the second-most important of these guoxue centers: the Qinghua College Institute of National Learning. Just like the Beijing University School of National Studies, this institute was run by people returning from Europe with high hopes of the nationalist movement. Avant-garde institutions like these two in Beijing were thus staffed by a small number of foreign-educated, elite intellectuals with the mission to create the China scholars of tomorrow.

In reality then, modern Chinese humanities came about – via European sinology – in the form of guoxue, or ‘national studies’. The first classes that Chen Yinke taught at the Qinghua College Institute of National Learning were on Buddhist Sanskrit texts and a bibliographical course on Western sinology. The first class in phonology that linguist Qian Xuantong gave at the Beijing University School of National Studies, in 1922 when the school was founded, relied on translations of Bernhard Karlgren’s research.21

Facing the competition from Europe, what had originally been an iconoclast movement returned to its own semi-sacred historical traditions. So it was that when research and education institutes in national studies had been set up in China even such anti-classicist scholar as Fu Sinian decided to come back home.22 His return would prove decisive for the delivery of the new Chinese humanities through the creation of the Institute of Philology and History at the newly founded Academia Sinica.23 Its first priority was to challenge the foreigners.

The Chinese humanities

One of the most important singular events in what would lead to the creation of the Academia Sinica, must have been the 1920 discovery of a Chinese Stone Age culture by Johan Gunnar Andersson [Fig. 26].24 Based on scientific meth-
ods and the search for new source material, this archeological discovery promised an ‘underground twenty-four dynastic histories’ to some and the possibility to finally reorganize China’s early history to others. But at the same time Andersson’s theory that the Chinese had come from the west greatly disturbed Chinese scholars. They themselves lacked the unique new sources that Western scholars
like Andersson possessed and could not easily dispute anything. Therefore they were helpless in front of new theories on their own civilization that scholars like Andersson brought forward.

A second, very important event in the prehistory of the Academia Sinica came with the expedition Sven Hedin and German Lufthansa tried to launch in early 1927. The Beijing University School of National Studies led a number of Chinese scholarly and culture organizations in protests against what they suspected to be an attempt to expatriate more source material related to China’s history. They finally managed to force Hedin to finance the inclusion of a number of Chinese scholars in his ten-year project. For the Chinese, this became a traveling university where for the first time indigenous scholars could learn fieldwork, which in turn gave the budding Chinese scientific community a great sense of confidence.

Only months after the protests against Hedin’s expedition, a Chinese research academy was also established. The former president of Beijing University, Cai Yuanpei, was chosen as the first director of this Academia Sinica. Cai had, as we remember, earlier set up the Beijing University School of National Studies. As all this was taking place, Fu Sinian was directing a department for history and philology at the nationalist stronghold of the Sun Yatsen University. Hearing about the Academia Sinica, Fu traveled to Shanghai to see Cai, advising him to include also an Institute for Philology and History. Fu Sinian had initially been against guoxue on the grounds that it was too concerned with textual exegesis. But as has been argued in recent scholarship, Fu was also strongly impressed by Parisian sinology. Although he regarded the greater part of the Western sinologists as charlatans, he highly admired scholars like Paul Pelliot and Bernhard Karlgren.

When Fu Sinian selected his Academia Sinica staff for an Institute of History and Philology they were all from Beijing University’s and Qinghua College’s Institutes for National Learning. So not only were the research areas that Fu Sinian choose for his section of the Academia Sinica the same as those of guoxue institutions, but the Institute of History and Philology was actually made up of people from such backgrounds as well. Chen Yinke thus took position as head of the History section and Zhao Yuanren the Philology section. Both were from the Beijing University School of National Studies. Li Ji, who came to head the important Archaeology section had worked with the American sinologist Carl Whiting Bishop but also taught at the Beijing University School of National Studies.

Under Fu Sinian’s leadership and with generous funds provided by the Nanjing government, the Institute of History and Philology became a renewed, better-funded version of the Beijing University School of National Studies. In contrast to its predecessor it was able to launch the kind of source-gathering scientific explorations that had earlier been the prerogative of Western and Japanese research.
institutions. In the distraught times Chinese scholarship found itself in the ideas of positivism and Quellenkritik had turned into an obsessive occupation with the sources themselves. Fu Sinian had been influenced by Rankean Quellenkritik as well as positivist ideas when he spent most of his time in Berlin studying Ernst Mach. He carried this reverence for the sources when he returned home and Fu’s directorship at the Academia Sinica was all about securing new sources. With the IHP of the Chinese Academy up and running, Fu Sinian managed to secure funding to enable Chinese scholars to compete with Western sinologists for access to new source material. But a second step was needed in order to limit the Europeans’ freedom to scour China for material. The Chinese scholars needed to get exclusive right to collect materials in order to research their own cultural heritage. Fu Sinian openly connected the faith of the Chinese nation with how well Chinese historians could win back the momentum by controlling the source material. If the Chinese scholars did not control the sources – which for Fu and most positivist Western historians at the time was history – then the West with its modern scientific methods and its hold on new sources, would reinterpret China’s history to their own liking. Fu Sinian expressed the fear of such a situation in the very program declaration of the Institute for History and Philology he was running for the Academia Sinica. Thus the introduction of the first issue of their Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology reads:

China is rich in sources on history and philology but the way Europeans strive to have them they might soon be difficult to access for us. Despite this we have just been sitting with arms crossed watching them getting ruined and disappear in front of our eyes. We are certainly not happy with this situation. We are certainly not appreciating how, not just any material sources, but scholarly source material is being brought out, sometimes even stolen by the Europeans. We decided to engage some fresh approaches to deal with this problem, and to secure source material. We have therefore set up this Research Institute for History and Philology.

The young and newly trained archeologist Li Ji shared the concerns of Xu Xusheng and Fu Sinian about how Europeans were acquiring precious Chinese source material. However, with his experience of working together with the Smithsonian and Carl Whiting Bishop, he centered in on the organized Western collecting of material from China. In his memoirs Li Ji thus writes the following on the foreign research organizations that had arrived in Beijing during the feeble rule of the Beiyang Army:
Forceful as they were, these organizations became increasingly unrestrained. With the sole exception of the Geological Survey these enterprises were all run by foreign research organizations. These foreigners were all richly supported, financially and materially, and they had acquired new and accurate methods. Not only did they go after and remove, bit by bit, specimens for the natural sciences but also historical, archeological, and other source material related to the human sciences fell prey to their eager attention. Determinedly, they stormed China, to investigate our language, measure our bodies, excavate our as-yet-unearthed antiques, and examine our traditional customs. These ‘scholarly sources’ are day after day ‘brought out, sometimes even stolen by the Europeans’!

In the contract that the protesting Chinese academics had forced the explorer Sven Hedin to sign, it was stated that all archeological and other material should stay in China to be studied by the Chinese. This was an important first step for the repatriation of sinology. When Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang Army regained control of China and set up a government in Nanjing, a state organization for protecting cultural heritage was also established. Named the Central Commission for the Preservation of Antiquities, it proved quite efficient in dealing with some of the well-known plunderers like Sir Aurel Stein, but many problems remained with foreign buyers, Chinese tomb raiders, and local attempts at excavation. Li Ji’s idea of coming to grips with the remaining problems was to lobby for a new law about cultural heritage and archeology. From the late 1920s he worked hard to bring about regulations to this effect, and in 1930 the ‘Legislative Yuan’ passed such a decree. The ‘Law on Protecting Antiquities’ covered historical and archeological artifacts plus fossil remains of plants and species, and it made clear that ‘everything buried in the earth, including those parts that protrude from the earth, entirely belongs to the state’.

**Conclusion**

Early-twentieth-century European sinology engaged with the Chinese tradition but in a context of modern academic humanities and furthermore based their scholarship on new sources found inside China. In this way it came to play an indispensable role in the establishment of a postimperial discipline of ‘national studies’. The national studies institutes of China were staffed with people returning from abroad and they relied on European advisers. These institutes also published the works of European sinologists for use in their teaching. The Beijing Institute of National Studies was therefore not only the first modern research in-
stitute in China, but from it – via European sinology – also arose the modern humanities as an academic discipline. It could thus be argued that modern humanities in China were not formed directly by the integration of Western learning in the form of academic disciplines like history, philosophy linguistics, etc. Instead, it built upon, and then challenged, a European sinology, which was already in itself a mix of Western and Chinese scholarship.

Fu Sinian imagined that the European sinologists had begun to despise the Chinese scholars, and therefore decided that his institute would become world-leading in Chinese studies. He furthermore argued that although the Westerners, together with Japan, excelled in Orientalist studies, the Chinese themselves, if only they could control and monopolize the sources, had a chance to reach the foreigners’ level and even control research in history, philology, and linguistics. The IHP under Fu became the synthesis of, on the one hand, a modernist iconoclastic positivism and then, on the other, the more classicist zhengli guogu movement. The IHP’s focus was on restoring the ties with the past plus protecting Chinese historical remains, and interpretations, from Western dominance. It had for the first time also at its disposal the resources and the will to carry out scientific expeditions for new source material. Thus, with Li Ji in the lead, the IHP undertook the Anyang excavations, rejecting the ‘doubting the old’ claims of Gu Jiegang, proving there had been a Shang Dynasty after all. Other archeological projects that were undertaken disputed Andersson’s theory of the western origin of the Chinese civilization.

With China under the threat of being carved up by the aggressive imperialist powers of the day its very history and cultural identity was at risk of expatriation. Source material had been shipped away en masse to Europe where Western sinologists were now chipping away at tradition to create a revised version of Chinese history. National studies was a first step in countering this trend and out of it grew the IHP. It has been argued that IHP, with its Anyang excavations, was the most successful section of the Academia Sinica. It brought back to the Chinese a national narrative based on a long unbroken history and cultural uniqueness. The IHP also launched modern humanities in China, modeled on European academic disciplines. Not least importantly, it had taken up the challenge of Western sinology, and won. The Chinese scholars had put laws in place claiming the state as the owner of archeological and other sources relevant to writing China’s history. The indigenous scholarship had at the same time modernized into a row of academic disciplines in the humanities, that soon began competing with and surpassing European sinology. No longer was China under threat of being represented scientifically by a West in sole possession of crucial source material. In 1932, after only four years in existence, Fu Sinian could therefore proudly report back to Cai Yuanpei that the IHP had achieved results that outdid that of the formerly ‘superior’ European sinologists.
Notes

3. Much ended up in the hands of Sir Percival David, who then donated it to museums in London.
4. These castrated palace servants of course had a unique access to the enormous amount of riches served inside the walls of the Forbidden City.
7. For more on this story, see Wu Ying, *Gugong chenmeng lu* (Beijing: Zijin cheng chubanshe, 2005), 148-155.
11. This short article is not the place to recapitulate that discussion in any detail. Readers are recommended the introduction to a very interesting study on the importance of the public survey for imaging the nation in China. Tong Lam, *A Passion for Facts: Social Surveys and the Construction of the Chinese Nation-State, 1900-1949* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).
16. Xu Xusheng, *Xu Xusheng xiyou riji* [A Diary of Xu Xusheng’s Travels to the West] (Yinchuan: Ningxia renmin chubanshe, 2000), 2. This situation was actually so bad that when the leading national studies scholar, the reputable Wang Guowei, committed suicide, Fu Sinian blamed his death on the poor research conditions indigenous scholars had to put up with (see Chen Yiai, *Zhongguo xiandai xueshu yanjiu*, 76). Another guoxue scholar, Chen Yinke instead saw Wang Guowei’s suicide as a proper way to mourn the shattering of the old symbolic universe and the social position it used to bring Chinese scholars. See Wen-Hsin Yeh, *The Alienated Academy: Culture and Politics in Republican China, 1919-1937* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 46.
Marcel Granet’s studies on kinship in China influenced, among others, also the renowned anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss. See Chen Yiai, Zhongguo xiandai xueshu yanjiu, 83. Paul Pelliot and Bernhard Karlgren had three articles each in the few issues published between 1922 and 1927. See Chen Yiai, Zhongguo xiandai xueshu yanjiu, 83. Paul Pelliot and Bernhard Karlgren had three articles each in the few issues published between 1922 and 1927. For more on Bernhard Karlgren, see Perry Johansson, Saluting the Yellow Emperor: A Swedish Case of Sinography (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2012), and Göran Malmqvist’s biography, Bernhard Karlgren: Portrait of a Scholar (Bethlehem, PA: Lehigh University Press, 2010).


Zhongyang yanjiu yuan, or ‘The Chinese Central Research Institute’, thus came to present itself as related to European sinology by using ‘Sinica’ instead of ‘Chinese’ in its name. See Johansson, Saluting the Yellow Emperor, or Chen Aiyi, Zhongguo xiandai xueshu yanjiu jigou de xingqi [The Rise of China’s Modern Academic and Research Institutions] (Beijing: Jiangxi Education Press, 2002), for more on this.

These matching the canonical written histories of the twenty-four dynasties of rulers. See Fiskesjö and Chen, China before China; Johansson, Saluting the Yellow Emperor, or Chen Hongbo, Zhongguo kexue kaogu, 58.


Fu later became known by the maxim, ‘No sources, no history’. See Wang Fansen, Fu Ssu-nien. However, his slogan, originally inspired of course from the French historian Charles Seignobos, has been mistranslated. Wu shiliao ji wu shixue should rather be ‘No historical sources, no study of history’.


See Edward Wang, Inventing China, or Wang Fansen, Fu Ssu-nien, for a lengthier discussion on Fu Sinian and his ideas on sources and Western sinology.


The Chinese themselves did not, Li Ji writes, recognize the value of the things foreigners were bringing out under the guise of science. It was not until the 1920s, as we have seen,
that a sense of national ownership started to take shape around the cultural heritage of China. The modern nation was still young. Only ten years earlier had the empire been toppled and the old order replaced by a republic. It would have to wait until 1924 before even the most important treasure, the belongings of the former imperial family, was taken care of properly by the state. For more on this, see Jeanette Shambaugh Elliot and David L. Shambaugh, *The Odyssey of China’s Imperial Art Treasure* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005).

But that did not solve all other problems. Li Ji grumbles in an article in *Dongfang Zazhi* in 1934 about the displaced Chinese love of antiquity. Although, he writes, the Chinese have a long tradition of loving the old (*hao gu*) they do not, like the Europeans and the Americans – and, yes, even the Japanese – know to preserve their antiquities. The trend of the last few years, he complains, was that the Chinese had been destroying archeological sites in a scale far surpassing that in any other nation. The lucrative market in antiquities was such a temptation that, many people, even scholars and those who advocated the protection of Chinese culture, became customers. He adds that people would be surprised if they knew about some of the cases he himself was familiar with. Li Ji, ‘Zhongguo kao-guxue zhi guoqu yu weilai’ [The Past and Future of Chinese Archeology], *Dongfang Zazhi* (1934).

See Karl Ernest Meyer and Shareen Blair Brysac, *Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and the Race for Empire in Central Asia* (New York: Basic Books, 2006) for a description of how Langdon Warner and Aurel Stein were hindered in their respective attempts to plunder.

The Legislative Yuan is the parliament of the Republic of China.


Fu Sinian, *Lishi yuyan yanjiusuo gongzuo zhi zhiqu*.

Wang Fansen, *Fu Ssu-nien*, 70. That the IHP was the most successful part of an Academia Sinica including all the sciences says something about the significance of the humanities in this period of China’s history.