Imams in Western Europe

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3 The making of Islamic authority in Europe

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Abstract
There is a growing body of scholarly work that addresses the transformations taking place in the ways Muslims experience, practice, and live Islam in Europe. One of the issues that have been taken up is the changing relationship between (established) religious authority and ordinary Muslims.¹ There is a growing consensus that these relations are under pressure. Older, established configurations of authority are destabilized and increasingly challenged by rival voices and practices. However, neither the position that Islamic authority is simply generated from Islamic sources or the depiction of the Islamic landscape in Europe as thoroughly fragmented and individualized properly address the question of how religious authority is produced. How does authority become acknowledged, and how is it incorporated into people’s life worlds? In this chapter, I argue that modes of religious knowledge production and conveyance do not just operate cognitively, but also involve a whole range of sensorial experiences that shape the relationship between religious practitioners and leaders.

Keywords: Islam in Europe, Islamic authority, globalization, knowledge production, lived Islam

¹ I prefer the term ‘ordinary Muslim’ over the more commonly used ‘lay Muslims’ for want of a better way to denote on the one hand those Muslims who are not religious experts or necessarily knowledgeable in matters of Islamic theology, and on the other ordinary ways of acting, acting in everyday situations. I critically engage with the dominant assumption that theological reflection is first and foremost a matter of theologians.
The institutionalization of Islam in Europe

In the fall of 1977, an ideological conflict emerged between two groups of Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands. The conflict reached an apogee when a church located in a Rotterdam neighbourhood with a relatively large proportion of Turkish immigrants put its building at the disposal of Turkish Muslims during Ramadan. Two imams were invited from Turkey to lead the ceremonies. One belonged to the Süleymanli Movement, which had already been active among Turkish Muslims in Europe for years. The other was sent by the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), the government department that regulates religious life in Turkey. The Diyanet feared that the Süleymanli Movement would gain more influence among Turkish Muslims at the time when the development of religious infrastructure in the Netherlands was gaining momentum. Both organizations claimed to speak on behalf of the majority of Turkish Muslims, so it was decided to let the attendees decide which of the two imams should lead the rest of the celebrations. The majority chose the Diyanet imam. Afterwards a debate broke out about how to interpret this choice. For Diyanet, it was a clear sign that the majority of Turkish Muslims opted for the official version of Islam promoted by the Turkish state – or at least a sign that there would be no major objection against the further involvement of Diyanet in religious affairs in Europe (Sunier, 1996). Similar conflicts also emerged in other European countries about the representation and guidance of Turkish Muslims. Soon after this event, the Diyanet’s supporters founded the Islamic Association for Cultural and Social Guidance of Turks. One of the objectives was to maintain contact with the Diyanet in Turkey, which would not only provide imams for Turkish mosques in Europe, but also issue religious material, organize the pilgrimage to Mecca, and provide a whole range of other services for Muslims in the diaspora.2

Around 1983, Diyanet signed agreements with a number of European governments to send imams for a designated period, whose salaries the Turkish government would pay. The need for trained religious personnel among the quickly growing Turkish migrant community was one of the most pressing issues at that time. Although regular labour immigration had already been stopped for a number of years, these ‘Diyanet imams’ were exempt from the general immigration restrictions because of their special capacities. After serving a certain number of years, they would be replaced by new ones.

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2 See Sunier and Landman (2015) for a more elaborate analysis of the Turkish Islamic landscape.
By investing in the institutionalization of Islam in Europe and supporting the local initiatives of the mosque communities, Diyanet and the Turkish government made a very clever strategic move. The majority of Muslims in Europe still maintained strong ties with their country of origin and were relatively poor. The decision to financially support the building of the Islamic religious infrastructure in Europe gave Diyanet a very strong bargaining position in relation to rival movements, which had to organize their own religious services.

The reasons for Turkish organizations to extend or to transfer activities to Europe were manifold and differed from organization to organization. In Turkey, the state control of religious affairs was very strict, and the constitutional prohibition on using religion as a political tool left little room for religious organizations. In Europe, the constitutional freedom of religion provided much better opportunities (Sunier and Landman, 2015, p. 14). Opposition groups tried to escape state repression and the ever-stricter measures to control dissident religious activity by fleeing to Europe. The state-controlled Islam responded by investing in European activities.

Others considered the growing number of Turkish migrants in Europe an appropriate field to increase their influence. The largest actors were the Süleymanlis, the Milli Görüş, and the Diyanet, but Turkish nationalist parties also became active in the European scene. These actors struggled for control over the existing mosque associations, inviting them to join the umbrella organizations they had established. This often led to the fusion and fission of various groups, adding to the dynamics of organizational developments (Akgönül, 2005; Canatan, 2001; Kühle, 2012; Landman, 1992; Maréchal and El Asri, 2012; Sunier and Landman, 2015; Yükleyen, 2012). The Nurcu Movement and its offshoot Gülen Movement also extended their network to Europe, but chose to focus on knowledge acquisition and study rather than competing for the control of mosques. As a result of this competition, the institutionalization of Turkish Islam in Europe evolved relatively quickly. In the course of the 1980s the Turkish landscape was more or less accomplished.

The case of the Rotterdam community described at the beginning of this chapter can be simply explained as an example of a fierce ideological struggle for influence over the rank-and-file between rival Islamic movements not particularly unique among Turkish Muslims, with only very limited relevance for how ordinary Muslims practice their religion. In this particular case, the common argument was that the majority of Muslims in the 1970s and 1980s had a rural background and were therefore not familiar with the ideological struggles taking place in Turkish cities. They simply wanted good and cheap accommodation.
Such an explanation assumes that the Islamic (Turkish in this case) landscape in Europe was simply a copy of the situation in the countries of origin. I question that perspective. Patterns of settlement and institutionalization and negotiations with local authorities about religious accommodation are of course important factors that contributed to the shaping of Islam under migrant conditions. However, this case was first and foremost a struggle about religious authority and legitimacy in new circumstances. In many studies that address the processes of institutionalization, religious authority seems to be taken as self-evident or is not even mentioned at all (e.g., Laurence, 2012; Maussen, 2006; Mügge, 2010; Rath, Penninx, Groenendijk, and Meyer, 2001; Shadid and Van Koningsveld, 2008). I argue that, first, the making of religious authority is a decisive factor in the way Islam takes shape – especially under new and changing circumstances and in times of rapid societal change. Second, I argue that ordinary Muslims play a crucial role in the making and un-making of religious authority.

2 Authenticating religious authority

Let me first ponder the two concepts that I have introduced here: ‘religious authority’ and ‘ordinary Muslims’. ‘Religious authority’ refers to theological legitimacy and persuasive powers (Chaves, 2003), and is much broader than leadership. It is a domain where negotiation and power are central constituting processes and where tensions – but also innovations – in Muslim communities become manifest (Volpi and Turner, 2007). It is commonly accepted that modernization, globalization, and the emergence of the modern mass media have unsettled traditional religious authority (Caeiro, 2010; Mandaville, 2007; Masud, Salvatore, and Van Bruinessen, 2009; Salvatore, 2006, 2007; Van Bruinessen, 2003). The modern mass media has allowed a tremendous increase in the number of voices in the public sphere (De Koning, 2008; Eickelman and Anderson, 2003). This shift has been referred to as the fragmentation and pluralization of religious authority and knowledge production; it has also affected Islamic authority. It can be observed throughout the Muslim world, but probably most explicitly in Europe. However, to refer to these developments in terms of the fragmentation of authority is only partly true. As Peter Mandaville rightly argues:

The tacit normative undercurrent within this line of analysis has often been the idea that such changes represent a positive and progressive ‘democratization’ of knowledge production and reception in Islam, with
Muslims increasingly reshaping religion with their own hands (rather than relying on ‘crusty’ clerics) and willing to offer these new formulations to critical consumers within the market of the public sphere. Yet it should be obvious that the mere fact alone of more people being able to serve up a wider range of ideas about religion – that is, a widening of the public sphere – does not in itself produce more pluralistic (in the sense of being more tolerant or open-ended) knowledge. (2007, p. 102)

In many studies of contemporary religious change and renewal there is a tendency to consider religious authority as an external normative force located in the domain of conformity, power, and obligation, which is set against the domain of spirituality, authenticity, individualization, and personal subjectivity – a distinction much in line with Charles Taylor’s ‘subjective turn’ (Taylor, 2002).

But although the individual search for knowledge may certainly have contributed to the fragmentation of authority, this does not necessarily mean that authority has faded or become irrelevant. New forms of acquiring knowledge and new (lay) preachers may contribute to fragmentation, but they do not replace existing religious authorities altogether; rather, they are new players on the religious market alongside other religious specialists. As Daan Beekers shows, religious subjectivation is not just an individual process of self-fulfilment, the victory of individual religious agency over submission to an external religious authority. Subjectivation also entails a process of subjection to religious authority, a quest for truth. This is what he calls a ‘Foucauldian understanding of subjectivation’ (Beekers, 2015, p. 139). It should be emphasized that subjection to religious authority (human or otherwise) does not mean unconditional and unquestioning submission to a certain regime of truth.

Religious authority is not just a normative external force vested in established institutions, religious scholarship, or religious sources that ordinary believers either submit to or reject. Rather, as George Husinger (1961) has reminded us, a theological utterance and its application are inextricably linked to each other and cannot be separated. Religious texts are mute, unless they have an audience and are applied and interpreted. Talal Asad has argued:

That enquiry, broadly speaking, has to do with the theme of power and religion, not merely in the sense in which political interests have used religion to justify a given social order or to challenge and change it (an important question in itself) but in the sense in which power constructs
What is at stake here is the contextuality of authority and knowledge production in what Michael Lambek calls a ‘political economy of knowledge’: ‘How are we to characterize the order to which people submit? Where is the locus of power?’ (Lambek, 1990, p. 28). I define (the making of) religious authority as an ongoing process of the authentication and production of religious knowledge. This authentication process is inextricably linked with legitimacy and persuasion.

Making religious authority is a constant dynamic; it is not just the imposition of normative frames onto ordinary believers, but also bottom-up critical reflection on authoritative frames. These reflections are related to the everyday lives and experiences of ‘ordinary Muslims’. ‘Everyday Islam’, ‘lived Islam’, and ‘ordinary Muslims’ all refer to an emerging scholarly field in the study of religion and an epistemological and methodological shift from institution to practice. ‘Ordinary’ denotes two things: Muslims who are not religious experts; and quotidian activities, practices, and experiences. ‘Everyday religion’ addresses the bottom-up experiences and religious practices of people of faith. The focus on everyday experiences, ordinary ethics, and everyday religion postulates that theologies are not made exclusively in official venues by religious experts, but at a multiplicity of places and occasions and not only by experts. ‘Expert religion’ is, then, a specific domain of activity and reasoning, to be distinguished from the no less important religious activities of non-experts (Davie, 2006, p. 274). Samuli Schielke and Liza Debevec (2012) draw on Michel De Certeau’s (1984) notion of the everyday as the domain where ordinary Muslims confront the order and discipline of powerful institutions. ‘Everyday Islam’ brings back the agency of ordinary Muslims (Bracke, 2008; Mahmood, 2005), who practice ‘tactical religion’ as a domain of creativity and innovation that is in constant interaction with the dominant ‘strategic religion’, which is ‘constantly engaged in operations to delimit and guard its sacred spaces’ (Woodhead, 2013, p. 16). In short, ‘ordinary Muslims’ and ‘everyday Islam’ refer to a perspective and category of practices that is less visible, but can be innovative and even transformative.

Skimming the recent literature that operates the concept of ‘everyday Islam’ or ‘lived Islam’, however, it seems too often be too broad and hardly focused on the ethical and normative dimensions of how Islam is lived and experienced in daily situations. ‘Lived Islam’ tends to become shorthand for the things done by people whom we generically call Muslims. According to this definition, an individual performing his or her religious duties is as much
‘lived Islam’ as the practice of a football team made up of people with an Islamic background. In other words, there is a tendency to categorize the activities and views of people with Islamic backgrounds as Islamic without any thorough conceptual underpinning. I would, in certain circumstances, qualify both activities as Islamic – but not because they are performed by ‘Muslims’. Do we use the term ‘Muslim’ generically, or does it have specific (religious or cultural) connotations? Are Muslims’ practices different from those of non-Muslims? Is it a cultural category? Or are Muslims the people who practice a religion? The way we categorize people has crucial methodological implications because it determines where and how we observe, what we include, and what we leave out in our observations. We also need to not distinguish the acts, practices, and convictions of Muslims on the basis of *a priori* ethical criteria. We need to not distinguish between the practices of people with faith and those of people with only Islamic backgrounds; rather, we have to critically and rigorously address the ethical issues that are at stake and how people reflect on them.

Different experiences lead to different interpretations of the same normative frames. When people find themselves in situations in which authoritative scripts are no longer self-evident or when a moral breakdown occurs, transformation is likely to follow. As Jarrett Zigon argues, ethics is always about stepping into an uncanny situation and back again into the unreflective comfort of the familiar. ‘But this return from the ethical moment is never a return to the same unreflective moral dispositions. [...] It is in the moment of breakdown, then, that it can be said that people work on themselves, and in so doing, alter their very way of being-in-the-world’ (Zigon, 2007, p. 138, my emphasis). Two Muslims, one living all of his or her life in a tiny, remote village, the other in a big city in Europe, may refer to the same normative principles, but they have built up completely different ethical reference schemes. If one shares their experiences with others – a process that has been altered tremendously due to the use of modern media – we come closer to a reflection on the very authoritative status quo. Critical reflection may generate inventiveness and renewal, and will impact religious authentication, the social process that confers normative authority on persons, rules, or institutions.

3 A political economy of religious knowledge

The Islamic landscape in Europe towards the end of the 1980s was formed by the configuration of power amongst Muslims, host countries’ policies on migration and integration, and the relationship between the states and
religion (see Laurence, Part I). The general observer of the organizational landscape of Muslims in Europe about three decades ago would probably conclude that the picture was clear and simple: there were Muslims with strong familial ties back home; religious practices were rooted firmly in their countries of origin; and mosques were run by Muslim organizations that had origins in the home countries, and were often controlled from a headquarters there as well. Political and doctrinal dividing lines followed a similar pattern, and religious authority was firmly in the hands of the traditional ulama, who were often sent from the home countries. Islamic observances and religious life revolved around the mosque and were practiced in familial and communal networks based on a common origin. Leadership and sources of religious authority were believed to self-evidently emanate from religious doctrine.

Since the vast majority of Muslims in European countries have a migrant background, issues of integration, minoritization, and not least political and cultural controversies largely determine how political decision-making evolves and how religious freedom and religious equality take shape. Until the end of the 1970s, the cultural and religious background of migrants did not play a significant role in debates about their position in society. Migrants were defined in terms of their ethnic origin, but this had no political consequences. Migrants were primarily seen as members of a temporary labour force who would return to their countries of origin. Policies across Europe were based on this idea of temporariness. The creation of religious facilities was therefore seen as something that should be left solely to private initiatives. No special policies were needed, as it was believed to be a self-regulating process (Nielsen, 1992; Rath, Penninx, Groenendijk, and Meyer, 2001; Sunier, 1996).

Towards the end of the 1970s, some important developments took place. The number of immigrants increased considerably, mainly through family reunions. These families settled in the old quarters of the main town centres and altered the urban landscape considerably. Although returning to their country of origin was still the intention of the vast majority of Muslims, their actual return was postponed. Many migrants could not afford to return home. As a consequence, the need for religious facilities increased, especially the need for qualified religious personnel (Abadan-Unat, 2011; Landman, 1992). Towards the beginning of the 1980s, governments acknowledged that the majority of the migrants were planning to stay permanently. In some countries this resulted in elaborate programmes to integrate migrants into the host countries; in other countries, it was basically through general legislation that integration would take place. The gradual transformation from migrants to
settlers also resulted in a stronger emphasis on their cultural backgrounds. Governments realized that migrants brought their cultural and religious backgrounds with them. This ‘culturalization’ process would intensify in the 1990s and 2000s (Duyvendak, Tonkens, and Hurenkamp, 2010).

Across Europe, the emerging Islamic organizations were increasingly perceived as organizations for migrants. This was certainly not unfavourable for Islamic organizations, as it provided the political legitimization to set up an Islamic infrastructure. But a seemingly opposite effect took place at the same time. Developments in the Islamic world such as the revolution in Iran (1979) and the assassination of the Egyptian president Sadat (1981) resulted in the ‘Islamization’ of migrants: the over-emphasis on the religious background of migrants as an explanation for their moods and motivations. Migrants with completely different backgrounds were lumped together under the heading of ‘Muslim culture’. Although the position of migrants was the result of a complex interplay of economic, social, political, and ideological factors, assumptions about the nature of Islam became a dominant explanatory factor. Towards the end of the 1980s, this discursive transformation was almost fully accomplished and would further develop in the 1990s and 2000s.

One of the consequences of the ‘Islamization’ of policy discourses was the emergence of a specific type of leadership among Muslims. These leaders had lived in Europe for quite some time, knew the language and society of residence quite well, and acted as intermediaries between Muslim migrants and the host society. They were entrepreneurs rather than ‘ideologists’, and were oriented towards mobilizing as many resources as possible. They emphasized that Islamic organizations should be considered the main forms of ‘self-organization’ among migrants. These leaders increasingly took part in societal discussions about the position of migrants, thereby influencing the ways the situation was understood and assessed. They represented the Muslim populations in the countries of residence and articulated Muslim needs and what it meant to be Muslim in a non-Islamic society. By stressing the ‘foreign’ aspect of Islam as part of the cultural heritage of a specific group of migrants, they were able to convince policymakers that certain facilities were necessary. What these leaders were in fact emphasizing was the unique character of this cultural and religious heritage, and the fact that they were the only ones who had access to these communities. This ‘enclavization’ of culture and religion impacted how religious authority was produced and reconfirmed. The almost complete conflation of religion and migrant culture made Islam into a ‘foreign’ element, and reinforced the idea of the exceptional position of Islam and that religious authority was predominantly a matter of the countries of origin.
In the course of the 1990s, many Muslim organizations had made a fundamental shift in their political agendas. This was mainly the result of the increasing influence of a younger generation and the 'cognitive shift' from an orientation towards the countries of origin into a focus on the host country (Sunier, 1996). There were two main reasons for this shift: the increasing upward mobility of Muslims, and the fundamental transformation of Muslims from migrants to permanent residents in European societies. From organizations of ‘foreigners’, they developed into organizations that asked for a place in society as Muslim citizens. Whereas in the 1980s the ‘migrantization’ of Muslims turned out to be an effective strategy, leaders now had to convince society that there was no fundamental contradiction between being Muslim and being a European citizen. Many young leaders considered ‘migrantization’ a weak bid, as it emphasized the role of Muslims as victims and outsiders. As to religion many spokespersons adopted a strategy of pillarization. As individual citizens migrants should integrate into society, but as Muslims they should have the right to set up their own institutions just as Catholics and Protestants do. This shift paralleled the emerging discussion about the place of Islam in European nation-states and the gradual ‘racialization’ of Islam (Silverstein, 2005).

In short, the developments of the last two decades have distorted the religious life of Muslims in Europe and unsettled power relations. Taking a closer look at the changes, we can observe two (seemingly contradictory) developments. On the one hand, the Islamic landscape in Europe has increasingly operated according to local dynamics and become less dependent on agents in the countries of origin to determine their agendas. On the other, a relatively wealthy, well-educated, and mobile middle class has emerged among Muslims in Europe. Due to the rapid spread of the modern mass media, transnational networks have increased, producing a multiplicity of forms and modes through which Muslims sustain relations across borders. Islamic organizations in Europe have to resort to other means than the ‘old’ emotional, familial, and financial bonds that once linked migrant communities with their country and region of origin. Other Islamic movements are also changing their strategies, and new players have emerged. Today we find a wide array of different organizational patterns and networks operating simultaneously among Muslims.

While the countries of origin used to be the dominant guiding factor in determining the development of organized Islam among migrants in Europe, the changing situation has seriously undermined this dominance. The contemporary landscape of European Islam must be approached as a complex multi-polar and multi-directional field, in which the modern mass media and socio-economic developments are crucial co-shaping factors.
When we look at the present-day Islamic landscape in Europe, the picture is complex. Organizations have changed or reformulated their policies and activities. The number of mosques and religious associations that are not organized along ethnic lines has increased sharply. A considerable number of young people no longer go to ordinary ethnicity-based mosques or have abandoned Islam altogether, while others opt for more radical variants of Islam or explore new modes and expressions of religiosity and piety. This has had a tremendous impact on the established ways of conveying religious knowledge. Traditional sources of religious authority have come under pressure; there is an enormous increase of semi-religious activities and practices that do not fit the picture of ‘mainstream’ religion.

4 Islamic authority: Future prospects

As I stated above, the fragmentation of religious authority and knowledge production should not be seen as a shorthand for the process of individualization, a ‘copy-paste’ or ‘do-it-yourself’ Islam under the influence of an ongoing secularization process (Cesari, 2004). Young Muslims also seek guidance and develop new notions of belonging. However, the circumstances and conditions in which this takes place are fundamentally different from those in a migration context. Consequently, the sources for the making and re-making of religious authority have also changed. Today the sources of Islamic authority are more diverse and unstable than ever before; modernization, the changing characteristics of migration, globalization, and the emergence of the modern mass media have unsettled traditional religious authority. The multiplicity of public voices has affected the making of Islamic authority in European countries. The authoritative frames and institutional settings that emerged in the early years of migration are still functioning, but their legitimacy is questioned by a growing number of Muslims born and raised in Europe. A wide variety of issues of faith that used to be undisputed are now brought into question. Religious authority has to be reconfirmed and reproduced continuously, and in contemporary media-saturated societies it increasingly needs to respond to the forms of auratic and charismatic power found in the mass media. In most studies that deal explicitly with doctrinal issues, Islamic leaders and organizational arrangements – in short, established institutional settings – are the principal focus. I contend that the role of ordinary Muslims in the making of religious authority and leadership is a crucial, but neglected venue of inquiry.
This is of course not a uniquely Islamic phenomenon. The increasing diversification and multiplication of religious audiences, the growing competition for followers, and the emergence of religious marketplaces have changed how religious practitioners perceive religious authority. This should not be understood in the narrow sense of a market system of demand and supply, where people make choices based on rational calculations of profit. Instead it should be understood more loosely, in the sense of a field of competition for audiences and followers who can be attracted by a strong public presence and seducing and convincing rhetoric, performance, and imagery. The older ‘legitimized’ and established categories of authority erode, and the capacity to disseminate specific understandings of religious practices and beliefs become increasingly based upon rhetoric, performances, and visual events (image bites). Miranda Klaver (2011) showed how ‘pastorpreneurs’ in the Pentecostal church have developed a mode of authority in which they combine entrepreneurial business skills with an orthodox Christian message, fostering a neo-Pentecostal style of spirituality. In this case, the new media create, inform, and facilitate a particular mode of leadership built upon the ‘media-savviness’ of the local preacher.

The growth of the modern mass media has produced new forms of religious leadership and has fundamentally changed the modes through which religious messages are communicated and disseminated. Modern mass media has become a serious challenge to traditional forms of Islamic authority, mainly because it has allowed a tremendous increase in the number of voices in the public sphere (Schulz, 2006; see also Warner, 2002, p. 50). Traditional forms of religious learning are complemented and increasingly challenged by ‘rival and alternative articulations of belief and practice’ (Eickelman and Anderson, 2003). New technologies of communication circumvent traditional centres of learning and address new publics – mainly young Muslims in urban centres. They engage with parts of the public sphere that are considered secularized. The complexities of the modern urban life in which the majority of young Muslims live require specific competences. Robert Orsi argues that:

[they] arise out of the complex desires, needs, and fears of many different people who have come to cities by choice or compulsion (or both), and who find themselves intersecting with unexpected others (and with

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3 As Meyer and Moors argue: ‘[new forms of mediation not only create] new styles of self-representation, but also pinpoint new forms of religious experience that cast believers as spectators, spectacles as miracles, and God’s blessing as prosperity’ (2006, p. 9).
unexpected experiences of their own subjectivities) on a complex field and in a protean physical landscape that insists on itself with particular intensity. (2005, p. 45)

They are both preachers and simultaneously opinion leaders – public figures that act upon certain situations and events. Sometimes they emerge from within the ranks of organizations, and in the course of becoming publicly known, they tend to detach from their original organizational bedrock and become free-floating public figures. They deliver speeches, appear in the media to comment on events, and in some cases become the centre of new devotional practices and beliefs. Sometimes these figures are genuine celebrities with fans rather than adherents. Their persuasive qualities emanate from a particular style of address and presentation (Meyer, 2006).

Performative styles, aesthetics, sensorial experiences and contextual factors are as important as discursive content to grasp the prominence of religious leadership (Schulz, 2006, p. 212). Leadership shifts from mere representation of a group to a form where the religious message and the representative’s presence merge in particular and interdependent ways. The Islamic leader becomes part of the religious experience (Gräf and Skovgaard-Petersen, 2009; see also De Witte, 2008). New forms of religious mediation also constitute new audiences (Hirschkind, 2012, p. 5). These audiences consist of relatively unstable overlapping constituencies that have no institutional ties to leaders; similarly, there is no sharp distinction between opinion leaders, entrepreneurs, brokers, priests, stakeholders, celebrities, and politicians. Where these roles used to be separated, they are increasingly merging. They preach, but also deliver speeches, appear on television, take part in debates, operate websites, and make use of social media (see Boender and De Ruiter, Part I). There is no sharp distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim, religious and non-religious, and political and non-political spheres. It is precisely their elusiveness, in combination with the fact they do not correspond to the image of the traditional imam, that makes them suspect in the eyes of many politicians. For this reason, much of the research on Islamic leadership treats them as a potential danger (Niblett, 2006).

In the light of these developments, the question is how and in what direction the Islamic landscape of Europe will develop. The fragmentation process has prompted some observers to call for a European centre of religious authority to counter the ever-increasing, un-coerced and deregulated playing field in which these new preachers operate (see Galguera, Part II). Others have reflected on the development of fiqh for Muslims in minority
situations (Al-Alwani, 2004; see also Auda, Part I), or the installation of 
sharia courts to deal with questions of Islamic law and morality of ordinary 
Muslims. What would be the main constituents of a ‘European imamate’?

More generally, the question of why fragmentation is considered problematic 
arises. Governments no doubt fear a loss of control, as do established centres 
of religious authority, but why do countries need interlocutors who will speak 
on behalf of as many Muslims as possible? And why do the spokespersons of 
established Islamic institutions express worry about the loss of control over 
a growing proportion of the Muslim population? It is clear that there is a 
somewhat odd common interest between governments and religious elites in a 
‘domesticated Islam’. Elsewhere I have discussed this term to understand how 
and why European governments attempt to domesticate religious practices 
and institutions (Sunier, 2014; see also Bowen, 2004; Humphrey, 2009; Sunier, 
2009). John Bowen uses this term to come to grips with the ‘structural problem 
of articulating a global religious field onto a self-consciously bounded French 
nation-state’. He shows how the strategies through which the French state 
tries to create ‘domesticated forms of Islam’ imply a set of dilemmas regarding 
the control of transnational religious communities (Bowen, 2004, pp. 43-44). 
These dilemmas revolve around three basic issues: the behaviour of Muslims, 
control of the republic, and adaptation of Islamic norms to France.

This is not unique to Islam. The issue of loyalty has been raised in the 
case of other transnational religions as well (see Baker, 1997; Casanova, 1994; 
Sunier, 2004). However, while ‘domestication’ or the gradual rooting of a 
once-imported religion has usually been described as an organic process 
that takes years, in the case of Islam it has become a state project with 
a considerable sense of urgency. Loyalty has to be enforced rather than 
developed organically. The same occurs with respect to religious authority. 
Instead of facilitating the recasting of the religious landscape, European 
governments increasingly interfere in religious issues, thereby violating 
their own principle of the separation of religion and state.

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