Introduction

Rhetorical Citizenship as a Conceptual Frame: What We Talk About When We Talk About Rhetorical Citizenship

CHRISTIAN KOCK AND LISA VILLADSEN

Under the heading “Rhetoric in Society” scholars have met four times: in Aalborg, Denmark; Leiden, The Netherlands; Antwerp, Belgium; and Copenhagen, Denmark. These events arguably make up the first series of rhetoric conferences on European soil. This volume is a manifest indication of the increasing interest this topic attracts in Europe and beyond. We welcome this growing attention to the role of rhetoric in public life, but for the purposes of constructive scholarly exchange we also felt the need to delimit the notion of “rhetoric in society” in selecting a theme for RiS4, the conference on which this book is based. Hence, we took rhetorician Gerard Hauser’s words to heart: “A public’s essential characteristic is its shared activity of exchanging opinion. Put differently, publics do not exist as entities, but as processes; their collective reasoning is not defined by abstract reflection but by practical judgment; their awareness of issues is not philosophical but eventful” (1999, p. 64; emphasis in original). This creative, collective, and processual understanding of rhetoric’s place in society struck us as highly resonant with the concept of rhetorical citizenship, which we had worked with earlier. By choosing “Contemporary Rhetorical Citizenship: Purposes, Practices, and Perspectives” as the theme of the RiS4 conference, we hoped to learn more about how colleagues near and far would challenge, develop, or make use of this notion to conceptualize the discursive, symbolic, and otherwise participatory aspects of civic life.

Since public discourse should not be studied merely as a theoretical or idealized notion the conference theme also called for scholarly endeavors in accounting for and critiquing actual practices. Focusing on how citizens actually engage each other across various forms of public fora allows us to consider both macro and micro practices – always with an eye to the significance
for the individuals involved. For example, what forms of participation does a particular discursive phenomenon encourage – and by whom? How are speaking positions allotted and organized? What discursive norms inform a particular forum? What possibilities – and obstacles – are there for “ordinary” citizens to engage in public discourse? How do individuals come to see themselves as legitimate “voices” in public debate – and is there any sign of resonance? How does one assess arguments presented on public issues?

While we think that rhetoric has something valuable to contribute to the study of such questions, it cannot possibly do the work alone. Exploring rhetorical citizenship and fleshing out the concept should, we believe, be a much wider, cross-disciplinary scholarly project including political scientists, media scholars, philosophers, and discourse analysts – to mention just a few.

The array of papers in this book reflects the breadth of what the notion of rhetorical citizenship can cover and subsume as well as its limits. In this introduction, we open with some comments on the scope and relevance of the concept, and then lay out the structure of the book and the various ways in which its chapters relate to the theme of rhetorical citizenship and each other.

Rhetorical citizenship as a conceptual frame

Rhetorical citizenship was from the beginning meant as an umbrella term for studying what rhetoricians Robert Asen and Dan Brouwer call “modalities” of public engagement (2010). While we maintain an interest in more traditional public and political debate, we want to heed Asen’s call to attend to the “fluid, multimodal, and quotidian enactments of citizenship in a multiple public sphere” (p. 191) where democracy is seen more as a “guiding spirit that informs human interaction” than a “set of institutions or specific acts” (p. 196). In our conceptualization, rhetorical citizenship may be theoretically accessed via the notion of rhetorical agency, i.e., citizens’ possibilities for gaining access to and influencing civic life through symbolic action; or it may be embraced from a focus on how people may be involved with, and evaluate, public rhetoric – not as participants, but as recipients. We think it important to maintain this dual focus on what one might call, respectively, the participatory and the receptive aspects of civic interaction.

It bears underscoring that rhetorical citizenship is not a new idea (and not even a new term). The notion that rhetoric is what makes civilized society possible goes back to the ancients, and many great thinkers and scholars have
prepared the way for thinking of citizenship as something that is, at least in part, discursively or symbolically constituted. Also, plenty of theorists have written about how citizenship is not just a formal or rights-based category but also a more qualitative, participatory process. Thus, we see rhetorical citizenship as a conceptual frame accentuating the fact that legal rights, privileges and material conditions are not the only constituents of citizenship; discourse that takes place between citizens is arguably more basic to what it means to be a citizen.

With this conceptual assumption it becomes natural to wish for a research platform that allows different strands of rhetorical scholarship to come into contact, including studies in public argumentation and deliberation on the one hand and studies in rhetorical agency on the other. At best, such efforts can enrich each other. Whereas argument and deliberation theories tend to rely on normative standards that are often pure and clinical, rhetorical agency theory for its part could sometimes do with more conceptual precision. In any case either might benefit from being brought into contact with the other. For example, argumentation studies and deliberative democracy theory might look more at real and less-than-ideal practices, and rhetorical agency theory might be more systematically applied and exemplified in case studies with an eye to evaluation. If not synthesis, there might be synergy. Complementary strengths and perspectives might coalesce in a common pursuit.

To take rhetorical citizenship as one’s conceptual frame in scholarship has a descriptive and a normative side, and its purpose is ultimately critical, as in any other kind of rhetorical criticism. But the focus is less on what a particular utterance is like, or how effective it is, but more on how suited it is to contribute to constructive civic interaction. The late rhetorician Thomas Farrell defined the constructive potential of rhetoric, which again is the basis for a normative approach, by saying that rhetoric builds not on “an a priori validity claim in advance of speech” - rather, “rhetorical practice enacts the norms of propriety collaboratively with interested others” (1991, p. 200; emphasis in the original). More specifically, he argued, “important civic qualities – such as civic friendship, a sense of social justice – are actively cultivated through excellence in rhetorical practice” (p. 187). This line of thought echoes that of founding rhetorical thinkers like Isocrates and Cicero who believed that human societies could not have been built and sustained without rhetoric; and recently, Robert Danisch (2012) has maintained that the sophists, from Protagoras on, saw rhetoric as a “prudential pragmatism” and taught it to equip citizens to participate in their polity. If this is so, then
citizenship inherently has a rhetorical side. And rhetoric is not merely persuasion in a narrow sense, but in fact a form of society building.

The place of rhetoric and rhetorical criticism, constructive or otherwise, in society and civic life is addressed below by Chaput, Mifsud, and Zarefsky in their respective chapters. At a theoretical level, Chaput interrogates the implications of the metaphors we use to conceptualize democracy: commodity and the common. Mifsud focuses on Aristotle’s notion of the audience as “simple judges” and argues that it represents an archaic concept of citizenship, based on mutual sympathy, deeper than the Rhetoric’s more technical notion of persuasion. The potential societal consequences of rhetorical criticism of public discourse are the topic of Zarefsky’s chapter. He asks if rhetorical criticism may have a degenerative effect by virtue of the risk it entails for cultivating cynicism and systematic suspicion. The study of individual rhetors’ utterances has different levels. Most fundamentally, there is a descriptive element in simply mapping how rhetors, whether elite or “common,” actually present arguments or positions in the public realm.

In this volume, we have included case studies of various types of discursive practices, from the large public hearings in three states in the US on same-sex marriage, studied by Karen Tracy, to Gene Navera’s cross-presidential study of the evolving uses made of the concept of “people power” in Philippine national politics, to Carolyne Lee and Judy Burnside-Lawry’s study of small group conversations as breeding grounds for rhetorical citizenship. Kuroiwa-Lewis’ and van Belle’s chapters both focus on individual rhetors’ conceptions of civic cohesion and division. While Kuroiwa-Lewis’ reading of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s rhetoric on taxes as a collective social responsibility shows how FDR attempts to create moral consensus around a contested political topic, van Belle’s study focuses on the Dutch immigrant poet Bouzza’s embrace of polarization as a means of igniting public debate.

Provocation to reflect on social membership and civic norms of communication is also the theme of Olmos’ critical analysis of the Rico affair in Spain, named after a a well-known intellectual, accused of deceiving the public regarding his status as a smoker in a debate on smoking bans.

Olmos’ study ventures the step from analytic criticism toward a normative assessment of how well a rhetor has performed in a debate, and how that debate might more profitably have continued. Such analyses, which necessarily imply norms of rhetorical merit, may lead to questions about how rhetors’ various practices reflect ruling discursive norms. By examining
these norms, whether they are recognized or not, one has a better basis for critique – one that takes into account the ruling doxai and social and other constraints, which can sometimes be at odds with more abstract idealizations of civic discourse. Such grounded criticism is, we believe, a meaningful supplement to existing cross-disciplinary scholarship on citizenship, which often is either primarily theoretical or focused on greater trends and quantifiable generalizations. Case studies are useful in at least two respects: first, they are useful for pedagogical purposes because they are concrete and thus easy to remember. Second, detailed analysis can further nuanced understanding, regardless of whether the analyzed artefact is representative of many or somehow odd or marginal. Whether under the aegis of rhetorical agency or not, rhetorical critics of, e.g., minority and women’s rhetoric have thus expanded our appreciation of the multiple ways in which rhetorical citizenship is manifested. Hannken-Illjes’ study of the celebration of trees as concrete material entities in a controversy over the new train station in Stuttgart is one such example of how social protest argumentation displays an expanded understanding of the stakeholders in the controversy and their means of symbolic expression. Similarly, Goggin’s study of “yarn bombing” as a protest form with global appeal illustrates how citizens, whether anonymously or not, contribute to the array of symbolic expressions inviting critical reflection on civic issues.

So, thinking of rhetorical citizenship becomes an impetus for forging more explicit links between particular utterances and their role in the maintenance and development of civic life. This may give renewed emphasis to the critical and social potential of rhetoric by teaching students to appreciate that the way we “do” citizenship discursively and the way we talk about society are both constitutive of and influential on what civic society is and how it develops.

**Rhetorical citizenship: participatory and receptive**

Rhetorical Citizenship as a conceptual frame emphasizes the fact that laws, rights, and material conditions are not the only constituents of citizenship; discourse broadly conceived among citizens (in other words: rhetoric in society) is arguably just as important. The concept unites under one heading citizens’ own discursive exchanges, in public or in private conversation, i.e., the active or participatory aspect of rhetorical citizenship, and the public discourse of which citizens are recipients. On a more fundamental level Thomas Farrell described this as “a dual sense of constraint and opportunity” (1991,
p. 199). With this bi-focal sensibility, Farrell wanted to capture the creative tension of customary practice on the one hand and on the other the inevitable uncertainty with regard to the constraints of the particular situation. Together, these competing forces explain how rhetoric can be at once adaptive and invention. He calls it “reflective participation” and suggests that it also implies that propriety has both an ethical and an aesthetic dimension. When we talk about the receptive aspects of rhetorical citizenship, we may link that with the “constraint” aspect posited by Farrell. Rhetorical encounters are circumscribed by situation, genre, and discursive norms; but that is precisely part of what makes it possible for us to identify better or worse instantiations of public argument. Farrell’s “opportunity” aspect is closer to ideas about how rhetorical agency can emerge, even where it is unexpected, when individuals do not let convention or habit constrain them, but begin to see themselves as citizens and even citizens with a point to make – be it in traditional oratorical form or some other kind of symbolic behavior.

A more concrete way of expressing these ideas is to see rhetorical citizenship as integrating two complementary aspects of both these categories: on the one hand, there are the rights that we, as citizens, are accorded, and the expectations that citizens may rightfully have in regard to discourse among citizens; on the other hand there is all that which other citizens are entitled to expect from us, precisely because we are citizens; we may also refer to this aspect as comprising discursive responsibilities or duties as citizens.

The two dimensions, active/passive and rights/responsibilities, define, much like the cardinal directions of a compass rose, four broad areas of interest. The “North-South” axis may represent the active or participatory aspect versus the passive or receptive aspect; the “West-East” axis may then represent citizens’ rights versus their responsibilities or duties (see Figure 1).

**FIGURE 1**
This figure illustrates how various rhetorical concerns are connected, but also how much recent thinking in other disciplines addresses rhetorical concerns; thus interdisciplinary contact becomes an obvious agenda. For example, the idea that citizenship involves not only citizens’ rights but also what might be expected or demanded of them is stated clearly as an emerging insight in an overview on citizenship research by the philosophers Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman: “most theorists now accept that the functioning of society depends not only on the justice of its institutions or constitutions, but also on the virtues, identities, and practices of its citizens, including their ability to co-operate, deliberate, and feel solidarity with those who belong to different ethnic and religious groups” (2000, p. 11).

As for the distinction between the active and the receptive aspects of rhetorical citizenship, it parallels what political theorists Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson call the “principles of accommodation.” These principles, they say, “make two kinds of general demands on citizens; one concerns how citizens present their own political positions, and the other how they regard the political positions of others” (1996, p. 80).

As for citizens’ rights or rightful expectations with regard to rhetoric in society, citizens not only have the right to speak, they also need the capacity and position to speak so that they may be heard. Studies of rhetorical agency and how it is achieved by some and denied to others belong here. How is rhetorical agency manifested or contested? What does it take to gain a hearing? What counts as participation in public debate? How do we determine what points of view are to be considered legitimate and appropriate forms of expression on issues of common concern? How can we account for changes in these categories?

Are there certain responsibilities or duties incumbent on those who speak – such as standards of responsible discourse or even of deliberation? Many scholars in disciplines other than rhetoric have reflected on what those standards might be. Recently, political theorist John Dryzek has recognized rhetoric as a necessity in democracy, while not per se a constructive factor. He argues for a “systemic” criterion to distinguish between “desirable and undesirable uses of rhetoric,” and after analyzing how rhetoric may be either “bridging” or “bonding,” and how both kinds may play positive roles, he concludes that we should be “asking whether or not the rhetoric in question contributes to the construction of an effective deliberative system joining competent and reflective actors on the issue at hand” (2010, p. 335).
Simone Chambers is another political theorist who has addressed the standards issue. She believes that deliberation is needed in a democracy, but also that “the mass public can never be deliberative.” Democratic deliberation in small groups of citizens is fine, but not enough. However, she believes that the public rhetoric we hear, mainly through the media, has the potential for providing deliberation. Regrettably, very often it provides none: failing to engage citizens’ “capacity for practical judgment,” it becomes what she calls “plebiscitary,” based on pandering and manipulation. So we must critically assess public rhetoric and the media that bring it to us, because we do have the task and at least some means of “making the mass public more rather than less deliberative.” “If rhetoric in general is the study of how speech affects an audience then deliberative rhetoric must be about the way speech induces deliberation in the sense of inducing considered reflection about a future action” (2009, p. 335).

Public rhetors’ responsibilities may also be expressed in terms of individual citizens’ rights. We citizens have a right to expect that public rhetoric helps us identify, understand and reflect on issues of common concern – by providing information and reasons that call on us to engage public issues and assist us in developing informed views on them.

The political theorist Robert Goodin has emphasized the importance of what he calls “deliberation within,” pointing out that “very much of the work of deliberation, even in external-collective settings, must inevitably be done within each individual’s head.” In modern nation states there is no way everyone can speak up and be heard by everyone else on any issue. But we may “ease the burdens of deliberative democracy in mass society by altering our focus from the ‘external-collective’ to the ‘internal-reflective’ mode, shifting much of the work of democratic deliberation back inside the head of each individual.” Goodin adds that “internal-reflective deliberations might hope to secure better representation of the communicatively inept or the communicatively inert than external-collective deliberations ever could” (2000, p. 83).

In this volume, Jørgensen’s chapter on politicians’ and especially the media’s abuse of the concept of election “promises” calls on us to be critical when presented with hasty or disingenuous characterizations of political statements as speech acts of various kinds. Similarly, Navera’s and Olmos’s chapters focus on evolving and ambiguous rhetoric presented by elite rhetors to the public.
Just as we have a right to expect deliberative public rhetoric, the polity may also expect from us that we will indeed weigh in our minds the information and reasons we hear. Indeed, a major emphasis on rhetoric as a capacity to listen, deliberate and assess, justifying its centrality in civic education, is evident in one of the most influential rhetoricians in history, the Renaissance theologian and educator Philipp Melanchthon, whose work informed the organization of general education in all of Protestant Europe. In the opening of his *Elementa rhetorices* (1531) he declares that the precepts of rhetoric were developed not just for aspiring rhetors, but for every young person, and not primarily so that they can become orators, but because it helps them in the reading of excellent writers and in judging upon complex issues (“in longis controversiis judicandis”). Even citizens who do not actively participate in debate and other discursive exchanges have a responsibility to listen to reasons, including those supporting views other than their own, and to information that is new and perhaps unwelcome. One important reference here might be to the rhetorician Wayne Booth’s concept of “listening-rhetoric” (2009). McKerrow’s contribution to the present volume addresses the criteria of the enactment of citizenship and points to issues of voice and silence and the respective motives that may lie behind the choice of speaking or remaining silent.

Rhetorical citizenship has potential as an interdisciplinary conceptual frame in which to interpret and assess rhetoric, in its practical as well as its theoretical and/or critical manifestations. Dahlgren’s chapter below on the interfaces between discourse studies and rhetorical studies provides a helpful overview of mutual points of interest and of areas where they either overlap or have yet to do so. Deneire, Eelbode, and Lauwers’ application of game theory to the study of political debate offers a completely new perspective on how to understand campaign rhetoric, and how to reform it.

One thing rhetorical citizenship might certainly be is a pedagogical project. With an increasingly heterogeneous population, public education has a growing responsibility to teach students not only about democracy and civic rights, but also about their own roles and obligations in civic life; and that should include training them in the practical skills necessary to participate in, and to receive, public discourse, including intercultural communication.

In 1998, a committee in Britain, led by the political theorist Bernard Crick, published a report, *Education for Citizenship and the Teaching of Democracy in Schools* (Crick 1998). The report pointed to a number of “skills
and aptitudes” that schools should teach, most of which might clearly be seen as mainstays of a rhetorical education. Among them were: “to make a reasoned argument both verbally and in writing,” “to consider and appreciate the experience and perspective of others,” “to tolerate other viewpoints,” and “to recognise forms of manipulation and persuasion” (p. 44). So, without ever mentioning rhetoric, the report confirmed that citizenship is in large part a rhetorical concept, and that citizenship education should in large part be rhetorical, too. In her present study of a pedagogical project in a Greek school, Egglezou describes an educational program aimed at preparing students to consider for themselves and discuss with each other complex topics of civic importance, exemplified by the case of GMO food products. While Kuehl’s starting point for talking about citizenship in the classroom is also local, her argument in this book is that rhetorical citizenship should be introduced to students as not just an invitation to participate in local concerns, but as a global awareness. Ulrich, in her chapter on the TV series The West Wing, shows how this series refutes the common notion that the portrayal of politics in popular film and TV fiction rests on a basic attitude of cynicism. Rather, she finds the series to be at once entertaining and educational in its celebration of rhetoric in the political culture as an important civic and aesthetic craft.

**The Structure of the Book**

As we said above, we hoped, when these papers were first invited, to learn how colleagues near and far would challenge, develop, or make use of the concept of rhetorical citizenship. They did all these things, and they did so in numerous divergent ways. Despite the diversity in theoretical starting points, methodology, and studied discourse, we found that the submissions nevertheless converged in broad groups. We have therefore organized the book in three sections, each headed by one of the three invited keynote lectures by internationally celebrated scholars.

In the first section, “Rhetorical Criticism from the Viewpoint of Rhetorical Citizenship,” David Zarefsky asks, “Is Rhetorical Criticism Subversive of Democracy?” He reminds us that rhetoric builds communities and makes citizenship active, but also cautions that rhetorical criticism may be subversive by fostering cynicism and thus apathy with regard to rhetorical invention and practice. This is so if, with systematic negativity, it suggests that individuals can have no agency, or that discourse is always a mere
mask for power, or a tool for ideological false consciousness. Deliberative rhetoric is the core of democracy, but criticism that claims always to see sinister underlying motives, or sees rhetoric as manipulation that obfuscates people’s self-interest, paralyze democracy by suspending deliberation. Rather than that, we need constructive rhetorical criticism that may help us work through our predicaments.

Paula Olmos, in “On Rhetorical Ethos and Personal Needs: A Spanish 2011 Public Controversy,” focuses on the Aristotelian notion of ethos and then discusses, by means of a borderline case, the classic question of what constitutes the basis of a speaker’s ethos: the discourse alone or a more comprehensive impression including the speaker’s biography. The aforementioned Rico affair illustrates the conundrum of ethos: a well-known author made an ethical statement known by the public to be untrue, thus stirring up intense speculation about his intentions and widespread disapproval of his letter and person.

Charlotte Jørgensen, in “The Hunt for Promises in Danish Political Debate,” criticizes the obsessive media focus on politicians’ promises and alleged breaches thereof, arguing that this orientation undermines the deliberative ideal of informed public debate. Along with so-called “contract politics” it renders argumentation superfluous, demotivating citizens from engaging themselves in the issues that arise in the contingent realm of politics.

In her paper “Keep[ing] profits at a reasonably low rate: Invoking American civil religion in FDR’s rhetoric of tax equity and citizenship,” Nathalie Kuroiwa-Lewis highlights aspects of Roosevelt’s presidential rhetoric that appear striking today: he presented taxation, even progressive taxation, as a civic good and a matter of social justice – a means for citizens to enact their citizenship and a part of a “civil religion.” Both Jørgensen’s and Kuroiwa-Lewis’ chapters may be said to represent the kind of appreciative and constructive criticism of rhetoric in the public sphere that Zarefsky suggests as a necessary counterbalance to systematically negative criticism.

Maureen Daly Goggin, in “Yarn Bombing: Claiming Rhetorical Citizenship in Public Spaces,” investigates how knitted patches, sewn together and displayed prominently at sites of civic controversy, become a global form of agency and an instantiation of contemporary feminist protest tactics on issues such as war and environmental sustainability. Yarn bombing, graphically exemplified, is conceptualized as a materialist epistemology in the form of DIY activism.
Establishing a linkage of two concepts: materiality and argumentation, Kati Hannken-Illjes, in “On Trees: Protest Between the Symbolic and the Material,” investigates a related aspect of the rhetoric of protest: how non-discursive entities – things – influence discourse, frame argumentation and thereby function rhetorically. Hundreds of old trees, destined to be cut down in a grand remodeling of Stuttgart’s main station, became a strong and central theme of dispute, and this can teach us something about the status of “things” and their materiality in public discourse.

Anne Ulrich, in her chapter “Cicero Would Love This Show: The Celebration of Rhetoric and Citizenship in The West Wing,” shows us how fictional narratives in the successful TV series The West Wing teach us “an entertaining civics lesson” and constitute a “celebration of rhetoric.” She considers Aaron Sorkin, the creator of the series, a political orator actively engaging in public discourse and openly performing his vision of citizenship. Analyzing crucial scenes in the activities of the White House oratorical team, Ulrich discusses how Sorkin conceives rhetoric and in what way one can understand the series itself as, literally speaking, epideictic rhetoric, i.e., a demonstration of rhetoric apt to enhance political participation and identification, that is, citizenship.

The second section of the book, “Studies in the Practice and Cultivation of Rhetorical Citizenship,” raises the perspective from the rhetorical criticism of intriguing cases to a more general level, namely what we might call rhetorical culture (or cultures).

Karen Tracy, in “Rhetorical Citizenship in Public Meetings: The Character of Religious Expression in American Discourse,” analyzes citizen testimony at public hearings on same-sex marriage bills, pointing to linkages for Americans among citizenship, public hearings participation, and religious talk. She identifies patterns of invoking religion as relevant to civic issues and calls for increased attention to rhetorical citizenship as a culturally inflected practice. Talk at such public hearings, she maintains, serves important functions, even if at odds with stringent norms of deliberation. Thus, rhetorical citizenship becomes a more useful concept if it can maintain a productive balance between deliberation and advocacy.

Carolyne Lee and Judy Burnside-Lawry consider, in “The Communicative Construction of Rhetorical Citizenship in Small Groups,” how people in small groups practice a continuous feedback loop of articulating one’s
position, listening to the positions of others, and finally responding appropriately to them. A triad of concepts helps explain this: voice – understood as the opportunity for people to speak and be heard on what matters in their lives; narrative; and listening. Narrative is an essential means for individuals to drive the feedback loop, and small group talk may thus be seen as a micro-model of what rhetorical citizenship could be like.

“Argumentative Literacy and Rhetorical Citizenship” is Fotini Egglezou’s detailed account of an ‘Isocratean’ program of rhetorical education implemented in a modern Greek primary school. A wide range of argumentative and reflective verbal activities concerning the same controversial issue led a group of twelve-year-olds to a measurable increase in “the Isocratean qualities of sophia or phronesis.” Egglezou thus makes an empirically supported case that the internalization of rhetorical argumentation, with the implied dimensions of criticism, evaluation and choice, lays a foundation for the cultivation of civic virtue; citizenship, as Isocrates believed, is grounded rhetorically.

Gene Segarra Navera, under the title “People Power’ in Philippine Presidential Rhetoric: (Re)framing Democratic Participation in Post-authoritarian Regimes,” traces the term “people power” in five Philippine presidents’ rhetoric as a malleable resource for talking about and performing democracy. Using concepts from cognitive linguistics, particularly “frames” stemming from seminal “conceptual metaphors,” he highlights the fluidity in the conceptualization of a hallowed phrase in its various metamorphoses from a form of resistance to an element of nation building.

In “On Being a Simple Judge,” Mari Lee Mifsud explores the notion of the haplous kritēs in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. This “simple judge” who judges public rhetorical argument is a citizen who understands the fundamental of eudaimonia: the “happiness” that the polis should seek to provide for all citizens. Aristotle here refers to Homeric examples. At the core of civic happiness are solidarity and mutual benefaction, central to archaic norms for gift-giving, which honors those who give and reciprocate gifts. Rhetoric and rhetorical citizenship built on this basis is “simpler,” i.e., deeper and more essential than, rhetorical technē based on persuasion.

Raymie McKerrow’s chapter is also an essay into thinking deeper on the nature of rhetoric and the social motives that carry it. “The Rhetorical Citizen: Enacting Agency” considers the nature and enactment of agency in the guise of the rhetorical citizen as a person whose actions within the public
sphere encompass considerations of race, class, sex, and gender lines. Premised on a Burkean sense of motive, McKerrow explores two major criteria undergirding the enactment of citizenship: the constraints provided with respect to access and the role of motive in highlighting why one acts in giving voice to one’s role as a citizen. The role of voice includes that of silence, and the author suggests that the refusal to act is as much a rhetorical statement, provided the motive is clear, and is an overt action.

In the third and last section of the book, “Crossing Borders, Disciplinary, Political and Otherwise,” we have brought together five chapters that each in their different ways explore borders between theoretical, disciplinary, and cultural assumptions about what communication in society is and should be like.

In “Rhetorical Analysis and Discourse Analysis: Probing the Interface,” Peter Dahlgren highlights key similarities and differences between rhetorical analysis and two prominent schools of discourse analysis to render them mutually accessible. All three do qualitative analysis of discourse in society and may learn from each other. He focuses on two strands of discourse analysis: Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough et al.) in a sense updates ideology critique, taking a constructionist view of language. Discourse Theory (Laclau & Mouffe et al.) adds theoretical weight to discourse analysis, with the aim of enabling us to “think and do otherwise.” Dahlgren finds that rhetorical analysis typically extrapolates readers’ and listeners’ responses to communication, but the subject and subjectivity remain less theorized.

Hilde van Belle’s chapter, “A Stowaway of Emigration: Polarization in Hafid Bouazza’s Work” deals with the Dutch writer Hafid Bouazza’s practice of challenging widely held assumptions that polarization in debate is undesirable and detrimental to constructive rhetorical citizenship. Bouazza is a full-blooded exponent of diversity and complexity, in fiction and drama as well as in his polemical writings, which castigate Islamic fundamentalism and tendencies in Holland, and the West generally, to seek appeasement and deny polarization. His driving force is passion for all colors of the spectrum, in language, literature, and society.

Under the title “Extending Civic Rhetoric: Valuing Rhetorical Dimensions of Global Citizenship in Civic Education,” Rebecca A. Kuehl argues that civic rhetoric would benefit from a rhetorical view of global citizenship in extending the practices of rhetorical education. She defines civic
rhetoric as a specific component of civic education, focusing on teaching skills such as critical thinking, speaking, and writing. Global citizenship, defined as a specific type of rhetorical citizenship, including issues that span nation-states, is claimed to be useful in extending the civic rhetoric tradition via arousing people’s emotions about political issues. In this way, Kuehl connects concepts of interconnectedness and social belonging as central to the notion of civic republicanism and civic liberalism.

Catherine Chaput argues that rhetoric, concomitant with democracy, has long helped capitalism appear inevitable in a “triple helix of freedom.” But this “triumphant knot” is unraveling. In “Rhetorical Citizenship beyond the Frontiers of Capitalism,” she posits that the core metaphor of capitalism is the commodity, emphasizing individual ownership and profit as central to citizenship. An alternative metaphor is the common. Both conceptions of citizenship are rhetorically constituted, but the “common” metaphor nudges us toward a sense of citizenship based on shared resources (such as history, knowledge, the environment). Jason Barker’s documentary Marx Reloaded, as Chaput sees it, revitalizes Marx’s thinking and imaginatively visualizes the commodity and the common as structuring myths of citizenship.

Finally, Tom Deneire, David Eelbode and Jeroen Lauwers in “A Game with Words: Rhetorical Citizenship and Game Theory” represent a fresh look at how political argumentation might be construed. Conceptualizing rhetorical behavior, and in particular: political discourse, with the metaphor of the “game,” the authors explore the hermeneutic questions whether the critical potential of mathematically formalized game theory for rhetorical criticism. The authors argue that rhetorical discourse can be interpreted as a game, speakers as players, and the rhetorical situation as providing the constraints on the actions the players can take. These lead to consequences with a certain pay-off, or rhetorically speaking to discourse capable of altering reality. The partisan nature of rhetoric is used as a starting point for discussing the speaker from the point of view of a rational decision-maker, thus linking to game-theoretical analysis. The authors compare rhetorical action to the so-called “prisoner’s dilemma,” and a location game model suggests that it is rational for politicians to stay close to the middle and at times concentrate on particular swing votes while ignoring many other voters. Finding this result unattractive, the authors conclude by suggesting the basic premise of an alternative voting system that they envision as fostering more responsible political debate.
Closing remarks
We believe rhetoric has a place in the study of civic life in virtue of the discipline’s dual nature as an everyday practice and a field of academic inquiry. Lots of rhetoric takes place every day. Sometimes it inspires us, sometimes it irks us, sometimes we are part of it, sometimes we don’t even notice it. Rhetoric makes society hang together. By paying close attention to what people say and do in various civic settings, we stand to learn about how people understand their society and their own role in it. The way they speak and what they say are keys to this understanding, which rhetorical analysis and criticism might promote. Studying the kind of argumentative “work” that certain viewpoints or topoi are being used to accomplish, or how they travel from vernacular settings to government discourse (or not), may be a way of understanding the workings of society better. Expectations may be confirmed, but at other times new arguments or new angles may emerge.

As rhetorician Robert Hariman noted, “understanding, appreciating, and improving democratic participation is impeded by both the rationality standards of deliberative democracy theorists and classical rhetoric’s ideal of eloquence” (2007, p. 222). We take this as a call for scholarly approaches that better account for, and can offer suggestions for, actual vernacular discourse. We as academics can assist in showing how praxis is both invention-al and reflects civic norms and cultural values. As a practice, rhetoric holds a built-in impetus of improvement. This is where the normative aspect rests, both on the practical and the theoretical level. With its keen eye for contingency and indeterminacy, rhetoric is equipped to deal with the imperfect nature of civic discourse, at once serving as a resource for improvement and a sober acknowledgement of the constraints of the situation. Rhetoric, in the words of Thomas Farrell, is “practical reasoning in the presence of collaborative others” (1991, p. 189). It is, he believed, “more than the practice; it is the entire process of forming, expressing, and judging public thought in real life. … this enhanced understanding needs to include the condition of being a rhetorical audience. This is a condition in which we are called to exert our own critical capacities to a maximum extent. We have to decide – quite literally – what sort of public persons we wish to be” (p. 208).
References


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